## 1NC – Off

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#### Capitalism is a system engendering massive violence and inevitable extinction – the foundational task is to find a way out – the Role of the Ballot is to endorse the best organizational tactics.

Badiou ‘18

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Today, it has become commonplace to predict the end of the human race such as we know it. There are various reasons for such forecasts. According to a messianic kind of environmentalism, the excessive predations of a beastly humanity will soon bring about the end of life on Earth. Meanwhile, those who instead point to runaway technological advances prophesy, indiscriminately, the automation of all work by robots, grand developments in computing, automatically-generated art, plastic-coated killers, and the dangers of a super-human intelligence.

Suddenly, we see the emergence of threatening categories like transhumanism and the post-human — or, their mirror image, a return to our animal state — depending on whether one prophesies on the basis of technological innovation or laments all the attacks on Mother Nature.

For me, all such prophesies are just so much ideological noise, intended to obscure the real peril that humanity is today exposed to: that is to say, the impasse that globalised capitalism is leading us into. In fact, it is this form of society — and it alone — which permits the destructive exploitation of natural resources, precisely because it connects this exploitation to the boundless quest for private profit. The fact that so many species are endangered, that climate change cannot be controlled, that water is becoming like some rare treasure, is all a by-product of the merciless competition among billionaire predators. There is no other reason for the fact that scientific innovation is subject to the question of what technologies can sell, in an anarchic selection mechanism.

Environmentalist preaching does sometimes use persuasive descriptions of what is going on — despite the exaggerations typical of the prophet. But most of the time this becomes mere propaganda, useful for those states who want to show their friendly face. Just as it is for the multinationals who would have us believe — to the greater benefit of their balance sheets — in the noble, fraternal, natural purity of the commodities they are trafficking.

The fetishism of technology, and the unbroken series of "revolutions" in this domain — of which the "digital revolution" is the most in vogue — has constantly spread the beliefs both that this will take us to the paradise of a world without work — with robots to serve us, and us left to idle — and then, on the other hand, that digital "thought" will crush the human intellect. Today there is not one magazine that does not inform its astonished readers of the imminent "victory" of artificial over natural intelligence. But in most cases neither "nature" nor the "artificial" are properly or clearly defined.

Since the origins of philosophy, the question of the real scope of the word "nature" has been constantly posed. "Nature" could mean the romantic reverie of evening sunsets, the atomic materialism of Lucretius (De natura rerum), the inner being of things, Spinoza’s Totality (Deus sive Natura), the objective underside of all culture, rural and peasant surroundings as counterposed to the suspicious artificiality of the towns ("the earth does not lie," as Marshal Pétain put it), biology as distinct from physics, cosmology as compared to the tiny location that is our planet, the invariance of centuries as compared to the frenzy of innovation, natural sexuality as compared to perversion… I am afraid that today "nature" most of all refers to the calm of the villa and the garden, the charm wild animals have for tourists, and the beach or the mountains where we can spend a nice summer. Who, then, can imagine man responsible for nature, when thus far he has just been a thinking flea on a secondary planet in an average solar system at the edge of one banal galaxy?

Since its origins philosophy has also devoted a great deal of thought to Technology, or the Arts. The Greeks meditated on the dialectic of Techne and Physis — a dialectic within which they situated the human animal. They laid the ground for this animal to be seen as "a reed, the weakest of nature, but … a thinking reed." For Pascal, this meant that humanity was stronger than Nature and closer to God. A long time ago, they saw that the animal capable of mathematics would do great things to the order of materiality.

Are these "robots" which they keep banging on about anything more than calculation in the form of a machine? Digits in motion? We know that they can count quicker than us, but it was we who invented them, precisely in order to fulfil this task. It would be stupid to look at a crane raising a concrete pillar up to some great height, use this to argue that man is incapable of the same feat, and then conclude by saying that some muscular, superhuman giant has emerged… Lightning-quick counting is not the sign of an insuperable "intelligence" either. Technological transhumanism plays the same old tune — an inexhaustible theme of horror and sci-fi movies — of the creator overwhelmed by his own creation. It does so either thrilled about the advent of the superman — something we have been expecting ever since Nietzsche — or fearing him and taking refuge under the skirt of Gaia, Mother Nature.

Let’s put things in a bit more perspective.

For four or five millennia, humanity has been organised by the triad of private property — which concentrates enormous wealth in the hands of very narrow oligarchies; the family, in which fortunes are transmitted via inheritance; and the state, which protects both property and the family by armed force. This triad defined our species’ Neolithic age, and we are still at this point — we could even say, now more than ever. Capitalism is the contemporary form of the Neolithic. Its enslavement of technology in the interests of competition, profit and concentrating capital only raises to their fullest extension the monstrous inequalities, the social absurdities, the murderous wars, and the damaging ideologies that have always accompanied the deployment of new technology under the reign of class hierarchy throughout history.

We should be clear that technological inventions were the preliminary conditions of the arrival of the Neolithic age, and by no means its result. If we consider our species’ fate, we see that sedentary agriculture, the domestication of cattle and horses, pottery, bronze, metallic weapons, writing, nationalities, monumental architecture, and the monotheist religions are inventions at least as important as the airplane or the smartphone. Throughout history, whatever has been human has always, by definition, been artificial. If that had not existed, there would not have been Neolithic humanity — the humanity we know — but a permanent close proximity with animal life; something which did indeed exist, in the form of small nomadic groups, for around 200,000 years.

A fearful and obscurantist primitivism has its roots in the fallacious concept of "primitive communism." Today we can see this cult of the ancient societies in which babies, men, women and the elderly supposedly lived in fraternity, without anything artificial, and indeed lived in common with the mice, the frogs, and the bears. Ultimately, all this is nothing but ridiculous reactionary propaganda. For everything suggests that the societies in question were extremely violent. After all, even their most basic survival needs were constantly under threat.

To speak fearfully of the victory of the artificial over the nature, of robot over man, is today an untenable regression, something truly absurd. It is easy enough to answer such fears, such prophesies. For judged by this standard, even a simple axe, or a domesticated horse, not to mention a papyrus covered in symbols, is an exemplary case of the post- or trans-human. Even an abacus allows quicker calculation than the fingers of the human hand.

Today we need neither a return to primitivism, or fear of the "ravages" the advent of technology might bring. Nor is there any use in morbid fascination for the science-fiction of all-conquering robots. The urgent task we face is the methodical search for a way out of the Neolithic order. This latter has lasted for millennia, valuing only competition and hierarchy and tolerating the poverty of billions of human beings. It must be surpassed at all cost. Except, that is, the cost of the high-tech wars so well known to the Neolithic age, in the lineage of the wars of 1914-1918 and 1939-1945, with their tens of millions of dead. And this time it could be a lot more.

The problem is not technology, or nature. The problem is how to organise societies at a global scale. We need to posit that a non-Neolithic way of organising society is possible. This means no private ownership of that which ought to be held in common, namely the production of all the necessities of human life. It means no inherited power or concentration of wealth. No separate state to protect oligarchies. No hierarchical division of labour. No nations, and no closed and hostile identities. A collective organisation of everything that is in the collective interest.

All this has a name, indeed a fine one: communism. Capitalism is but the final phase of the restrictions that the Neolithic form of society has imposed on human life. It is the final stage of the Neolithic. Humanity, that fine animal, must make one last push to break out of a condition in which 5,000 years of inventions served a handful of people. For almost two centuries — since Marx, anyway — we have known that we have to begin the new age. An age of technologies incredible for all of us, of tasks distributed equally among all of us, of the sharing of everything, and education that affirms the genius of all. May this new communism everywhere and on every question stand up against the morbid survival of capitalism. This capitalism, this seeming "modernity," represents a Neolithic world that has in fact been going on for five millennia. And that means that it is old — far too old.

#### The aff’s depoliticization of competition and the law acts to maintain the stability of capital accumulation.

Christophers 16 [Brett Christophers, Professor in the Department of Social and Economic Geography at Uppsala University, “The Great Leveler: Capitalism and Competition in the Court of Law,” 2016, Harvard University Press, pp. 8-15, EA]

The aforementioned argument that capitalism has historically migrated from a state of competitiveness to a state of monopoly or oligopoly is deficient in four primary respects, both empirical and conceptual in nature.

First, there is something deeply misleading about the either/or nature of this historical narrative. One of the most important—although rarely acknowledged—of Marx’s insights was that capitalism always, everywhere, requires both. It needs competition, assuredly, not least to drive technological innovation and the reinvestment of profits, and thus growth. But it also needs monopoly—not merely to enhance visibility within and control over otherwise potentially chaotic business environments, but also to underwrite capitalist, market-based trade per se. Not for nothing does David Harvey argue, after Marx, that the “monopoly power of private property” is “both the beginning point and the end point of all capitalist activity.”20 For the legal institution of private property does confer monopoly: the exclusive power to dispose of said property as the owner alone sees fit.

Capital’s seemingly paradoxical need for both competition and monopoly is explored in Chapter 1, which extracts from Marx a conceptualization of capitalism that critically informs the remainder of the book: that of capitalism always, necessarily, teetering on a knife edge, balanced precariously between the contradictory forces of competition and monopoly, and perennially in danger of lapsing too far to one side or the other. “The problem,” Harvey shrewdly observes, “is to keep economic relations competitive enough while sustaining the individual and class monopoly privileges of private property that are the foundation of capitalism as a political-economic system.”21

And it is here that our economic laws crucially enter the picture. In metaphorical terms, the law acts as a powerful leveler: a pincer of sorts on the critical, combustible nexus of monopoly and competition, applicable from one side of the knife edge, the other, or both. Antitrust (competition) law, meaningfully enforced, serves to constrain monopoly power where it coheres too readily, thus boosting competition; IP law acts from the other side, allowing a degree of monopoly power where none “naturally” coheres, and limiting competition in the process. This conceptualization of economic law is sketched out in Chapter 3. Together, such laws help to ensure that over the long term, market-based capitalism is not too competitive (driving down prices and profits) but, in Harvey’s terms, remains competitive enough (avoiding stagnation and rent-seeking). In the process, the laws in question historically have contributed substantially to keeping capitalist accumulation regimes broadly in balance.

At the pivot of this overall mechanism sits the phenomenon of profit. Following the lead of scholars such as Robert Brenner, this book places front and center the relationship between profitability and the interrelated dynamics of competition and monopoly.22 As, indeed, did the classicals: Profit rates were, as Chapter 1 will show, fundamental to their theorization of competition. But it is vital to recognize, as writers such as Keith Cowling have done, that this relationship does not assume a simplistic less-competition-means-more-profit form, isolated as it were from other contributory factors.23 Indeed, the book shows that excesses neither of competitive intensity nor of monopoly power support long-term stability of profit-making and accumulation.

Instead, it leans more toward the type of argument proffered by Gérard Duménil and Dominique Lévy, which is that the dynamics of profitability strongly influence the state’s attempts to regularize regimes of accumulation, and that stabilizing capitalism is thus in no small part a question, ultimately, of stabilizing profitability.24 Or, as David Gordon and coauthors have written, the reproduction of capitalism is “fundamentally conditioned by the level and stability of capitalist profitability. As profits go, in short, so goes the economy.”25 The book’s particular slant on such conceptions is to consider corporate profits more in relative than absolute terms—and relative to, especially, labor and wages. While a comparable focus has recently been adopted by Thomas Piketty in his much discussed Capital in the Twenty-First Century, the inspiration underlying the approach taken here lies much further back in time, in the work in particular of Michal Kalecki.26 For as Kalecki showed both historically and conceptually, the relation of capital with labor, and profit with wages, is centrally implicated in the monopoly-competition relation and the balance that capitalism requires of it. Kalecki, it is fair to say, would have had some very interesting things to say about the Apple wage-suppression antitrust lawsuit.

A second and related problem with the linear historical narrative of from-competition-to-monopoly is its positing of monopoly and competition not only as mutually exclusive alternatives, but as separable ones. Once more, we can turn to Marx for an effective disabusal of this figuring. Monopoly and competition, he argued, are much more closely related, and much more closely connected, than is typically recognized. “Monopoly produces competition, competition produces monopoly,” he maintained, somewhat aphoristically, in a letter he wrote to Pavel Annenkov in 1846.27 Capital not only requires both but is in fact the expression, inter alia, of their synthesis—a synthesis that Marx, in trademark dialectical fashion, described not as a “formula” but as a “movement,” specifically “the movement whereby a true balance is maintained between competition and monopoly.”28 Such movement comprises opposing but connected economic dynamics of centralization and decentralization. When one or the other dynamic becomes disproportionately powerful, Marx argues, the “counteracting tendency” kicks in to return capital to a balanced configuration of monopoly and competition.

This balanced organization of productive forces—always inherently unstable and always prone to knife-edge slippages—is very close to what Edward Chamberlin would later call “monopolistic competition.”29 Such monopolistic competition internalizes monopoly and competition in dialectical relation with one another and is the capitalist norm—and always has been. “The notion of a bygone ‘competitive’ stage of capitalism where firms were price-takers is,” as Duménil and Lévy insist, “a fiction derived from the neoclassical analytical apparatus.”30 Equally fictional, albeit a fiction usually emanating from a very different analytical source, is the notion of a contemporary “monopoly” stage of capitalism absent meaningful competition.31

The historical, U.S.- and U.K.-based narrative related in this book therefore turns on precisely this dialectical, restless synthesis of monopoly and competition, and its ever-evolving, historically and geographically specific forms. In recent years, it is Harvey who has provided the most provocative reading of this dialectic and of its centrality to capitalism. It is, Harvey argues, one of numerous “moving” contradictions that plague the capital form, and with which capital constantly wrestles as it enters into and out of crisis.32 Harvey repeats Marx’s observation that capital requires a balance of competitive and monopolistic forces. He then derives from this postulate the propositions that crisis occurs when such forces become imbalanced—although this is not the only cause of crisis—and that such crisis can only be “fixed” once balance is restored. The result is that capital historically “oscillates” between relative excesses of monopoly and competition, always finding balance hard to achieve, let alone sustain.33 Understanding capital and its historical development in this particular regard, Harvey insists, requires us to recognize “how successful capital has generally been in managing the contradictions between monopoly and competition” and that “it uses crises to do so.”34

Such success, and the role played by crises or by threats thereof, are two of this book’s central, recurring themes. However, Harvey’s framing raises two vital questions that he fails, in his admittedly brief account of monopoly and competition, to answer.

First, how has this success been achieved? “Capital,” Harvey writes, “has organically arrived at a way to balance and rebalance the tendencies towards a monopolistic centralisation and decentralised competition through the crises that arise out of its imbalances.”35 Again, there is no objection here, except to press: “organically,” how? This book fashions an answer. This answer rests on the role of the law. When capital has become sufficiently overcentralized and monopolistic to threaten its own successful, profitable reproduction, antitrust law has been called upon to help restore the necessary degree of balance. This balance will never be perfect and at rest; in a dialectical relation, such as that between monopoly and competition, it never can be. When the dangerous excess has been of competition, by contrast, IP law has come to the rescue. Such laws, needless to say, have not effected this work of rebalancing by themselves, and this book documents their interaction with other pertinent dynamics; but their role has been paramount.

The other problematic question raised by Harvey’s framing brings us directly to our third point of divergence with the Baran and Sweezy or Foster and McChesney reading of capitalist development. Consider here the agency behind the successful, crisis-based management and rebalancing of monopolistic and competitive forces envisioned by Harvey: “capital has been successful . . .”; “capital has arrived at . . .” But what, or who, is this capital, and has its form remained constant? For Harvey, clearly, capital is the capitalist class: those that own the means of production. Yet this singularization of responsibility for regulating and reregulating the core dynamics of the capitalist economy raises all manner of questions that Harvey fails to address. Is this capitalist class homogeneous? Does it share consistent objectives in terms of economic development and management? And even if it does (and of course, it does not), what is its relation with the state and with the different tools of economic regulation, the law among them, that the state uses to govern and shape economic conduct?

If Harvey’s stimulating propositions call for circumspection on account of their simplifying structural abstractions, the connection to the “monopoly capital” thesis is that it too tends to rely upon just such totalizing, even reified, concepts. “Monopoly capital” is itself one such. One of the consistent themes of the tradition renewed by The Endless Crisis—one extending back through Baran and Sweezy’s Monopoly Capital to Rudolf Hilferding’s Finance Capital (1910) and even Lenin’s Imperialism (1917)—is its tendency not only to associate potent monopoly powers with a new stage or phase of capitalism but to depict the latter in terms of a consciously regulated and (centrally) planned system in which market-based competition largely disappears from view.36 For Lenin, this system fused the interests of capital and state (state monopoly capitalism); for Hilferding the fusion was tripartite, with finance capital also integral. But Marx, for all the stereotypes to the contrary, never saw capitalism as such. It was a totality, to be sure, but one that needs to be continually reproduced and reconstituted. This process occurs in and through the disparate actions of government, workers, consumers, businesses, and so on; when such reconstitution occurs in ways that imperil accumulation, crisis looms.

The point of saying all this is not simply to oppugn a totalizing view of “monopoly capital,” but to contrast with it the approach taken in this book, particularly to the law and its mobilization. There is not, and has not been, a single hand on the tiller, for all the obvious importance of the state as the law’s formal originator; there is no single, homogeneous entity pulling the levers, so to speak, of political-economic regulation— no consistent regime of conscious, systematic control. As with other modalities of economic regulation or governance, the law, in practice, does not “work” like that.

For one thing, there is an important difference between the written law and its interpretation. Two courts can interpret and apply the same law or laws in markedly different ways and with very different consequences. Perhaps the clearest example of this, at least in this book (Chapter 6), concerns U.S. antitrust law in the second half of the twentieth century: The nature and degree of enforcement of this law underwent a dramatic transformation in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but the law itself did not materially change. Intellectual training, social and political context, even judicial personality: These variables, and more, all matter to the law’s practical materialization. As such, we must remain constantly alive to the simple fact that, as Peter Carstensen has put it, “court doctrine is not the whole of the law in practice.”37 Relatedly, much of the enforcement of IP rights occurs at a significant remove from courts—specifically in, as argued by William T. Gallagher, the everyday practices of IP owners and their lawyers, whose “negotiations” with alleged infringers take place largely in the “shadow” of IP law.38

For another thing, just as the state never enacts new economic laws in total isolation from the influence and interests of capital, so both capital(s) and state—and indeed other economic agents—use the law to their own ends, and these ends are far from necessarily commensurate. Think, once again, about our two Apple cases. Who, in each case, instigated the legal action? Who put the law to work in their own interests? In the IP case it was Apple itself. In the class-action suit it was labor. But the latter suit was in fact itself based upon a prior government investigation launched by the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division in 2010.39 Three legal cases, then, all driven by different actors with different motivations, but all revolving around the same political-economic locus: the knotty complex of profit generation and accumulation constituted by Apple Inc. And if the law, together with its agents, is so palpably nonsingular at the scale of the political economy of just one company, on what reasonable grounds could we ever envision it thus—as a vehicle of conscious, unified control—in relation to the political economy of capitalism more widely? The “great leveler” indicated in the book’s title, in short, is not some omnipotent regulator in charge of the law; it is the law per se.

How, then, might we more accurately characterize the human and institutional agency analyzed in the following pages in relation to the law, its mobilization, and its political-economic effects? At a general level, the conclusion reached by Paul David in his examination of the history of IP law fits particularly well: “The complex body of law, judicial interpretation, and administrative practice that one has to grapple with in this field was not created by some rational, consistent, social welfare-maximizing public agency. What one is faced with, instead, is a mixture of the intended and unintended consequences of an undirected historical process on which the varied interests of many parties, acting at different points (some widely separated in time and space), have left an enduring mark.”40 More specifically, however, we will see that although IP and competition laws have indeed performed their work under the influence of varied individuals and groups, the vast majority of the latter are ultimately committed to, and institutionally invested in, the reproduction, in as smooth a fashion as possible, of capitalism in more or less its existing form. And even more specifically, the “smoothness” here alluded to means the reproduction of capitalism especially without the kinds of problems—identified in Chapter 3—that tend to emerge when the necessary balance between monopoly and competition is substantially disrupted.

On all the above grounds, therefore, this book’s argument diverges from that which we find in the all-too-common narrative of competitive capitalism historically segueing into monopoly capitalism. Of course, none of this is to suggest that nothing has changed historically in the capitalist constellation of monopoly-competition structures and dynamics. Far from it. But the book’s fourth and final quarrel with the conventional narrative is that what has substantively, perhaps irrevocably, changed is not the relative levels of competitive intensity and monopoly power—as in, that era had more competition, this one has more monopoly—so much as the source of monopoly powers and the degree of defensibility thereof.

Capitalism, this argument runs, is always characterized by competitive undercurrents; were it not, it would not be capitalism. Meanwhile, and arising partly out of these competitive dynamics (the Marxian argument), there is an endemic drive to fashion monopoly powers. Yet the means of assembly of such powers do not remain constant, and neither does the ability of monopolistic capitalists to defend the powers thus amassed. Capitalists—and indeed the states committed to stabilizing capitalism, with the law one obvious apparatus at their disposal—must constantly find new ways of putting monopoly in place and keeping it there. “As monopoly privileges from one source diminish,” Harvey observes, “so we witness a variety of attempts to preserve and assemble them by other means.”41 Mindful, thus, of Marx’s dictum that the monopoly-versus-competition dualism is a red herring that confuses a dialectical relation for an oppositional one, this book focuses instead on the ways in which the unstable balance between the two forces is maintained—and it posits the law as the primary, necessarily mutable, instrument of such maintenance.

#### Their existential portrayal of terrorism is unfounded, obscures capitalism, justifies interventions, and backfires.

Wolfendale 16 – Professor of Philosophy, Marquette University [Jessica Wolfendale, “Routledge Handbook of Critical Terrorism Studies | The narrative of terrorism as an existential threat,” 2016, Routledge, pp. 253-258]

A number of scholars (Jackson et al. 2011, Chapter 6; Michaelson 2012; Mueller 2006; Wolfen-dale 2007) have pointed out that the existential threat narrative of terrorism is based on a false portrayal of the risks posed by modern terrorism. Simply put, there is no compelling evidence that nonstate terrorism poses a significant risk to the physical security, economic stability, and continuing functioning of democratic states or to the lives of citizens of those states. Even in 2001, when nearly 3,000 people died in the 9/11 attacks, “three times as many [US citizens] died from malnutrition and almost 40 times as many people died in car accidents” as were killed in those attacks (Michaelson 2012: 436). In fact, non-state terrorism has never seriously undermined or threatened the political, economic, or physical survival of democratic states – a fact that holds true even for states such as Israel that have been the target of long-standing and ongoing terrorist attacks.

The adoption of the existential threat narrative of terrorism is not only based on a false assessment of the threat posed by non-state terrorism, but it has also sidelined and obscured other serious threats to individuals and communities. For example, the narrative ignores the fact that state terrorism and other forms of state violence have always posed a far greater threat to individuals and communities than non-state terrorism (Jackson et al. 2011: 193–194; Primoratz 2013). Second, serious nonviolent threats are neglected or ignored. For example, the threat posed by climate change has not received anything like the attention given by politicians, academics, and the media to the threat of terrorism. Yet, the predicted effects of climate change (such as the effect of just a 2° F increase in global temperature) include “5–15% reductions in the yields of crops grown… 3–10% increases in the amount of rain falling during the heaviest precipitation events, which can increase flooding risks… 200%–400% increases in the area burned by wildfire in parts of the western United States” (EPA 2014). These effects are likely to have a devastating impact on states’ economies, environments, and infrastructure, not to mention on the lives of millions of individuals. However, despite the extremely serious and growing threat posed by climate change (Mooney 2014) and the global reach of this threat, the funding, research, and political capital spent on meeting this threat pales in comparison to that devoted to fighting terrorism.

The destructive effects of the existential threat narrative

A second set of criticisms focuses on the destructive impact of the existential threat narrative on communities, individuals, and states. As will become apparent, counterterrorism policies and practices driven by the existential threat narrative have in some cases caused a greater threat to the lives and security of individuals than terrorism itself.

In many countries, the most immediate consequence of the adoption of the existential threat narrative is the creation of new counterterrorism legislation. In the US, the UK, and Australia, components of the existential threat narrative were used to justify legislation that drastically broadened the powers of police and intelligence services to detain individuals suspected of terrorist activity or of having information relevant to terrorism investigations (Jackson et al. 2011: 229–231; Kostakopoulou 2008: 5–6; Wolfendale 2007: 75). For example, the 2005 UK Prevention of Terrorism Act permitted the home secretary to impose significant restrictions on individuals suspected of being involved in terrorism for an initial 12-month period, including restrictions on their “liberty,… movement, residence, occupational activity, association and communications” (Kostakopoulou 2008: 7). In September 2014, in response to a threat from the militant group Islamic State (IS), Australia passed legislation that expanded the powers of security forces to detain terrorism suspects without charge and to monitor phone and internet activity, and lowered the threshold required to execute control orders (Griffiths 2015).

The law enforcement and intelligence powers typical of such counterterrorism legislation lower the evidentiary standards required to arrest and detain persons suspected of terrorism and extend the powers of organizations such as the National Security Agency (NSA) to collect personal information from individuals by accessing email accounts, phone records, and other personal information without a warrant (Sledge 2014). These new forms of legislation have, not surprisingly, led to the arrest, investigation, and detention without charge of many individuals who had no information about terrorism (Friedersdorf 2013), 4 not to mention the violation of privacy of thousands of individuals whose phone records and email correspondence were monitored and collected by intelligence agencies.

If these consequences seem minor relative to the lives potentially threatened by terrorism, the following two examples illustrate how destructive counterterrorism strategies can be. First, consider the toll of the numerous military operations initiated by the US and its allies in the so-called war on terror (see Rogers, this volume). In the first 18 months of the Iraq war (a war justified by the claim that Saddam Hussein possessed WMDs and was connected to al Qaeda), over 100,000 Iraqis died (Michaelson 2012: 436). The civilian death toll of that conflict exceeds 140,000. If combatants are included, the death toll is nearly 200,000 (Iraq Body Count 2014).

Second, the case of Israel and Palestine is arguably another example of how a state’s counter-terrorism polices can threaten a community to a greater extent than vice-versa. Israeli counterterrorism strategies have included attacks on Palestinian communities that have killed and wounded hundreds of civilians (Human Rights Watch 2014; United Nations 2007), 5 the use of tactics such as torture (PCATI 2014), and the construction of illegal housing settlements in Palestinian territory (Human Rights Watch 2014). I am not claiming that such tactics rise to the level of an existential threat to the Palestinian community, or that they justify or excuse Palestinian terrorism. Instead, the point is that, in some cases, state counterterrorism measures can cause greater harm to a community than the harm caused by the non-state terrorism to which the measures are responding.

In addition, the existential threat narrative of terrorism has been used to justify massive funding increases for military operations and for security agencies such as the CIA and the NSA (Mueller & Stewart 2011). In the US, it led to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, whose yearly budget is over $50 billion (Michaelson 2012: 442). In total, the expenditure of US domestic homeland security in the first ten years after 9/11 exceeded $1 trillion (Mueller & Stewart 2011: 1). One consequence of such massive spending is that government money is not being spent on other crucial areas such as health and education. A further consequence of this spending on security has been the acquisition by US police forces of military equipment, including tanks, mine-resistant ambush protected vehicles (MRAPs), and military-grade weapons on the grounds that such equipment might be necessary to prevent a terrorist attack (ACLU 2014: 3). 6 One of the effects of this militarization of the police has been the increasing use of SWAT teams for minor police operations such as executing search warrants, which in turn has led to the injury and death of several innocent individuals, including a 19-month old baby (Pow 2014).

Other, harder to quantify, effects of the adoption of the existential threat narrative of terrorism include the continuing damage to the environment, economy, and basic infrastructure of those countries that are targeted by the war against terrorism, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. In addition, the destabilization of political power and social stability in those countries has led to continuing turmoil and unrest and contributed to the rise of militant groups such as IS (Collins 2014).

This political and social destabilization is compounded by the portrayal of terrorists as religiously motivated fanatics that are part of a “global network” governed by al Qaeda (Bergen et al. 2011). This portrayal has led to non-state groups (such as Jema’ah Islamiyah in Indonesia and Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia) being “lumped together” because of their identification with Islam, even if they are distinct from each other and from al Qaeda in terms of their origins, structure, aims, and uses of violence. Ironically, the view that these groups are part of an international al Qaeda network has “granted such groups more currency in their ability to evoke fear. This is despite the fact that the basic concerns and tactics of these groups did not necessarily undergo any substantive change after 9/11” (Mustapha 2011: 493).

The flip side of this portrayal of Islamic groups is that legitimate political groups and nonviolent movements have been demonized as “terrorist” merely on the basis of their identification with Islam, even when such groups have consistently opposed the use of terrorism (Mustapha 2011: 495). For example, the Indonesian Islamist organization Nadhatul Ulama (which has 30 million followers) has actively supported the Indonesian government’s anti-terrorism efforts, yet has been portrayed as a terrorist organization purely because it is a Muslim organization (Gershman 2002: 64; Mustapha 2011). Once a group is labeled “terrorist” by states such as the US, this not only undermines the ability of those groups to effectively fight terrorism in their own countries, but it also makes it extremely difficult for the governments of those countries to work with those groups. In addition, such nonviolent groups can become the targets of governments who decide to use the war on terror as a justification for harsh repression of perceived enemies, as occurred in a number of Southeast Asian states (Mustapha 2011: 499–500).

Finally, since the existential threat narrative drastically restricts the range of possible counter-terrorism strategies, nonviolent counterterrorism methods, such as the infiltration of dangerous organizations and negotiation with the leaders of non-state groups, are “off the table” from the beginning. Yet, historically, such methods have consistently proven to be more effective in preventing terrorism than military force and tactics such as torture (Arrigo 2004: 562–563; Jackson et al. 2011). A 2006 study of evaluations of the effectiveness of post-9/11 counterterrorism strategies (such as increased airport security, military interventions, and political regime change) found that most of these strategies were not only ineffective in reducing incidents of terrorism, but some were also linked to an increase in terrorism (Lum et al. 2006). However, this should not be surprising; the inefficacy of methods such as torture and “no concessions or negotiation” policies on terrorism was known well before 9/11. For example, the author of a 1998 article on terrorism criticized the US’s “no concessions” policy on the grounds that it proved ineffective in deterring several high-profile terrorist attacks (Tucker 1998: 104–105).

The inefficacy of many counterterrorism strategies is a result of a number of factors. For example, the demonizing of nonviolent Islamic organizations (discussed earlier) has made it more difficult for those organizations and the governments who support them to counteract the radical versions of Islam utilized by more extreme groups (Mustapha 2011: 495). Another contributing factor is that states that adopt the existential threat narrative typically refuse to consider the possibility that terrorist groups might have legitimate grievances against their targets. Such grievances thus continue to go unaddressed, which can in turn fuel the anger and resentment of these groups (see Toros, this volume). This is not meant as an excuse for terrorism. Rather, the point is that if states are genuinely committed to reducing the possibility of non-state terrorism, they should be willing to address and, if possible, rectify any injustices that have resulted from their own current or past policies.

#### Vote neg to join the party – dual power organizing is the only path to revolutionary change – spec for the alt on doc.

* It’s not a floating pik
* Its uncondo
* cx checks anything else – we asked before debate and u didn’t answer

Escalante ‘18

[Alyson, philosophy at U of Oregon. 08/24/2018. “Against Electoralism, For Dual Power!” <https://theforgenews.org/2018/08/24/against-electoralism-for-dual-power/>] pat

I am sure that at this point, the opportunists reading this have already begun to type out their typical objection: the world is different than it was in 1917, and the conditions of the United States in no way echo the conditions which enabled the Bolsheviks to achieve revolutionary success.

To this tried and true objection, there is one simple answer: you are entirely correct, and that is why we need to abandon electoralism and working within the bourgeois state.

What were the conditions which allowed the Bolsheviks to successfully revolt? The conditions were that of Dual Power. Alongside the capitalist state, there existed a whole set of institutions and councils which met the needs of the workers. The soviets, a parallel socialist government made up of individual councils, successfully took over many governmental responsibilities in some parts of Petrograd. In the radical Viborg district, the Bolshevik controlled soviets provided government services like mail, alongside programs that could meet the needs of workers. When a far right coup was attempted against the provisional government, it was troops loyal to the Bolshevik factions within the soviet who repelled the coup plotters, proving concretely to the workers of Petrograd that the socialists could not only provide for their needs, but also for their defense.

In short: the Bolsheviks recognized that instead of integrating into the bourgeois state, they could operate outside of it to build dual power. They could establish programs of elected representatives who would serve the workers. They would not bolster the capitalist state in the name of socialism, they would offer an alternative to it.

And so, when the time came for revolt, the masses were already to loyal to the Bolsheviks. The only party who had never compromised, who had denounced the unpopular imperialist wars, who had rejected the provisional government entirely, was the party who successfully gained the support of the workers.

And so, many of us on the more radical fringes of the socialist movement wonder why it is the the DSA and other socialist opportunists seem to think that we can win by bolstering the capitalist state? We wonder, given this powerful historical precedent, why they devote their energy to getting more Ocasios elected; what good does one more left democrat who will abandon the workers do for us?

The answer we receive in return is always the same: we want to win small changes that will make life for the workers easier; we want to protect food stamps and healthcare.

And do this, we reply: what makes you think reformism is the only way to do this. When the bourgeois state in California was happy to let black children go to school unfed, the Black Panthers didn’t rally around democratic candidates, they became militant and fed the children themselves. In the 40s and 50s, socialists in New York saw people going without healthcare and instead of rallying behind democratic candidates, they built the IWO to provide healthcare directly. Both these groups took up our pressing revolutionary task: building dual power.

Imagine if all those hours the DSA poured into electing Ocasio were instead used to feed the people of New York, to provide them with medical care, to ensure their needs were met. Imagine the masses seeing socialism not as a pipe dream we might achieve through electing more imperialists, but as a concrete movement which is currently meeting their needs?

The fact is, we are not nearly ready for revolution. Socialists in the United States have failed to meet the needs of the people, and as long as their only concrete interaction with the masses is handing them a voter registration form, they will continue to fail the people. Our task now is not to elect representatives to advocate for the people; it is much more gruelingly laborious than that. Our task is to serve the people. Our task is to build dual power.

The movement to do this is underway. Members of the DSA refoundation caucus have begun to move the left of the DSA in this direct, socialist groups like Philly Socialists have begun to build dual power through GED programs and tenants unions, many branches of the Party For Socialism and Liberation have begun to feed the people and provide for their concrete needs, and Red Guard collectives in Los Angeles have built serve the people programs and taken on a stance of militant resistance to gentrification. The movement is growing, its time is coming, and dual power is achievable within our life time.

The opportunists are, in a sense, correct. We are not where we were in 1917, but we can begin to move in that direction and dual power can take us there. In order to achieve dual power we have to recognize that Lenin was right: there will be no socialist gains by working within state institutions designed to crush socialism. Furthermore, we must recognize that the strategies of the electoral opportunists trade off with dual power. Electing candidates drains resources, time, and energy away from actually serving the people.

And so, we should commit to undertake the difficult and dangerous task of building dual power. We must reject opportunism, we must name the democratic party as our enemy, we must rally around power directly in the hands of the socialist movement. We do not have a parallel system of soviets in the United States. We can change that. Someday the cry “all power to the soviets” will be heard again. Lets make it happen.

## 1NC – Case