### Off

#### Interpretation—the aff may not defend a subset of appropriation.

#### Appropriation is a generic indefinite singular. Cohen 01

Ariel Cohen (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev), “On the Generic Use of Indefinite Singulars,” Journal of Semantics 18:3, 2001 <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/188590876.pdf>

\*IS generic = Indefinite Singulars

French, then, expresses the two types of reading differently. In English, on¶ the other hand, generic BPs are ambiguous between inductivist and normative¶ readings. But even in English there is one type of generic that can express only¶ one of these readings, and this is the IS generic. While BPs are ambiguous¶ between the inductivist and the rules and regulations readings, ISs are not. In¶ the supermarket scenario discussed above, only (44.b) is true:¶ (44) a. A banana sells for $.49/lb.¶ b. A banana sells for $1.00/lb.¶ The normative force of the generic IS has been noted before. Burton-Roberts¶ (1977) considers the following minimal pair:¶ (45) a. Gentlemen open doors for ladies.¶ b. A gentleman opens doors for ladies.¶ He notes that (45.b), but not (45.a), expresses what he calls “moral necessity.”7¶ Burton-Roberts observes that if Emile does not as a rule open doors for ladies, his mother could utter [(45.b)] and thereby successfully imply that Emile was not, or was¶ not being, a gentleman. Notice that, if she were to utter. . . [(45.a)] she¶ might achieve the same effect (that of getting Emile to open doors for¶ ladies) but would do so by different means. . . For [(45.a)] merely makes a¶ generalisation about gentlemen (p. 188).¶ Sentence (45.b), then, unlike (45.a), does not have a reading where it makes¶ a generalization about gentlemen; it is, rather, a statement about some social¶ norm. It is true just in case this norm is in effect, i.e. it is a member of a set of¶ socially accepted rules and regulations.¶ An IS that, in the null context, cannot be read generically, may receive a¶ generic reading in a context that makes it clear that a rule or a regulation is¶ referred to. For example, Greenberg (1998) notes that, out of the blue, (46.a)¶ and (46.b) do not have a generic reading:¶ (46) a. A Norwegian student whose name ends with ‘s’ or ‘j’ wears green¶ thick socks.¶ b. A tall, left-handed, brown haired neurologist in Hadassa hospital¶ earns more than $50,000 a year.¶ However, Greenberg points out that in the context of (47.a) and (47.b),¶ respectively, the generic readings of the IS subject are quite natural:¶ (47) a. You know, there are very interesting traditions in Norway, concerning the connection between name, profession, and clothing. For¶ example, a Norwegian student. . .¶ b. The new Hadassa manager has some very funny paying criteria. For¶ example, a left-handed. . .¶ Even IS sentences that were claimed above to lack a generic reading, such¶ as (3.b) and (4.b), may, in the appropriate context, receive such a reading:¶ (48) a. Sire, please don’t send her to the axe. Remember, a king is generous!¶ b. How dare you build me such a room? Don’t you know a room is¶ square?

#### Their plan violates. Rules readings are always generalized – specific instances are not consistent. Cohen 01

Ariel Cohen (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev), “On the Generic Use of Indefinite Singulars,” Journal of Semantics 18:3, 2001 https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/188590876.pdf

In general, as, again, already noted by Aristotle, rules and definitions are not relativized to particular individuals; it is rarely the case that a specific individual¶ forms part of the description of a general rule.¶ Even DPs of the form a certain X or a particular X, which usually receive¶ a wide scope interpretation, cannot, in general, receive such an interpretation in the context of a rule or a definition. This holds of definitions in general, not¶ only of definitions with an IS subject. The following examples from the Cobuild¶ dictionary illustrate this point:¶ (74) a. A fanatic is a person who is very enthusiastic about a particular¶ activity, sport, or way of life.¶ b. Something that is record-breaking is better than the previous¶ record for a particular performance or achievement.¶ c. When a computer outputs something it sorts and produces information as the result of a particular program or operation.¶ d. If something sheers in a particular direction, it suddenly changes¶ direction, for example to avoid hitting something.

#### Appopration isnt the term- rather “Appropriation of outer space-” which means by private the exercise of exclusive control of space- gonly allow general readings.

TIMOTHY JUSTIN TRAPP, JD Candidate @ UIUC Law, ’13, TAKING UP SPACE BY ANY OTHER MEANS: COMING TO TERMS WITH THE NONAPPROPRIATION ARTICLE OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2013 No. 4]

The issues presented in relation to the nonappropriation article of the Outer Space Treaty should be clear.214 The ITU has, quite blatantly, created something akin to “property interests in outer space.”215 It allows nations to exclude others from their orbital slots, even when the nation is not currently using that slot.216 This is directly in line with at least one definition of outer-space appropriation.217 [\*\*Start Footnote 217\*\*Id. at 236 (“Appropriation of outer space, therefore, is ‘the exercise of exclusive control or exclusive use’ with a sense of permanence, which limits other nations’ access to it.”) (quoting Milton L. Smith, The Role of the ITU in the Development of Space Law, 17 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 157, 165 (1992)). \*\*End Footnote 217\*\*]The ITU even allows nations with unused slots to devise them to other entities, creating a market for the property rights set up by this regulation.218 In some aspects, this seems to effect exactly what those signatory nations of the Bogotá Declaration were trying to accomplish, albeit through different means.219

3] doesn’t turn precsion- they shuld just defend apporation of outerspace

4] You get the same topic ed buy reading these posotions on the neg- ie switch side debate

5] prefer our def we read in the 1NC

1. Can’t solve – plan can’t stop cyberattacks – they only ban military satellties by private entities not public entiries

#### That outweighs—only our evidence speaks to how indefinite singulars are interpreted in the context of normative statements like the resolution. This means throw out aff counter-interpretations that are purely descriptive

#### Vote neg:

#### 1] Precision –any deviation justifies the aff arbitrarily jettisoning words in the resolution at their whim which decks negative ground and preparation because the aff is no longer bounded by the resolution.

#### 2] Limits—specifying a type of appropriation offers huge explosion in the topic since space is, quite literally, infinite.

#### Drop the debater to preserve fairness and education – use competing interps –reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation

#### Hypothetical neg abuse doesn’t justify aff abuse, and theory checks cheaty CPs

#### No RVIs—it’s their burden to be topical.

### NC Shell – Space Debris – T Appropriation

#### Interpretation: Appropriation is permanently taking property for exclusive use. Gorove 69:

Stephen Gorove, Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, 37 Fordham L. Rev. 349 (1969). Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol37/iss3/2

With respect to the concept of appropriation the basic question is what constitutes "appropriation," as used in the Treaty, especially in contradistinction to casual or temporary use. The term "appropriation" is used most frequently to denote the taking of property for one's own or exclusive use with a sense of permanence. Under such interpretation the establishment of a permanent settlement or the carrying out of commercial activities by nationals of a country on a celestial body may constitute national appropriation if the activities take place under the supreme authority (sovereignty) of the state. Short of this, if the state wields no exclusive authority or jurisdiction in relation to the area in question, the answer would seem to be in the negative, unless, the nationals also use their individual appropriations as cover-ups for their state's activities.5 In this connection, it should be emphasized that the word "appropriation" indicates a taking which involves something more than just a casual use. Thus a temporary occupation of a landing site or other area, just like the temporary or nonexclusive use of property, would not constitute appropriation. By the same token, any use involving consumption or taking with intention of keeping for one's own exclusive use would amount to appropriation.

#### Violation: satellites aren’t appropriation. These companies do not take the EXCLUSIVE use of anything in space. These satellites can be launched by that doesn’t mean that’s appropriation.

#### Vote neg – two impacts:

#### Limits. Expanding the topic to anything that involves merely launching something into the atmosphere expands the topic into numerous new tech areas which undermines core neg prep.

#### Topic literature. Our definition has intent to define and exclude in the context of the OST, which is the core of all topic research and the only predictable source.

#### Drop the debater to preserve fairness and education – use competing interps – reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation. No RVIs – they don’t get to win for following the rules.

### Off

#### CP Text: States ought to ban appropriation of outer space by private entities via military tracking satellites except for the United States.

#### Satellites are k2 US primacy-it’s make or break

Reid Barbier\*, 7-23-2020, "The Purpose and Mission of the Space Force," American University, https://www.american.edu/sis/centers/security-technology/the-purpose-and-mission-of-the-space-force.cfm

The Purpose and Mission of the Space Force

By Reid Barbier\* | July 23, 2020

Photo credit: Tech Sgt Robert Barnett

Questions proliferated when the Trump administration announced its intention in 2018 to form a sixth branch of the military focused entirely on space. The U.S. Space Force faces persistent skepticism from the public as well as certain sectors of the government, with critics contending that the new military branch is overly costly and could lead to dangerous escalation in space. While the debate over the organization is important and necessary, the actual roles and responsibilities of the Space Force remain obscured by the controversy. This paper will seek to illuminate the mission of the Space Force and its position in the national security system, as laid out by the 2020 Defense Authorization legislation as well as subsequent directives from the Pentagon. An elucidation of the Space Force’s founding mission will hopefully help to inform scholarly analysis as well as public understanding. Upon examination, the Space Force’s mission as defined by Congress and the Pentagon can be contained in two broad goals: defend the massive U.S. satellite fleet and develop a unified space warfighting theory. These goals will help to define the Space Force in the coming years as it attempts to respond to its critics’ charges and establish its own independence. Can the Space Force live up to its own expectations?

Recent History of the U.S. Military Presence in Space

The U.S. Space Force is a direct descendant of the [Air Force Space Command](https://www.afspc.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Article/249014/air-force-space-command/#:~:text=In%201982%2C%20the%20Air%20Force,and%20control%20for%20national%20leadership.) established in 1982. That command sought to expand America’s advantage in space during the Cold War, primarily through the launch of advanced military satellites. [Space Command](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01495933.2019.1633182?journalCode=ucst20) played a crucial role in establishing the Global Positioning System (GPS), which improved American ability to quickly detect missile launches and monitor military movements around the world. Following the Cold War, improved [satellite technology contributed](https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/gps-and-the-world-s-first-space-war/) to the decisive coalition victory in the Gulf War by providing instantaneous surveillance of enemy forces as well as enabling precision missile and air strikes. [Space Command further aided](https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/135586/space-assets-critical-to-winning-war-on-terrorism/) U.S. military efforts in the Balkans as well as the War on Terror, aiding in locating enemy leaders and fugitives. Space gained even more attention as a potential conflict domain as states like China and Russia developed weapons capable of destroying American satellites and began deploying more of their own space assets.

[Calls grew](https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/military-balance-2020-book/the-space-domain-towards-a-regular-realm-of-conflict) from some military theorists and officials to elevate Space Command to its own branch of the military, ensuring more resources and support for American space efforts in order to meet the growing challenge from rivals. The effort was [bitterly resisted](https://spacenews.com/air-force-changes-message-on-space-force-amid-criticism-it-stifled-debate/) by the Air Force, for both bureaucratic and doctrinal reasons. Air Force officials feared the loss of resources and influence that the creation of an independent space branch would entail, and [also argued](https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/429665-in-the-space-force-debate-the-militarys-space-experts-are-missing) that the new force’s mission was undefined and confused. The Air Force argued for maintaining Space Command until space warfighting theory had advanced enough to justify a new branch. [The Trump administration](https://www.military.com/daily-news/2018/06/18/its-official-trump-announces-space-force-6th-military-branch.html) embraced the push for an independent branch however, and quickly presented Congress with legislation to that effect, which Congress approved in late 2019 after some wrangling. [16,000 personnel](https://breakingdefense.com/2019/12/16000-afspc-head-to-space-force-what-about-the-rest/) were transferred from Space Command to the new branch, forming the core of the new organization. A [legislative compromise](https://spacenews.com/u-s-space-force-organizational-plan-delivered-to-congress/) modeled on the Marine Corp’s semi-independent status within the Navy was reached to allay Air Force concerns. [The Space Force](https://www.airforcemag.com/app/uploads/2020/02/Comprehensive-Plan-for-the-Organizational-Struccture-of-the-USSF_Feb-2020.pdf) was given its own command structure and position on the Joint Chiefs of Staff but was placed under the nominal authority of the Secretary of the Air Force, ensuring a seat at the table for the Air Force in the space domain. This compromise command structure is likely a harbinger of the intense bureaucratic battles that the Space Force will face as it struggles for resources and authority within the national security system.

Protecting and Expanding American Space Assets

The primary mission of the U.S. Space Force as directed by Congress is to [maintain, protect, and expand](https://www.spaceforce.mil/About-Us/About-Space-Force) the U.S. fleet of advanced military satellites that form the backbone of U.S. global military operations. [The importance of satellites](https://www.questia.com/magazine/1G1-275489739/airpower-spacepower-and-cyberpower) to the modern U.S. military can hardly be overstated. They allow instantaneous communication across battle-zones, identify enemy positions and movements, track weather patterns, guide navigational systems, and allow for precision strikes. These advantages have bolstered the U.S. position as the leading military power in the world as the U.S. satellite fleet [far outnumbers](https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/satellite-database#.XG6yv3RKiUk) that of any other country. The Space Force will [act as a conduit](https://spacenews.com/what-would-the-mission-of-the-united-states-space-force-be/) for space-based intelligence and technology to reach the rest of the military, for instance by making sure that battlefield commanders have real-time access to satellite reconnaissance. The Space Force is designed to be much more than a maintenance unit however, as multiple threats have emerged in recent years that require a substantial updating of American space presence. Satellites are extremely vulnerable to attack, which could turn America’s reliance on them into a dangerous weakness and potentially cripple American military operations globally. [China in particular](https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Volume-34_Issue-1/F-McCabe.pdf) has homed in on this vulnerability by building a growing arsenal of anti-satellite missiles and technologies, including cyber-attacks. The Space Force’s most urgent mission is finding ways to defend satellites in order to maintain America’s preeminence in space.

       One strategy the Space Force is pursuing to protect satellite capabilities, adopted from Space Command, is to foster an explosion in the number of satellites in orbit, so that the loss of one or several would not represent an existential threat to military operations. The first way to do this is to increase the tempo of launches from Earth into orbit and thus increase the overall number of satellites. Private companies are playing a crucial role in this expansion of American launch capabilities, demonstrated in Space Force’s [first official operation](https://spaceflightnow.com/2020/06/30/spacex-launches-its-first-mission-for-u-s-space-force/), which saw SpaceX lift an advanced military satellite into geostationary orbit. The second method of increasing the number of satellites is to [decrease their size](https://www.space.com/us-military-small-satellite-cubesat-constellations.html) so that they are cheaper and more easily deployed. Indeed, recent years have seen a proliferation of small satellites in orbit, a technology the Space Force is actively pursuing to increase the resilience of U.S. space capabilities.

An alternate defensive strategy would be to find ways to [directly protect satellites](https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Space_Threat_V14_020119_sm.pdf) from physical strikes and cyber-attacks. This is a much more difficult proposition, as it would likely involve placing some form of missile defense in space, which is [controversial both legally](https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/legal-agreements-space-weapons) and politically and could lead to dangerous escalation. Upgrading the cyber defenses of satellites is a growing priority, but many older satellites will be [vulnerable to attack](https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/09/09/the_cyber_threat_to_satellites_114731.html) regardless of current efforts. [Air Force](https://www.forbes.com/sites/davedeptula/2019/04/10/u-s-space-command-yes-separate-u-s-space-force-no/#45e9efa2e3e9) [Space Command contended](https://www.forbes.com/sites/davedeptula/2019/04/10/u-s-space-command-yes-separate-u-s-space-force-no/#45e9efa2e3e9) with the same issues and ultimately decided to concentrate its limited resources on satellite proliferation rather than direct defense. Pentagon officials were cool to the costs of space-based satellite defenses and doubtful of political support for such a project. The Space Force is similarly relying on satellite proliferation rather than active satellite defenses.

Developing a Theory of Space Power

       Along with aiding Earth-based military action and protecting American assets in space, [the Space Force has also been tasked](https://www.rand.org/news/press/2020/03/13.html) with developing a unified theory of space warfighting. Essentially, the Space Force will seek to explain how space fits into U.S. grand strategy and how the Space Force itself will contribute to national security. The most recent parallel would be military efforts in the early 20th Century to develop a theory of airpower that could contribute to victory on the battlefield. As mentioned earlier, [critics have sharply questioned](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/04/20/the-space-force-is-a-misguided-idea-congress-should-turn-it-down/) the wisdom of establishing a new military force without first developing an effective theory of warfighting. The Air Force and Marine Corps for instance only achieved their organizational independence after extensive demonstrations of their worth on the field of battle. By moving ahead without a solid theoretical or doctrinal grounding, these critics worry the U.S. is risking a bureaucratic disaster that could actually hamper efforts in space. [Advocates for the Space Force](https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-we-need-space-force) within the Pentagon and the Federal government respond that there is no time to waste in the pursuit of a military advantage in space. By quickly forming a sixth branch of the military entirely focused on space, the U.S. can concentrate space resources and expertise in a single organization not overly dominated by the thinking of one service like the Air Force. While Space Command was the main military organization for space, other services had their own space units, creating a confusing patchwork of different space efforts. Advocates argue that consolidation into one branch will actually accelerate theoretical research and development and ensure the necessary bureaucratic independence for American space endeavors.

The Space Force will have to quickly meet this doctrinal challenge in order to be viewed as an effective component of the military. [Foundational questions](https://www.questia.com/library/journal/1P4-2399211671/the-united-states-in-space) to be answered include whether the U.S. will pursue an offensive or defensive strategy in space, the relation of the Space Force to civilian and private space entities, the extent to which the U.S. will cooperate militarily with other nations in space, and finally the previously explored question of how satellites can be effectively defended. The answers to these questions will determine how the Space Force will be integrated into the core operations of the U.S. military.

Conclusion

       The Space Force faces an uncertain path to establishing itself as an effective warfighting organization within the sprawling American national security system. It is currently operating with far less resources, bureaucratic influence, and even doctrinal justification than any other branch of the military. The organization has also garnered merely lukewarm support from Congress and the Pentagon, with its very existence the result of a bureaucratic and legislative compromise. The Space Force will have to move quickly to develop effective doctrines for a rapidly emerging military domain while maintaining the satellite fleet which the Pentagon has come to rely upon. Space is a crucial domain for U.S. national security as rivals advance and technologies shift. Whether the U.S. Space Force will be the dominant player in space remains to be seen.

#### Primacy and allied commitments solve arms races and great power war – unipolarity is sustainable, and prevents power vacuums and global escalation

Brands 18 [(Hal, Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments) "American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump," Page 129-133]

Since World War II, the United States has had a military second to none. Since the Cold War, America has committed to having overwhelming military primacy. The idea, as George W. Bush declared in 2002, that America must possess “strengths beyond challenge” has featured in every major U.S. strategy document for a quarter century; it has also been reflected in concrete terms.6

From the early 1990s, for example, the United States consistently accounted for around 35 to 45 percent of world defense spending and maintained peerless global power-projection capabilities.7 Perhaps more important, U.S. primacy was also unrivaled in key overseas strategic regions—Europe, East Asia, the Middle East. From thrashing Saddam Hussein’s million-man Iraqi military during Operation Desert Storm, to deploying—with impunity—two carrier strike groups off Taiwan during the China-Taiwan crisis of 1995– 96, Washington has been able to project military power superior to anything a regional rival could employ even on its own geopolitical doorstep.

This military dominance has constituted the hard-power backbone of an ambitious global strategy. After the Cold War, U.S. policymakers committed to averting a return to the unstable multipolarity of earlier eras, and to perpetuating the more favorable unipolar order. They committed to building on the successes of the postwar era by further advancing liberal political values and an open international economy, and to suppressing international scourges such as rogue states, nuclear proliferation, and catastrophic terrorism. And because they recognized that military force remained the ultima ratio regum, they understood the centrality of military preponderance.

Washington would need the military power necessary to underwrite worldwide alliance commitments. It would have to preserve substantial overmatch versus any potential great-power rival. It must be able to answer the sharpest challenges to the international system, such as Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 or jihadist extremism after 9/11. Finally, because prevailing global norms generally reflect hard-power realities, America would need the superiority to assure that its own values remained ascendant. It was impolitic to say that U.S. strategy and the international order required “strengths beyond challenge,” but it was not at all inaccurate.

American primacy, moreover, was eminently affordable. At the height of the Cold War, the United States spent over 12 percent of GDP on defense. Since the mid-1990s, the number has usually been between 3 and 4 percent.8 In a historically favorable international environment, Washington could enjoy primacy—and its geopolitical fruits—on the cheap.

Yet U.S. strategy also heeded, at least until recently, the fact that there was a limit to how cheaply that primacy could be had. The American military did shrink significantly during the 1990s, but U.S. officials understood that if Washington cut back too far, its primacy would erode to a point where it ceased to deliver its geopolitical benefits. Alliances would lose credibility; the stability of key regions would be eroded; rivals would be emboldened; international crises would go unaddressed. American primacy was thus like a reasonably priced insurance policy. It required nontrivial expenditures, but protected against far costlier outcomes.9 Washington paid its insurance premiums for two decades after the Cold War. But more recently American primacy and strategic solvency have been imperiled.

THE DARKENING HORIZON For most of the post–Cold War era, the international system was— by historical standards—remarkably benign. Dangers existed, and as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated, they could manifest with horrific effect. But for two decades after the Soviet collapse, the world was characterized by remarkably low levels of great-power competition, high levels of security in key theaters such as Europe and East Asia, and the comparative weakness of those “rogue” actors—Iran, Iraq, North Korea, al-Qaeda—who most aggressively challenged American power. During the 1990s, some observers even spoke of a “strategic pause,” the idea being that the end of the Cold War had afforded the United States a respite from normal levels of geopolitical danger and competition. Now, however, the strategic horizon is darkening, due to four factors.

First, great-power military competition is back. The world’s two leading authoritarian powers—China and Russia—are seeking regional hegemony, contesting global norms such as nonaggression and freedom of navigation, and developing the military punch to underwrite these ambitions. Notwithstanding severe economic and demographic problems, Russia has conducted a major military modernization emphasizing nuclear weapons, high-end conventional capabilities, and rapid-deployment and special operations forces— and utilized many of these capabilities in conflicts in Ukraine and Syria.10 China, meanwhile, has carried out a buildup of historic proportions, with constant-dollar defense outlays rising from US$26 billion in 1995 to US$226 billion in 2016.11 Ominously, these expenditures have funded development of power-projection and antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) tools necessary to threaten China’s neighbors and complicate U.S. intervention on their behalf. Washington has grown accustomed to having a generational military lead; Russian and Chinese modernization efforts are now creating a far more competitive environment.

#### Pursuit inevitable---decline causes global war

Beckley 15 (Michael Beckley is a research fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs., “The Myth of Entangling Alliances Michael Beckley Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts”, <http://live.belfercenter.org/files/IS3904_pp007-048.pdf>)

The finding that U.S. entanglement is rare has important implications for international relations scholarship and U.S. foreign policy. For scholars, it casts doubt on classic theories of imperial overstretch in which great powers exhaust their resources by accumulating allies that free ride on their protection and embroil them in military quagmires.22 The U.S. experience instead suggests that great powers can dictate the terms of their security commitments and that allies often help their great power protectors avoid strategic overextension.

For policy, the rarity of U.S. entanglement suggests that the United States’ current grand strategy of deep engagement, which is centered on a network of standing alliances, does not preclude, and may even facilitate, U.S. military restraint. Since 1945 the United States has been, by some measures, the most militarily active state in the world. The most egregious cases of U.S. overreach, however, have stemmed not from entangling alliances, but from the penchant of American leaders to define national interests expansively, to overestimate the magnitude of foreign threats, and to underestimate the costs of military intervention. Scrapping alliances will not correct these bad habits. In fact, disengaging from alliances may unleash the United States to intervene recklessly abroad while leaving it without partners to share the burden when those interventions go awry.

### Case

Vote neg on presumption- militaries arent private apporation as theyre owned by govt- after they make it they ffshore- that’s why they attack specific country if their counrty gies down

Gallahagar tallks abt space war as a result of satillites goes down and the counrties attack mean they own.

#### No miscalc or escalation

James Pavur 19, Professor of Computer Science Department of Computer Science at Oxford University and Ivan Martinovic, DPhil Researcher Cybersecurity Centre for Doctoral Training at Oxford University, “The Cyber-ASAT: On the Impact of Cyber Weapons in Outer Space”, 2019 11th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Silent Battle T. Minárik, S. Alatalu, S. Biondi, M. Signoretti, I. Tolga, G. Visky (Eds.), <https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/06/Art_12_The-Cyber-ASAT.pdf>

A. Limited Accessibility Space is difficult. Over 60 years have passed since the first Sputnik launch and only nine countries (ten including the EU) have orbital launch capabilities. Moreover, a launch programme alone does not guarantee the resources and precision required to operate a meaningful ASAT capability. Given this, one possible reason why space wars have not broken out is simply because only the US has ever had the ability to fight one [21, p. 402], [22, pp. 419–420]. Although launch technology may become cheaper and easier, it is unclear to what extent these advances will be distributed among presently non-spacefaring nations. Limited access to orbit necessarily reduces the scenarios which could plausibly escalate to ASAT usage. Only major conflicts between the handful of states with ‘space club’ membership could be considered possible flashpoints. Even then, the fragility of an attacker’s own space assets creates de-escalatory pressures due to the deterrent effect of retaliation. Since the earliest days of the space race, dominant powers have recognized this dynamic and demonstrated an inclination towards de-escalatory space strategies [23]. B. Attributable Norms There also exists a long-standing normative framework favouring the peaceful use of space. The effectiveness of this regime, centred around the Outer Space Treaty (OST), is highly contentious and many have pointed out its serious legal and political shortcomings [24]–[26]. Nevertheless, this status quo framework has somehow supported over six decades of relative peace in orbit. Over these six decades, norms have become deeply ingrained into the way states describe and perceive space weaponization. This de facto codification was dramatically demonstrated in 2005 when the US found itself on the short end of a 160-1 UN vote after opposing a non-binding resolution on space weaponization. Although states have occasionally pushed the boundaries of these norms, this has typically occurred through incremental legal re-interpretation rather than outright opposition [27]. Even the most notable incidents, such as the 2007-2008 US and Chinese ASAT demonstrations, were couched in rhetoric from both the norm violators and defenders, depicting space as a peaceful global commons [27, p. 56]. Altogether, this suggests that states perceive real costs to breaking this normative tradition and may even moderate their behaviours accordingly. One further factor supporting this norms regime is the high degree of attributability surrounding ASAT weapons. For kinetic ASAT technology, plausible deniability and stealth are essentially impossible. The literally explosive act of launching a rocket cannot evade detection and, if used offensively, retaliation. This imposes high diplomatic costs on ASAT usage and testing, particularly during peacetime. C. Environmental Interdependence A third stabilizing force relates to the orbital debris consequences of ASATs. China’s 2007 ASAT demonstration was the largest debris-generating event in history, as the targeted satellite dissipated into thousands of dangerous debris particles [28, p. 4]. Since debris particles are indiscriminate and unpredictable, they often threaten the attacker’s own space assets [22, p. 420]. This is compounded by Kessler syndrome, a phenomenon whereby orbital debris ‘breeds’ as large pieces of debris collide and disintegrate. As space debris remains in orbit for hundreds of years, the cascade effect of an ASAT attack can constrain the attacker’s long-term use of space [29, pp. 295– 296]. Any state with kinetic ASAT capabilities will likely also operate satellites of its own, and they are necessarily exposed to this collateral damage threat. Space debris thus acts as a strong strategic deterrent to ASAT usage.

#### MAD checks space escalation – nuclear response and debris

Bowen 18 [Bleddyn Bowen, Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Leicester. The Art of Space Deterrence. February 20, 2018. https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/the-art-of-space-deterrence/]

Fourth, the ubiquity of space infrastructure and the fragility of the space environment may create a degree of existential deterrence. As space is so useful to modern economies and military forces, a large-scale disruption of space infrastructure may be so intuitively escalatory to decision-makers that there may be a natural caution against a wholesale assault on a state’s entire space capabilities because the consequences of doing so approach the mentalities of total war, or nuclear responses if a society begins tearing itself apart because of the collapse of optimised energy grids and just-in-time supply chains. In addition, the problem of space debris and the political-legal hurdles to conducting debris clean-up operations mean that even a handful of explosive events in space can render a region of Earth orbit unusable for everyone. This could caution a country like China from excessive kinetic intercept missions because its own military and economy is increasingly reliant on outer space, but perhaps not a country like North Korea which does not rely on space. The usefulness, sensitivity, and fragility of space may have some existential deterrent effect. China’s catastrophic anti-satellite weapons test in 2007 is a valuable lesson for all on the potentially devastating effect of kinetic warfare in orbit.

4. Plan flaw — they say they ban “via military tracking satellites” – this is unclear whether they are banning the military satellites or they are enforcing the plan via military satellites. This is a loophole countries will exploit.

#### Russia cheats – gives an asymmetric advantage – constitutional and political constraints prevent US reciprocation

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While Russia is making strong technical strides toward having weapons capable of damaging or destroying U.S. satellites, it is using its foreign policy to try to hobble potential U.S. space weapons. For example, Russia (along with China) has advocated for a treaty preventing the placement of weapons in outer space and the threat or use of force against space-based assets. Russia is fully aware that there are no known technologies or capabilities to verify compliance with such a treaty. The purpose in pursuing such arms control agreements is to hobble U.S. weapons and technology development, because of the domestic political opposition such rhetoric might generate and because the United States will comply with any arms control agreement that it signs. The Russians do not have the same constitutional and political constraints in place as the United States to restrain its development of ASATs. Moreover, the Russians are accustomed to violating arms control agreements that it they have signed. Writes defense analyst Mark Schneider: “There is no reason to expect Russia to break a habit of ignoring its arms control and treaty obligations. By doing this, it has gained military advantages for decades.”119

#### China cheats by creating domestic laws that contradict agreements

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But there one huge caveat to that statement, which is international law is fine as long as it moves their ball forward on what they hope to achieve. If it doesn't, suddenly, domestic law takes priority, and domestic law coming out of the National People's Congress can be cooked up pretty quickly. And so, they decide which law, which approach they want to use in the South China Sea or East China Sea, whichever one moves the ball most effectively.

And so, one would have to worry about — now this may be a bridge too far but — a Chinese domestic space law. In fact, one may exist. I have no idea if it does or doesn't. But it would counteract any agreements that are either in place or that could be made.