## 1NC – Off

### 1NC – T

#### Interpretation: Res is passive voice which has no specific actor, so aff has to defend the whole res generally not a specific instance or plan

Darwin 14, Emma. Writer. "What is passive voice, and why are you told to avoid it?". https://emmadarwin.typepad.com/thisitchofwriting/2014/09/what-is-passive-voice-and-why-might-it-be-a-bad-thing.html. 2 Sep 2014. Accessed 7 Mar 2019 TR

There seems to be confusion between the actual grammar of active and passive voice, and prose that's accused of being "passive". So, let's start with the bare facts. When the action - the verb - of a sentence is being performed by the subject of the sentence, the sentence is in active voice. This kind of subject + verb + object construction is the basic building block of English. Anne chases the cat. The dog bit Ben. Here, the action is being done by the subject of the sentence: "Anne chases" and "The dog bit". When the action is being done to the subject of the sentence, by something else, then the sentence is in passive voice. The cat is chased by Anne. Ben was bitten by the dog. The sentence expresses exactly the same meaning, and order is still subject + verb + what's called the agent: but now the subject is the thing suffering the verb: the cat, and Ben. It's the agent - Anne, the dog - who is doing the verb. N.B.: Talking of which, you'll have noticed that, to make a passive voice sentence, the verb becomes a verb phrase, with the auxiliary verb (the little extra one) usually being a form of "to be": is chased, was bitten, would have been bitten, shall be chased. Notice, though, that in informal expressions "to get" also figures: She would have got promoted last week. I get beaten at tennis. One crucial difference between active and passive makes more sense if you remember that a sentence isn't a grammatically complete sentence unless it has a subject and a verb: Chases the cat and Bit Ben are not complete sentences. But in passive voice you can leave out the thing doing the verb, because it's not the grammatical subject, and still have a complete sentence: The cat is chased. Ben was bitten. In other words, as with those examples, in passive voice constructions an agent need not be specified, and this is one of the most important reasons for using it: the agent is unknown, or not relevant, or something non-specific. I was blindfolded and pushed into the cellar. The car can't be driven, and the weekend has been ruined. It is believed that order has been restored in Paris and the Estates General will be summoned next week. Water was added to the test-tube and the solution was heated to boiling point. Had the catch been landed on the quay, it would have been sold much more quickly. It was decided that all the Borough's playgrounds should be closed and the money allocated to the Council's hospitality fund. N.B.: Notice how in sentences with more than one verb phrase, you can often leave the auxiliary verb out of the second one, and even the subject, if the structure of the two halves is similar enough to clue the reader into what the full verb phrase would be: I was blindfolded and I was pushed into the cellar. would be very clunky. Even if the subject of the two phrases is different, you can drop the auxiliary verb if it's repeated, and the result is much more fluent: Water was added to the test-tube and the solution heated to boiling point. But notice how the motive for leaving out the agent, in something like It was decided that all the Borough's playgrounds should be closed, may not be admirable! And that's the clue to one creative reason for using passive voice: it may have exactly the same meaning, but it has a different tone and feel. The subject of the sentence is often our representative in the experience the story, and here they're suffering the verb, not doing it. There may be no agent: nothing and no one is actually acting at all, within the sentence.

#### 1] Limits – there’s near infinite types of recognition or scenarios around space annd permutataions you could read which explodes the number of affs – there’s no universal disad to every government since each has different political scenarios and space programs/IR scenarios. Limits outweighs – it controls the internal link to the possibility of engagement which turns education.

#### 2] Precision – semantics outweighs pragmatics:

#### A] Anything else allows the aff to jettison words from the resolution to moot neg ground since they’re not bound by the resolution – they’ll say they’re good enough but there’s no brightline for that which justifies straying from the rez always.

#### B] Resolvability—it’s more resolvable to compare semantics because you’re just comparing two definitions, but pragmatics involves weighing between different impacts and how well they connect to voters, which is less resolvable because pragmatics is way more subjective. Resolvability matters because otherwise the judge must intervene to determine a winner which is the worst form of abuse since the debaters can’t control it.

#### C] Jurisdiction – tournament rules mandate that we must defend the resolution, which means the judge doesn’t have the jurisdiction to vote on an advocacy that’s not topical. Fairness is a voter—the judge must vote for the better debater which is impossible if the round is skewed.

#### D] Extra topicality is a voter – it jettisons debates about the topic to small and obscure topics which moots neg prep because they can just cut an advantage around topics that aren’t within the literature which moots our generics – that makes engagement impossible which link turns any of their clash or topic research arguments

#### TVA solves – say that private appriopriation of space is unjust.

#### Drop the debater since drop the arg is severance – restarts the debate so the aff gets 7-6 time skew and too late for new neg offense.

#### Use competing interps—[a] leads to a race to the top where we find the best norms [b] reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention [c] reasonability collapses—you use offense/defense on the paradigm debate.

#### No RVIs—[a] logic – you don’t win for being fair, [b] means you bait theory and go for the RVI

### 1NC – DA

#### Xi is maintaining CCP power now – but consolidation means he’s at unique risk of blame for policy mis-steps

Kewalramani, 18

Manoj, The vulnerabilities of Xi Jinping and China's Communist Party, Aljazeera, 3-10-18, <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/vulnerabilities-xi-jinping-china-communist-party-180309141431670.html>]

In advance of the National People's Congress (NPC) meeting in Beijing, which will mark the official start of Xi Jinping's second term as the president of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party's (CPC) Central Committee proposed a set of constitutional amendments, chief among them being the removal of presidential term limits and the inclusion of "Xi Jinping Thought" in the country's constitution. NPC deputies are expected to overwhelmingly support these changes in a vote on Sunday, effectively allowing Xi to remain at the helm of Chinese politics for as long as he deems fit. Ever since the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, Xi has been making moves to upend norms of collective leadership and succession that were cobbled together after the excesses of the Mao Zedong era. Xi's rapid consolidation of power has led some to conclude that China is descending into an era of dictatorship, with an all-powerful strongman in charge. Such claims, while not without basis, gloss over the underlying nature of the CPC's specific brand of authoritarianism and the shifting dynamics of governance in modern-day China. Today, despite all the accumulation of power, Xi, and even the party itself, is far more vulnerable than is apparent. One can, for the sake of convenience, classify these vulnerabilities into two broad, interlinked categories: structural and policy-level threats. Structural threats Ever since Xi took charge as the CPC General Secretary in late 2012, he has been working towards increasing the centralisation of power. To achieve this, he restructured and centralised the policymaking architecture of the party and unleashed a ruthless anti-corruption campaign. The former permitted him to have greater personal supervision over key policy areas. The latter, meanwhile, helped blunt opposing factions and earn local and institutional compliance, through either the demonstrable threat of coercive action or placement of key confidantes in positions of authority. The centralisation of political power in itself is not necessarily problematic or a threat to the regime's stability. What matters is how power is exercised, ie, whether it flows through a system of institutions that place necessary checks and offer opportunities for corrective action, or it is arbitrarily imposed on the elites and the populace alike by the force of personality. Under Xi, the constitutional amendment on presidential terms and the violation of party norms on succession imply that the latter is becoming the dominant means of exercising power. This heightens the threat of bad policy decisions going unchecked and potential abuse of power, which, in turn, increases the possibility of deepening fissures among the elites and broader social upheaval. Moreover, personalisation of power in this way renders the leader directly vulnerable to real and perceived failures, which can no longer be viewed as the products of structural mishaps or secondary actors. Xi, therefore, now bears greater personal liability for failure to achieve key social, economic and foreign policy objectives, thereby impinging on broader national stability. Policy-level challenges At the moment, Xi and the Party are also facing serious policy level challenges. These threats are particularly acute since they come at a time when Xi faces the daunting task of guiding the Chinese economy from a stage of rapid to high-quality growth. What this means is focussing on reducing credit risks, containing pollution, tackling inequality and moving up the manufacturing value chain to avoid the middle-income trap. In doing so, however, he must contend with entrenched political, bureaucratic and business interests. In fact, the desire to effectively manage this economic transition has often been cited as the underlying rationale for Xi's consolidation of power, placement of aides in key positions and establishment of the new National Supervision Commission (NSC). This is Xi's strategy to address the "emperor is far away" problem. However, this does not guarantee success. For instance, even during Xi's reign, provinces far away from the capital have falsified economic data. And while the NSC now brings state functionaries under a Party-style discipline campaign, operational questions and concerns over who will check the guardians remain unanswered. Moreover, the social and economic policies adopted by Xi have seen increased the Party's role in private enterprises, bolstering of state-owned enterprises, controlled market opening, as well as support for - and investment in - innovative Chinese businesses. Xi's policies also heightened restrictions on dissenting voices and expanded state intervention in people's daily lives. Such policies inherently cause friction with the redefined principal contradiction facing Chinese society, ie, the desire for balanced and adequate development that satisfies people's need for a better life. This implies the promise of responsive governance, which would require reduced control and greater openness. The bargain that Xi appears to be offering is better economic opportunities and welfare assistance along with the promise of an improved environment in exchange for greater social control. Pulling this off requires a tricky tightrope walk to assuage China's growing middle class and the maintenance of personal credibility. Likewise in the external domain, Xi has broken from Deng Xiaoping's dictum of "hide your capabilities and bide your time." The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is as much an economic programme as it is a geopolitical campaign to take China to the centre of world affairs. Under the BRI, Xi is seeking to expand Chinese business, military and diplomatic influence around the world. The BRI's success, however, is contingent on the sustenance of Beijing's economic muscle. It is the remarkable growth that China has enjoyed over the past 40 years that has allowed a build-up of capacities to launch such an ambitious global initiative. Slowing growth will, therefore, impinge on Beijing's capacities to execute BRI projects. Moreover, Xi's global ambitions manifested through the BRI are also constrained by geostrategic, political and security challenges. For instance, the alignment of counter-balancing forces in the form of the Quadrilateral Group - India, US, Japan and Australia - of countries, the growing concern over the CPC's so-called influence activities in the West, the threat of attacks from violent non-state actors targeting Chinese projects and citizens abroad and the spectre of resurgent nationalism derailing Chinese investments in recipient countries. All of these pose serious challenges, which, if not managed well, could lead to questions being asked at home and even potentially threaten the regime's stability. And that could result in China sliding down a dark and slippery slope.

#### The plan is seen as weakness – that undermines Xi and CCP legitimacy – makes space war inevitable

Lambakis 19 (Steve, National Institute for Public Policy, “A Guide to Thinking About Space Deterrence and China”, National Institute for Public Policy, July, <http://www.nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Lambakis-Guide-to-Thinking-About-Space-for-web.pdf>) DB

Chinese military writings also stress the importance of maintaining control, to include the need for control in the conduct of information warfare, particularly as it might impact command and control. Threats to information networks from cyber-attacks, for example, could undermine Chinese armed forces. According to Michael Pillsbury, “means of maintaining control include deploying unexpected ‘assassin’s mace’ weapons and throwing the opponent off balance at a critical point….”196 The assassin’s mace is a tool that may be used by an inferior opponent to overcome a more powerful adversary. An ASAT weapon might be a very useful tool, and potentially cheap means, for gaining an advantage and accomplishing this objective.197 Beijing, of course, is not subjected to the same political influences as is Washington. Chinese leaders are not as sensitive to domestic public opinion as U.S. leaders. Yet China will have its own political challenges to contend with. In recent years, President Xi has built up a cult of personality around “Xi Jinping thought,” and he has consolidated his power as the supreme ruler in China.198 Xi is allowed to keep power indefinitely (going back to the way things were under Mao), which means Xi has been given time to centralize party control. On the one hand, dissenting is becoming riskier, and the room for debate narrower than it has been in the last couple of decades. On the other hand, the risk of a policy mistake could now be higher, and correcting a flawed policy could take longer.199 Perceived weakness in foreign policy could encourage elite and mass criticism of Xi and the regime, thus undermining the leader’s legacy and weakening the Chinese Communist Party rule.200 Xi’s failures could be viewed as stemming from his foolishness, confusion, or susceptibility to deception. These political considerations could serve to push the Chinese leadership towards an aggressive deterrent strategy involving space weapons in an effort to preclude U.S. military and political gains in the region.

#### China is highly perceptual of any internal appeasement – legitimacy decline ensures territorial wars

Kim 15 (Jihyun, assistant professor in the Institute of International Studies at Bradley University, IL, PhD in political science from the University of South Carolina, “Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea: Implications for Security in Asia and Beyond”, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 2) DB

Some liberals are less optimistic about the pacifying effects of China’s economic liberalization and more skeptical about the implications of the country’s growing power on important matters, including Sino-US relations and the ongoing South China Sea spats. For example, these so-called “liberal pessimists” point toward the differences between the internal structures and domestic political dynamics of China and the United States (along with America’s allies and friends in the region) and expect greater tensions, which could occur as a result of the interaction among these countries, whose core values are incompatible and whose visions for what constitutes regional leadership are irreconcilable. In other words, what makes liberal pessimists worry is the disparate nature of the Chinese regime vis-à-vis the US-led democratic alliances and partnerships. The inevitable interactions of the two regimes could create a vicious cycle of mutually reinforcing distrust and fear. What makes matters worse is that China is still an authoritarian regime in transition, led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)—the legitimacy of which is based on an anachronistic ideology that has lost most of its charm.6 Thus, Chinese leaders face a dilemma of adapting its old politics to the new and increasingly complex society without losing control of the system. Under the condition, they may opt for utilizing the military as a diversionary measure to face “external threats,” including “foreign encroachments” on China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in the South China Sea, without making the issue of extending political freedom of their people and embracing a more open society as a primary order; as doing so could not only undermine internal cohesion along the way but also threaten Chinese leaders’ grip on power in the end. In addition, Beijing has resorted to the promise of building a more prosperous economic future together with appeals to Chinese nationalism so as to compensate for increasingly irrelevant communist tenets and to enhance public support for the regime. Yet, this could be a dangerous mixture, given that if Chinese leaders fail to deliver the promise of economic growth, they would be under pressure to depend “even more heavily on nationalist appeals as its sole remaining source of support.”7 In fact, nationalism can be one of the most powerful domestic sources of territorial expansion, which could be exploited by Chinese leaders to bolster political security at home through uniting the public and diverting their frustrations outward. There are several reasons why nationalism and territory are closely intertwined and can easily provide a justification for the state to take a diversionary action through belligerent expansion.8 In the case of China, such incentives are particularly strong because of its historical memories of territorial loss and its aspiration to regain the status of a great power after its century of humiliation. In this light, a key aspect of Beijing’s legitimacy stems from protecting national dignity and never again letting China to be bullied. What is more, China’s growing social instability and public discontent, engendered by decades of rapid economic reforms at any cost, have made nationalism even more essential as a substitute for the governing ideology and as a mechanism to unify the country and sustain the legitimacy of the state. Consequently, leaders in Beijing fear that if they show flexibility regarding China’s foreign relations, including its maritime claims in the South China Sea, it could be taken as a sign of disgraceful appeasement and weakness at home. In this view, China’s muscle-flexing foreign policy, including its southward push into the western Pacific, can be seen as a diversionary maneuver to preserve domestic cohesion and unity as well as regime legitimacy.

### 1NC – FW

#### The Standard is maximizing expected wellbeing

#### Framing issue – no new 1ar framework args, incentivizes infinite sandbagging – at worst give us new answers otherwise new 2ar spin always wins

#### Extinction outweighs – it’s the upmost moral evil and disavowal of the risk makes it more likely.

Elizabeth Burns 17. Elizabeth Finneron-Burns is a Teaching Fellow at the University of Warwick and an Affiliated Researcher at the Institute for Futures Studies in Stockholm, What’s wrong with human extinction?, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00455091.2016.1278150?needAccess=true>, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2017)

Many, though certainly not all, people might believe that it would be wrong to bring about the end of the human species, and the reasons given for this belief are various. I begin by considering four reasons that could be given against the moral permissibility of human extinction. I will argue that only those reasons that impact the people who exist at the time that the extinction or the knowledge of the upcoming extinction occurs, can explain its wrongness. I use this conclusion to then consider in which cases human extinction would be morally permissible or impermissible, arguing that there is only a small class of cases in which it would not be wrong to cause the extinction of the human race or allow it to happen. 2.1. It would prevent the existence of very many happy people One reason of human extinction might be considered to be wrong lies in the value of human life itself. The thought here might be that it is a good thing for people to exist and enjoy happy lives and extinction would deprive more people of enjoying this good. The ‘good’ in this case could be understood in at least two ways. According to the first, one might believe that you benefit a person by bringing them into existence, or at least, that it is good for that person that they come to exist. The second view might hold that if humans were to go extinct, the utility foregone by the billions (or more) of people who could have lived but will now never get that opportunity, renders allowing human extinction to take place an incidence of wrongdoing. An example of this view can be found in two quotes from an Effective Altruism blog post by Peter Singer, Nick Beckstead and Matt Wage: One very bad thing about human extinction would be that billions of people would likely die painful deaths. But in our view, this is by far not the worst thing about human extinction. The worst thing about human extinction is that there would be no future generations. Since there could be so many generations in our future, the value of all those generations together greatly exceeds the value of the current generation. (Beckstead, Singer, and Wage 2013) The authors are making two claims. The first is that there is value in human life and also something valuable about creating future people which gives us a reason to do so; furthermore, it would be a very bad thing if we did not do so. The second is that, not only would it be a bad thing for there to be no future people, but it would actually be the worst thing about extinction. Since happy human lives have value, and the number of potential people who could ever exist is far greater than the number of people who exist at any one time, even if the extinction were brought about through the painful deaths of currently existing people, the former’s loss would be greater than the latter’s. Both claims are assuming that there is an intrinsic value in the existence of potential human life. The second claim makes the further assumption that the forgone value of the potential lives that could be lived is greater than the disvalue that would be accrued by people existing at the time of the extinction through suffering from painful and/or premature deaths. The best-known author of the post, Peter Singer is a prominent utilitarian, so it is not surprising that he would lament the potential lack of future human lives per se. However, it is not just utilitarians who share this view, even if implicitly. Indeed, other philosophers also seem to imply that they share the intuition that there is just something wrong with causing or failing to prevent the extinction of the human species such that we prevent more ‘people’ from having the ‘opportunity to exist’. Stephen Gardiner (2009) and Martin O’Neill (personal correspondence), both sympathetic to contract theory, for example, also find it intuitive that we should want more generations to have the opportunity to exist, assuming that they have worth-living lives, and I find it plausible to think that many other people (philosophers and non-philosophers alike) probably share this intuition. When we talk about future lives being ‘prevented’, we are saying that a possible person or a set of possible people who could potentially have existed will now never actually come to exist. To say that it is wrong to prevent people from existing could either mean that a possible person could reasonably reject a principle that permitted us not to create them, or that the foregone value of their lives provides a reason for rejecting any principle that permits extinction. To make the first claim we would have to argue that a possible person could reasonably reject any principle that prevented their existence on the grounds that it prevented them in particular from existing. However, this is implausible for two reasons. First, we can only wrong someone who did, does or will actually exist because wronging involves failing to take a person’s interests into account. When considering the permissibility of a principle allowing us not to create Person X, we cannot take X’s interest in being created into account because X will not exist if we follow the principle. By considering the standpoint of a person in our deliberations we consider the burdens they will have to bear as a result of the principle. In this case, there is no one who will bear any burdens since if the principle is followed (that is, if we do not create X), X will not exist to bear any burdens. So, only people who do/will actually exist can bear the brunt of a principle, and therefore occupy a standpoint that is owed justification. Second, existence is not an interest at all and a possible person is not disadvantaged by not being caused to exist. Rather than being an interest, it is a necessary requirement in order to have interests. Rivka Weinberg describes it as ‘neutral’ because causing a person to exist is to create a subject who can have interests; existence is not an interest itself.3 In order to be disadvantaged, there must be some detrimental effect on your interests. However, without existence, a person does not have any interests so they cannot be disadvantaged by being kept out of existence. But, as Weinberg points out, ‘never having interests itself could not be contrary to people’s interests since without interest bearers, there can be no ‘they’ for it to be bad for’ (Weinberg 2008, 13). So, a principle that results in some possible people never becoming actual does not impose any costs on those ‘people’ because nobody is disadvantaged by not coming into existence.4 It therefore seems that it cannot be wrong to fail to bring particular people into existence. This would mean that no one acts wrongly when they fail to create another person. Writ large, it would also not be wrong if everybody decided to exercise their prerogative not to create new people and potentially, by consequence, allow human extinction. One might respond here by saying that although it may be permissible for one person to fail to create a new person, it is not permissible if everyone chooses to do so because human lives have value and allowing human extinction would be to forgo a huge amount of value in the world. This takes us to the second way of understanding the potential wrongness of preventing people from existing — the foregone value of a life provides a reason for rejecting any principle that prevents it. One possible reply to this claim turns on the fact that many philosophers acknowledge that the only, or at least the best, way to think about the value of (individual or groups of) possible people’s lives is in impersonal terms (Parfit 1984; Reiman 2007; McMahan 2009). Jeff McMahan, for example, writes ‘at the time of one’s choice there is no one who exists or will exist independently of that choice for whose sake one could be acting in causing him or her to exist … it seems therefore that any reason to cause or not to cause an individual to exist … is best considered an impersonal rather than individual-affecting reason’ (McMahan 2009, 52). Another reply along similar lines would be to appeal to the value that is lost or at least foregone when we fail to bring into existence a next (or several next) generations of people with worth-living lives. Since ex hypothesi worth-living lives have positive value, it is better to create more such lives and worse to create fewer. Human extinction by definition is the creation of no future lives and would ‘deprive’ billions of ‘people’ of the opportunity to live worth-living lives. This might reduce the amount of value in the world at the time of the extinction (by killing already existing people), but it would also prevent a much vaster amount of value in the future (by failing to create more people). Both replies depend on the impersonal value of human life. However, recall that in contractualism impersonal values are not on their own grounds for reasonably rejecting principles. Scanlon himself says that although we have a strong reason not to destroy existing human lives, this reason ‘does not flow from the thought that it is a good thing for there to be more human life rather than less’ (104). In contractualism, something cannot be wrong unless there is an impact on a person. Thus, neither the impersonal value of creating a particular person nor the impersonal value of human life writ large could on its own provide a reason for rejecting a principle permitting human extinction. It seems therefore that the fact that extinction would deprive future people of the opportunity to live worth-living lives (either by failing to create either particular future people or future people in general) cannot provide us with a reason to consider human extinction to be wrong. Although the lost value of these ‘lives’ itself cannot be the reason explaining the wrongness of extinction, it is possible the knowledge of this loss might create a personal reason for some existing people. I will consider this possibility later on in section (d). But first I move to the second reason human extinction might be wrong per se. 2.2. It would mean the loss of the only known form of intelligent life and all civilization and intellectual progress would be lost A second reason we might think it would be wrong to cause human extinction is the loss that would occur of the only (known) form of rational life and the knowledge and civilization that that form of life has created. One thought here could be that just as some might consider it wrong to destroy an individual human heritage monument like the Sphinx, it would also be wrong if the advances made by humans over the past few millennia were lost or prevented from progressing. A related argument is made by those who feel that there is something special about humans’ capacity for rationality which is valuable in itself. Since humans are the only intelligent life that we know of, it would be a loss, in itself, to the world for that to end. I admit that I struggle to fully appreciate this thought. It seems to me that Henry Sidgwick was correct in thinking that these things are only important insofar as they are important to humans (Sidgwick 1874, I.IX.4).5 If there is no form of intelligent life in the future, who would there be to lament its loss since intelligent life is the only form of life capable of appreciating intelligence? Similarly, if there is no one with the rational capacity to appreciate historic monuments and civil progress, who would there be to be negatively affected or even notice the loss?6 However, even if there is nothing special about human rationality, just as some people try to prevent the extinction of nonhuman animal species, we might think that we ought also to prevent human extinction for the sake of biodiversity. The thought in this, as well as the earlier examples, must be that it would somehow be bad for the world if there were no more humans even though there would be no one for whom it is bad. This may be so but the only way to understand this reason is impersonally. Since we are concerned with wrongness rather than badness, we must ask whether something that impacts no one’s well-being, status or claims can be wrong. As we saw earlier, in the contractualist framework reasons must be personal rather than impersonal in order to provide grounds for reasonable rejection (Scanlon 1998, 218–223). Since the loss of civilization, intelligent life or biodiversity are per se impersonal reasons, there is no standpoint from which these reasons could be used to reasonably reject a principle that permitted extinction. Therefore, causing human extinction on the grounds of the loss of civilization, rational life or biodiversity would not be wrong. 2.3. Existing people would endure physical pain and/or painful and/or premature deaths Thinking about the ways in which human extinction might come about brings to the fore two more reasons it might be wrong. It could, for example, occur if all humans (or at least the critical number needed to be unable to replenish the population, leading to eventual extinction) underwent a sterilization procedure. Or perhaps it could come about due to anthropogenic climate change or a massive asteroid hitting the Earth and wiping out the species in the same way it did the dinosaurs millions of years ago. Each of these scenarios would involve significant physical and/or non-physical harms to existing people and their interests. Physically, people might suffer premature and possibly also painful deaths, for example. It is not hard to imagine examples in which the process of extinction could cause premature death. A nuclear winter that killed everyone or even just every woman under the age of 50 is a clear example of such a case. Obviously, some types of premature death themselves cannot be reasons to reject a principle. Every person dies eventually, sometimes earlier than the standard expected lifespan due to accidents or causes like spontaneously occurring incurable cancers. A cause such as disease is not a moral agent and therefore it cannot be wrong if it unavoidably kills a person prematurely. Scanlon says that the fact that a principle would reduce a person’s well-being gives that person a reason to reject the principle: ‘components of well-being figure prominently as grounds for reasonable rejection’ (Scanlon 1998, 214). However, it is not settled yet whether premature death is a setback to well-being. Some philosophers hold that death is a harm to the person who dies, whilst others argue that it is not.7 I will argue, however, that regardless of who is correct in that debate, being caused to die prematurely can be reason to reject a principle when it fails to show respect to the person as a rational agent. Scanlon says that recognizing others as rational beings with interests involves seeing reason to preserve life and prevent death: ‘appreciating the value of human life is primarily a matter of seeing human lives as something to be respected, where this involves seeing reasons not to destroy them, reasons to protect them, and reasons to want them to go well’ (Scanlon 1998, 104). The ‘respect for life’ in this case is a respect for the person living, not respect for human life in the abstract. This means that we can sometimes fail to protect human life without acting wrongfully if we still respect the person living. Scanlon gives the example of a person who faces a life of unending and extreme pain such that she wishes to end it by committing suicide. Scanlon does not think that the suicidal person shows a lack of respect for her own life by seeking to end it because the person whose life it is has no reason to want it to go on. This is important to note because it emphasizes the fact that the respect for human life is person-affecting. It is not wrong to murder because of the impersonal disvalue of death in general, but because taking someone’s life without their permission shows disrespect to that person. This supports its inclusion as a reason in the contractualist formula, regardless of what side ends up winning the ‘is death a harm?’ debate because even if death turns out not to harm the person who died, ending their life without their consent shows disrespect to that person. A person who could reject a principle permitting another to cause his or her premature death presumably does not wish to die at that time, or in that manner. Thus, if they are killed without their consent, their interests have not been taken into account, and they have a reason to reject the principle that allowed their premature death.8 This is as true in the case of death due to extinction as it is for death due to murder. However, physical pain may also be caused to existing people without killing them, but still resulting in human extinction. Imagine, for example, surgically removing everyone’s reproductive organs in order to prevent the creation of any future people. Another example could be a nuclear bomb that did not kill anyone, but did painfully render them infertile through illness or injury. These would be cases in which physical pain (through surgery or bombs) was inflicted on existing people and the extinction came about as a result of the painful incident rather than through death. Furthermore, one could imagine a situation in which a bomb (for example) killed enough people to cause extinction, but some people remained alive, but in terrible pain from injuries. It seems uncontroversial that the infliction of physical pain could be a reason to reject a principle. Although Scanlon says that an impact on well-being is not the only reason to reject principles, it plays a significant role, and indeed, most principles are likely to be rejected due to a negative impact on a person’s well-being, physical or otherwise. It may be queried here whether it is actually the involuntariness of the pain that is grounds for reasonable rejection rather than the physical pain itself because not all pain that a person suffers is involuntary. One can imagine acts that can cause physical pain that are not rejectable — base jumping or life-saving or improving surgery, for example. On the other hand, pushing someone off a cliff or cutting him with a scalpel against his will are clearly rejectable acts. The difference between the two cases is that in the former, the person having the pain inflicted has consented to that pain or risk of pain. My view is that they cannot be separated in these cases and it is involuntary physical pain that is the grounds for reasonable rejection. Thus, the fact that a principle would allow unwanted physical harm gives a person who would be subjected to that harm a reason to reject the principle. Of course the mere fact that a principle causes involuntary physical harm or premature death is not sufficient to declare that the principle is rejectable — there might be countervailing reasons. In the case of extinction, what countervailing reasons might be offered in favour of the involuntary physical pain/ death-inducing harm? One such reason that might be offered is that humans are a harm to the natural environment and that the world might be a better place if there were no humans in it. It could be that humans might rightfully be considered an all-things-considered hindrance to the world rather than a benefit to it given the fact that we have been largely responsible for the extinction of many species, pollution and, most recently, climate change which have all negatively affected the natural environment in ways we are only just beginning to understand. Thus, the fact that human extinction would improve the natural environment (or at least prevent it from degrading further), is a countervailing reason in favour of extinction to be weighed against the reasons held by humans who would experience physical pain or premature death. However, the good of the environment as described above is by definition not a personal reason. Just like the loss of rational life and civilization, therefore, it cannot be a reason on its own when determining what is wrong and countervail the strong personal reasons to avoid pain/death that is held by the people who would suffer from it.9 Every person existing at the time of the extinction would have a reason to reject that principle on the grounds of the physical pain they are being forced to endure against their will that could not be countervailed by impersonal considerations such as the negative impact humans may have on the earth. Therefore, a principle that permitted extinction to be accomplished in a way that caused involuntary physical pain or premature death could quite clearly be rejectable by existing people with no relevant countervailing reasons. This means that human extinction that came about in this way would be wrong. There are of course also additional reasons they could reject a similar principle which I now turn to address in the next section. 2.4. Existing people could endure non-physical harms I said earlier than the fact in itself that there would not be any future people is an impersonal reason and can therefore not be a reason to reject a principle permitting extinction. However, this impersonal reason could give rise to a personal reason that is admissible. So, the final important reason people might think that human extinction would be wrong is that there could be various deleterious psychological effects that would be endured by existing people having the knowledge that there would be no future generations. There are two main sources of this trauma, both arising from the knowledge that there will be no more people. The first relates to individual people and the undesired negative effect on well-being that would be experienced by those who would have wanted to have children. Whilst this is by no means universal, it is fair to say that a good proportion of people feel a strong pull towards reproduction and having their lineage continue in some way. Samuel Scheffler describes the pull towards reproduction as a ‘desire for a personalized relationship with the future’ (Scheffler 2012, 31). Reproducing is a widely held desire and the joys of parenthood are ones that many people wish to experience. For these people knowing that they would not have descendants (or that their descendants will endure painful and/or premature deaths) could create a sense of despair and pointlessness of life. Furthermore, the inability to reproduce and have your own children because of a principle/policy that prevents you (either through bans or physical interventions) would be a significant infringement of what we consider to be a basic right to control what happens to your body. For these reasons, knowing that you will have no descendants could cause significant psychological traumas or harms even if there were no associated physical harm. The second is a more general, higher level sense of hopelessness or despair that there will be no more humans and that your projects will end with you. Even those who did not feel a strong desire to procreate themselves might feel a sense of hopelessness that any projects or goals they have for the future would not be fulfilled. Many of the projects and goals we work towards during our lifetime are also at least partly future-oriented. Why bother continuing the search for a cure for cancer if either it will not be found within humans’ lifetime, and/or there will be no future people to benefit from it once it is found? Similar projects and goals that might lose their meaning when confronted with extinction include politics, artistic pursuits and even the type of philosophical work with which this paper is concerned. Even more extreme, through the words of the character Theo Faron, P.D. James says in his novel The Children of Men that ‘without the hope of posterity for our race if not for ourselves, without the assurance that we being dead yet live, all pleasures of the mind and senses sometimes seem to me no more than pathetic and crumbling defences shored up against our ruins’ (James 2006, 9). Even if James’ claim is a bit hyperbolic and all pleasures would not actually be lost, I agree with Scheffler in finding it not implausible that the knowledge that extinction was coming and that there would be no more people would have at least a general depressive effect on people’s motivation and confidence in the value of and joy in their activities (Scheffler 2012, 43). Both sources of psychological harm are personal reasons to reject a principle that permitted human extinction. Existing people could therefore reasonably reject the principle for either of these reasons. Psychological pain and the inability to pursue your personal projects, goals, and aims, are all acceptable reasons for rejecting principles in the contractualist framework. So too are infringements of rights and entitlements that we accept as important for people’s lives. These psychological reasons, then, are also valid reasons to reject principles that permitted or required human extinction.

## 1NC – Case

v