## OFF

#### Interpretation: the affirmative may not specify a type of appropriation

#### ‘The’ indicates that appropriation is generic – no spec is allowed

Merriam **Webster’s 19** Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/the

4 -- used as a function word before a noun or a substantivized adjective to indicate reference to a group as a whole <the elite>

#### Violation: they spec asteroid mining

#### Standards

#### 1] Limits – they can spec infinite different types of appropriation like space mining, satellite orbit types, colonization, etc. This takes out functional limits – it’s impossible for me to research every possible combination of entities, governments, and appropriation.

#### 2] TVA solves – just read your aff as an advantage to a whole rez aff – we don’t stop them from reading new FWs, mechanisms or advantages. PICs aren’t aff offense – a] it’s ridiculous to say that neg potential abuse justifies the aff being non-T b] There’s only a small number of pics on this topic c] PICs incentivize them to write better affs that can generate solvency deficits to PICs

#### Topicality is a voting issue that should be evaluated through competing interpretations—it tells the negative what they do and do not have to prepare for. Reasonability is arbitrary and unpredictable, inviting a race to the bottom and we’ll win it links to our offense.

#### No RVIs—it’s your burden to be fair and T—same reason you don’t win for answering inherency or putting defense on a disad.

## OFF

#### The psychic and structural imposition of liberalism legitimizes securitized rhetoric and biopolitical control in domestic spheres which justifies the affs heternormative logic

Melanie Richter-Montpetit, 03-17-2017, ("Queer International Relations," No Publication, <https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-265>) SP

While there is increasing awareness of certain non-normative sexualities (“homosexuality”) and sexual practices (“Men-who-have-Sex-with-Men”), with few exceptions, key international actors and policy frameworks in the area of peace and security rest on what Queer and Transgender theory describes as cisprivilege. Cisprivilege refers to people whose gender assigned at birth matches their gender identity (“cisgender”). As Jamie Hagen (2016) explores in the context of the UN’s Women, Peace and Security (WPS) architecture, heteronormativity and cissexism obscure a wide set of practices of violence and exclusions negatively affecting people that are not straight or cisgender. Hagen shows how deploying a limited understanding of a heteronormative gender binary allows WPS policy and monitoring to account for the security needs of heterosexual cisgender women, while obscuring LGBT subjects and their safety. This framework also reproduces insecurities for the “women” it is meant to protect, in particular those with queer sexualities and non-normative gender expression. For instance, trans people and gender non-binary people are typically refused medical care, safe access to bathrooms in shelters, and refugee camps (see also Jauhola, 2010, 2013). Neither is sexual and gender-based violence against gay men recognized and accounted for under the WPS architecture, even though their presumed lack of masculinity makes them vulnerable to rape during conflict (Hagen, 2016, p. 315f.). Military Masculinities and Soldiering Queer IR builds on the rich body of Feminist IR scholarship on the seemingly inextricable linkages between modern militaries, war, and masculinities. Queer IR agrees with Feminist Security Studies [link] about the significance of gendered norms and discourses of masculinity for producing soldiers, militaries, and militarism and extends this research by inquiring in more depth into the “heterosexist premises of military masculinity.”52 Queer IR demonstrates the foundational role of particular normativities around sexuality and gender in producing soldiers and war, while it simultaneously complicates understandings of the modern military and military masculinity as structured by clear-cut gendered and sexualized dichotomies, such as male/female and heterosexual/homosexual. Contrary to commonsense understandings of soldiering involving only “manly” tasks, modern militaries (including the U.S. military) rely on service members to also perform unmasculine practices and inhabit subjectivities commonly coded as feminine. Examples for this embrace of the “unmasculine” range from cleaning toilets and polishing boots to enduring anal rape during hazing. Queer IR adds to our understanding of these seeming contradictions by demonstrating how these practices and subject positions get recoded as affirming a soldier’s overall military masculinity (Belkin, 2012; Cohn, 1998). In conversation with Feminist Security Studies, Queer IR argues that the military may in fact provide men the rare opportunity to safely transcend the boundaries of acceptable heteromasculinity. The military is among the very few institutions where men are allowed to engage in emotional, erotic, and sexual encounters and impulses otherwise suppressed in the civilian world for fear of being seen (by others or themselves) as queer and therefore not real men (Cohn, 1998, p. 17). A burgeoning body of Queer IR scholarship examines the increasing inclusion of LGBT people and associated representational practices in modern militaries. These works offer important insights for IR theory and policy, challenging in particular dichotomous frameworks regarding the agency of LGBT recruits, such as subversion/co-optation (Bulmer, 2013) or power/resistance (Richter-Montpetit, 2014b). Agathangelou, Bassichis, and Spira’s (2008) groundbreaking work coined the concept of “intimate investments” to understand how queer soldiers—historically themselves cast as threats to the nation and national security—seek to actively participate in the military and military violence. Queer IR scholarship examines whether the inclusion of LGBT soldiers in the United Kingdom (Bulmer, 2011, 2013) and the United States (Agathangelou et al., 2008; Richter-Montpetit, 2014b) or homoerotic visual representations of soldiers (Caso, 2016) challenge the heteropatriarchal character of the military and/or contribute to militarization and imperial geopolitics. Finally, Queer IR also speaks to the generative character of war and the military in shaping sexual and gender identities, practices, and normativities (Crane-Seeber, 2016; Howell, 2014; Wool, 2015). Security Governance/Regimes Queer IR demonstrates that certain normativities around sexuality and gender also play a central role in global security governance, including security regimes in the Global South. For example, Paul Amar’s work explores how the governance of stigmatized sexualities and gender expressions plays a key role in shifting figurations of global security regimes. Amar’s (2013) most recent book The Security Archipelago: Human-Security States, Sexuality Politics, and the End of Neoliberalism focuses on Cairo and Rio de Janeiro, two megacities said to be at the forefront of new and innovative security practices, actors, and governance structures. Amar traces a range of new and complex securitization projects and practices and the ways in which they are shot through with sexual and gender normativities. Central to the consolidation and expansion of these security regimes is the rise of a new doctrine of human security that casts human rights as beneficial to both national and societal security. Military and police security apparatuses and associated parastate actors prosper by focusing their efforts on constructing non-normative sexualities and gender expressions as threats to public safety. These new security regimes bring together a set of strange bedfellows, including ultra-conservative and self-identified progressive mass movements around morality, sexuality, and labor. For other Queer IR scholarship examining the construction of men who have sex with men as national security threats, see Nicola Pratt on the Queen Boat case in Egypt (2011). Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of Military Interventions Over the past decade, the thesis that powerful and otherwise highly heteronormative and patriarchal states in both the Global North and South increasingly harness queer sexualities and LGBT populations for their geopolitical ambitions has ushered in a rich and vibrant research agenda in Transnational Queer Studies and more recently, Queer IR.53 This shift has given rise to two dominant figurations of homosexuality and the homosexual—“the perverse homosexual” and “the normal homosexual” (Weber, 2016a). Progressive discourses recognize the latter as a “normal” sexual subject looking for love within the framework of monogamous couplehood, making “‘the LGBT’ as normal as any other loving human being” (Agathangelou, 2013; Agathangelou et al., 2008; Weber, 2016b). Much of Queer IR scholarship has been critical about the ways in which queer sexualities and increasingly also the rights of trans people have been taken up as tools of chauvinist or imperial statecraft. To make sense of what they see as problematic practices of diplomacy and foreign policy, critics in Queer IR have deployed the influential concepts of “homonationalism” (Puar, 2007) and “pinkwashing” developed in Transnational Queer Studies and activism (Puar & Mikdashi, 2012; Schotten & Maikey, 2012) and/or developed new terminology, such as “homocolonialism” (Rahman, 2015). Other Queer IR scholarship examines how the production of the figure of the respectable homosexual is made possible through structures of settler colonialism (Leigh, 2015; Richter-Montpetit, 2014b) and anti-Blackness (Agathangelou, 2013; Richter-Montpetit, 2014b). A classic example in Queer IR on the central role of cultural ideas about heteromasculinity—and performances of queer masculinities—in legitimizing military interventions is Cynthia Weber’s work on U.S. relations with various Caribbean states in the wake of the Cuban Revolution (1959–1994). Feminist analyses of military interventions typically show the critical role gendered “rescue” narratives play in producing the conditions of possibility for so-called humanitarian interventions. These gendered “rescue” narratives typically frame (post)colonial spaces and peoples as variously feminized and in need of forceful yet benign masculine intervention by major powers like the United States. Weber shows that the U.S. state did not simply seek to project itself as hyper-masculine and hyper-heterosexual. Rather the U.S. state relied upon non-normative codes of gender and sexuality—queer performativities—as an unlikely strategy to pacify the Caribbean region, regain its heteromasculine national identity, and thus reclaim its status as a potent and virile global super power. Other Queer IR scholarship explores how to techno-strategic discourses about nuclear warfare (Cohn, 1993) are shot through with heteronormative cultural logics. Terrorism and Counter-Insurgency Building on the pathbreaking work by Jasbir K. Puar and Amit Rai (2002) and Puar’s later solo work (2004, 2005, 2006, 2007) in Transnational Queer Studies, Queer IR scholarship has demonstrated the role of non-normative understandings of gender and sexuality in representations of the figure of the Muslim terrorist and/or insurgent and the ways in which these knowledges have shaped security practices in the War on Terror.54 Queer IR draws our attention to how the will to knowledge about sexuality and gender in this context is deeply shaped by cultural ideas about racial difference and colonial forms of power to construct internationally dangerous figures—like “the terrorist” and/or “the insurgent”—and those who need to be secured from them like “the docile patriot” (Puar & Rai, 2002). For example, Queer IR scholarship on U.S. and British Counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts in the so-called War on Terror shows how Orientalist discourses about Afghan, Arab, and or Muslim men’s (allegedly) failed masculinity and perverse sexualities shaped COIN practices at the operational and tactical level. In her study of Western representations of Afghan—in particular Pashtun—men, Nivi Manchanda (2015) identifies a strong preoccupation with the alleged prevalence of “illicit sex” among Pashtun men in both U.S. counter-insurgency documents and U.S. and British media reports. Manchanda shows how that “truth” about Pashtun men’s sexualities informed both operational and tactical considerations in U.S. counter-insurgency in Afghanistan. For instance, COIN training materials for U.S. soldiers contains information about queer sexualities and effeminate gender presentation, including the use of eyeliner among the local population. These knowledges produce the figure of the “Queer Pashtun” or “perverse” “terrorist” masculinities, which make it possible for both official COIN and media discourses to frame “violence against Americans [.º.º.] as a much-needed release of the terrorists’ bottled-up sexual rage” (Manchanda, 2015, p. 12). Other Queer IR scholarship shows how associated Orientalist ideas about “the Arab mind” and its monolithic moral framework of honor and shame anchored in a distinctly heteropatriarchal Islamic sex-gender regime shaped many of the actual torture techniques documented in the Senate Torture Report about the U.S. post-9/11 torture regime (Owens, 2010; Richter-Montpetit, 2007, 2014a, 2015). Featuring prominently among reported torture practices are highly sexualized carceral practices aimed at feminizing male prisoners. The underlying assumption is simple: The concerted effort at humiliating and destroying Muslim/Arab prisoners’ (presumed) sense of masculinity would “soften them up” and getting them to “confess” terrorist crimes they had committed, were planning to commit, and/or share valuable intelligence about other terrorists/insurgents (Owens, 2010; Richter-Montpetit, 2007, 2014a, 2015). At the center of these feminizing torture techniques were forced nudity; rape and sexualized assault; forced simulation of anal and oral “gay sex”; and forcing otherwise naked male prisoners to wear “women’s” underwear, including on their head. These sexualized carceral practices did not “simply” apply Orientalist stereotypes about Islam and Arabs but in fact produced Muslim prisoners as sexually deviant—they cast the tortured “as racially queer” (Richter-Montpetit, 2014a, p. 56). Taking seriously the influential role of cultural logics about racialized sexuality and gender in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency practices helps IR make sense of the large number of prisoners that were detained and tortured for years even though they were officially known to be “innocent” and/or without any intelligence value (Richter-Montpetit, 2014a, 2015). This research opens up critical IR analyses beyond explanatory and moral frameworks such as failed intelligence gathering, “state of exception,” or “human rights abuses” toward a more comprehensive understanding of seemingly illiberal security practices in the War on Terror. Finally, like Postcolonial and Decolonial IR, Queer IR contributes to IR debates on the ongoing raciality and coloniality of international relations by showing how counter-terrorism practices and the larger War on Terror they are part of are not only shaped by Orientalism, but also anti-Blackness and settler colonialism (Agathangelou, 2013; Leigh, 2015; Puar, 2007; Richter-Montpetit, 2014a, 2015). Securitization Theory Queer IR has also contributed to debates about the conceptual and empirical validity of securitization theory. For example, Alison Howell’s work on Global Health challenges the argument that health has been securitized. In fact, Howell questions the validity of analytics of securitization generally. Bringing Critical War studies into conversation with Queer theory and Critical Disability studies or Crip theory, Howell argues that modern warfare and modern medicine emerged in tandem rather than medicine and psychiatry being “abused” by military actors. Howell evidences her understanding of medicine as an instrument of violence by exploring medicine’s role in the violent management of “abnormal” populations, such as homosexuals and trans women. Taking queer and trans people seriously in global politics renders visible the routine character of practices of force inherent in—and indeed constitutive of—liberal rule and its use of “social warfare” (Howell, 2014, p. 970). Howell’s queer analysis thus contributes to IR theory and Critical Security Studies by rethinking the validity of the norm/exception and politics/security distinctions underwriting securitization theory. Border Security Queer IR scholarship shows that ideas about normative sexuality and gender are also central to everyday security practices at the border (Frowd, 2014). The management of border security is based on calculations about risk and danger of certain bodies and relies on and is productive of certain normativities around gender. For instance, airport security assemblages with their use of biometric data and body scanners mobilize knowledges of gender to assess the truth about travelers’ bodies, which produces trans and non-binary people as deceptive, deviant, and dangerous bodies (Sjoberg & Shepherd, 2012; Wilcox, 2015). In conversation with Transgender theory, Queer IR approaches to border security thus extend the insights of feminist and critical race analyses on the role of gendered and racialized knowledges to problematic ontologies of cisnormativity.

#### The aff’s drive to prevent extinction is a form of masculine survivalism where gendered bodies become the unwilling tools to sustain humanity

Mitchell 15 (Audra Mitchell, Audra Mitchell is a settler scholar who lives and works on the Ancestral and treaty lands of the Neutral (Attawandaron), Haudenosaunee and Mississaugas of the New Credit (please see Honouring the Land). She currently holds the the Canada Research Chair in Global Political Ecology at Wilfrid Laurier University. From 2015-18 she held the CIGI Chair in Global Governance and Ethics at the Balsillie School of International Affairs Audra is an Associate Professor at Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada, 8-3-2015, "Gendering extinction," Worldly, <https://worldlyir.wordpress.com/2015/08/03/gendering-extinction/>, JKS)

The reproduction of survival/ the survival of reproduction

Extinction is almost always understood against the horizon of survival and the imperative to sustain it – at least for life forms deemed to be of value to humans. In many cases, this imperative takes the form of deliberate strategies for enforcing existence. Donna Haraway’s influential book When Species Meet devotes considerable attention to the logics, practices and politics of Species Survival Plans. These plans monitor and enforce reproduction amongst ‘endangered’ species, not least by collecting data on populations, genetic profiles and genetic materials to enable selective breeding. This strategy assumes that all organisms can, should, and can be made to exercise their reproductive capacities in order to resist extinction, and it actively mobilizes members of ‘endangered species’ into this project. In so doing, it helps to entrench norms regarding gender, sexuality and reproductive labour that are deeply entrenched in modern, Western human cultures. Attention to these programmes highlights an important way in which extinction is gendered in dominant scientific and policy frameworks. Specifically, strategic breeding programmes share in the belief that reproduction is an imperative for those capable of reproducing if ‘the species’ is at risk’. This belief is directly related to Western norms of the reproductive imperative for women. Indeed, Haraway points out that it is precisely “‘woman’s’ putative self-defining responsibility to ‘the species’ as this singular and typological female is reduced to her reproductive function”. In a similar sense, within SSPs and other strategies of enforced survival, entire life forms are reduced to their reproductive capacities. Moreover, programmes of enforced survival can, in the context of sexual reproduction, disproportionately burden female organisms with the task of avoiding extinction. This logic is particularly fraught in discussions of the possibility of human extinction, in which female fertility (captured in the standard policy language of ‘births per woman’) is framed simultaneously as a threat to survival, and the only hope for escaping extinction (see, for instance, Alan Weisman’s comments on this). In these ways, the securitization of survival entrenches the intersectional categories of gender, species and race discussed above. Dominant discourses of extinction and conservation also entrench and privilege sexual reproduction, in ways that entrench heteronormative assumptions and norms. This is reflected in the way that the subjects of extinction and conservation are framed. The standard object of conservation is the biological ‘species’, a term which is defined by the ability of organisms to reproduce sexually. As Myra Hird has pointed out, this conception of ‘species’ makes it appear as if sexual reproduction is the ‘best’ means of sustaining the existence of a life form. However, Hird’s work demonstrates that Earthly life forms actually engage in myriad forms of reproduction, from the free exchange of DNA between bacteria to the hermaphroditic practices of some fish. The upshot of these arguments is that Earthly life is sustained through a huge variety of reproductive activities that do not conform to biological understandings of life processes or species. Crucially, Hird argues that there is no necessary hierarchy between forms of reproduction. In Darwinian terms, all species that manage to survive are equally successful. However, by conflating survival with sexual reproduction, existing discourses of extinction embed hetero-normative frameworks that devalue other forms of reproduction. They also reduce reproduction to the imperative to survive, ignoring the myriad cultural, political, aesthetic, sensual and other dimensions of reproduction.

#### The 1AC perpetuates this fear of death that is rooted in violence against non – normative bodies, we become the scapegoats for violence in the name of preserving a future-to-come that never quite arrives.

Winnubst 2006 (Shannon, Asst. Prof. Women’s Studies, “Queering Freedom,” 2006 Pp. 184)CJQ

While death is unarguably a part of the human condition, for Bataille the fear of death is a historically habituated response, one that grounds cultures of advanced capitalism and phallicized whiteness. In those frames of late modernity, death introduces an ontological scarcity into the very human condition: it represents finitude, the ultimate limit. We must distance ourselves from such threats, and we do so most often by projecting them onto sexualized, racialized, and classed bodies. But for Bataille, servility to the order of knowledge is as unnecessary as servility to the order of utility. To die humanly, he argues, is to accept “the subordination of the thing” (1988– 91, 2:219), which places us in the schema that separates our present self from the future, desired, anticipated self: “to die humanly is to have of the future being, of the one who matters most in our eyes, the senseless idea that he is not” (1988–91, 2:219). But if we are not trapped in the endless anticipation of our future self as the index of meaning in our lives, we may not be anguished by this cessation: “If we live sovereignly, the representation of death is impossible, for the present is not subject to the demands of the future” (1988–91, 2:219). To live sovereignly is not to escape death, which is ontologically impossible. But it is to refuse the fear, and subsequent attempts at disavowal, of death as the ontological condition that defines humanity. Rather than trying to transgress this ultimate limit and prohibition, the sovereign man “cannot die fleeing. He cannot let the threat of death deliver him over to the horror of a desperate yet impossible flight” (1988–91, 2:219). Living in a temporal mode in which “anticipation would dissolve into NOTHING” (1988–91, 2: 208), the sovereign man “lives and dies like an animal” (1988–91, 2:219). He lives and dies without the anxiety invoked by the forever unknown and forever encroaching anticipation of the future. As Bataille encourages us elsewhere, “Think of the voracity of animals, as against the composure of a cook” (1988–91, 2:83).

#### The alternative is THE ABORTION OF REALITY, to sign your ballot for NONE OF THE ABOVE in an act of queer mutiny that throws into question heterosexual logics of reproduction and efficiency that would straightwash the violence done to queers by articulating it only as individual criminal acts. This social order has given nothing to queers that they couldn’t build on their own: use your ballot to embrace a queer reclamation of this and every other space.

Edelman 2004 (Lee, Prof. English Tufts, “No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive,” Pp. 4-5)//Raunak

Rather than rejecting, with liberal discourse, this ascription of negativity to the queer, we might, as I argue, do better to consider accepting and even embracing it. Not in the hope of forging thereby some more perfect social order-such a hope, after all, would only reproduce the constraining mandate of futurism, just as any such order would equally occasion the negativity of the queer-but rather to refuse the insistence of hope itself as affirmation, which is always affirmation of an order whose refusal will register as unthinkable, irresponsible, inhumane. And the trump card of affirmation? Always the question: If not this, what? Always the demand to translate the insistence, the pulsive force of negativity into "some determinate stance or "position" whose determination would thus negate it: always the imperative to immure it in some stable and positive form. When I argue, then, that we might do well to attempt what is surely impossible-to withdraw our allegiance, however compulsory, from a reality based on the Ponzi scheme of reproductive futurism -I do not intend to propose some "good" that will thereby be assured. To the contrary, I mean to insist that nothing, and certainly not what we call the "good," can ever have any assurance at all in the order of the Symbolic. Abjuring fidelity to a futurism that's always purchased at our expense, though bound, as Symbolic subjects consigned to figure the Symbolic's undoing, to the necessary contradiction of trying to turn its intelligibility against itself, we might rather, figuratively, cast our vote for "none of the above," for the primacy of a constant no in response to the law of the Symbolic, which would echo that law's foundational act, its self-constituting negation. The structuring optimism of politics to which the order of meaning commits us, installing as it does the perpetual hope of reaching meaning through signification, is always, I would argue, a negation of this primal, constitutive, and negative act. And the various positivities produced in its wake by the logic of political hope depend on the mathematical illusion that negated negations might somehow escape, and not redouble, such negativity. My polemic thus stakes its fortunes on a truly hopeless wager: that taking the Symbolic's negativity to the very letter of the law, that attending to the persistence of something internal to reason that reason refuses, that turning the force of queerness against all subjects, however queer, can afford an access to the jouissance that at once defines and negates us. Or better: can expose the constancy, the inescapability, of such access to jouissance in the social order itself, even if that order can access its constant access to jonissance only in the process of abjecting that constancy of access onto the queer.

#### The judge should treat the AC as an artifact. The aff must defend their epistemic orientation prior to debating a risk of fiated solvency.

#### Resolvability­– no fiat can’t pass policies but your ballot can change community norms. EX: debate community going from K’s are cheating to a more middle ground f/w

#### Rep shape policy implementation– The epistemic justifications for what we debate function in what we do

#### Repetition compulsion– Heteronormative logics normalize themselves in academic arenas. Using procedurals of debate to shield themselves from criticism, anti-queer violence becomes naturalized in this space. Your role as an educator is to maintain a space that all bodies can feel comfortable in entering. Accessiblity comes first, bc it determines the ability for queer individuals to access the benefits of this model.

#### The ontopolitical nature of gender encodes of cispirvellege shapes the way we conceptualize of IR – Your theorizations relies on violence against genderqueer and trans bodies to justify itself.

Shepherd and Sjoberg 12 (Laura J, Australian Research Council Future Fellow and Professor of International Relations at Sydney University, and Laura, PhD USC and associate professor of Political Science at the University of Florida, Trans- bodies in/of war(s): Cisprivilege and contemporary security strategy, Feminist Review) //Raunak Dua

Taking cisprivilege seriously draws attention to the fact that even the most inclusive interpretations of security exclude the ambiguous (Munoz, 1999: 2), the cross (McCloskey, 2000: xii; Roen, 2002), the invisible (Bettcher, 2007: 52), the disidentified (Heyes, 2003: 1096) and the 'in' (Shotwell and Sangray, 2009: 59). We argue here that this is neither incidental nor accidental, even if it is not a conscious practice of exclusion, and that these exclusionary practices are forms of violence. Foucault suggested that '[a] relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks, it destroys or it closes off all possibilities' (1983: 340). Violence perverts, inverts or renders unintelligible certain ways of being in the world while endorsing others; in this, violence is perhaps best conceptualised as a specific relation of power that is not necess- arily repressive but productive. A conceptualisation of violence inspired by Foucault can allow for the admission of 'the exclusionary presuppositions and foundations that shore up discursive practices insofar as those foreclose the heterogeneity, gender, class or race of the subject' (Hanssen, 2000: 215) as acts of violence that are simultaneously practices of power. On this view, violence is not reducible to (physical) constraint or repression but rather encompasses regulative idea(l)s and performs ordering functions in our collective cognitive frameworks. If we accept that representing transpeople and queer bodies specifically as in- and hypervisible in war stories and security strategy is a form of violence, and that this violence has its foundation in unexamined and often unconscious privilege enjoyed by cispeople, then we can begin to understand how a nuanced and sophisticated gendered theory of security needs to incorporate corporeality, including trans- corporeality. We can note parallels between transphobic violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of gender) and transnational violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of religions, states, ethnicities and/or alliances. Laura Shepherd (2008: 78; see also Shepherd, 2010c) terms these processes 'the violent reproduction of gender' and 'the violent reproduction of the international'). The borders of gender are policed as a part of an active policing of the borders between states, the borders between states and non-states, and the borders between the (safe) self-state and the (dangerous, terrorist) other. Narratives of the international fetishise and Orientalise the exotic 'Other' (be it a colonial other, a trans- other or a terrorist other) to associate Otherness with violence and inspire violence towards the Other. 'Non-violent' resisters of existing (engendered) social orders are often addressed by the dominant (gendered) social order violently, much like non-violent transpeople are often attacked for the very presentation of trans-ness in the face of a social order that excludes their existence both de jure and de facto. We suggest that these are ontopolitical practices; as Michael Dillon explains, 'all political interpretation is simultaneously ontopolitical because it cannot but disclose the ontology sequestered within iť (1999: 112). The ontopolitical (representational) practices of security have thus far been founded on embedded cisprivilege. The ontology of security, even of gendered security theory, has conventionally relied on gender/sex certainty and gender/sex hierarchy. If it is analytically and conceptually productive to see transphobic violence as the violent reproduction of a stable sex/gender system that 'naturally' privileges cisgender performances because such performances are associated with normality and safety and trans- performances are associated with danger and discomfort, it then becomes possible to ask questions about the ways that trans-in(/hyper)visibiIity, cisprivilege and a regulative, exclusionary ontopolitical social order are violently reproduced in inter/transnational relations. In tentative conclusion, we suggest that this might be a creative and constructive way forward that resists the dominant ontopolitical practices of security-as-matter and gender-as-binary, both of which bring into being a disguised and disfigured (corpo)reality of genderqueer and trans- bodies in/of war.

#### UTIL DA: Util is the fantasy of reproductive futurity, it cannot exist without. Just on the framing level the aff structurally excludes queer bodies and places an emphasis on the notion of reproductive futurity. Queer debaters cannot engage with their calculus because it is functionally made to exclude them. Exclusion is a voter, because accessibility comes before literally everything else.

## Case

### Gen

#### Viewing space as a site for appropriation creates problematic visions of the world beyond us. By only banning one form of appropriation under a resolution that calls all unjust they feed into this logic

**Oman-Reagan 17** [Michael Oman-Reagan: Department of Anthropology at the Memorial University of Newfoundland. Oman-Reagan, Michael P. 2015. “Queering Outer Space.” SocArXiv, Open Science Framework. Manuscript, submitted January 22, 2017. osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/mpyk6/] JV

Since the Space Shuttle program was retired in 2011, the U.S. space agency NASA has turned over much of the work on space transportation to private corporations and the “commercial crew” program. As venture capitalist space entrepreneurs and aerospace contractors compete to profit from space exploration, we’re running up against increasingly conflicting visions for human futures in outer space (Wright and Oman-Reagan 2017). Narratives of military tactical dominance alongside “NewSpace” ventures like asteroid mining projects call for the defense, privatization, and commodification of space and other worlds, framing space as a resource-rich “frontier” to be “settled” in what amounts to a new era of colonization (Anker 2005; Redfield 2000; Valentine 2012; Wright and Oman-Reagan 2017). However, from at least the 1970s, some space scientists have challenged this trajectory of resource extraction, neo-colonialism, and reproduction of earthly political economies with alternative visions of the future (McCray 2012). Today’s “visionary” space scientists imagine space exploration as a source of transformative solutions to earthly problems such as climate change, economic inequality, conflict, and food insecurity (Grinspoon 2003; Hadfield 2013; Sagan 1994; Shostak 2013; Tyson 2012; Vakoch 2013). Elsewhere I’m doing research on all of this as a PhD student in anthropology, but here I want to argue that we must go even further than academically interrogating the military and corporate narratives of space “exploration” and “colonization.” We must water, fertilize,and tend the seeds of alternative visions of possible futures in space, not only seeking solutions to earthly problems which are trendy at the moment, but actively queering outer space and challenging the future to be even more queer.

### Sol

#### Outer Space Laws are unclear – private corporations are still capable of escaping due to loopholes in the plan.

Green and Stark 17 [Christopher and Eda, “Outer Space Treaty and Beyond: Do Existing Space Laws Put an Astronomical Barrier to Private IP Rights in Space?”, JDSUPRA. 8 September 2020 https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/outer-space-treaty-beyond-do-existing-44028/] //DebateDrills LC

Our limited body of space law provides little guidance. The first international treaty, the “Outer Space Treaty,” was signed by the U.S., Russia, and the U.K. in 1967, quickly followed by the Rescue Agreement. Over the next two decades, three other treaties—the Liability Convention, the Registration Convention, and the Moon Agreement—were also signed by these nations, with most countries following in their footsteps.[3] But after that rapid succession of international treaties, there have since been few others. These five documents form the basis of the international space law we have today, but none address the issue of [intellectual property rights in space](https://www.fr.com/fish-litigation/ip-rights-outer-space/). Rather, upon inspection, it appears that the stated purpose of these treaties may be antithetical to intellectual property protection.

The “Outer Space Treaty” espouses communal themes in characterizing space as the “province of all mankind,” the “common heritage of mankind” and to the “benefit of all countries.”[4] Unsurprisingly, Article II of the Outer Space Treaty prohibits any appropriation of areas in space, keeping in line with its principle of communal property.[5] On the other hand, patents are fundamentally territorial and grant monopoly rights for a period of time. Applied to space, it is unclear just what is open for patent protections.

For example, can private companies patent orbital patterns of satellites? Currently, companies may patent the technology or design of satellites that stay in a particular orbit, even if not the orbital pattern itself.[6] The practical implications of this are significant, especially with the advent of satellite constellations. If particular satellite technologies, and, indirectly, their orbital patterns, are patentable, then a significant portion of space may be occupied by one satellite constellation, i.e. one company alone.[7] Does this private apportionment of space run counter to our notions of sharing space? Some argue that the Outer Space Treaty only bans sovereign appropriation and does not limit private entities from exerting claims. Others counter that private property rights flow from sovereign property claims, so the former is meaningless without the latter.[8] So the question remains, can the stated goals of sharing outer space be reconciled with the proprietary nature of patents?

Our current corpus of space treaties comes from a period of history when space exploration was undertaken primarily by governments rather than private actors. The cooperative goals were likely a reaction to the time, as the world was coming out of a charged space race. The silence of these space treaties on intellectual property rights presents an opportunity for modern-day agreements to provide patent protections for private companies. Without robust international agreement on patents for space, we may even see less international cooperation as companies refuse to divulge their discoveries.[9] Now, as more and more private companies enter space exploration and carry the torch of innovation, it is more important than ever to strike a balance between sharing our “common heritage” and providing patent protections that incentivize invention.[10]

#### The affirmative has no enforcement mechanism – private corporations can just circumvent since they have the funding to launch rockets on their own.

Sheetz 21 [Michael, “Elon Musk’s SpaceX raised about $850 million, jumping valuation to about $74 billion”, CNBC. 16 February 2021. https://www.cnbc.com/2021/02/16/elon-musks-spacex-raised-850-million-at-419point99-a-share.html] //DebateDrills LC

SpaceX completed another monster equity funding round of $850 million last week, people familiar with the financing told CNBC, sending the company’s valuation skyrocketing to about $74 billion.

The company raised the new funds at $419.99 a share, those people said — or just 1 cent below the $420 price that [Elon Musk](https://www.cnbc.com/elon-musk/) [made infamous in 2018](https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/28/sec-says-elon-musk-at-tesla-chose-420-price-as-pot-reference.html) when he declared he had “funding secured” to take [Tesla](https://www.cnbc.com/quotes/TSLA) private at that price.

The latest round also represents a jump of about 60% in the company’s valuation from its previous round in August, when [SpaceX raised near $2 billion at a $46 billion valuation](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/10/14/tesla-investor-ron-baron-spacex-has-a-chance-to-be-just-as-large.html).

SpaceX did not immediately respond to CNBC’s request for comment. In addition to SpaceX further building a war chest for its ambitious plans, company insiders and existing investors were able to sell $750 million in a secondary transaction, one of the people said.

The people spoke on condition of anonymity because SpaceX is not a publicly traded company and the fundraising talks were private. SpaceX raised only a portion of the funding available in the marketplace, with one person telling CNBC that the company received “insane demand” of about $6 billion in offers over the course of just three days.

### Space war

#### Kinetic space targeting requires huge resources that make it infeasible, but cyber attacks are an alt cause they don’t solve

Handberg, 17 – Faculty and Research, School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs, UCF Roger Handberg, “Is space war imminent? Exploring the possibility,” Comparative Strategy. 2017. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01495933.2017.1379832?needAccess=true>

Third, the most obvious initial attack of space-based assets will most likely come from cyber attacks, given that such actions do not necessarily require the scale of resources necessary for other modalities such as kinetic weapons, or even lasers or other energy-type weapons. One will have to position the weapons plus the infrastructure to permit rapid recycling of the weapons for the next attack. Firing off interceptors will likely be a one-off, meaning extremely precise targeting will be required if the attack is to be successful. Note that none of these systems require that individuals be placed in Earth orbit, despite the imagery describing such operations in fictional universes.

#### Deterrence in space solves even if we’re more vulnerable ---

#### 1] Countries know we value our space assets and are willing to practice brinkmanship or escalate horizontally

Harrison, 9 – Director, Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies Ambassador Roger G. Harrison, “Space Deterrence: The Delicate Balance of Risk,” Space and Defense, Volume 3, No. 1. Summer 2009. <http://www.usafa.edu/app/uploads/Space_and_Defense_3_1.pdf>

There are, however, potential mitigating factors. First, an adversary could not be certain that retaliation would be limited to space. Although the threat of escalation is often portrayed as inhibiting rather than empowering U.S. decision makers, that threat would also have to be taken seriously by an adversary. U.S. declaratory policy has always emphasized that retaliation for attacks on vital assets will be of a magnitude and by means of our choosing.38 No rational adversary could rule out a disproportionate response or so called “horizontal escalation” (for example in the cyber domain), especially if his conclusion was the same as ours: that limiting ourselves to space-for-space retaliation would leave the U.S. at a disadvantage. He would also have to take into account the possibility of a less than rational response to his action, perhaps leading to an even more rapid escalation.

The Cold War analogy is brinksmanship, the willingness to escalate unpredictably when vital strategic interests are threatened.

#### 2] No shot of a disarming strike --- we’d maintain BMD and be able to retaliate --- that makes our threats credible

Harrison, 9 – Director, Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies Ambassador Roger G. Harrison, “Space Deterrence: The Delicate Balance of Risk,” Space and Defense, Volume 3, No. 1. Summer 2009. <http://www.usafa.edu/app/uploads/Space_and_Defense_3_1.pdf>

The second mitigating factor is that even in the absence of dedicated ASAT systems, a potential attacker is not likely to perceive the U.S. lacks capability to retaliate against the space assets of an adversary. Many nations perceive existing U.S. ballistic missile defense systems as having a dual-use nature, including potential anti-satellite capability. The U.S. reportedly has an active and acknowledged program of “negation” designed to deny an adversary the use of his space assets as force multipliers in the case of hostilities within the atmosphere. We may safely assume that other nations are pursuing similar programs. In our judgment, the most likely scenario for future space conflict is a “war of negation,” i.e. an attempt by each side to preserve the product of its space assets while denying those space services to the opponent. To win such a contest requires technological superiority, which the U.S. should make every effort to maintain and which, in this area as in others, is a vital element in maintaining space deterrence.

We conclude that the threat of retaliation can remain a credible element of our overall space deterrence. The attribution of attack is not an insuperable obstacle, and that questions of resolve will ultimately depend on the perceptions of a potential attacker in the circumstances existing when his decision to attack is being considered. A credible threat of retaliation may require willingness to escalate into other domains. It could include fielding ASAT systems if such systems are deployed by others, but the resulting arms race would not be in the interests of the United States. The U.S. should not be the first to deploy such systems and the U.S. use the full extent of its influence internationally to avoid that outcome. Ultimately, a threat of retaliation is never more credible than the leader and the government that issues it. No declaratory policy can compensate for an irresolute commander in chief, one who is misinformed or badly served by his subordinates. An opponent will tend to judge the likelihood of retaliation not according to proclamations made months or years earlier, but according to the situation pertaining at the time – as Hitler did in Europe and Saddam did in the Middle East. What a President does in the run up to and conduct of a crisis will have far more to do with an adversaries decisions than libraries full of ultimatums and guarantees. Subordinates who doubt the resolution of a commander will try to limit his or her flexibility to respond other than in ways the subordinates think appropriate. A wise commander in chief, on the other hand, will strive to maintain flexibility, to approach a particular conflict in the context of wider responsibilities, to take account of factors which were unforeseen when the doctrine or battle plan was devised – in short, to balance one risk off against others. No bureaucratic arrangement, declaratory doctrine or weapon capability will compensate when such leadership is not present.