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#### Objective Communication is terminally unsustainable -- the proliferation of a singular interconnected sphere of the media has conditioned what we perceive as real. No longer is what we perceive grounded in any tangibly objective reality, rather, information is created and spread by the media, and the legitimacy of new information is determined through its cross-checking with the information deemed “objective” by media representations.

Krevel 18 [Mojca, Professor of English at the University of Lituania, “On the Apocalypse that No One Noticed”, <https://revije.ff.uni-lj.si/elope/article/view/7917>, published 2018, accessed 07/04/18]

From the present perspective, the cyberpunk movement is revealed as the inevitable response of science fiction (SF) – and fiction in general – to the cultural realities of the early 1980s, when the processes implicit in the development of the economy, society and culture after the Second World War culminated on the level of everyday experiential reality. These processes have been part and parcel of the globalizing tendencies of post-industrial capitalism, fueled by the rapid growth of advertising and media industries, and facilitated by exponential development of information technologies which have provided ever more effective means for the storage, manipulation and distribution of information. The ubiquity of media that disseminate information on a global scale instigated the gradual modification of the value systems of individuals, and the formation of mass identity and mass culture. Under the constant barrage of media-generated global trends, the notion of reality came to rely less and less on subjective, lived experience, but rather on its mediated reproductions. As these primarily serve the interests of global capitalism, the capitalist shift of production relations, in the process of which buying becomes consumption, at this point reaches its definitive stage, whereupon the representational value of products completely replaces their functional and exchange values. Products become objects of consumption which circulate as signs, creating meaning in relation to other signs. Through the act of consumption they represent – signify – the consumer, making the popular maxim “**you are what you buy**” acutely literal. The processes described have gradually transformed the established concepts of reality and subject to the point where the now-transformed concept is no longer part of the same ontological order as its original counterpart. Such major alterations of the fundamental metaphysical paradigms have historically coincided with the changing of epochs, and indeed, the developments described above are invariably recognized by theoreticians in all pertinent disciplines as being inherent to the advent of the new epoch generally referred to as postmodernity. Arguably the most succinct conceptual framework – a framework which effectively incorporates all the main accents of existing theoretical discourse on postmodernity – was the one developed by Jean Baudrillard (cf. Krevel 2016, 175–76). His notions of **hyperreality and the fractal subject** also **seem the most appropriate** instruments **for explaining the apocalypse** Landon was referring to, as well as for assessing the impact of that apocalypse on science fiction. Hyperreality refers to the reality of mediated reproductions of experience, a condition that involves “substituting signs of the real for the real itself” (Baudrillard 2004, 366). Such reality is produced from “matrices, memory banks and command models – and with these it can be reproduced an indefinite number of times” (Baudrillard 2004, 366). In other words, our notions of what is real depend on data we receive through what has become – due to the digitalization of all media (from print to movies and music and film) – a single communication channel. Because all media are now encoded in the same, digital, way, we have seen an “erasing [of] the notion of the medium” (Kittler, von Mücke and Similon 1987, 102). Hence, digitally coded information transferred through this channel conditions our perception of the environment, but refers to nothing tangible, as it is an algorithm, a sign, a mere probability of a message (cf. Shannon and Weaver 1949, 3). The actual message relies on the configurations that these signs establish with other signs, meaning that what we perceive as reality is a system of more or less compatible information, against which each new piece (or cluster) of information is verified. Such reality is therefore but one of the many potential configurations of the signs that circulate the postmodern mediascape, which means that in the paradigm of the hyperreal all realities exist simultaneously as a potentiality. Similarly, Baudrillard’s fractal postmodern subject (2011, 47) refers to the multiplicity of selves, creatable through the consumption of available objects-turned-signs. The subject is fractal – “not at all contradictory with mass status, […] both subdivisible to infinity and indivisible, closed on [it]self” (Baudrillard 2011, 64) – because all individuals choose from a common fund of these signs, and because these signs are coded in the same way. Consequently, such a subject is a “subject without other” (Baudrillard 2011, 64), an endless variation on the same subject, which means that the postmodern self is essentially a potential identity creatable from available signs. In the paradigm of the fractal subject, then, all identities exist at the same time as a potentiality, and what we perceive as a self is an identity variant actualized by observation.

#### The Impact is implosive violence as we seek to exterminate otherness by imposing meaning onto the globe.

Artrip and Debrix 14, Ryan E., and François Debrix. "The digital fog of war: Baudrillard and the violence of representation." (2014). (Philosophy and Political Science at Guilford College and Elon University)//raunak dua

The story that needs to be told is thus not about the undoubtedly deplorable “truth” or fact of explosive and warlike violence, but about a violence of another sort. In the radical digital **transparency** of the global scene, we (members of the demos) often **have** full or direct exposure to explosivity, as we saw above with the image of terror. But what still needs to be thought and problematized is implosivity or what may be called **implosive violence.** Implosive violence is a violence for which we do not, and perhaps will never, have much of a language (Rancière, 2007: 123). Although, not having a language for it or, rather, as we saw above, seeking to find a language to talk about it and, perhaps, to make sense of it is still sought after. This is, perhaps, what digital pictures of war/terror violence seek to capture or want to force through. Implosive violence, often digitally rendered these days, is in close contact with media technologies and representational devices and techniques because **it seeks** representation and **meaning**. This is why implosive violence insists **on calling in wars** (against terror, for example) and on **mobilizing war machines** (against terrorist others, against **vague enemy figures**), but wars and war machines that no longer have—to the extent that they ever had—a clearly identifiable object and subject, or **a clear mission/purpose**. As such, this implosive violence and its wars (the new Western/global way of war, perhaps) **must remain** uncertain, **unclear**, foggy, inwardly driven, representational, and indeed virulent. They must remain uncertain and confused even as they are digitally operative and desperately capture events/images **to give the impression that meanings/significations can and will be found.** Yet, as we saw above, it is not meanings exactly that must be found, but information and the endless guarantee of its immediate circulation. As information occupies the empty place of meaning, certainty, or truth, images must be instantaneously turned into appearances that search for meanings that will never be discovered because, instead, a proliferation of information-worthy facts and beliefs will take over (perhaps this is what US fake pundit and comedian Stephen Colbert famously referred to as “truthiness”). Or, as Baudrillard puts it, “free from its former enemies, humanity now has to **create enemies from within**, which in fact produces a wide variety of inhuman metastases” (Baudrillard, 2003). Thus, this implosive violence is destined to be a global violence since it "is the product of a system that tracks down any form of negativity and singularity, including of course death as the ultimate form of singularity. […] It is a violence that, in a sense, puts an end to violence itself and strives to establish a world where anything related to the natural must disappear  […] Better than a global violence, we should call it a global virulence. This form of violence is indeed viral. It moves by contagion, produces by chain reaction, and little by little it destroys our immune systems and our capacities to resist" (2003; our

#### The endless search for objectivity culminates in a violent cycle of self-depravity – instead you should vote negative to refuse their binarisitic interpolation of information

Pawlett’14 Dr. William Pawlett (Sociology and Cultural Studies, University of Wolverhampton, UK) //raunak dua

We find ourselves, then, between good and evil, in an irresolvable antagonism in which – at the risk of being Manichaen, and contradicting the whole of our humanism – there is no possible reconciliation (Baudrillard 2003: 29). That Baudrillard professes a certain Manichaenism cannot be doubted, but how influential is Manichaeism to the overall shape of his thought? Isn’t Manichaeism simply one reference point for Baudrillard and less important than other better known influences such as pataphysics, Marxism, structuralism and situationism for example? In a sense the answer must be yes, however a surprising number of Baudrillard’s themes and arguments can be seen as closely related to Manichaen principles, as Smith (2004) has argued. These include: Baudrillard’s extensive studies of Evil in his later work, his long-standing emphasis on illusion, his frequent references to the importance of the secret, and his writing on radical otherness. Baudrillard writes of the evil demon of images, and the evil demon of language, suggesting than representation is illusory, diabolic and also dual: both banal and fatal. Illusion is closely related to Evil in Baudrillard’s lexicon: Evil is part of the vital illusion that cannot be eliminated or subordinated to Good. Or, perhaps more accurately, Evil becomes evil insofar as it concerns that which good has tried and failed to eliminate. It is worth clarifying further: Good and Evil as symbolic, mythic or poetic forms do not seek to eliminate each other, only in being abstracted and opposed do they become the moral categories of good and evil. As moral categories good seeks to obliterate evil, yet evil will always seem to have the upper-hand because it gains the force and élan of that which ought not to exist but does, and which returns to shock and scandalise the order of the good. As modernity dismantles symbolic exchanges, denies duality and attempts, ever more aggressively, to eliminate evil, Evil becomes “a hide-out for the symbolic order” (Baudrillard 1990b: 182) and anything that is symbolically exchanged is perceived as a threat to the system (Baudrillard 1993a; 188 n. 7). Manichaeism is not referred to, explicitly, in Baudrillard’s early studies on the object, sign and consumer systems. However, the early essay ‘Pataphysics’ (orig. 1952) evokes the fundamental power of illusion as something far more radical and challenging to order, power, and control than any ‘reality’ – such as nature, sex or violence: “The façade is there and nothing behind it” Baudrillard asserts (2005b: 214). The world is illusion, yet this illusion is dual: there is the symbolic play of appearance and disappearance, vital illusion on the one hand, and on the other the world of “forced materialisation”, hyperreality and simulation – “the lowest form of illusion” (Baudrillard 1998:3). The world of banal illusion is produced through: “concretizing, verifying, objectizing, demonstrating: ‘objectivity’ is this capture of the real that forces the world to face us, expurgating it of any secret complicity” (2005a: 39). The real expurgated of complicity is no longer real, but hyperreal. Complicity is very important here and seems not to be a theme derived directly from Manichaeism. Rather, Baudrillard’s emphasis on complicity seems to be an extension of the principle of symbolic exchange into fatal theory: complicity is a form of duality and reversibility. In fatal theory, reversibility becomes an internal duality, an internal ‘nothing’ present within yet challenging or defying all of the ‘somethings’ of the world of value. The themes of duality and reversibility take on an ever wider scope in Baudrillard’s writing: “Since consciousness is an integral part of the World and the World is an integral part of consciousness, I think it and it thinks me” (Baudrillard 2005a: 39). It is worth asking what Baudrillard means by ‘the world’. Human beings live in a state of complicity with the world, not one of mastery. If reality has a history, a temporality and can be understood in terms of causes and effects, ‘the world’ cannot. Having no history or genealogy, the world “was born at a stroke” (1995: 57). This primal, poetic, radical or even “objective” illusion is benevolent, in a sense, because “[i]llusion, being pre-eminently the art of appearing, of emerging from nothing, protects us from being. And being also pre-eminently the art of disappearing, it protects us from death” (ibid.). Here Baudrillard’s anti-materialism again becomes evident, a theme that emerged clearly with Symbolic Exchange and Death in 1976. Subject and object, good and evil, something and nothing, life and death are inseparable and reversible or dual. The object discovers the subject, just as the subject discovers the object; for example, viruses learn about the human immunological system at the same time as the human immunological system learns about viruses. Baudrillard’s assertion that the world is fundamentally illusory is of course an unverifiable one, as he readily admits (2005a: 47) but the existence of reality, causality and objectivity are all ultimately unverifiable too. However, Baudrillard is not content to note an impasse or stalemate. Rather, he suggests that it is because the world as illusion is unverifiable and also “unbearable” that the great drive towards control through simulation and virtuality – integral reality – occurs. Baudrillard’s anti-materialism should not be dismissed as idealism. Idealism posits the ultimate compatibility of the categories of the mind with the material world; Baudrillard challenges any such notion of compatibility, reconcilability or resolution. Instead, he approaches the world as enmeshed within a dual, complicitous and reversible relationship with the subject, the subject constantly becoming-object and the object becoming-subject, indeed, “above all the subject has the passion to be object, to become object” (Baudrillard 1988: 93, emphasis in original). Baudrillard also links his principle of Evil to the theme of radical otherness or singularity: The sovereign hypothesis, the hypothesis of evil, is that man is not good by nature, not because he might be said to be bad, but because he is perfect as he is … [e]very stage of life, every moment of life, every animal or plant species, is perfect in itself. Every character, in its singular imperfection, in its matchless finitude, in incomparable” (Baudrillard 2005a: 140). So, an apparently provocative and irresponsible remark “evil is perfect when left to itself” (ibid.) is, on closer analysis, almost a humanistic celebration of imperfection. Or rather, Baudrillard’s position on radical otherness suggests an ethics of singularity not dissimilar to that espoused by Levinas and Derrida (see Critchley 1992). The transcendent and divine radical otherness of the Gnostics and Manichaens becomes, in Baudrillard’s hands, radically immanent with the human becoming divine: divine in the sense of having an intelligence of Evil. The notion of complicity is crucial here, rather than seeking to exile evil through the imputation of objective causes (of misfortune) an “intelligence of evil begins with the hypothesis that our ills come to us from an evil genius that is our own. Let us be worthy of our perversity … let us measure up to our tragic involvement in what happens to us” (Baudrillard 2005a: 152-3). The notion of the intelligence of Evil signals a partial rejection of Manichaeism: Above all, we must not confuse the idea of evil with some kind of objective existence of evil. That has no more meaning than an objective existence of the Real; it is merely the moral and metaphysical illusion of Manichaeism that it is possible to will evil, to do evil, or, alternatively, to denounce and combat it (Baudrillard 2005a: 159). Rather, Evil appears in the diverting and reversal of things, objects, people, events which good believes that it has mastered. Moral evil as malign force or essence is always a “phantasmic projection” where the other is construed as the source or cause of evil. In Baudrillard’s intelligence of evil, “it is evil that is intelligent…in the sense that it is implied automatically in every one of our acts” (2005a: 160). All acts, thought, talk are dual in this sense. Evil has no independent reality; it is a moment in metamorphosis or becoming. In speaking of the world as a fundamental illusion, Baudrillard’s position can be seen as Manichaen or Gnostic, but it can also be seen as Pataphysical. Commenting on contemporary technology and culture, Baudrillard asserts “We are, in fact, in pure pataphysics … the only known attempt to move to integral metaphysics, the metaphysics in which the phenomenal world is treated definitively as an illusion” (Baudrillard 2005a: 45). It is not Manichaeism as a philosophical position, still less as a religious system, that interests Baudrillard; it is Manichaeism as a heresy, as a shadow or nothing that mainstream religion and society cannot quite eliminate. Radical duality cannot be eliminated, not because its simplicity is appealing, but because it seeks an alternative position, a position beyond conceptual polarities, sensing that conceptual polarities – binary, dialectical, simulatory, integral – are narrow and confining, and are subservient to the notion of ‘reality’. It is the powerful sense that Evil is more than the opposite of Good that cannot be eliminated and that re-appears in many heresies through the ages, from Mani to the Cathars and Bogomils (see Stoyanov 2000), and to Bataille and Baudrillard. V. Conclusion To speak evil is to say that in every process of domination and conflict is forged a secret complicity, and in every process of consensus and balance, a secret antagonism (Baudrillard 2005a: 163). There is no bar or effective dividing line between Good and Evil. They cannot be defined in isolation, they cannot be separated and the project of eliminating evil to universalise good can bring only disastrous consequences. When good seeks to totalise itself by eliminating evil, not only does it fall short of good, but evil returns in catastrophic form. Good and Evil as symbolic forms are not two halves of a totality, they are not merely different; they are intimately related and they alternate or metamorphose without ever achieving unification or synthesis – like day and night. Where modernity sought the separation of good and evil, to expel evil and accumulate good, in contemporary Western societies the moral opposition of good and evil is, increasingly, transformed into the binary happiness/misfortune. The concept of misfortune eliminates the notion of evil, yet duality reappears fracturing happiness, making it unbearable, diverting happiness and misfortune into despair – the despair of having everything and nothing. Baudrillard challenges those who wish to separate evil from good in order to celebrate evil, just as he challenges those who wish to separate evil from good to celebrate good. However, Baudrillard says very little about Good as symbolic form. Can Good be a symbolic form? Baudrillard does suggest that the loss of Good is as “baneful” and dangerous as the loss of Evil (Baudrillard 2005a: 139). However, it seems that, for Baudrillard, Good as symbolic form always tends towards control, order and totalisation, hence it must always be challenged by Evil to prevent it from hardening into tyranny. At the most general level, Baudrillard works with an assumption, inspired by Manichaeism, that the world as human beings encounter it, is given to disorder and to such an extent that it cannot be managed, rationalised or controlled in any ultimate sense. All attempts to impose control will come to grief; they may achieve temporary successes but will always, ultimately, fail. At this meta-theoretical level Baudrillard seeks to challenge the prejudice towards seeing the world, the object, reality, society as unified, as unitary and as having a single origin, cause, direction and end (Baudrillard 2003: 81). It is the challenge of heresy – the heresy of refusing to make evil subordinate to good – that interests Baudrillard; challenge and defiance are symbolic relations: dual, fatal and reversible.

#### Interpretation – the 1AC is an object of research. The role of the negative should be to disprove the contents of that object

## Case

### Gen

#### -----Terrible for democracy

#### Objectivity is a poor ideal and threatens democracy

**Wijberg 17** [Rob Wijnberg (1982) is the founding editor of The Correspondent. At age 27, he became Europe's youngest editor-in-chief at Dutch print daily nrc.next. He studied philosophy at the University of Amsterdam and has written six books on news, media and philosophy. He was voted Journalist of the Year in The Netherlands in 2013, 07 – 10 – 2017, “Why objective Journalism is a misleading and dangerous illusion” de Correspondent, [https://thecorrespondent.com/6138/why-objective-journalism-is-a-misleading-and-dangerous-illusion/157316940-eb6c348e]/SP](https://thecorrespondent.com/6138/why-objective-journalism-is-a-misleading-and-dangerous-illusion/157316940-eb6c348e%5d/SP)

“It’s very easy for an editorial team to appear to be taking a position. And that’s exactly what I don’t want. We don’t ever want to do that. We don’t want to take a position on the news. We want the viewers to take a position on the news.” Those are the words of Marcel Gelauff, [Gelauff said this on a primetime TV talk show in the Netherlands. You can watch a clip here (in Dutch only).](http://dewerelddraaitdoor.vara.nl/media/369238)head of the Dutch public broadcasting company NOS’s news department. **Objectivity, the tenet being expressed here, may be the most poorly understood, tenacious, dangerous illusion journalism has ever believed in**. Misunderstood, because **it’s confused with independence and impartiality**. Tenacious, because it **seems easy and it’s cheap**. Dangerous, because it’s the biggest lie you can tell the public. And an illusion, because it doesn’t exist. The origins of the ideal Journalistic objectivity, like many Western articles of faith, began as a late 19th-century ideal with very different aims than we attach to it today. Originally, journalism was nothing more than a megaphone for the powerful: the king dictated, and the reporters wrote it down. Newspapers were filled with pronouncements from on high: declarations of war, changes in navigation routes, calls to prayer, that kind of thing. The **Enlightenment and the rise of modern science eventually ushered in the idea of journalism as a critical counterpower: it should act as a watchdog, not a messenger**. This conviction was rooted in a **new ideal known as objectivity, which was linked to independence. We, the press, would decide what to report on. And we’d only do so once we’d made sure it was true**. Now, more than a century later, we’ve gained a fully professionalized PR and information industry and lost every **modern illusion about Truth with a capital T, and objectivity has come to mean precisely the opposite**. What gets reported, we believe, shouldn’t be determined by the press but by “what’s happening in the world.” **The media’s job is merely to “report the news**.” In Gelauff’s words, we shouldn’t take a position. “We’ll figure it out” has become “You figure it out.” Readers familiar with my news philosophy will already know what I think of objectivity. (De Correspondent’s founding principles [Read our founding principles, in which we pledge to be explicitly subjective.](https://thecorrespondent.com/)explicitly renounce it). But at a time when Facebook and Google have devised fake-news [I wrote an essay on the fake-news earnings model: “Truth is whatever people click on” (in Dutch only).](https://decorrespondent.nl/5951/waar-is-wat-klikt/1317122124615-0703f9eb)earnings models, the White House is inhabited by a pathological bullshitter, [Here’s what I mean by “bullshitter” (in Dutch only).](https://decorrespondent.nl/4693/wat-bullshitter-trump-ons-leert-over-een-samenleving-zonder-waarheid/1038691670445-55f138ac)and his counterparts are popping up in political races all across Europe, it’s worth saying again: **the ideal of journalistic objectivity is an outright threat to democracy**. Here’s why. **1. There’s no such thing as objectivity** Marcel Gelauff says he doesn’t want his editorial team to take a position on the news. Let me be the first to say that, alas, it’s a vain hope. Describing the world with no idea of what’s good or bad, relevant or trivial, true or false is literally impossible. **Behind every report, every feature, every news item, lies a worldview rooted in assumptions ontological** (what’s real?), epistemological (what’s true?), methodological (how do we find out?), and moral (why does it matter?). Or, to put it in Gelauffian terms, all news comes from a position. **Why doesn’t the evening newscast ever lead with crop circles made by UFOs? Because the editorial department takes the position that UFOs don’t exist.** Why doesn’t the news ever lead with a delayed train between St. Petersburg and Novosibirsk? Because the editors take the position that a late Russian train doesn’t matter here. Why does the news never open with the biggest, most powerful Dutch company [Correspondents Maurits Martijn and Tomas Vanheste have written about Vitol: “Nobody’s ever asked a question in Parliament about this Dutch oil giant” (in Dutch only).](https://decorrespondent.nl/438/over-deze-nederlandse-oliereus-is-nog-nooit-een-kamervraag-gesteld/96941604870-00bd17df)in the world, the oil and gas trader Vitol? Because the editors take the position that Vitol isn’t doing anything wrong. The reverse is true too: why does the news open with a Trump tweet, a bombing in Syria, a domestic policy proposal, chaos at a national transportation hub? Because the editors take the position that statements by a US president, wars in the Middle East, our own leaders’ plans, and travel snafus in our own country matter. And why does the news always call bombings by ISIS “terrorist attacks” and those by Western governments “bombardments”? Because the editors take the position that that’s what they are. Why does the **news always frame the growth of the economy as something positive and not as a disaster for the climate, the environment, or the corals in the ocean? Because the editors take the position that economic growth is good. So when an editor claims not to take a position on the news, he or she is making the most basic misrepresentation possible**. And it’s also the worst [Even worse than making your anchors deliver the news standing up, which Gelauff called “an important moment in the history of NOS news” (in Dutch only).](https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2016/01/02/ik-wil-de-wereld-bij-jou-thuis-brengen-zoals-ie-is-1575235-a890960)instruction you can give your editorial team. **2. Objectivity is a poor ideal** So there’s no such thing as objectivity. But even if there were, journalists would need to steer clear of it. That’s because the word “objectivity” is usually **understood in terms of its moral dimension**. Journalists are expected to **suspend moral judgment. They’re not supposed to say what they think**. Yet this has never been an amoral business. On the contrary, **journalism is moral through and through. It’s about what we as a society consider important, or should. All journalism, then, begins and ends with ideas about good and evil. The planet getting hotter isn’t news because it’s fact.** The planet getting hotter is news because that’s a bad thing. Journalism is moral through and through. It begins and ends with ideas of good and evil If you order journalists to check their moral judgments at the door, one of two things will happen. Either they’ll have no clue what to report on and go home without a story, or they’ll figure it out in the only way possible: by letting others decide. In practice, that means becoming a mouthpiece for the establishment [I talk in depth about objectivity and being a mouthpiece for the establishment in this interview with Esther van Fennema (in Dutch only).](http://media.tpo.nl/2017/01/18/rob-wijnberg-nos-journaal-is-spreekbuis-gevestigde-belangen-en-elite/)– the people with the power to decide what’s important, trivial, good, or bad. (Or, like the Dutch premier, to define what’s “normal” and what isn’t.)[Premier Rutte wrote an open letter “to all Dutch people” effectively calling on immigrants to “act normal or leave" (in Dutch only).](https://vvd.nl/nieuws/lees-hier-de-brief-van-mark/) **Objective journalism, defined as not taking a position or having an opinion, has become precisely the opposite of what it was originally intended to be.** Today, it **equates to unquestioningly repeating the opinions of the powerful.** By leaving the position-taking to the public, we reduce our task as journalists to issuing press releases on behalf of elites. In short, we fail to fulfill our most basic duty. That brings us to the third and most urgent problem with objectivity. **3. Objectivity threatens democracy News is one of the most important sources of information in a democratic society. Today more than ever**, it determines what we know, understand, and think about the world. It **influences our voting behavior and how we see other people, cultures, and countries. To a large degree, it even shapes our image of ourselves**. Our view of the world is increasingly fueled by half-truths, whole fairytales, and bald-faced lies issuing from the uppermost ranks of global politics, amplified by the loudest yellers in domestic politics, and spread across millions of phones, laptops, and TVs in milliseconds**. Today it’s more crucial than ever that journalism stand for something**. **We must commit to the values that are essential to a democratic society: to a check on power, to the pursuit of truth, to providing context and perspective.** When the president of the United States fabricates the number of attendees at his inauguration and then lashes out at every media organization that presents the evidence to show he’s lying, it’s not enough to report “Trump accuses media despite ample counterevidence,” as the NOS news did. Or to broadcast some even-handed variant that leaves the public in the lurch: “So-and-so reports X number of people, Trump says there were Y. And now over to Philip with the weather.” Instead, you need to clearly announce that one of the world’s most powerful politicians is demonstrably lying yet again. [The New York Times did a better job of this, with its story "With False Claims, Trump Attacks Media"](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/21/us/politics/trump-white-house-briefing-inauguration-crowd-size.html)And you’d better figure out why. [The Washington Post provided an excellent explanation of why Trump ordered his press chief to peddle lies.](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/the-first-days-inside-trumps-white-house-fury-tumult-and-a-reboot/2017/01/23/7ceef1b0-e191-11e6-ba11-63c4b4fb5a63_story.html?tid=sm_tw&utm_term=.bad162486ed1)Meanwhile, you should be keeping track [**The award-winning website Politifact.com keeps an eye on all Trump’s campaign promises.**](http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/promises/trumpometer/)**of his actions and not just his words. Otherwise, “not taking a position” means being not only a mouthpiece for power but a conduit for lies. If demagogues loathe political correctness, journalistic correctness is their best friend. And democracy’s no match for that.**

#### ----- Re-create oppression

#### Objectivity is a tool to silence black voices and issues in media

Schneider 20 [Gabe Schneider, political journalist with a degree in Political Science and Urban Planning from University of California San Diego, 12-21-2020, "Journalism outlets need new social media policies," University of Missouri Reynolds Journalism Institute, https://rjionline.org/reporting/journalism-outlets-need-new-social-media-policies/]/Kankee

What should they look like? Pittsburgh Post-Gazette journalist Alexis Johnson was barred from protest coverage after joking about a Kenny Chesney concert on Twitter. She tweeted: “Horrifying scenes and aftermath from selfish LOOTERS who don’t care about this city!!!!! …. oh wait sorry. No, these are pictures from a Kenny Chesney concert tailgate. Whoops.” Johnson, a Black journalist, was punished for making a joke about the media framing of “riots” and “looting.” While one of her white colleagues called one alleged looter a “scumbag,” it was Johnson who was punished. “I was told it violated our social media policy. They kept calling it an educational conversation, but there was no warning, no ‘Hey can you take the tweet down?’ By Monday morning, they had decided I would no longer be able to cover it,” Johnson told CBS2. The harsh reactionary punishment applied to Johnson is ridiculous, but not unique. Other Black journalists have faced similar repercussions: Wesley Lowery was punished by the Washington Post for correctly framing the Tea Party as a racist reactionary movement. So was Kendra Pierre-Louis, who was punished by the New York Times for saying white supremacy is racist. The trend line is that reporters, often Black, are punished for their perspective, even if it’s rooted in reporting and facts. Punishment can mean being barred from covering a topic that is close to the reporter’s identity, like Johnson was, or an implied threat of being fired. The dynamic is so crystalized that, instead of individually challenging The New York Times for their op-ed calling on the president to use force against civilians, Black New York Times employees and their allies responded as a collective on Twitter, all tweeting: “This puts Black New York Times staff in danger.” But even in the wake of massive protests, even as management at many legacy newspapers committed to better social media policies, and even as journalism has shifted to a mostly online workforce, there’s been a lack of movement in newsrooms to craft a social media policy that allows journalists of color to just do their jobs. “Since the events of January 2020 and the summer, there’s been zero further conversation,” said B, a social media producer at a large legacy newspaper. “It’s just a standstill right now.” Journalists and social media managers I spoke with, like B, did not want their names published out of concern for how their managers might react to them being candid or because press requests required approval from newsroom leadership. But all of them, all younger reporters of color, had extensive thoughts on how newsrooms are failing to craft good social media policies and move the conversation beyond humanizing reporters of color. While social media has become a driving force for digital readership, and therefore ad revenue or donors, many legacy newsrooms have barely pushed the envelope in changing their social media policies. The New York Times adopted a new policy in 2017, which makes the blanket statement: “Our journalists should be especially mindful of appearing to take sides on issues that The Times is seeking to cover objectively.” The Washington Post also updated its policy in 2017, with many of the same themes. R, who recently interned for a different large legacy newspaper, said that they received clear instructions from management when they started: “They asked us not to tweet about Black Lives Matter, but didn’t address the complexity of that issue.” R said it is problematic to frame supporting a human rights issue, like Black Lives Matter, similarly to taking an open political stance. R doesn’t believe any reporter should be explicitly partisan (“don’t tweet about ‘blue’ or ‘red’”), but they do believe it makes you a better reporter if you’re able to be empathetic to readers who are affected by human rights issues, like police violence. “At the end of the day, it makes me a better reporter,” R, who is non-Black, said of saying “Black Lives Matter.” “I’m being empathetic to a movement that’s affecting my Black brothers and sisters. So therefore it would help me connect to readers who identify with that. And two: [It] just makes me more of a human, because I don’t think that people of another race should be shot and killed by police for no reason. I think that makes me a better reporter.” Z, an audience engagement editor at a newer digital publication, said the false equivalencies and double standards in current social media policy are exacerbated by the fact that racist readers are more willing to flag tweets for newsroom management. “It’s always been easier for white reporters to get away with saying things like that is because they’re white,” she said. “People automatically assume they don’t have any ties to a community and they don’t have any reason to say that thing other than it’s a fact.” Z said that the current conversation is way behind the times, in that newsrooms are still trying to figure out how to humanize their own Black and brown reporters. Instead, she’s looking to the future and thinking about the ways in which newsrooms should be expanding their audience. “I don’t see why more newsrooms aren’t sending out tweets in native languages,” she said. “I think that there is a huge population of people on the internet that are not being properly served; readers and persons of the community that don’t have access or can’t understand tweets that are coming from newsrooms because they’re not accessible.” Ultimately, B said that the divide in newsrooms is clear: on one side, there’s management, which is often whiter and older; on the other is the younger journalists, who are often more diverse. She said that management believes that you can separate your humanity from your work and younger journalists do not (although some editors, like The New York Times Dean Baquet, do not believe “there is a big gap”). “It’s like two schools of thought. And they’re both clashing in really ugly, really ugly ways. And one of the schools of thought is almost in every leadership position in the newsroom.” Newsrooms, especially older institutions, need to move on from the conversation of whether or not these social media policies are racist: if journalists of color are saying that the current structure of social media policies are applied unevenly and are racist, then they are racist. If journalists and social media managers from around the newsroom, especially those who are most impacted by these policies are given space to craft these policies, then perhaps we’ll soon see the necessary changes. If B were in charge of social media, she said her changes across the board are easy to articulate: No more penalizing reporters for the experiences they bring to the table. Instead: “Be honest, be truthful, be transparent when you get things wrong and just don’t be a bad person online. It’s very simple. It’s very short.”

#### Objectivity justifies police violence by finding excuses for law enforcement in order to appear balanced

Meyer 20 [Will Meyer, writer at Columbia Journalism Review and the New Republic, 2-6-2020, "The Abuses of Objectivity," New Republic, https://newrepublic.com/article/156486/abuses-objectivity]/Kankee

In January 2017, Kellyanne Conway, at that time President Trump’s press secretary, coined the term “alternative facts” on Meet the Press. The term was part of a broader move by President Trump and others on the right to discredit journalists, taunting them as “enemies of people” and purveyors of “fake news.” In this environment, the mainstream press doubled down on its commitments to truth-telling and objectivity. The Washington Post introduced the new slogan, “Democracy Dies in the Darkness.” The New York Times aired a pompous ad during the Oscars titled “The Truth is Hard.” The nonprofit ProPublica used the motto “Defend the Facts” in its fundraising. Newsrooms were defending the twentieth-century ideal of impartial journalism, leaning hard on its norms and brand. What a commitment to objectivity meant, however, was often the appearance of fairness. Neutrality meant showing two sides to every story, even in cases where one side’s arguments were much weaker than the other’s. Over the summer, The New York Times looked into conditions at a Staten Island Amazon warehouse and told the story in a way that was more than generous to management. More recently, the paper was criticized by this magazine for taking its both-sides-style reporting on impeachment so far as to take right-wing conspiracy theories at face value. “Objectivity” also meant veering away from describing figures on the right in unflattering terms—avoiding the words “lies” or “racism”—because those descriptions could be seen as evidence of left-wing bias. Above all, it meant that reporters themselves could not be seen to have any political opinions, because then they would be vulnerable to accusations of impropriety, regardless of the accuracy of what they actually wrote. Just days after the new president was sworn in, NPR’s senior vice president of News, Michael Oreskes, defended his organization’s choice not to call the president elect’s fabrications “lies.” On that same day, January 25, 2017, the popular public radio show Marketplace fired an award-winning transgender journalist, Lewis Raven Wallace, after he wrote a blog post questioning journalistic objectivity. In a follow-up post describing the firing, Wallace notes that the ethics code he was accused of having violated didn’t contain the words “objectivity” or “neutrality.” The show hadn’t received blowback for this transgression (or any of Wallace’s work), nor had he advocated for any particular political position. He merely offered skepticism about the frame, suggesting that as a trans journalist, he could not be impartial about attacks on his humanity. During his firing, Marketplace Vice President Deborah Clark told Wallace about leaving the anti-apartheid struggle—choosing journalism over activism—as a student: The subtext was that Wallace had to get in line. He didn’t, and paid the price with his job. Wallace follows in a long line of journalists who questioned the sacrosanct wisdom of objectivity. His new book, The View From Somewhere: Undoing the Myth of Journalistic Objectivity, aims to place his own story in the context of a long history of deviants and agitators who resisted the basic premise that media should be neutral. The ideal of neutrality, he shows, has been used both by the center to marginalize radical voices and by the right as a bludgeon to quiet and discredit its critics. Meanwhile, right-wing media organizations do not hold themselves to the same standard—Fox News’s infamous slogan “Fair and Balanced” came at the expense of liberals who took it at face value. One Weekly Standard writer has described the right’s strategy as: “Criticize other people for not being objective. Be as subjective as you want. It’s a great little racket.” As long as the left tries to be fair to the right, but the right does not try to be fair to the left, objectivity will always push discourse to the right. The ideal of objectivity is relatively recent. Before the 1830s, newspapers and pamphlets were mostly produced either by political parties (appealing to men who could vote) or business interests, which created trade journals; and, before advertising took hold, early American newspapers were in some cases subsidized by the government. It was, by most accounts, the advent of the penny press—newspapers with mass appeal—that pioneered the advertising business model and led more directly to the papers we know today. Tracing these changes, journalism scholar David Mindich has identified a shift in the mid-nineteenth century from partisan political writing to the more detached, observational writing that foreshadows modern journalistic conventions. This included formats that separated fact-based writing from editorial essays, and the birth of the professional reporter, who went out to gather the news not as a political participant but as a neutral observer. Between the late 1880s and World War I, the newspaper business was “unsure of its place” and went through many changes to establish the norms newspapers employ now. In was in these years that the first professional journalism schools opened and ethical standards for the profession started to be established. Mindich argues that objectivity, at least as an ideal, began to form in the 1890s, directly alongside the professionalization of the trade, shifting from a “low-class occupation” to a specialized one. By 1924, a book called The Ethics of Journalism by Nelson Antrim Crawford spelled out these standards: a wall between advertising and editorial, a moratorium on bribes, fact-checking and thorough sourcing, and a greater reliance on “experts.” The historical moment in which this occurred was in the wake of World War I, when the nation got a taste of mass propaganda created by the U.S. government to support the war effort. In his book Public Opinion, The New Republic’s founding co-editor Walter Lippman lamented the role of naked distortions in shaping public perceptions. Within two years of Lippman’s book’s publication in 1922, rigorous standards began to take form. Some were skeptical—“Show me a man who thinks he’s objective, and I’ll show you a man who’s deceiving himself,” Henry Luce, the founder of Time, said in 1923—but a consensus was hardening. Although Wallace says that objectivity “emerged for many of the right reasons,” he argues that it was just as quickly “weaponized,” as it was ideologically used to police journalism’s bounds. With the rise of objectivity and professional ethics, Wallace writes that the “gates went up,” leaving many outside. The first journalist to be fired for a breach of objectivity (not unlike Wallace) was Morris Watson, a reporter from the Associated Press in 1935. What made him “biased,” according to his bosses, was his effort to organize a union with the Newspaper Guild. He sued, and the newly formed National Labor Relations Board took his case and brought it to the Supreme Court, which ruled in his favor. The AP had not found any actual bias in his reporting, the court found, but was banking on “potential bias” to thwart his organizing. Watson was a victim of what Wallace dubs “journalism’s purity ritual,” which can be described as using objectivity as a pretext to fire someone for their politics. One particularly egregious example Wallace came across was a 1996 headline in The New York Times: “Gay Reporter Wants to Be Activist.” As the paper of record reported: To labor leaders … Sandy Nelson is an unlikely hero—a lesbian, socialist journalist. But to the top editors at The [Tacoma] News Tribune, where Ms. Nelson works, she is a walking conflict of interest whose off-duty activities threaten the credibility of journalism. During the 1980s, Nelson was involved in a local struggle to pass a human rights ordinance that would prohibit job discrimination against gay workers. Although political expression was allowed by her union, Nelson was relegated to the copy desk by her editor, a post from which she filed a lawsuit. Unlike in Watson’s case, the Washington State Supreme Court ruled against her, deciding that journalists were exempt from a state law protecting employees from retaliation for political expression. When Wallace interviewed Nelson for the book, she told him, “They didn’t go after people who were involved with their churches, or people who were in the Boy Scouts. They can be political, can’t they?” She believed her bosses intended to make an example out of her, adding, “During the McCarthy era they went after people in the same way.” The tendency to exclude gay journalists, on the grounds of “objectivity,” from conversations about issues that affected the gay community led to serious problems in media coverage. In 1982, as the AIDS death toll continued to rise to around 400, The New York Times ran only five stories; none were on the front page. For comparison, the paper ran four front page and 50 total articles on the Tylenol scare that year, which killed seven people. Yet executives there refused to allow those close to the crisis to influence the paper’s reporting. Instead, as one critic charged in 1981, “Lesbians and gay men at the Times were allowed little—if any—positive influence over the paper’s coverage of gay people.” As Wallace shows, the Times was criticized repeatedly for its homophobic stories, often qualifying crimes with the word “homosexual” (as in “homosexual murder”), prompting journalists and activists to pressure the paper to stop using the term. The Times never reported on violence against queer people but would go out of its way to say if the perpetrator of a crime was gay. The ideal of objectivity has led to an increase in “both-sidesism”—often elaborate attempts to avoid showing favor to any person in a story. One of the most telling examples of this was The New York Times’s coverage of the killing of Michael Brown by a white police officer in Ferguson, Missouri, in 2014. In its coverage, the Times went out of its way to portray “balance.” In a story about Brown’s memorial, the paper remarked that he was “no angel” and went out on a limb to mention that he allegedly stole an iPod when he was in ninth grade, a fact that had nothing to do with his death. The memorial piece concerned itself with trafficking heavy-handed moral obfuscations. At one point, it quoted a violent lyric (“My favorite part is when the bodies hit the ground”) in a rap song Brown had “collaborated on,” as if that could somehow be morally comparable to the police violence that saw his body fall in the same manner. Instead of objectivity or impartiality, The View From Somewhere advocates for a different distinction: between earnestly searching for the truth and peddling distortions and falsehoods. For Wallace, it’s OK for journalists to admit where they are coming from, while still “hanging on to some basic tenets of traditional journalism ethics: verification and fact-checking, editorial independence from political parties and corporations, clarity and transparency about financial and political conflicts of interests, and deep, thorough sourcing.” In Wallace’s paradigm, “curiosity” is the “antidote to misinformation and disinformation.” Wallace calls for more collaborative journalism, like Chicago’s City Bureau or Indigenous Media Rising, where members of communities work with journalists to change what kinds of stories are covered and how. Still, in-depth, curious journalism is difficult and expensive to produce, and many newsrooms are strapped for resources, if they even exist at all. Today, some 1,400 communities have lost papers in the past 15 years (it is within these vacuums that Trump excelled), more papers are owned by indifferent hedge funds, and even civic-minded philanthropy seems to overlook local news. The economic precariousness of the news business remains outside of Wallace’s purview. Democracy has been dying in the darkness for quite some time. What The View From Somewhere makes dazzlingly clear is that saving journalism will mean saving it from a false notion of objectivity.

### Climate

#### We need climate action NOW

**UN 19** [Meetings Coverage and Press Releases. “Only 11 Years Left to Prevent Irreversible Damage from Climate Change, Speakers Warn during General Assembly High-Level Meeting.” UNITED NATIONS [GENERAL ASSEMBLY](https://www.un.org/press/en/general-assembly), SEVENTY-THIRD SESSION, HIGH-LEVEL MEETING ON CLIMATE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (AM & PM). 28 March 2019. URL: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/ga12131.doc.htm>] JV

Ambition, Urgency Needed to Address Global Emergency, Secretary-General Says Just over a decade is all that remains to stop irreversible damage from climate change, world leaders heard today as the General Assembly opened a high‑level meeting on the relationship between the phenomenon and sustainable development. The meeting — held pursuant to General Assembly resolution 72/219 (2017) — will run through 29 March with a focus on protection of the global climate for present and future generations, in the context of the economic, social and environmental dimensions of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. “We are the last generation that can prevent irreparable damage to our planet,” General Assembly President María Fernanda Espinosa Garcés (Ecuador) warned the gathering in her opening remarks, stressing that 11 years are all that remain to avert catastrophe.  Highlighting the meeting’s theme, Ms. Espinosa called for an intergenerational approach to climate change.  “Climate justice is intergenerational justice,” she said, calling on States to act collectively and responsibly.

#### Regulatory capture and media co-option by the fossil fuel industry manufactures public consent in favor of devastating climate change inaction – media presupposes “objective facts” and reports them as news

MacLean 19 [Jason MacLean, educator at University of Saskatchewan’s College of Law, 12-1-2019, “Manufacturing Consent to Climate Inaction: A Case Study of The Globe and Mail ’s Pipeline Coverage,” DALHOUSIE LAW JOURNAL, https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1450&context=dlj]/Kankee

The normative dimension of the public interest in respect of any given area of regulation remains equally complex and difficult to establish even in statutory regimes where regulators are subject to a legal “public interest” standard. As the Supreme Court of Canada recently observed, the “public interest is a broad concept and what it requires will depend on the particular context.”10 For these reasons, the mainstream news media are attracting increasing scrutiny both as a means and as strategic sites in and of themselves of regulatory reform in the public interest. The media play a significant role in manufacturing public opinion, including public opinion about what constitutes the “public interest,”11 the starting point of regulatory analysis, including regulatory reform. A growing number of studies and commentaries, for example, are paying attention to how—and how often—the news media are covering climate change science and policy for precisely this purpose12: climate policy reform requires a sufficiently informed public motivated to press elected representatives and public decisionmakers to act in the public interest. Growing attention is also being paid to the ways in which powerful industry interests influence the media to shape public discourse and attitudes about climate change and climate change policy options. There is an intersection between the public interest in meaningful and effective climate change action and the mainstream news media as a mechanism of regulatory capture employed by entrenched special interests. Two US climate change commentators have described this intersection in the following terms: To save civilization, most of us would need to supplement our standard daily practices—eating, caring for family and community, faith—with a steady push on the big forces that are restraining progress, the most prominent being the fossil fuel industry’s co-option of government, education, science, and media. 13 To understand what such a “steady push” should consist of, it is necessary not only to identify media co-optation and distortion generally but also to shine a light on specific instances of such distortion with a view to exposing how they contribute to reshaping—and redirecting—the public interest. There has, for example, recently been a proliferation of educational initiatives designed to improve individuals’ evaluation of the quality of information presented by the news media and other information platforms.14 While such longer-term initiatives are laudable, it is also important to better understand how the media influence the construction and perception of the public interest in respect of regulatory issues that are pressing and urgent in the short-term, especially climate change mitigation, given the nature and degree of the threat posed by climate change. Moreover, because even well-educated individuals are susceptible to media bias and tend to default to pre-committed political ideologies, improved media literacy in itself is not a panacea.15 Research on the nature of how the media distort the public interest and that informs how best to respond to and counter such distortions is urgently required. With these broad and challenging considerations in mind, I critically examine how Canada’s leading newspaper, The Globe and Mail, has constructed the “public interest” in respect of the controversial Trans Mountain oil pipeline expansion project. My central argument is that The Globe and Mail’s coverage of the Trans Mountain pipeline serves to legitimize and sustain climate change policy inaction in Canada, to the short-term benefit of Canada’s oil and gas sector, and at the expense of the public and the environment. The article unfolds as follows: In the first section I briefly discuss the political economy of the mainstream news media in democratic societies, and describe the media “propaganda model” as a useful analytical lens to read The Globe and Mail’s coverage of the Trans Mountain project, specifically its editorial characterization of the “national interest” in approving and completing the project as soon as possible. I proceed in the second section by briefly introducing The Globe and Mail as Canada’s newspaper of record along with the history thus far of the Trans Mountain project, and then provide a critical account of The Globe and Mail’s editorial coverage of the project vis-à-vis Canada’s interests and obligations in respect of mitigating climate change. In the third section of the article I discuss the difficulties inherent in seeking to reform the news media as a means of countering this form of regulatory capture. I conclude by discussing the limitations of the analysis and suggesting avenues of future research.

I. Democracy dies in darkness: The political economy of the fourth estate “Democracy dies in darkness” is the motto of the Washington Post newspaper.16 The motto signals the foundational public-interest role that a free and independent press plays in democratic societies by shining a light on the special interests and workings of power. As Edmund Burke reportedly remarked, “there were Three Estates in Parliament; but, in the Reporters’ Gallery yonder, there sat a Fourth Estate more important far than them all.”17 And yet, the press and mass communications media more generally have always been bound up in the exercise of political-economic power, so much so that neither can be understood in isolation from the other.18 There is an apparent and abiding tension between the news media as watchdog and the news media as lapdog.19 Arguably the most powerful explanatory model of the media’s role in shaping democratic discussion and debate about public policy is the “propaganda model” developed by Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky.20 Propaganda is a provocative term, but in its more nuanced formulation it has considerable explanatory power. Herman and Chomsky argue that the mainstream news media in democratic societies do not play an overtly oppressive function as they do in totalitarian states. The news media in democratic societies “permit—indeed, encourage—spirited debate, criticism, and dissent as long as these remain faithfully within the system of presuppositions and principles that constitute an elite consensus, a system so powerful as to be internalized largely without awareness.”21 In contrast to the popular perception that propaganda is exclusively state-based and operates principally through the use of intimidation and fear-mongering, the news media in democratic societies tend not to explicitly proclaim a particular party line (i.e. the narrow spectrum of debate acceptable to the political-economic elite), but rather they presuppose it, “thus helping to establish it even more deeply as the very precondition of discussion, while also providing the appearance of lively debate.”22 In the United States, for example, the Federal Communications Commission maintained an official policy from 1949 to 1987 requiring broadcast news providers to present controversial public interest topics in a “balanced” manner.23 Known as the “Fairness Doctrine,” this policy had the effect of ensuring that roughly equal time was accorded to each side of controversial subjects, independent of merit.24 The “Fairness Doctrine” has subsequently come to be understood by media and policy scholars as a vehicle of propaganda, one that has been effectively deployed by the tobacco industry and the fossil fuels industry.25 The following factors account for the news media’s distortional propaganda role in otherwise democratic societies: (a) concentrated corporate ownership of the news media; (b) advertising as the primary revenue source for media outlets; (c) political-economic elite perspectives as the predominant sources of news; (d) “flak,” or government efforts to suppress views critical of political-economic elites; and (e) “anticommunism” via the promotion of capitalism as an economic system, including the promotion of market-based governance and regulatory measures.26 Given these prevailing conditions of media ownership, concentration, and composition, perhaps it should not be surprising—let alone controversial—that the mainstream news media “serve to mobilize support for the special interests that dominate the state and private activity” through the strategic use of “choices, emphases, and omissions”.27 Subsequent empirical work on US news media bias strongly supports the media propaganda model.28 While Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model is based on the US news media, Canadian analyses have, mutatis mutandis, consistently arrived at substantially similar findings. Mainstream news journalism in Canada, according to one study focused on the relationship between the media and the prevailing normative order, “is concerned primarily with communications among elite, authorized knowers.”29 “We can begin to understand how news media circulate and reinforce dominant values and meanings,” another study explains, “by examining ownership of Canadian media, their dependence on advertising revenue and its implications, and some typical patterns of news presentation.”30 According to the Kent Commission, Canada’s Royal Commission on Newspapers, “it was leftwing viewpoints that tended to be under-represented as commercialism increased its hold.”31 And as Globe and Mail columnist Jeffrey Simpson observed in 1996, “more [news media] commentators than ever are ideologues of the right.”32 Given the political and economic importance of the news media generally, a growing number of researchers based in democratic societies are investigating mainstream media representations of climate change, the most pressing public interest issue of our time.33 Of course, climate change is not a discrete public policy issue that can be meaningfully discussed in isolation from other public policy concerns, including issues of economic competitiveness, growth, and inequality. It follows that media representations of a number of important business and economic issues —e.g. domestic and foreign investment, international trade, job growth, natural resources extraction, infrastructure, energy costs, commodity prices, and many more—may have significant climate change implications, even if those implications are not always framed as such. This may help explain the curious finding that scholarly research on Canadian media representations of climate change appears to be declining. 34 While analyses of media representations of climate change are interesting and important in and of themselves,35 such analyses do not always directly connect the form and substance of those representations to the critically important issue of climate policy action (or inaction, as is more often the case) in political and economic context.36 This is particularly problematic in light of recent integrated assessment modeling suggesting that rapid and widespread changes in both individual behaviour and socioeconomic systems are urgently required to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius above the pre-industrial norm.37 Utilizing Herman and Chomsky’s media propaganda model, I analyze a contextually-important set of media representations in relation to a particular climate policy outcome. In the next section, I provide an account of The Globe and Mail’s editorial coverage of the controversial Trans Mountain oil pipeline expansion project. The analytical aim of this account is to conceptualize and expose mainstream media representations of climate policy as a means of fossil fuels industries’ capture of climate change policymaking, with the regrettable result being the legitimization of climate policy inaction in Canada. Before proceeding, however, a brief discussion of the article’s methodology, including an important methodological caveat, is in order.

#### Journalistic objectivity undermines climate action by framing established science as undecided, evenly balanced debates

Stecula and Merkley 19 [Dominik A. Stecula, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Colorado State University with a PhD from the University of Columbia, and Eric Merkley, Professor of Political Science in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto, 2-26-2019, "Framing Climate Change: Economics, Ideology, and Uncertainty in American News Media Content From 1988 to 2014," Frontiers, https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fcomm.2019.00006/full]/Kankee

Uncertainty and Risk in Climate Change A final set of important frames in climate news coverage involves the communication of uncertainty and risk in climate change. Scientific uncertainty exists when there is a lack of scientific knowledge or disagreement over the knowledge that exists at a given point in time (Friedman et al., 1999). Researchers understand that all forms of scientific endeavors involve such uncertainty. In the context of climate change, discussion of uncertainty can focus on conflicting claims or a lack of knowledge about the existence or cause of climate change, its present-day effects, and the difficulty with assessing probabilities of specific outcomes and their consequences in the future (Patt and Schrag, 2003; Renn et al., 2011). Journalists covering scientific issues, such as climate change, are also routinely confronted with uncertainty, since controversy and debate are important criteria for the “newsworthiness” of a story (Friedman et al., 1999). As a result, how journalists present and describe scientific uncertainty affects how the public interpret such uncertainty. Communicating this uncertainty, however, is notoriously difficult (Fischhoff and Davis, 2014). Scientific discourse often involves an amount of details that can overwhelm even seasoned experts. It can also leave out crucial uncertainties that are commonly understood by the experts within the field, but need to be communicated to the broader public (Fischhoff and Davis, 2014). Finding the right balance is difficult, yet essential, considering the important role that uncertainty plays in human decision making (Curley et al., 1986; Sword-Daniels et al., 2018). Psychological research shows that uncertainty generally has a negative effect on prosocial behaviors, since it tends to enable people to adopt self-serving narratives about their actions and limit their capacity to cooperate in social dilemma situations (Hine and Gifford, 1991; Dannenberg et al., 2015; for a review of the literature, see Kappes et al., 2018). Experimental work highlights that uncertainty framing also matters for climate change related behaviors, such as decreasing one's energy consumption (Morton et al., 2011). A focus on uncertainty in news coverage can potentially reduce the public's support and engagement in climate action because of the unclear outcomes of such actions. Uncertainty can take several forms in climate change coverage. On a wide range of climate impacts and long-range forecasts of future warming there is uncertainty that is appropriately acknowledged by experts in the media's coverage of climate science. More problematic is if uncertainty is used in a way that casts doubt on the well-established tenants of the climate consensus of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)—that climate change is happening, is predominantly man-made through the production of greenhouse gas emissions, and will result in severe environmental and human harm. The persuasive power of uncertainty in this context is its implicit justification and reification of the status quo, especially as it pertains to fossil-fuel usage and carbon emissions (Feygina et al., 2010). One way in which this type uncertainty enters the media coverage of climate change has been through the journalistic engagement of so-called “false balance.” Reporters frequently treat topics as debates in which they present “both sides” in order to adhere to a journalistic norm of objectivity. This norm exists, in part, because both journalists and the general public prize it (Schudson, 1978; Giannoulis et al., 2010), but also because it acts as a mechanism to protect journalists from attacks on their credibility and to preserve access to sources on both sides of a given political debate (Hallin, 1989; Shoemaker and Reese, 2013). The desire for balance also serves the media's tendency toward drama and conflict in news coverage (Bennett, 2007). In many contexts it is important for journalists to be fair and evenly balanced in their presentation of different sides of a story, but it quickly becomes awkward when discussing the existence or causes of climate change where the credibility of each side does not have equal weight. And, the consequences of this coverage are troubling. Presenting a scientific consensus as a debate confuses the public on the state of the science and, in the case of climate change, possibly reduces support for climate action (Friedman et al., 1999; Corbett and Durfee, 2004; Koehler, 2016; McCright et al., 2016). Newsroom norms of objectivity will only contribute to a balanced presentation of a political debate if another side presents itself. Journalists ultimately rely on easily accessible sources when reporting on the news. And, because of the activism of the fossil fuel industry and conservative movement, there have been no shortage of sources ready and willing to use a platform provided by journalists to cast doubt on climate science—the so-called “Merchants of Doubt” (Oreskes and Conway, 2011). Scholars have noted that these groups have made a concerted effort to mobilize opposition to climate mitigation policy by undermining trust in foundations of climate science for both the public and policy makers (Jacques et al., 2008; Dunlap and McCright, 2011; Dunlap and Jacques, 2013; Farrell, 2016a,b). While these groups are likely not as active in the media as conventional wisdom might suggest (Merkley and Stecula, 2018), it is still possible that the press, and in particular conservative media, pick up on their message of uncertainty in their coverage of climate science even if they don't explicitly cite these actors. As the broader research on misinformation has shown, various myths surrounding climate science, including those pertaining to certainty of different outcomes, tend to be “sticky,” and hence very difficult to correct (Lewandowsky et al., 2012). Efforts to correct such information tend to be ineffective, and, in some circumstances might even result in what is called a backfire effect, when people get more entrenched in their original position (Nyhan and Reifler, 2010; Lewandowsky et al., 2012). Some promising work suggests that exposing people to correct information prior to misinformation might be an effective way to “inoculate” them from the perils of misinformation, at least in some contexts, but the broader point remains that, if the press disseminates uncertainty frames about climate change, such information might play a negative role in people's attitudes about climate change and climate change mitigation policies (Cook et al., 2017; Jolley and Douglas, 2017). The themes of uncertainty have been analyzed in the context of climate change news coverage. Some research has shown that coverage of climate change in the 1990s and early 2000s was characterized by scientific inaccuracy and uncertainty, which was driven by an adherence to balanced reporting and resistance to a growing body of scientific evidence. More recently, however, balance nearly disappeared from the press (Zehr, 2000; Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004, 2007; Boykoff, 2007). The scope of this work, however, has been fairly limited in terms of the time dimension as well as the amount of news coverage examined, as was highlighted in the previous section. However, scholars who have been examining this feature of news coverage of climate change in the comparative context, have highlighted that the U.S. coverage features substantially more climate skeptic voices pushing doubt about climate science, compared to countries like India or France (Painter and Ashe, 2012). Furthermore, contrary to the findings in the U.S.-centric literature, the authors found that skeptics voicing climate increased their media presence between 2007 and 2010 (Painter and Ashe, 2012). In a separate analysis, Painter (2013) also found that uncertainty was the second most common frame used in climate change coverage, appearing in 76 percent of American articles, however it was the salient frame in only 13 percent of the coverage. It is important to note that this analysis, however, was based only on a total of 55 articles. This disparity in findings highlights the need to systematically examine uncertainty in the context of American news coverage and examine degrees of uncertainty, not just whether the frame is present or not.

#### Warming causes extinction – It’s linear; every decrease in rising temperatures radically mitigates the risk of existential climate change.

**Xu and Ramanathan 17,** Yangyang Xu, Assistant Professor of Atmospheric Sciences at Texas A&M University; and Veerabhadran Ramanathan, Distinguished Professor of Atmospheric and Climate Sciences at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, University of California, San Diego, 9/26/17, “Well below 2 °C: Mitigation strategies for avoiding dangerous to catastrophic climate changes,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 114, No. 39, p. 10315-10323//recut CHS PK

We are proposing the following extension to the DAI risk categorization: warming greater than 1.5 °C as “dangerous”; warming greater than 3 °C as “catastrophic?”; and warming in excess of 5 °C as “unknown??,” with the understanding that **changes of this magnitude, not experienced in the last 20+ million years, pose existential threats to a majority of the population**. The question mark denotes the subjective nature of our deduction and the fact that **catastrophe can strike at even lower warming levels.** The justifications for the proposed extension to risk categorization are given below. From the IPCC burning embers diagram and from the language of the Paris Agreement, we infer that the DAI begins at warming greater than 1.5 °C. Our criteria for extending the risk category beyond DAI include the potential risks of climate change to the physical climate system, the ecosystem, human health, and species extinction. Let us first consider the category of catastrophic (3 to 5 °C warming). The first major concern is the issue of tipping points. **Several studies** (48, 49) **have concluded that 3 to 5 °C global warming is likely to be the threshold for tipping points such as the collapse of the western Antarctic ice sheet, shutdown of deep water circulation in the North Atlantic, dieback of Amazon rainforests as well as boreal forests, and collapse of the West African monsoon, among others.** While **natural scientists refer to these as abrupt and irreversible climate changes**, economists refer to them as **catastrophic events** (49). **Warming of such magnitudes** also **has catastrophic human health effects**. Many recent studies (50, 51) have focused on the direct influence of extreme events such as heat waves on public health by evaluating exposure to heat stress and hyperthermia. It has been estimated that the likelihood of extreme events (defined as 3-sigma events), including heat waves, has increased 10-fold in the recent decades (52). **Human beings are extremely sensitive to heat stress**. For example, the 2013 European heat wave led to about 70,000 premature mortalities (53). The major finding of a recent study (51) is that, currently, about 13.6% of land area with a population of 30.6% is exposed to deadly heat. The authors of that study defined deadly heat as exceeding a threshold of temperature as well as humidity. The thresholds were determined from numerous heat wave events and data for mortalities attributed to heat waves. According to this study, **a 2 °C warming would double the land area subject to deadly heat and expose 48% of the population. A 4 °C warming by 2100 would subject** 47% of the land area and almost **74% of the world population to deadly heat, which could pose existential risks to humans and mammals** alike unless massive adaptation measures are implemented, such as providing air conditioning to the entire population or a massive relocation of most of the population to safer climates. Climate risks can vary markedly depending on the socioeconomic status and culture of the population, and so we must take up the question of “dangerous to whom?” (54). Our discussion in this study is focused more on people and not on the ecosystem, and even with this limited scope, there are multitudes of categories of people. We will focus on the poorest 3 billion people living mostly in tropical rural areas, who are still relying on 18th-century technologies for meeting basic needs such as cooking and heating. Their contribution to CO2 pollution is roughly 5% compared with the 50% contribution by the wealthiest 1 billion (55). This bottom 3 billion population comprises mostly subsistent farmers, whose livelihood will be severely impacted, if not destroyed, with a one- to five-year megadrought, heat waves, or heavy floods; for those among the bottom 3 billion of the world’s population who are living in coastal areas, a 1- to 2-m rise in sea level (likely with a warming in excess of 3 °C) poses existential threat if they do not relocate or migrate. It has been estimated that **several hundred million people would be subject to famine with warming in excess of 4 °C** (54). However, **there has essentially been no discussion on warming beyond 5 °C**. Climate change-induced species extinction is one major concern with warming of such large magnitudes (>5 °C). The current rate of loss of species is ∼1,000-fold the historical rate, due largely to habitat destruction. At this rate, about 25% of species are in danger of extinction in the coming decades (56). Global warming of 6 °C or more (accompanied by increase in ocean acidity due to increased CO2) **can act as a major force multiplier and expose as much as 90% of species to the dangers of extinction** (57). **The bodily harms combined with climate change-forced species destruction, biodiversity loss, and threats to water and food security**, as summarized recently (58), **motivated us to categorize warming beyond 5 °C as** unknown??, implying the possibility of **existential** threats. Fig. 2 displays these three risk categorizations (vertical dashed lines).