## OFF

#### The psychic and structural imposition of liberalism legitimizes securitized rhetoric and biopolitical control in domestic spheres which justifies the affs heternormative logic

Melanie Richter-Montpetit, 03-17-2017, ("Queer International Relations," No Publication, <https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-265>) SP

While there is increasing awareness of certain non-normative sexualities (“homosexuality”) and sexual practices (“Men-who-have-Sex-with-Men”), with few exceptions, key international actors and policy frameworks in the area of peace and security rest on what Queer and Transgender theory describes as cisprivilege. Cisprivilege refers to people whose gender assigned at birth matches their gender identity (“cisgender”). As Jamie Hagen (2016) explores in the context of the UN’s Women, Peace and Security (WPS) architecture, heteronormativity and cissexism obscure a wide set of practices of violence and exclusions negatively affecting people that are not straight or cisgender. Hagen shows how deploying a limited understanding of a heteronormative gender binary allows WPS policy and monitoring to account for the security needs of heterosexual cisgender women, while obscuring LGBT subjects and their safety. This framework also reproduces insecurities for the “women” it is meant to protect, in particular those with queer sexualities and non-normative gender expression. For instance, trans people and gender non-binary people are typically refused medical care, safe access to bathrooms in shelters, and refugee camps (see also Jauhola, 2010, 2013). Neither is sexual and gender-based violence against gay men recognized and accounted for under the WPS architecture, even though their presumed lack of masculinity makes them vulnerable to rape during conflict (Hagen, 2016, p. 315f.). Military Masculinities and Soldiering Queer IR builds on the rich body of Feminist IR scholarship on the seemingly inextricable linkages between modern militaries, war, and masculinities. Queer IR agrees with Feminist Security Studies [link] about the significance of gendered norms and discourses of masculinity for producing soldiers, militaries, and militarism and extends this research by inquiring in more depth into the “heterosexist premises of military masculinity.”52 Queer IR demonstrates the foundational role of particular normativities around sexuality and gender in producing soldiers and war, while it simultaneously complicates understandings of the modern military and military masculinity as structured by clear-cut gendered and sexualized dichotomies, such as male/female and heterosexual/homosexual. Contrary to commonsense understandings of soldiering involving only “manly” tasks, modern militaries (including the U.S. military) rely on service members to also perform unmasculine practices and inhabit subjectivities commonly coded as feminine. Examples for this embrace of the “unmasculine” range from cleaning toilets and polishing boots to enduring anal rape during hazing. Queer IR adds to our understanding of these seeming contradictions by demonstrating how these practices and subject positions get recoded as affirming a soldier’s overall military masculinity (Belkin, 2012; Cohn, 1998). In conversation with Feminist Security Studies, Queer IR argues that the military may in fact provide men the rare opportunity to safely transcend the boundaries of acceptable heteromasculinity. The military is among the very few institutions where men are allowed to engage in emotional, erotic, and sexual encounters and impulses otherwise suppressed in the civilian world for fear of being seen (by others or themselves) as queer and therefore not real men (Cohn, 1998, p. 17). A burgeoning body of Queer IR scholarship examines the increasing inclusion of LGBT people and associated representational practices in modern militaries. These works offer important insights for IR theory and policy, challenging in particular dichotomous frameworks regarding the agency of LGBT recruits, such as subversion/co-optation (Bulmer, 2013) or power/resistance (Richter-Montpetit, 2014b). Agathangelou, Bassichis, and Spira’s (2008) groundbreaking work coined the concept of “intimate investments” to understand how queer soldiers—historically themselves cast as threats to the nation and national security—seek to actively participate in the military and military violence. Queer IR scholarship examines whether the inclusion of LGBT soldiers in the United Kingdom (Bulmer, 2011, 2013) and the United States (Agathangelou et al., 2008; Richter-Montpetit, 2014b) or homoerotic visual representations of soldiers (Caso, 2016) challenge the heteropatriarchal character of the military and/or contribute to militarization and imperial geopolitics. Finally, Queer IR also speaks to the generative character of war and the military in shaping sexual and gender identities, practices, and normativities (Crane-Seeber, 2016; Howell, 2014; Wool, 2015). Security Governance/Regimes Queer IR demonstrates that certain normativities around sexuality and gender also play a central role in global security governance, including security regimes in the Global South. For example, Paul Amar’s work explores how the governance of stigmatized sexualities and gender expressions plays a key role in shifting figurations of global security regimes. Amar’s (2013) most recent book The Security Archipelago: Human-Security States, Sexuality Politics, and the End of Neoliberalism focuses on Cairo and Rio de Janeiro, two megacities said to be at the forefront of new and innovative security practices, actors, and governance structures. Amar traces a range of new and complex securitization projects and practices and the ways in which they are shot through with sexual and gender normativities. Central to the consolidation and expansion of these security regimes is the rise of a new doctrine of human security that casts human rights as beneficial to both national and societal security. Military and police security apparatuses and associated parastate actors prosper by focusing their efforts on constructing non-normative sexualities and gender expressions as threats to public safety. These new security regimes bring together a set of strange bedfellows, including ultra-conservative and self-identified progressive mass movements around morality, sexuality, and labor. For other Queer IR scholarship examining the construction of men who have sex with men as national security threats, see Nicola Pratt on the Queen Boat case in Egypt (2011). Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of Military Interventions Over the past decade, the thesis that powerful and otherwise highly heteronormative and patriarchal states in both the Global North and South increasingly harness queer sexualities and LGBT populations for their geopolitical ambitions has ushered in a rich and vibrant research agenda in Transnational Queer Studies and more recently, Queer IR.53 This shift has given rise to two dominant figurations of homosexuality and the homosexual—“the perverse homosexual” and “the normal homosexual” (Weber, 2016a). Progressive discourses recognize the latter as a “normal” sexual subject looking for love within the framework of monogamous couplehood, making “‘the LGBT’ as normal as any other loving human being” (Agathangelou, 2013; Agathangelou et al., 2008; Weber, 2016b). Much of Queer IR scholarship has been critical about the ways in which queer sexualities and increasingly also the rights of trans people have been taken up as tools of chauvinist or imperial statecraft. To make sense of what they see as problematic practices of diplomacy and foreign policy, critics in Queer IR have deployed the influential concepts of “homonationalism” (Puar, 2007) and “pinkwashing” developed in Transnational Queer Studies and activism (Puar & Mikdashi, 2012; Schotten & Maikey, 2012) and/or developed new terminology, such as “homocolonialism” (Rahman, 2015). Other Queer IR scholarship examines how the production of the figure of the respectable homosexual is made possible through structures of settler colonialism (Leigh, 2015; Richter-Montpetit, 2014b) and anti-Blackness (Agathangelou, 2013; Richter-Montpetit, 2014b). A classic example in Queer IR on the central role of cultural ideas about heteromasculinity—and performances of queer masculinities—in legitimizing military interventions is Cynthia Weber’s work on U.S. relations with various Caribbean states in the wake of the Cuban Revolution (1959–1994). Feminist analyses of military interventions typically show the critical role gendered “rescue” narratives play in producing the conditions of possibility for so-called humanitarian interventions. These gendered “rescue” narratives typically frame (post)colonial spaces and peoples as variously feminized and in need of forceful yet benign masculine intervention by major powers like the United States. Weber shows that the U.S. state did not simply seek to project itself as hyper-masculine and hyper-heterosexual. Rather the U.S. state relied upon non-normative codes of gender and sexuality—queer performativities—as an unlikely strategy to pacify the Caribbean region, regain its heteromasculine national identity, and thus reclaim its status as a potent and virile global super power. Other Queer IR scholarship explores how to techno-strategic discourses about nuclear warfare (Cohn, 1993) are shot through with heteronormative cultural logics. Terrorism and Counter-Insurgency Building on the pathbreaking work by Jasbir K. Puar and Amit Rai (2002) and Puar’s later solo work (2004, 2005, 2006, 2007) in Transnational Queer Studies, Queer IR scholarship has demonstrated the role of non-normative understandings of gender and sexuality in representations of the figure of the Muslim terrorist and/or insurgent and the ways in which these knowledges have shaped security practices in the War on Terror.54 Queer IR draws our attention to how the will to knowledge about sexuality and gender in this context is deeply shaped by cultural ideas about racial difference and colonial forms of power to construct internationally dangerous figures—like “the terrorist” and/or “the insurgent”—and those who need to be secured from them like “the docile patriot” (Puar & Rai, 2002). For example, Queer IR scholarship on U.S. and British Counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts in the so-called War on Terror shows how Orientalist discourses about Afghan, Arab, and or Muslim men’s (allegedly) failed masculinity and perverse sexualities shaped COIN practices at the operational and tactical level. In her study of Western representations of Afghan—in particular Pashtun—men, Nivi Manchanda (2015) identifies a strong preoccupation with the alleged prevalence of “illicit sex” among Pashtun men in both U.S. counter-insurgency documents and U.S. and British media reports. Manchanda shows how that “truth” about Pashtun men’s sexualities informed both operational and tactical considerations in U.S. counter-insurgency in Afghanistan. For instance, COIN training materials for U.S. soldiers contains information about queer sexualities and effeminate gender presentation, including the use of eyeliner among the local population. These knowledges produce the figure of the “Queer Pashtun” or “perverse” “terrorist” masculinities, which make it possible for both official COIN and media discourses to frame “violence against Americans [.º.º.] as a much-needed release of the terrorists’ bottled-up sexual rage” (Manchanda, 2015, p. 12). Other Queer IR scholarship shows how associated Orientalist ideas about “the Arab mind” and its monolithic moral framework of honor and shame anchored in a distinctly heteropatriarchal Islamic sex-gender regime shaped many of the actual torture techniques documented in the Senate Torture Report about the U.S. post-9/11 torture regime (Owens, 2010; Richter-Montpetit, 2007, 2014a, 2015). Featuring prominently among reported torture practices are highly sexualized carceral practices aimed at feminizing male prisoners. The underlying assumption is simple: The concerted effort at humiliating and destroying Muslim/Arab prisoners’ (presumed) sense of masculinity would “soften them up” and getting them to “confess” terrorist crimes they had committed, were planning to commit, and/or share valuable intelligence about other terrorists/insurgents (Owens, 2010; Richter-Montpetit, 2007, 2014a, 2015). At the center of these feminizing torture techniques were forced nudity; rape and sexualized assault; forced simulation of anal and oral “gay sex”; and forcing otherwise naked male prisoners to wear “women’s” underwear, including on their head. These sexualized carceral practices did not “simply” apply Orientalist stereotypes about Islam and Arabs but in fact produced Muslim prisoners as sexually deviant—they cast the tortured “as racially queer” (Richter-Montpetit, 2014a, p. 56). Taking seriously the influential role of cultural logics about racialized sexuality and gender in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency practices helps IR make sense of the large number of prisoners that were detained and tortured for years even though they were officially known to be “innocent” and/or without any intelligence value (Richter-Montpetit, 2014a, 2015). This research opens up critical IR analyses beyond explanatory and moral frameworks such as failed intelligence gathering, “state of exception,” or “human rights abuses” toward a more comprehensive understanding of seemingly illiberal security practices in the War on Terror. Finally, like Postcolonial and Decolonial IR, Queer IR contributes to IR debates on the ongoing raciality and coloniality of international relations by showing how counter-terrorism practices and the larger War on Terror they are part of are not only shaped by Orientalism, but also anti-Blackness and settler colonialism (Agathangelou, 2013; Leigh, 2015; Puar, 2007; Richter-Montpetit, 2014a, 2015). Securitization Theory Queer IR has also contributed to debates about the conceptual and empirical validity of securitization theory. For example, Alison Howell’s work on Global Health challenges the argument that health has been securitized. In fact, Howell questions the validity of analytics of securitization generally. Bringing Critical War studies into conversation with Queer theory and Critical Disability studies or Crip theory, Howell argues that modern warfare and modern medicine emerged in tandem rather than medicine and psychiatry being “abused” by military actors. Howell evidences her understanding of medicine as an instrument of violence by exploring medicine’s role in the violent management of “abnormal” populations, such as homosexuals and trans women. Taking queer and trans people seriously in global politics renders visible the routine character of practices of force inherent in—and indeed constitutive of—liberal rule and its use of “social warfare” (Howell, 2014, p. 970). Howell’s queer analysis thus contributes to IR theory and Critical Security Studies by rethinking the validity of the norm/exception and politics/security distinctions underwriting securitization theory. Border Security Queer IR scholarship shows that ideas about normative sexuality and gender are also central to everyday security practices at the border (Frowd, 2014). The management of border security is based on calculations about risk and danger of certain bodies and relies on and is productive of certain normativities around gender. For instance, airport security assemblages with their use of biometric data and body scanners mobilize knowledges of gender to assess the truth about travelers’ bodies, which produces trans and non-binary people as deceptive, deviant, and dangerous bodies (Sjoberg & Shepherd, 2012; Wilcox, 2015). In conversation with Transgender theory, Queer IR approaches to border security thus extend the insights of feminist and critical race analyses on the role of gendered and racialized knowledges to problematic ontologies of cisnormativity.

#### The aff’s drive to prevent extinction is a form of masculine survivalism where gendered bodies become the unwilling tools to sustain humanity

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The reproduction of survival/ the survival of reproduction

Extinction is almost always understood against the horizon of survival and the imperative to sustain it – at least for life forms deemed to be of value to humans. In many cases, this imperative takes the form of deliberate strategies for enforcing existence. Donna Haraway’s influential book When Species Meet devotes considerable attention to the logics, practices and politics of Species Survival Plans. These plans monitor and enforce reproduction amongst ‘endangered’ species, not least by collecting data on populations, genetic profiles and genetic materials to enable selective breeding. This strategy assumes that all organisms can, should, and can be made to exercise their reproductive capacities in order to resist extinction, and it actively mobilizes members of ‘endangered species’ into this project. In so doing, it helps to entrench norms regarding gender, sexuality and reproductive labour that are deeply entrenched in modern, Western human cultures. Attention to these programmes highlights an important way in which extinction is gendered in dominant scientific and policy frameworks. Specifically, strategic breeding programmes share in the belief that reproduction is an imperative for those capable of reproducing if ‘the species’ is at risk’. This belief is directly related to Western norms of the reproductive imperative for women. Indeed, Haraway points out that it is precisely “‘woman’s’ putative self-defining responsibility to ‘the species’ as this singular and typological female is reduced to her reproductive function”. In a similar sense, within SSPs and other strategies of enforced survival, entire life forms are reduced to their reproductive capacities. Moreover, programmes of enforced survival can, in the context of sexual reproduction, disproportionately burden female organisms with the task of avoiding extinction. This logic is particularly fraught in discussions of the possibility of human extinction, in which female fertility (captured in the standard policy language of ‘births per woman’) is framed simultaneously as a threat to survival, and the only hope for escaping extinction (see, for instance, Alan Weisman’s comments on this). In these ways, the securitization of survival entrenches the intersectional categories of gender, species and race discussed above. Dominant discourses of extinction and conservation also entrench and privilege sexual reproduction, in ways that entrench heteronormative assumptions and norms. This is reflected in the way that the subjects of extinction and conservation are framed. The standard object of conservation is the biological ‘species’, a term which is defined by the ability of organisms to reproduce sexually. As Myra Hird has pointed out, this conception of ‘species’ makes it appear as if sexual reproduction is the ‘best’ means of sustaining the existence of a life form. However, Hird’s work demonstrates that Earthly life forms actually engage in myriad forms of reproduction, from the free exchange of DNA between bacteria to the hermaphroditic practices of some fish. The upshot of these arguments is that Earthly life is sustained through a huge variety of reproductive activities that do not conform to biological understandings of life processes or species. Crucially, Hird argues that there is no necessary hierarchy between forms of reproduction. In Darwinian terms, all species that manage to survive are equally successful. However, by conflating survival with sexual reproduction, existing discourses of extinction embed hetero-normative frameworks that devalue other forms of reproduction. They also reduce reproduction to the imperative to survive, ignoring the myriad cultural, political, aesthetic, sensual and other dimensions of reproduction.

#### The 1AC perpetuates this fear of death that is rooted in violence against non – normative bodies, we become the scapegoats for violence in the name of preserving a future-to-come that never quite arrives.

Winnubst 2006 (Shannon, Asst. Prof. Women’s Studies, “Queering Freedom,” 2006 Pp. 184)CJQ

While death is unarguably a part of the human condition, for Bataille the fear of death is a historically habituated response, one that grounds cultures of advanced capitalism and phallicized whiteness. In those frames of late modernity, death introduces an ontological scarcity into the very human condition: it represents finitude, the ultimate limit. We must distance ourselves from such threats, and we do so most often by projecting them onto sexualized, racialized, and classed bodies. But for Bataille, servility to the order of knowledge is as unnecessary as servility to the order of utility. To die humanly, he argues, is to accept “the subordination of the thing” (1988– 91, 2:219), which places us in the schema that separates our present self from the future, desired, anticipated self: “to die humanly is to have of the future being, of the one who matters most in our eyes, the senseless idea that he is not” (1988–91, 2:219). But if we are not trapped in the endless anticipation of our future self as the index of meaning in our lives, we may not be anguished by this cessation: “If we live sovereignly, the representation of death is impossible, for the present is not subject to the demands of the future” (1988–91, 2:219). To live sovereignly is not to escape death, which is ontologically impossible. But it is to refuse the fear, and subsequent attempts at disavowal, of death as the ontological condition that defines humanity. Rather than trying to transgress this ultimate limit and prohibition, the sovereign man “cannot die fleeing. He cannot let the threat of death deliver him over to the horror of a desperate yet impossible flight” (1988–91, 2:219). Living in a temporal mode in which “anticipation would dissolve into NOTHING” (1988–91, 2: 208), the sovereign man “lives and dies like an animal” (1988–91, 2:219). He lives and dies without the anxiety invoked by the forever unknown and forever encroaching anticipation of the future. As Bataille encourages us elsewhere, “Think of the voracity of animals, as against the composure of a cook” (1988–91, 2:83).

#### The alternative is THE ABORTION OF REALITY, to sign your ballot for NONE OF THE ABOVE in an act of queer mutiny that throws into question heterosexual logics of reproduction and efficiency that would straightwash the violence done to queers by articulating it only as individual criminal acts. This social order has given nothing to queers that they couldn’t build on their own: use your ballot to embrace a queer reclamation of this and every other space.

Edelman 2004 (Lee, Prof. English Tufts, “No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive,” Pp. 4-5)//Raunak

Rather than rejecting, with liberal discourse, this ascription of negativity to the queer, we might, as I argue, do better to consider accepting and even embracing it. Not in the hope of forging thereby some more perfect social order-such a hope, after all, would only reproduce the constraining mandate of futurism, just as any such order would equally occasion the negativity of the queer-but rather to refuse the insistence of hope itself as affirmation, which is always affirmation of an order whose refusal will register as unthinkable, irresponsible, inhumane. And the trump card of affirmation? Always the question: If not this, what? Always the demand to translate the insistence, the pulsive force of negativity into "some determinate stance or "position" whose determination would thus negate it: always the imperative to immure it in some stable and positive form. When I argue, then, that we might do well to attempt what is surely impossible-to withdraw our allegiance, however compulsory, from a reality based on the Ponzi scheme of reproductive futurism -I do not intend to propose some "good" that will thereby be assured. To the contrary, I mean to insist that nothing, and certainly not what we call the "good," can ever have any assurance at all in the order of the Symbolic. Abjuring fidelity to a futurism that's always purchased at our expense, though bound, as Symbolic subjects consigned to figure the Symbolic's undoing, to the necessary contradiction of trying to turn its intelligibility against itself, we might rather, figuratively, cast our vote for "none of the above," for the primacy of a constant no in response to the law of the Symbolic, which would echo that law's foundational act, its self-constituting negation. The structuring optimism of politics to which the order of meaning commits us, installing as it does the perpetual hope of reaching meaning through signification, is always, I would argue, a negation of this primal, constitutive, and negative act. And the various positivities produced in its wake by the logic of political hope depend on the mathematical illusion that negated negations might somehow escape, and not redouble, such negativity. My polemic thus stakes its fortunes on a truly hopeless wager: that taking the Symbolic's negativity to the very letter of the law, that attending to the persistence of something internal to reason that reason refuses, that turning the force of queerness against all subjects, however queer, can afford an access to the jouissance that at once defines and negates us. Or better: can expose the constancy, the inescapability, of such access to jouissance in the social order itself, even if that order can access its constant access to jonissance only in the process of abjecting that constancy of access onto the queer.

#### The judge should treat the AC as an artifact. The aff must defend their epistemic orientation prior to debating a risk of fiated solvency.

#### Resolvability­– no fiat can’t pass policies but your ballot can change community norms. EX: debate community going from K’s are cheating to a more middle ground f/w

#### Rep shape policy implementation– The epistemic justifications for what we debate function in what we do

#### Repetition compulsion– Heteronormative logics normalize themselves in academic arenas. Using procedurals of debate to shield themselves from criticism, anti-queer violence becomes naturalized in this space. Your role as an educator is to maintain a space that all bodies can feel comfortable in entering. Accessiblity comes first, bc it determines the ability for queer individuals to access the benefits of this model.

#### The ontopolitical nature of gender encodes of cispirvellege shapes the way we conceptualize of IR – Your theorizations relies on violence against genderqueer and trans bodies to justify itself.

Shepherd and Sjoberg 12 (Laura J, Australian Research Council Future Fellow and Professor of International Relations at Sydney University, and Laura, PhD USC and associate professor of Political Science at the University of Florida, Trans- bodies in/of war(s): Cisprivilege and contemporary security strategy, Feminist Review) //Raunak Dua

Taking cisprivilege seriously draws attention to the fact that even the most inclusive interpretations of security exclude the ambiguous (Munoz, 1999: 2), the cross (McCloskey, 2000: xii; Roen, 2002), the invisible (Bettcher, 2007: 52), the disidentified (Heyes, 2003: 1096) and the 'in' (Shotwell and Sangray, 2009: 59). We argue here that this is neither incidental nor accidental, even if it is not a conscious practice of exclusion, and that these exclusionary practices are forms of violence. Foucault suggested that '[a] relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks, it destroys or it closes off all possibilities' (1983: 340). Violence perverts, inverts or renders unintelligible certain ways of being in the world while endorsing others; in this, violence is perhaps best conceptualised as a specific relation of power that is not necess- arily repressive but productive. A conceptualisation of violence inspired by Foucault can allow for the admission of 'the exclusionary presuppositions and foundations that shore up discursive practices insofar as those foreclose the heterogeneity, gender, class or race of the subject' (Hanssen, 2000: 215) as acts of violence that are simultaneously practices of power. On this view, violence is not reducible to (physical) constraint or repression but rather encompasses regulative idea(l)s and performs ordering functions in our collective cognitive frameworks. If we accept that representing transpeople and queer bodies specifically as in- and hypervisible in war stories and security strategy is a form of violence, and that this violence has its foundation in unexamined and often unconscious privilege enjoyed by cispeople, then we can begin to understand how a nuanced and sophisticated gendered theory of security needs to incorporate corporeality, including trans- corporeality. We can note parallels between transphobic violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of gender) and transnational violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of religions, states, ethnicities and/or alliances. Laura Shepherd (2008: 78; see also Shepherd, 2010c) terms these processes 'the violent reproduction of gender' and 'the violent reproduction of the international'). The borders of gender are policed as a part of an active policing of the borders between states, the borders between states and non-states, and the borders between the (safe) self-state and the (dangerous, terrorist) other. Narratives of the international fetishise and Orientalise the exotic 'Other' (be it a colonial other, a trans- other or a terrorist other) to associate Otherness with violence and inspire violence towards the Other. 'Non-violent' resisters of existing (engendered) social orders are often addressed by the dominant (gendered) social order violently, much like non-violent transpeople are often attacked for the very presentation of trans-ness in the face of a social order that excludes their existence both de jure and de facto. We suggest that these are ontopolitical practices; as Michael Dillon explains, 'all political interpretation is simultaneously ontopolitical because it cannot but disclose the ontology sequestered within iť (1999: 112). The ontopolitical (representational) practices of security have thus far been founded on embedded cisprivilege. The ontology of security, even of gendered security theory, has conventionally relied on gender/sex certainty and gender/sex hierarchy. If it is analytically and conceptually productive to see transphobic violence as the violent reproduction of a stable sex/gender system that 'naturally' privileges cisgender performances because such performances are associated with normality and safety and trans- performances are associated with danger and discomfort, it then becomes possible to ask questions about the ways that trans-in(/hyper)visibiIity, cisprivilege and a regulative, exclusionary ontopolitical social order are violently reproduced in inter/transnational relations. In tentative conclusion, we suggest that this might be a creative and constructive way forward that resists the dominant ontopolitical practices of security-as-matter and gender-as-binary, both of which bring into being a disguised and disfigured (corpo)reality of genderqueer and trans- bodies in/of war.

## OFF

#### Interpretation: debaters must disclose the aff, even if they are new, at least 15 mins before the round

#### Violation: my opponent did not disclose they simply stated that they were “breaking new”

A computer screen with a keyboard

Description automatically generated with low confidence

#### Standards:

#### Time skew: the neg has 7 mins for constructives and 6 mins for rebuttal while the aff only as 4 and 3 mins. Not disclosing hurts the aff severly in the round and prevents them from properly engaging with the arguments that the neg is presenting. This is an internal link to fairness.

#### Clash: the aff cannot not properly engage with the neg if they have never seen the argument before. Even disclosing just 15 mins prior would have been fine, but my opponent refused to do so. This hurts education in round. We can literally learn everything else outside of round, clash is the only way to effectively learn in round. Internal link to education.

#### Voters:

#### Fairness: the game only has purpose if it is fair. Hurting another side’s chances b4 the round even starts ruins the while point of debate.

#### Education: debate is only valuable because of the education that it provides. Without education it is nothing.

#### Paradigm issues:

#### Prefer competing interpretation, it is the only way to set norms in debate and ensure that abusive tactics are not used just in the name of the ballot

#### Drop the debater, only way to set a precedent

#### No RVIs, only goes on to punish the debater for calling out abuse

## OFF

#### interp: the aff debater must defend banning appropriation by private entities, not reduction.

#### Vio: plan text and

#### The PTD doesn’t ban appropriation by private entities, just limits them.

**Rollins 06** [Brigit, “The Public Domain: Basics of the Public Trust Doctrine”, The National Agricultural Law Center. April 2006. https://nationalaglawcenter.org/the-public-domain-basics-of-the-public-trust-doctrine/] / LC//AK

The Supreme Court revisited the PTD again in both Illinois Central R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), and Greer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896). In Illinois Central R. Co., the Court considered the responsibility of the states as trustees under the PTD. First, the Court reaffirmed that states held navigable waters and the lands beneath them in trust for the benefit of the public, but went on to note that states may allow private entities to use trust resources, and to obtain property rights in those resources. **However**, even though states may allow private entities to use and acquire rights to trust resources, the PTD still required that as trustees the states must ensure that the underlying purposes of the public trust are fulfilled.

#### To clarify: reduce is make smaller or less in amount, degree, or size (oxford) and ban is officially or legally prohibit (oxford).

#### Framers intent: the people at NSDA could have very easily changed the topic from banned to reduce but they didn’t.

#### Reduce is too vague- making smaller in any amount has no briteline and could have little to no impact. Without briteline it is impossible to evaluate this argument and its impact so drop it.

#### Standards:

#### Clash: their impact isn’t even measurable so its impossible to weigh/clash with. It could scale up or down based on whatever the aff wants making it abusive since the aff gets the last speech.

#### TVA solves – just read your aff as an advantage to the whole rez. We aren’t stopping them from reading new FWs, mechanisms, or advantages. PICs don’t solve – it’s ridiculous to say that neg potential abuse justifies the aff making it impossible for me to win

## Case

#### ] Nothing is publicly owned– it is arbitrary and impractical

**Feser 5 [**Edward Feser (associate professor of philosophy at Pasadena City College). “There is no such thing as unjust initial acquisition.” Jan 2005. Social Philosophy and Policy. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052505041038>**]**

Of course, this raises the question of how exactly we come collectively to own all resources, which leads us to the second point. Those who object to Nozick’s assumption that resources start out unowned8 typically rest content with noting that there are alternative possibilities, especially the possibility that resources start out commonly owned, as if the mere existence of this alternative casts doubt on Nozick’s assumption—indeed, as if merely noting the possibility of common ownership were enough to establish its actuality. But why is the assumption of common ownership of resources any less in need of justification than the assumption that resources are unowned? Why should we regard the former assumption, and not the latter, as the default assumption to make?

Surely the reverse is true: the claim that we all own everything is more in need of justification than the claim that no one initially owns anything. Surely such a claim is not merely unjustified, but counterintuitive, even mysterious. Consider the following: a pebble resting uneasily on the surface of the asteroid Eros as it orbits the sun, a cubic foot of molten lava churning a mile below the surface of the earth, one of the polar icecaps on Mars, an ant floating on a leaf somewhere in the mid-Pacific, or the Andromeda galaxy. It would seem odd in the extreme to claim that any particular individual owns any of these things: In what sense could Smith, for example, who like most of the rest of us has never left the surface of the earth or even sent a robotic spacecraft to Eros, be said to own the pebble resting on its surface? But is it any less odd to claim we all own the pebble or these other things? Yet the entire universe of external resources is like these things, or at least (in the case of resources that are now owned) started out like them—started out, that is to say, as just a bunch of stuff that no human being had ever had any impact on. So what transforms it into stuff we all commonly own? Our mere existence? How so? Are we to suppose that it was all initially unowned, but only until a group of Homo sapiens finally evolved on our planet, at which point the entire universe suddenly became our collective property? (How exactly did that process work?) Or was it just the earth that became our collective property? Why only that? Does something become collective property only when we are capable of directly affecting it? But why does everyone share in ownership in that case—why not only those specific individuals who are capable of affecting it: for example, explorers, astronauts, or entrepreneurs? It is, after all, never literally “we” collectively who discover Antarctica, strike oil, or go to the moon, but only particular individuals, together perhaps with technical assistance and financial backing provided by other particular individuals. Smith’s being the first to reach some distant island and build a hut on it at least makes it comprehensible how he might claim—plausibly or implausibly—to own it. This fact about Smith gives some meaning to the claim that he has come to own it. But it is not at all clear how this fact would give meaning to the claim that Jones, whom Smith has never met or even heard of, who has had no involvement in or influence on Smith’s journey and homesteading, and who lives thousands of miles away (or even years in the future), has also now come to own it. Still less intelligible is the claim that Smith’s act has given all of us—the human race collectively, throughout all generations—a claim to the island.

Whatever objections one might raise against Locke’s “labor-mixing” theory of property,9 it at least provides the beginnings of a story that makes it clear how anyone can come to own something. Locke’s initial acquirer does, after all, do something to a specific resource, and does it with something he already owns (his labor), so that it is at least not mysterious why one might suppose he comes to own the resource, whether or not one thinks that this supposition is ultimately defensible. The common-ownership assumption, by contrast, appears to suppose that we can, all together, simply and peremptorily come to own everything without having to lift a finger— or worse, that we don’t come to own it at all, but just do own it—the pebble on Eros, Andromeda, and all the rest. Surely it is the common-ownership advocate who has the greater burden of proof!

There is another problem with the common-ownership assumption besides its lack of support, namely, that it seems irremediably indeterminate. Indeed, at first sight it appears vacuous. If everyone has an equal right to every part of the world, how does this differ exactly from Nozick’s assumption that everything is initially unowned—an assumption on which, too, everyone has an equal right to everything (since no one, at the start anyway, has any right to anything in particular at all)? Ownership, that is to say, seems to imply exclusion. Your (or even our) owning something implies that there are others who do not own it; thus, it appears that we cannot intelligibly all own something, much less everything. This is no doubt (part of ) why Locke, though he held that God initially gave the world to mankind in common, also held that individuals can acquire portions of it for their exclusive use. Initial common “ownership” in the Lockean sense entails only that the various resources constituting the world are initially “up for grabs”; for these resources truly to become anyone’s property in any meaningful sense, specific individuals actually have to go out and do something with them.

The problem, then, is that if everyone owns everything, no one owns anything. This remains true if we take not a Lockean construal of common ownership, but a construal on which one must get the permission of every other human being, as co-owners of the world, to use any part of the world—what Cohen calls the “joint ownership” interpretation of common ownership.10 In what sense do you own something if no one is in principle excluded from it, if everyone has a say over everything and anything you seek to do with it? 11 One’s “ownership” becomes purely formal and practically useless. This joint-ownership construal also has the difficulty that it is incompatible with any substantial (as opposed to formal) form of self-ownership, since, given that I cannot so much as move without using parts of the external world, it entails that I cannot do anything with my self-owned powers without the permission of everyone else.12 And it is, of course, for this reason wildly impractical. These considerations would seem to tell decisively against the assumption that resources are initially commonly owned (in the joint-ownership sense at least), even if there were some reason to believe this assumption, which (as I have suggested) there is not.

#### ] No solvency – the PTD doesn’t ban appropriation by private entities, just limits them.

**Rollins 06** [Brigit, “The Public Domain: Basics of the Public Trust Doctrine”, The National Agricultural Law Center. April 2006. https://nationalaglawcenter.org/the-public-domain-basics-of-the-public-trust-doctrine/] //DebateDrills LC

The Supreme Court revisited the PTD again in both Illinois Central R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), and Greer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896). In Illinois Central R. Co., the Court considered the responsibility of the states as trustees under the PTD. First, the Court reaffirmed that states held navigable waters and the lands beneath them in trust for the benefit of the public, but went on to note that states may allow private entities to use trust resources, and to obtain property rights in those resources. However, even though states may allow private entities to use and acquire rights to trust resources, the PTD still required that as trustees the states must ensure that the underlying purposes of the public trust are fulfilled.

#### ] Plan gets circumvented. It gets funneled through public private partnerships with space agencies.

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**NASA** **announced** Thursday **that several companies had won contracts to mine the moon** and turn over small samples to the space agency for a small fee. In one case, a company called Lunar Outpost bid $1 for the work, a price NASA jumped at after deciding the Colorado-based robotics firm had the technical ability to deliver. “You’d be surprised at what a dollar can buy you in space,” Mike Gold, NASA’s acting associate administrator for international and interagency relations, said in a call with reporters. But the modest financial incentives are not the driver of the program. Nor to a large extent is the actual lunar soil. NASA is asking for only small amounts — between 50 and 500 grams (or 1.8 ounces to about 18 ounces). While there would be scientific benefits to the mission, **it’s** really **a tech**nology **development program, allowing companies to practice extracting resources from the lunar surface** and then selling them. It would also establish a legal precedent that would pave the way for companies to mine celestial bodies in an effort blessed by the U.S. government to help build a sustainable presence on the moon and elsewhere. To do that, **NASA** says it **needs its astronauts**, like the western pioneers, to “live off the land,” **using the resources in space instead of hauling them from Earth**. The moon, for example, has plenty of water in the form of ice. **That’s not only key to sustaining human life, but** the hydrogen and oxygen in water **could also be used as rocket fuel, making the moon a potential gas station in space** that could help explorers reach farther into the solar system. **Asteroids also have significant resources, particularly precious metals that could be used for in-space manufacturing.** While the prospect of large mining and manufacturing facilities in orbit is still many years away, NASA wants to use the mining program as a small step toward that goal. NASA is now trying to return astronauts to the moon under its Artemis program for the first time since 1972. Unlike its predecessor, Apollo, where the astronauts visited the lunar surface for a short while before coming home, the Artemis program would create a permanent presence on and around the moon. “**The ability to extract and utilize space resources is the key to achieving this objective of sustainability**,” Gold said. “We must learn to generate our own water, air and even fuel. Living off the land will enable ambitious exploration activities that will result in awe-inspiring science and unprecedented discoveries.” In 2015, then-President Barack Obama signed a law that allowed private companies the right to own the resources they mined in space. Under the program announced Thursday, NASA said the materials would be transferred from the private companies to NASA. **The effort would not violate the 1967 Outer Space Treaty**, NASA officials have said, which prohibits nations from claiming sovereignty over a celestial body. NASA Administrator Jim Bridenstine previously likened the policy to the rules governing the seas. “We do believe **we can extract and utilize the resources of the moon, just as we can extract and utilize tuna from the ocean**,” he said earlier this year. As part of its lunar exploration mission, NASA has been working to get countries around the world to adopt what it calls the Artemis Accords, a legal framework that would govern behavior in space and on celestial bodies such as the moon. The rules would allow private companies to extract lunar resources and create safety zones to prevent conflict and ensure that countries act transparently about their plans in space, while sharing their scientific discoveries. The mining announcement came during the same week that China landed a spacecraft on the moon, extracted resources and then lifted off from the lunar surface in an effort to return the sample to Earth. Instead of developing and sustaining a big government sample-return mission, **NASA is taking another approach by partnering with the private sector**. “If you step back and think about how really amazing it is that NASA can essentially piggyback on the private-sector space capabilities to perform this mission, it would not have been possible 10 years ago,” said Phil McAlister, the director of NASA’s commercial spaceflight division. **In addition to Lunar Outpost, the other companies chosen for NASA’s** program **are**: **ispace Japan and Europe**, which would each charge $5,000 for the material; **and Masten Space Systems of California**, would charge $15,000. All of the companies would already be on the moon, according to NASA, conducting other missions. McAlister said Lunar Outpost would be ferried to the moon by the lunar lander known as Blue Moon being developed by Jeff Bezos’s Blue Origin. (Bezos owns The Washington Post.) The company later clarified that it was looking at a number of landers to get it to the lunar surface, and not just Blue Origin’s. The ispace companies would fly on a Japanese lander, McAlister said, and Masten, already part of another NASA lunar contract, would use its own Masten XL-1 lander.

#### Nuclear winter is rooted in divisive technostrategic discourse that prevents effective anti-nuclear activism – their ev might be rights that debates about nuclear war are good but it shouldn’t center around nuke winter

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(Pertti. PoliSci@Copenhagen, SeniorResearchFellow@COPRI, "DECODING NUCLEAR WINTER; HAS WAR LOST ITS NAME?" Current Research on Peace and Violence 10, no. 1, 20-31)

The discourse established might also have the weakness that it only indirectly calls for concrete countermeasures and action to stop the nuclear arms race. The image of nuclear winter rebels against the dominant forms of conceptualizing essential security matters, but is societally very mild and sophisticated in its consequences. It results in appeals rather than demands. The descriptions of nuclear winter, developments that might render Earth uninhabitable, no doubt frighten the public. But this does not as such impel people to take a stand against nuclear weapons and dominant strategic thinking. The net result could also be one of inactivity, staying aside and observing the rather sophisticated debate of the experts and their cautious advice to the decision-makers. Nuclear winter, being a product of the scientific community, takes the form of expert knowledge. It has already from the beginning been connected with an effort to increase the understanding of the public of the various physical, biological and medical consequences of the large scale use of nuclear weapons. It stands for an endeavour to inform, but also to inform in a particular and selective way. The view put forward on Nature tends to be orgasmic and mechanistic. This is what all the map-making and model-building is about. There is an emphasis on the rational and the calculable with complicated computer models seen as the final, decisive proof. This way of presentation splits and divides rather than opens and invites for a broad and comprehensive dialogue in issues that require unifying understanding. The abstraction of nuclear winter and the nuclear winter theory are therefore two different things working in different ways. This narrowness of the theory also comes out in the way of reporting results. In preparing a study on the environmental consequences of nuclear war the International Council for Scientific Unions stressed the need for a report that "would be unemotional non-political, authoritative and readily understandable" (Crutzen 1985, p. 7). The terms established for informing about the nuclear winter theory are quite selective. They divide rather than unify. The approach chosen is an explicitely reductionist one openly acknowledging that the way of presentation is fragmentized. This mode of presentation might have its merit if seen strictly from a scientific point of view. But there is more to it, more than logic and physics. There is also metaphysical dimension, that is the images, visions and symbols and not only the logical propositions. As these metaphysical aspects are laid aside in the presentations the discourse becomes narrow and elite oriented. It adds to the alienation among the public rather than reduces it. Also values, emotions and human feelings are by and large excluded from the discourse, not to speak of judgement on moral or ethical issues. It excludes a number of qualities and aspects that would be quite familiar to the public. War, with its social and cultural aspects, is reduced to a natural catastrophe to make it more approachable. With the stress on authoritative presentations, backed by the prestige of the natural sciences and scientists, a dialogue is created that easily places the public in the position of a listener, an object rather than subject and participant in an exchange of views and judgements. The dialogue with its stress on instrumentality is reduced to those aspects that are particularly favourable to the natural scientists. For example the issue of human life is approached in the following way: "Recent studies projecting the consequences of nuclear war estimate that from 750 million to 1.1 billion humans in the Northern Hemisphere could die from blast, thermal, and radiation effects of large-scale nuclear war. In addition, the number of individuals suffering serious injury and trauma, many of whom would not recover, could reach hundreds of millions." This text (Grover 1984, p. 7) resembles to some extent those of strategists and nuclear planners. It refers in its narrative to entities rather than human beings, persons, citizens and individuals. Also the strategic parlance is devoid of values, human feelings and ethics. In a similar vein it aspires to the unemotional, nonpolitical and authoritative. In the above text there is no reference to imply that it would speak about "us". Death is presented as something happening to others, not to us. The victims have no specific characteristics or personality. This tends to leave the reader outside uninvolved in regard to the issue described. It makes him an object and bystander rather than a subject with deep concern for what is being described. The text does not bring home its human dimension strongly enough. Consequently, it is not easy for the reader to identify with millions and to be a part of the picture. The holistic approach and the communal ideology underlying the nuclear winter discourse turns easily into an anti-individualistic stance. The text above is perhaps not too different from those that sometimes use the deeply dehumanizing concept of "megabodies" in describing the potential effects of nuclear war. This is a measure equal to a million human deaths. By using this measure strategists and researchers in nuclear policies may approach their subject unemotionally, without too much risk of identification and attachment of feelings. "Megadeath", like nuclear winter, allows the discourse to stay unemotional and authoritative. By its very essence it deprives the audience of opportunities for intense moral reactions of ought and ought not. As nuclear issues are not classified into good or bad they offer few opportunities for linkages with our group feelings. We can extend our "we" feelings to our parents, ancestors and children, and in this way gain an increased sense of security and certainty. But nuclear issues are nebulous, and reduce our perceptions of life, the world, and our boundaries, as has been observed by Rita R. Rogers. Linkages to ancestors and progeny are nonexistent. "Our lives possibly become more "now" oriented, more hedonistic, more frantic and also more diminished in feelings. The nuclear threat creates only feelings of bland, non-participatory aloofness" (Rogers 1982, p. 18). The image of nuclear winter does not even strive to meet and mobilize our emotional capacities. It aspires to the unemotional and gives in general the impression that it is something particularly for top politicians, not ordinary people, to worry about. This is not as things should be. Far too often the nuclear winter parlance is devoid of emotions and human feelings. It deliberately strives for expressions that are technical in their essence and tend to preserve a distance from what is discussed. It approaches the receiver in an exact, rational and distinctively informative way. Thus it also avoids approaching the mental structures that for the individual are decisive for a stand to be taken. The nuclear threat, in spite of its existence and our cognitive awareness of it, does not fully penetrate our human fantasy. It remains there and we here. We tend to see it as another realm. Nuclear winter further adds to this awareness but does not sufficiently increase the psychological and cultural armament to deal with the issue. It seems that the theory of nuclear winter goes some way in preparing the ground. It is something of a counterconcept initiated by a scientific community that has thus far not very strongly engaged itself in matters of security and nuclear war. It is as such an important sign of resistance and rethinking within this community. However, as to society at large no real breakthrough has taken place.

#### Extinction reps in debate suck – prefer my ev its debate specific

Bjork ’93 [Rebecca Bjork; 1993; Former Associate Professor at the University of Utah; Reflections on the Ongoing Struggle; Debater's Research Guide 1992-1993: Wake Forest University, Symposium, <http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Oudingetal1992Pollution.htm>]

I remember listening to a lecture a few years ago given by Tom Goodnight at the University summer debate camp.  Goodnight lamented what he saw as the debate community's participation in, and unthinking perpetuation of what he termed the "death culture."  He argued that the embracing of "big impact" arguments--nuclear war, environmental destruction, genocide, famine, and the like-by debaters and coaches signals a morbid and detached fascination with such events, one that views these real human tragedies as part of a "game" in which so-called "objective and neutral" advocates actively seek to find in their research the "impact to outweigh all other impacts"--the round-winning argument that will carry them to their goal of winning tournament X, Y, or Z. He concluded that our "use" of such events in this way is tantamount to a celebration of them; our detached, rational discussions reinforce a detached, rational viewpoint, when emotional and moral outrage may be a more appropriate response.  In the last few years, my academic research has led me to be persuaded by Goodnight's unspoken assumption; language is not merely some transparent tool used to transmit information, but rather is an incredibly powerful medium, the use of which inevitably has real political and material consequences. Given this assumption, I believe that it is important for us to examine the "discourse of debate practice:" that is, the language, discourses, and meanings that we, as a community of debaters and coaches, unthinkingly employ in academic debate.  If it is the case that the language we use has real implications for how we view the world, how we view others, and how we act in the world, then it is imperative that we critically examine our own discourse practices with an eye to how our language does violence to others. I am shocked and surprised when I hear myself saying things like, "we killed them," or "take no prisoners," or "let's blow them out of the water."  I am tired of the "ideal" debater being defined as one who has mastered the art of verbal assault to the point where accusing opponents of lying, cheating, or being deliberately misleading is a sign of strength. But what I am most tired of is how women debaters are marginalized and rendered voiceless in such a discourse community.  Women who verbally assault their opponents are labeled "bitches" because it is not socially acceptable for women to be verbally aggressive.  Women who get angry and storm out of a room when a disappointing decision is rendered are labeled "hysterical" because, as we all know, women are more emotional then men.  I am tired of hearing comments like, "those 'girls' from school X aren't really interested in debate; they just want to meet men."  We can all point to examples (although only a few) of women who have succeeded at the top levels of debate.  But I find myself wondering how many more women gave up because they were tired of negotiating the mine field of discrimination, sexual harassment, and isolation they found in the debate community. As members of this community, however, we have great freedom to define it in whatever ways we see fit.  After all, what is debate except a collection of shared understandings and explicit or implicit rules for interaction?  What I am calling for is a critical examination of how we, as individual members of this community, characterize our activity, ourselves, and our interactions with others through language.  We must become aware of the ways in which our mostly hidden and unspoken assumptions about what "good" debate is function to exclude not only women, but ethnic minorities from the amazing intellectual opportunities that training in debate provides.  Our nation and indeed, our planet, faces incredibly difficult challenges in the years ahead.  I believe that it is not acceptable anymore for us to go along as we always have, assuming that things will straighten themselves out. If the rioting in Los Angeles taught us anything, it is that complacency breeds resentment and frustration.  We may not be able to change the world, but we can change our own community, and if we fail to do so, we give up the only real power that we have.