# 1NC

## 1

#### The standard is maximizing expected well-being: (Hedonistic Util)

1. **Pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable**

**Moen 16** [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] SJDI

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues**.** This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values**.** If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable**.** You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.3 As Aristotle observes**:** “We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.

#### 2] Lexical prerequisite: threats to bodily security preclude the ability for moral actors to effectively act upon other moral theories since they are in a constant state of crisis that inhibits the ideal moral conditions which other theories presuppose

#### 3] Actor specificity:

#### ---A] Aggregation – every policy benefits some and harms others, so side constraints freeze action.

#### ---B] States lack wills or intentions since policies are collective actions.

#### ---C] No act-omission distinction—governments are responsible for everything in the public sphere, so inaction is implicit authorization of action: they have to yes/no bills, which means everything collapse to aggregation.

#### ---D] Actor-specificity first since different agents have different ethical standings. Link turns calc indicts because the alt would be *no* action.

#### 4] Extinction comes first under any framework

Pummer 15 [Theron, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford. “Moral Agreement on Saving the World” Practical Ethics, University of Oxford. May 18, 2015] AT, recut BWSEKL.

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

#### 5] Use epistemic modesty – that’s multiplying the probability of a framework being true by its general contention impact –

#### ---A] It maximizes the probability of achieving net most moral value—beating a framework acts as mitigation to their impacts but the strength of that mitigation is contingent

#### ---B] EC is too high a burden—thousands of years of philosophy can’t be resolved in 40 minutes.

#### 6] Reject calc indicts –

#### ---A] Empirically denied—both individuals and policymakers carry out effective cost-benefit analysis which means even if decisions aren’t always perfect it’s still better than not acting at all

#### ---B] Theory—they’re functionally NIBs that everyone knows are silly but skew the aff and move the debate away from the topic and actual philosophical debate, killing valuable education

#### 7] Permissibility and presumption negate:

#### We presume statements false absent an active reason to think otherwise – proven by conspiracy theories

#### Statements are more often false than true because any part can be false – this means you negate in the absence of offense

### Off

## 2

#### The Global Economy is stabilizing and set for increases in 2021 but is still vulnerable to shocks

World Bank 6-8 6-8-2021 "The Global Economy: on Track for Strong but Uneven Growth as COVID-19 Still Weighs" <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2021/06/08/the-global-economy-on-track-for-strong-but-uneven-growth-as-covid-19-still-weighs>

A year and a half since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the global economy is poised to stage its most **robust post-recession recovery** in 80 years in 2021. But the rebound is expected to be **uneven across countries**, as major economies look set to register strong growth even as many developing economies lag. Global growth is expected to accelerate to 5.6% this year, largely on the strength in major economies such as the United States and China. And while growth for almost every region of the world has been revised upward for 2021, many continue to grapple with COVID-19 and what is likely to be its long shadow. Despite this year’s pickup, the level of global GDP in 2021 is expected to be **3.2% below** pre-pandemic projections, and per capita GDP among many emerging market and developing economies is anticipated to remain below pre-COVID-19 peaks for an extended period. As the **pandemic continues to flare**, it will shape the path of global economic activity.

#### Strikes hurt the Economy – two warrants:

#### 1] They hurt critical core industries that is necessary for economic growth

McElroy 19 John McElroy 10-25-2019 "Strikes Hurt Everybody" <https://www.wardsauto.com/ideaxchange/strikes-hurt-everybody> (MPA at McCombs school of Business)

This creates a **poisonous relationship** between the company and its workforce. Many GM hourly workers don’t identify as GM employees. They identify as UAW members. And they see the union as the source of their jobs, not the company. It’s an unhealthy dynamic that puts GM at a disadvantage to non-union automakers in the U.S. like Honda and Toyota, where workers take pride in the company they work for and the products they make. Attacking the company in the media also **drives away customers**. Who wants to buy a shiny new car from a company that’s accused of underpaying its workers and treating them unfairly? Data from the Center for Automotive Research (CAR) in Ann Arbor, MI, show that **GM loses market share during strikes and never gets it back**. GM lost two percentage points during the 1998 strike, which in today’s market would represent **a loss of 340,000 sales**. Because GM reports sales on a quarterly basis we’ll only find out at the end of December if it lost market share from this strike. UAW members say one of their greatest concerns is job security. But causing a company to lose market share is a sure-fire path to **more plant closings and layoffs**. Even so, unions are incredibly important for boosting wages and benefits for working-class people. GM’s UAW-represented workers earn considerably more than their non-union counterparts, about $26,000 more per worker, per year, in total compensation. Without a union they never would have achieved that. Strikes are a powerful weapon for unions. They usually are the only way they can get management to accede to their demands. If not for the power of collective bargaining and the threat of a strike, management would largely ignore union demands. If you took away that threat, management would pay its workers peanuts. Just ask the Mexican line workers who are paid $1.50 an hour to make $50,000 BMWs. But strikes don’t just hurt the people walking the picket lines or the company they’re striking against. They hurt **suppliers, car dealers and the communities located near the plants.** The Anderson Economic Group estimates that 75,000 workers at supplier companies were temporarily laid off because of the GM strike. Unlike UAW picketers, those supplier workers won’t get any strike pay or an $11,000 contract signing bonus. No, most of them lost close to a month’s worth of wages, which must be financially devastating for them. GM’s suppliers also lost a lot of money. So now they’re cutting budgets and delaying capital investments to make up for the lost revenue, which is a further drag on the economy. According to CAR, the communities and states where GM’s plants are located collectively lost a couple of hundred million dollars in payroll and tax revenue. Some economists warn that if the strike were prolonged it could knock the state of Michigan – home to GM and the UAW – **into a recession.** That prompted the governor of Michigan, Gretchen Whitmer, to call GM CEO Mary Barra and UAW leaders and urge them to settle as fast as possible. So, while the UAW managed to get a nice raise for its members, the strike left a path of destruction in its wake. That’s not fair to the innocent bystanders who will never regain what they lost. John McElroyI’m not sure how this will ever be resolved. I understand the need for collective bargaining and the threat of a strike. But there’s got to be a better way to get workers a raise without torching the countryside.

#### 2] Strikes create a stigmatization effect over labor and consumption that devastates the Economy

Tenza 20, Mlungisi. "The effects of violent strikes on the economy of a developing country: a case of South Africa." Obiter 41.3 (2020): 519-537. (Senior Lecturer, University of KwaZulu-Natal)

When South Africa obtained democracy in 1994, there was a dream of a better country with a new vision for industrial relations.5 However, the number of violent strikes that have bedevilled this country in recent years seems to have shattered-down the aspirations of a better South Africa. South Africa recorded 114 strikes in 2013 and 88 strikes in 2014, which cost the country about **R6.1 billion** according to the Department of Labour.6 The impact of these strikes has been hugely felt by the mining sector, particularly the platinum industry. The biggest strike took place in the platinum sector where about 70 000 mineworkers’ downed tools for better wages. Three major platinum producers (Impala, Anglo American and Lonmin Platinum Mines) were affected. The strike started on 23 January 2014 and ended on 25 June 2014. Business Day reported that “the five-month-long strike in the platinum sector pushed the economy to the brink of recession”. 7 This strike was closely followed by a four-week strike in the metal and engineering sector. All these strikes (and those not mentioned here) were characterised with violence accompanied by damage to property, intimidation, assault and sometimes the killing of people. Statistics from the metal and engineering sector showed that about 246 cases of intimidation were reported, 50 violent incidents occurred, and 85 cases of vandalism were recorded.8 Large-scale unemployment, soaring poverty levels and the dramatic income inequality that characterise the South African labour market provide a broad explanation for strike violence.9 While participating in a strike, workers’ stress levels leave them feeling frustrated at their seeming powerlessness, which in turn provokes further violent behaviour.10 These strikes are not only violent but **take long to resolve.** Generally, a lengthy strike has a **negative effect on employment, reduces business confidence and increases the risk of economic stagflation**. In addition, such strikes have a major setback on the growth of the economy and investment opportunities. It is common knowledge that consumer spending is directly linked to economic growth. At the same time, if the economy is not showing signs of growth, employment opportunities are shed, and poverty becomes the end result. The economy of South Africa is in need of rapid growth to enable it to deal with the high levels of unemployment and resultant poverty. One of the measures that may boost the country’s economic growth is by attracting potential investors to invest in the country. However, this might be difficult as investors would want to invest in a country where there is a likelihood of getting returns for their investments. The wish of getting returns for investment may not materialise if the labour environment **is not fertile**

#### Economic Collapse goes Nuclear.

Tønnesson 15, Stein. "Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace." International Area Studies Review 18.3 (2015): 297-311. (the Department of Peace and Conflict, Uppsala University, Sweden, and Peace research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Norway)

Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances a combination of nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers. At least four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict are right. Interdependence raises the cost of conflict for all sides but asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations may generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that in turn increase the risk of military conflict (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, decisions for war and peace are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. If leaders on either side of the Atlantic begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline then they may blame this on external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain respect or credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and ultimately refuse to be deterred by either nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party. Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions in East Asia are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. The greatest risk is not that a territorial dispute leads to war under present circumstances but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so. Deterrence could lose its credibility: one of the two great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional limited war, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.

#### Nuke war causes extinction – Ice Age, famines, and war won’t stay limited

Edwards 17 [Paul N. Edwards, CISAC’s William J. Perry Fellow in International Security at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. Being interviewed by EarthSky. How nuclear war would affect Earth’s climate. September 8, 2017. earthsky.org/human-world/how-nuclear-war-would-affect-earths-climate] Note, we are only reading parts of the interview that are directly from Paul Edwards -- MMG

In the nuclear conversation, what are we not talking about that we should be?

We are not talking enough about the climatic effects of nuclear war. The “nuclear winter” theory of the mid-1980s played a significant role in the arms reductions of that period. But with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the reduction of U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, this aspect of nuclear war has faded from view. That’s not good. In the mid-2000s, climate scientists such as Alan Robock (Rutgers) took another look at nuclear winter theory. This time around, they used much-improved and much more detailed climate models than those available 20 years earlier. They also tested the potential effects of smaller nuclear exchanges. The result: an exchange involving just 50 nuclear weapons — the kind of thing we might see in an India-Pakistan war, for example — could loft 5 billion kilograms of smoke, soot and dust high into the stratosphere. That’s enough to cool the entire planet by about 2 degrees Fahrenheit (1.25 degrees Celsius) — about where we were during the Little Ice Age of the 17th century. Growing seasons could be shortened enough to create really significant food shortages. So the climatic effects of even a relatively small nuclear war would be planet-wide. What about a larger-scale conflict? A U.S.-Russia war currently seems unlikely, but if it were to occur, hundreds or even thousands of nuclear weapons might be launched. The climatic consequences would be catastrophic: global average temperatures would drop as much as 12 degrees Fahrenheit (7 degrees Celsius) for up to several years — temperatures last seen during the great ice ages. Meanwhile, smoke and dust circulating in the stratosphere would darken the atmosphere enough to inhibit photosynthesis, causing disastrous crop failures, widespread famine and massive ecological disruption. The effect would be similar to that of the giant meteor believed to be responsible for the extinction of the dinosaurs. This time, we would be the dinosaurs. Many people are concerned about North Korea’s advancing missile capabilities. Is nuclear war likely in your opinion? At this writing, I think we are closer to a nuclear war than we have been since the early 1960s. In the North Korea case, both Kim Jong-un and President Trump are bullies inclined to escalate confrontations. President Trump lacks impulse control, and there are precious few checks on his ability to initiate a nuclear strike. We have to hope that our generals, both inside and outside the White House, can rein him in. North Korea would most certainly “lose” a nuclear war with the United States. But many millions would die, including hundreds of thousands of Americans currently living in South Korea and Japan (probable North Korean targets). Such vast damage would be wrought in Korea, Japan and Pacific island territories (such as Guam) that any “victory” wouldn’t deserve the name. Not only would that region be left with horrible suffering amongst the survivors; it would also immediately face famine and rampant disease. Radioactive fallout from such a war would spread around the world, including to the U.S. It has been more than 70 years since the last time a nuclear bomb was used in warfare. What would be the effects on the environment and on human health today? To my knowledge, most of the changes in nuclear weapons technology since the 1950s have focused on making them smaller and lighter, and making delivery systems more accurate, rather than on changing their effects on the environment or on human health. So-called “battlefield” weapons with lower explosive yields are part of some arsenals now — but it’s quite unlikely that any exchange between two nuclear powers would stay limited to these smaller, less destructive bombs.

# Case

## UV

Yes 1AR theory – but no predetermined paradigm issues- since severity of theory and T is different. Prevents friv theory.

No Aff fairness comes before NC args- rif not the aff has a huge adv. Also not reciprocal.

Yes 2N Therory args if necceasry- if not they can be super abusiuve

No evaling debate after 1AR- that’s a 9-7 skew- and non reciprocal

Neg theory good- if they get thepry we get- even if they win affirmin harder there are certain things that should be said and done in debate and the aff can get away w it.

### 1NC – AT Tricks

#### No tricks overview –

#### 1---Yes new 2nr responses to the underview---A] Shiftiness---New 1ar contextualization moots 1nc answers especially because they’re all blippy and the implications aren’t explained B] Clash---Voting us down for missing one blippy spike is antieducational because it moots all of substance for a silly theory argument

#### 2---The underview was super fast and unclear---hold the line and don’t vote on an argument if you can’t trace both the claim and the warrant from your 1ac flow

#### 3---No Timeskew---we both get 13 minutes---Getting faster and more efficient solves small distribution differences

#### 4---Reject sidebias warrants---A] They’re a cool fyi without a reason their interp solves best---Assign their argument 0 risk because its not complete---This is akin to reading a disad without an internal link B] Kills clash and normsetting because its just arbitrary assertions about who should get more leeway instead of the best norm for debate C] No offense---We both debate each side half the time, so skews cancel out and the game is fair D] Skews self-correcting since aff can consolidate and doesn’t have to answer each argument since they get the last speech

#### 5---Reject arguments that always affirm or negate---Incentivizes reusing arguments and intellectual laziness instead of doing research. At best, the research they do do is worthless and doesn’t mirror academic research practices that are the only portable skill.

#### 6---Negating is harder---A] Aff gets infinite prep and neg has to prep for each aff B] first and last word means they have a persuasiveness advantage C] Aff chooses the terms of the debate in the 1ac

### Comparative Worlds

#### Use a comparative worlds paradigm for evaluating the debate

#### 1 - Structurally removes unfair NIB’s like Skep or Log Con from the debate because they’re either defensive or don’t make sense under comparative worlds

#### 2 - Neg skewed because disproving one word in the rez is enough to negate but the aff has to prove the entire rez true

#### Fairness o/w because it’s constitutive to the activity – i.e. in order to evaluate arguments the judge needs to adjudicate the round fairly

### AT Dictionaries

#### 1 - The rez doesn’t say aff or neg – if anything the word resolved with a colon means we should only debate policies – we could’ve used the words aff and neg

### ACC

#### Counterinterp: the neg can contest the aff’s framework and contention

#### Net benefits:

#### Phil ed – we can’t contest whether the aff’s offense is an example of their framework AND whether the framework is true – don’t learn about OR apply ethics which ow

#### Reciprocity – the 1ar can choose whether or not jettison the contention and read turns under the neg framework OR go for their own framework, but the neg only has 1 substance route to the ballot

#### Our interp is better because anyone can answer any arg – reading offense under other fwks like you did solves

Strat skew – you can go for multiple layers too like 1ar theory

Depth – solved by multiple rounds and more efficiency – phil ed link turns

## Kant

At Bindingness

Yes bindgness- Blum proves this b/c pleasure and pain are intrically valuable meaning if I put my hand over a stove I will move it b/c its painful

### AT action theory

* Util can explain why the constitutive features of an action are morally relevant because those actions are required in order to complete an action that maximizes pleasure
* Util doesn't deny that agents act on reasons — we just contest that value consists in rational agency as opposed to states of affairs

Performativity flows aff

* The ability to make arguments presupposes you are live, which proves we have an obligation to preserve life

### Constistivism

#### Constitutivism fails—showing we inevitably do engage in agency is insufficient to prove we ought to

Enoch 11 [(David, Philosophy Professor at Hebrew University) “Shmagency Revisited,” New Waves in Metaethics pp 208-233, 2011, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230294899\_11] TDI

3.2 Irrelevance

So much, then, for the implausibility of the but-you-do-care response to the whyshould-I-care-about-(e.g.)-self-understanding challenge. What I want to argue now is that even if we ignore this implausibility, still this response cannot possibly work, because it does not even qualify as a response – it fails to address the challenge. The thought here is very simple: Noting that I do Φ is never a good answer to the question whether I should Φ. This is true for actions, and it is just as true for carings. Perhaps I do care about something; but how does noticing this fact count as an answer to the normative question whether I should care about it, or indeed as a reason for caring about it?

The point is not merely an is-ought-gap kind of point. True, some of us have somehow become very good at convincing ourselves that sometimes, an ought can after all be derived from an is, or that some normative facts or properties just are some natural facts or properties, or some such. But what we are up against here is an especially problematic instance of such a move – it is the move from someone caring about something, immediately to it being the case that she should care about it, or at least that she has a reason to so care. I take it even those of us with the strongest stomach for naturalistic fallacies should not be happy with such a move. When someone asks "Why should I care about self-understanding?" (or whatever else is constitutive of agency), and the response comes "But you do care!", all that is needed by way of counter-response is "So what? I asked whether I should care, not whether I 14 do. You haven't answered my question." The but-you-do-care response is thus no response at all. It is utterly irrelevant.

Constitutivists like to emphasize that the agency game is not just one we do play, but also one we cannot avoid playing, agency is – in certain senses – inescapable for creatures like us. Constitutivists then sometimes suggest that the inescapability of agency somehow helps with the shmagency challenge (and related challenges) 17.

Thus, Velleman (136-7) distinguishes two senses of inescapability, suggesting that their combined strength helps in answering the why-should-I-care-about-self-understanding challenge. His two senses may be labeled natural and dialectical18. Let me postpone discussion of dialectical inescapability to sections 5 through 7. The natural inescapability of agency seems to come down to the fact that we cannot opt out of the game of agency, such opting out is just not something we can do. We can, of course, choose to end our lives, but as I also noted in "Agency, Shmagency" (188), far from opting out of the game of agency, this would be a major move within this game. And we can temporarily opt out of this game, say by going to sleep. But still, acting and choosing is, as Korsgaard likes to put things, "our plight"19.

I want to concede that agency is indeed naturally inescapable for us. But I also want to note (as I did, to an extent, in "Agency, Shmagency" (188 and on)) that such inescapability does not matter in our context, and in particular does not render the but- you-do-care response any better. For the move from "You inescapably Φ" to "You should Φ" is no better – not even the tiniest little bit – than the move from "You actually Φ" to "You should Φ".

#### Even if shmagency is impossible the objection still applies

Enoch 11 [(David, Philosophy Professor at Hebrew University) “Shmagency Revisited,” New Waves in Metaethics pp 208-233, 2011, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230294899\_11] TDI

Perhaps an example can help here. Assume a philosopher – call her the paperskeptic – who believes that there's something intellectually corrupting about the papers analytic philosophers are so fond of reading and writing. Philosophical progress, she thinks, can only be achieved by writing books. The paper-frenzy is just a race to philosophical superficiality, and an incentive to substitute technical skills for deep philosophical insights. Being a conscientious professional, she writes this all down, presenting her analysis and arguments, culminating in the conclusion that philosophers should not write papers. But – in order for the example to be interesting – she writes this all down in the format of a paper, and proceeds to submit it to her friendly-neighborhood philosophy journal (where it is rejected, without comments, eleven months later).

Now, us paper-writing philosophers are eager to defeat the paper-skeptic's challenge. Does it suffice, in order to do that, to show that she has no stable ground to stand on while she's launching her attack, that in a sense she defeats herself because she wrote down her paper-skepticism in the form of a paper? Perhaps – though I doubt it – this shows that our paper-skeptic is in some sense in trouble. But this certainly does not show that we are out of trouble. If her arguments still work, then we – committed as we are to writing papers – are in trouble. We need a substantive answer to the challenge she puts in a sort-of self-defeating way. The challenge is real enough. It is real enough even if putting her paper-skepticism in the format of a paper is for some reason inescapable for her. Indeed, the challenge is real enough even if a paper-skeptic does not, or even cannot, exist. And so it is better to tell the story without anthropomorphizing the arguments at all. There are arguments attempting to show that we shouldn't be so seriously into writing papers. We need to deal with these arguments. It just doesn't matter whether there is a character – the paper-skeptic – who can help us make this debate more dramatic. And even if there is such a character, we should not mistake finding flaws with her for vindicating our paperwriting practices28. We should not, in a term I borrow from Crispin Wright (1991, 89), commit the mistake of the adversarial stance.

The analogy, I hope, is clear. Showing that the practical-reason-skeptic (the one asking "Why should I care about (e.g.) self-understanding?") has no safe grounds from which to launch his attack is neither here nor there. It does not even begin to vindicate practical reason. Thinking otherwise is like settling – in the discussion with the paper-skeptic – for noting that she's written a paper, without tackling her arguments against paper-writing head on. And so here too – as in the paper-skepticism case – we are better off avoiding the dramatic effects and anthropomorphizing the challenge. The challenge is a challenge for us, non-skeptic as we are29. It is we who have to come up with a theory of normativity that will be adequate (at least) by our own lights. It is we who must be convinced that agency is not normatively arbitrary (for us), that

we do have, even upon reflection, reason to care about whatever it is that's constitutive of action and agency30, even if regardless of having or failing to have such a story, we inescapably do care about it. And so, it is us who are vulnerable to the shmagency challenge. Whether or not there is an agent (or a shmagent) who can stably embody this challenge is just beside the point.

#### No link – util agrees that intrinsic values exist and torture is intrinsically wrong

Vergara 11 [(Francisco, economist and philosopher, author of The Philosophical Foundations of Liberalism) “Bentham and Mill on the ‘quality’ of Pleasures,” Revue d’études benthamiennes, 9/15/2011] JL  
These critics are wrong on two counts. First of all, as we saw above, the fact that something has “no intrinsic value” does not imply that it is less important than other things. Some of the most important institutions for a happy society (taxes and prisons, for example) are, in a greater or lesser degree, unpleasant in themselves but have, through their consequences, enormous value.

42Second of all, in the utilitarian system everything that is pleasant in itself has intrinsic value. And anyone who has lived through a period of oppression knows how unpleasant it is to be deprived of freedom of expression and how pleasant it is to recover it afterwards (independently of the well-known *beneficial consequences* of free discussion).

43Freedom of expression is so unpleasant to be deprived of (has so much intrinsic value) that people who are accustomed to it would not accept *a life without it* in exchange for *a life* containing any amount of ice-cream, tobacco, wine or whatever other pleasure of “mere sensation” they may happen to enjoy. As Mill writes (in an often misunderstood phrase), they “would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of”.[**21**](https://journals.openedition.org/etudes-benthamiennes/422?lang=en#ftn21)

44This is what Mill means when he writes that, for those who have become familiarized with them, the pleasures “of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments”[**22**](https://journals.openedition.org/etudes-benthamiennes/422?lang=en#ftn22) have an *intrinsic* *superiority* over the pleasures of “mere sensation”. The word “intrinsic” simply points to the fact that the superior value of these pleasures lies not only in their excellent consequences; but also in the fact that they are better as pleasures.

45What seems to trouble authors like Sen is that when Utilitarians elevate a freedom (like *freedom of* *expression*) to the rank of “a right” – meaning that society has the duty to intervene if someone is deprived of it – they do not do this because of its “intrinsic value” (*its* *pleasantness*); they do it because of its “public utility” (*its consequences and implications*for the happiness of the community).

46A similar mistake is made by Harvard Professor Michael Sandel, who writes that Utilitarians “do not assert that torturing a human being is intrinsically wrong, only that practicing torture will have bad effects”.[**23**](https://journals.openedition.org/etudes-benthamiennes/422?lang=en#ftn23) The truth is almost the exact opposite. All Utilitarians consider torture to be intrinsically wrong; some Utilitarians think that it can occasionally have good effects (avoid a catastrophe).

47The explanation, here again, is quite simple. “Pain” is the very definition of evil for Utilitarians. And torture – being deliberately designed to cause physical or mental pain – is undoubtedly evil. Some Stoics may believe that “pain is no evil”, Utilitarians do not.

48But, is torture an intrinsic or an extrinsic evil? Or both? Though *many Utilitarians* believe that, if everything is considered, it will globally produce *bad effects* (which would make it an *extrinsic* evil), all Utilitarians believe that it is very unpleasant in itself, which makes it an intrinsic evil.

### AT universality

* + The implicit generality of reasons does not force me, on pain of inconsistency, to treat others in any particular way — if I view getting to work on time as a reason for getting out of bed in the morning, that means any person, committed to getting to work on time, has reason to get out of bed in the morning — but I am not committed to legislating a rule based on that action that commits me to not impinging the freedom of others — reasons are not laws, and there's no reason to view myself as a legislator

### AT Agency Claims

#### Argumentative context is key to understanding agency, Thompson

David L. Thompson - “Body as the Unity of Action” - 2011-01-10

**Which level of unification we label "agent" or "action" is arbitrary and depends on the context of our conversation. What we should not do is give a non-contextual definition of action and agency** and then excommunicate all other uses of the terms. When conversing about amoebas or giraffes, we can use the term "agent" to mark the important distinction between eating and falling. Talking of bike riding, we can attribute balancing to the action of a body-subject to distinguish it from the movement of flying through the air when hit by a car**. In the interpersonal, social context we can hold a narrative self unified over time responsible for their promise, while accepting that someone with Alzheimer's disease has not "broken a promise," since the unity of their temporal agency has dissipated.**

#### Stable conceptions of personal identity do not exist, Shultz:

Persons, Selves, and Utilitarianism. Bart Shultz.

Furthermore, since on this view the continued existence of a person over time just involves relations that, in their nature, can hold to varying degrees, in cases where these relations hold to an intermediate degree there may not be any deep difference between [so that] a person's identity [can fail] holding or failing to hold. For example, we can imagine a mad neurosurgeon who operates on me in such a way that after the operation the resulting person is, both physically and psychologically, roughly half my former self and half a completely different person. Now, although it may be clear that if I had been completely made over into a replica of somebody else, I would not have survived, and that if almost no changes in my physical or mental make-up had occurred, I would still be me, how does one [cannot] describe the intermediate case [if they believe in the existence of personal identity]? Have I survived? The question, Parfit argues, is an empty one. Although all of the relevant facts are known, no answer will be truly nonarbitrary. Personal identity [is] can, in this sense, be indeterminate.

#### Shmagency answers practical reason

David Enoch 11 [studied law and philosophy in Tel Aviv University, where he earned his B.A. and LL.B. in 1993. After completing his military service and clerking for Justice Dorit Beinisch at the Supreme Court, David turned to graduate studies in philosophy, first in Tel Aviv University, and then at the NYU Philosophy Department, where he earned his Ph.D. in May, 2003], “Shmagency revisited”, In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave Macmillan (2011), BE

If it can be defended, then, constitutivism promises to yield significant payoffs3. But constitutivism seems to be subject to a powerful objection. For agents need not care about their qualifications as agents, or whether some of their bodily movements count as actions. They can, it seems, be perfectly happy being shmagents – non-agent things that lack the thing purportedly constitutive of agency, but that are as similar to agents as is otherwise possible – or perhaps being something else altogether. If so, constitutivism cannot make good on its promises: For when Korsgaard replies to the agent who asks, say, "Why should I care about the hypothetical and categorical imperatives?" with "Well, otherwise you wouldn't even count as an agent, you wouldn't even be in the game of performing actions.", the skeptic can discard this reply with a simple "So-what?". What is it to her, as it were, if she qualifies as an agent or not? She would be analogous not to the chess-player who asks why she should play according to the rules, but to someone who enjoys the aesthetic qualities of (what we call) the chess board and pieces. If we tell this person that he must not move his king to a certain position because it's against the rules, and if he breaks them he won't count as playing chess, he can shrug us off with a simple "So-what?". He doesn’t care whether his manipulation of the chess pieces qualifies as chess-playing. And at this point the objectivity Velleman hopes for also collapses, because the practical reasons whose objectivity Velleman wants to secure will not reach the person who is happy being a shamgent-rather-than-an-agent, or perhaps something else entirely. The general point here is that the status of being constitutive of agency does not suffice for a normatively non-arbitrary status. Of course, if there were some independent reason to be an agent (for instance, rather than a shmagent), or to perform actions, this objection would go away. But the price would be too high, for such an independent reason – one not accounted for by the constitutivist story, but rather presupposed by it – would make it impossible for constitutivism to be the whole, or the most foundational, account of normativity, or to deliver on its promised payoffs.

#### You can act outside of your practical identity, which collapses this f/w, i.e. a student can choose not to study, a citizen of a state can choose to break the law

### AT- Infinite consequences

We can reasonably predict and determine what impacts matter---impacts in the future have lower probability ---- more utilitarian to reasonably make decisions when we’re somewhat confident about the outcome

## AT: Meta Ethic

Interp- debaters may not use meta ethics

#### 1. No individual framing argument can carry enough epistemic weight to disprove every potential objection to its claim. Also proven by the wide disagreement in the field of ethics.

#### 2. Meta-ethics are infinitely regressive in that they beg the question of meta-meta-ethics and meta-meta-meta-ethics, leading to an irresolvable debate, a destruction of clash, and total void of topic discussion.

#### 3. Meta-ethics can be used to justify any practice, making them a meaningless discussion to be had. The sheer number of different meta-ethics proves their irresolvability.