# Fem K Aff File

**Framing**

**Feminist foreign policy maximizes the well-being of all of society and avoids a laundry list of big stick impacts**

**Lal & Graham 2021** [Rollie Lal, Associate Professor of International Affairs at George Washington University, and Shirley Graham, Director, Gender Equality Initiative in International Affairs and Associate Professor of Practice, Elliott School, George Washington University, “How a ‘feminist’ foreign policy would change the world,” March 9, 2021, The Conversation, <https://theconversation.com/how-a-feminist-foreign-policy-would-change-the-world-152868>] //neth

The Biden administration has a woman, Vice President Kamala Harris, in its second-highest position, and 61% of White House appointees are women. Now, it has declared its intention to “protect and empower women around the world.” Gender equity and a gender agenda are two ingredients of a “feminist foreign policy” – an international agenda that aims to dismantle the male-dominated systems of foreign aid, trade, defense, immigration and diplomacy that sideline women and other minority groups worldwide. A feminist foreign policy reenvisions a country’s national interests, moving them away from military security and global dominance to position equality as the basis of a healthy, peaceful world. This is in keeping with Hillary Clinton’s groundbreaking 1995 statement at the United Nations, “Women’s rights are human rights.” The world could change in some positive ways if more countries, especially a power like the United States, made a concerted effort to improve women’s rights abroad, our scholarship on gender and security suggests. Research shows that countries with more gender equality are less likely than other countries to experience civil war. Gender equality is also linked with good governance: Countries that exploit women are far more unstable. Women aren’t yet any country’s top foreign policy priority. But ever more countries are starting to at least write them into the agenda. Women at the bottom In 2017, Canada launched a “feminist international assistance policy” aimed at supporting women, children and adolescent health worldwide. Putting money behind its promises, it pledged Canadian $1.4 billion annually by 2023 to both governments and international organizations to strengthen access to nutrition, health services and education among women in the developing world. Some $700 million of this money will go to promoting sexual and reproductive health and rights and eradicating gender-based violence. Some $10 million over four years will go to UNICEF to reduce female genital mutilation. In January 2020, Mexico became the first country in Latin America to adopt a feminist foreign policy. Its strategy seeks to advance gender equality internationally; combat gender violence worldwide; and confront inequalities in all social and environmental justice program areas. Mexico must also increase its own foreign ministry’s staff to be at least 50% women by 2024, and ensure it is a workplace free of violence. Neither Canada nor Mexico has achieved its lofty new goals. Critics say Canada’s lack of focus on men and boys leaves the traditions and customs supporting gender inequality not fully addressed. And in Mexico, which has among the world’s highest rates of gender violence – men murder 11 women there every day – it’s hard to see how a government that cannot protect women at home can credibly promote feminism abroad. But both countries are at least taking women’s needs explicitly into account. Feminist foreign policy The U.S., too, has taken steps toward a more feminist foreign policy. In summer of 2020, under the Trump administration, the departments of Defense, State and Homeland Security, along with the U.S. Agency for International Development, each published a plan putting women’s empowerment in their agendas. These documents – passed in accordance with a 2000 United Nations Security Council resolution on women, peace and security – promote women’s participation in decision-making in conflict zones, advance women’s rights and ensure their access to humanitarian assistance. They also include provisions encouraging American partners abroad to similarly encourage women’s participation in peace and security processes. These are the components of a feminist foreign policy. But the plans are still operating in silos. A truly feminist foreign policy would be coherent across aid, trade, defense, diplomacy and immigration – and consistently prioritize equality for women. One of Biden’s early moves in office, in January, was to rescind the “global gag rule,” a Republican policy prohibiting health providers in foreign countries that receive any U.S. aid from providing abortion-related services – even if they use their own money. Studies show the funding restriction reduces women’s access to all kinds of health care, exposing them to disease and forcing women to seek unsafe abortions. Reallocating financial resources in ways that level the playing field for women is another critical aspect of a feminist foreign policy. But again, it needs to be a policy that’s consistent and across the board, not a one-off decision. Afghanistan, women and peace The U.S., long a leading world power, is unlikely to replace its international military security strategy with a purely “feminist” foreign policy. But it doesn’t have to. As the evidence grows that women’s well-being is central to everyone’s well-being, the connection between gender equality and global security can be naturally incorporated into updated global strategies focusing on traditional American goals like international security and human rights. Afghanistan shows the necessity of – and opportunities for – a feminist U.S. foreign policy. Afghan women were brutally discriminated against under the Taliban, with girls banned from education and women barred from leadership in politics, security and business. Now, under the Afghan government of President Ashraf Ghani, 28% of Afghan parliamentarians are women and 3.5 million girls are in school. Women worry that their freedoms could be compromised in any power-sharing agreement with the Taliban. Yet American officials distinctly, and controversially, did not incorporate gender into negotiations with the Taliban militant group to end the war in Afghanistan. Only one U.S. negotiator is a woman – poor representation for a country that says it is committed to conserving Afghan women’s rights. The Taliban delegation has no women, and just four women sit on the Afghanistan government’s 21-member delegation. With the United States’ help, an Afghanistan accord could secure the gains women have made since the United States toppled the Taliban in 2001 – or it could sacrifice them for “peace.”

**The role of the ballot is to endorse the debater who best centers feminist foreign policy. To clarify, we don’t advocate for a recreation of the problematic implementations of FFP, we endorse a change in the way FFP is implemented such that it reaches its original goals**

**Masood 2020** [Hana Masood, Former Assistant Editor at Statecraft; Hana holds a BA in IR from Symbiosis International University (private university in India), “Feminist Foreign Policy and its Applicability in Contemporary International Relations,” January 26, 2020, <https://www.statecraft.co.in/article/feminist-foreign-policy-and-its-applicability-in-contemporary-international-relations>] //neth

In 2014, the Swedish coalition of the Social Democrats and the Green Party became the world's government to proclaim that it will adopt a Feminist Foreign Policy (FFP), with a goal to become the ‘strongest voice for gender equality and full employment of human rights for all women and girls’. This rather radical stance positions Sweden as a normative model for other countries to follow. Most recently, Mexico, under the leadership of Andrés Manuel López Obrador, became the first country in the Global South to announce a feminist shift in its foreign policy. But is an FFP practical in the current global political economy? FFP derives its core tents from feminist international relations (IR) theory, which critiques state-centric notions of security and peace and the manner in which they 'invisibilize' power structures, hierarchies, and gendered boundaries. The foundational belief of most feminist IR theory is that gender is not an accidental, but an integral feature of military, economic, and diplomatic relations between nations. Hence, feminist IR theory challenges the current international system that is and has been structurally and ideologically defined mainly by elite white men for decades. These Eurocentric and masculine practices fail to accommodate diverse perspectives or create an equal space for people belonging to other intersectionalities of gender, race, class, caste, and ethnicity. Thus, it builds on postcolonial, postliberal, and constructivist theories by adding an additional layer of gender-sensitivity to the existing discourse. Some feminist IR theorists use the concept of hegemonic masculinity to describe the gendered nature of power distribution in the international system, which is generally understood as the collective, personal, and institutional mainstreaming of hierarchical and aggressive power. From a neorealist perspective, core security concerns usually deal with conceptions of state sovereignty, border control, and transnational trade, which are usually governed by military defence frameworks and protectionist migration laws. Feminist security critics believe that the idea of using force and manipulating access to space, resources, goods, and services to particular groups of people is an inherently masculine trait that violates the idea of an equal quality of life for all people. Along with the military-industrial complex, these practices marginalize the value of femininity as being weak or inferior, and push forward the idea that the responsibility to protect is primarily a male one. Hence, the practice of FFP as an action-oriented offshoot of feminist IR theory demanding the reimagination of power and security by modifying the decision-making of actors in the international system, facilitated through the involvement of women and other marginalized communities. It argued that this approach prioritizes development, peace, and human security. By accounting for the diverse intersectionalities of people, it is hoped that one can build a more empathetic political dialogue. Critics of such an approach argue that the current FFP framework and its link with normative soft power undermine its capacity to challenge the premonition that feminist security policy will fail to confront aggression and hardcore security issues. However, FFP is not as closely associated with pacifism as it is assumed to be; in fact, it argues that state actors must alternate between hard and soft power according to the severity of threats. From an international law perspective, FFP is a reflection of larger worldwide efforts following the formation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), which emphasizes the agenda of women, peace, and security (WPS) as a framework for security and foreign policy. This is the skeleton from which Sweden, Australia, Canada, Britain, and now Mexico have framed their policies to reflect a feminist shift. However, the WPS agenda has been critiqued for its rudimentary application of feminist principles by way of its insistence on purely increasing the number of women represented at international forums. A study by the UN Women and Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative reveals that the mere inclusion of women at negotiating tables is not enough to achieve gender parity. Rather, the power or “level of influence” that they wield in such spaces is what truly makes a difference. To add to this, in her book Bananas, Beaches, and Bases, Cynthia Enloe talks about the lack of intersectional representation in such dialogues, and argues that there is a more pressing need to invite women from diverse backgrounds to play a role in international politics as they are systematically ignored, excluded, and often forgotten by a usually homogenous group of privileged, white world leaders. Zillah Eisenstein, a postcolonial feminist, elucidates that while gender inclusion allows a partial restructuring of the gendered power race, it is not a complete power shift unless it deals with its inherent exclusion of non-elite and non-white women from theory and practice. It is a futile exercise to focus on increased representation without paying attention to the underlying assumptions guiding foreign policy and feminist discourse. Despite these theoretical drawbacks, it is important to evaluate the current situation of FFP as it is being practiced. As the first country to adopt this model, Sweden focuses on three Rs in its FFP–rights, representation, and reallocation. Put simply, this means that Stockholm advocates women’s rights as human rights; the protection of women and other marginalized groups from sexual and gender-based violence; the promotion of participation of women, particularly in peace processes; and the equitable and gender-sensitive distribution of global resources and income. The Swedish government also frequently refers to a subliminal fourth R, reality check, which indicates a reliance on policy-relevant research to assess the correlation between inclusive practices and sustainable peace efforts. However, there is a natural tension between pragmatism and idealism. Many civil society groups have critiqued Sweden for its failure to live up to its FFP during the 2015 migration crisis when the country received around 160,000 asylum seekers. In particular, the administration’s strict family reunification policy outlined by its 2016 Temporary Aliens Act was inconsistent with its FFP as its effects were inexplicably gendered, with the wellbeing of women and children at high risk due to separation from their families. Further, Sweden’s extensive record of arms exports also seems contradictory to its feminist goals. While the Swedish government views itself as a ‘good nation’ championing humanitarianism, Swedish-manufactured exported weapons are enabling and fuelling violence in various conflict zones–in August 2019, a year after signing the Stockholm Agreement with Yemen, it was reported that Swedish weapons and combat management systems were used in the conflict. UN Human Rights Council Resolution 30/18 on human rights capacity building for Yemen highlights that gender-based and sexual violence is rampant, while Recommendations 19 and 30 of the CEDAW and Article 7(9) of the Arms Trade Treaty also recognize a deep-rooted connection between the transfer of arms and the facilitation of violence against women and children in conflict. Sweden’s inability to fully realize these dilemmas in policy practice is illustrated by its relationship with Saudi Arabia. In 2015, Swedish foreign minister Margot Wallström publicly criticized the Saudi regime for its poor human rights record, describing the punishment of Saudi blogger Raif Badawi as “medieval”. This caused a major diplomatic dispute between the two nations; Saudi Arabia recalled its ambassador and accused Wallström of criticizing Islam. The rest of the Arab world–including Palestine, who had previously lauded Sweden for its recognition of its authority–also responded harshly to the Swedish government and even cancelled Wallström’s speech at the year’s Arab League summit. Despite the blowback, Stockholm cancelled its arms deal with Riyadh, a decision that its own financial and ~~diplomatic experts criticized. Even Sweden’s former foreign minister Carl Bildt stated that the move damaged Sweden’s international reputation. Postcolonial understandings of such events posit that the construction of a liberal FFP is dependent on an ‘otherization’ of the Global South, as the international system has been constructed to recognize Western conceptions of human rights and liberalism as superior to the practices of non-Western traditions. This is why nations like Sweden, while aspiring to shine a light on violations, fail to acknowledge their complicity and face backlash for their ‘white saviour complex’ attitudes towards feminist issues. In response, Columba Achilleos-Sarll offers an alternative to Sweden’s three Rs to combat this predicament–recentering intersectionality, reinstating connected histories, and reconfiguring normative orders. This presents a more comprehensive and nuanced framework that accommodates diverse perspectives based on the lived experiences of women and other minorities. Feminist ethical frameworks expect to see visible and tangible gender-sensitive results. However, systematically changing patriarchal structures in international institutions are long-term goals that will most certainly be met with resistance and rejection. Diplomacy is regulated by compromise, even if it means inconsistency with ethical ideals to achieve an overarching goal. While this may result in contradictory practices, it is essential for countries at the forefront of the FFP movement to maintain amicable international relations to build trust and aid sustainable change. In its current form, FFP's reliance on the UN's WPS model, which focuses on increasing gender equality through representation alone, leaves ample room for predominant neorealist structures to undermine and deflect its efforts. The UN itself is intrinsically hierarchical; substantive power rests in the hands of a few nations. It is questionable whether UN proposals on equality of any sort hold value when its own structure is so unbalanced. To be fair, FFP has attempted to be more inclusive of other genders and marginalized communities by involving male leaders in the #HeForShe initiative. However, meaningful, long-term, systemic change will remain elusive unless Sweden, Canada, and the like actively work to restructure the current system to encourage the cooperation and acceptance of FFP by other Western nations and emerging powers in the Global South.~~

**The role of the judge is to center intersectional feminist pedagogy**

**Morris 2020** [Charlotte Morris, teaching fellow at University of Sussex (UK); holds a doctorate in gender studies, “TEACHING TO TRANSFORM: REIMAGINING FEMINIST PEDAGOGIES IN CONTEMPORARY HIGHER EDUCATION,” January 27, 2020, <https://maifeminism.com/teaching-to-transform-reimagining-feminist-pedagogies-in-contemporary-higher-education/>] //neth

Here, I draw on foundational feminist pedagogical principles, which can be applied across course content and are not gender specific. While it is not possible to fully summarise the diversity of feminist teaching here, feminist pedagogies build on epistemologies which question white, western, male-centred, heteronormative forms of knowing (Harding 2003) and values of disembodied objectivity, rationality and neutrality as sole ways of being and knowing. Rather they recognise caring, embodied, emotional domains of life (Motta 2012); understand knowledge as ‘situated’—context-bound, partial and contingent (Haraway 1988)—and disrupt power relationships by foregrounding previously marginalised voices and knowledges. bell hooks’ work (1994) comprises a useful touchstone in elucidating meanings and purposes of feminist pedagogies, drawing on feminist, critical and de-colonial approaches in paving the way for intersectional teaching. hooks (1994) draws on Freire’s critical pedagogy (1970) in disrupting what is defined as the banking system whereby students are positioned as passive recipients of deposits of knowledge, as opposed to active participants. Instead, the classroom can be a safe space in which students can raise critical questions and where teachers attend to their wellbeing. Within this current milieu where sexism, racism, classism and ‘anti-social justice’ attitudes are emboldened, it is not always possible to promise every student a safe space; indeed the very premise of safer spaces in universities is frequently derided within popular media. However, such discourses can be challenged; creating learning environments where open and meaningful discussions can take place without causing harm can be a shared endeavour wherein students take responsibility and co-create rules of engagement. Within feminist pedagogical frameworks, teachers might not expect immediate gratification in student feedback as there may be an initial discomfort in relation to different ways of learning and thinking and students may not realise the benefits until years later. (hooks 1994) With students positioned as consumers (Brule 2004) there are now additional challenges to enacting such discomforting practices. National Student Surveys and Teaching Excellence Frameworks focus on immediate gratification, positioning students as passive recipients as opposed to co-creators of knowledge (Rohrer 2018) who undergo complex and uneven learning journeys. (Gale & Parker 2014) Current challenges inherent in approaching education as a ‘practice of freedom’, as hooks (1994) advocates, are invoked by recent commentators, including Toni Wright (2016), who suggests that feminist university teaching is in crisis: Following cuts to women’s and gender studies courses, gender content is frequently treated as an optional ‘add-on’. (Hinton-Smith et al. 2019) Others highlight a longstanding backlash against feminism and lack of time-space for developing feminist curricula. (Moss & Richter 2011) While this may be the case, perhaps the current moment of reactionary politics and neoliberalisation can be simultaneously viewed as an opportunity to rejuvenate and reimagine possibilities and potentialities of feminist teaching—to rebuild capacities, communities and solidarities. Background to Study and Methodology Feminist pedagogical strategies are particularly relevant in this case study wherein I teach social justice content on an interdisciplinary course for social sciences, business, arts and humanities foundation students from diverse backgrounds within a cohort of approximately 80 students. Foundation courses are geared towards non-traditional learners and in this cohort, 26.9% are from Black and Minority Ethnic backgrounds and 20.6% disclose disabilities, above the sector average. [1] This course, entitled ‘Cradle to the Grave’, explores themes of welfare, wellbeing and their interconnections, investigating how policy contexts shape life chances and experiences while taking different social locations into account. Inevitably, content interlinks with issues of equity and social justice. Ethics approval was granted by the University of Sussex and permission was sought from students to draw on reflections as data with reassurance that no sensitive data would be used, all data would be anonymised and identifying features would be removed. All 80 students undertaking the course submitted regular short reflections on their learning through the course of the year (2018-2019). Many of the extracts analysed here were drawn from both formative and summative work gathered towards the end of this year at a point when the majority were now confident with the process of reflection; approximately 200 pieces of data were analysed in total. A thematic analysis of data was then undertaken with a focus on processes and shifts in learning. This is complemented by ongoing reflections on my own teaching practice. Before proceeding to an exploration of identified themes, I should acknowledge my privileged standpoint of being a white cis-woman and British citizen working in a UK university, a western context developed through histories of exclusion, coloniality and violence. Being a Feminist Teacher: Attending to Transparency Attending to teacher-student power dynamics has long been a concern of feminist practitioners (hooks 1994) and enabling students to hold more power in the classroom is potentially liberating. Yet, it is vital firstly to recognise the relative privilege students might hold and secondly, in a climate where precariously employed women teachers hold relatively little power there are continual anxieties about repercussions. Furthermore, gender-related content and feminism can be perceived alternately as threatening and not to be taken seriously in contexts where students are exposed to misogynistic, anti-feminist viewpoints and universities are positioned as full of politically correct feminist ‘lefties’. (Burke & Carolissen 2018; Read 2018) This situation is exacerbated by the consumer model whereby teaching is judged in accordance with student satisfaction (Rohrer 2018), further complicating teacher-student power dynamics. Navigating a route between setting expectations of professionalism and respect from students while maintaining a commitment to feminist practices can be fraught, so building trust and reciprocity over time and encouraging students to take ownership of their learning is crucial. Positive pedagogical relationships can begin with transparency around our purposes, practices, politics, language and positionalities. This entails carefully referencing and critiquing contemporary discourses which seek to undermine social justice aims, meaningful discussions (Kouloris 2017) and scholarly critiques. Students may start university with (media-fuelled) concerns around academics fostering particular agendas; some may have been exposed to far-right propaganda circulating on many university campuses suggesting that education is increasingly founded on left-wing ‘dogma’; [2] indeed some students may identify as ‘alt-right’. Early conversations in teaching sessions about what we are and are not trying to do can help to build trust and provide a framework for quality discussions. I explain to my students that we will inevitably be touching on a range of political issues but, rather than supporting particular political parties or viewpoints, our purpose is to develop meaningful knowledge and understanding, building on high quality evidence and analysis beyond uninformed opinions and popular, common-sense reactions. Students are reassured that we welcome a range of perspectives—challenge, contestation and debate form an important part of our sessions. Despite unhelpful stereotypes of feminist university teachers, being open about our own positions and conveying a willingness to be vulnerable can be empowering for students who identify as feminists or may consider doing so, those who are marginalised and those who are working out their own positions while navigating complex environments. While some may push back against such openness to begin with, tired media tropes about feminists trying to ‘brainwash’ students impose particular theories or disempower male students soon dissipate. Feminism makes an early appearance on the curriculum and forms an opportunity to address what it is (a wide-ranging global movement addressing sexism) and what it is not, i.e. ‘man-hating’; we stress that there is not a ‘single story’ of feminism. Students from all genders and backgrounds appreciate definitions, theoretical and historical underpinnings to inform their emergent understandings in the light of much misinformation. This moment provides an opportunity to introduce my own personal take on feminism, being transparent about my positionality, theoretically scaffolding this by introducing the concept of intersectionality at an early stage. Stereotypes about feminist academics can be addressed directly; for example, when the class discuss ground-rules to create a ‘safer space’ for discussion, I explicitly reference wider language used in popular press of ‘snowflake students’ and feminist academics ‘policing’ language, explaining that we have this initial discussion not in order to shut down conversations but to enable them to take place. It is much easier to share responses and perspectives if everyone in the room feels valued, equal, safe and respected. Resulting discussions are more likely to be more open, thoughtful and engaged without resorting to ‘common-sense’ assumptions or prejudices and causing those from less privileged locations to be silenced. Language is always politically charged and arguably never more so than now. Tropes of ‘political correctness’ are explored and I tend to posit that, despite the unfortunate terminology, to be ‘politically correct’ refers simply to an awareness of the history behind words and the impact language can have on others. There are usually a variety of understandings and viewpoints on this, creating opportunities for debate and exploration. The notion of ‘free speech’ has increasingly been weaponised (Phipps 2017), conflated with a ‘right to offend’ as justification for sexism, racism, transphobia, homophobia and other forms of hate. Discussing ‘free speech’, ‘hate speech’ and ways in which the latter can potentially impinge on the freedom of others is another valid discussion to have early on to scaffold discussions and set expectations. Likewise, it is imperative to carefully define and work with concepts such as ‘diversity’, always a ‘slippery’ term (Ahmed 2012), which has recently been invoked by the far-right as a way of shutting down conversation around race. [3] Similarly, ‘social justice’, my students report, is frequently being used as a term of abuse in social media; students can be important informants as to current uses and misuses of language and discussions around it can foster criticality. Setting boundaries, encouraging thoughtful, open and professional approaches to communication and developing the kind of environment which will best enable meaningful learning sets the tone for learning. A ‘calling in’ rather than ‘calling out’ model can help in this: ‘Calling out’ means to adopt a blaming or judgemental stance if someone inadvertently uses language which may offend others, for example. Students may make mistakes or, due to social and previous educational contexts or media exposure, not realise what is socially acceptable or that certain language choices might be offensive. It is not necessarily helpful to castigate but rather to ‘call in’ what the impacts may be, raising and addressing any concerns in a sensitive manner. Dynamics of openness do not always make for ‘comfortable’ classrooms but ensuring everyone understands the ‘terms of engagement’ fosters respectful and meaningful exchanges, not possible in all settings. Often students draw on their own knowledge and experiences in contesting reductive and reactionary positions. However, in some cases, vulnerable and marginalised students may not necessarily have a level of confidence and articulation needed to challenge harmful, discriminatory comments. If this were to occur I [the teacher] would need to take responsibility, speak up and support these students. (Phipps 2017) Thinking cannot move forwards unless it is opened up to challenges and there needs to be a supported environment for this to happen. Due to the sensitive, often controversial, nature of many issues discussed in my classes (including gender-based violence, gender and sexual identities, attitudes to welfare claimants, migrants and other marginalised groups), it is imperative that students feel it is acceptable to make mistakes, take risks, question, speak out and share experiences so that they can undergo meaningful learning. I make a well-timed statement to students about it being ‘OK to be political’: In my first year of teaching this group, I received several pieces of work decrying a particular author for not being politically ‘neutral’ in their left-aligned perspectives, echoing far-right sentiments. There were also several feedback comments indicating that the course itself was biased or not politically neutral. In epistemological terms, feminist thought has sought to challenge dominant constructions of knowledge which value objectivity, distance and neutrality (Stanley & Wise 1983) above intuitive, engaged, embodied, creative, situated knowledges. (Haraway 1988; Motta 2012) At the risk of undermining previous learning based on positivistic assumptions, academic positions are introduced which contest restrictive notion of knowledge and assert that it is considered important for good quality ethical research to be open about our positionalities and standpoints. (Harstock 1998) Above all, in academic writing it is important to take up a position and clear line of argument. I reassure students that no-one is going to be penalised for holding views which do not correspond to my own; as good academic practice work should be well thought through, evidenced by credible academic sources and rigorous analysis, clearly explaining how conclusions are reached. A high degree of reflexivity is needed to reflect on my own political prejudices throughout the teaching and marking process, ensuring that I am listening and taking alternative perspectives into account; while challenging at times, I have found giving time to debating points of contention with Conservative students, for example, lifts the quality of discussions and creates opportunities for critique; [4] such debates may even shift positions in some cases. I reinforce to students that ‘party politics’ are not the object of our studies—I am not seeking to influence opinions but due to course foci, we inevitably discuss inequalities in relation to many contemporary social issues, necessitating critical rather than neutral stances. Part of our role in universities, I contend, is to scrutinise and critique dominant positionings and modes of governance. Following on from this, students are reminded that this is a learning journey we are undergoing that will involve questioning, uncertainty and sometimes vulnerability. Students are encouraged to bring their knowledges and experiences into the classroom and it is important that we as teachers, in a reciprocal relationship, are willing to do the same (hooks 1994), to open up about how we are affected by difficult issues and reflexively share our own uncertainties, experiences and learning where relevant. It entails acknowledging the limitations of our own knowledge, positioning ourselves as learners who may not know everything and who are open to different perspectives. While there is a risk initially of undermining our authority, this makes it more possible for students to ask questions and be open to complexities, uncertainties, not-knowing.

**The panic over potential threats to the nation is a form of masculine futurity which allows reproductive bodies to be regulated. Claims of utilitarianism justify the endless sacrifice of reproductive freedom in the name of the “greatest good.”**

**Petersen 15** (Kristin Petersen B.A., University of Southern California 2003 M.A. New York University 2008, A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies of Emory University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies, The Logic of Futurity: Reproduction, Cultural Eugenics, and Contingencies of Women’s Citizenship in the Contemporary United States, Proquest, JKS)

Cultural theorist Ruth McElroy suggests, “Women’s belonging to nations is indissoluble from their reproductive biology” (325). For all that motherhood may be conceived as a private choice occurring in the supposedly private sphere, reproduction and motherhood are nonetheless public and political as well, and thoroughly entangled with women’s status as members of their nation. By virtue of their reproduction (or even lack thereof!), women can be constructed in cultural narratives and political scripts as contributors to society or threats to the national good, caretakers of the future who merit protection and support or wayward parents who must be disciplined back into the national fold, national maternal ideals or outsiders within. The state’s identification of and response to women as reproducers reflects the continuous processes of the politics of belonging, which “involve not only the maintenance and reproduction of the boundaries of the community of belonging by the hegemonic political powers...but also by their contestation, challenge and resistance by other political agents” (Yuval-Davis 20). We see these politics of belonging manifested not only discursively, but also in the policies and laws that protect or privilege some mothers and not others, some children, but not all. When anthropologists Faye Ginsburg and Rayna Rapp ask, “who defines the body of the nation into which the next generation is recruited? Who is considered to be in that national body, who is out of it?” (3), therefore, there is no one answer; rather, this is the question perpetually being asked and answered by political discourse and practice infused with the logic of futurity. The hopes and fears of the present political moment and the imaginative desires for the future are thus continually projected upon the bodies of women and their procreative capacities. Futurity, I suggest in this project, as a possibly inevitable perspective or worldview, allows for the state to focus on women as reproductive beings in a way that it does not for men. Following from Foucault’s explication of biopower, the modern state takes an interest in the workings and ostensible health of its populations, creating new knowledges and indices for the normal as it counts up the characteristics of its citizenry and sets goals for demographic management. While Foucault tends not to focus on the reproductive elements of the state’s biopolitical interest—for instance, the setting of ideal rates of fertility, health expectations for women and children, creation of access to the medical, economic, and social resources needed for reproduction—these are, I would argue, operations of the state that have potential for tremendous impacts upon women particularly. The other biopolitical interests of the state—appropriate number of workers, manageable immigration rates, proper ratio of elderly to young, and so on—are also all implicated in the procreative behaviors of women, which would seem to intensify the state’s interest in them. Brought into the broader framework of women’s political status and national belonging, reproduction in this context seems poised to function as an axis upon which the dispensation of women’s citizenship can pivot, with particular regard to her racial, economic, and social demographic and the state’s assessment of her (and her children’s) value to the national future. Penelope Deutscher suggests that through the emergence of biopower: Women would later assume a status as a reproductive threshold of the future and health of nations, populations and peoples. But the condition for this role for women and maternal reproductivity was the very possibility of reproduction being associated with a shifting field of possible substances, telos, outcomes and obligations: **the overall good, the general happiness, the future** of the nation, the **health of the nation, the competitiveness of the nation, the future of the people, individual flourishing or freedom, individual rights,** domestic happiness, the family unit as building block of the nation, the transmission of the bloodline, the family name, transmission of property or family or genealogical transmission, reproduction of the labour force, etc. That reproduction be plausibly thought of in such terms at all was a precondition of it becoming associated with women’s role as threshold of futurity. (Deutscher 129) **The state’s biopolitical management of women’s reproduction** may thus **allow it to approach women primarily as reproductive beings, an essentalist** or even **utilitarian collapse that** may **make it easier to intervene upon their bodies** and perhaps **reflects a deeply ingrained discomfort with the notion that women have tremendous potential power to impact the composition of the future.** In this project, I am proposing a framework of futurity that is in operation, characterized by discursive and eugenic aspects, that uses women as the vehicle for future world-building and nation-making. This futurity aims to enact particular visions of the future via changes in the present, particularly through the management of women’s reproduction in the present such that the future population comports with present desires. When this futurity framework is picked up by the state in its various capacities, I suggest there are significant consequences for women’s citizenship as women because they are so intrinsically linked in the cultural and political imaginary with reproduction. In the process of grappling with these concepts, this project asks how the logic of futurity functions to organize the terms of women’s social or political belonging in reproductive terms. How does the state pick up and extend this logic to women, and how might that impact the meaningfulness of women’s citizenship or national belonging? Does the logic of futurity, the constant pressure of the forward vision combined with the imaginative limitations of the present, insist upon women’s citizenship being or becoming something fundamentally different from men’s by virtue of reproductive capacity and association? Exploring these questions brings this project into several disciplinary contexts, including feminist theory and philosophy, political theory, disability theory (eugenics), and even the sphere of economics. In connecting these concepts to ongoing conversations about women and citizenship in the contemporary United States, this project is ultimately working to tie together disparate fields and illuminate how they interact with respect to a model of futurity that I theorize as containing discursive and eugenic aspects. It may be that state-based discourses and practices related to women’s reproduction and citizenship are not so much causes as they are effects of the logic of futurity.

**Advantage**

**Space exploration assumes and utilizes the assumption of a cisgender, heterosexual, able-bodied white man**

**Valentine 2017** [David Valentine, Professor at the University of Minnesota, “Gravity fixes: Habituating to the human on Mars and Island Three,” HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory, Volume 7, Number 3, Winter 2017, journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.14318/hau7.3.012) //neth

My informants cite pressing, human-scaled terrestrial problems as justification for this weighty endeavor: a “back up” of terrestrial species against cosmic or Anthropocene-era disasters; a need to restore Earth’s biosphere by moving mining, polluting industries, and energy production to space; a growing population’s demand for new resources under globalized capitalism; and a human-species psychic need to explore and be free on a new frontier. But they also hold out a libertarian hope that conscious effort and free enterprise in places where—as I have frequently heard said—“there are no natives” will fix things so that humans can do a more equitable job of colonialism this time around in settlements characterized by diversity and equal opportunity. The problems of terrestrial history, human difference, and equality, that is, could be finally settled and fixed elsewhere in the cosmos. As habitual analysts of contemporary and historical matters of concern, readers will immediately recognize problems in these imagined futures of human equality and planetary salvation: the enduring gravity of universalizing Euro-American Enlightenment, free market, and imperial chronotopes that promise fixes through claims of general human equivalence and a future human diversity in as-yet uninhabited places. The unmarked “human” underpinning these visions has been an ever-widening focus of critical concern across a range of scholarly fields for decades now, for precisely its capacity to fix modernity’s universalizing progressive projects through an epistemological colonialism that simultaneously retains the white, male, able-bodied, cisgendered, and heteronormative Man as its implicit representative. More recently, scholars in anthropology and other disciplines have insisted that “human” be revised by attention to Euro-American world-making, including a critical scholarship that retains humanness at its core. Ontological and multinaturalist anthropologies critique the discipline’s solution to the problem of human difference, commonality, and exceptionalism through fuller representation as rooted in a Western ontology that frames humanness as commensurable in the context of a common nature and therefore ultimately subject to comparison (e.g., Viveiros de Castro 1998). Ethnographies that take nonhumans as ethnographic subjects insist on the human’s deep imbrication with other species, undercutting human claims to radical difference and separateness from those species (e.g., Kohn 2013). But as Black and Indigenous feminist scholars such as Sylvia Wynter (2003) and Audra Simpson (2014) further argue, any attempt to fix or problematize the “human” by way of a solution to any general problem of the nature of difference (between different kinds of humanness or between the human and nonhuman) is still barren unless it acknowledges the historical centrality of Black death and attempts at Indigenous extinction to the constitution of the problem of general humanness and of difference itself (see also McKittrick 2013; Weheliye 2014). The problem of the unmarked “human” is thus, like Earth’s crust, a ground that consistently shifts (Clark 2010). For critical scholars who engage outer space—from Hannah Arendt (1968) to Paul Virilio (1997), Peter Redfield (2000), Dennis Cosgrove (2003), and Daniel Sage (2014)—we see a similar problem with the shifting grounds of the human. These scholars have focused on state-led space programs’ self-proclaimed goals of human-species-level projects of discovery as universal solutions to terrestrial problems. If Arendt was concerned about the view from space as broadly dehumanizing and depoliticizing, these latter scholars have concluded that outer space is not a site of radical difference, but rather a renewed spatial fix for the problems faced by capital and (especially US) state power on Earth, underwritten by the alibi of an unmarked “humanity.” Jean Baudrillard expresses this stance precisely through gravity: “What, ultimately, is the function of the space program … if not the institution of a model of universal gravitation, of satellization of which the lunar module is the perfect embryo?” (1995: 34). Critical concern with outer space has more recently been met by a materialist and ontological analysis around the urgency of the Anthropocene and concomitant emergent problems that require “planet” and “cosmos” as frames of analysis to upend certainties about the human or that require new collective ways to think about humanness (Chakrabarty 2009; Stengers 2010; Latour 2013; Olson and Messeri 2015). But, as Zoe Todd notes, metropolitan scholarly concerns with the Anthropocene and Earth-as-planet still implicitly mobilize both human commonality and Euro-American discovery—this time that “the climate is ~~a common organizing force” for humanness (2016: 8)—without citing Indigenous intellectuals who speak from those traditions and who frame the human in other terms. This critique demands a rethinking of the problems of commonality and equivalency proposed by metropolitan arguments, even if they recognize the incommensurabilities of climate change experience. The evolving critiques of “the human” that I sketch out above are vital first readings of modernist projects, whether historical, epistemological, or ontological. But as the scale of social theory moves toward that of Earth and its material conditions, and toward human engagements in places beyond Earth, I argue that it is necessary to think about those places, their multiple conditions, and what new challenges they pose to “the human.” In the multiple places of outer space, where Earth’s conditions of spatiality or temporality—including those of one-g—do not hold, the problem of what it is to be and become human would need to be ongoingly debated, revised, and contingently solved in ways that do not easily enable a spatial fix via the extension of terrestrial relations or forms of difference—discursive, historical, or ontological.~~

**Private space appropriation recreates spaces of techno-masculinity**

**Ileri 2021** [Eren Ileri, PhD Candidate at Academy of Fine Arts – Vienna, “Disembodied Masculinity and the Imagination of Outer Space in Contemporary Video Games,” 2021, <https://www.researchcatalogue.net/view/733292/733293>] //neth

In this perspective, outer space became white men’s playground, either in real life aspirations or in science fiction, where the language and images of colonialism can be reproduced. Renewed colonialist imagery in the realm of extra-terrestrial space and the manifestation of a new kind of relationship between human and machine, embodied by the cyborg, together constituted the image of the astronaut, that is defined by supposedly intrinsic qualities of masculinity, such as risk taking, pathfinding and having an insatiable curiosity to explore and to progress (Llinares, 2011). Yet, this image of the space explorer, whether as the spacefarer, the scientist or the economic visionary behind the technology (like scientists such as Wernher von Braun or today’s billionaire business men like Elon Musk or Jeff Bezos) is a complex one, incorporating issues of gender, race and class. What is relatively stable in this construction of representation is that space exploration has always been driven by an unquestioned, axiomatic curiosity or drive for exploration which was frequently ascribed as a masculine quality. For Llinares, “[i]n most evocations of space history ´man´ stands in for a supposedly genderless expression of humanity’s innate subjectivity. Think of Neil Armstrong’s now legendary phrase: ´That’s one small step for man, one giant leap for mankind´, or Star Trek’s mantra, ´to boldly go where no man has gone before´. These phrases have become a naturalized parlance and defining rhetoric of space exploration. Far from being neutral semantics however, they are part of an underlying discourse within space history in which ´man´ implicitly means men” (Llinares, 2011: 5)[26]. (Dovey, 2018). Considering the access to outer space, human spaceflight has not been particularly diverse in terms of gender and race/ethnicity Out of approximately 600 people who traveled to outer space, only 62 of them were women, while 24 astronauts who traveled to the Moon were all white men[27]. Only recently, following efforts to increase diversity in the selection process of astronauts, NASA has achieved a 50% ratio of men and women with the 2013 astronauts class, where out of eight graduated astronauts, four were women and four men[28]. Historically, NASA’s criteria for astronaut selection required the candidates to be chosen from a pool of military test pilots, which was exclusively male, since it was not possible for women to enter this profession in the American army in the 1960’s and 70’s. The Soviet Union’s first female cosmonaut Valentina Tereshkova traveled to the earth orbit in 1964, much earlier than NASA’s first female astronaut Sally Ride, who flew to space in 1983. Despite the early date of Tereshkova’s flight, it was nearly 20 years until another woman flew to space. Towards the end of the Apollo program in the late 1970’s, there was a shift in the qualifications of astronauts and more were selected among scientists, instead of the ranks of military test pilots. Today, it became natural to conceive astronaut as a “scientist in the lab”, an identity that starkly contrasts with the 1960’s conception of the military-originated, risk-taking, masculinized adventurer astronaut. As space travel became gradually more inclusive to women and people of color, the traditional language of space travel was also challenged. For instance, since 2006 NASA’s guidelines for space travel language suggest the usage of gender neutral terms such as “human-piloted” or “crewed” instead of the much-used and almost standardized term “manned spaceflight”[29]. In science fiction, the diversification and democratization of space travel in recent years have also been represented and celebrated, as we increasingly see women and people of color characters in the forefront of fictional space exploration. Yet, considering the “techno-masculinized” subject of space travel, one could argue that the representation of masculinity was somewhat decoupled from the physical body, while tensions relating to the traditional binary understanding of gender were rearticulated on the level of the relationship between bodies and the technological. The traditional hierarchical dualism of masculinity and femininity, frequently positions femininity as masculinity’s inferior other. In the landscape of the cyborg, these traditional definitions of masculinity are being rearticulated, taken away from the biological body image and ascribed to hybrid technological subjects. The traditional model of muscular masculinity, characterized by strength, bravery, independence and virility as masculine qualities, has been destabilized with the advent of the cyborg, while being rearticulated through it at the same time. Human bodies have been “feminized”, rearticulated as needing protection, while technology has been “techno-masculinized” (Fernbach, 2000; Masters, 2005). When considering the cyborg’s potential for guarding the patriarchal lineage they emerged from, Cristina Masters crucially ~~points out that “[…] the figure of the cyborg remains rather faithful to its origins. Thus, while the cyborg may provide new grounds upon which to reveal gender representations as contingent and historically grounded social constructs, we need also to attend to the ways in which the figure of the cyborg may continue to represent a desire for total masculinist control and domination” (Masters, 2010: 2)[30]. One of the most apparent examples for this kind of disembodied masculinity is incorporated by the cyborg soldier of the American military, where the body is the weakest link in the chain, as Masters argues, “[w]hat we are witnessing, and indeed participating in, with the constitution of the cyborg soldier is a radical rearticulation of subjectivity. Contemporary military techno-scientific discourses have profoundly altered the subject of discursive power productions, with the fleshy body of the soldier no longer standing in as the agent of politics by other means, or in this case, war by other means. With the discursive positioning of military technologies as superior to the human soldier, machines are now the subjects of the text. […] Technology, not the male body, becomes the subject capable of the discursive transcendence of embodiment” (Masters, 2010: 5)[31]. As discussed, masculinity serves as one of the main pillars for the construction of a dualistic, earth-centric understanding of outer space (Kilgore, 2003). But what does masculinity mean in the context of disembodiment and how is it represented in the posthuman condition? To accurately answer this question and to be able to investigate forms and representations of disembodied masculinities in the context of “space exploration”, it is necessary to employ a posthumanist approach, because it allows us to challenge predominantly anthropocentric perceptions of the cosmos. To emphasize a critical proposition towards the understanding of the extra-terrestrial, I will thus draw upon arguments from discourses of posthumanism, new materialism and – albeit with a strong critical distance – transhumanism. Based on this framework, my research investigates how disembodied masculinity manifests itself in the astronaut/spacefarer, in digital game narratives of outer space exploration as well as in the world building and experiencing of outer space through gameplay mechanics.~~

**The representation of the cyborg in space is a continuation of hegemonic masculinity**

**Ileri 2021** [Eren Ileri, PhD Candidate at Academy of Fine Arts – Vienna, “Disembodied Masculinity and the Imagination of Outer Space in Contemporary Video Games,” 2021, <https://www.researchcatalogue.net/view/733292/733293>] //neth

As it becomes apparent in the example of the American soldier – there are organic and formal similarities between the American soldier and the astronaut – the cyborg can become a continuation of patriarchal capitalism and hegemonic masculinity. A similar proposal was also made by Braidotti regarding the condition of the posthuman, recognizing the ambiguity about the end of humanism and “man”: “[t]he Vitruvian Man rises over and over again from his ashes, continues to uphold universal standards and to exercise a fatal attraction” (Braidotti, 2013, 29[32]; Matthews, 2018, 91)[33]. Likewise, humanism’s capacity for resistance was also drawn to attention by Neil Badmington: “Apocalyptic accounts of the end of “Man”, it seems to me, ignore humanism’s capacity for regeneration and, quite literally, recapitulation. In the approach to posthumanism on which I want to insist, the glorious moment of Herculean victory cannot yet come, for humanism continues to raise its head(s)” (Badmington, 2003, 11)[34]. This capacity of “man’s” perpetual insurgency for its validation will form the basis of my thesis. My suggestion is that “man’s” crisis in the face of the posthuman condition and his attempts at reconfiguring the anthropocentric masculine identity in a disembodied subject are exemplified by various representations of the astronaut or outer space exploration narratives and gameplay mechanics across popular science fiction video games. In many popular video games (Metal Gear Solid, Mass Effect, Deus Ex series as few prominent examples for many) we witness a version of glorified transhumanism where the fetishization of human enhancement is expressed both in the game’s narrative and the gameplay itself. At the same time, the aforementioned games morally and ethically question the conditions of the cyborg and almost always posit a tension between the avatar/player and the posthuman condition that is seemingly imposed on the human, posthuman or non-human subject in their narrative. The representation of the “crisis of masculinity” arising from disembodiment in video games is complex and multifaceted, both exemplified by the narratives of conquest, exploitation, antagonistic relationships with non-human entities among others, while also encapsulated by the video games’ intrinsic qualities through gaming technologies which undermine the traditional humanist conception of the subject (Boulter, 2015).

**Advocacy/solvency**

**All signatories of the Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967 should end private appropriation of outer space by ruling that it violates the non-appropriations clause of the OST**

**Gorove 1969** [Stephen Gorove, jurist & Professor Emeritus at University of Missisipi, “Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty”, 37 Fordham L. Rev. 349, 1969, <https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1966&context=flr>] //neth

I. SUBJECT MATTER OF APPROPRIATION With respect to the problem of subject matter, the prohibition of national appropriation relates clearly to "outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies."2 The Treaty is silent on the question of what is outer space, what it encompasses or what its boundaries are in relation to airspace. The only statement contained in the Treaty is that the moon and other celestial bodies are included in outer space. For this reason, the prohibition regarding national appropriation would unquestionably extend to the moon and other celestial bodies. Whether or not the prohibition would extend to outer space in its totality or only to part of it, or would relate to the moon or a celestial body as a whole or only to a part of it, are further significant questions. By common sense interpretation the prohibition could not very well relate to outer space as a whole since no one could at present appropriate outer space as a whole but only a part of it. Insofar as the moon and other celestial bodies are concerned, the prohibition could extend to the whole entity if national appropriation of the whole is indeed possible. But even in relation to the moon and other celestial bodies, it would appear by reasonable interpretation that the prohibition would also cover acquisition of a part of the moon or other celestial body. Any contrary interpretation would seem to make the prohibition of national appropriation largely illusory. In relation to national acquisition of a part of outer space, further questions may be raised. For example, does the prohibition extend to the collection of dust particles or other special elements during flight in outer space? Does the prohibition extend to the appropriation of cosmic rays, gases or the sun's energy, or to the collecting of mineral samples or precious metals on the moon or other celestial bodies? Should the answer depend on the type of resource involved, or on its availability in unlimited (cosmic rays, meteorites, gases) or limited (minerals, metals) quantities or perhaps on its location? In attempting to give answers to these questions, it may be pointed out, first of all, that, in the absence of some special circumstance, little would be gained by insisting on the nonappropriation of resources such as cosmic rays or gases, which are available in inexhaustible quantities. At the same time, the Treaty as it stands seems to make little allowance for national acquisition of exhaustible spatial resources. With respect to location, it could be argued that if any parts of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, were found on the earth, they would not be subject to the prohibition of national appropriation since they would become part and parcel of the earth. Under a strict interpretation it may also be argued that the prohibition extends to the resource irrespective of its location. However, it might be preferable to distinguish between elements of outer space which have reached the earth as a result of natural causes and those which have done so through human intervention. In the first instance national appropriation would not be prohibited, whereas in the second example the prohibition would apply. Thus, a meteorite falling on the earth could be appropriated whereas a precious stone or metal brought to the earth from outer space could not be a subject of national appropriation. Regarding the jurisdictional boundaries of outer space, particularly the dividing line between airspace and outer space, we seem to know a little more now than we knew at the time of the first Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space back in 1958. At that time it did not appear with certainty that nation states would not object to the orbiting of foreign space instrumentalities over and above their territories. Today after more than a decade of spatial experiments, it can be said that an international custom seems to have sprung up which regards the area where space instrumentalities move in durable orbit as outer space. From this we also take for granted that anything above and beyond this area is also regarded as outer space. However, the more precise boundary line between airspace and outer space is still left undetermined. II. NATIONAL APPROPRIATION Turning to the second question which involves the meaning of "national" appropriation, it has been suggested that only the United Nations acting on behalf of the world community as a whole, should be entitled to appropriate.3 While further developments in space law, by international custom or treaty, may eventually prohibit spatial appropriations by an individual or a chartered company or the European communities, the Treaty in its present form appears to contain no prohibition regarding individual appropriation or acquisition by a private association or an international organization, even if other than the United Nations. Thus, at present, an individual acting on his own behalf or on behalf of another individual or a private association or an international organization could lawfully appropriate any part of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies. Whether or not an ad hoc international organization could be created for the exclusive purpose of enabling it to appropriate outer space is a delicate question. The answer may have to depend on the good faith of the parties. A further question in relation to "national" appropriation is whether or not political subdivisions of a state, such as the states of a federal state, cities or municipalities may appropriate? Under a strict interpretation, the answers to these questions would likely be in the negative even though an occasional court decision in other areas of the law may support an affirmative position.4 IlL. THE CONCEPT OF APPROPRIATION With respect to the concept of appropriation the basic question is what constitutes "appropriation," as used in the Treaty, especially in contradistinction to casual or temporary use. The term "appropriation" is used most frequently to denote the taking of property for one's own or exclusive use with a sense of permanence. Under such interpretation the establishment of a permanent settlement or the carrying out of commercial activities by nationals of a country on a celestial body may constitute national appropriation if the activities take place under the supreme authority (sovereignty) of the state. Short of this, if the ~~state wields no exclusive authority or jurisdiction in relation to the area in question, the answer would seem to be in the negative, unless, the nationals also use their individual appropriations as cover-ups for their state's activities.5 In this connection, it should be emphasized that the word "appropriation" indicates a taking which involves something more than just a casual use. Thus a temporary occupation of a landing site or other area, just like the temporary or nonexclusive use of property, would not constitute appropriation. By the same token, any use involving consumption or taking with intention of keeping for one's own exclusive use would amount to appropriation. The question may also be asked whether or not the purpose of appropriation, that is whether it takes place in the name of science, for enrichment, or for any other purpose would have a bearing on the question of its lawfulness. Normally, the purpose of appropriation should have little bearing on the prohibition except that to constitute appropriation, the acquisition must be carried out for the purpose of one's own or exclusive use. However, since the Treaty proclaims freedom of scientific investigation in outer space, 6 there seems to be some support for the argument that if the appropriation takes place in the name of science or in the course of a scientific investigation in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, such use would not be prohibited under the Treaty. Nonetheless, if the proclaimed principle is taken literally, the same argument could not be used with equal force in a case where the scientific investigation was carried out on the earth. It is doubtful whether the Treaty intended such effect, but if it did not, it is unfortunate that it fails to make it clear.7 IV. SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY In relation to the question whether or not there is any room for the exercise of some form or degree of superior authority, jurisdiction, use or occupation in outer space, the answer would seem to be in the affirmative, since the Treaty prohibits the exercise of such authority, use or occupation only if it amounts to national appropriation. Under such interpretation, the temporary use of a spatial resource without the latter's transformation or deterioration may be permissible, whereas the consumption or destruction of a resource may not. Furthermore, insofar as the exercise of authority is concerned, the state on whose registry an object launched into space is carried must retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and over its personnel, while in outer space or on a celestial body.' The Treaty also makes it clear that the states will be internationally responsible for national activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, irrespective of whether such activities are carried on by governmental or nongovernmental entities. In fact, the activities of nongovernmental entities require authorization and continuing supervision by the state concerned.9 The fact that some measure of at least temporary exclusive jurisdiction may be exercised over a particular area on the moon or other celestial bodies, such as a space station and its adjacent grounds, is also apparent from Article XII which makes access by representatives of a foreign state contingent on reciprocity. It is not the purpose of the foregoing brief analysis to attempt to resolve the complex problems which may arise in connection with the interpretation of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty. The purpose is rather to draw attention to the existence of these problems which will have to be resolved if man's exploration of the cosmos is to be guarded by law and order.~~