# Glenbrooks R1 1AC

### Harms

#### Workplace discrimination still exists – especially in the context of sexual harassment

**Parker and Funk 2017** (Kim Parker and Cary Funk, December 14, 2017, “Gender discrimination comes in many forms for today’s working women,” Pew Research Center, <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/12/14/gender-discrimination-comes-in-many-forms-for-todays-working-women/>) //neth

About four-in-ten working women (42%) in the United States say they have faced discrimination on the job because of their gender. They report a broad array of personal experiences, ranging from earning less than male counterparts for doing the same job to being passed over for important assignments, according to a new analysis of Pew Research Center survey data. The survey – conducted in the summer before a recent wave of sexual misconduct allegations against prominent men in politics, the media and other industries – found that, among employed adults, women are about twice as likely as men (42% versus 22%) to say they have experienced at least one of eight specific forms of gender discrimination at work. One of the biggest gender gaps is in the area of income: One-in-four working women (25%) say they have earned less than a man who was doing the same job; one-in-twenty working men (5%) say they have earned less than a female peer. Women are roughly four times as likely as men to say they have been treated as if they were not competent because of their gender (23% of employed women versus 6% of men), and they are about three times as likely as men to say they have experienced repeated small slights at work because of their gender (16% versus 5%). There are significant gaps on other items as well. While 15% of working women say they have received less support from senior leaders than a man who was doing the same job, only 7% of working men report having a similar experience. One-in-ten working women say they have been passed over for the most important assignments because of their gender, compared with 5% of men. The survey, which was conducted July 11-Aug. 10, 2017, with a nationally representative sample of 4,914 adults (including 4,702 who are employed at least part time), also asked about sexual harassment in a separate question. It found that while similar shares of women and men say sexual harassment is at least a small problem in their workplace (36% versus 35%), women are about three times as likely as men to have experienced it personally while at work (22% versus 7%).

#### Race and politics also impact gender discrimination

**Parker and Funk 2017** (Kim Parker and Cary Funk, December 14, 2017, “Gender discrimination comes in many forms for today’s working women,” Pew Research Center, <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/12/14/gender-discrimination-comes-in-many-forms-for-todays-working-women/>) //neth

There are differences by race and ethnicity as well. While roughly half of employed black women (53%) say they have experienced at least one type of gender discrimination at work, fewer white and Hispanic women say the same (40% for each group). One area in particular where black women stand apart is in their reporting of having been passed over for the most important assignments because of their gender – 22% of employed black women say this has happened to them, compared with 8% of whites and 9% of Hispanics. Women’s experiences with discrimination in the workplace also differ along party lines. Roughly half (48%) of working Democratic women and Democratic-leaning independents say they have experienced at least one form of gender discrimination at work, compared with a third of Republican and Republican-leaning women. These party differences hold up even after controlling for race. The partisan gap is in keeping with wide party differences among both men and women in their views of gender equality in the U.S.; a separate 2017 Pew Research Center survey found Democrats largely dissatisfied with the country’s progress toward gender equality.

#### Some workers are currently not allowed to strike

**Campbell 2019** (Alexia Campbell “5 Questions About Labor Strikes That You Were Too Embarrassed To Ask.” Vox. September 20, 2019. Web. October 13, 2021. https://www.vox.com/policy-and- politics/2019/9/20/20873867/worker-strike-walkout-stoppage-firing-job) //neth

1) Am I allowed to strike? If you work in the private sector, definitely. It doesn’t matter if you are part of a labor union or not. For government workers, though, it depends. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 enshrined the right to strike into law. At the time, workers were reeling from the Great Depression and President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s pro-labor administration saw collective bargaining as a fundamental right. But the law only covered workers in the private sector, as they were more at risk of being exploited. The NLRA reversed years of federal opposition to organized labor and guaranteed the right of employees to organize, form unions, and bargain collectively with their employers. Striking was considered the most powerful tool in collective bargaining, so it was given special emphasis in the NLRA. “The law protects the right to strike, no question,” Ruben Garcia, co-director of the Workplace Law Program at the University of Nevada Las Vegas, said to me, regarding employees in the private sector. “You don’t have to give any notice or any reason for walking.” But this doesn’t apply to all workers. The NLRA doesn’t cover certain transportation workers, agricultural laborers, or public employees. Government employees — state, local, and federal — do not have a right to strike under the federal law. That said, eight states allow most government employees to strike. Illinois and California, for example, allow teachers to strike. Yet it’s illegal for police and firefighters to walk off the job in any state.

### Solvency

**I affirm resolved: a just government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike as an act of solidarity with marginalized peoples. To clarify, we defend the postfiat implementation of the res and the liberatory impacts of an unconditional right to strike.**

#### International experts agree that RTS is a human right.

**Garcia 2017** (Jose Garcia. “THE RIGHT TO STRIKE AS A FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHT: RECOGNITION AND LIMITATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW.” Revista Chilena de Derecho. 2017. Web. October 13, 2021. https://www.redalyc.org/pdf/1770/177054481008.pdf) //neth

The recognition of the right to strike as a fundamental right in the context of the ILO standards has been the result of the work performed mainly by two of its supervisory bodies: the Committee on Freedom of Association (a committee of the Governing Body with a tripartite composition) and the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (conformed by independent experts appointed by the Governing Body). As Gernigon, Odero and Guido have pointed out4 , both the Committee of Experts and the Committee on Freedom of Association have consistently indicated that there is a fundamental right to strike for workers that emanates from the content of Convention N°87, particularly from its articles 35 and 106. The interpretation given by both Committees is based in the idea, expressed in these articles, that the ILO members are bound to respect and protect the autonomy of employer’s and worker’s organizations whose purpose is to defend and put forward the interests of their members. The inequality of bargaining power that exists between employers and workers can only be counterbalanced through collective action and industrial action is the only way in which workers can put pressure on the employers to improve labour conditions. As Bellace points out, the Committee on Freedom of Association recognized this reality since its earlier days and considered that the right to strike was an intrinsic aspect of the principle of Freedom of Association that emanated from the ILO’s Declaration of Philadelphia and Convention N°87. In her words, “it is reasonable to conclude that its members believed that a right to strike was implicit in the Convention’s guarantee of freedom of association”7. Hence, this Committee has considered that the right to strike is “an intrinsic corollary to the right to organize protected by Convention No. 87”8 and “one of the essential means through which workers and their organizations may promote and defend their economic and social interests”9. A similar conceptualization can be found in the reports of the Committee of Experts. For example, in their 2010 Report on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations10, the Committee referred to the right to strike in the same terms11, remarking the very similar approaches that both bodies have adopted when assessing the position of the right to strike within the ILO standards. The ILO supervisory system has worked since under the shared understanding that the right to strike is protected by ILO standards, and there has been a wide consensus about its importance in the context of Freedom of Association and trade union rights. In recent years, however, the ILO forum has been the scenario of a growing polemic regarding the place of the right to strike and the role of the ILO supervisory machinery (particularly the Committee of Experts). The employer’s representatives have questioned in strong terms the very existence of a right to strike and have declared that the Committee of Experts has exceeded its mandate by creating what they see as an overreaching and unlimited right to strike with no warrant in the ILO Conventions. Many of the arguments expressed by the employers are contained in an article written by Alfred Wisskirchen, a former employer spokesperson at the ILO Conference Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations. Most of his article is dedicated to a wider subject: a critique of the state of the ILO’s standard setting and supervisory machinery during the last 30 years of the twentieth century. In the final pages of his piece, however, he mounts a strong and direct critique of the way in which the Committee of Experts has performed its task in recent (and not so recent) years. He claims that the Committee has “formulated a comprehensive corpus of minutely detailed strike law which amounts to a far-reaching, unrestricted freedom to strike”12. This encompasses with one of his general critiques of the ILO’s supervisory machinery: the extent of the mandate of the Committee of Experts. Wisskirchen sees many of the Committee’s actions in recent decades as transgressions of the mandate intended when the ILO Conference created it in 1926.

#### Organized strikes give workers more leverage – now is the best time to strike

**Janse et al 2021** (Alejandra Marquez Janse, Ailsa Chang, Courtey Dorning, and Matt Ozug, November 2, 2021, “3 reasons labor strikes are surging right now — and why they could continue to grow,” National Public Radio, <https://www.npr.org/2021/11/02/1051112806/strikes-labor-great-resignation-covid>) //neth

Thousands of workers across the U.S. are on strike, demanding better wages, better working conditions and more benefits. In what some have called "Striketober," workers in factories as well as the health care and food industries have either started or authorized strikes in the past month. It comes after more than a year of working during the pandemic and as millions of workers are quitting in what has been named the "Great Resignation." Joseph McCartin is a professor of history and the director of the Kalmanovitz Initiative for Labor and the Working Poor at Georgetown University. He spoke with NPR's All Things Considered about why so many American workers seem to be either striking or threatening to strike. Ailsa Chang: Why exactly are we seeing so many strikes right now in particular? McCartin: One [reason] is that workers have just come through the pandemic and the economy is just beginning to improve. And usually, after a big crisis and when things begin to improve, workers can become more militant. I think the fact that this has coincided with the "Great Resignation" is also crucial because we've seen a tremendous upsurge in workers quitting jobs in the private sector. And that's unusual. In August, we set a record for such quits, and what I think that shows is there's a broad dissatisfaction that workers feel and that's giving workers who are organized more leverage. The third thing is that people see now that they have an administration in power that's really openly siding with workers and even taking positions in support of strikes. It's very unusual for Cabinet members to visit strike picket lines. Could that mean that we will be seeing even more strikes soon? Strikes tend to breed strikes. If workers see that strikes are being effective, they're more likely to use the strike weapon. What makes this current wave of strikes significant or unique? I think one of the things that makes it unique is the post-pandemic context. The pandemic disrupted a lot of the status quo and labor management relations in a way that only happened, I think, three times in the 20th century — after both of the world wars and during the Great Depression. It was in each of those cases, by the way, that we saw a big upsurge in worker militancy. When the status quo gets upended, it changes workers' expectations. Coming out of World War II, workers had made sacrifices and they wanted rewards after the war. I think a similar feeling pervades the American workforce today. A lot of people sacrificed a lot in the past year — the essential workers, for example — and yet they're looking at a labor market that they feel still doesn't reward them as they feel they ought to be rewarded. Do you think workers actually do have more leverage at this moment? They actually do have more leverage right now, and part of that has to do with the "Great Resignation," which is showing discontent that is tightening the labor market. What's unique about this moment is there is a labor shortage that many employers are complaining about, but it's a labor shortage that is largely worker driven. Workers have been withdrawing from the labor market in dissatisfaction with the jobs they currently have. We still haven't returned to the job levels we had before the recession; we're about 80% of what we had before COVID struck. Could this "Striketober" stretch into a months-long wave and have maybe even long-term impacts? It could. It could last for quite a while. The militancy that came up after World War II went on for more than a year, and it did have long-term consequences. The same thing after World War I. And what happened in those cases, especially after World War I — employers started to realize from the postwar strike militancy that workers weren't as happy as they thought that they were, and that the jobs needed to be improved and employers needed to get on that program and make some improvements. So, we could possibly see that.

**RTS is good for indigenous people – they WANT to strike and the aff yields protections for them to do so**

**Bocanegra 2020** (Nelson Bocanegra, October 21, 2020, “Thousands, including indigenous people, march in peaceful Colombia protests,” Reuters, <https://www.reuters.com/article/colombia-protests/thousands-including-indigenous-people-march-in-peaceful-colombia-protests-idUSKBN27706S>) //rr

BOGOTA (Reuters) - Thousands of union members, teachers, students and indigenous people participated in a national strike in Colombia on Wednesday to protest the social and economic policies of President Ivan Duque, the killing of human rights activists and police violence. The marches are the latest in a sporadic series of protests which began late last year, including September demonstrations against police brutality that led to 13 deaths. The government warned protesters of increased risk of coronavirus infections. Colombia, which was under lockdown for more than five months, is set to top one million confirmed infections this weekend. Protesters are demanding a variety of government concessions, including guaranteed income for those who lost jobs in the pandemic, more funding for health and education and steps to stop gender-based violence. “We’re asking for no more massacres against our indigenous leaders,” said Harold Arias, 32, who was among thousands of indigenous people visiting Bogota to protest in Bolivar Plaza. “We’re not scared of coronavirus. We’re scared of going back to our territories without getting a dialogue with the president.” Protest leaders had demanded a meeting with Duque to discuss the murders of activists, whose deaths the government attributes to criminal gangs and leftist rebels. Some 10,000 indigenous people came to Bogota to protest this week, principally from southwestern Colombia. “Not even the pandemic will stop our movement,” said Hermes Pete, head of the Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca (CRIC). Most of the indigenous demonstrators began their journey home on Wednesday afternoon. Bogota mayor Claudia Lopez attributed the day’s peacefulness to the presence of indigenous people, who use the term “minga” to refer to collective action. “We are grateful to the minga for the great example it gave to the city and to the social organizations who have followed it,” Lopez said on Twitter.

### Fw

#### Prioritizing womens rights and economic equality in policymaking is key to creating positive material consequences

**MacLaren 2015** (Barb MacLaren, “To empower women, prioritize their social and economic rights,” World Economic Forum, May 28 2015, <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/05/to-empower-women-prioritize-their-social-and-economic-rights/>) //neth

Which leads to a provocative question: could governments have more impact helping women by advancing the social and economic rights of the rural poor, rather than spending years formulating public policies specific to women’s rights? Some anecdotal evidence from Colombia supports the argument that prioritizing the social and economic rights of the rural poor may indeed better advance the broader agenda for women’s rights. In Colombia, women’s integration into a rural wage-earning labour market is severely hindered by the smallholder family farm as the country’s predominant unit of production. In the coffee sector, for example, the average Colombian producer’s crop is less than five sq. hectares and permanent workers are often not paid until crops are sold. In this context, governments can largely only support women’s economic empowerment by helping to support family incomes in the aggregate. Formalization of the rural labour force and promoting decent work agendas need to be at the heart of this effort. While we wait for these agendas to gain traction, key opportunities for the fulfilment of economic rights in Colombia include: expanded credit and better and more direct links to buyers in domestic and international commodity markets, on the one hand, balanced by government programs to support those that fall between the cracks—such as female heads of household and displaced families affected by the armed conflict—on the other hand. The female coffee producers involved in my research in Colombia had lower education levels, on average, than their husbands and common-law partners. Gender-targeted investments in training and education in rural communities would not only result in higher earnings potential (as women become more likely to afford child care) but the investment would also yield many beneficial secondary impacts for families (such as increased status of women within the family linked to their educational attainment). Many of the women I encountered during fieldwork in coffee communities were inclined to perceive their wellbeing as directly linked to that of their children. As a result, many had received extension services (training to improve crop yields) or technical training of some sort, but didn’t complete trainings because course schedules interfered with family obligations. As the 2011 FAO Women in Agriculture report recommends, ensuring extension services in agricultural communities aren’t discriminatory would help increase training completion rates among women. Of course, this goes hand in hand with the need to extend child care services in Colombia—another (if perhaps unarticulated) social right that would disproportionately benefit women. Women farmers surveyed by my project valued their health lower than that of the men in their families and were less likely to seek medical assistance than were their husbands. Only with better education outcomes for girls (to encourage women to seek assistance) and higher rural incomes (to be distributed more equitably among family members), will social norms like these start to change. For example, in our field workshops, adolescent pregnancies were identified as a common challenge, which higher secondary school completion rates among girls would no doubt help to reduce. More accessible health care in rural areas wouldn’t hurt either: Colombia has one of the highest maternal mortality rates in Latin America, at 83 deaths per 100,000 births. In reality, we need to engage both strategies in tandem. That is, we need to promote women’s rights and fight discrimination in all its forms, as well as promote the social and economic rights of all. Governments, including Colombia’s, would do better if they implemented comprehensive approaches (at various levels) to tackle gender issues. With the creation of a Presidential Commission (“La Alta Consejería Presidencial para la Equidad de Género”) to implement the National Policy on Gender Equity, Colombia embarked on just such an effort; now it needs to follow through on its promise. Unfortunately, President Juan Manuel Santos put the equity policy on the backburner following his re-election last year, leaving the Vice Minister responsible with an extremely downsized staff.

#### The panic over potential threats to the nation is a form of masculine futurity which allows reproductive bodies to be regulated. Claims of utilitarianism justify the endless sacrifice of reproductive freedom in the name of the “greatest good.”

Petersen 15 (Kristin Petersen B.A., University of Southern California 2003 M.A. New York University 2008, A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies of Emory University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies, The Logic of Futurity: Reproduction, Cultural Eugenics, and Contingencies of Women’s Citizenship in the Contemporary United States, Proquest, JKS)

Cultural theorist Ruth McElroy suggests, “Women’s belonging to nations is indissoluble from their reproductive biology” (325). For all that motherhood may be conceived as a private choice occurring in the supposedly private sphere, reproduction and motherhood are nonetheless public and political as well, and thoroughly entangled with women’s status as members of their nation. By virtue of their reproduction (or even lack thereof!), women can be constructed in cultural narratives and political scripts as contributors to society or threats to the national good, caretakers of the future who merit protection and support or wayward parents who must be disciplined back into the national fold, national maternal ideals or outsiders within. The state’s identification of and response to women as reproducers reflects the continuous processes of the politics of belonging, which “involve not only the maintenance and reproduction of the boundaries of the community of belonging by the hegemonic political powers...but also by their contestation, challenge and resistance by other political agents” (Yuval-Davis 20). We see these politics of belonging manifested not only discursively, but also in the policies and laws that protect or privilege some mothers and not others, some children, but not all. When anthropologists Faye Ginsburg and Rayna Rapp ask, “who defines the body of the nation into which the next generation is recruited? Who is considered to be in that national body, who is out of it?” (3), therefore, there is no one answer; rather, this is the question perpetually being asked and answered by political discourse and practice infused with the logic of futurity. The hopes and fears of the present political moment and the imaginative desires for the future are thus continually projected upon the bodies of women and their procreative capacities. Futurity, I suggest in this project, as a possibly inevitable perspective or worldview, allows for the state to focus on women as reproductive beings in a way that it does not for men. Following from Foucault’s explication of biopower, the modern state takes an interest in the workings and ostensible health of its populations, creating new knowledges and indices for the normal as it counts up the characteristics of its citizenry and sets goals for demographic management. While Foucault tends not to focus on the reproductive elements of the state’s biopolitical interest—for instance, the setting of ideal rates of fertility, health expectations for women and children, creation of access to the medical, economic, and social resources needed for reproduction—these are, I would argue, operations of the state that have potential for tremendous impacts upon women particularly. The other biopolitical interests of the state—appropriate number of workers, manageable immigration rates, proper ratio of elderly to young, and so on—are also all implicated in the procreative behaviors of women, which would seem to intensify the state’s interest in them. Brought into the broader framework of women’s political status and national belonging, reproduction in this context seems poised to function as an axis upon which the dispensation of women’s citizenship can pivot, with particular regard to her racial, economic, and social demographic and the state’s assessment of her (and her children’s) value to the national future. Penelope Deutscher suggests that through the emergence of biopower: Women would later assume a status as a reproductive threshold of the future and health of nations, populations and peoples. But the condition for this role for women and maternal reproductivity was the very possibility of reproduction being associated with a shifting field of possible substances, telos, outcomes and obligations: the overall good, the general happiness, the future of the nation, the health of the nation, the competitiveness of the nation, the future of the people, individual flourishing or freedom, individual rights, domestic happiness, the family unit as building block of the nation, the transmission of the bloodline, the family name, transmission of property or family or genealogical transmission, reproduction of the labour force, etc. That reproduction be plausibly thought of in such terms at all was a precondition of it becoming associated with women’s role as threshold of futurity. (Deutscher 129) The state’s biopolitical management of women’s reproduction may thus allow it to approach women primarily as reproductive beings, an essentalist or even utilitarian collapse that may make it easier to intervene upon their bodies and perhaps reflects a deeply ingrained discomfort with the notion that women have tremendous potential power to impact the composition of the future. In this project, I am proposing a framework of futurity that is in operation, characterized by discursive and eugenic aspects, that uses women as the vehicle for future world-building and nation-making. This futurity aims to enact particular visions of the future via changes in the present, particularly through the management of women’s reproduction in the present such that the future population comports with present desires. When this futurity framework is picked up by the state in its various capacities, I suggest there are significant consequences for women’s citizenship as women because they are so intrinsically linked in the cultural and political imaginary with reproduction. In the process of grappling with these concepts, this project asks how the logic of futurity functions to organize the terms of women’s social or political belonging in reproductive terms. How does the state pick up and extend this logic to women, and how might that impact the meaningfulness of women’s citizenship or national belonging? Does the logic of futurity, the constant pressure of the forward vision combined with the imaginative limitations of the present, insist upon women’s citizenship being or becoming something fundamentally different from men’s by virtue of reproductive capacity and association? Exploring these questions brings this project into several disciplinary contexts, including feminist theory and philosophy, political theory, disability theory (eugenics), and even the sphere of economics. In connecting these concepts to ongoing conversations about women and citizenship in the contemporary United States, this project is ultimately working to tie together disparate fields and illuminate how they interact with respect to a model of futurity that I theorize as containing discursive and eugenic aspects. It may be that state-based discourses and practices related to women’s reproduction and citizenship are not so much causes as they are effects of the logic of futurity.

#### [ROJ & Mehta] Creating solidarity is good and this starts with including more womxn in the space. A rejection of the patriarchal form of debate is key and this is the place to resist it. Thus, the role of the judge is to be an anti-patriarchal educator.

**Mehta 2019** (Damini Mehta, Feminism In India, Feminisminindia.com, February 4, 2019, “Does Patriarchy Divide Women: The Importance Of Solidarity”, <https://feminisminindia.com/2019/02/04/patriarchy-divide-women-solidarity/>) // Hill NL

Patriarchy and the way it has manifested, and has continued to, has long been a matter of analytical concern and still continues to be one. A very subtle yet explicit way that it manifests out of the many other renditions of its existence, is one where it thrives by being a divisive force under the garb of competition, or by creating a comparative – which results in being exclusionary in so far as it creates an illusion of how there can be only ‘one suitable woman’ for whatever category or space it seeks to compare women in. Therefore, it ends up being very reductive in the way that it views women as a community and a collective. While patriarchy has always thrived on not letting women ever be equals, the way it’s shaped itself within the popular narrative to still continue to thrive with changing climates is by morphing into more subtle forms. A very significant manifestation of this is how patriarchy internalises as well as pits women against each other. In an atmosphere where the feminist movement and how it engages with patriarchy becomes extremely relevant, it becomes very pertinent to analyse the consequences of how it pans out. It creates a narrative where women cannot thrive; but even if they somehow manage to, the way it then restricts them is by creating a narrative of “only a select few of you can actually access resources and prestige, and that has to be done at the cost of the others.” How this is achieved is by patriarchy pitting women against another in a manner where women start negatively viewing their female counterparts – and seeing themselves as the one successful woman. As a consequence of this, women are given a climate where they are implicitly or explicitly encouraged to pull each other down and to do whatever it takes to be the one woman who’s better out of all women in that position. As a consequence, a very strong sense of animosity festers between women, who are already minorities within very male dominated workspaces. This sense of animosity is encouraged in these environments and workspaces under the garb of ‘healthy competition’ and ‘achievement’, but they often end up further dividing women and making their interactions with each other more toxic. This sort of a mudslinging competition sponsored by patriarchy further divides women – for what threatens patriarchy is women and other gendered minorities banding together against a common oppressor. If they’re too busy fighting amongst themselves, they won’t be able to figure out that this sort of division is being sponsored by a common oppressor. This illusion of achievement which is propagated not only creates divide between women, it also restricts access to resources to women – because now structures don’t have to make more inclusive spaces for have more seats at the table for women, they just have to pit them against one another to see which one comes out on top. This creation of division and toxic competition is also a very problematic cause which contributes to a systematic exclusion of women from systems and institutions. As a consequence, institutions don’t have any incentive to create spaces for women beyond the tokenistic ‘inclusive’ spaces they have to create – a very half-hearted effort at the bare minimum to bridge the gender gap. This is very visible if we take a comparative – out of all Fortune 500 company CEOs, only 5% are women. This is the representation of the creamiest layer of the work industry – representation only grows thinner from here onwards, as we go to the lower rungs of corporations, and within the corporate ladder, the lower rungs of the business company ecosystem. However, in this climate, what has been a very prominent development is women recognising this systemic problem and taking active steps to address it. Women have created a community that is slowly but surely becoming immune to the divisive forces that patriarchy creates. Prominent examples of this are Lilly Singh, and India origin Canadian Youtuber and her campaign #GirlLove, and closer home, women like Rega Jha, an Instagram Influencer. Even the Indian beauty community which is flourishing is seeing a very inclusive and positive space for women to share and grow together. This sense of community which comes out of shared lived experiences and other overlapping diaspora within which people function, is very important for it not only helps in the creation and sustenance of a bond but also an unsaid implicit contract which manifests in the form of being able to celebrate each other’s’ successes because they realise that an individual success is also success on a larger level, a collective success which creates space for more recognition and more merit. This ecosystem of solidarity and collectivisation based on being able to help each other in creating more success not only helps the individual, but also stands in direct contrast to the toxic ecosystem of patriarchy – and challenges it. But solidarity isn’t only limited to this – it is also a sense of community where women allow each other space for their own unique expression. This is an expression that comes out of not encroaching on each others’ spaces. Women of upper castes and upper classes don’t take up space meant for and deserved by women who may not be from that same privilege, women don’t take up spaces meant for trans people and other gendered minorities; just creating a more inclusive space meant for celebrating and building each other up – to challenge[s] the contours of patriarchy and [helps us] thrive despite its oppression.

#### [ROB & Raider and Griffin] Womxn role models are key to retention of womxn in the space – inclusivity is the key starting point. Thus, the role of the ballot is to endorse the debater who best includes womxn in the debate space

Raider and Griffin 1989 J. Cinder Griffin and Holly Jane Raider. “Women in High School Debate”. *Punishment Paradigms : Pros and Cons 1989*. [http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Griffin&Raider1989PunishmentPar.htm //](http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Griffin&Raider1989PunishmentPar.htm%20//) PZ

'I don't usually vote for girl debaters because debate really is a boy's activity. I am surprised by your ability to handle these issues.' This is virtually a verbatim quote received by one of the authors on a ballot during her senior year in high school. A woman wrote the ballot. In recent years there has been some effort to isolate the factors that limit the participation of women in collegiate debate.2 These studies are superfluous if the factors regarding participation of females at the high school level are not understood. Unfortunately, no such formal research attempt has been made to explain the reasons underlying the thoughts that contribute to the opening quote. The issue of participation of other minority groups in debate is a topic beyond the scope of our discussion. The virtual non-existence of minorities is a deeply disturbing issue and deserves further investigation. Understanding gender and minority selection of debate as an activity in high school level is useful in explaining those selection factors at the collegiate level. One finds few college debaters who were not exposed to the activity in high school. Furthermore, it is unlikely that a female who has not experienced some competition and success in the activity while in high school will remain, very much less begin, debating in college. Additionally, given its competitive nature, quest for excellence, and skewed gender composition, debate offers a micro-model of the business and academic worlds. There are implications for female representation and treatment in these societal roles as debaters tend to become leaders in both the business and academic worlds. As the perceptions of women ingrained through debate experience are translated into society at large through leadership positions, the implications for under-representation of women in debate takes on greater significance. This article addresses several of the reasons behind female participation rates at the high school level and offers a few solutions to the problem. All things being equal, one would assume roughly equal numbers of male and female participants in high school debate. Debate, unlike athletics, does not require physical skills which might restrict the participation of women. Additionally, debate is academically oriented and women tend to select extracurricular activities , that are more academic in nature than men.3 Based on these assumptions, one would expect proportional representation of the genders in the activity. Why then, are there four times more men in debate than women? Several explanations exist that begin to account for the low rate of female participation in debate. Fewer females enter the activity at the outset. Although organizational and procedural tactics used in high school debate may account for low initial rates of participation, a variety of social and structural phenomena, not necessarily caused by the debate community also account for these rates. Ultimately, the disproportionate attrition rate of female debaters results in the male dominated composition of the activity. There are more disincentives for women to participate in debate than for men. While entry rates for women and man may in some cases be roughly equal, the total number of women who participate for four years is significantly lower than the corresponding number of men. This rate of attrition is due to factors that can be explained largely by an examination of the debate community itself. Socially inculcated values contribute to low rates of female entry in high school debate. Gender bias and its relation to debate has been studied by Manchester and Freidly. They conclude, "[m]ales are adhering to sex-role stereotypes and sex-role expectations when they participate in debate because it is perceived as a masculine' activity. Female debate participants experience more gender-related barriers because they are not adhering to sex-role stereotypes and sex-role expectations.5 In short, 'nice girls' do not compete against or with men, are not assertive, and are not expected to engage in policy discourse, particularly relating to military issues. Rather, "nice girls" should be cheerleaders, join foreign language clubs, or perhaps participate in student government. It should be noted that many of these attitudes are indoctrinated at birth and cannot be directly attributed to the debate community. However, there are many activity specific elements that discourage female participation in high school debate. Structural barriers endemic to the forensics community dissuade female ninth graders from entering the activity.6 Recruitment procedures and initial exposure may unintentionally create a first impression of the activity as dominated by men. By and large, it is a male debater or a male debate coach that will discuss the activity with new students for the first time. Additionally, most debate coaches are men. This reinforces a socially proven norm to prospective debaters, that debate is an activity controlled by men. This male exposure contributes to a second barrier to participation. Parents are more likely to let a son go on an overnight than they are a daughter, particularly when the coach is male and the squad is mostly male. This may be a concern even when the coach is a trusted member of the community. While entry barriers are formidable, female attrition rates effect the number of women in the activity most significantly. Rates of attrition are largely related to the level of success. Given the time and money commitment involved in debate, if one is not winning one quits debating. The problem is isolating the factors that contribute to the early failure of women debaters. Even if equal numbers of males and females enter at the novice level, the female perception of debate as a whole is not based on the gender proportions of her immediate peer group. Rather, she looks to the composition of debaters across divisions. This may be easily understood if one considers the traditional structures of novice debate. Often it is the varsity debate team, composed mostly of males, who coach and judge novice. Novices also learn how to debate by watching debates. Thus, the role models will be those individuals already involved in the activity and entrenched in its values. The importance of female role models and mentors should not be underestimated. There is a proven correlation between the number of female participants and the number of female coaches and judges.8 The presence of female mentors and role models may not only help attract women to the activity, but will significantly temper the attrition rate of female debaters. Novice, female debaters have few role models and, consequently, are more likely to drop out than their male counterparts; resulting in an unending cycle of female attrition in high school debate. Pragmatically, there are certain cost benefit criteria that coaches on the high school level, given the constraints of a budget, must consider. Coaches with teams dominated by males may be reluctant to recruit females due to traveling and housing considerations. Thus, even if a female decides to join the team, her travel opportunities may be more limited than those of the males on the team. Once a female has "proven" herself, the willingness to expend team resources on her increases, assuming she overcomes the initial obstacles.

**[Bleiker] Singular political strategies are doomed to failure – methodological pluralism is necessary to any sustainable critique, which justifies perms to any K- we impact turn your notion of “severance” or “exclusivity.”**

**Bleiker ’14** [Roland, professor of international relations at the university of Queensland. “International Theory Between Reification and Self-Reflective Critique” International Studies Review, Volume 16, Issue 2. June 17, 2014]

This book is part of an increasing trend of scholarly works that have embraced poststructural critique but want to ground it in more positive political foundations, while retaining a reluctance to return to the positivist tendencies that implicitly underpin much of constructivist research. The path that Daniel Levine has carved out is innovative, sophisticated, and convincing. A superb scholarly achievement. For Levine, the key challenge in international relations (IR) scholarship is what he calls “unchecked reification”: the widespread and dangerous process of forgetting “the distinction between theoretical concepts and the real-world things they mean to describe or to which they refer” (p. 15). The dangers are real, Levine stresses, because IR deals with some of the most difficult issues, from genocides to war. Upholding one subjective position without critical scrutiny can thus have far-reaching consequences. Following Theodor Adorno—who is the key theoretical influence on this book—Levine takes a post-positive position and assumes that the world cannot be known outside of our human perceptions and the values that are inevitably intertwined with them. His ultimate goal is to overcome reification, or, to be more precise, to recognize it as an inevitable aspect of thought so that its dangerous consequences can be mitigated. Levine proceeds in three stages: First he reviews several decades of IR theories to resurrect critical moments when scholars displayed an acute awareness of the dangers of reification. He refreshingly breaks down distinctions between conventional and progressive scholarship, for he detects self-reflective and critical moments in scholars that are usually associated with straightforward positivist positions (such as E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, or Graham Allison). But Levine also shows how these moments of self-reflexivity never lasted long and were driven out by the compulsion to offer systematic and scientific knowledge. The second stage of Levine's inquiry outlines why IR scholars regularly closed down critique. Here, he points to a range of factors and phenomena, from peer review processes to the speed at which academics are meant to publish. And here too, he eschews conventional wisdom, showing that work conducted in the wake of the third debate, while explicitly post-positivist and critiquing the reifying tendencies of existing IR scholarship, often lacked critical self-awareness. As a result, Levine believes that many of the respective authors failed to appreciate sufficiently that “reification is a consequence of all thinking—including itself” (p. 68). The third objective of Levine's book is also the most interesting one. Here, he outlines the path toward what he calls “sustainable critique”: a form of self-reflection that can counter the dangers of reification. Critique, for him, is not just something that is directed outwards, against particular theories or theorists. It is also inward-oriented, ongoing, and sensitive to the “limitations of thought itself” (p. 12). The challenges that such a sustainable critique faces are formidable. Two stand out: First, if the natural tendency to forget the origins and values of our concepts are as strong as Levine and other Adorno-inspired theorists believe they are, then how can we actually recognize our own reifying tendencies? Are we not all inevitably and subconsciously caught in a web of meanings from which we cannot escape? Second, if one constantly questions one's own perspective, does one not fall into a relativism that loses the ability to establish the kind of stable foundations that are necessary for political action? Adorno has, of course, been critiqued as relentlessly negative, even by his second-generation Frankfurt School successors (from Jürgen Habermas to his IR interpreters, such as Andrew Linklater and Ken Booth). The response that Levine has to these two sets of legitimate criticisms are, in my view, both convincing and useful at a practical level. He starts off with depicting reification not as a flaw that is meant to be expunged, but as an a priori condition for scholarship. The challenge then is not to let it go unchecked. Methodological pluralism lies at the heart of Levine's sustainable critique. He borrows from what Adorno calls a “constellation”: an attempt to juxtapose, rather than integrate, different perspectives. It is in this spirit that Levine advocates multiple methods to understand the same event or phenomena. He writes of the need to validate “multiple and mutually incompatible ways of seeing” (p. 63, see also pp. 101–102). In this model, a scholar oscillates back and forth between different methods and paradigms, trying to understand the event in question from multiple perspectives. No single method can ever adequately represent the event or should gain the upper hand. But each should, in a way, recognize and capture details or perspectives that the others cannot (p. 102). In practical terms, this means combining a range of methods even when—or, rather, precisely when—they are deemed incompatible. They can range from poststructual deconstruction to the tools pioneered and championed by positivist social sciences. The benefit of such a methodological polyphony is not just the opportunity to bring out nuances and new perspectives. Once the false hope of a smooth synthesis has been abandoned, the very incompatibility of the respective perspectives can then be used to identify the reifying tendencies in each of them. For Levine, this is how reification may be “checked at the source” and this is how a “critically reflexive moment might thus be rendered sustainable” (p. 103). It is in this sense that Levine's approach is not really post-foundational but, rather, an attempt to “balance foundationalisms against one another” (p. 14). There are strong parallels here with arguments advanced by assemblage thinking and complexity theory—links that could have been explored in more detail.

#### [Spade] My method doesn’t buy into sweeping narratives that conflate change with progress nor expand or validate legal institutions – rather, it’s a tactical intervention that reduces violence, while exposing that contradictions in the law.

Spade 13 [Dean Spade, associate professor of law @ Seattle University, “Intersectional Resistance and Law Reform” Signs Vol. 38, No. 4, Summer 2013] TJHSSTAD

Instead, **law reform, in this view, might be used as a tactic of transformation focused on interventions that materially reduce violence or maldistribution without inadvertently expanding harmful systems in the name of reform.** One recent example is the campaign against gang injunctions in Oakland, California. A broad coalition—comprising organizations focused on police violence, economic justice, imprisonment, youth development, immigration, gentrification, and violence against queer and trans people—succeeded in recent years in bringing significant attention to the efforts of John Russo, Oakland’s city attorney, to introduce gang injunctions (Critical Resistance 2011). The **organizations in this coalition are prioritizing anticriminalization work that might usually be cast as irrelevant or marginal to organizations focused on the single axis of women’s or LGBT equality.** The campaign has a law reform target in that it seeks to prevent the enactment of certain law enforcement mechanisms that are harmful to vulnerable communities. However, it is not a legal-equality campaign. **Rather than aiming to change a law or policy that explicitly excludes a category of people, it aims to expose the fact that a facially neutral policy is administered in a racially targeted manner** (Davis 2011; Stop the Injunctions 2011).¶ Furthermore, **the coalition frames its campaign within a larger set of demands not limited to what can be won within the current structure of American law but focused on population-level conditions of maldistribution.** The demands of the coalition include stopping all gang injunctions and police violence; putting resources toward reentry support and services for people returning from prison, including fully funded and immediate access to identity documents, housing, job training, drug and alcohol treatment, and education; banning employers from asking about prior convictions on job applications; ending curfews for people on parole and probation; repealing California’s three-strikes law; reallocating funds from prison construction to education; ending all collaborations between Oakland’s government and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); providing affordable and low-income housing; making Oakland’s Planning Commission accountable regarding environmental impacts of development; ending gentrification; and increasing the accountability of Oakland’s city government while augmenting decision-making power for Oakland residents (Stop the Injunctions 2011). These demands evince an analysis of conditions facing vulnerable communities in Oakland (and beyond) that **cannot be resolved solely through legal reform since they include the significant harm inflicted when administrative bodies like ICE and the Planning Commission implement violent programs under the guise of neutral rationales. These demands also demonstrate an intersectional analysis of harm and refuse logics of deservingness that have pushed many social movements to distance themselves from criminalized populations.** Instead, **people caught up in criminal and immigration systems are portrayed as those in need of resources and support**, and the national fervor for law and order that has gripped the country for decades, emptying public coffers and expanding imprisonment, is criticized.¶ Another example of intersectional activism utilizing law reform without falling into the traps of legal equality is activism against the immigration enforcement program Secure Communities. Secure Communities is a federal program in which participating jurisdictions submit the fingerprints of arrestees to federal databases for an immigration check. As of October 2010, 686 jurisdictions in thirty-three states were participating.12 Diverse coalitions of activists and organizations around the United States launched organizing campaigns to push their jurisdictions to refuse to participate. Organizations focused on domestic violence, trans and queer issues, racial and economic justice, and police accountability, along with many others, have joined this effort and committed resources to stopping the devolution of criminal and immigration enforcement. **Their advocacy has rejected deservingness narratives that push the conversation toward reform for “good, noncriminal” immigrants. These advocates have won significant victories, convincing certain jurisdictions to refuse to participate and increasing understanding of the intersecting violences of criminal punishment and immigration enforcement.**13 **This work also avoids the danger of expanding and legitimizing harmful systems that other legal reform work can present. It is focused on reducing, dismantling, and preventing the expansion of harmful systems.**14¶ I offer these examples not because they are perfect—certainly a significant range of tactics and strategies are part of each of these campaigns, and, with detailed analysis, we might find instances of co-optation, deservingness divides, and other dangers of legal reform work occurring even as some are avoided and rejected. However, **these examples are indicative of resistance to limitations of legal equality or rights strategies.** These demands exceed what the law recognizes as viable claims. These campaigns suggest that **those who argue that a politics based on intersectional analysis is too broad, idealistic, complex, or impossible—or that it eliminates effective immediate avenues for resistance—are mistaken.** **Critical political engagements are** resisting the pitfalls of rights discourse and **seeking to build broad-based resistance formations made up of** constituencies that come from a variety of vulnerable **subpopulations** but find **common cause in concerns about criminalization, immigration, poverty, colonialism, militarism, and other urgent conditions.** **Their targets are administrative systems and law enforcement mechanisms** that are nodes of distribution for racialized-gendered harm and violence, **and their tactics seek material change in the lives of vulnerable populations rather than recognition and formal inclusion.**