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#### The aff’s positioning of competition as intrinsic good acts to maintain the stability of capital accumulation.

* Mata 19- only innovate to protect neoliberalism and because it’s efficent

Christophers 16 [Brett Christophers, Professor in the Department of Social and Economic Geography at Uppsala University, “The Great Leveler: Capitalism and Competition in the Court of Law,” 2016, Harvard University Press, pp. 8-15, EA]

The aforementioned argument that capitalism has historically migrated from a state of competitiveness to a state of monopoly or oligopoly is deficient in four primary respects, both empirical and conceptual in nature.

First, there is something deeply misleading about the either/or nature of this historical narrative. One of the most important—although rarely acknowledged—of Marx’s insights was that capitalism always, everywhere, requires both. It needs competition, assuredly, not least to drive technological innovation and the reinvestment of profits, and thus growth. But it also needs monopoly—not merely to enhance visibility within and control over otherwise potentially chaotic business environments, but also to underwrite capitalist, market-based trade per se. Not for nothing does David Harvey argue, after Marx, that the “monopoly power of private property” is “both the beginning point and the end point of all capitalist activity.”20 For the legal institution of private property does confer monopoly: the exclusive power to dispose of said property as the owner alone sees fit.

Capital’s seemingly paradoxical need for both competition and monopoly is explored in Chapter 1, which extracts from Marx a conceptualization of capitalism that critically informs the remainder of the book: that of capitalism always, necessarily, teetering on a knife edge, balanced precariously between the contradictory forces of competition and monopoly, and perennially in danger of lapsing too far to one side or the other. “The problem,” Harvey shrewdly observes, “is to keep economic relations competitive enough while sustaining the individual and class monopoly privileges of private property that are the foundation of capitalism as a political-economic system.”21

And it is here that our economic laws crucially enter the picture. In metaphorical terms, the law acts as a powerful leveler: a pincer of sorts on the critical, combustible nexus of monopoly and competition, applicable from one side of the knife edge, the other, or both. Antitrust (competition) law, meaningfully enforced, serves to constrain monopoly power where it coheres too readily, thus boosting competition; IP law acts from the other side, allowing a degree of monopoly power where none “naturally” coheres, and limiting competition in the process. This conceptualization of economic law is sketched out in Chapter 3. Together, such laws help to ensure that over the long term, market-based capitalism is not too competitive (driving down prices and profits) but, in Harvey’s terms, remains competitive enough (avoiding stagnation and rent-seeking). In the process, the laws in question historically have contributed substantially to keeping capitalist accumulation regimes broadly in balance.

At the pivot of this overall mechanism sits the phenomenon of profit. Following the lead of scholars such as Robert Brenner, this book places front and center the relationship between profitability and the interrelated dynamics of competition and monopoly.22 As, indeed, did the classicals: Profit rates were, as Chapter 1 will show, fundamental to their theorization of competition. But it is vital to recognize, as writers such as Keith Cowling have done, that this relationship does not assume a simplistic less-competition-means-more-profit form, isolated as it were from other contributory factors.23 Indeed, the book shows that excesses neither of competitive intensity nor of monopoly power support long-term stability of profit-making and accumulation.

Instead, it leans more toward the type of argument proffered by Gérard Duménil and Dominique Lévy, which is that the dynamics of profitability strongly influence the state’s attempts to regularize regimes of accumulation, and that stabilizing capitalism is thus in no small part a question, ultimately, of stabilizing profitability.24 Or, as David Gordon and coauthors have written, the reproduction of capitalism is “fundamentally conditioned by the level and stability of capitalist profitability. As profits go, in short, so goes the economy.”25 The book’s particular slant on such conceptions is to consider corporate profits more in relative than absolute terms—and relative to, especially, labor and wages. While a comparable focus has recently been adopted by Thomas Piketty in his much discussed Capital in the Twenty-First Century, the inspiration underlying the approach taken here lies much further back in time, in the work in particular of Michal Kalecki.26 For as Kalecki showed both historically and conceptually, the relation of capital with labor, and profit with wages, is centrally implicated in the monopoly-competition relation and the balance that capitalism requires of it. Kalecki, it is fair to say, would have had some very interesting things to say about the Apple wage-suppression antitrust lawsuit.

A second and related problem with the linear historical narrative of from-competition-to-monopoly is its positing of monopoly and competition not only as mutually exclusive alternatives, but as separable ones. Once more, we can turn to Marx for an effective disabusal of this figuring. Monopoly and competition, he argued, are much more closely related, and much more closely connected, than is typically recognized. “Monopoly produces competition, competition produces monopoly,” he maintained, somewhat aphoristically, in a letter he wrote to Pavel Annenkov in 1846.27 Capital not only requires both but is in fact the expression, inter alia, of their synthesis—a synthesis that Marx, in trademark dialectical fashion, described not as a “formula” but as a “movement,” specifically “the movement whereby a true balance is maintained between competition and monopoly.”28 Such movement comprises opposing but connected economic dynamics of centralization and decentralization. When one or the other dynamic becomes disproportionately powerful, Marx argues, the “counteracting tendency” kicks in to return capital to a balanced configuration of monopoly and competition.

This balanced organization of productive forces—always inherently unstable and always prone to knife-edge slippages—is very close to what Edward Chamberlin would later call “monopolistic competition.”29 Such monopolistic competition internalizes monopoly and competition in dialectical relation with one another and is the capitalist norm—and always has been. “The notion of a bygone ‘competitive’ stage of capitalism where firms were price-takers is,” as Duménil and Lévy insist, “a fiction derived from the neoclassical analytical apparatus.”30 Equally fictional, albeit a fiction usually emanating from a very different analytical source, is the notion of a contemporary “monopoly” stage of capitalism absent meaningful competition.31

The historical, U.S.- and U.K.-based narrative related in this book therefore turns on precisely this dialectical, restless synthesis of monopoly and competition, and its ever-evolving, historically and geographically specific forms. In recent years, it is Harvey who has provided the most provocative reading of this dialectic and of its centrality to capitalism. It is, Harvey argues, one of numerous “moving” contradictions that plague the capital form, and with which capital constantly wrestles as it enters into and out of crisis.32 Harvey repeats Marx’s observation that capital requires a balance of competitive and monopolistic forces. He then derives from this postulate the propositions that crisis occurs when such forces become imbalanced—although this is not the only cause of crisis—and that such crisis can only be “fixed” once balance is restored. The result is that capital historically “oscillates” between relative excesses of monopoly and competition, always finding balance hard to achieve, let alone sustain.33 Understanding capital and its historical development in this particular regard, Harvey insists, requires us to recognize “how successful capital has generally been in managing the contradictions between monopoly and competition” and that “it uses crises to do so.”34

Such success, and the role played by crises or by threats thereof, are two of this book’s central, recurring themes. However, Harvey’s framing raises two vital questions that he fails, in his admittedly brief account of monopoly and competition, to answer.

First, how has this success been achieved? “Capital,” Harvey writes, “has organically arrived at a way to balance and rebalance the tendencies towards a monopolistic centralisation and decentralised competition through the crises that arise out of its imbalances.”35 Again, there is no objection here, except to press: “organically,” how? This book fashions an answer. This answer rests on the role of the law. When capital has become sufficiently overcentralized and monopolistic to threaten its own successful, profitable reproduction, antitrust law has been called upon to help restore the necessary degree of balance. This balance will never be perfect and at rest; in a dialectical relation, such as that between monopoly and competition, it never can be. When the dangerous excess has been of competition, by contrast, IP law has come to the rescue. Such laws, needless to say, have not effected this work of rebalancing by themselves, and this book documents their interaction with other pertinent dynamics; but their role has been paramount.

The other problematic question raised by Harvey’s framing brings us directly to our third point of divergence with the Baran and Sweezy or Foster and McChesney reading of capitalist development. Consider here the agency behind the successful, crisis-based management and rebalancing of monopolistic and competitive forces envisioned by Harvey: “capital has been successful . . .”; “capital has arrived at . . .” But what, or who, is this capital, and has its form remained constant? For Harvey, clearly, capital is the capitalist class: those that own the means of production. Yet this singularization of responsibility for regulating and reregulating the core dynamics of the capitalist economy raises all manner of questions that Harvey fails to address. Is this capitalist class homogeneous? Does it share consistent objectives in terms of economic development and management? And even if it does (and of course, it does not), what is its relation with the state and with the different tools of economic regulation, the law among them, that the state uses to govern and shape economic conduct?

If Harvey’s stimulating propositions call for circumspection on account of their simplifying structural abstractions, the connection to the “monopoly capital” thesis is that it too tends to rely upon just such totalizing, even reified, concepts. “Monopoly capital” is itself one such. One of the consistent themes of the tradition renewed by The Endless Crisis—one extending back through Baran and Sweezy’s Monopoly Capital to Rudolf Hilferding’s Finance Capital (1910) and even Lenin’s Imperialism (1917)—is its tendency not only to associate potent monopoly powers with a new stage or phase of capitalism but to depict the latter in terms of a consciously regulated and (centrally) planned system in which market-based competition largely disappears from view.36 For Lenin, this system fused the interests of capital and state (state monopoly capitalism); for Hilferding the fusion was tripartite, with finance capital also integral. But Marx, for all the stereotypes to the contrary, never saw capitalism as such. It was a totality, to be sure, but one that needs to be continually reproduced and reconstituted. This process occurs in and through the disparate actions of government, workers, consumers, businesses, and so on; when such reconstitution occurs in ways that imperil accumulation, crisis looms.

The point of saying all this is not simply to oppugn a totalizing view of “monopoly capital,” but to contrast with it the approach taken in this book, particularly to the law and its mobilization. There is not, and has not been, a single hand on the tiller, for all the obvious importance of the state as the law’s formal originator; there is no single, homogeneous entity pulling the levers, so to speak, of political-economic regulation— no consistent regime of conscious, systematic control. As with other modalities of economic regulation or governance, the law, in practice, does not “work” like that.

For one thing, there is an important difference between the written law and its interpretation. Two courts can interpret and apply the same law or laws in markedly different ways and with very different consequences. Perhaps the clearest example of this, at least in this book (Chapter 6), concerns U.S. antitrust law in the second half of the twentieth century: The nature and degree of enforcement of this law underwent a dramatic transformation in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but the law itself did not materially change. Intellectual training, social and political context, even judicial personality: These variables, and more, all matter to the law’s practical materialization. As such, we must remain constantly alive to the simple fact that, as Peter Carstensen has put it, “court doctrine is not the whole of the law in practice.”37 Relatedly, much of the enforcement of IP rights occurs at a significant remove from courts—specifically in, as argued by William T. Gallagher, the everyday practices of IP owners and their lawyers, whose “negotiations” with alleged infringers take place largely in the “shadow” of IP law.38

For another thing, just as the state never enacts new economic laws in total isolation from the influence and interests of capital, so both capital(s) and state—and indeed other economic agents—use the law to their own ends, and these ends are far from necessarily commensurate. Think, once again, about our two Apple cases. Who, in each case, instigated the legal action? Who put the law to work in their own interests? In the IP case it was Apple itself. In the class-action suit it was labor. But the latter suit was in fact itself based upon a prior government investigation launched by the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division in 2010.39 Three legal cases, then, all driven by different actors with different motivations, but all revolving around the same political-economic locus: the knotty complex of profit generation and accumulation constituted by Apple Inc. And if the law, together with its agents, is so palpably nonsingular at the scale of the political economy of just one company, on what reasonable grounds could we ever envision it thus—as a vehicle of conscious, unified control—in relation to the political economy of capitalism more widely? The “great leveler” indicated in the book’s title, in short, is not some omnipotent regulator in charge of the law; it is the law per se.

How, then, might we more accurately characterize the human and institutional agency analyzed in the following pages in relation to the law, its mobilization, and its political-economic effects? At a general level, the conclusion reached by Paul David in his examination of the history of IP law fits particularly well: “The complex body of law, judicial interpretation, and administrative practice that one has to grapple with in this field was not created by some rational, consistent, social welfare-maximizing public agency. What one is faced with, instead, is a mixture of the intended and unintended consequences of an undirected historical process on which the varied interests of many parties, acting at different points (some widely separated in time and space), have left an enduring mark.”40 More specifically, however, we will see that although IP and competition laws have indeed performed their work under the influence of varied individuals and groups, the vast majority of the latter are ultimately committed to, and institutionally invested in, the reproduction, in as smooth a fashion as possible, of capitalism in more or less its existing form. And even more specifically, the “smoothness” here alluded to means the reproduction of capitalism especially without the kinds of problems—identified in Chapter 3—that tend to emerge when the necessary balance between monopoly and competition is substantially disrupted.

On all the above grounds, therefore, this book’s argument diverges from that which we find in the all-too-common narrative of competitive capitalism historically segueing into monopoly capitalism. Of course, none of this is to suggest that nothing has changed historically in the capitalist constellation of monopoly-competition structures and dynamics. Far from it. But the book’s fourth and final quarrel with the conventional narrative is that what has substantively, perhaps irrevocably, changed is not the relative levels of competitive intensity and monopoly power—as in, that era had more competition, this one has more monopoly—so much as the source of monopoly powers and the degree of defensibility thereof.

Capitalism, this argument runs, is always characterized by competitive undercurrents; were it not, it would not be capitalism. Meanwhile, and arising partly out of these competitive dynamics (the Marxian argument), there is an endemic drive to fashion monopoly powers. Yet the means of assembly of such powers do not remain constant, and neither does the ability of monopolistic capitalists to defend the powers thus amassed. Capitalists—and indeed the states committed to stabilizing capitalism, with the law one obvious apparatus at their disposal—must constantly find new ways of putting monopoly in place and keeping it there. “As monopoly privileges from one source diminish,” Harvey observes, “so we witness a variety of attempts to preserve and assemble them by other means.”41 Mindful, thus, of Marx’s dictum that the monopoly-versus-competition dualism is a red herring that confuses a dialectical relation for an oppositional one, this book focuses instead on the ways in which the unstable balance between the two forces is maintained—and it posits the law as the primary, necessarily mutable, instrument of such maintenance.

#### The WTO is neoliberial

Martin Hart-Landsberg, 4-1-2006, "Monthly Review," Monthly Review, https://monthlyreview.org/2006/04/01/neoliberalism-myths-and-reality/ (LHS IB)

Agreements like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) have enhanced transnational capitalist power and profits at the cost of growing economic instability and deteriorating working and living conditions. Despite this reality, neoliberal claims that liberalization, deregulation, and privatization produce unrivaled benefits have been repeated so often that many working people accept them as unchallengeable truths. Thus, business and political leaders in the United States and other developed capitalist countries routinely defend their efforts to expand the WTO and secure new agreements like the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) as necessary to ensure a brighter future for the world’s people, especially those living in poverty.

For example, Renato Ruggiero, the first Director-General of the WTO, declared that WTO liberalization efforts have “the potential for eradicating global poverty in the early part of the next [twenty-first] century—a utopian notion even a few decades ago, but a real possibility today.”1 Similarly, writing shortly before the December 2005 WTO ministerial meeting in Hong Kong, William Cline, a senior fellow for the Institute for International Economics, claimed that “if all global trade barriers were eliminated, approximately 500 million people could be lifted out of poverty over 15 years….The current Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations in the World Trade Organization provides the best single chance for the international community to achieve these gains.”2

Therefore, if we are going to mount an effective challenge to the neoliberal globalization project, we must redouble our efforts to win the “battle of ideas.” Winning this battle requires, among other things, demonstrating that neoliberalism functions as an ideological cover for the promotion of capitalist interests, not as a scientific framework for illuminating the economic and social consequences of capitalist dynamics. It also requires showing the processes by which capitalism, as an international system, undermines rather than promotes working class interests in both third world and developed capitalist countries.

The Myth of the Superiority of ‘Free Trade’: Theoretical Arguments

According to supporters of the WTO and agreements such as the FTAA, these institutions/agreements seek to promote free trade in order to enhance efficiency and maximize economic well being. This focus on trade hides what is in fact a much broader political-economic agenda: the expansion and enhancement of corporate profit making opportunities. In the case of the WTO, this agenda has been pursued through a variety of agreements that are explicitly designed to limit or actually block public regulation of economic activity in contexts that have little to do with trade as normally understood.

For example, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) limits the ability of states to deny patents on certain products (including over living organisms) or control the use of products patented in their respective nations (including the use of compulsory licensing to ensure affordability of critical medicines). It also forces states to accept a significant increase in the length of time during which patents remain in force. The Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) restricts the ability of states to put performance requirements on foreign direct investment (FDI), encompassing those that would require the use of local inputs (including labor) or technology transfer. A proposed expansion of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) would force states to open their national service markets (which include everything from health care and education to public utilities and retail trade) to foreign providers as well as limit public regulation of their activity. Similarly, a proposed Government Procurement Agreement would deny states the ability to use non-economic criteria, such as labor and environmental practices, in awarding contracts.

These agreements are rarely discussed in the mainstream media precisely because they directly raise issues of private versus public power and are not easily defended. This is one of the most important reasons why those who support the capitalist globalization project prefer to describe the institutional arrangements that help underpin it as trade agreements and defend them on the basis of the alleged virtues of free trade. This is a defense that unfortunately and undeservedly holds enormous sway among working people, especially in the developed capitalist countries. And, using it as a theoretical foundation, capitalist globalization advocates find it relatively easy to encourage popular acceptance of the broader proposition that market determined outcomes are superior to socially determined ones in all spheres of activity. Therefore, it is critical that we develop an effective and accessible critique of this myth of the superiority of free trade. In fact, this is an easier task than generally assumed.

#### The Neoliberalism approach the aff takes in by restricting IP’s for competition, the invisible hand, and by restricting IP’s is a myth- further entrenches us in neoliberalism and causes meaningless death and drives less innovation and distribution.

At- sach 14- that only neolib solves

AT- Cooper 06- only privatization solves

Ognian Kassabov, 1-20-2021, "What the vaccine debacle tells us about predatory capitalism," No Publication, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/2/21/the-vaccine-debacle-shows-the-predatory-nature-of-capitalism (LHS IB)

Myth one: The private sector is the best innovator

One foundational myth of global capitalism is that private entrepreneurship is the only effective source of innovation and progress. But Big Pharma has long demonstrated this is not necessarily so.

For decades, vaccines have been de-prioritised by the industry as insufficiently profitable. For example, despite the persistence of deadly outbreaks of the Ebola virus in West Africa, there were no serious efforts to develop a vaccine against it until after the epidemic of 2014. And up until the coronavirus pandemic, companies like BionNTech – which partnered with Pfizer to develop a COVID-19 vaccine – were mostly focusing on the application of the mRNA technology in drugs rather than vaccines.

The swift development of COVID-19 vaccines came only in the wake of significant financial support by governments, combined with massive buyout contracts using taxpayers’ money. For instance, US government agencies gave Moderna alone some $2.5bn to help develop the vaccine and buy doses.

That is, the public sector was a key driver of COVID-19 vaccine development and public funds are used to finance the process. In effect, pharmaceutical companies secured a cost-reduced development and risk-free launch of a new product.

The claim that private companies are best at innovation is further eroded by the fact that at least two state-owned companies, Russia’s Gamaleya Institute and China’s Sinopharm, **were successful in developing effective vaccines.**

#### Neolib capitalism is the greatest impact—root cause of Covid-- it’s the greatest existential threat and the biggest affront to human rights and causes catastrophic healthcare crises, climate change, structural racism, and value to life deprivation. Litany of recent studies prove that transition is possible and would save humanity, but requires urgent divestment from current modes of politics

Ahmed 20 (Nafeez Ahmed -- Visiting Research Fellow at the Global Sustainability Institute at Anglia Ruskin University's Faculty of Science & Technology + M.A. in contemporary war & peace studies + DPhil (April 2009) in international relations from the School of Global Studies @ Sussex University, “Capitalism is Destroying ‘Safe Operating Space’ for Humanity, Warn Scientists”, https://www.resilience.org/stories/2020-06-24/capitalism-is-destroying-safe-operating-space-for-humanity-warn-scientists/, 24 June 2020, EmmieeM)

The COVID19 pandemic has exposed a strange anomaly in the global economy. If it doesn’t keep growing endlessly, it just breaks. Grow, or die.

But there’s a deeper problem. New scientific research confirms that capitalism’s structural obsession with endless growth is destroying the very conditions for human survival on planet Earth.

A landmark study in the journal Nature Communications, “Scientists’ warning on affluence” — by scientists in Australia, Switzerland and the UK — concludes that the most fundamental driver of environmental destruction is the overconsumption of the super-rich.

This factor lies over and above other factors like fossil fuel consumption, industrial agriculture and deforestation: because it is overconsumption by the super-rich which is the chief driver of these other factors breaching key planetary boundaries.

The paper notes that the richest 10 percent of people are responsible for up to 43 percent of destructive global environmental impacts.

In contrast, the poorest 10 percent in the world are responsible just around 5 percent of these environmental impacts:

The new paper is authored by Thomas Wiedmann of UNSW Sydney’s School of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Manfred Lenzen of the University of Sydney’s School of Physics, Lorenz T. Keysser of ETH Zürich’s Department of Environmental Systems Science, and Julia K. Steinberger of Leeds University’s School of Earth and Environment.

It confirms that global structural inequalities in the distribution of wealth are intimately related to an escalating environmental crisis threatening the very existence of human societies.

Synthesising knowledge from across the scientific community, the paper identifies capitalism as the main cause behind “alarming trends of environmental degradation” which now pose “existential threats to natural systems, economies and societies.” The paper concludes:

“It is clear that prevailing capitalist, growth-driven economic systems have not only increased affluence since World War II, but have led to enormous increases in inequality, financial instability, resource consumption and environmental pressures on vital earth support systems.”

Capitalism and the pandemic

Thanks to the way capitalism works, the paper shows, the super-rich are incentivised to keep getting richer — at the expense of the health of our societies and the planet overall.

The research provides an important scientific context for how we can understand many earlier scientific studies revealing that industrial expansion has hugely increased the risks of new disease outbreaks.

Just last April, a paper in Landscape Ecology found that deforestation driven by increased demand for consumption of agricultural commodities or beef have increased the probability of ‘zoonotic’ diseases (exotic diseases circulating amongst animals) jumping to humans. This is because industrial expansion, driven by capitalist pressures, has intensified the encroachment of human activities on wildlife and natural ecosystems.

Two years ago, another study in Frontiers of Microbiology concluded presciently that accelerating deforestation due to “demographic growth” and the associated expansion of “farming, logging, and hunting”, is dangerously transforming rural environments. More bat species carrying exotic viruses have ended up next to human dwellings, the study said. This is increasing “the risk of transmission of viruses through direct contact, domestic animal infection, or contamination by urine or faeces.”

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the COVID19 pandemic thus emerged directly from these rapidly growing impacts of human activities. As the new paper in Nature Communications confirms, these impacts have accelerated in the context of the fundamental operations of industrial capitalism.

Eroding the ‘safe operating space’

The result is that capitalism is causing human societies to increasingly breach key planetary boundaries, such as land-use change, biosphere integrity and climate change.

Remaining within these boundaries is essential to maintain what scientists describe as a “safe operating space” for human civilization. If those key ecosystems are disrupted, that “safe operating space” will begin to erode. The global impacts of the COVID19 pandemic are yet another clear indication that this process of erosion has already begun.

“The evidence is clear,” write Weidmann and his co-authors.

“Long-term and concurrent human and planetary wellbeing will not be achieved in the Anthropocene if affluent overconsumption continues, spurred by economic systems that exploit nature and humans. We find that, to a large extent, the affluent lifestyles of the world’s rich determine and drive global environmental and social impact. Moreover, international trade mechanisms allow the rich world to displace its impact to the global poor.”

The new scientific research thus confirms that the normal functioning of capitalism is eroding the ‘safe space’ by which human civilisation is able to survive.

The structures

The paper also sets out how this is happening in some detail. The super-rich basically end up driving this destructive system forward in three key ways.

Firstly, they are directly responsible for “biophysical resource use… through high consumption.”

Secondly, they are “members of powerful factions of the capitalist class.”

Thirdly, due to that positioning, they end up “driving consumption norms across the population.”

But perhaps the most important insight of the paper is not that this is purely because the super-rich are especially evil or terrible compared to the rest of the population — but because of the systemic pressures produced by capitalist structures.

The authors point out that: “Growth imperatives are active at multiple levels, making the pursuit of economic growth (net investment, i.e. investment above depreciation) a necessity for different actors and leading to social and economic instability in the absence of it.”

At the core of capitalism, the paper observes, is a fundamental social relationship defining the way working people are systemically marginalised from access to the productive resources of the earth, along with the mechanisms used to extract these resources and produce goods and services.

This means that to survive economically in this system, certain behavioural patterns become not just normalised, but seemingly entirely rational — at least from a limited perspective that ignores wider societal and environmental consequences. In the words of the authors:

“In capitalism, workers are separated from the means of production, implying that they must compete in labour markets to sell their labour power to capitalists in order to earn a living.”

Meanwhile, firms which own and control these means of production “need to compete in the market, leading to a necessity to reinvest profits into more efficient production processes to minimise costs (e.g. through replacing human labour power with machines and positive returns to scale), innovation of new products and/or advertising to convince consumers to buy more.”

If a firm fails to remain competitive through such behaviours, “it either goes bankrupt or is taken over by a more successful business. Under normal economic conditions, this capitalist competition is expected to lead to aggregate growth dynamics.”

The irony is that, as the paper also shows, the “affluence” accumulated by the super-rich isn’t correlated with happiness or well-being.

Restructure

The “hegemonic” dominance of global capitalism, then, is the principal obstacle to the systemic transformation needed to reduce overconsumption. So it’s not enough to simply try to “green” current consumption through technologies like renewable energy — we need to actually reduce our environmental impacts by changing our behaviours with a focus on cutting back our use of planetary resources:

“Not only can a sufficient decoupling of environmental and detrimental social impacts from economic growth not be achieved by technological innovation alone, but also the profit-driven mechanism of prevailing economic systems prevents the necessary reduction of impacts and resource utilisation per se.”

The good news is that it doesn’t have to be this way.

The paper reviews a range of “bottom-up studies” showing that dramatic reductions in our material footprint are perfectly possible while still maintaining good material living standards.

In India, Brazil and South Africa, “decent living standards” can be supported “with around 90 percent less per-capita energy use than currently consumed in affluent countries.” Similar possible reductions are feasible for modern industrial economies such as Australia and the US.

By becoming aware of how the wider economic system incentivises behaviour that is destructive of human societies and planetary ecosystems critical for human survival, both ordinary workers and more wealthy sectors — including the super-rich — can work toward rewriting the global economic operating system.

This can be done by restructuring ownership in firms, equalising relations with workers, and intentionally reorganising the way decisions are made about investment priorities.

The paper points out that citizens and communities have a crucial role to play in getting organised, upgrading efforts for public education about these key issues, and experimenting with new ways to work together in bringing about “social tipping points” — points at which social action can catalyse mass change.

While a sense of doom and apathy about the prospects for such change is understandable, mounting evidence based on systems science suggests that global capitalism as we know it is in a state of protracted crisis and collapse that began some decades ago. This research strongly supports the view that as industrial civilization reaches the last stages of its systemic life-cycle, there is unprecedented and increasing opportunity for small-scale actions and efforts to have large system-wide impacts.

The new paper shows that the need for joined-up action is paramount: structural racism, environmental crisis, global inequalities are not really separate crises — but different facets of human civilization’s broken relationship with nature.

Yet, of course, the biggest takeaway is that those who bear most responsibility for environmental destruction — those who hold the most wealth in our societies — urgently need to wake up to how their narrow models of life are, quite literally, destroying the foundations for human survival over the coming decades.

#### Neolib is the root cause of Covid and all pandemics- multiple warrants- the aff is a hopeless attempt and an example of disaster neolib to solve through restricting IP’s- when in reality they can’t since they’re dependent on free markets sacrifices which proliferates the virus

Miloš ŠUmonja, 21- June"Neoliberalism is not dead – On political implications of Covid-19," PubMed Central (PMC), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7770495/ (LHS IB)

The neoliberal pandemic – the causes of crisis

From the viewpoint suggested above, the results of capital’s totalising effort to commodify and eat away its own social and natural preconditions appear as the structural causes of the pandemic, which thus represents a potentially fatal internal crisis of neoliberalism. The crisis is not, as one might conclude from the establishment’s ‘going back to normal’ narrative, an exogenous shock to an otherwise functional system. A Black Swan-type event ([Smith 2020](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7770495/#bibr54-0309816820982381)), or a meteorite of history which can only be ascribed to a foreign entity is how capitalism’s ideological defence in the West already projects its own contradictions: to the contingency of nature ([Joye 2020](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7770495/" \l "bibr31-0309816820982381)); then to virus-producing China (on 1 February, the German newsmagazine Der Spiegel run a cover page with a headline ‘Coronavirus – Made in China’; Der Spiegel [2020](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7770495/#bibr17-0309816820982381)); to a virus-carrying immigrant; and in a final act of inversion of reality, to the class enemy within (as in the case of Amazon warehouse employee, Chris Smalls, who organised his coworkers to demand safer working conditions amid the pandemic, only to find himself fired because of – breaching of the safety measures; see [Bellafante 2020](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7770495/" \l "bibr6-0309816820982381)).

The interventions from the Left highlight at least three constitutive connections between neoliberalism and the pandemic. According to [Rob Wallace (2020a](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7770495/#bibr62-0309816820982381), [2020b](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7770495/#bibr63-0309816820982381)) evolutionary biologist and phylogeographer, the increased appearance of corona viruses like SARS, MERS or Covid-19 in the human population is a predictable outcome of agroindustry’s devastating impact on natural ecosystems rather than a series of isolated incidents. What is seen is an interplay between industrial production of food and a growing market for exotic wild food. The multinationals’ land-grab and deforestation push the increasing capitalised wildlife deeper into the remaining primary ecosystems. This enables the spillover of previously boxed-in pathogens to human communities that are forced to breach the natural barrier between them while working:

Capital is spearheading land grabs into the last of primary forest and smallholder-held farmland worldwide . . . As industrial production – hog, poultry, and like – expand into primary forest, it places pressure on wild food operators to dredge further into the forest for source populations, **increasing the interface with, and spillover of, new pathogens, including Covid-19.** ([Wallace 2020a](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7770495/#bibr62-0309816820982381)).

As for the speed at which the virus has spread, the unprecedented physical connectivity in the word of global supply chains and low-cost flying was not the only contributing social factor. It should not be forgotten that the initial reaction from most governments to the outbreak was an exercise in ‘epidemiological neoliberalism’ ([Frey 2020](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7770495/#bibr20-0309816820982381)). This policy bluntly exposed the politics of the whole project: pretend to do nothing while making sure that the ‘natural laws’ of markets keep functioning, even if it means allowing people to get sick and die from ‘just another flu’. Encapsulated in social-Darwinian ‘survival of the fittest’ notion of ‘herd immunity’, this solution in practice consisted of voluntary behavioural guidelines – business as usual, just wash your hands and keep your distance. This, in effect, turned a social problem into an individual matter, thus shaking off any responsibility the authorities had for the public health crisis.

However, with the numbers of infected inevitably rising in consequence, the genocidal charade backfired, not just because the public lost faith in neoliberal crisis management but also because the markets lost confidence in it. In the United States, for example, President Donald Trump changed his approach only during the March stock crash. Then, in the wake of what was becoming the greatest pandemic since the Spanish Flu, the disastrous effects of 40 years of neoliberal privatisation of public health institutions were revealed. That is, the lack of staff and material capacities in underfunded state hospitals, and the complete inability of the private for-profit health industry to provide even the most basic medical equipment and treatment in the time of social need. To illustrate the point: in Italy, one of the countries hardest hit by the pandemic, austerity cuts in the national health system resulted in an extraordinary 50% reduction in hospital beds between 1997 and 2015, and 46,000 less hospital employees from 2009 to 2017 ([Autore & Corizzo 2020](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7770495/" \l "bibr3-0309816820982381)). Add the outsourcing of medical production in search for cheap labour and that health companies have no commercial interest in preparing for or preventing emergency situations – in keeping hospital beds empty and magazines stocked with face masks and gloves, or investing in vaccine development – and you get a centennial public health crisis.

In response to the crisis, the resources of national states have been mobilised in full force, mandatory lockdowns imposed, and branches of industry told what to produce. However, with the majority of workers not working, global supply chains broke, demand collapsed, production fell, company revenues sharply dropped and stock markets plunged. The IMF projects global growth to fall to -3%, a downgrade of over 6 percentage points from January 2020, which makes the ongoing capitalist crisis ‘the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression’ ([Gopinath 2020](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7770495/#bibr24-0309816820982381)). Indications of what awaits the working classes are clear: in the United States, the world epicentre of both neoliberalism and the pandemic, unemployment rose to 14.7% in April, again the worst rate since the Great Depression ([BBC 2020](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7770495/#bibr5-0309816820982381)). Moreover, in August, the real unemployment rate, which includes underemployed and marginally attached to the labour market, reached 16.8% ([Hindery 2020](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7770495/" \l "bibr28-0309816820982381)), with a significant number of disproportionately women and minority workers facing permanent job loss ([Data Speaks 2020](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7770495/#bibr14-0309816820982381)).

#### The alt is to decentralize global chains, the free markets and neoliberalism- we support Democratisation of capitalism through the Keynesian state

Miloš ŠUmonja, 21- June"Neoliberalism is not dead – On political implications of Covid-19," PubMed Central (PMC), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7770495/ (LHS IB))

Nationalist states and neoliberal solutions

Surprisingly, after all the historical experiences from the 1970s onwards, and all the theoretical work done to explain the neoliberal counter-revolution, its common sense ‘small state’ ideology still haunts the Left, in particular Keynesian critics of austerity. Even works accentuating the conflict between capitalism and democracy, like [Wolfgang Streeck’s (2014)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7770495/#bibr56-0309816820982381) widely read Buying Time, describe neoliberalism as ‘a general rollback of the state and its intervention in the markets’ (p. 124). Thus, it is worth recalling the lessons of the Marxist State Debate ([Clarke 1991](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7770495/#bibr11-0309816820982381)), particularly the insight that the apparent self-isolation of the state from the economy, which seems to be taken for granted in obituaries written for neoliberalism since 2008, is a function of its class nature. The modern state is capital’s home court in its struggle against the masses because it sets the limits to democracy around capitalist social relation of production – although in a way that also depends on the outcome of political and class conflict. Its welfarist incarnation projected and restricted an unprecedented egalitarian change in those relations across the post-war West to the level of distribution. Democratisation of capitalism through the Keynesian state – meaning strong trade unions, politically guaranteed full employment, redistribution of wealth and life chances to the dispossessed, and extensive social services and benefits for all citizens – was a mode of class rule based on compromise rather than outright conflict with the workers. This accumulation regime began to crumble during the late 1960s and early 1970s due to the fall of the rate of profit, when struggles over distribution started to erode the relations of production ([Davidson 2018](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7770495/#bibr16-0309816820982381); [Streeck 2014](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7770495/" \l "bibr56-0309816820982381)), and capital owners lost confidence in the social and democratic state of capitalism. In these circumstances, neoliberalism appeared as capital’s solution to the economic crisis of 1973, and as a long-term project of class rule.

Theoretically and practically, neoliberalism is committed not only to the protection of markets from society and democracy but also to the transformation of society in the image of markets at the expense of egalitarian democracy ([Munck 2005](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7770495/" \l "bibr39-0309816820982381)). That explains why neoliberalism requires a strong and active state, which is capable of reorganising social relations, in particular those characteristic to its Keynesian predecessor, in a way that deepens and entrenches the inequalities of capitalism – through the crushing of the trade unions, cuts in social provision, privatisation of public industries and services, deregulation of financial markets, monetary policies predicated on price stability and so on. Therefore, the so-called ‘roll-back of the state’ is just an ideological misnomer for the process of its neoliberal restructuring in the course of the capital’s efforts to restore the rate of profit:

Projects of neoliberalisation . . . have never been synonymous with a simple diminution, or withdrawal, of the state, but instead have been variously concerned with its capture and reuse, albeit in the context of a generalized assault on social-welfarist or left-arm functions, coupled with an expansion of right-arm roles and capacities in areas like policing and surveillance. ([Peck & Theodore 2019](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7770495/#bibr42-0309816820982381): 249)

Here, the point is to note that the coronavirus crisis is being managed by the neoliberal state, whose purpose was, and still is, ‘the creation and maintenance of a politico-economic order which actively defends itself against impulses towards greater equality and democratisation’ ([Bruff 2016](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7770495/" \l "bibr8-0309816820982381): 110). No doubt, the fact that it has been forced to shut down the economy and break open the Keynesian toolbox it was meant to bury forever, speaks of an organic crisis in the whole social order. For, paradoxically, in conditions of emergency, when states demonstrate their full commitment to the survival of markets, even if it means temporarily prioritising the survival of the people, the laws of capitalism show themselves as a matter of political choice, and not of natural necessity. By the same token, however, there is nothing contradictory in neoliberal ‘disaster socialism’. Depending on the future, the coronavirus crisis might, in retrospect, appear as just another capitalist crisis, an integral part of its life cycle, or a round of ‘creative destruction’ – and, therefore, another reorganisation, that is further de-democratisation of social relations. As a matter of fact, the crucial question of who is paying for the crisis is already being answered in practice.

### FW

#### Interp – the aff has to win the social institution through which the plan is enacted is better than the status quo or competiting option proposed by the negative – solves all their offense

#### Institutions are a critical part of implementation, solvency, and ideology – the aff should be forced to think about that before writing a plan

#### It’s predictable – institutions are obvious if we win a link we win their institutional bias is real, we can’t shift the goalposts on which institution we think is good – also, it’s the cap K – it’s been around for decades

#### Critical debate good – it’s most educational by opening our minds to different viewpoints – taking institutions for granted perpetuates all the harms of the status quo

#### Fiat is illusory – analyzing competing political strategies is the core of any social change.

Giroux 12 6/19/12 [Henry, Global TV Network Chair Professorship at McMaster University in the English and Cultural Studies Department, “Beyond the Politics of the Big Lie: The Education Deficit and the New Authoritarianism” June 6, 2012 http://truth-out.org/opinion/item/9865-beyond-the-politics-of-the-big-lie-the-education-deficit-and-the-new-authoritarianism]

While a change in consciousness does not guarantee a change in either one's politics or society, it is a crucial precondition for connecting what it means to think otherwise to conditions that make it possible to act otherwise. The education deficit must be seen as intertwined with a political deficit, serving to make many oppressed individuals complicit with oppressive ideologies. As the late Cornelius Castoriadis made clear, democracy requires "critical thinkers capable of putting existing institutions into question.... while simultaneously creating the conditions for individual and social autonomy."(41) Nothing will change politically or economically until new and emerging social movements take seriously the need to develop a language of radical reform and create new public spheres that support the knowledge, skills and critical thought that are necessary features of a democratic formative culture. Getting beyond the big lie as a precondition for critical thought, civic engagement and a more realized democracy will mean more than correcting distortions, misrepresentations and falsehoods produced by politicians, media talking heads and anti-public intellectuals. It will also require addressing how new sites of pedagogy have become central to any viable notion of agency, politics and democracy itself. This is not a matter of elevating cultural politics over material relations of power as much as it is a rethinking of how power deploys culture and how culture as a mode of education positions power. James Baldwin, the legendary African-American writer and civil rights activist, argued that the big lie points to a crisis of American identity and politics and is symptomatic of "a backward society" that has descended into madness, "especially when one is forced to lie about one's aspect of anybody's history, [because you then] must lie about it all."(42) He goes on to argue "that one of the paradoxes of education [is] that precisely at the point when you begin to develop a conscience, you must find yourself at war with your society. It is your responsibility to change society if you think of yourself as an educated person."(43) What Baldwin recognizes is that learning has the possibility to trigger a critical engagement with oneself, others and the larger society - education becomes in this instance more than a method or tool for domination but a politics, a fulcrum for democratic social change. Tragically, in our current climate "learning" merely contributes to a vast reserve of manipulation and self-inflicted ignorance. Our education deficit is neither reducible to the failure of particular types of teaching nor the decent into madness by the spokespersons for the new authoritarianism. Rather, it is about how matters of knowledge, values and ideology can be struggled over as issues of power and politics. Surviving the current education deficit will depend on progressives using history, memory and knowledge not only to reconnect intellectuals to the everyday needs of ordinary people, but also to jumpstart social movements by making education central to organized politics and the quest for a radical democracy.

# Disclosure

#### Interpretation: At all TOC bid-distributing tournaments, debaters must disclose full round reports with what they went for and must open source for each round they compete in.   The disclosure must occur within 30 minutes of the round.

Graphical user interface, application

Description automatically generated

Violation: They don’t have docs disclosed for there three rounds earlier. And their round reports don’t have what they went for in there speeches after the 1AC.

Net Benefits:

#### 1] Accessibility: There is a section of literature base and evidence that is blanketed by paywalls and online protections: things like Heinonline and JSTOR make it so that only certain debaters can access some articles. Full text disclosure means that even in the face of inaccessible evidence, debaters can still understand the crux of the arguments that are being detailed that a first three last three disclosure can never allow. Accessibility is an independent voter: we cannot have any debate without the ability to participate.

#### 2] Reciprocity: I disclose full-text and you don’t, which automatically gives you a structural prep advantage over me since you have to spend less time before the round hunting through articles and recutting ev to figure out my positions. This outweighs—a) every reason disclosure is good is an advantage for them and not me, b) view their counter-interp with a grain of salt since it’s self-serving. Reciprocity key to fairness—ensures equal access to the ballot.

# Case

#### Their ev doesn’t consider differentiation, product pipelines, investment, FDA approval, etc.

Stuart 5/19 [(Jordan, Client Portfolio Manager), “Why we're (still) positive on biotech“, Federated Hermes, 5-19-2021, <https://www.federatedhermes.com/insights/why-were-still-positive-on-biotech/>]

While its performance is currently on pause, this sector’s innovation is unstoppable. During this period of market rotation, investors who have reaped years of rewards by investing in the high-growth biotech sector are currently feeling some pain. As long-time investors in this area, we believe it’s a good time to take perspective. While biotech has some headwinds including the potential for more regulation, a steepening yield curve and volatility, our view as growth investors is that the long-term outlook for biotech remains strong. Here’s why: Opportunity for differentiation Investors looking for differentiation beyond the broad market indexes favor promising biotech firms that typically are excluded from large index universes. Accelerating innovation leading to robust product pipelines The link between computing power, genomic research and medical science is growing exponentially. Researchers can now apply powerful computing capacity to mine vast database networks that contain everything from an individual’s genetic blueprint and lifestyle information to the pharmacological properties of virtually every known compound to a store of information about previously used treatments. Biotech innovators can cross-reference this data in seconds, as they work to develop more targeted and effective therapies for cancer, diabetes, viruses and myriad diseases. The rapid and highly effective development of Covid-19 vaccines and therapeutics underscores these capabilities. Abundant investment Year-to-date, more than 40% of initial public offerings were health-care-related with much of that investment going to biotech firms for building facilities, hiring scientists and funding research. Food and Drug Administration is increasingly on board Clearly, the FDA’s complex approval process has the potential to present biotech firms—and their leading-edge therapies—with substantial obstacles. But facing pressure from patients, industry and Congress over the years, the agency has adopted a more innovation-friendly approach. **The FDA continues to streamline its approval approach** by applying the information they have gathered from one company’s trials to others wherever appropriate. Previously, each approval process existed as a separate silo, which was both inefficient and costly. The accelerating ability to collect, analyze and cross-reference enormous amounts of data from around the world is likely to support even more robust, timely and effective review of innovative therapies. Historical outperformance DRG, the pharmaceutical index representing “big pharma” has outperformed the S&P 500 in only seven of the past 20 years. Meanwhile, the biotech index—BTK—has outperformed the S&P 500 in 15 of past 20 years. More bark than bite from politicians Although investors may worry about Washington imposing price limits and other regulations on biotech firms, keep in mind the Democrats’ very narrow Senate majority. It would take just one “nay” vote from a big pharma/biotech state, such as New Jersey, New York, Massachusetts or California, to eliminate this sector overhang. Amazing breakthroughs in biotech will increase, but when investing in such a complex, niche and less-covered area, two attributes are essential: patience and industry knowledge. Most drugs/treatments take 10 years to develop at an average cost of $2 billion. Plus, fewer than 12% of Phase I trial drugs receive FDA approval—despite an accelerated FDA approval process. When evaluating such an enormous array of potential opportunities, understanding the science, the industry, the key players and the competitive landscape is essential—as is being highly selective. Investing in biotech is nothing less than investing in the future of health care.

Innovation

Econ decline doesn’t mean war-0 haveent contelzized a brink- this is a link

There burden to do this

Biotech

We solve biotech by moving-also haven’t given a link in the context of medicines meaning it doesn’t matter