## 1NC – Off

### 1 – T

#### Interpretation – “A” in the resolution indicates that you must defend that all just governments recognize an unconditional right to strike.

#### An indefinite article like the word “a” is a universal quantifier if the main verb applies directly to it

Michael Hess. 1985. (Michael Hess is professor of Computational Linguistics and head of the Institute of Computational Linguistics. PhD at University of Zurch). “How Does Natural Language Quantify?”. <https://www.aclweb.org/anthology/E85-1002.pdf>. Bergen AK

The indefinite article seems, on the surface, to cause much less trouble than the definite article. Its interpretation as an existential quantifier always looked quite straightforward. However, it was noticed (Kamp 1981) that indefinite articles sometimes must be represented as universal quantifiers. Prominent among these cases are the so- called donkey sentences, exemplified by sentences 7 and 8. 7) If Pedro owns a donkey he is rich. 8) If Pedro owns a donkey he beats it. The traditional, and most natural, representation of 7 is 7a 7a) EXISTS X: (donkey(X) AND owns(pedro,X)) IMPLIES rich(pedro). where the top-most syntactic connector of the English sentence, i.e. the conjunction "if", corresponds to the top-most connector of the logical form, i.e. the implication. However, if we apply the same schema mechanically to example 8 it will produce the non-sentence 8a: 8a) EXISTS X: (donkey(X) AND owns(pedro,X)) IMPLIES beats(pedro, X). This is not a logical sentence because the variable "X" in the consequent is outside the scope of the existential quantifier and remains unbound. 8 must therefore be represented as 8b 8b) ALL X: ((donkey(X) AND owns(pedro,X)) IMPLIES beats(pedro, X)) where the indefinite article is now represented as a universal quantifier. Now we are in the most unsatisfactory situation that we have to represent two syntactically very similar surface sentences by two radically different logical sentences, and that the same noun phrase has to be mapped into an existential quantifier one time, into a universal quantifier another time. If we try to consistently represent indefinite articles as universal quantfflers we get 7b as representation for 7 7b) ALL X: ((donkey(X) AND owns(pedro,X)) IMPLIES rich(pedro)). which is indeed logically equivalent to 7a, but on purely formal grounds. The scope has been artificially extended to span over terms without any variables, which certainly runs very much against our intuition about the meaning of the original sentence. The conclusion cannot be avoided that even the seemingly innocuous indefinite article cannot be represented as a straightforward existential quantifier.

#### That applies to the rez – the obligation in the resolution applies directly to the just government, which makes “A” a universal quantifier. Vote neg:

#### 1] Limits – there’s 195 different governments that you could potentially specify, which explodes the number of affs – hypercharged by intra-national governments like the aff – there’s no universal disad to every government since each has different political scenarios so we lose core neg ground like the business confidence DA or the Grids/Police PIC. Limits outweighs – it controls the internal link to the possibility of engagement which turns education.

#### 2] Precision – semantics outweighs pragmatics:

#### A] Anything else allows the aff to jettison words from the resolution to moot neg ground since they’re not bound by the resolution – they’ll say they’re good enough but there’s no brightline for that which justifies straying from the rez always.

#### B] Resolvability—it’s more resolvable to compare semantics because you’re just comparing two definitions, but pragmatics involves weighing between different impacts and how well they connect to voters, which is less resolvable because pragmatics is way more subjective. Resolvability matters because otherwise the judge must intervene to determine a winner which is the worst form of abuse since the debaters can’t control it.

#### C] Jurisdiction – tournament rules mandate that we must defend the resolution, which means the judge doesn’t have the jurisdiction to vote on an advocacy that’s not topical. Fairness is a voter—the judge must vote for the better debater which is impossible if the round is skewed.

#### Drop the debater since drop the arg is severance – restarts the debate so the aff gets 7-6 time skew and too late for new neg offense.

#### Use competing interps—[a] leads to a race to the top where we find the best norms [b] reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention [c] reasonability collapses—you use offense/defense on the paradigm debate.

#### No RVIs—[a] logic – you don’t win for being fair, [b] means you bait theory and go for the RVI

### 2 – K

#### Capitalism is a system engendering massive violence and inevitable extinction – the foundational task is to find a way out – the Role of the Ballot is to endorse the best organizational tactics.

Badiou ‘18

[Alain, former chair of philosophy at the Ecole Normale Superiure, professor of philosophy at The European Graduate School. Translated by David Broder. 07/30/2018. “The Neolithic, Capitalism, and Communism,” <https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/3948-the-neolithic-capitalism-and-communism>] pat

Today, it has become commonplace to predict the end of the human race such as we know it. There are various reasons for such forecasts. According to a messianic kind of environmentalism, the excessive predations of a beastly humanity will soon bring about the end of life on Earth. Meanwhile, those who instead point to runaway technological advances prophesy, indiscriminately, the automation of all work by robots, grand developments in computing, automatically-generated art, plastic-coated killers, and the dangers of a super-human intelligence.

Suddenly, we see the emergence of threatening categories like transhumanism and the post-human — or, their mirror image, a return to our animal state — depending on whether one prophesies on the basis of technological innovation or laments all the attacks on Mother Nature.

For me, all such prophesies are just so much ideological noise, intended to obscure the real peril that humanity is today exposed to: that is to say, the impasse that globalised capitalism is leading us into. In fact, it is this form of society — and it alone — which permits the destructive exploitation of natural resources, precisely because it connects this exploitation to the boundless quest for private profit. The fact that so many species are endangered, that climate change cannot be controlled, that water is becoming like some rare treasure, is all a by-product of the merciless competition among billionaire predators. There is no other reason for the fact that scientific innovation is subject to the question of what technologies can sell, in an anarchic selection mechanism.

Environmentalist preaching does sometimes use persuasive descriptions of what is going on — despite the exaggerations typical of the prophet. But most of the time this becomes mere propaganda, useful for those states who want to show their friendly face. Just as it is for the multinationals who would have us believe — to the greater benefit of their balance sheets — in the noble, fraternal, natural purity of the commodities they are trafficking.

The fetishism of technology, and the unbroken series of "revolutions" in this domain — of which the "digital revolution" is the most in vogue — has constantly spread the beliefs both that this will take us to the paradise of a world without work — with robots to serve us, and us left to idle — and then, on the other hand, that digital "thought" will crush the human intellect. Today there is not one magazine that does not inform its astonished readers of the imminent "victory" of artificial over natural intelligence. But in most cases neither "nature" nor the "artificial" are properly or clearly defined.

Since the origins of philosophy, the question of the real scope of the word "nature" has been constantly posed. "Nature" could mean the romantic reverie of evening sunsets, the atomic materialism of Lucretius (De natura rerum), the inner being of things, Spinoza’s Totality (Deus sive Natura), the objective underside of all culture, rural and peasant surroundings as counterposed to the suspicious artificiality of the towns ("the earth does not lie," as Marshal Pétain put it), biology as distinct from physics, cosmology as compared to the tiny location that is our planet, the invariance of centuries as compared to the frenzy of innovation, natural sexuality as compared to perversion… I am afraid that today "nature" most of all refers to the calm of the villa and the garden, the charm wild animals have for tourists, and the beach or the mountains where we can spend a nice summer. Who, then, can imagine man responsible for nature, when thus far he has just been a thinking flea on a secondary planet in an average solar system at the edge of one banal galaxy?

Since its origins philosophy has also devoted a great deal of thought to Technology, or the Arts. The Greeks meditated on the dialectic of Techne and Physis — a dialectic within which they situated the human animal. They laid the ground for this animal to be seen as "a reed, the weakest of nature, but … a thinking reed." For Pascal, this meant that humanity was stronger than Nature and closer to God. A long time ago, they saw that the animal capable of mathematics would do great things to the order of materiality.

Are these "robots" which they keep banging on about anything more than calculation in the form of a machine? Digits in motion? We know that they can count quicker than us, but it was we who invented them, precisely in order to fulfil this task. It would be stupid to look at a crane raising a concrete pillar up to some great height, use this to argue that man is incapable of the same feat, and then conclude by saying that some muscular, superhuman giant has emerged… Lightning-quick counting is not the sign of an insuperable "intelligence" either. Technological transhumanism plays the same old tune — an inexhaustible theme of horror and sci-fi movies — of the creator overwhelmed by his own creation. It does so either thrilled about the advent of the superman — something we have been expecting ever since Nietzsche — or fearing him and taking refuge under the skirt of Gaia, Mother Nature.

Let’s put things in a bit more perspective.

For four or five millennia, humanity has been organised by the triad of private property — which concentrates enormous wealth in the hands of very narrow oligarchies; the family, in which fortunes are transmitted via inheritance; and the state, which protects both property and the family by armed force. This triad defined our species’ Neolithic age, and we are still at this point — we could even say, now more than ever. Capitalism is the contemporary form of the Neolithic. Its enslavement of technology in the interests of competition, profit and concentrating capital only raises to their fullest extension the monstrous inequalities, the social absurdities, the murderous wars, and the damaging ideologies that have always accompanied the deployment of new technology under the reign of class hierarchy throughout history.

We should be clear that technological inventions were the preliminary conditions of the arrival of the Neolithic age, and by no means its result. If we consider our species’ fate, we see that sedentary agriculture, the domestication of cattle and horses, pottery, bronze, metallic weapons, writing, nationalities, monumental architecture, and the monotheist religions are inventions at least as important as the airplane or the smartphone. Throughout history, whatever has been human has always, by definition, been artificial. If that had not existed, there would not have been Neolithic humanity — the humanity we know — but a permanent close proximity with animal life; something which did indeed exist, in the form of small nomadic groups, for around 200,000 years.

A fearful and obscurantist primitivism has its roots in the fallacious concept of "primitive communism." Today we can see this cult of the ancient societies in which babies, men, women and the elderly supposedly lived in fraternity, without anything artificial, and indeed lived in common with the mice, the frogs, and the bears. Ultimately, all this is nothing but ridiculous reactionary propaganda. For everything suggests that the societies in question were extremely violent. After all, even their most basic survival needs were constantly under threat.

To speak fearfully of the victory of the artificial over the nature, of robot over man, is today an untenable regression, something truly absurd. It is easy enough to answer such fears, such prophesies. For judged by this standard, even a simple axe, or a domesticated horse, not to mention a papyrus covered in symbols, is an exemplary case of the post- or trans-human. Even an abacus allows quicker calculation than the fingers of the human hand.

Today we need neither a return to primitivism, or fear of the "ravages" the advent of technology might bring. Nor is there any use in morbid fascination for the science-fiction of all-conquering robots. The urgent task we face is the methodical search for a way out of the Neolithic order. This latter has lasted for millennia, valuing only competition and hierarchy and tolerating the poverty of billions of human beings. It must be surpassed at all cost. Except, that is, the cost of the high-tech wars so well known to the Neolithic age, in the lineage of the wars of 1914-1918 and 1939-1945, with their tens of millions of dead. And this time it could be a lot more.

The problem is not technology, or nature. The problem is how to organise societies at a global scale. We need to posit that a non-Neolithic way of organising society is possible. This means no private ownership of that which ought to be held in common, namely the production of all the necessities of human life. It means no inherited power or concentration of wealth. No separate state to protect oligarchies. No hierarchical division of labour. No nations, and no closed and hostile identities. A collective organisation of everything that is in the collective interest.

All this has a name, indeed a fine one: communism. Capitalism is but the final phase of the restrictions that the Neolithic form of society has imposed on human life. It is the final stage of the Neolithic. Humanity, that fine animal, must make one last push to break out of a condition in which 5,000 years of inventions served a handful of people. For almost two centuries — since Marx, anyway — we have known that we have to begin the new age. An age of technologies incredible for all of us, of tasks distributed equally among all of us, of the sharing of everything, and education that affirms the genius of all. May this new communism everywhere and on every question stand up against the morbid survival of capitalism. This capitalism, this seeming "modernity," represents a Neolithic world that has in fact been going on for five millennia. And that means that it is old — far too old.

#### History proves an effective right to strike is impossible in liberal capitalist society – courts will water it down and workers will be replaced – but its justification relies on the same tropes of property protection that will be used to delegitimize worker militancy.

White ‘18

[Ahmed, University of Colorado Law School. 2018. “Its Own Dubious Battle: The Impossible Defense of an Effective Right to Strike,” <https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles/1261/>] pat

Like every other aspect of Taft-Hartley, the 1947 amendments to the Wagner Act that directly touched on mass picketing and other forms of strike militancy were strongly supported by the business community, including prominent employers and business associations like the National Association of Manufactures, the American Iron and Steel Institute, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Promoted by these groups, witness after witness regaled the Congress with stories of how mass picketing, along with secondary boycotts and other militant tactics, gave unions too much power, eroded the power of owners and their supervisors, and threatened the American way. Time and again, senators and representatives expressed their support for new restrictions on the right to strike as mandates of a common faith, a commitment of the nation itself, to the principles of property and order. “They are a veritable pronouncement of contempt of law and order, private capitalism, and ownership of property, competition, and everything that even smacks of liberty,” said Ohio Representative Frederick Smith, speaking of NLRB positions that seemed to continence an expansive view of the right to strike. “He has been required to employ or reinstate individuals who have assaulted him and his employees and want only to destroy his property,” said New York Representative Ralph Gwinn, in defense of employers supposedly ravaged by such strikes. Under prevailing law, such employers endured “respectable robbery without liability,” Gwinn said.

We in America prize human individual liberty even above the state. We believe that property rights are natural to man. The best protection of those property rights and of that liberty is in the balancing of the rights of our workers and the rights of our businessmen so that the great majority of our citizens will enjoy that private property and that human liberty,

said Representative Charles Kersten of Wisconsin, condemning mass picketing of the sort that had recently featured at the Allis-Chalmers plants in his state. Consider, too, the remarks of Representative John Robsion of Kentucky:

There have been cases in this country where literally thousands of persons have picketed a plant and engaged in violence. In my honest opinion, labor nor management never did help its cause by engaging in lawlessness, violence, and the destruction of the property of others, and under this bill and the law the company cannot mistreat, browbeat and engage in violence and lawlessness against the workers.

Nor was it only conservatives who joined in this, as evidenced by remarks of Utah Senator Elbert Thomas, who had supported the New Deal and the work of the La Follette Committee, on which he had served, and who had joined with Robert La Follette Jr. in 1939 in sponsoring a pro-labor amendment to the Wagner Act. For a worker, he said,

to interpret his right to strike as being an absolute right, entitling him to quit work while the water is turned on in the plant, for leaving in a mine certain equipment in such a way as to result in costly destruction, would obviously be most improper. No person has a right to do such things. No one has a right to act against society. No one has a right to destroy it.

And so it went, the references to the inviolate values of property and order in defense of the legislation much too numerous to exhaustively cite. It is easy to dismiss these contentions, even from moderates like Thomas, as the contrived utterances of people who were singularly committed to advancing their narrow class and political interests. To some extent, they surely were that. But these views were hardly outside the mainstream of American politics, particularly among elites, broad swathes of the middle class, and important elements of the working class. Indeed, they comported very conveniently with commonplace views about the virtues of property and order and resonated with what much of the public believed at the time—this is what made them so resonant. And whether contrived or not, they performed an important function. By invoking the virtues of property and order in this way, these Congressmen and the witnesses before them who favored restricting mass picketing and other forms of coercive protest were conspicuously able to couch this position as something other than a malicious attack on the “legitimate” rights of labor. Instead, theirs was a mission to realign the labor law with fundamental American values, to save it from those who had allowed labor policies and the habits of union to stray beyond this field. In this way they were able to deflect, if not disprove, the all-too-apt contention by the legislation’s opponents, repeated many times in the process, that what Taft-Hartley was really about was elevating property rights over human rights.

Added proof that strike militancy was actually indefensible can be found in the fact that no scholars would justify it, not even mass picketing—at least not beyond the point at which it became coercive, which was of course the very point at which it was employed in an effective way. In the wake of the Memorial Day Massacre, most all the major papers sided with the police, declaring the strikers enemies of public order who brought the violence upon themselves. Initially, this stance was premised on distorted readings of the events of that day that charged the strikers with various acts of provocation. But even when the La Follette Committee publicized a Paramount Pictures newsreel (which the company had suppressed) and unearthed other evidence that proved that most all of the blame for what happened that day rested on the police, most of the papers still adhered to this reading of the events.

This attitude toward mass picketing was a centerpiece of revived interest in the right to strike in the major papers, one that extended from the mid 1930s into the 1940s and exceeded the surge in interest of the late 1910s and early 1920s. In 1941, for instance, the New York Herald Tribune described pending legislative attempts to limit mass picketing as “too thoroughly justified to require argument.” In 1946 the New York Times summoned up the rhetoric used to condemn the sitdown trikes and declared mass picketing a “seizure” that was “by its very nature illegal because it infringes both individual and property rights.” Conservative though he was, newspaperman David Lawrence, founder of U.S. News and World Report, spoke for many when he declared mass picketing an act of “violence” by which unionists were seeking to take the law into their own hands. In fact, Lawrence’s judgement that mass picketing was an affront to civil liberties aligned with that of the American Civil Liberties Union, long a champion of labor rights, which, as the New York Times was keen to note, also condemned the tactic in these terms.

Such views fit with a broader tendency to criticize the right to strike as being too aggressively employed by unionists and too generously construed by the courts and the NLRB. In the decade between the validation of the Wagner and the passage of Taft-Hartley, newspapers gave voice to a criticism of mass picketing and other erstwhile excessive forms of strike behavior, one that typically described the Wagner Act as having gone too far in protecting workers’ prerogatives to protest. A typical example of the content and tenor of these pieces is a 1941 editorial in the Chicago Daily Tribune:

“The right to strike” is now used frequently to mean the right of union leaders to force men who don’t want to strike to do so. It is used to justify the seizure of industries and the blockading of factories by mass picketing to prevent the entrance of workers who are satisfied with their working conditions and the movement of goods in and out of the plants. “The right to strike” in this sense means not only that every strike is right but that every measure which may be adopted to win a strike is right.

In fact, at this crucial moment it was common for elites of all stripes to claim that they supported the right to strike and yet to assert that it was being abused by unionists who insisted on winning every labor dispute and using coercive and disorderly methods to do so. In 1946, Hebert Hoover, who might well have denied just such a thing fifteen years earlier, inveighed that “Nobody denies that there is a ‘right’ to strike”; but that right, he said, had been abused to the detriment of the public interest. Although considerably more liberal than Hoover, Walter Lippmann, the extremely popular political commentator, offered a similar judgement about a railroad strike that same year, concluding “we must henceforth refuse to regard the right to strike as universal and absolute, and as one of the inalienable rights of man.” Also writing in 1946, Henry Ford II, whose father had used a small army of thugs and toughs to enforce the open shop at his plants and bitterly fought unionization until 1941, now purported at once to support the right to strike—and to believe that it should be limited. “There is no longer any question of the right of organized workers to strike, but that right,” he said, “is being misused.”

Like Taft-Hartley’s supporters in Congress, figures like Hoover, Lippmann, and Ford did not trouble themselves to confess that such tactics as they so blithely condemned might actually be necessary to counterbalance the power of employers and give life and meaning to a statute that did not take adequate account of this basic reality, let alone that they were essential in establishing the idea that workers enjoyed any enforceable right to strike. But they did not have to, either; for they honestly did not believe that labor should generally prevail. Liberal or conservative, it did not matter; these were capitalists in a capitalist society, contented, consistent with their values, with a right to strike that went little further than a right to withhold one’s labor. To be sure, these were not the views of ordinary people. But the public’s perspective did not seem to vary all that much from those of elites. Although overall approval of union membership as measured in Gallup surveys slipped noticeably after 1937, it remained quite high—well above fifty percent right through the 1940s. Nevertheless, Gallup surveys taken in June 1937, after the big wave of sit-strikes had waned noticeably, but while mass picketing and overall levels of labor militancy remained high, revealed that fifty-seven percent supported the proposition that the militia should “be called out whenever strike trouble threatens.”

As with the sit-down strikes, too, the status of mass picketing and other forms of strike militancy can also be gauged by the way these tactics were defended. During the hearings on Taft-Hartley, only a few labor leaders stood against the torrent of criticism of these practices by businessmen, conservative unionists, and congressmen and senators, and tried to parry the move to prohibit the strikes. With only a couple of exceptions, most of them consistently qualified their defense of these tactics by downplaying their coercive qualities—again the very thing that made them so effective in the first place—while also describing them as expedients, presumably temporary, that were justified by the unreasonable stances of some employers.

While the political motivations and implications of this campaign against these forms of strike militancy might be as dubious as the attacks on the sit-down strikes, their value in expressing dominant political judgments concerning these tactics is not. Repeatedly, it was taken for granted that workers could not be allowed to excessively coerce their fellow workers, that they should be obliged to adhere to their contractual obligations, that they did not own the streets or the workplace, and that whatever the right to strike was, it was surely, as Brandeis had insisted, not an absolute right. Of course, all of this was controversial for many unionists. But unionists were almost the only ones to really push back against these measures. Even President Harry Truman’s dramatic veto of Taft-Hartley is widely regarded as a political move taken with the expectation that Congress would override the veto anyway. It is also notable that despite dedicating itself to this aim, the labor movement has never come close to repealing the Taft-Hartley Act, or even securing the enactment of favorable amendments to any of its provisions.

And then there is the replacement worker doctrine where, if anything, the change in the law even more clearly reflected the depth and power of liberal norms. For the rule established in Mackay Radio came out of the blue. It was set forth in a case which required no such question to be resolved, in a manner that drew no support from the text of the Wagner Act, and on the basis of legislative history that was ambiguous at best. Worse, as Getman points out, the rule is in direct conflict with the very statutory principle of barring discrimination on the basis of a worker’s assertion of the basic labor rights laid out in § 7 that it was, itself, supposedly derived from.

As an exercise in statutory construction and administration, Mackay Radio makes no sense; but as a defense of property rights it makes all the sense in the world. One way to see this is to consider what would have happened had the Court decided the matter in a fundamentally different way. If employers were barred from replacing economic strikers, it seems likely that strikes would have proliferated to an extraordinary extent, as workers could at least plausibly have expected to be able to strike under a broad array of circumstances and yet be restored to their jobs no matter the outcome. But precisely because such a doctrine would have given workers so much power, Congress would almost certainly have stepped in with its own rule, codifying employers’ right to permanently replace striking workers and bringing this to an end. Ultimately, it is difficult to imagine a much more liberal alternative to the Mackay Radio rule surviving for very long—a point that also draws support from labor’s failure to repeal the rule in Congress in the early 1990s.

A simple exercise in counterfactual speculation bears similar fruit in regard to other, more basic, limitations on the right to strike, including those imposed relative to sit-down strikes, mass picketing, and secondary boycotts. Shrill and self-interested though it was, all the testimony from employers and their allies during the hearings on Taft-Hartley or Landrum-Griffin about the perils posed by these tactics, was fundamentally correct. For were workers able to make unfettered use of sit-down strikes, mass picketing, and general strikes and sympathy walkouts, they could have very much challenged the sovereignty of capitalists in and about the workplace, and with this the bedrock institutions and norms of liberal society. As Jim Pope puts it, Charles Evans Hughes’ opinion in Fansteel established the maxim that “the employer could violate the workers’ statutory rights without sacrificing its property rights, while the workers could not violate the employer’s property rights without sacrificing their statutory rights.” This is unquestionably true. But equally unquestionable is that neither this court nor any other important arbiter of legal rights in this country was ever prepared to endorse the contrary view that property rights might be sufficiently subordinate to labor rights as to justify the kinds of tactics by which workers could routinely defeat powerful employers on the fields of industrial conflict.

Significantly, there is no reason to believe that any of this has changed or is poised to change today. Quite the contrary: In a culture and political system more immersed than ever in the veneration of order and control, mediated by criminal law and police work, by the celebration of property rights, and by a readiness to punish violence, it is all but unthinkable that the courts or the NLRB would deign to give legal sanction to workers to engage in any sustained way in the kinds of tactics that might make going on strike a worthwhile thing to do.

#### Their patchwork weaving of settler colonialism studies and liberal labor reform cannot be divorced from the academic push toward neoliberalism – indigeneity is coopted as a terrain of new market expansions – this is especially true in the context of their demand for inclusion of indigenous workers in liberal labor organizing, as this is the precise logic of inclusion that neoliberalism pushes for.

Radcliffe ‘15

Sarah A. Radcliffe is a Professor in Latin American Geography at the University of Cambridge and a fellow of Christ's College, Cambridge. Geography and indigeneity. Geography and indigeneity I Indigeneity, coloniality and knowledge] VR

The concept of indigeneity potentially offers an incisive entry-point for analysis of the diverse subjects and institutions who represent themselves or who label (diverse) Others as holding an Indigenous quality. As an analytical concept, indigeneity attends to the social, cultural, economic, political, institutional, and epistemic processes through which the meaning of being Indigenous in a particular time and place is constructed. As this formulation makes clear, analyses seek to account for indigeneity’s production through processual, multi-actor, multi-scalar networks and within specific grounded contexts, each with particular configurations of colonial histories, postcolonial modernities, epistemological-ontological commitments, and formulations of difference.5 Indigeneity is hence a positioning, a relational reading and a producing of difference and subjectivity on/in the body politic that is always embedded in power differentials at multiple scales. Decentring any straightforward category or containment of ‘Indigenous peoples’, the concept signals the need to carefully parse the conditions under which this positioning emerges and how it becomes articulated with positionings of settler, nation-state, development, whiteness, and geographer, among many others. Hence, indigeneity is to Indigenous peoples as cartography is to the earth’s surface: Like maps, indigeneity also functions as a style and manner of representing the outcomes of specific historical and geographical processes as facts, naturalizing the asymmetries of power characteristic of colonialism through the assertion of an essential connection between place and identity.… Indigeneity works as a residual category, referring to everything that existed prior to all that is Western or modern [. Yet such] assumed categories and concepts obscure social processes.… Like maps, indigeneity thus describes a relationship rather than an objective fact, emphasizing the importance of understanding what work those concepts do in terms of the relationships they make possible and what forms of knowledge they produce. (Bryan, 2009: 25) As Joe Bryan’s brilliant riff makes clear, indigeneity can only come into being from contested, geographically- and temporally-fixing processes. Indigeneity is produced by particular people and institutions at particular times in power-drenched ways and, like maps, is selective, interested, highly codified, co-produced through routines and technologies, and entails traceable consequences. So how are we to move forward with indigeneity as a mode of analysis? Selectivity, interests, codification, co-production (perhaps using assemblage theory) and relational articulations seem to be the core analytical tools to hand, each of which I briefly outline and exemplify here. Only particular dimensions of social difference are mobilized as indicators of the quality of indigeneity, in ways that reinforce socio-spatial boundaries. Late liberalism selectively endorses particular features as indicative of a quality of indigeneity (cultural distinctiveness, social networks, environmental knowledges), while demanding of them the necessary configurations of disposition, affect and outlook compatible with hegemonic forms of governance and economy (Andolina et al., 2009; Lindroth and Sinevaara, 2014). Pluri-national Bolivia’s governmentality produces indigeneity as a selective positioning in relation to anti-Western climate activism and territorial sovereignty (Anthias, 2014; Zimmerer, 2015). Such shifting parameters by which to designate indigeneity are intrinsically bound up with the interests and projects of dominant groups – as much as with the constrained mobility of Indigenous subjects to contest their position. Forms of citizenship that interpellate Indigenous peoples hence have to be considered within the wider legal and governance orders within which they are placed. As scholarship now documents in numerous contexts, a (postcolonial) state’s recognition of ethnic diversity or customary justice occurs not on a neutral terrain where Indigenous peoples have equal sovereignty and autonomously determine their social life. As Elizabeth Povinelli so elegantly argues, settler colonialism is predicated upon the ‘governance of the prior’ by which settler legal orders claim sovereignty against which the ‘prior’ subjects’ order is relationally non-legal, invalid and mired in collective obligations (Povinelli, 2011a, 2011b). Indigenous subjects are hence perpetually ambivalent and uncertainly positioned with respect to citizenship, even as legal geographies (protected areas, Indigenous jurisdictions, intercultural education, etc.) proliferate and make Indigenous peoples legible to the state and non-Indigenous publics (e.g. Coulthard, 2014; Yates, 2014; Gombay, 2015). Research has also begun to unpack how dominant interests (continuously referring back to questions of rule generated by coloniality-modernity and settler nation-states) become codified and implemented in particular concatenations, reflecting social norms as well as individual and institutional trajectories. Lester and Dussart (2012) trace how colonial officials experimented with and developed modalities of humanitarian governance over Indigenous peoples throughout the British Empire during the first half of the 19th century. Similarly, policymakers, state employees, staff at multinational corporations, quasi-governmental agencies, bodies of legislation, civil society and third sector organizations, among many others, seek to identify, organize and mobilize indigeneity to specific ends, and thereby enter into complex fields of influence, delimitation and recognition. While indigeneity can offer a means by which to leverage protection over resources in conditions of inequality and dispossession (e.g. LaTorre, 2014), other research demonstrates how the state offers ambivalent spaces. While it may seek to elicit non-standard relational dynamics via Indigenous people, it can simultaneously be ‘working to exclude already existing relational ethics’ (Thomas, 2015: 5; Horowitz, 2015). Nevertheless, decolonial subjects can find (subdued) voice from a position of great ambivalence within settler colonial states (Radcliffe and Webb, 2015). Regimes of managing indigeneity become inexorably bound up with the tools at hand. Whereas Indigenous peoples were controlled historically via routines of education, dress and market rules, geography highlights how new technologies are enmeshed in settler-Indigenous dynamics of spatialization and territorialization, as when the US Bureau of Indian Affairs uses GIS (Palmer and Rundstrom, 2013), the military builds counter-insurgency procedures in part through mapping Indigenous territories (Bryan and Woods, 2015), and when genetic information plays an active role in shaping contests over claim, presence and difference in Asia and North America (McHenry et al., 2013; Simpson, 2014). Late liberalism re-tools coloniality-modernity in its image, demanding types of authenticity, sociality and adaptability from Indigenous subjects (e.g. Lindroth and Sinevaara-Niskanen, 2014). The dimensions of selectivity, interestedness, codification, technologies and governmentalities come together in particular configurations to produce multiply-inscribed embodiments and relationships through which indigeneity is understood and lived. Hence, in contradistinction to readings of indigeneity as relational only with nature (however broadly and post-humanistically nature might be defined), these accounts stress the deeply historical, institutionalized and power-inflected ontologies through which indigeneity emerges. Just as powerful actors have reasons for and means of fashioning indigeneity in their mould, so too those labelled Indigenous often have urgent reasons to challenge or reformulate it. Aspirations for change among those subjects require slow and steady effort to build political action and articulate provisional agendas for political transformation. The production of a subaltern or politicized indigeneity hence requires complex, time-consuming negotiations across language, location, citizenship status, histories of resource control, gender, generation and education between diverse subjects, as the emancipatory valence of indigeneity is neither natural nor automatic. Hence geographers pay attention to the multi-scalar institutional pathways through which Indigenous political demands are devised, shared and create a platform for mobilization. Global international law provides a (albeit universalizing) toolkit where indigeneity is neither a self-evident positionality among citizens nor the basis for governmentality (Baird, 2015). Geographers trace the networks through which Indigenous mobilization jumps scale and co-produces local, national and wider space, by showing how networks rely upon institutionally, culturally and racially heterogeneous actors and institutional bases, all variously positioned vis-à-vis indigeneity (Andolina et al., 2009). According to modernity’s geographical imagination, indigeneity is naturalized by its association with a telluric (almost magnetic) attachment to locale, a once pristine place, a reification that establishes perspectives on Indigenous peoples’ mobility, spatial practices and subjectivities. In order to bypass such rigid spatial assumptions, Povinelli (2011b: 39–40) treats Indigenous subjects and postcolonial nation-states as ‘both … caught in strategic maneuvers around a shared problematic, [both citing] a shared discourse originating in a history that predates both of their emergence’ (as the very notion of ‘Indigenous’ could not exist before conquest).7 The governance of the prior means, however, that settler and Indigenous are ‘not implicated in the same way or to the same ends’ (Povinelli, 2011a: 14). Indeed forced mobility under coloniality/modernity in the name of political, economic and nationalist expansion is intrinsic to indigeneity, reflecting displacement and dispossession and denial of Indigenous co-presence with modernity (Kobayashi and De Leeuw, 2010; Mamani Ramírez, 2011; Rivera Cusicanqui, 2012; Simpson, 2014).8 In such accounts, Indigenous diasporas and urbanization come to the fore as scholarly and public opinion begins to recognize that indigeneity is not on the verge of extinction but coming to a city near you. In a visually striking way, the resource Mapping Indigenous LA documents prior Indigenous habitation in today’s Los Angeles and links neighbourhoods with diverse migrant streams from the Pacific and Latin America. Mobility and diasporas are, it is argued, generators – not destroyers – of indigeneity in the 21st century (Clifford, 2013). However, urban-based constitutions of indigeneity express coloniality-modernity because Indigenous and other actors are not equal contributors to making and unmaking urban citizenship (Walker, 2006; Carpio, 2011; Bessire, 2014). Understanding urban spaces and Indigenous ancestral territories/reservations as relational highlights the ways Indigenous mobility is co-constituted with disempowerment, although Indigenous agency is documented too. Indigenous experiences of urban spaces are precarious and stigmatizing if not erased, and shapes access to and rights over health, housing (including social housing), welfare, public space and political representation (Walker and Barcham, 2010; James, 2012; Christensen, 2013; cf. Peters and Anderson, 2013).

#### Vote neg to join the party – dual power organizing is the only path to revolutionary change.

Escalante ‘18

[Alyson, philosophy at U of Oregon. 08/24/2018. “Against Electoralism, For Dual Power!” <https://theforgenews.org/2018/08/24/against-electoralism-for-dual-power/>] pat

I am sure that at this point, the opportunists reading this have already begun to type out their typical objection: the world is different than it was in 1917, and the conditions of the United States in no way echo the conditions which enabled the Bolsheviks to achieve revolutionary success.

To this tried and true objection, there is one simple answer: you are entirely correct, and that is why we need to abandon electoralism and working within the bourgeois state.

What were the conditions which allowed the Bolsheviks to successfully revolt? The conditions were that of Dual Power. Alongside the capitalist state, there existed a whole set of institutions and councils which met the needs of the workers. The soviets, a parallel socialist government made up of individual councils, successfully took over many governmental responsibilities in some parts of Petrograd. In the radical Viborg district, the Bolshevik controlled soviets provided government services like mail, alongside programs that could meet the needs of workers. When a far right coup was attempted against the provisional government, it was troops loyal to the Bolshevik factions within the soviet who repelled the coup plotters, proving concretely to the workers of Petrograd that the socialists could not only provide for their needs, but also for their defense.

In short: the Bolsheviks recognized that instead of integrating into the bourgeois state, they could operate outside of it to build dual power. They could establish programs of elected representatives who would serve the workers. They would not bolster the capitalist state in the name of socialism, they would offer an alternative to it.

And so, when the time came for revolt, the masses were already to loyal to the Bolsheviks. The only party who had never compromised, who had denounced the unpopular imperialist wars, who had rejected the provisional government entirely, was the party who successfully gained the support of the workers.

And so, many of us on the more radical fringes of the socialist movement wonder why it is the the DSA and other socialist opportunists seem to think that we can win by bolstering the capitalist state? We wonder, given this powerful historical precedent, why they devote their energy to getting more Ocasios elected; what good does one more left democrat who will abandon the workers do for us?

The answer we receive in return is always the same: we want to win small changes that will make life for the workers easier; we want to protect food stamps and healthcare.

And do this, we reply: what makes you think reformism is the only way to do this. When the bourgeois state in California was happy to let black children go to school unfed, the Black Panthers didn’t rally around democratic candidates, they became militant and fed the children themselves. In the 40s and 50s, socialists in New York saw people going without healthcare and instead of rallying behind democratic candidates, they built the IWO to provide healthcare directly. Both these groups took up our pressing revolutionary task: building dual power.

Imagine if all those hours the DSA poured into electing Ocasio were instead used to feed the people of New York, to provide them with medical care, to ensure their needs were met. Imagine the masses seeing socialism not as a pipe dream we might achieve through electing more imperialists, but as a concrete movement which is currently meeting their needs?

The fact is, we are not nearly ready for revolution. Socialists in the United States have failed to meet the needs of the people, and as long as their only concrete interaction with the masses is handing them a voter registration form, they will continue to fail the people. Our task now is not to elect representatives to advocate for the people; it is much more gruelingly laborious than that. Our task is to serve the people. Our task is to build dual power.

The movement to do this is underway. Members of the DSA refoundation caucus have begun to move the left of the DSA in this direct, socialist groups like Philly Socialists have begun to build dual power through GED programs and tenants unions, many branches of the Party For Socialism and Liberation have begun to feed the people and provide for their concrete needs, and Red Guard collectives in Los Angeles have built serve the people programs and taken on a stance of militant resistance to gentrification. The movement is growing, its time is coming, and dual power is achievable within our life time.

The opportunists are, in a sense, correct. We are not where we were in 1917, but we can begin to move in that direction and dual power can take us there. In order to achieve dual power we have to recognize that Lenin was right: there will be no socialist gains by working within state institutions designed to crush socialism. Furthermore, we must recognize that the strategies of the electoral opportunists trade off with dual power. Electing candidates drains resources, time, and energy away from actually serving the people.

And so, we should commit to undertake the difficult and dangerous task of building dual power. We must reject opportunism, we must name the democratic party as our enemy, we must rally around power directly in the hands of the socialist movement. We do not have a parallel system of soviets in the United States. We can change that. Someday the cry “all power to the soviets” will be heard again. Lets make it happen.

#### Marxism provides the best framework for Indigenous emancipation – it’s self-correcting, which means offense against the aff solves itself.

The Red Nation ‘19

[International coalition of Native and non-Native activists, educators, students, and community organizers advocating Native liberation. 09/6/2019. “Revolutionary Socialism is the Primary Political Ideology of The Red Nation”. <https://therednation.org/2019/09/07/revolutionary-socialism-is-the-primary-political-ideology-of-the-red-nation-2/>] pat

Marxism is a tool for making revolution, first and foremost. But it is a useless tool unless wielded properly by the oppressed. Our traditions of Indigenous resistance wield Marxism, not to uphold European traditions, but to emancipate ourselves from the colonizers by destroying that which destroys us, and building and rebuilding our nations according to our traditions and cultures so that our human and nonhuman relations and thus all people may live. And we cannot merely destroy capitalism, without the foresight and knowledge of replacing it with a more humane and just system without rulers and without colonizers. That system is called socialism, which seeks to destroy the class system and the ruling classes, redistribute land and wealth to its proper owners, and restore dignity to the humble people of the earth. Put simply, socialism is people power. Socialism puts people before profits. Socialism aligns with Indigenous traditions of relationality as we seek to be good relatives to other humans and other-than-humans. Socialism is the natural state of humanity, to live and work towards peace and justice.

Communism is the greatest expression of love for the people and our nonhuman relatives. And it is the only solution for a planet on the brink of destruction at the hands of the ruling bourgeoisie and their backwards ideologies and institutions.

1. US imperialism is the number one enemy of the planet.

Our socialism is rooted in Indigenous resistance, African slave rebellions, and European labor history. It is also rooted in the nations of the Tri-Continental—of Asia, Africa, and the Americas—that aligned themselves against the primary enemy of the planet: US imperialism. Indigenous peoples were the first victims of European imperialism and invasion. The US inherited that mantle and has exported the settler colonial project to the rest of the globe by plundering and killing other darker nations. We are internationalists.

As Indigenous nations, who are in the United States but not entirely of it, we align ourselves with the Third World. We seek to end the oppressive relations between European nations and the Third World. This means opposing US imperialism at all turns, denouncing all US imperialist wars, and aligning ourselves with the poorer nations of the world in the defense of their sovereignty and self-determination. The US must get out of everywhere, including Turtle Island!

Global climate change is also not a Third World problem—it’s a first world problem. Nations like the United States consume and produce the most carbon. This concentration of wealth and consumption derives from the histories of African slavery, Indigenous genocide, and European settler colonialism. Thus, the struggle against the multinational oil and gas corporations is an anti-imperialist struggle in which Indigenous nations are leading the fight. But we also recognize that our socialism, our freedom and emancipation, can never come at the expense of our Third World comrades and relatives.

Marx and Engels developed their theories of change and history from the vantage point of the laboring European proletariat. Industrial capitalism, however, didn’t begin solely in the English factory. The hands that picked the cotton that was weaved in English textile mills were African — stolen from their homelands and enslaved by European masters. The land where the cotton grew had to be cleared of Indigenous people and Indigenous title to make way for the plantation economy, the main driving force behind the expansion of modern capitalism. Thus, the expansion of African slavery fueled the dispossession of Indigenous peoples.

US settler colonialism was thoroughly a racial project of genocide and Indigenous elimination, which is an enduring structure that changes over time. After all, even the so-called Five Civilized Tribes who had adopted the plantation economy and African slave system from their European counterparts were themselves dispossessed and extirpated from their lands. And both freed Africans and Indigenous people fought as soldiers and scouts for the US settler wars of extermination against western Indigenous nations and overseas campaigns of conquest. Despite their military service in the US imperialist army, their stations within settler society have always been subordinate to white Europeans. They faced Jim Crow segregation, police violence, mass incarceration, and the continued settler occupation of Indigenous lands. We reject settler colonialism and US imperialism as the means of emancipation for the working class and for colonized people.

Our communist and anti-imperialist principles to which we ascribe are as follows:

1. End the unequal relations between European and colonized nations.

2. End the violent competition between the nations of exploiters and colonizers.

3. End the plunder of the earth for profit.

2. Marxism is not European. Socialism is Indigenous.

Marxism is founded on the expropriated knowledges of non-capitalist Indigenous societies. Although Marx himself was wrong about many things, Marxism, as a science, has a built-in self-correcting mechanism that has helped revolutionaries throughout the world build off the political theory Marx first formulated. If this were untrue, there would be no Russian Revolution, no African Revolution and decolonization movement, no Vietnamese liberation, no Bolivarian Revolution, no Cuban Revolution, no Chinese Revolution, etc. Each adopted Marxism and applied it to its specific and unique circumstances by building off the long struggles against exploitation and European imperialism.

Even for Indigenous peoples in the Americas, the concepts and theories of decolonization explicitly derive from Marxist revolutionary movements. It’s dishonest for us to not recognize this history. It’s not because of Marx or European thinkers that these revolutions were successful. It’s because Marxism is the science of revolution for the poor masses, the colonized, and the wretched of the earth. Fundamentally, Marxism is the science of how to get free. It is the study of class struggle.

If capitalism upholds the systems of racism, settler colonialism, heteropatriarchy, and imperialism, then we cannot use capitalism to undo these systems. It’s not enough to just be anti-capitalist. Like our ancestors we must be forward-thinking by drawing from and amplifying our non-capitalist social relations as Indigenous peoples, not to make Indigenous traditions relevant to Marxism or socialism but to make socialism and Marxism relevant to our struggle as Indigenous peoples.

You cannot fight fire with fire. You cannot fight capitalism with Indigenous capitalism. You cannot fight nationalism with hyper-nationalism. You can only fight fire with water. And the solution to all these ills—and it is what capitalists and colonists hate the most—is socialism. If capitalism is burning the planet, then socialism is the water to douse the flame. Water is life. We all need water to live, but we don’t need capitalism.

And for us to fight colonialism, we must ensure that our nations can live. But our nationalism cannot mirror the bourgeois settler nationalism of colonial states, which is premised on exclusion and white supremacy. We adopt a revolutionary Indigenous nationalism that aligns with the most oppressed and marginalized first, within and outside our own communities. And we recognize that by organizing production—for our food, medicines, resources, etc.—according to need and not profit is the only possible path forward according to our traditions.

The philosophy of communism neatly lines up with the philosophy of our Indigenous ancestors. Friedrich Engels admitted as much when in the 1888 English edition of the Communist Manifesto he added a footnote to the famous line: “The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle.” He clarified, “That is, all written history,” making note specifically of Lewis Henry Morgan’s study of the Haudenosaunee Confederacy, which was a communistic, classless, and democratic society before European invasion. Moreover, it was the relative gender equality of Indigenous societies that inspired the suffragettes — white women seeking parity with white men. The study of Indigenous societies, the inherent equality and freedom they engendered among producers and the common ownership of property and social institutions, also inspired European workers to demand eight-hour workdays and the abolition of child labor. And, in the final analysis, despite their own limited understandings, Marx and Engels, the founders of the modern communist movement, had developed theories of emancipation largely from the expropriated knowledges of Indigenous and communal people, whose examples they relied on to prove that capitalism is neither inevitable nor natural. But, in fact, communism is both natural and inevitable.

This is not to suggest Indigenous societies were utopias — no society is perfect. It is, however, important to understand that Indigenous peoples have been knocked off the path of their natural social development to live in balance and correct relations. We are not trying to recreate the past so much as steer Indigenous nations back on their communal developmental path that has been destroyed or seriously distorted by capitalist social relations.

3. The United States is not a “nation of immigrants” but a nation of colonizers.

Whereas contemporary racial identity politics attempts to mask or obscure class antagonisms, a class struggle that doesn’t overturn white supremacy and settler colonialism frees no one. We are not seeking parity with colonizers or further integration into a colonial system. We’re seeking to end settler and white supremacy entirely over Black, Indigenous, and colonized people. We aim to end the colonial system entirely.

Why? The United States, as a nation of European colonizers, had no feudal or communal past. Unlike other nations in history who transitioned from feudalism to capitalism, the United States was the first nation born entirely as a capitalist state. It was constructed from the ground up according to the nightmare vision of European slave owners and Indian killers — the nation’s founding bourgeois ideologies. The United States began as an oppressor nation, as a colonizer of oppressed people, and its function remains so. It not only has a capitalist ruling class, but all strata and classes of white Europeans among its ranks are encouraged to become preoccupied with the aims of the ruling class through petty racial privileges and private property ownership, the guiding stars of white settler nationalism. We reject those national and settler aspirations and ask our comrades in struggle to reject them as well.

The current US colonial state is not only an instrument of racial and class rule, it is also an instrument of imperialist plunder and the oppressor of nations. It thus obscures its own internal divisions of colonizer and colonized. The United States fabricates national myths by calling itself a “nation of immigrants” to hide its unnaturalness and crimes. Immigrants come to a land to integrate within the existing legal, social, and political orders. The first European settlers came to colonize, to destroy and replace existing Indigenous legal, social, and political orders. The United States is, therefore, more accurately described as a “nation of colonizers.” Immigrants don’t come in chains; you can’t immigrate to a land you already belong to; and refugees fleeing imperialist violence are not immigrants.

We recognize that the colonial state keeps in place irreconcilable class antagonisms, between rich and poor, between settler and Native. The state is first and foremost police and military violence. Its legitimacy is maintained by force. It’s primary function is enforcing capitalist social relations. The veneer of “representative democracy” is only possible because the ruling classes have crushed and will continue to crush any alternative to capitalism by mobilizing the police and military.

In this sense, Indigenous people are the first “Red Scare.” Because we held land in common and represented an alternative to the settler state (whether it be by taking in escaped slaves or mounting armed resistance), we had to be annihilated. Today, because we adopt revolutionary socialism as our struggle and vision for a free society, we are the second coming of the “Red Scare.” But we are not exclusive in our struggles for freedom. We align ourselves with all colonized and oppressed people of the world. Only imperial borders and nation-states that are not of our own making divide our common humanity. Therefore, our struggle transcends the state, but we are not naive enough to turn away from the state as a site of struggle.

We understand that state power is nearly impossible to achieve, since Indigenous peoples are a minority. Yet, in alliance with other colonized and oppressed peoples, we can take state power, not to become the new rulers of a capitalist society, but to use the mechanisms of the state to wage our rightful struggle against our class enemies—the rich. A socialist state uses the power and democracy of the masses to undo the privileges and wealth of the ruling classes and the colonial elite, even among our own people. A socialist state seeks to destroy itself because it is built in the shell of the old. But it has to be wielded by the oppressed in the service of the oppressed to achieve freedom and the abolition of the state itself, because, whether we like it or not, the state is the primary organizer of society. And through a decolonized socialist state, we will reorganize society to redistribute wealth and land by taking it back from those who stole it from us in the first place.

## 1NC – Case