## OFF

#### Interpretation – the affirmative should have to defend a why appropriation of outer space is unjust

#### Appropriation of outer space is the exercise of exclusive control.

**Trapp 13** (TIMOTHY JUSTIN TRAPP, JD Candidate @ UIUC Law, ‘13, TAKING UP SPACE BY ANY OTHER MEANS: COMING TO TERMS WITH THE NONAPPROPRIATION ARTICLE OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2013 No. 4])//DebateDrills AY

The issues presented in relation to the nonappropriation article of the Outer Space Treaty should be clear.214 The ITU has, quite blatantly, created something akin to “property interests in outer space.”215 It allows nations to exclude others from their orbital slots, even when the nation is not currently using that slot.216 This is directly in line with at least one definition of outer-space appropriation.217 [\*\*Start Footnote 217\*\*Id. at 236 (“**Appropriation of outer space**, **therefore, is ‘the exercise of exclusive control or exclusive use’ with a sense of permanence, which limits other nations’ access to it.**”) (quoting Milton L. Smith, The Role of the ITU in the Development of Space Law, 17 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 157, 165 (1992)). \*\*End Footnote 217\*\*]The ITU even allows nations with unused slots to devise them to other entities, creating a market for the property rights set up by this regulation.218 In some aspects, this seems to effect exactly what those signatory nations of the Bogotá Declaration were trying to accomplish, albeit through different means.219 Though the legitimacy of such a regime may be questionable, it remains in effect, showing that it is at least tolerable under the edict of the nonappropriation article of the Outer Space Treaty.220 There must, therefore, be something about the ITU that differentiates it from something like the Bogotá Declaration.221 The most immediate difference is the character of the body promulgating the regulation. The Bogotá Declaration is an agreement between eight countries claiming rights to all space above them.222 The ITU’s regulations are promulgated under the auspices of the U.N.223 While the Bogotá Declaration is an international agreement, it is still a very limited cooperation.224 The ITU, through the U.N., comprises the largest possible cooperation of international actors, giving it an international character as opposed to simply a multinational character.225 Furthermore, the allocation of orbital slots by the ITU is a response to the limited character of geostationary orbits.226 While the Bogotá Declaration was probably promulgated in response to a few nations’ fears that they may be excluded from the space arena,227 **the allocation system of the ITU is a measure to make sure that the GEO resource is efficiently managed for the use of all mankind**.228

#### Standards:

#### Aff-neg dialectics---the resolution is the only problem given to both teams in advance - centering it allows deep preparation and engagement that refines our activist strategies. Post-facto shifts do not capture this offense because lack of central point to engage means that we can’t effectively synthesize activist lessons.

Scheuer, 21 [Robert Scheuer is a Social Ecologist from Southeast Michigan. He received a M.A. in Philosophy from Eastern Michigan University, and a B.A. in Philosophy from Michigan State University, “Dialogical Vanguard Pedagogy: Educate, Agitate, Awaken!,” 5/17/2021, Midwestern Marx]//Townes

​Most notably, methods of prescription are integral to the oppressed-oppressor relationship.[4] I find that this is a direct consequence of the way in which the ruling class manages any discourse that pertains to the knowledge, norms, and rules of how a society functions. Freire designates this as the “banking model” of education.[5] In the banking model, knowledge is considered to be a gift that is given from the teacher to the student. Consequently, the banking model of education enables the ruling class to narrate and dictate information to the oppressed, who in turn are only able to passively receive and listen to these commands. Ultimately, the banking model culminates into practices in which the ruling class acts as the teachers, while the oppressed are categorized as students who are to be controlled.

Additionally, in the banking model of education, the teacher narrates a certain set of content to their students. Here, the task of the teacher is to deposit into the students minds a series of fixed knowledge, norms, and rules, as if their minds were empty containers to be filled. In turn, the student’s job then is to record, memorize, and repeat the information given to them. These students are not permitted to reflect or engage with this content. In this model it is not for the student to ask why two times two equals four, but rather, only to know that it simply is four.[i] In light of this, the banking model can be said to be quite mechanistic in composition.

Subsequently, the ruling class has taken the banking model as the way in which the knowledge, norms, and rules of society are applied, presenting themselves as the teachers, while at the same time positioning the oppressed as their students. Anti-dialogical by its very nature, the banking model has been so successful for the ruling class because there is no room for any participation on the side of the oppressed, with the exception of absorbing what is dictated to them. As a result, the banking model does not allow the oppressed to actively participate and transform the world around them.

This makes the banking model a particularly dangerous pedagogical approach, as it allows the ruling class to place limitations on the rights and liberties that the oppressed can have. At best, political emancipation is the only form of freedom that can be advanced when the ruling class is permitted to act as teachers who have the exclusive authority to prescribe knowledge, norms, and rules. The ruling class utilizes these pedagogical tactics to ensure their complete control of all our social-political actions and behaviors. In this worldview, it is not for the oppressed to ask or challenge why we must continue to live in a capitalist society, but only to know that it simply is the case that we do.

With the backing of the banking model of education the ruling class is able to prohibit all potential revolutionary changes. Simply put, the ruling class uses the banking model to make the possibility of human emancipation untenable. However, it should be noted that a revolution is not a project in which one liberates another. The ruling class cannot and will not lead us in the struggle to overcome oppression. To believe the oppressors would liberate the oppressed is indeed a naive notion. This is why the oppressed must not rely on the knowledge given to them by the ruling class. As Freire attests, “Freedom is acquired by conquest, not by gift” (47). Emancipation cannot be gifted to the oppressed because the ruling class places strict limitations on what kind of emancipation can be achieved in their social-political system. Even though political emancipation has traditionally come from the ruling class by way of integrating citizens into their fold, there is no question that human emancipation cannot come from within this currently existing superstructure.

As such, the oppressed cannot use the State apparatus as a means of liberation. In the essay “The Civil War in France” Marx insists that “the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery, and wield it for its own purposes” (Marx, 302). To put this another way, the oppressed cannot replace the bourgeois State with a proletariat State, as this would simply be a transference of domination. This would only amount to a substation of power and would not necessarily promote the end of oppression as such. Rather than reconstructing social-political power, an organization such as this merely rearranges it. Hence, the conditions of human emancipation would not be sufficiently met by the creation of a proletariat State. In sum, a full form of freedom cannot be achieved through the mere rearrangement of society, rather, it must be completely reconstructed anew.

The conditions needed for the total negation of alienation and exploitation requires the destruction of the oppressor State apparatus. On these grounds, Marx postulates two distinct movements that must occur prior to the actualization of a truly free and equal society. First, the bourgeois State must be smashed. This can be achieved through revolution. The second movement is the withering away of the new State.[6] But what does this mean and how does it happen? While there is no simple or singular answer to this riddle, it must be asserted that the withering away of the oppressor State can only happen when every person is given the opportunity to engage in dialogical discourse and action with one another.

With all of this in mind, I will now argue that any attempt to liberate the oppressed must involve their active and reflective participation in how society is shaped. For this reason, members of revolutionary vanguard leadership cannot rely on the same pedagogy used by the ruling class. According to Freire, the oppressed should not be dictated “liberatory” propaganda, nor can they be told what to think or how to act.[7] Instead, Freire asserts the best route to freedom occurs when there is constant and continual dialogue between all members of society. Revolutionary leaders cannot act as banking model teachers in relation to the oppressed, for they must instead enter into a co-intentional form of education with them. This is the only way to combat the contradictions that exist between the student and the teacher - the oppressed and the oppressor - as posited by the ruling class. Thus, communication should be acknowledged as having paramount significance for all matters concerning revolutionary liberation.

When dialogical discourse happens, both parties become teachers and students equiprimordially. As Freire states, “Through dialogue, the teacher-of-the-students and the students-of-the-teacher cease to exist and a new term emerges: teacher-student with students-teachers” (Freire, 80). Freire calls this form of dialogue between teachers and students the “problem-posing model” of education.[8] As the problem-posing model is dialogical, it stands in direct contrast with the banking model. Whereas the banking model teacher prescribes information to students, the problem-posing teacher-student discovers knowledge alongside their fellow student-teachers. Freire says this about the problem-posing teacher-student, “Here, no one teaches another, nor is anyone self-taught. People teach each other” (Freire, 80). Freire’s interpretation of a liberatory pedagogy therefore does not place the oppressed student as a passive listener, but rather, as a critical and active participant. Through dialogue, trust, and love the problem-posing model allows the student-teacher and the teacher-student to work together with one another as co-authors of knowledge, norms, and rules.

​Overall, education is dialogical if students can contribute to the discourse at hand and it is anti-dialogical when they cannot. Indeed, dialogical action necessitates the possibility of participation. In short, the “Banking education resists dialogue; problem-posing education regards dialogue as indispensable to the act of cognition which unveils reality. Banking education treats students as objects of assistance; problem-posing education makes them critical thinkers” (Freire, 83). This is valuable insight for those who are involved in the revolutionary struggle. From this interpretation we can see that when vanguard leaders fight apart from the oppressed it can only amount to fighting for liberation for themselves and not the people.

#### Clash: effective clash is the only way to learn about the topic and create change. It is thru resolutional debating that we are able to become beter activitists that can challenge structures of power.

#### Limits- Their model explodes the amount of potential affs because there’s thousands of different types of private satellites—in combination with the million of other things they can spec, neg prep becomes impossible since there’s no universal DA because each action has a different situation- limits k2 reciprocal engagement because it creates neg caselists.

#### This is drop the debater. Prefer competing interps. No rvis prevents us from calling abuse

## OFF

**Anti-capitalist transition threatens the liberal international order.**

**Mann 14** [Eric Mann is a special agent with a United States federal agency, with significant domestic and international counterintelligence and counter-terrorism experience. Worked as a special assistant for a U.S. Senator and served as a presidential appointee for the U.S. Congress. He is currently responsible for an internal security and vulnerability assessment program. Bachelors @ University of South Carolina, Graduate degree in Homeland Security @ Georgetown. “AUSTERITY, ECONOMIC DECLINE, AND FINANCIAL WEAPONS OF WAR: A NEW PARADIGM FOR GLOBAL SECURITY,” May 2014, <https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/37262/MANN-THESIS-2014.pdf>]

The conclusions reached in this thesis demonstrate how economic considerations within states can figure **prominently into the calculus for future conflicts**. The findings also suggest that security issues with economic or financial underpinnings will transcend classical determinants of war and conflict, and change the manner by which rival states engage in hostile acts toward one another. The research shows that security concerns emanating from economic uncertainty and the inherent vulnerabilities within global financial markets will present new challenges for national security, and provide developing states new asymmetric options for balancing against stronger states.¶ The security areas, identified in the proceeding chapters, are likely to mature into **global security threats** in the immediate future. As the case study on South Korea suggest, the overlapping security issues associated with economic decline and reduced military spending by the United States will **affect allied confidence in America’s security guarantees**. The study shows that this outcome could cause **regional instability** or realignments of strategic partnerships in the Asia-pacific region with ramifications for U.S. national security. Rival states and non-state groups may also become **emboldened to challenge America’s status** in the unipolar international system.¶ The potential risks associated with **stolen or loose WMD**, resulting from poor security, can also pose a threat to U.S. national security. The case study on Pakistan, Syria and North Korea show how financial constraints affect weapons security making weapons vulnerable to theft, and how financial factors can influence WMD proliferation by contributing to the motivating factors behind a trusted insider’s decision to sell weapons technology. The inherent vulnerabilities within the global financial markets will provide terrorists’ organizations and other non-state groups, who object to the current international system or distribution of power, with opportunities to disrupt global finance and perhaps weaken America’s status. A more ominous threat originates from states intent on increasing diversification of foreign currency holdings, establishing alternatives to the dollar for international trade, or engaging financial warfare against the United States.

#### Extinction- LIO collapse accelerates revisionism and great power war.

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Robert Kagan, “The Twilight of the Liberal World Order,” Brookings Big Ideas for America edited by Michael O’Hanlon, Brookings Institution Press (2017): <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctt1kk66tr.31>

The liberal world order established in the aftermath of World War II may be coming to an end, challenged by forces both without and within. The external challenges come from the ambition of dissatisfied large and medium-size powers to overturn the existing strategic order dominated by the United States and its allies and partners. Their aim is to gain hegemony in their respective regions. China and Russia pose the greatest challenges to the world order because of their relative military, economic, and political power and their evident willingness to use it, which makes them significant players in world politics and, just as important, because the regions where they seek strategic hegemony—Asia and Europe—historically have been critical to global peace and stability. At a lesser but still significant level, Iran seeks regional hegemony in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, which if accomplished would have a strategic, economic, and political impact on the international system. North Korea seeks control of the Korean peninsula, which if accomplished would affect the stability and security of northeast Asia. Finally, at a much lower level of concern, there is the effort by ISIS and other radical Islamist groups to establish a new Islamic caliphate in the Middle East. If accomplished, that, too, would have effects on the global order.

However, it is the two great powers, China and Russia, that pose the greatest challenge to the relatively peaceful and prosperous international order created and sustained by the United States. If they were to accomplish their aims of establishing hegemony in their desired spheres of influence, the world would return to the condition it was in at the end of the 19th century, with competing great powers clashing over inevitably intersecting and overlapping spheres of interest. These were the unsettled, disordered conditions that produced the fertile ground for the two destructive world wars of the first half of the 20th century. The collapse of the British-dominated world order on the oceans, the disruption of the uneasy balance of power on the European continent due to the rise of a powerful unified Germany, combined with the rise of Japanese power in East Asia all contributed to a highly competitive international environment in which dissatisfied great powers took the opportunity to pursue their ambitions in the absence of any power or group of powers to unite in checking them. The result was an unprecedented global calamity. It has been the great accomplishment of the U.S.-led world order in the 70 years since the end of the Second World War that this kind of competition has been held in check and great power conflicts have been avoided.

The role of the United States, however, has been critical. Until recently, the dissatisfied great and medium-size powers have faced considerable and indeed almost insuperable obstacles in achieving their objectives. The chief obstacle has been the power and coherence of the order itself and of its principal promoter and defender. The American-led system of political and military alliances, especially in the two critical regions of Europe and East Asia, has presented China and Russia with what Dean Acheson once referred to as “situations of strength” in their regions that have required them to pursue their ambitions cautiously and in most respects to defer serious efforts to disrupt the international system. The system has served as a check on their ambitions in both positive and negative ways. They have been participants in and for the most part beneficiaries of the open international economic system the United States created and helped sustain and, so long as that system was functioning, have had more to gain by playing in it than by challenging and overturning it. The same cannot be said of the political and strategic aspects of the order, both of which have worked to their detriment. The growth and vibrancy of democratic government in the two decades following the collapse of Soviet communism has posed a continual threat to the ability of rulers in Beijing and Moscow to maintain control, and since the end of the Cold War they have regarded every advance of democratic institutions, including especially the geographical advance close to their borders, as an existential threat—and with reason. The continual threat to the basis of their rule posed by the U.S.-supported order has made them hostile both to the order and to the United States. However, it has also been a source of weakness and vulnerability. Chinese rulers in particular have had to worry about what an unsuccessful confrontation with the United States might do to their sources of legitimacy at home. And although Vladimir Putin has to some extent used a calculated foreign adventurism to maintain his hold on domestic power, he has taken a more cautious approach when met with determined U.S. and European opposition, as in the case of Ukraine, and pushed forward, as in Syria, only when invited to do so by U.S. and Western passivity. Autocratic rulers in a liberal democratic world have had to be careful.

The greatest check on Chinese and Russian ambitions, however, has come from the combined military power of the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia. China, although increasingly powerful itself, has had to contemplate facing the combined military strength of the world’s superpower and some very formidable regional powers linked by alliance or common strategic interest, including Japan, India, and South Korea, as well as smaller but still potent nations like Vietnam and Australia. Russia has had to face the United States and its NATO allies. When united, these military powers present a daunting challenge to a revisionist power that can call on no allies of its own for assistance. Even were the Chinese to score an early victory in a conflict, they would have to contend over time with the combined industrial productive capacities of some of the world’s richest and most technologically advanced nations. A weaker Russia would face an even greater challenge.

Faced with these obstacles, the two great powers, as well as the lesser dissatisfied powers, have had to hope for or if possible engineer a weakening of the U.S.-supported world order from within. This could come about either by separating the United States from its allies, raising doubts about the U.S. commitment to defend its allies militarily in the event of a conflict, or by various means wooing American allies out from within the liberal world order’s strategic structure. For most of the past decade, the reaction of American allies to greater aggressiveness on the part of China and Russia in their respective regions, and to Iran in the Middle East, has been to seek more reassurance from the United States. Russian actions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria; Chinese actions in the East and South China seas; Iranian actions in Syria, Iraq, and along the littoral of the Persian Gulf—all have led to calls by American allies and partners for a greater commitment. In this respect, the system has worked as it was supposed to. What the political scientist William Wohlforth once described as the inherent stability of the unipolar order reflected this dynamic—as dissatisfied regional powers sought to challenge the status quo, their alarmed neighbors turned to the distant American superpower to contain their ambitions.

The system has depended, however, on will, capacity, and coherence at the heart of the liberal world order. The United States had to be willing and able to play its part as the principal guarantor of the order, especially in the military and strategic realm. The order’s ideological and economic core order—the democracies of Europe and East Asia and the Pacific—had to remain relatively healthy and relatively confident. In such circumstances, the combined political, economic, and military power of the liberal world would be too great to be seriously challenged by the great powers, much less by the smaller dissatisfied powers.

In recent years, however, the liberal order has begun to weaken and fracture at the core. As a result of many related factors—difficult economic conditions, the recrudescence of nationalism and tribalism, weak and uncertain political leadership and unresponsive mainstream political parties, a new era of communications that seems to strengthen rather than weaken tribalism—there has emerged a crisis of confidence in what might be called the liberal enlightenment project. That project tended to elevate universal principles of individual rights and common humanity over ethnic, racial, religious, national, or tribal differences. It looked to a growing economic interdependence to create common interests across boundaries and the establishment of international institutions to smooth differences and fa cilitate cooperation among nations. Instead, the past decade has seen the rise of tribalism and nationalism; an increasing focus on the “other” in all societies; and a loss of confidence in government, in the capitalist system, and in democracy. We have been witnessing something like the opposite of the “end of history” but have returned to history with a vengeance, rediscovering all the darker aspects of the human soul. That includes, for many, the perennial human yearning for a strong leader to provide firm guidance in a time of seeming breakdown and incoherence.

This crisis of the enlightenment project may have been inevitable. It may indeed have been cyclical, due to inherent flaws in both capitalism and democracy, which periodically have been exposed and have raised doubts about both—as happened, for instance, throughout the West in the 1930s. Now, as then, moreover, this crisis of confidence in liberalism coincides with a breakdown of the strategic order. In this case, however, the key variable has not been the United States as the outside power and its willingness, or not, to step in and save or remake an order lost by other powers. Rather it is the United States’ own willingness to continue upholding the order that it created and which depends entirely on American power.

That willingness has been in doubt for some time. Increasingly in the quarter-century after the end of the Cold War, Americans have been wondering why they bear such an unusual and outsized responsibility for preserving global order when their own interests are not always apparently served and when, indeed, the United States seems to be making sacrifices while others benefit. The reasons why the United States took on this abnormal role after the calamitous two world wars of the 20th century have been largely forgotten. As a consequence, the American public’s patience with the difficulties and costs inherent in playing such a role has worn thin. Thus, whereas previous unsuccessful wars, in Korea in 1950 and Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, and previous economic downturns, such as in the mid- to late 1970s, did not have the effect of turning Americans against global involvement, the unsuccessful wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the financial crisis of 2007–09 have had that effect. President Obama pursued an ambivalent approach to global involvement, but the main thrust of his approach was retrenchment. His actions and statements were a critique of previous American strategy and reinforced a national mood favoring a much less active role in the world and much narrower definition of American interests.

With the election of Donald Trump, a majority of Americans have sig naled their unwillingness to continue upholding the world order. Trump was not the only candidate in 2016 to run on a platform suggesting a much narrower definition of American interests and a lessening of the burdens of American global leadership. “America First” is not just an empty phrase but a fairly coherent philosophy with a long lineage and many adherents in the American academy. It calls for viewing American interests through a narrow lens. It suggests no longer supporting an international alliance structure, no longer seeking to deny great powers their spheres of influence and regional hegemony, no longer attempting to uphold liberal norms in the international system, and no longer sacrificing short-term interests—in trade for instance—in the longer-term interest of preserving an open economic order.

Coming as it does at a time of growing great power competition, this new approach in American foreign policy is likely to hasten a return to the instability and clashes of previous eras. These external challenges to the liberal world order and the continuing weakness and fracturing of the liberal world from within are likely to feed on each other. The weakness of the liberal core and the abdication by the United States of its global responsibilities will encourage more aggressive revisionism by the dissatisfied powers, which may in turn exacerbate the sense of weakness and helplessness and the loss of confidence of the liberal world, which will in turn increase the sense on the part of the great power autocracies that this is their opportunity to reorder the world to conform to their interests.

History suggests that this is a downward spiral from which it will be difficult to recover absent a major conflict. It was in the 1920s, not the 1930s, that the most important and ultimately fatal decisions were made by the liberal powers. Above all, it was the American decision to remove itself from a position of global responsibility, to reject strategic involvement to preserve the peace in Europe, and neglect its naval strength in the Pacific to check the rise of Japan. The “return to normalcy” of the 1920 U.S. election seemed safe and innocent at the time, but the essentially selfish policies pursued by the world’s strongest power in the following decade helped set the stage for the calamities of the 1930s. By the time the crises began to erupt in that decade, it was already too late to avoid paying the high price of global conflict.

One thing for the new administration to keep in mind: History tells us that revisionist great powers are not easy to satisfy short of complete capitulation. Their sphere of influence is never quite large enough to satisfy their pride or their expanding need for security. The “satiated” power that Bismarck spoke of is rare—even his Germany, in the end, could not be satiated. And of course, rising great powers always express some historical grievance. Every people, except perhaps for the fortunate Americans, have reason for resentment at ancient injustices, nurse grudges against old adversaries, seek to return to a glorious past that was stolen from them by military or political defeat. The world’s supply of grievances is inexhaustible.

These grievances, however, are rarely solved by minor border changes. Japan, the aggrieved “have-not” nation of the 1930s, did not satisfy itself by swallowing Manchuria in 1931. Germany, the aggrieved victim of Versailles, did not satisfy itself by bringing the Germans of the Sudetenland back into the fold. And, of course, Russia’s historical sphere of influence does not end in Ukraine. It begins in Ukraine. It extends to the Baltics, to the Balkans, and to heart of Central Europe. The tragic irony is that, in the process of carving out these spheres of influence, the ambitious rising powers invariably create the very threats they use to justify their actions. The cycle only ends if and when the great powers that make up the existing power structure, in today’s case, the United States, decide they have had enough. We know those moments as major power wars.

The new administration seems to be fixated almost entirely on the threat of radical Islam and may not believe its main problem is going to be great power confrontation. In fact, it is going to have to confront both sets of challenges. The first, addressing the threat of terrorism, is comparatively manageable. It is the second, managing great power competition and confrontation, that has historically proved the most difficult and also the most costly when handled badly.

The best way to avoid great power clashes is to make the U.S. position clear from the outset. That position should be that the United States welcomes competition of a certain kind. Great powers compete across multiple planes—economic, ideological, and political, as well as military. Competition in most spheres is necessary and even healthy. Within the liberal order, China can compete economically and successfully with the United States; Russia can thrive in the international economic order upheld by the liberal powers, even if it is not itself liberal.

But security competition is different. The security situation undergirds everything else. It remains true today as it has since the Second World War that only the United States has the capacity and the unique geographical advantages to provide global security. There is no stable balance of power in Europe or Asia without the United States. And while we can talk about soft power and smart power, they have been and always will be of limited value when confronting raw military power. Despite all of the loose talk of American decline, it is in the military realm where U.S. advantages remain clearest. Even in other great powers’ backyards, the United States retains the capacity, along with its powerful allies, to deter challenges to the security order. But without a U.S. willingness to use military power to establish balance in far-flung regions of the world, the system will buckle under the unrestrained military competition of regional powers.

If history is any guide, the next four years are the critical inflection point. The rest of the world will take its cue from the early actions of the new administration. If the next president governs as he ran, which is to say if he pursues a course designed to secure only America’s narrow interests; focuses chiefly on international terrorism—the least of the challenges to the present world order; accommodates the ambitions of the great powers; ceases to regard international economic policy in terms of global order but only in terms of America’s bottom line narrowly construed; and generally ceases to place a high priority on reassuring allies and partners in the world’s principal strategic theaters—then the collapse of the world order, with all that entails, may not be far off.

**Independently, a transition from capitalism opens us up to nuclear annihilation**

**Milne and Kinsella, 17**—Faculty of English, University of Cambridge AND School of Media, Culture and Creative Arts, Faculty of Humanities, Curtin University (Drew and John, “NUCLEAR THEORY DEGREE ZERO, WITH TWO CHEERS FOR DERRIDA,” Angelaki, 22:3, 1-16,) brett

Another version of the “accelerationist” argument captures some of the ideological workings of the term. In Marxist circles, an “accelerationist” is someone who thinks that the collapse of capitalism will be **hastened** by allowing reactionary forces to **speed up capitalism’s self-destruction**. There are occasions when such an argument has validity: nothing about the form of the argument makes it inherently or structurally wrong. There are revolutionary moments when allowing capitalism to collapse in order to rebuild a socialist society is a better path than propping up a failing capitalist regime. The judgement is political rather than philosophical. In **most contexts**, however, the accelerationist argument, especially as a political principle, is **deeply dangerous**. It would be **better**, for example, to **preserve a failing US capitalist regime while building social forces to take it over**, than to allow the **nuclear weapons** of the United States to **fall into the hands of a suicidal military rearguard** or some **counter-revolutionary terrorist organisation**. Preserving the possibility of human life **might involve propping up collapsing capitalist institutions**, not least the **nuclear safety inspectorate**, rather than **allowing humanity to be swallowed up by some death spiral of presidential dictators** in fear of being toppled. These are **critical judgements** that could arise at **any moment**, with **real risks** that poor judgements will **hasten a nuclear confrontation** that leads to **mutually assured annihilation**. The **formal shape** of an accelerationist argument needs to be understood **strategically** and **politically** if it is to address nuclear questions.

## OFF

#### **Public support for climate reform is high now**

Tyson and Kennedy 20

Alec and Brian, (Alec Tyson is an associate director of research at Pew Research Center, where he studies public views of science and technology and the implications of science for society. He is an expert in U.S. survey research and has written about American public opinion on a range of topics, including U.S. generations, the growing role of partisanship in American life, climate change, the environment, and trust in scientists. And Brian Kennedy received his master’s and Ph.D. in political science at Michigan State University, where his work focused on cross-national attitudes about climate change.)/EE

ALEC AND BRIAN KENNEDY

A majority of Americans continue to say they see the effects of climate change in their own communities and believe that the federal government falls short in its efforts to reduce the impacts of climate change. At a time when partisanship colors most views of policy, broad majorities of the public – including more than half of Republicans and overwhelming shares of Democrats – say they would favor a range of initiatives to reduce the impacts of climate change, including large-scale tree planting efforts, tax credits for businesses that capture carbon emissions and tougher fuel efficiency standards for vehicles, according to a new Pew Research Center survey Public concern over climate change has been growing in recent years, particularly among Democrats, and there are no signs that the COVID-19 pandemic has dampened concern levels. A recent Center analysis finds 60% view climate change as a major threat to the well-being of the United States, as high a share taking this view as in any Pew Research Center survey going back to 2009. The new national survey by Pew Research Center, conducted April 29 to May 5 among 10,957 U.S. adults using the Center’s online American Trends Panel, finds a majority of U.S. adults want the government to play a larger role in addressing climate change. About two-thirds (65%) of Americans say the federal government is doing too little to reduce the effects of climate change – a view that’s about as widely held today as it was last fall. And public dissatisfaction with government environmental action is not limited solely to climate: Majorities also continue to say the government is doing too little in other areas, such as protecting air and water quality and wildlife. Consistent with public concerns over climate and the environment, 79% of Americans say the priority for the country’s energy supply should be developing alternative sources of energy, such as wind and solar; far fewer (20%) give priority to expanding the production of oil, coal and natural gas. To shift consumption patterns toward renewables, a majority of the public (58%) says government regulations will be necessary to encourage businesses and individuals to rely more on renewable energy; fewer (39%) think the private marketplace will ensure this change in habits.

#### **Governmental policy is key to solve for climate change but continued public support is needed**

Leiserowitz, 19

Anthony, (Anthony Leiserowitz is a human geographer at Yale University who studies public perceptions of climate change. He has particularly examined perceptions within the United States, where people are considerably less aware of climate change than in other countries.)October 22, "Building Public and Political Will for Climate Change Action," Yale School of the Environment, [https://environment.yale.edu/news/article/building-public-and-political-will-for-climate-change-action /](https://environment.yale.edu/news/article/building-public-and-political-will-for-climate-change-action%20/) EE

Global climate change is a “massive collective action problem.” While changes in individual behavior (for example, energy conservation) can help reduce emissions, system-level changes to the way human societies use energy and natural resources are necessary to limit global warming to “safe” levels. Government policy is one important means of system change — including laws, rules, regulations, standards, and incentives. But many climate change policies, from the local level to the global level, founder on the lack of “political will” — the unwillingness or inability of government officials to enact policies that will reduce carbon pollution at the scale and speed required. Public will, especially as expressed through citizen activism, is an important influence on the policymaker process. Strong public demand increases the likelihood that governments will prioritize climate change action. Public will refers to a “social system’s shared recognition of a particular problem and resolve to address the situation in a particular way through sustained collective action.” Indicators of public will can include public support for mitigation policies, contacting government officials, and pro-climate consumer behavior. Importantly, however, there is no single, homogenous “public” — there are many diverse “publics” within any society. “Strong public demand increases the likelihood that governments will prioritize climate change action.” One key set of citizens is an issue public — a relatively small proportion of a population that is passionate about a specific issue. Issue publics are highly attentive to and seek out information about their issue, have relatively high levels of knowledge, have developed strong and stable attitudes, and are more likely than other citizens to take action on the issue. Some issue publics are diffuse, with few and weak connective ties between individual members. Others are highly organized through social, institutional, or advocacy groups and networks, which can make them powerful political actors. One example of the latter is the National Rifle Association — an organized issue public of approximately four to five million members (in a country of more than 250 million adults) who wield political clout far beyond their numbers on the issues they care about. Public will can thus include at least three levels of citizen engagement: (1) general public support for an issue or policy, (2) an issue public focused on that issue or policy, and (3) an organized issue public mobilized to exert influence on policymakers. In turn, a mobilized issue public can include diverse groups, organized into a coordinated “advocacy coalition” of partners working together to achieve a common goal. Separately, there is always “limited space available on the political or decision-making agenda, that is the continually evolving, brief list of issues that command policy makers’ attention at a given time.” “Windows of Opportunity” theory says an issue is “most likely to reach the political agenda when three things occur at the same time: a problem is perceived as important and urgent by the public and elites [public will]; viable policy solutions are available; and political commitment to adopt a solution is high [political will]. When these three elements converge, a “policy window” opens during which significant change is possible. All three elements are necessary for policy change, but even then, change is not inevitable. Advocates have to be ready and able to take advantage of a policy window when it opens. After it closes, only incremental progress is likely until the next window opens. Global Warming’s Six Americas Building public will for climate change action must start with an understanding of the different publics within a population. Since 2008, the Yale Program on Climate Change Communication, in partnership with the George Mason University Center for Climate Change Communication, has conducted a twice-a-year nationally representative survey called Climate Change in the American Mind. One key insight has been the identification of “Global Warming’s Six Americas” — six distinct segments of the American publican public that each respond to the issues in a different way. As of 2008, 21 percent of Americans were alarmed about climate change. The Alarmed are convinced that global warming is happening, human-caused, and an urgent threat, and they strongly support climate change action. Most, however, do not know what they can do to solve the problem. Next are the Concerned (30 percent), who also think human-caused global warming is happening and is a serious threat. However, they believe that it is still a distant problem — distant in time, with impacts a generation or more away, and distant in space — a problem that will primarily impact plants, penguins, or polar bears but not the United States, their communities, or the people and places they care about. The Concerned support policy action but do not see the issue as an urgent priority. Next are the Cautious (21 percent), who still question: Is global warming happening? Is it human-caused or natural? Is it serious or overblown? The Cautious have not yet made up their minds. Then come the Disengaged (7 percent), who know little about global warming. They rarely or never hear about it in the media or from their own friends or family members. Next are the Doubtful (12 percent), who do not think global warming is happening, but if it is, it is just a natural cycle. They do not think about climate change much or consider it a serious risk. The final group are the Dismissive (9 percent), who are convinced global warming is not happening, human-caused, or a threat. Most endorse conspiracy theories: global warming is a hoax, scientists are making up the data, or it is just a get-rich scheme by Al Gore. The Dismissive are just a small percentage of the American public. But they are very vocal, and their views have had an outsize influence in Congress, the White House, and many state governments. Engagement Strategies A first priority is to organize the Alarmed, who are currently a latent issue public. There ae approximately 53 million Americans alarmed about climate change. Of this group, 7 percent (about 3.7 million) say they are already part of “a campaign to convince elected officials to take action to reduce global warming.” 28 percent (about 14.8 million) say they “definitely would join” a campaign, and 37 percent (about 19.6 million) say they “probably would join” such a campaign. This represents an enormous potential social movement — if they were recruited, organized, and deployed. But unlike other issue publics, the citizen activist wing of the climate movement remains relatively small and disorganized. Second, the diverse organizations advocating for climate change action need to be organized into an advocacy coalition with the political muscle to sway elections, influence policymakers, and overcome the concerted opposition of climate change action opponents. Advocacy coalitions can include nongovernment organizations, social movements, governments, political parties, research institutions, companies, and media outlets. On the issue of climate change, opponents of climate change policy, such as the fossil fuel industry billionaires Charles Koch and David H. Koch, have constructed a larger, better organized, and better financed coalition, sustained over decades, than have proponents, who — despite having majority public support for many policies, a larger issue public, and a larger number of organizations working on climate change — continue to pursue relatively diverse agendas, with less coordination and focus. The balance of power and influence between these different coalitions can have very significant effects on the policy-making process. A third priority is to build the “silent permission” for action among the 70 percent of Americans in the middle four groups of the Six Americas. These audiences are unlikely to become active members of the climate change issue public (for example, the Alarmed), but critically, they do represent the majority of voters. They are unlikely to ever lobby a public official, call their members of Congress, march in the streets, or donate money to a climate change organization. But most elected officials need their silent permission to pass climate policies — their tacit support and willingness to not punish political leaders at the ballot box for taking action. A slightly more ambitious goal for this silent majority is to persuade them to prefer political candidate X over candidate Y, because candidate X favors stronger climate change action. “Climate change threatens the life-support systems all human beings, human societies, and other species depend on. This recognition has led to the emergence of diverse new voices also demanding action.” A fourth priority is to build a diverse issue public among the Alarmed. Many Americans currently associate climate change with three main messengers: scientists, environmentalists, and liberal politicians. For most Americans, however, these are relatively abstract others. Most people trust scientists and hold them in high esteem; however, for most Americans, scientists remain a distant abstraction. Few Americans personally know a scientist, let alone a climate scientist, and rarely identify with science or scientists themselves. Likewise, many Americans do not consider themselves “environmentalists,” who are often stereotyped as “others,” with different values, attitudes, and behaviors than mainstream Americans. Finally, most Americans do not identify as strong liberals. Likewise, pre-existing political identities shape attitudes toward climate champions like former vice president Gore. Gore successfully engaged the liberal Democratic base and elites in the issue of climate change, but he also activated strong opposition from those Americans who dislike him and his politics — intensifying the partisan divide on climate change. All three of these messengers reinforce the perception for many Americans that climate change is “their” issue, not “my” issue. Most Americans have not yet seen people like themselves demanding climate change action. But climate change threatens the life-support systems all human beings, human societies, and other species depend on. This recognition has led to the emergence of diverse new voices also demanding action, including business, faith, and military leaders, media organizations, artists, minority groups, doctors, lawyers, children, parents, grandparents, and every other sector of society. It is critical to organize and amplify these new voices. Beyond their own political, social, and cultural power, their participation communicates to the silent majority that people other than scientists, environmentalists, and liberals care about climate change. Diverse Americans are starting to see and hear from people who look like them, dress like them, talk like them, and share their values, who are now saying climate change is “our” issue too. This mental shift — from perceiving climate change as “their” issue to “our” and ultimately “my” issue — helps build public will for policy action. That public will can then be mobilized when policy windows open at the local, state, national, or international levels. Discussion Engaged citizens, organized issue publics, and advocacy coalitions can build public and political will for climate change action. These groups will be vital to the achievement of strong and sustained climate change policies. While many organizations with professional staff advocate for such policies, relatively few find, recruit, train, and deploy active citizens as a means of political power. Instead, many environmental groups focus on legal challenges, policy development, economic analysis, or professional lobbying of elected officials. These are all critical functions of a robust climate movement, but relatively few environmental or other groups focus on developing citizen activists. Citizen’s Climate Lobby, the Sierra Club’s Beyond Coal campaign, 350.org, the Sunrise Movement, and some state and local-based organizations are a few examples of groups that have made citizen organizing a core part of their DNA. Building a powerful issue public, with political muscle, requires a different kind of organization. It necessitates different strategies and tactics: taking advantage of twenty-first-century data-driven tools to find Alarmed citizens; connecting them to organizations devoted to developing and amplifying citizen voices and power (not just fund-raising or petition-signing), also known as “deep organizing”; building a shared sense of collective efficacy through wins big and small; and investing in sustained power building so the movement is eady to act when policy windows open. Ultimately, advocates must shift the political climate of climate change. Climate change itself provides an analogy — as the planet warms, extreme events become more frequent and severe. Similarly, as the climate movement shifts the political climate of climate change in a positive direction, the movement will win more frequently and the policy wins will go further and be less vulnerable to electoral swings. As the climate itself shifts in an ever-more dangerous direction, it will become ever more imperative that advocates build public and political will — shifting the political climate toward more ambitious climate change action.

We don’t expect individuals to take the lead when it comes to other social and economic challenges, such as unemployment. There is a decades-long economic consensus that unemployment should be kept as low as possible. But you would not ask an individual who warned that unemployment was too high: “so, what action do you personally take in the fight against unemployment?” Because that question is absurd. Unless you are the CEO of a big company, or the mayor of a city, as an individual you have no significant impact on unemployment.

The same is true of the climate crisis. What we need is citizens to make adamant demands of their politicians and institutions for more urgent action. Just as no party that pledged to increase rather than reduce unemployment would ever get elected in the UK or any other country, no political party should be allowed to dodge a clear strategy against climate risks. This is a challenge for politics, not for the individual.

#### The aff is “culturally” left- recourse to abstract philosophy/jargon and denigration of policy/institutions are more naively optimistic than pragmatic political engagement which causes a trade off with public support

McClean, PhD, 14

(David E., RICHARD RORTY, LIBERALISM AND COSMOPOLITANISM)

Yet for some reason, at least partially explicated in AOC, many leftist critics continue to cite and refer to the eccentric and often a priori ruminations of thinkers such as Bataille, Lacan and Ricoeur, and so are dismissed by policy pros doing serious work aimed at curing the ills of society. Rorty thought it was high time for these culture critics to recognize that they have a disease. The disease is, in part, the need for elaborate theoretical ‘remedies’ wrapped in neological and multi-syllabic jargon that makes no contact with the world, other than the world of books in which they are cross-referenced and cited. These elaborate theoretical remedies can seem more ‘philosophically interesting’ (a locution, sometimes employed by Rorty himself, over which I have long puzzled) than pragmatic questions about policy. As Rorty put it, somewhat famously: When one of today’s academic leftists says that some topic has been ‘inadequately theorized,’ you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of language, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist version of economic determinism ... These futile attempts to philosophize one’s way into political relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left retreats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice produces theoretical hallucinations? Rorty thought that leftist culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about their country’s social and political prospects and help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, ‘achieve our country’ - the country of Thomas Jefferson and Martin Luther King, Jr; of John Dewey and Malcom X; of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin; of Margaret Fuller and Susan B. Anthony; ofJack Welsh and Mary P. Follett; and of Harvey Milk and Barack Hussein Obama. To invoke the words of Martin Luther King, Jr, and with reference to the American context, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the ‘Beloved Community’, one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same-sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be unremarkable features of the social landscape, one wherein business interests and the interests of universities are not seen as belonging to two separate realms but rather as part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. People who fancy themselves to be intellectuals, Rorty seemed to be saying, would do well to create from within their ranks a new kind of public intellectual, one that has both a hungry and able theoretical mind yet is capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to address practical and perplexing problems, problems which require discussion and treatment that are less bedazzling and ‘philosophically interesting’ but more important to the prospects for human flourishing. The engaged public intellectual does more listening and less pontificating, and seeks to understand labour law and the complexities of managerial decision making as much as theories of surplus value and the fact-value dichotomy, the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power. This means diving deeply into the guts of social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where many intellectuals are loathe to go or to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other people’s lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their erasure or reconstitution. It means taking the risk of honest mistakes where mistakes have consequences, and may be uncovered in the glaring light of practical application, something with which too few on the cultural Left bother themselves as they stand on the sidelines as critical spectators, bearing no ultimate consequences for their proffers, and doing so, as Rorty saw it, somewhat priggishly at times. Is it really possible to philosophize by holding Lacan or Bataille in one hand (for, to be clear, there is nothing wrong with reading and employing the works of either of them) and the Code of Federal Regulation in the other? Given that whatever it has meant to be a philosopher has been under siege at various levels, Rorty believed that referring to the way things are actually done in the actual world as one thinks through issues of public morality and solidarity should be considered a viable alternative to the way culture critique is undertaken on the cultural Left. Intellectuals who want to be taken seriously should become more like social and cultural auditors and less like removed and disconnected culture critics. They might then be able to recast themselves as thinkers who take up questions of social justice in a serious way, as the ones in society able to traverse the distances between the ivory towers of the academy and the street. We do have examples of such persons, of various political bents. John Dewey, Mary War- nock, Mary P. Follett, Paul Krugman, George Soros, William James, Sheila Bair and Jane Addams come to mind, as but a few examples, all using insights gained from living a life of the mind to shape (or to help shape) better public policies and better ways to run institutions. If philosophers seek to remain what the public thinks we are anyway, a class of persons of whom it can be said, as Orwell put it in another context, ‘One has to belong to the intelligentsia to believe things like that; no ordinary man could be such a fool’, we will only become more and more irrelevant to the task of forging solutions that have a chance to adequately address the many problems of various publics.10 There are probably very few unscrupulous optimists - reformers who plunge ahead without counting the cost. The closest group of people I can think of who might meet the requirements to belong to such a class of persons are some members of the disengaged cultural Left, just described. But to brand such a group with the appellation ‘unscrupulous optimists might be to brand them inappropriately, for they are not known for optimism, but rest content, too often, with cynicism. For that reason, a better appellation might be ‘desiderative utopians’. Desiderative utopians, as opposed to Pragmatic utopians, are perennially dyspeptic, though they can and often do sketch a vision of an ideal state of political and social affairs. They have concluded that cash-backed power always wins, that money will always get the last word, and so they retreat to their seminars, books and conferences that seem more like orgies of wishful thinking and pessimism than places to think through ways to coopt the oligarchs and the plutocrats or, failing that, to beat them back. Desiderative utopians, in the context of this discussion, are those who think that erudite complaint exhausts their responsibilities to their country - the country concerning which they have articulated aspirations to finish the work that is required to transform it into a pluralist civilization in which the worst sorts of cruelty, including the cruelties of invidious types of social distance, are eradicated. They tend not to be guilty of ‘the best case fallacy’ because they are not engaged enough with real politics or the workings of real institutions to bring about any case. It is not hard to understand why conservatives and those who consider themselves politically engaged abjure desiderative utopian visions. Desiderative utopians and those engaged in unceasing dyspeptic critique have given the words ‘utopia’ and ‘utopian’ a negative connotation. But while utopian sketches of possible futures can be construed as unrealistic social velleities, as possible to bring into reality as unicorns, they may also be construed, as the Pragmatist utopian does, as the amalgamation of desirable social and political goals that are assumed to come about only through successive meliorative and reformist moves, moves made in what Rorty refers to as cultural politics as well as in ordinary power politics. This is how Rorty understood the word ‘utopia’, on my reading. For Rorty’s liberal/pragmatist/cosmopolitan utopia is a sketch of a social order that has at least some reasonable chance of coming about if (and this is a big if, as Rorty well knew) the right moves get made, and if there is enough hopeful and optimistic political engagement to bring it about. Rorty’s utopia is deeply rooted in the traditions and habits of mind that attend Western liberalism, and so it is no mere velleity. It rests upon what ‘we’ have already achieved, which gives license to think about what can come next, even if we must assume, as with Josiah Royce, that the future society we envision and about which we concern ourselves is one that may not be achieved in our lifetimes, or even in our children’s lifetimes - may even be seen as a ‘lost cause’ when viewed in the short run. But Royce reminds us, as well: Loyalty to lost causes is ... not only a possible thing, but one of the most potent influences of human history. In such cases the cause comes to be idealized through its very failure to win temporary and visible success ... All the more, in consequence, does this cause demand that its followers should plan and work for a far-off future, for whole ages and aeons of time; should prepare the way for their Lord, the cause, and make his paths straight ... All this larger and broader devotion of those loyal to a lost cause is colored and illuminated by [their] strong [emotional commitment to that cause].11 Royce did not assume that the lost cause is lost because it is impossible to attain, but it is simply lost for any practical purposes for some time, perhaps for some generations. Thus there is a conception of utopia that is grounded in the realistic assessment of the probability of its outcome, and that attends the impassioned reformers’ understanding that nothing comes about without work, risk, intelligence, sacrifice, sometimes blood, and always faith. This notion of utopia is useful because it serves to capture collections of ideals that reflect our noblest hopes and sentiments in view of the distance we have already travelled in our social and political development, and so serves as a light to guide the political community or the ‘ship of state’ on its way toward achieving them. This is the purpose of any political theorizing that does not object to its ideals being cast as utopian. As James reminded us in the Postscript to his Varieties of Religious Experience: No fact in human nature is more characteristic than its willingness to live on a chance. The existence of the chance makes the difference, as Edmund Gurney says, between a life of which the keynote is resignation and a life of which the keynote is hope.12 The tension between this attitude of social hope and Scrutonian conservatism is the boundary from where Rorty’s political and social reflections took shape. Rorty worked within the tensions that exist and will always exist between Jamesian hope, risk and chance, on the one hand, and the need to embrace and defend the values of a particular ‘we’ that, on Scruton’s account, must be defended, and which in fact provides the realism for the venture. The utopian sketch that derives from this tension has a far better chance of becoming a reality, for what it provides us with is a rooted, historicist vision, a utopianism that looks to past success as it ‘muddles’ forward toward ever-improving social conditions. (76-9)

#### Scientific consensus- immediate, large scale action is needed to prevent extinction from climate change

Beardsworth, PhD, 20

(Richard, Politics@Leeds, Climate science, the politics of climate change and futures of IR, *International Relations*, https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117820946365)

The call of climate science and its implications The IPCC’s special report in October 2018 was requested by the outgoing Paris Agreement at the CoP21 in 2015, particularly by the small island states which achieved, under the French presidency and gavel, political voice. The special report was put together by a core group of 70 climate scientists and includes over 6000 peer-reviewed references. Working within the parameters of uncertainty and probability particular to scientific calculation,6 its estimates have been accepted by a broad swathe of national and international actors (but not by the governments of the United States, Russia and Saudi Arabia). The initial report made several points that have helped provide a national and global framework for climate action. To summarize, they are as follows: Limiting the global average temperature increase to 2°C relative to pre-industrial levels could cause catastrophic harm and a new climate regime; the higher ambition of a 1.5°C increase constitutes, for climate science, the upper limit of present-day ‘natural’ variability. The remaining allowable global carbon budget, to limit average global temperature to below 1.5°C relative to pre-industrial levels, is estimated at 420 Gt CO2eq. Whatever the exactitude of this estimate,7 only a 0.5°C additional temperature increase is now in view, and only three decades are envisaged before the world has to reach average net-zero carbon emissions and, thenceforth, negative emissions. The goal of a 50 percent decrease for the next decade requires on average a fivefold increase of existing reduction commitments by the nations of the world between the years 2020 and 2030. If net-zero is not achieved by 2050, climate science predicts that the climate will become self-determining: that is, with tipping-points reached like the melting of Canadian and Siberian permafrost or the melting of the Arctic icecap, the climate will move outside the powers of the human species to control its effects. The above calculations were made in late 2018. Although one and a half years later – with a 1.5 percent increase of average global temperature since – this fivefold increase of existing reduction commitments may be considered conservative,8 these calculations already require that the average annual reduction of emissions from 2020 to 2030 (to attain the 50% reduction above) must be by 7 percent to 8 percent. To understand the order of action required, it is very important to underscore here the recent fact that the 4-month staggered lockdown of all national economies in the world resulting from COVID-19 has led to a reduction in carbon emissions of 17 percent, and a predicted annual decrease of 8 percent relative to 2019.9 In other words, the scale of decarbonization required per year for the next decade is one just witnessed in reactive response to the coronavirus pandemic. The scale of proactive action required within the time-horizon given is consequently daunting. If the minimal increase of 1.5°C is not achieved within this century, the IPCC 2018 special report predicts existential harm to biodiversity and to human life, following soaring temperatures, drought, excess precipitation and severe flooding, with increasingly overlapping energy, food and water risks.10 The report maintains that the latter will affect in particular small islands, low-lying coastal areas and deltas as well as formerly arable land areas. The regions of main attention are West Africa, the Sahel, and Southeast and West Asia with an estimation of 450 million people, at most, at risk of death, or, at least, as dramatically more vulnerable if an increase of 1.5°C (rather than 2°C) of average global warming is not secured. The conclusion to the scientific report therefore maintains that the only way to begin to reach 1.5°C is systemic change now. ‘Fundamental societal and systems changes are required that explicitly link mitigation and adaptation strategies to practices of sustainable development’ of both rich and poor countries in the world (economic, financial, technological, behavioural).11 Before turning to the political response to the advice of climate science, I wish to rehearse the profound implications of the IPCC report. First, the time within which action is necessary as well as the scale of action necessary within this time are literally unprecedented within the 3000-year history of advanced human civilization. Most analogies made between previous mass action and the action required to achieve a carbon net-zero society by 2050 concern, at an international level, the mobilization of forces for the second world war and, at a national level, the progressive New Deal put in place by US president Franklin Roosevelt in response to the Great Depression.12 These analogies, while highly relevant, miss something essential: the scale of change to keep climate change within the least harmful parameters must be sustained over three decades. Nothing short of a large-scale transformation in human self-organization can reach the scale required over this sustained period of time.

## Case

#### ROB is the vote for the debater that did the best debating. Anything else is self serving and is a reason to drop to debater for hurting access to debate.

#### Ivory Tower DA: They high theorizing goes on to separate people from pariticipating in any form of activitst thought. Pushes people out of grass roots movements in favor of academic theorizing

### Gen

#### Free market capitalism has survived and will survive again

**The Australian, 09 (Staff Writer, “The Case for Capitalism,” 6-25 http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,25685611-16382,00.html)**

THE way Australians are selling out of shares will delight doomsayers, giving them additional evidence for their argument that capitalism has failed and that only the state can save us from privation. The number of shareholders has slumped by 14 per cent from 2004, when more than half of us had portfolios. But the problem with the cassandras' commentary is that while they are obviously accurate in pointing to the damage down by the global financial crisis, they have misunderstood the nature of the disease and are peddling a snake oil solution to an imaginary malady. Whatever critics, including Kevin Rudd, claim, **there was no crisis in capitalism last year; the laws of market economics did not suddenly stop operating** - to suggest they did is the equivalent of arguing that the principles of physics are optional. The immutable rule of **supply and demand did not disappear** in October, the way wealth is created did not change. In the real world, **entrepreneurs continued to produce products** and supply services **to sell for a profit,** just as they have done since humanity first grasped that free exchange on open markets is the only just way to create wealth. **Last year's disaster** on stock exchanges and in credit markets around the world **had nothing to do with capitalism. Rather, it was caused by** the folly of **financial alchemists, who thought they could con investors** that it was possible to make money from trading what were ultimately promissory notes based on the supposed value of bundles of loans. And it was also caused by the incompetence of regulators charged with stopping such market manipulation. According to Financial Times journalist Gillian Tett, the collapse of the $US12,000 billion market for these so-called securities precipitated the much broader slump. In the US, where regulators once required banks to hold reserves of $US800 million to cover loans with a face value of $US10bn, the amount required was reduced to just $US160m. This sort of exposure meant disaster was inevitable, and beyond the global scope of the problem there was little to distinguish last year's crisis from other get-rich-quick schemes throughout history. But critics, such as the Prime Minister in his now-famous essay in which he argued that the state must regulate the economy to protect ordinary people from the ravages of capitalism, miss the point. **While the world requires efficient regulation** to protect the gullible from corrupt credit markets, **this is very different from constraining capitalism itself.**

#### Methodological changes don’t shape reality

Roth 2000 (Brad R., Assistant Professor of Legal Studies and Political Science and Adjunct Professor of Law, Wayne State University, “Governmental Illegitimacy And Neocolonialism: Response To Review By James Thuo Gathii”, Michigan Law Review, May, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 2056, Lexis)

"Critical" scholars frequently seem to imagine that, in struggling against the methodological norms of their disciplines, they are struggling against the very structure of the power relations that exploit and repress the poor and weak - the metaphor being, in their minds, somehow transubstantiated into reality. The result is, all too often, an  [\*2057]  illusory radicalism, rhetorically colorful but programmatically vacuous. The danger is that a fantasized radicalism will lead scholars to abandon the defense of the very devices that give the poor and weak a modicum of leverage, when defense of those devices is perhaps the only thing of practical value that scholars are in a position to contribute. [3](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97#n3) My main problem with Gathii's critique, then, is not (as he might imagine) that it is political, but that it is politically dysfunctional. More specifically, for all of Gathii's anticolonial posturing, my book is, I insist, far more effectively anticolonial than is his critique of it. I. The Law and Politics of Governmental Illegitimacy Professor Gathii is fully justified in subjecting Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law to an essentially political critique, for the book, like all legal scholarship, has political implications - in this case, designedly so. [4](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97#n4) This is not to say, as "critical" scholars sometimes seem to imply, that law or legal scholarship is reducible to ordinary politics. Law is a purposive project, and thus not exclusively an empirical phenomenon; "law as it is" cannot be wholly separated from "law as it ought to be." [5](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n5" \t "_self) The purposes that drive the project, however, must be demonstrably immanent in social reality, not merely superimposed according to the predilections of the jurist; the jurist's task, at once creative and bounded, is to render a persuasive account of how those immanent purposes bind powerful actors to worthy projects  [\*2058]  (such as the self-determination of Third-World peoples) that they would not otherwise be inclined to undertake. [6](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n6" \t "_self) That legal scholarship impress those who are not natural political allies is the test, not only of its scholarly merit, but also of its political merit; that friends may be disappointed is of far lesser significance. This task is not to everyone's taste, and some in the academy have devoted their considerable talents to discrediting the project of legal reasoning, as conventionally understood. [7](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n7" \t "_self) But their efforts, though often of great intellectual sophistication, are profoundly misguided. In their zeal to "unmask" law's legitimation of exercises of power, they fail to appreciate that law can legitimate such exercises only insofar as it simultaneously constrains them. Power holders seeking the imprimatur of legality can benefit only to the extent that they accept its limits, for violation of the limits necessarily reverses the process of legitimation. [8](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n8" \t "_self) To deny such a relationship between legitimation and constraint is to assert that putative legal limits are a remarkably effective ruse - that legal rhetoric, rather improbably, fools most of the people all of the time. (Presumably, the power holders are not thought to be fooling themselves, since if the constraints, though objectively illusory, seem real enough to them, the rule of law would be a reality in political terms even if a chimera in philosophical terms.) On the other  [\*2059]  hand, if law does constrain as well as legitimate the exercise of power, to neglect that point is to miss an important political opportunity. [9](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n9" \t "_self) Thus, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law, in developing legal grounds for limiting the intervention of foreign powers in the internal affairs of weak states, is highly conventional in its method, except in one important respect. Because there has only recently come into being an international law of the internal character of domestic political systems, there is no tradition in international law scholarship of interpreting the relevant practices and pronouncements of states in light of the diversity of political principles and power arrangements that have been efficacious in the international community. The task of legal interpretation in this area implicates the fields of political theory and comparative politics; without an understanding of the political ideals and structures that have had a voice and a vote in the international system, one tends to read the source material in light of highly parochial assumptions about political life. Thus, Chapters Two, Three, and Four, as interdisciplinary aids to legal interpretation, distinguish the book from more standard international law scholarship. For this limited interpretive purpose, however, one need understand only empowered approaches to political legitimacy - that is to say, approaches that have been influential among state actors (Western, Socialist, and Nonaligned) whose deeds and words are the source material of international law in the relevant periods. That other, disempowered approaches may more authentically represent cultural norms in much of the world (e.g., in postcolonial states ruled by unrepresentative, Western-influenced leaders) would be interesting to know, but unhelpful to this particular project. The book does not purport to be a thoroughgoing examination of the question of political legitimacy in general; that would be a project so immense as to be imponderable. Rather, the book seeks to be a thoroughgoing examination of the international norm emerging to govern the exceptional case: the de facto government so manifestly unrepresentative as to be arguably without standing to resist, in the name of the sovereignty belonging to the underlying political community, external impositions. The question, then, is what indication of representativeness is minimally required to deem a ruling apparatus the state's "government" for purposes of international law. The orthodox approach to this question has been the "effective control doctrine," the linchpin of  [\*2060]  which is popular acquiescence in governance (pp. 137-42). A sharp break from orthodoxy is implicit in liberal-internationalist assertions of a "democratic entitlement," the linchpin of which is a liberal-democratic institutional structure. [10](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n10" \t "_self) The former approach is clearly giving way to a significant extent, and there are those who argue, on the basis of a fair amount of evidence, that the latter approach is emerging as the basis of a new norm that would open the door to "prodemocratic" intervention, perhaps including even the use of force, especially where a "freely and fairly elected" government has been overthrown. [11](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n11" \t "_self) Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law elaborately argues two politically relevant propositions: (1) that the case for the democratic entitlement as the emerging norm in international law is weaker than is generally supposed; and (2) that liberal-democratic legitimism (i.e., the use of the democratic entitlement as the basis for disregarding a government's legal prerogatives) is dangerous both to self-determination and to peace. The book presents the second proposition as relevant to the first, inasmuch as one may appropriately amplify those aspects of the source material that stem from enlightened considerations. The book thereby intends to strike a blow for anticolonialism. It denies the existence of, and opposes the establishment of, a broad-ranging legal license for external intervention in the affairs of weak states. It associates such a license with great-power initiatives of the past that have been misguided at best, oppressive and exploitative at worst. Confronting a dismal subject matter that admits only of bleak choices, the book maintains a presumption in favor of what I, none too facetiously, often refer to as "the right to be ruled by one's own thugs," though it concedes a limited range of blatant thuggery that overcomes this presumption. [12](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n12" \t "_self) The book does not, as Gathii charges, "celebrate[] Haiti as the exemplary contemporary case of successful prodemocracy intervention," [13](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n13" \t "_self) but merely accepts that in a certain class of cases, of which Haiti is archetypical, one can no longer, and should not want to, deny the existence of an exception to the nonintervention norm. What  [\*2061]  Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law seeks to promote is a balanced norm, one that finds ample support in state practice and opinio juris and that serves, to the extent possible, the long-term interests of the inhabitants of weak states. II. Confessions of a "Neoconservative Realist" Gathii's characterization of my work as an exemplar of "neo-conservative realism" presents several difficulties. There are certain aspects of the book that can fairly be characterized as "conservative" and as "realist," at least in counterposition to liberal internationalism, if special definitions of those terms are designated with sufficient care. The book is conservative in the limited sense that it seeks to rationalize and to bolster the conception of international legal order, premised on the twin principles of self-determination of peoples and non-intervention in internal affairs, that was dominant throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, but that now faces significant challenges. [14](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n14" \t "_self) The book is realist to the extent that it takes states (qua political communities entitled to self-government) seriously as units of the international system, and that it treats skeptically efforts to superimpose idealist blueprints on complex and unruly realities. [15](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n15" \t "_self) Gathii's own efforts to define the terms, however, lead only to confusion. The prefix "neo-" is especially troubling, because although Gathii at times seems to intend it in a more generic sense, the term "neoconservative" cannot be disassociated from a specific movement among right-wing American intellectuals that stands for propositions diametrically opposed to the book's central arguments. It is jarring to see the word used to characterize, for example, a discussion of U.S. intervention in Central America so overtly adverse to that emblematic neoconservative project of the 1980s (pp. 290-303, 347-61). Indeed, Gathii's accurate assertion that "the neoconservative tradition... is embedded in American exports such as neoliberalism and democracy promotion programs" [16](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n16" \t "_self) goes far in explaining the book's chilly reception  [\*2062]  of the latter; but how, then, can the book conceivably be identified with neoconservatism? This glitch could be dismissed as a detail if it were not reflective of Gathii's broader misperception of the political spectrum. Gathii complains of "binary thinking" as a " "pathological' feature of Western knowledge systems," [17](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n17" \t "_self) but ironically, it is his organization of the material, not mine, that suffers from this pathology. Thus, Gathii does not discern that my approach to the question of governmental illegitimacy charts a middle way between the effective control doctrine and the democratic entitlement, one that seeks to appreciate the vast diversity of legitimacy rationales without embracing an abject relativism. To the extent that the book seeks to categorize the elements of that diversity, it does so expressly for the sake of convenience alone, and in a tone of self-deprecation. [18](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n18" \t "_self) For all of his complaints about my neglect of non-Western approaches to legitimacy, Gathii nowhere explains how the book excludes that which it does not expressly discuss. Nonetheless, this either-or motif is the relentless theme of his essay. According to Gathii's dichotomous reasoning, "Western" approaches to international relations amount to a dyad of liberal internationalist and neoconservative realist tendencies. Thus, the idea of "liberalism overextending itself" - which well captures my adverse characterization of the effort to exalt liberal-democratic institutional norms as legal criteria for governmental legitimacy - is, for Gathii, necessarily of a piece with Right-of-Center critiques of the New Deal welfare state. [19](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n19" \t "_self) Yet the considerations that underlie my critique of liberal internationalism cannot, on any careful reading, be imagined to emanate from the Right. Gathii's reasoning turns on an assertion that my "examination of only the legitimacy or illegitimacy of state authority invariably endorses the inequalities inherent in the private order which overlays the authority of any government providing its public imprimatur in private ordering." [20](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n20" \t "_self) But given that my project concerned a very narrow (albeit  [\*2063]  grandly complex) question - namely, when does a ruling apparatus in effective control lack standing to assert rights, incur obligations, and authorize acts on behalf of the state in the international system? - Gathii's assertion seems merely to reflect a methodological prejudice against treating anything as a discrete issue. [21](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n21" \t "_self) For Gathii, either one expressly discusses economic and social inequality in every context, or one is unconcerned with it. Ironically, part of the book's criticism of the democratic entitlement thesis is precisely that the latter emphasizes institutional criteria at the expense of contextual factors such as economic and social conditions (pp. 104-06, 120, 424-26) - an aspect that would, I had supposed, be hard to miss if one were reading the book for its political implications. The book's defense of sovereign prerogative overtly reflects an interest in maintaining political space for the very resistance to private-sector predation that Gathii seeks to champion. [22](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n22" \t "_self) Moreover, Gathii's complaint that I "ignore" international economic domination [23](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n23" \t "_self) could not be more misplaced, since I not only discuss the various pronouncements of intergovernmental organizations against coercive economic measures, but seek to establish for those pronouncements a legal significance that, though modest, goes beyond what most Western international lawyers tend to admit. [24](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n24" \t "_self) To make use of legal discourse, however, is to accept that its political worth - its credibility with influential actors who do not share one's interests and values - can be maintained only by resisting the temptation to assert as law one's entire political and moral wish list. I do not contend that the lending conditions imposed by international financial institutions are violations of international law, as Gathii  [\*2064]  would like, [25](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n25" \t "_self) because the absence of any broadly accepted basis would render the contention useless and self-discrediting. Furthermore, I do not denounce the absence of a doctrinal basis for this contention as a failing of international law, because that body of law has never pretended to exhaust the question of international distributive justice. Like many "critical" theorists, Gathii, in so busily demonstrating the truism that law is political, fails to appreciate the distinctiveness of law's role in politics, and therefore curses its necessary limitations. The supreme example of Gathii's binary thinking, however, and by far the most disturbing, is the neat division between "Eurocentric" and "Third-World" approaches. The irony of Gathii's condemnation of my "Eurocentrism" (apart from the difficulty of reconciling it with my copious quotations from Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Raul Castro, and the like) is that the reconstructed image of the contemporary sovereign state system that I present reflects the influences, direct and indirect, of the Nonaligned Bloc, quite as much as it does those of Westphalia or even of the drafters of the United Nations Charter. As the book details, the era of decolonization and its aftermath profoundly affected legal norms, as both Western and Socialist blocs purchased Third-World political support by, inter alia, affirming the inviolability of weak states (pp. 6, 113-18, 160-71). In repudiating conventional legal analysis as Eurocentric, Gathii dismisses both the significance of Third-World participation in shaping contemporary norms and the extent of the Third World's stake in the continued vitality of those norms - an attitude not, so far as I can tell, broadly shared among Third-World leaders, scholars, or peoples. International law's basic categories do, of course, stem from European sources, [26](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n26" \t "_self) but then so, too, in large measure, do the ideologies of the postcolonial state governments. Gathii may see this as itself a corruption of authentic African, Asian, and Latin-American traditions, [27](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n27" \t "_self) but the struggle over authenticity is internal to those  [\*2065]  societies and cultures. If Gathii is intent on regarding Third-World authenticity as excluding Western political thought - Rousseau and Marx as much as Locke and Mill, and by extension all African, Asian, and Latin-American thinkers who have drawn inspiration from them - his notion of "Third-World approaches" cannot help but be a highly tendentious rendering. Gathii is correct to assert that my analysis treats colonialism as a legal aberration rather than as "ingrained in international law as we know it today." [28](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n28" \t "_self) But he fails altogether to explain why it would be useful, in terms of his purported political goals, to do otherwise. Characterizing contemporary international law as essentially continuous with patterns of past Western domination (thereby belittling the hard-won achievements of anticolonialist struggles) scarcely promises a more effective defense to the phenomena - economic disempowerment, cultural imperialism, and proposals to subject "failed states" to trusteeship [29](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=09f90476a1942b49ffc9e173cb3f97f3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=2a8ae3c0defbbd51a2908363cb088a97" \l "n29" \t "_self) - against which he inveighs. Gathii undoubtedly believes that Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law, in failing to attack the structure of international law itself, subtly reinforces these phenomena. But the first two exist despite, not because of, the conception of international law that the book embodies, and the last is most effectively opposed by invoking that conception. Conclusion Professor Gathii's substantive concerns about neocolonialism and neoliberalism are the very concerns that underlie Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law. It is thus ironic - though, in light of recent scholarly trends, not very surprising - that he should regard my book as part of the problem rather than as part of the solution. It would be different if the methodological radicalism of Gathii and others of his persuasion entailed a programmatic alternative. But it does not. Instead, it disdains to engage in the only consequential struggle in which its adherents are, by training and position, equipped to participate. It therefore reflects neither the interests nor, it is a sure bet, the views of those on whose behalf it purports to operate. Faced with the alternative that it presents to more traditional modes of scholarship, I much prefer to take the advice of an old mentor: "the more radical the message, the more conservative the suit."

#### Capitalism is self-correcting and sustainable – war and environmental destruction are not profitable and innovation solves their impacts

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Democratic **capitalism is a system built for survival. It has adapted successfully to shocks of every kind, to upheavals in technology and economics, to political revolutions and world wars. Capitalism** has been able to do this because, unlike communism or socialism or feudalism, it **has an inner dynamic akin to a living thing. It can adapt and refine itself in response to the changing environment.** And it will evolve into a new species of the same capitalist genus if that is what it takes to survive. In the panic of 2008—09, many politicians, businesses, and pundits forgot about the astonishing adaptability of the capitalist system. Predictions of global collapse were based on static views of the world that extrapolated a few months of admittedly terrifying financial chaos into the indefinite future. **The self-correcting mechanisms that market economies and democratic societies have evolved over several centuries were either forgotten or assumed defunct.** The language of biology has been applied to politics and economics, but rarely to the way they interact. **Democratic capitalism’s equivalent of the biological survival instinct is a built-in capacity for solving social problems and meeting material needs. This capacity stems from the principle of competition, which drives both democratic politics and capitalist markets. Because market forces generally reward the creation of wealth rather than its destruction, they direct the independent efforts and ambitions of millions of individuals toward satisfying material demands, even if these demands sometimes create unwelcome by-products.** Because voters generally reward politicians for making their lives better and safer, rather than worse and more dangerous, **democratic competition directs political institutions toward solving rather than aggravating society’s problems**, even if these solutions sometimes create new problems of their own**. Political competition is slower and less decisive than market competition, so its self-stabilizing qualities play out over decades or even generations, not months or years.** But regardless of the difference in timescale, **capitalism** and democracy have one crucial feature in common: Both are mechanisms that **encourage individuals to channel their creativity, efforts, and competitive spirit into finding solutions for material and social problems.** And in the long run, these mechanisms work very well. If we consider democratic capitalism as a successful problem-solving machine, the implications of this view are very relevant to the 2007-09 economic crisis, but diametrically opposed to the conventional wisdom that prevailed in its aftermath. Governments all over the world were ridiculed for trying to resolve a crisis caused by too much borrowing by borrowing even more. Alan Greenspan was accused of trying to delay an inevitable "day of reckoning” by creating ever-bigger financial bubbles. Regulators were attacked for letting half-dead, “zombie” banks stagger on instead of putting them to death. But these charges missed the point of what the democratic capitalist system is designed to achieve. In a capitalist democracy whose raison d’etre is to devise new solutions to long-standing social and material demands, a problem postponed is effectively a problem solved. To be more exact, a problem whose solution can be deferred long enough is a problem that is likely to be solved in ways that are hardly imaginable today. **Once the self-healing nature of the capitalist system is recognized,** the charge of “passing on our problems to our grand-children”—whether made about budget deficits by conservatives or about global warming by liberals—becomes morally unconvincing. Our grand-children will almost certainly be much richer than we are and will have more powerful technologies at their disposal. It is far from obvious, therefore, why we should make economic sacrifices on their behalf. Sounder morality, as well as economics, than the Victorians ever imagined is in the wistful refrain of the proverbially optimistic Mr. Micawber: "Something will turn up."

#### War- Cap key to peace – prefer 40 years of empirics

Mousseau 09 [Michael, associate professor of International Relations at Koc University in Istanbul, “The Social Market Roots of Democratic Peace,” International Security Vol 33 No 4, Spring, Muse]

One of the most important achievements in the study of international security has been the arrival and broad acceptance of the “democratic peace,” that is, the statistically significant absence of war between democracies. This discovery has produced a broader acceptance of domestic factors in the study of international conflict. It has also influenced public policy: since the early 1990s, U.S. policymakers have widely embraced democracy as a cause of peace. The extent to which scholars and practitioners can be convinced that democracy causes peace, however, depends on how confident they are in explaining it. Numerous studies have identified democracy as a cause of democratic peace, but none have yielded much meaningful, clear-cut, and nontrivial predictive power—achievements that lie at the heart of scientifically identifying causality. On the contrary, it appears increasingly likely that existing explanations for how democracy causes peace may be incomplete. Several studies have shown that the impact of democracy on peace may depend on the level of economic development.1 No compelling challenges to these findings have been offered, and some scholars who once confirmed the democratic peace now acknowledge the role played by economic conditionality.2 It follows that [End Page 52] democracy, alone, may not be the cause of the peace. Instead, some factor related to economic development either causes the peace or qualifies the impact of democracy on peace. This article advances the understanding of the democratic peace by demonstrating how a particular kind of economic development, contract-intensive development, appears to account for this peace. The economic conditionality of the democratic peace was originally predicted by economic norms theory, which identifies how liberal values may be rooted in the decisionmaking heuristics of a social market economy—that is, one where most people have the opportunity to choose, as individuals in the market, their sources of income and where to spend it.3 In this economy, sometimes called “advanced capitalism,” individuals habitually trust strangers in making contracts and depend on the state to enforce them impartially. They learn to prefer free choice and the equal application of law, and they expect their government to behave accordingly in foreign affairs. As a consequence, contract-intensive societies tend to agree on the preservation of the Westphalian order of sovereign states and the primacy of international law over power politics, and they are in natural alliance against any entity—state or nonstate—that seeks to challenge this order. This study demonstrates that from 1961 to 2001 not a single fatal conflict occurred among nations with contract-intensive economies. In contrast, democracies without contract-intensive economies engaged each other in several fatal conflicts during this period, about the number to be expected if democracy in states without a contracting economy has no impact on foreign policy. These results are highly robust after consideration of many competing causes, few of which have any significant impact on war and peace once the role of the contract-intensive economy variable is considered. The existence of this variable, in contrast, has the strongest impact of all nontrivial variables normally observed in studies of international conflict. Several implications follow from this study. First, this research supports the claims of some critics of the democratic peace who have long argued that a third variable may cause both democracy and peace:4 that variable is a [End Page 53] contract-intensive economy. Second, although challenging the role of democracy as a cause of democratic peace, this study shows that a zone of peace does exist among democratic nations, but it is one that appears to be caused by economic rather than governing institutions. Third, whether or not shared democracy contributes to international peace is an important issue because U.S. leaders’ belief in this proposition has influenced their conduct of foreign policy. President Bill Clinton, for example, supported the United States’ “democratic enlargement” policy because he believed that “democracies don’t attack each other.”5 His successor, George W. Bush, explained that his administration promoted democracy because “democracies don’t go to war with each other.”6 President Barack Obama has asserted that “we benefit from the expansion of democracy” because democracies are “the nations with which we share our deepest values.”7 Although support for democracy may be good for a variety reasons, this article presents compelling evidence that the promotion of peace among nations is not one of them. The article is organized as follows. First, I review the emergence of the democratic peace literature and the evidence linking this peace to economic development. Next, I present several explanations for the role of economic conditionality. I draw out the implications of economic norms theory for explaining stable democracy and peace among nations. After discussing the test conditions, reporting the results, and exploring alternative explanations, I offer a case study of the economic peace involving Greece and Turkey to illustrate the usefulness of the theory. I conclude with several policy implications that follow from the analysis. Two pioneers in the study of the democratic peace were Dean Babst in the 1960s and Rudolph Rummel in the 1970s.8 Key articles by Michael Doyle and [End Page 54] Jack Levy brought increased attention to the concept.9 By the early 1990s, a large number of highly rigorous studies had widely confirmed the proposition that democracies do not go war with each other.10 There are two primary sources of continuing skepticism, however. First, because most explanations for the democratic peace were created after it was first observed—the primary exception being Immanuel Kant in 179511—empirical confirmation for any of them can come only with the observation of novel empirical facts.12 To my knowledge, there are few confirmed, clear-cut, nontrivial, and novel facts that have been explicitly deduced from any explanation for the democratic peace. The closest candidate is the war-winning hypothesis, an expectation deduced from several accounts. The weight of the evidence is mixed as to whether democracies tend to win their wars.13 [End Page 55] Second, the finding that the democratic peace may be conditioned on some level of economic development indicates that democracy, alone, is probably not an independent cause of the peace. The most compelling study in this regard appeared in 2003, when several scholars came together to examine their contending expectations.14 The following four hypotheses were tested: (1) the democratic peace holds firm without any conditions; (2) the democratic peace is conditioned by economic development;15 (3) the democratic peace is conditioned by trade;16 and (4) the interaction of trade and development accounts for the democratic peace.17 The test failed to support hypotheses (1), (3), and (4), and robustly reconfirmed hypothesis (2). Most other studies that have examined the role of economic conditionality have confirmed it, including those of some scholars who had once supported the democratic peace thesis.18 Some scholars have responded to this finding by stressing that the level of economic development at which democracy becomes significant is low enough that, at least in recent years, most democracies are included among [End Page 56] those nations that do not engage in war with each other.19 But in a previous study, I argued that the exact level at which democracy becomes significant is not important, for two reasons. First, the question probably cannot be answered to everyone’s satisfaction. The precise level is highly sensitive to the researcher’s choice of control variables, sample, and measure of economic development.20 Second, without theory, the predicted level of development at which democracy becomes significant poses the danger of the fallacy of induction. Scholars can be much more confident in predictions grounded in theories with established predictive and explanatory power. Not only have all theories of democracy acting alone in causing the peace been unable to produce compelling novel facts, but the economic conditionality of this peace strongly suggests that all of these theories are, at best, incomplete. The issue is not the level of economic development at which democracy becomes a significant force for peace: it is how development causes the peace. Economic Conditionality and Economic Norms Theory Following the first report of the economic conditionality of the democratic peace, several studies sought to explain it. Azar Gat offered a list of factors potentially associated with what he calls economic “modernization,” including industrialization, which has delinked territory from the production of wealth, and a cultural “feminization” of men caused by urbanization and the service economy.21 Erik Gartzke argued that openness of markets may be the cause of the economic peace: nations with freer capital markets are more dependent than others on international investors, who are likely to divest from a country about to engage in war. Policymakers first recognize which nations have free capital markets and which do not, and then give greater credibility to threats made by those with freer capital markets than those with controlled ones. In theory, this can cause countries with freer capital markets to be more peaceful than others. The role of development in the democratic peace is based, presumably, on the assumption that development and capital openness are related.22 [End Page 57] My explanation for the economic peace integrates two long-standing findings in social science.23 First, research in economics and sociology has established the notion of bounded rationality: that is, individuals economize on the costs of decisionmaking by forming cognitive habits—heuristics—for situations they repeatedly encounter.24 Second, studies in economic history and sociology have documented that dependency on ties with friends and families—clientelism—often constitutes significant portions of trade and services in middle- and lower-income countries.25 It follows that divergent everyday routines of individuals in clientelist and contract-intensive societies should give rise to divergent decisionmaking heuristics. In a previous study, I showed how these divergent heuristics can affect political culture and institutions.26 In clientelist economies, individuals depend on group leaders, called “patrons,” who promote loyalty by providing economic and physical security in the form of gifts. To obtain these gifts, clients learn to habitually signal their willingness to abide by all of their patron’s commands with alacrity. When clientelist societies face rapid change and leadership is fluid, political entrepreneurs offer themselves as new group patrons. To increase the demand for security, these political entrepreneurs promote fear of outsiders. This may explain why societies in civil anarchy or in transition between clientelism and advanced capitalism—when high unemployment rates often coexist with clientelist traditions in large cities—tend to give rise to extremist dogmas that fit in-group worldviews, such as nationalist, Marxist, fascist, and militant Islamist ideologies.27 In contract-intensive societies, in contrast, making contracts with strangers promotes loyalty not to patrons but to a state that enforces these contracts with [End Page 58] impartiality and equal application of the rule of law. Because bigger markets offer more contracting opportunities than smaller ones, and because contracts cannot be arranged unless all parties explicitly state their preferences, individuals habitually perceive it as in their interest to respect the preferences and rights of strangers. Compared with voters in clientelist-integrated societies, voters in contract-intensive societies are more likely to support candidates for office who stress individual freedoms, at home and abroad, and who advocate government transparency and equal enforcement of the law. Discussion of the causes of a nation’s transition from a clientelist to a contract-intensive economy is largely beyond the scope of economic norms theory. Exogenous factors include those that make the benefits of trusting strangers in the market greater than the benefits of personalized ties. The theory identifies political factors as the primary cause of economic changes because a contract-intensive economy cannot exist unless government authorities make the decision to enforce contracts with impartiality. But this decision does not guarantee a contract-intensive economy: geographic factors, such as poor harbors or an absence of neighbors with contract-intensive economies, can constrain markets. 28 There is also a likely feedback loop from an emerging market culture to greater opportunities in the market. As increasing numbers of individuals decide to accept the risk of contracting with strangers—as a society approaches the “tipping point”29—the division of labor must grow increasingly complex. This in turn enhances opportunities in the market, causing more individuals to accept the risk of trusting strangers and their states. The shift in loyalty from group leaders to impartial states is not monotonic, however. Acontract-intensive economy can collapse for a variety of reasons, as the nascent capitalist and quasi-liberal political cultures of Classical Athens and Renaissance Italy did after defeats in foreign wars. In the modern era, the feedback loop seems to have started anew in Holland in the fifteenth century (possibly triggered by climate change), and was soon entered into by its neighbors with good harbors: England, northern France, northwestern Germany, and Scandinavia. Over time, contract norms reached more deeply into these societies. By the eighteenth century, however, in only two societies were [End Page 59] these norms in all likelihood highly institutionalized: possibly Switzerland and almost certainly the northern colonies of British North America, led foremost by the Massachusetts Bay Colony.30 By extrapolating from economic history and global migration patterns (because emigration can inversely reflect the level of opportunities in the market), I was able to determine that by the early twentieth century contract-intensive economies were highly institutionalized in all of the previously mentioned regions, as well as in the settler communities of the American West, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. But between World Wars I and II, global economic troubles stalled the diffusion of contracting, causing it to decline in northwestern Germany when hyperinflation wiped out the middle class. Drawing on data discussed below, I found that by the 1960s contract norms were institutionalized throughout much of West Germany, rural France, the southern United States, and northern Italy, as well as Austria, Finland, and Japan.31 By the end of the Cold War, much of the rest of Italy, as well as Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, and Taiwan seemed to have reached the tipping point. Since the end of the ColdWar, the peoples of Argentina, Chile, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Malaysia, Poland, and Slovenia may have reached it as well. A broad range of research documents the crucial role of economic norms in influencing political and social phenomena. Karl Polanyi’s book The Great Transformation highlights the transition from clientelist to contractual modes of exchange in Europe from the sixteenth to twentieth centuries.32 Studies in anthropology and archaeology document how economic conditions influence political and institutional preferences.33 As predicted by economic norms theory, there exists a correlation between high income and contracting and between low income and clientelism. Experimental studies have confirmed sizable differences in the way individuals from low- and high-income countries react in tests involving economic preferences.34 Studies in comparative politics have confirmed a strong linkage between economic development and stable, liberal [End Page 60] democracy.35 Survey and case studies in sociology and economics have linked in-group norms with collectivist preferences, and economic development with individualist preferences and higher levels of trust among strangers.36 The contract-intensive economy represents only one form of economic development. In the twentieth century, noncapitalist forms of development included fascism, communism, and petro-clientelism. Nations with these forms of development included totalitarian states (command economies—e.g., the Soviet Union), bureaucratic clientelist states (where authorities distributed wealth with an eye toward promoting and maintaining loyalty—e.g., Saudi Arabia), and “hybrid” states involving a mix of clientelism and totalitarianism (e.g., Nazi Germany). To test whether individuals in contract-intensive, higherincome economies think differently from those in other higher-income economies, I obtained data on levels of trust in nations from the World Values Survey project.37 Recall that contract-intensive economies are thought to foster the expectation that strangers will fulfill their contractual commitments, so a crucial prediction of economic norms theory is that, comparatively speaking, nations with contract-intensive economies should tend to have higher levels of impersonal trust than other nations. There are forty-four countries in 1997 with data on all variables. I regressed trust on gross domestic product (logged) and contract-intensive economy (see measure below). The result confirms this expectation: the contract-intensive economy variable, not higher income per se, is associated with higher levels of trust in nations.38 Both economic norms theory and classical liberal theory focus on the role of markets. But their assumptions and implications differ. Classical liberalism assumes that Adam Smith’s “propensity to truck, barter, and exchange” is ingrained [End Page 61] in human nature, and that freer markets (less state regulation and more foreign trade) promote economic development.39 Economic norms theory suggests that the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange is learned from the sustained presence of market-based opportunities, and that these opportunities have geographic and political origins. In this way, economic norms theory identifies the origins and popularity of classical liberal and social contract theories in the sustained presence of market-based opportunities. When contracting in the market becomes the way of life, people begin to think of it as natural and conceive of democratic governance too as a “social” contract or as embedded in “natural” law.40 Economic norms theory thus offers an explanation for why the classical liberal, social contract, and natural law traditions emerged when and where they did: in the areas of northwestern Europe that were developing contract-intensive economies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In fact, in contrast to what classical liberalism advocates claim, heavy state regulation of the economy may well be a prerequisite for countries to build and sustain a social market economy. Examples include the Scandinavian countries that have both contract-intensive economies and extensive state redistribution and regulation policies. Economic norms theory predicts that the leaders of contact-intensive nations will be less likely than other leaders to visibly challenge the sovereign rights of other states. This is because the modern interstate system is itself based on contract norms of legal equality: the Protestant Reformation was the consequence of the initial rise of contract norms in northwestern Europe in the sixteenth century; and the Treaty of Westphalia, which settled the Thirty Years’ War in 1648, institutionalized these norms across nations.41 Leaders of contract-intensive nations thus tend to view the continuation of the [End Page 62] Westphalian system of legally equal sovereign states, and the supremacy of international law over brute power politics, as consistent with the values and interests of their domestic populations. At first glance, economic norms theory may seem to imply the monadic expectation that contract-intensive nations should be less likely than other nations to engage in militarized conflict. But nothing in this theory suggests this to be true: rather, it is how they perceive their interests that makes contract-intensive nations different from other nations. Because contract-intensive nations consider the preservation of the Westphalian order to be in their interest, they may engage in wars with non-contract-intensive nations that challenge this order: for example, they may oppose states that threaten other states for economic gain in ways that violate international law. Economic norms theory predicts instead two hypotheses, one dyadic and one conditionally monadic. The dyadic hypothesis predicts a peace among contract-intensive nations; the monadic hypothesis predicts that contract-intensive nations, which are almost always highly democratic, will refrain from fighting other democratic nations. Starting with the dyadic hypothesis, the theory predicts that contract-intensive nations not only will be at peace with each other but are in a natural alliance. The alliance is the result of their fundamental agreement across a range of global issues and their consequent tendency to be on the same side in militarized confrontations.42 When the comparatively rare militarized dispute does occur between two contract-intensive nations, they are more likely than others to settle short of deadly force because their domestic audiences— and domestic opposition leaders—are more likely than their counterparts in non-contract-intensive nations to accept resolution through legal arbitration. The monadic hypothesis is conditioned by democracy. Recall that economic norms theory identifies how a contract-intensive economy can cause a population to value liberal democratic government. It follows that voters in contract-intensive democracies expect their leaders to refrain from fighting other democracies, regardless of the latters’ actions or economic conditions. This expectation accords with Spencer Weart’s view that liberal ideology causes [End Page 63] democratic nations to refrain from attacking other democratic nations.43 The key difference between Weart’s thesis and mine is that I predict that liberal ideology originates in contract-intensive economies, and thus only contract-intensive democracies—not other democracies—are so constrained. In this way, economic norms theory offers an explanation for why the promotion of human rights and democracy abroad appears on the agendas of contract-intensive democracies, but seemingly not on those of democracies that lack contract-intensive economies, or nations with other kinds of political systems. If this monadic thesis is correct, then democratic dyads where at least one state has a contract-intensive economy will be peaceful. Tests that do not control for this pattern would yield misleading results. Constructing the Test Conditions To test my hypotheses, I closely followed the analytic procedures used in a previous study.44 I included all fatal militarized disputes and wars as identified in the Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Dispute data set over the years 1961 to 2001.45 I made one modeling change to this previous study by [End Page 64] controlling for the development level of the more developed state in the dyad and its interaction with geographic distance.46 To my knowledge, two sources of direct contracting data across nations are available: investments in stocks and bonds and life insurance policies. Of all economic sectors to gauge, economic securities and life insurance are probably the most informative because it is the essential need for economic security that compels individuals to form loyalties to patrons or liberal states. Unfortunately, national-level data on stocks and bonds include foreign investment, and foreign investment does not reflect a society’s norms. Life insurance contracts, however, are not affected in this way. These contracts should also serve as an accurate indicator of contracting heuristics because, in predominantly clientelist societies, individuals normally protect their families in the event of death through ties with friends and extended families, as children inherit the debts of their parents as well as the favors owed them. In this type of society, few individuals are likely to trust strangers and the state enough to place their family’s welfare in an insurance contract; prevailing heuristics prevent most from even considering it. In societies where contracting is highly institutionalized, in contrast, comparatively few will have the personalized ties that are sufficiently strong and reliable that they will place their family’s security in them; comparatively larger numbers will act on prevailing heuristics and trust their family’s welfare to strangers in the form of life insurance contracts.47 [End Page 65] I gathered cross-national data on active life insurance contracts collected under the auspices of the World Bank from 1960 to 2000.48 Only sixty-five nations are included in the data, however, and many of these only after 1978. It is possible, however, to expand the data to most countries for this period by adopting a binary threshold and assuming that missing data reflect zero contract norms. This assumption follows from economic norms theory: contract-intensive societies are comparatively reliable providers of economic data because contracts must be enforced, and enforcement requires written records. States that promote markets also have an interest in collecting data on contractual transactions, so that they can monitor and promote contractual economic activity as well as tax it. In contrast, recording and tallying clientelist transactions are difficult tasks because they are framed as favors, which is why much more economic data exist on contract-intensive societies than on others, past and present. For instance, we know that in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, merchants in Cairo engaged in extensive contracting with merchants in Spain, North Africa, the Levant, and even India, because many of these contracts were later discovered in a repository of Old Cairo called the Geniza.49 The insurance data are most comprehensive for the years 1979 to 2000, so I identified the contract-intensive nations as those with existing insurance policies above the median level over this period. Additional tests show that the choice of threshold has no effect on the results. I also obtained identical results, unreported, using the original continuous data with missing values treated as missing.50 Model 1 in table 1 confirms the findings of previous studies regarding the relationship between democracy and fatal militarized disputes from 1961 to 2001. The coefficient for DemocracyL (−0.10) is negative and highly significant, confirming the expectation of democratic peace when the presence or absence of contract-intensive economy is not considered. The performance of most of the control variables is similar to that found in these earlier studies.51 To test the dyadic hypothesis that contract-intensive nations refrain from engaging in militarized disputes with each other, I constructed a binary indicator for both states having contract-intensive economies, which I call “Both States CIE.” As can be seen in table 1, the test yields a startling result: the Both States CIE variable must be dropped from the estimate because it predicts peace perfectly; that is, in the sample from 1961 to 2001, no fatal militarized disputes occurred between two nations with contract-intensive economies. A bivariate chi-square test indicates that this peace cannot be reasonably attributed to chance (p < 0.001). In contrast, with the binary measure “Both Coherent Democracies,” as defined by Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder,52 ten fatal militarized disputes took place between democratic nations that lacked contract-intensive economies. A bivariate chi-square test suggests that this is about the expected number if democracy in countries without a contract-intensive economy does not cause peace among nations (p < 0.715). To test the monadic hypothesis, I distinguished democratic dyads where one state has a contract-intensive economy from those where neither state has one by including the variable “One State CIE” and its interaction with [End Page 68] DemocracyL. As can be seen in model 2 in table 1, the coefficient for the interactive term DemocracyL x One State CIE (−0.20) is negative and significant. This confirms the supplemental monadic hypothesis of a conditional relationship between contract-intensive economy and democracy. Because the coefficients for constituent terms (DemocracyL) in interactive models are meaningful only for cases where the other constituent term (One State CIE) equals zero, the coefficient for DemocracyL (−0.03) in model 2 confirms the results of the bivariate chi-square tests: in countries without a contract-intensive economy, democracy does not cause peace among nations.53 Models 3 and 4 in table 1 repeat the analyses for the onset of war, defined by convention as militarized interstate disputes that include more than 999 battle deaths. The coefficient for DemocracyL (−0.15) in model 3 is negative and highly significant. This confirms the findings of previous studies regarding the relationship between democracy and war from 1961 to 2001. In model 4 all cases where Both States CIE equals one are excluded because this variable predicts peace perfectly. A bivariate chi-square test indicates that this absence of war among contract-intensive nations is probably not the result of chance (p < 0.10). In contrast, the data yield two wars among coherent democracies where both lacked contract-intensive economies over the sample period: Cyprus and Turkey in 1974 and the Kargil war fought between India and Pakistan starting in 1993 (this dispute continued to 1999 when it reached the war level while both countries were still democratic). A chi-square test indicates that this is approximately the number to be expected if democracy without a contract-intensive economy does not prevent wars among nations (p < 0.857).54 The remaining coefficients in model 4 are substantially identical to the results for fatal militarized interstate disputes in model 2. The coefficient for [End Page 69] DemocracyL x One State CIE (−0.30) confirms the supplemental monadic hypothesis of a conditional relationship between a contract-intensive economy and democracy at the war level; the coefficient for DemocracyL (−0.03) confirms that democracy without a contract-intensive economy does not cause peace among nations. Identical results also appear, for fatal militarized disputes and wars, using the dyadic dummy variable for Both Coherent Democracies. One possible explanation for the insignificance of democracy may be that there are too few cases of democracies without contract-intensive economies. The data, however, do not support this conclusion. Economic norms theory predicts that a contract-intensive economy will cause and stabilize democracy: it is thus no surprise that 88 percent of contract-intensive nation-years from 1960 to 2000 are also coherently democratic.55 But non-contract-intensive nations can experiment with democratic government for a host of reasons, and 49 percent of coherent democratic nation-years do not have contract-intensive economies during this period. Because there are about as many democratic nation-years without contract-intensive economies as there are with them, a dearth of non-contract-intensive democratic cases cannot explain the insignificance of the democratic peace. Could the causal arrow point in the opposite direction, with democracy the ultimate cause of contract-intensive economies and peace? The evidence does not support this conclusion. Correlations among independent variables are not calculated in the results of multivariate regressions: coefficients show only the effect of each variable after the potential effects of the others are excluded. If democracy was a direct cause of both contract-intensive economy and peace, then there would be some variance remaining, after its moderate correlation with contract-intensive economy is excluded, that links democracy directly with peace.56 The insignificance of the DemocracyL coefficients in models 2 and 4 in table 1 indicates that no such direct effect exists. In addition, the scholarly consensus is that higher income per capita, which correlates with the contract-intensive economy variable, is far more likely to cause democracy [End Page 70] than democracy is to cause development.57 Still, the analysis here is not designed to test for reverse causation, though performance of such a test would be a valuable addition to the literature. Robustness tests indicate that in analyses of wars, democracy remains highly insignificant under any examined circumstance. In analyses of fatal disputes, on the other hand, the removal of some control variables can cause democracy to reach significance at the 0.10 level, which is the lowest threshold statisticians normally assign significance. Further tests show that democracy is not significant with the removal of all control variables.58 Nor does democracy become significant under any circumstance when observing only bordering nations. This suggests that if peace exists among non-bordering democracies, it is because non-contract-intensive democracies usually have weak economies and thus refrain from fighting each other because they do not have the capability to do so. The results in table 1 support both aspects of the economic peace: the dyadic unconditional peace and the supplemental monadic peace conditioned by democracy. These patterns conform with the economic norms expectation that a contract-intensive economy promotes liberal values and consolidated liberal democracy. Common preferences and interests cause foreign policy agreement and peace among contract-intensive nations, whereas liberal ideology causes contract-intensive democracies to refrain from using force against other democracies, including those without contract-intensive economies. Democracies that lack contract-intensive economies, on the other hand, have no such constraints and do not perceive common interests within the Westphalian order; thus they tend to fight each other about as often as other nations do. Further calculations indicate that a contract-intensive economy is a powerful force for peace. I could not directly estimate the substantive impact of Both States CIE because it predicts peace perfectly, so I reestimated model 2 after combining the dyadic and monadic measures into a single “super” variable: “One or Both States CIE.” I then included the product of this variable and Both Coherent Democracies to identify cases where both states are democracies and at least one has a contract-intensive economy. The results—unreported for reasons [End Page 71] of space—indicate that, among bordering democracies, a change from neither to one or both states with a contract-intensive economy causes a 97 percent reduction in the probability of fatal dispute onset. None of the remaining variables has an impact of this magnitude.59 Exploration of Alternative Explanations This section examines the possibility that the results discussed above may be explained by variables that I have excluded thus far because economic norms theory predicts that they are at least partly caused by the contract-intensive economy variable. Because correlations among independent variables are not credited to any variable in a multivariate regression, economic norms theory predicts that inclusion of the variables below will reduce the impact of the contract-intensive economy variable. Therefore, this section cannot serve as a test of economic norms theory. Instead, it departs from the theory and examines the possibility that competing theories may account for the results discussed above. Economic norms theory identifies contract norms as a cause of economic development. It is also likely, however, that wealthier individuals are better positioned than poorer ones to engage in contracts. To ensure that the results of model 2 in table 1 are not a function of wealth, I added a control for economic development (see model 1 in table 2). The coefficients for the contract-intensive economy variables hold firmly, and the coefficient for DevelopmentL (0.05) is not significant. This means that the results of this study cannot be attributed to the fact that contract-intensive nations tend to be wealthier than other nations.60 Economic norms theory predicts that individuals in contract-intensive societies will be more likely than individuals in other societies to seek profitable contracts wherever they may find them. Because the nature of governance in contract-intensive nations is expected to reflect the contractualist worldview that good government abets the private pursuit of wealth, it predicts that governments of contract-intensive nations will be more likely than others to encourage foreign trade. Trade per capita is not the same as trade interdependence (trade/gross domestic product), however, and economic norms theory does not predict trade interdependence per se. But contract-intensive nations prefer law over brute force, and thus they are more likely to prefer trade over imperialism in foreign economic policy.61 Richard Rosecrance has argued that the decision to trade rather than to fight is a key factor in explaining peace among trading nations.62 Economic norms theory thus complements Rosecrance’s insights, and the contract-intensive economy variable can potentially account for the pacifying role of trade interdependence in international relations. But the reverse is also possible: trade interdependence may account for peace among contract-intensive nations. This is the view of economic liberals: interstate trade promotes market development, democracy, and peace.63 As can be seen in model 2 in table 2, the coefficient for Trade Interdependence (−0.59) is not significant. It thus appears that contracting is the more likely cause of both trade interdependence and peace among nations. Still, caution must be exercised: the trade variable is close to significant, and this regression model was not designed for resolving this issue. Also, scholars have not settled on how best to gauge trade interdependency.64 Further examination of the impact of trade in conflict is thus warranted. Some explanations for the democratic peace suggest that only democracies with mature or consolidated institutions might be peaceful. In addition, mature democracies may promote contract-intensive economies, suggesting the potential reversal of causation. In model 3 in table 2 the coefficient for Democratic MaturityL (−0.09) is not significant.65 It thus appears that even mature, consolidated democracies are not more peaceful with each other than [End Page 74] other nations. Rather, a contract-intensive economy is the more likely cause of both democratic maturity and the prevailing peace. Economic norms theory predicts that contract-intensive nations will perceive common security interests in the primacy of international law over power politics, causing them to form alliances. Common interests can develop for other reasons, however, and it is possible that alliances may account for the economic peace.66 In model 4 in table 2, the coefficient for Alliance (0.16) is not significant. The evidence thus favors the conclusion that contract-intensive economy partially accounts for the existence of both alliances and peace. As discussed above, Gat has offered several explanations for the peace among developed democratic nations.67 Most of these are broad and unfalsifiable, but he does offer urbanization and size of the service sector as variables, which he suggests make individuals less accustomed to the suffering of war and therefore opposed to it. But a service economy may be a function of contract norms, which encourage the commodification of services as well as of labor and capital. I gauge the variable Service Economy as the proportion of gross domestic product in the service sectors.68 In model 5 in table 2, the coefficient (0.01) is not significant. Analyses of urbanization show that dyads where both states are highly urbanized are significantly more likely than other dyads to engage in fatal disputes. Neither urbanization nor a service economy is thus a likely explanation for the economic peace. Also discussed above, Gartzke argues that free capital markets might explain the developed democratic peace. But these markets could be caused by contract norms, as states promote foreign trade and financial markets diffuse within, as well as across, international borders. Model 6 in table 2 reports the results using Gartzke’s measure. 69 The coefficient for Capital OpennessL (−0.15) is negative and significant, and coefficients for the contract-intensive economy variable also hold firmly. This suggests that, even if there is some causality stemming from the contract-intensive economy variable, free capital markets have an independent impact on the onset of fatal disputes. In short, the data support both Gartzke’s theory and economic norms theory. This result is reasonable, as the theories do not contain incompatible assumptions and are [End Page 75] not mutually exclusive.70 Further tests show that contract-intensive economy is the far stronger variable, with an impact about twice that of capital openness. Subsequent tests for war onsets produced identical results for all variables except Capital OpennessL, which is not significant at the war level. The Greek-Turkish Case An examination of a case study of recent changes in Greece’s economy and its relations with its neighbor Turkey illustrates how economic norms affect the domestic and foreign politics of nations. I chose this case because both countries have experienced many years of “coherent” democracy as defined above: Greece since 1975, with eighty-four years of democracy previously; and Turkey since 1983, with twenty-five years of democracy previously.71 Nevertheless, from 1960 to 2000, twenty militarized interstate disputes occurred between the two countries, five of which resulted in fatalities. If economic norms theory is correct, these tensions were a function of nationalist and xenophobic attitudes of voters on both sides. In 1990 Greece transitioned from a clientelist to a contract-intensive economy. This offers a direct opportunity to test the economic norms expectation that Greece’s transition to a contract-intensive economy should have been followed by substantial moderation and rationalization of Greek domestic and foreign politics, including Greece’s relations with Turkey. As discussed earlier, an increase in the use of contracts is thought to have political and geographic root causes. For Greece, the political roots stem from a desire to join the European Community (EC) and the role played by the EC in giving politicians an “excuse” to make institutional changes, such as the equitable enforcement of banking and trade laws, which favors the transition to a market economy. Geographically, Greece’s entry into the EC was followed by a substantial increase in foreign investment into the country from 1980 to 1995.72 Starting in 1986, the rate of growth in life insurance contracting in Greece increased dramatically; it crossed the global median into contract-intensive status in 1990. Still, in the year 2000 Greece’s level of per capita life insurance [End Page 76] contracting was only one-twenty-fifth that of the contract-intensive standard-bearers Japan, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Most observers agree that the mid-1990s was a turning point in Greek politics. Before then, the two main parties, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and New Democracy (ND), were primarily agents of bureaucratic clientelism. As economic norms theory would expect, both parties were highly personalist and centered on charismatic leaders prone to populist and ideological bombast.73 Interparty relations were tense and based on opposing social identities and systems of patronage.74 The rule of law was weak,75 and distrust of the state ran deep76; in addition, the people identified with “the political parties rather than governments.”77 In foreign policy there was an “exclusivist notion of ‘Greekness.’”78 In the 1980s and early 1990s, PASOK won elections with the xenophobic, anticapitalist, anti-American, and anti-European rhetoric of its populist leader, Andreas Papandreou. In 1976 Greece confronted Turkey on issues in the Aegean over which the International Court of Justice later ruled the Greeks had no case. When a similar issue arose in 1987, Prime Minister Papandreou asserted that it was time to “teach the Turks a hard lesson.”79 The two countries came close to war in 1976, 1987, and 1996.80 Although during this period Greek and Turkish leaders made frequent attempts to resolve their differences, “these initiatives were not sustainable in the face of an adverse political climate, limited social contacts, high level of biases, and sensationalist press.”81 The watershed moment in Greek politics came in 1996, when Papandreou died and PASOK elected Costas Simitis to replace him. The gulf separating the two leaders was vast. Simitis was elected largely on the platform of [End Page 77] Eksynchronismos (modernization). In the words of Kevin Featherstone, “Simitis and his supporters advocated a greater separation of party from the state” and a break from the “bureaucratic clientelism of the recent past.” Whereas Papandreou “exercised a dominant authority over his party,” Simitis was “more managerial and technocratic.”82 As economic norms theory would expect, PASOK’s choice of a reformer reflected deep-seated changes in Greece’s political culture. The opposition ND also moved to the center, with the nationalist posturing and ideological bravado of both parties largely disappearing from Greece’s political discourse.83 A “cultural shift” occurred,84 as the new rhetoric of reform struck a strong chord with the electorate, which increasingly viewed the leaders of the country’s oldstyle politics as “dinosaurs.”85 Voters began to distance themselves from Greece’s political parties; legal institutions became more central to everyday life; and a “new sense of security changed the way ordinary citizens viewed public life.”86 Reflecting an increased respect for the rule of law, the two leading parties agreed on new protections for individual rights in the constitution. 87 Still, a minority continued to vocalize opposition to what many Greeks called Greece’s growing “Europeanization,” led by Archbishop Christodoulos. Both leading parties also backed fundamental changes in Greece’s foreign policy.88 For Europe, the country that was once viewed as the “black sheep” of European foreign policy had evolved into a more consensual partner.89 Prior to the late 1990s, Greece maintained an uncompromising approach in its relations with Albania, Bulgaria, and Macedonia, and was widely viewed in Europe as the “bully of the Balkans.” In the late 1990s, however, a more cooperative attitude emerged, and Greece’s relations with these countries greatly improved.90 This realignment with other contract-intensive countries following Greece’s own transition to a contract-intensive economy, and its more cooperative attitude toward other democracies, accords with expectations of economic norms theory. [End Page 78] Greece’s foreign policy toward Turkey also underwent fundamental change in the late 1990s.91 Reflecting a change in Greek attitudes, foreign minister Theodoros Pangalos—considered a hard-liner—asserted that “we Greeks must get over the old knee-jerk reaction that if something is bad for Turkey it is good for us.”92 The most significant change occurred in 1999, when Greece moved from perennial obstructer to supporter of Turkey’s membership bid to join the European Union (EU). In all likelihood, this move was not strategic but an outcome of deep-seated shifts in Greeks’ perceptions of their national interest.93 Greek scholars and think tanks have stressed that it is in Greece’s interest to have Turkey in the EU as a partner.94 From 2000 to 2004, Greece and Turkey signed twenty-five major agreements; from 1970 to 2000 there were none.95 It must be recalled, however, that fundamental differences remain over the division of Cyprus and exploitation of the Aegean seabed.96 Resolution of the deeper issues in Greek-Turkish relations would also require change in how Turkish leaders perceive their interests. Unlike Greece, Turkey has not transitioned to a contract-intensive economy. If economic norms theory is correct, then Turkish politics should appear similar to Greek politics before Greece’s transition; this would include strong party loyalties, intense identity issues, and fear of outsiders in the country’s political discourse. In foreign policy, compromise should be difficult, as opposition parties seeking to garner the nationalist identity seize any reason to criticize the government for “giving in” to outsiders. Most observers agree that the above description characterizes Turkish politics today. There is no significant liberal party concerned with individual rights, equal enforcement of the law, or transparency in government. The left is characterized as favoring the elite-led modernization project, which increasingly includes “an intensifying nationalism with an underlying xenophobia”; the right emphasizes communitarian religious identity and social conservatism.97 [End Page 79] Turkey’s national identity includes a strong ethnoreligious dimension, and communitarianism remains a prominent feature: it continues to be a criminal offense to insult Turkishness. The political parties are weakly institutionalized and headed by strong, charismatic leaders who compete over state rents with ideological and populist appeals. Voters identify with parties, and the parties offer competing images of national identity.98 Although Turkey has contributed in many ways to the rapprochement with Greece, domestic core values continue to place constraints on further progress. For instance, Turkey could grant more religious freedom to its Orthodox community. 99 But with the international community, Turks feel that they can rely only on themselves, and the EU concern over Turkey’s human rights record is widely viewed “as part of a design to undermine Turkish national unity.”100 Engagement with Greece is considered risky for any incumbent government because it tends “to generate widespread nationalist sentiments.”101 The opposition can easily brand concessions, even if mutual, as giving in to outsiders and contrary to Turkish interests. Public opinion surveys in Turkey show that there continue to be very low levels of trust in the society, and “popular sentiment towards Greeks tends to be quite negative.”102 Turkey may have engaged with Greece in part due to the “earthquake diplomacy” that occurred after the catastrophic earthquake that struck Turkey in August 1999.103 Consistent with the economic norms expectation of a new universalism in Greek identity, many Greek individuals, nongovernmental organizations, and local authorities, in addition to the Greek government, offered substantial help to the Turks in their time of need. This opened a temporary window of good feeling toward Greece in Turkey that allowed Ankara to sign a number of confidence-building measures with Athens. [End Page 80] An alternative explanation for the improvement in Greek-Turkish relations might be the constraining and moderating role of the EU. It is true that Turkey’s constructive responses to Greek initiatives have been at least partly aimed at satisfying EU conditions for full membership. For instance, after refusing for decades to allow an international solution to the Cyprus dispute, Ankara acquiesced after the EU made doing so a condition of Turkey’s candidacy. In this way, the carrot of the EU acts as political cover for Turkish politicians, just as the EC once did for Greek politicians, offering leaders an “excuse” for “giving in” to the foreigners. Given Greece’s full membership in the EU since 1981, however, EU incentives do not offer a satisfying account for the changes in Greek politics and foreign policy in the 1990s. Recognition of the EC’s role in Greece’s transition to a contract-intensive economy suggests some promise for a more stable peace between Greece and Turkey in the years ahead. Like Greece in the 1980s, after Turkey became an official EU candidate, it experienced an explosion of foreign direct investment. 104 In the 1990s Turkey also experienced a rise in per capita life insurance contracting. If the rate of growth of the 1990s continues, the country will pass the contract-intensive threshold in the year 2019. If the time lag for political change after the economic transition in Turkey is the same as it was in Greece (seven years), significant moderation and individualization of Turkey’s political culture may occur around 2026. If the EU continues to act as an incentive for institutionalizing the market and as a source of foreign investment, Turkey’s change could come sooner.105 Economic norms theory would predict that when this happens, all of Turkey’s security-related issues with Greece will be positively and permanently settled; the enduring rivalry will end; and fatal militarized confrontations in this dyad will be a thing of the past. Conclusion Many policymakers and scholars of international relations believe that the promotion of democracy abroad will enhance global order and the security of the United States and its allies. Yet since the terrorist attacks on New York and [End Page 81] Washington on September 11, 2001, efforts to promote democracy as part of U.S. grand strategy in the Muslim Middle East only increased the influence of anti-U.S. factions in the region, including in Egypt, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories. This study challenges the strategic assumptions of U.S. policymakers by showing that democracy is not a likely cause of peace among nations. Rather, domestic economic conditions appear to be the main factor in promoting peace. Scholars have erroneously linked democracies with peace because most contract-intensive nations are democratic. But this study showed that about half of all democratic nations lack contract-intensive economies, and these democratic countries are not peaceful. Indeed, all the potential exceptions to the democratic peace—such as the Spanish-American War, the Continuation War of Finland against the Allies during World War II, and the Kargil war between India and Pakistan—are easily accounted for in this study because in each of these wars the democracy on at least one of the sides lacked a contract-intensive economy. This article examined the implications of economic norms theory, which integrates the insights of bounded rationality with research by economic historians to show how voter preferences for democracy and respect for individual rights and equal protection under the law may be rooted in the conditions unique to social market economies, where individuals trust both strangers in making contracts and a state that enforces them with impartiality. In many middle- and low-income countries, in contrast, high structural unemployment encourages dependence on the patronage of friends and family. This dependency can promote the heuristics of identifying and trusting in-groups and their leaders, and distrusting strangers from out-groups and state institutions. The study traced the path of causation from economic norms to interstate peace across levels of analysis and methodologies and found that contract-intensive societies are associated with higher levels of trust. It is not this trust, however, that causes peace among contract-intensive nations: peace is the result of a fundamental agreement among voters and elites in these countries on the Westphalian order of sovereign states, including the primacy of international law over power politics and imperialist bullying. This agreement emerges from the heuristics of their common economic way of life. Leaders of states with contract-intensive economies thus perceive common security interests in defending the global status quo and are in natural alliance against any state or nonstate entity that seeks to challenge it. Although democracies are not inherently peaceful, there is a conditional role for democracy in the economic peace: Because contract-intensive economy [End Page 82] promotes the heuristics that value individual freedom and equitable government, most contract-intensive nations have liberal democratic governments. Valuing democracy, voters and elites in contract-intensive democracies tend to value the promotion of individual rights and democracy abroad. They therefore restrain themselves from fighting other countries perceived as democratic, regardless of their economic or foreign policy behavior. These patterns were confirmed in the quantitative analyses and in a case study of Greece and Turkey.