## 1

#### The plan requires [clarifying international space law/ amending the OST]—but that causes strategic bargaining to extract concessions.

Salter 16 [Alexander William Salter is an Assistant Professor of Economics at the Rawls College of Business at Texas Tech University, "SPACE DEBRIS: A LAW AND ECONOMICS ANALYSIS OF THE ORBITAL COMMONS", 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 221 (2016), [https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/19-2-2-salter-final\_0.pdf 12-24-2021](https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/19-2-2-salter-final_0.pdf%2012-24-2021) recut amrita]

V. MITIGATION VS. REMOVAL Relying on international law to create an environment conducive to space debris removal initially seems promising. The Virginia school of political economy has convincingly shown the importance of political-legal institutions in creating the incentives that determine whether those who act within those institutions behave cooperatively or predatorily.47 In the context of space debris, the role of nation-states, or their space agencies, would be to create an international legal framework that clearly specifies the rules that will govern space debris removal and the interactions in space more generally. The certainty afforded by clear and nondiscriminatory48 rules would enable the parties of the space debris “social contract” to use efficient strategies for coping with space debris. However, this ideal result is, in practice, far from certain. To borrow a concept from Buchanan and Tullock’s framework,49 the costs of amending the rules in the case of international space law are exceptionally high. Although a social contract is beneficial in that it prevents stronger nation-states from imposing their will on weaker nation-states, **it also creates incentives for the main spacefaring nations to block reforms that are overall welfare-enhancing but that do not sufficiently or directly benefit the stronger nations.** The 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (more commonly known as the Outer Space Treaty) is the foundation for current international space law.50 All major spacefaring nations are signatories. Article VIII of this treaty is the largest legal barrier to space debris removal efforts. This article stipulates that parties to the treaty retain jurisdiction over objects they launch into space, whether in orbit or on a celestial body such as the Moon. This article means that American organizations, whether private firms or the government, cannot remove pieces of Chinese or Russian debris without the permission of their respective governments. Perhaps contrary to intuition, consent will probably not be easy to secure. A major difficulty lies in the realization that much debris is valuable scrap material that is already in orbit. A significant fraction of the costs associated with putting spacecraft in orbit comes from escaping Earth’s gravity well. The presence of valuable material already in space can justifiably be claimed as a valuable resource for repairs to current spacecraft and eventual manufacturing in space. As an example, approximately 1,000 tons of aluminum orbit as debris from the upper stages of launch vehicles alone. Launching those materials into orbit could cost between $5 billion and $10 billion and would take several years.51 Another difficulty lies in the fact that no definition of space debris is currently accepted internationally. This could prove problematic for removal efforts, if there is disagreement as to whether a given object is useless space junk, or a potentially useful space asset. **Although this ambiguity may appear purely semantic, resolving it does pose some legal difficulties. Doing so would require consensus among the spacefaring nations. The negotiation process for obtaining consent would be costly.** Less obvious, but still important, is the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, normally referred to as the Liability Convention. The Liability Convention expanded on the issue of liability in Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty. Under the Liability Convention, any government “shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its space objects on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft, and liable for damage due to its faults in space.”52 In other words, if a US party attempts to remove debris and accidentally damages another nation’s space objects, the US government would be liable for damages. More generally, because launching states would bear costs associated with accidents during debris removal, those states may be unwilling to participate in or permit such efforts. In theory, insurance can partly remediate the costs, but that remediation would still make debris removal engagement less appealing. A global effort to remediate debris would, by necessity, involve the three major spacefaring nations: the United States, Russia, and China.53 However, any effort would also require—at a minimum—a significant clarification and—at most —a complete overhaul of existing space law.54 One cannot assume that parties to the necessary political bargains would limit parleying to space-related issues. Agreements between sovereign nation-states must be self-enforcing.**55 To secure consent, various parties to the change in the international legal-institutional framework may bargain strategically and may hold out for unrelated concessions as a way of maximizing private surplus.** **The costs, especially the decision-making costs, of changing the legal framework to secure a global response to a global commons problem are potentially quite high.**

#### Russia and China will *absolutely* use negotiations to push for the PPWT—that allows for US satellites to go kaput.

Bowman + Thompson 3-31 [Bradley Bowman is the senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Jared Thompson is a U.S. Air Force major and visiting military analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Russia and China Seek to Tie America’s Hands in Space, 03-31-2021,Foreign Policy,https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/31/russia-china-space-war-treaty-demilitarization-satellites/, 12-24-2021 amrita]

Saying one thing and doing the opposite is, unfortunately, common in international diplomacy. Beijing and Moscow, however, seem to have a unique proclivity for the practice. Consider the actions of the United States’ two great-power adversaries when it comes to anti-satellite weapons. China and Russia have sprinted to develop and deploy both ground-based and space-based weapons targeting satellites while simultaneously pushing the United States to sign a treaty banning such weapons. To protect its vital space-based military capabilities—including communications, intelligence, and missile defense satellites—and effectively deter authoritarian aggression, Washington should avoid being drawn into suspect international treaties on space that China and Russia have no intention of honoring. The Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT), which Beijing and Moscow have submitted at the United Nations, is a perfect example. PPWT signatories commit “not to place any weapons in outer space.” It also says parties to the treaty may not “resort to the threat or use of force against outer space objects” or engage in activities “inconsistent” with the purpose of the treaty.On the surface, that sounds innocuous. Who, after all, wants an arms race in space? The reality, however, is that China and Russia are already racing to field anti-satellite weapons and have been for quite some time. “The space domain is competitive, congested, and contested,” Gen. James Dickinson, the head of U.S. Space Command, said in January. “Our competitors, most notably China and Russia, have militarized this domain.” Beijing already has an operational ground-based anti-satellite missile capability. People’s Liberation Army units are training with the missiles, and the U.S. Defense Department believes Beijing “probably intends to pursue additional [anti-satellite] weapons capable of destroying satellites up to geosynchronous Earth orbit.” That is where America’s most sensitive nuclear communication and missile defense satellites orbit and keep watch. Similarly, Moscow tested a ground-based anti-satellite weapon in December that could destroy U.S. or allied satellites in orbit. That attack capability augments a ground-based laser weapon that Russian President Vladimir Putin heralded in 2018. In a moment of candor, Russia’s defense ministry admitted the system was designed to “fight satellites.” To make matters worse, both countries are also working to deploy space-based—or so-called “on-orbit”—capabilities to attack satellites. Meanwhile, at the United Nations and other international forums, **China and Russia are pushing the PPWT and advocating for a “no first placement” resolution—saying all governments should commit not to be the first to put weapons in space.** Yet more than two years ago, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency noted that both China and Russia were already putting in space capabilities that could be used as weapons. **The PPWT would thus protect their weapons while tying Washington’s hands.** In a thinly veiled attempt to mask their intentions, the two countries claim that their on-orbit capabilities are simply for peaceful purposes—for assessing the condition of broken satellites and conducting repairs as needed**. This “dual-use” disguise permits Beijing and Moscow to put into orbit ostensibly peaceful or commercial capabilities that those countries can actually use to disable or destroy U.S. military and intelligence satellites.** China, for example, has tested several so-called scavenger satellites, which use grappling arms to capture other satellites. China has also demonstrated the capability to maneuver a satellite around the geosynchronous belt, allowing its satellites to sidle up to other satellites in space. Not to be outdone, Russia deployed a pair of “nesting doll” satellites that shadowed a U.S. satellite in space. One Russian satellite birthed another, with Russia’s defense ministry claiming its purpose was to assess the “technical condition of domestic satellites.” But later, the second satellite conducted a weapons test, firing what appeared to be a space torpedo. The Kremlin never explained how a fast-moving one-time projectile provided superior inspection benefits compared with the other Russian satellite flying persistently nearby. A well-crafted treaty that clearly defines acceptable and unacceptable actions in space and includes tough and realistic inspection and verification mechanisms could promote security and stability. But **the PPWT is** decidedly **not that** kind of **treat**y. For starters, the proposed treaty **does not** explicitly **prohibit the ground-based anti-satellite weapons** that China and Russia have already fielded. **Nor does the proposed treaty prevent the deployment of space-based weapons under the cloak of civilian or** **commercial capabilities**. The PPWT also does not prohibit the development, testing, or stockpiling of weapons on Earth that could be quickly put into orbit. Even if these deficiencies were addressed, **the PPWT lacks** any **verification plan to ensure compliance**. Instead, the treaty calls for “transparency and confidence-building measures” implemented on a “voluntary basis.” In other words, Beijing and Moscow want **the U**nited **S**tates **to trust but never verify**.

#### The PPWT prohibits space-based missile defense

Jack M. Beard 16, Associate Professor of Law at the University of Nebraska College of Law, Feb 15 2016, "Soft Law ’s Failure on the Horizon: The International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities", University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Vol. 38, No. 2, 2016, <https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1086&context=spacelaw>

B. Avoid Arms Control Traps in Space

Any successful effort to achieve legally binding restrictions on military activities or weapons in space must focus on specific, definable, and limited objectives or run afoul of issues that have historically ensured deadlock among suspicious and insecure adversaries.306 Some seemingly desirable goals, however, are likely to ensure failure.

The first such problematic goal involves attempting to use arms control agreements or other instruments to comprehensively ensure peace in space. Unfortunately, the integration of modern military systems on earth, sea, air and space guarantees that at some point states seeking to disrupt or deny the ability of an adversary (such as the United States) to project power will find space capabilities to be a particularly appealing target, especially in the early stages of a crisis or conflict.307 The presence of so many things of military value in space thus makes actions by an adversary to neutralize, disrupt or destroy these things likely during a major conflict on earth.308

The second problematic arms control goal in space that seems certain to ensure stalemate involves attempting to define and prohibit military technologies with a view to broadly prevent the weaponization of space. Clearly defining a space weapon for purposes of any legally binding arms control agreement is a daunting task, one which is made particularly challenging by the “essentially military nature of space technology.”309 As noted, space technologies are routinely viewed as dual-use in nature, meaning that they can be readily employed for both civilian and military uses. Determining the ultimate purpose of many space technologies may thus depend on discerning the intentions of states, a process perhaps better suited for psychological than legal evaluation. 310

Further complicating the classification of space military technologies is the inherent difficulty in distinguishing most space weapons on the basis of their offensive and defensive roles or even their specific missions.311 For example, this problem lies at the heart of debates over the status and future of ballistic missile defense (BMD) programs, since the technology underlying BMD systems and offensive ASAT weapons is often indistinguishable.312 Vague and broad soft law instruments do not resolve this problem, but create instead their own confusion and insecurity. Vague and broad provisions in legally binding agreements that do not or cannot distinguish between these missions are similarly problematic.

These issues, particularly difficulties in distinguishing ASAT and BMD systems, have figured prominently in complicating negotiations on space weapons over previous decades.313 Similarly, these concerns were a significant factor in initial U.S. opposition to the arms control measure proposed by China and Russia (the PPWT) since it prohibits states from placing any type of weapon in outer space (regardless of its military mission), thus effectively prohibiting the deployment of ballistic missile defense systems. 314 Furthermore, even if clear legal restrictions could be developed, verifying compliance with respect to technology in orbit around Earth would be very difficult (a point conceded even by China with respect to its own proposed PPWT).315

#### Escalates—extinction.

Shanahan 19[Patrick M. Shanahan is an Acting Secretary of Defense from January to June 2019, previously vice president and general manager of Boeing Missile Defense Systems, Jan 2019, "2019 MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW", US Department of Defense, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jan/17/2002080666/-1/-1/1/2019-MISSILE-DEFENSE-REVIEW.PDF]

U.S. Homeland Missile Defense will Stay Ahead of Rogue States’ Missile Threats Technology trends point to the possibility of increasing rogue state missile threats to the U.S. homeland. Vulnerability to rogue state missile threats would endanger the American people and infrastructure, undermine the U.S. diplomatic position of strength, and could lead potential adversaries to mistakenly perceive the United States as susceptible to coercive escalation threats intended to preclude U.S. resolve to resist aggression abroad. Such misperceptions risk undermining our deterrence posture and messaging, and could lead adversaries to dangerous miscalculations regarding our commitment and resolve. It is therefore imperative that U.S. missile defense capabilities provide effective protection against rogue state missile threats to the homeland now and into the future. The United States is technically capable of doing so and has adopted an active missile defense force-sizing measure for protection of the homeland. DoD will develop, acquire, and maintain the U.S. homeland missile defense capabilities necessary to effectively protect against possible missile attacks on the homeland posed by the long-range missile arsenals of rogue states, defined today as North Korea and Iran, and to support the other missile defense roles identified in this MDR. This force-sizing measure for active U.S. missile defense is fully consistent with the 2018 NPR, and in order to keep pace with the threat, DoD will utilize existing defense systems and an increasing mix of advanced technologies, such as kinetic or directed-energy boost-phase defenses, and other advanced systems. It is technically challenging but feasible over time, affordable, and a strategic imperative. It will require the examination and possible fielding of advanced technologies to provide greater efficiencies for U.S. active missile defense capabilities, including space-based sensors and boost-phase defense capabilities. Further, because the related requirements will evolve as the long-range threat posed by rogue states evolves, it does not allow a static U.S. homeland defense architecture. Rather, it calls for a missile defense architecture that can adapt to emerging and unanticipated threats, including by adding capacity and the capability to surge missile defense as necessary in times of crisis or conflict. In coming years, rogue state missile threats to the U.S. homeland will likely expand in numbers and complexity. There are and will remain inherent uncertainties regarding the potential pace and scope of that expansion. Consequently, the United States will not accept any limitation or constraint on the development or deployment of missile defense capabilities needed to protect the homeland against rogue missile threats. Accepting limits now could constrain or preclude missile defense technologies and options necessary in the future to effectively protect the American people. As U.S. active defenses for the homeland continue to improve to stay ahead of rogue states’ missile threats, they could also provide a measure of protection against accidental or unauthorized missile launches. This defensive capability could be significant in the event of destabilizing domestic developments in any potential adversary armed with strategic weapons, and as long-range missile capabilities proliferate in coming years. U.S. missile defense capabilities will be sized to provide continuing effective protection of the U.S. homeland against rogue states’ offensive missile threats. The United States relies on nuclear deterrence to address the large and more sophisticated Russian and Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities, as well as to deter attacks from any source consistent with long-standing U.S. declaratory policy as re-affirmed in the 2018 NPR.

## 2

#### The affirmative offers a solution: implement [insert aff plan] to secure [insert aff impact]. This is the wrong approach—we exist within a “control society,” where power is exercised not through repression, but continuous control-- frame this round as an interrogation of productivity and desire.

Deleuze 92[Gilles Deleuze was a French philosopher who, from the early 1950s until his death in 1995, wrote on philosophy, literature, film, and fine art. His most popular works were the two volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus, both co-written with psychoanalyst Félix Guattari, Postscript on the Societies of Control on JSTOR, Winter 1992,The MIT press,https://www.jstor.org/stable/778828?seq=1, 12-11-2021 amrita]

The different internments or spaces of enclosure through which the individual passes are independent variables: each time one is supposed to start from zero, and although a common language for all these places exists, it is analogical. On the other hand, **the different control mechanisms are inseparable variations, forming a system of variable geometry the language of which is numerical** (which doesn’t necessarily mean binary). Enclosures are molds, distinct castings, but controls are a modulation, like a self-deforming cast that will continuously change from one moment to the other, or like a sieve whose mesh will transmute from point to point. This is obvious in the matter of salaries: the factory was a body that contained its internal forces at a level of equilibrium, the highest possible in terms of production, the lowest possible in terms of wages; but **in a society of control, the corporation has replaced the factory, and** the corporation is a spirit, a gas. Of course the factory was already familiar with the system of bonuses, but **the corporation works more deeply to impose a modulation of each salary, in states of perpetual metastability** that operate through challenges, contests, and highly comic group sessions. If the most idiotic television game shows are so successful, it’s because they express the corporate situation with great precision. The factory constituted individuals as a single body to the double advantage of the boss who surveyed each element within the mass and the unions who mobilized a mass resistance; but **the corporation constantly presents the brashest rivalry as a healthy form of emulation, an excellent motivational force that opposes individuals** against one another and runs through each, dividing each within. The modulating principle of “salary according to merit**” has not failed to tempt national education itself**. Indeed, just as the corporation replaces the factory, **perpetual training tends to replace the school, and continuous control to replace the examination, which is the surest way of delivering the school over to the corporation**. In the disciplinary societies one was always starting again (from school to the barracks, from the barracks to the factory), while in the societies of control one is never finished with anything—the corporation, the educational system, the armed services being metastable states coexisting in one and the same modulation, like a universal system of deformation. In The Trial, Kafka, who had already placed himself at the pivotal point between two types of social formation, described the most fearsome of juridical forms. The apparent acquittal of the disciplinary societies (between two incarcerations); and the limitless postponements of the societies of control (in continuous variation) are two very different modes of juridical life, and if our law is hesitant, itself in crisis, it’s because we are leaving one in order to enter into the other. **The disciplinary societies have two poles: the signature that designates the individual, and the number or administrative numeration that indicates his or her position within a mass**. This is because the disciplines never saw any incompatibility between these two, and because at the same time power individualizes and masses together, that is, constitutes those over whom it exercises power into a body and molds the individuality of each member of that body. (Foucault saw the origin of this double charge in the pastoral power of the priest—the flock and each of its animals—but civil power moves in turn and by other means to make itself lay “priest.”) **In the societies of control, on the other hand, what is important** is no **longer either a signature or a number, but a code:** the code is a password, while on the other hand the disciplinary societies are regulated by watchwords (as much from the point of view of integration as from that of resistance). The numerical language of control is made of codes that mark access to information, or reject it. **We no longer find ourselves dealing with the mass/individual pair.** Individuals have become “dividuals,” and masses, samples, data, markets, or “banks.” Perhaps it is money that expresses the distinction between the two societies best, since discipline always referred back to minted money that locks gold in as numerical standard, while control relates to floating rates of exchange, modulated according to a rate established by a set of standard currencies. The old monetary mole is the animal of the spaces of enclosure, but the serpent is that of the societies of control. We have passed from one animal to the other, from the mole to the serpent, in the system under which we live, but also in our manner of living and in our relations with others. The disciplinary man was a discontinuous producer of energy, but the man of control is undulatory, in orbit, in a continuous network. Everywhere surfing has already replaced the older sports. Types of machines are easily matched with each type of society—not that machines are determining, but because they express those social forms capable of generating them and using them. The old societies of sovereignty made use of simple machines—levers, pulleys, clocks; but the recent disciplinary societies equipped themselves with machines involving energy, with the passive danger of entropy and the active danger of sabotage; the societies of control operate with machines of a third type, computers, whose passive danger is jamming and whose active one is piracy and the introduction of viruses. This technological evolution must be, even more profoundly, a mutation of capitalism, an already well-known or familiar mutation that can be summed up as follows: nineteenth-century capitalism is a capitalism of concentration, for production and for property. **It therefore erects the factory as a space of enclosure, the capitalist being the owner of the means of production but also, progressively, the owner of other spaces conceived through analogy** (the worker’s familial house, the school). As for markets, they are conquered sometimes by specialization, sometimes by colonization, sometimes by lowering the costs of production. But**, in the present situation, capitalism is no longer involved in production, which it often relegates to the Third World, even for the complex forms of textiles, metallurgy, or oil production. It’s a capitalism of higher-order production.** It no longer buys raw materials and no longer sells the finished products: it buys the finished products or assembles parts. What it wants to sell is services and what it wants to buy is stocks. **This is no longer a capitalism for production but for the product, which is to say, for being sold or marketed. Thus it is essentially dispersive, and the factory has given way to the corporation.** The family, the school, the army, the factory are **no longer the distinct analogical spaces that converge towards an owner—state or private power—but coded figures—deformable and transformable—of a single corporation that now has only stockholders**. Even art has left the spaces of enclosure in order to enter into the open circuits of the bank. The conquests of the market are made by grabbing control and no longer by disciplinary training, by fixing the exchange rate much more than by lowering costs, by transformation of the product more than by specialization of production. Corruption thereby gains a new power. Marketing has become the center or the “soul” of the corporation. We are taught that corporations have a soul, which is the most terrifying news in the world. The operation of markets is now the instrument of social control and forms the impudent breed of our masters. Control is short-term and of rapid rates of turnover, but also continuous and without limit, while discipline was of long duration, infinite and discontinuous. Man is no longer man enclosed, but man in debt. It is true that capitalism has retained as a constant the extreme poverty of three-quarters of humanity, too poor for debt, too numerous for confinement: control will not only have to deal with erosions of frontiers but with the explosions within shanty towns or ghettos.

#### Distinctions between the private and public sphere do not exist-- the affirmative’s theorization of such is the latest tactic of control society to modulate the enunciation of behavior and subjectivity through fascist mechanisms.

Hardt 98 [Michael Hardt is an American political philosopher and literary theorist. Hardt is best known for his book Empire, which was co-written with Antonio Negri. It has been praised by Slavoj Žižek as the "Communist Manifesto of the 21st Century". He is currently a professor of literature at Duke University, The Global Society of Control on JSTOR, Fall 1998, Discourse Vol. 20, No. 3, Gilles Deleuze: A Reason to Believe in this World, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41389503, 12-14-2021 amrita]

There Is No More Outside The passage from disciplinary society to **the society of control is characterized** first of all **by the collapse of** the walls **that defined** the **institutions. There is progressively less distinction,** in other words, between inside and outside. This is really part of a general change in the way that power marks space in the passage from modernity to postmodernity. Modern sovereignty has always been conceived in terms of a (real or imagined) territory and the relation of that territory to its outside. Early modern social theorists, for example,from Hobbes to Rousseau, understood the civil order as a limited and interior space that is opposed or contrasted to the external order of nature. The bounded space of civil order, its place, is defined by its separation from the external spaces of nature. In an analogous fashion, the theorists of modern psychology understood drives, passions, instincts, and the unconscious metaphorically in spatial terms as an outside within the human mind, a continuation of nature deep within us. Here the sovereignty of the Self rests on a dialectical relation between the natural order of drives and the civil order of reason or consciousness. Finally, modern anthropology's various discourses on primitive societies often function as the outside that defines the bounds of the civil world. **The process of modernization**, then, in all these varied contexts, **is the internalization of the outside,** that is, the civilization of nature. In the postmodern world, **however, this dialectic** between inside and outside, between the civil order and the natural order, **has come to an end**. This is one precise sense in which the contemporary world is postmodern. "Postmodernism," Fredric Jameson tells us, "is what **you have when the modernization process is complete and nature is gone for good**."3 Certainly we continue to have forests and crickets and thunderstorms in our world, and we continue to understand our psyches as driven by natural instincts and passions, but we have no nature in the sense that these forces and phenomena are no longer understood as outside, that is, they are not seen as original and independent of the artifice of the civil order. In a postmodern world all phenomena and forces are artificial, or as some might say, part of history. The modern dialectic of inside and outside **has been replaced by a play of degrees** and intensities, of hybridity **and** artificiality. Secondly, the outside **has also declined in terms of** a rather different modern **dialectic that defined the relation between public and private in liberal political theory**. The **public spaces** of modern society, **which constitute the place of liberal politics, tend to disappear** in the postmodern world. According to the liberal tradition, the modern individual, at home in its private spaces, regards the public as its outside. The outside is the place proper to politics, where the action of the individual is exposed in the presence of others and there seeks recognition. In the process of postmodernization, however, **such public spaces are increasingly becoming privatized**. The urban landscape is shifting from the modern focus on the common square and the public encounter to the closed spaces of malls, freeways, and gated communities. The architecture and urban planning of megalopolises such as Los Angeles and Sao Paulo have tended to limit public access and interaction as well as limited chance encounters of different social subjects, creating rather a series of protected interior and isolated spaces. Alternatively, consider how the banlieu of Paris has become a series of amorphous and indefinite spaces that promote isolation rather than any interaction or communication. **Public space has been privatized to such an extent** that **it no longer makes sense to understand social organization in terms of a dialectic between private and public spaces**, between inside and outside. The **place of modern liberal politics has disappeared** **and thus from this optic our postmodern and imperial society** **is characterized by a deficit of the political**. In effect, the place of politics has been deactualized. In this regard, Guy Debord's analysis of the society of the spectacle, thirty years after its composition, seems ever more apt and urgent.4 In postmodern society the spectacle is a virtual place, or more accurately, a non-place of politics. The **spectacle is at once unified** and diffuse in such a way that **it is impossible to distinguish** any inside from outside - the natural from the social, **the private from the public**. The **liberal notion of the public**, the place outside where we act in the presence of others, **has been** both **universalized** (because we are always now under the gaze of others, monitored by safety cameras) **and sublimated** or de-actualized in the virtual spaces of the spectacle. The end of the outside is the end of liberal politics. Finally, from the perspective of Empire, or rather from that of the contemporary world order, there is no longer an outside **also in a** third sense, a properly **military sense**. When Francis Fukuyama claims that the contemporary historical passage is defined by the end of history, he means that the era of major conflicts has come to an end: in other words, sovereign power will no longer confront its Other, it will no longer face its outside, but rather progressively expand its boundaries to envelop the entire globe as its proper domain.5 The history of imperialist, inter-imperialist, and anti-imperialist wars is over. The end of that history has ushered in the reign of peace. Or really, we have entered the era of minor and internal conflicts. Every imperial war is a civil war, a police action- from Los Angeles and Granada to Mogadishu and Sarajevo. **In fact, the separation of tasks between the external and internal arms of power (between the army and the police, the CIA and the FBI) is increasingly vague and indeterminate.** In our terms the end of history that Fukuyama refers to is the end of the crisis at the center of modernity, the coherent and defining conflict that was the foundation and raison d'etre for modern sovereignty. History has ended precisely and only to the extent that it is conceived in Hegelian terms- as the movement of a dialectic of contradictions, a play of absolute negations and subsumption. The binaries that defined modern conflict have become blurred. The Other that might delimit a sovereign Self has become fractured and indistinct, and there is no longer an outside that can bound the place of sovereignty. At one point in the Cold War, in an exaggerated version of the crisis of modernity, every enemy imaginable (from women's garden clubs and Hollywood films to national liberation movements) could be identified as communist, that is, part of the unified enemy. The outside is what gave the crisis of the modern and imperialist world its coherence. **Today it is increasingly difficult for the ideologues of the United States to name the enemy, or rather there seem to be minor and elusive enemies everywhere.6 The end of the crisis of modernity has given rise to a proliferation of minor and indefinite crises in the imperial society of control, or as we prefer, to an omni-crisis.** It is useful to remember here that the capitalist market is one machine that has always run counter to any division between inside and outside. The capitalist market is thwarted by exclusions and it **thrives by including always increasing numbers within its sphere**. Profit can only be generated through contact, engagement, interchange, and commerce. The realization of the world market would constitute the point of arrival of this tendency. In its ideal form there is no outside to the world market: the entire globe is its domain.7 We might use the form of the world market as a model for understanding the form of imperial sovereignty in its entirety. Perhaps, just as Foucault recognized the panopticon as the diagram of modern power and disciplinary society, the world market might serve adequately (even though it is not an architecture; it is really an anti-architecture) as the diagram of imperial power and the society of control.8 The striated space of modernity constructs places that are continually engaged in and founded on a dialectical play with their outsides**. The space of imperial sovereignty, in contrast, is smooth. It might appear that it is free of the binary divisions of modern boundaries, or striation, but really it is criss-crossed by so many fault lines that it only appears as a continuous, uniform space. In** this sense, the clearly defined crisis of modernity gives way to an omnicrisis in the imperial framework. In this smooth space of empire, there is no place of power- it is both everywhere and nowhere. The empire is an u-topos , or rather a non-place.

#### This may seem innocuous, but it creates a war on difference, a new totalitarian model that is premised upon reactive orientations to desire, leaving only a simulation of political participation creating fascism-- that turns case.

Karatzogianni and Robinson 13. [Athina Karatzogianni is a Senior Lecturer in Media and Communication at the University of Leicester (UK), Andrew Robinson is an independent researcher and writer, “Schizorevolutions vs. Microfascisms: A Deleuzo-Nietzschean Perspective on State, Security, and Active/Reactive Networks,” Selected Works, July 2013, http://works.bepress.com/athina\_ karatzogianni, 8-17-2019, amrita]

Thesis 2: The threatened state transmutes into the terror state. The return of state violence from the kernel of state exceptionalism is a growing problem. It is grounded on a reaction of the terrified state by conceiving the entire situation as it is formerly conceived specific sites of exception and emergency (c.f. Agamben, 1998, 2005). New forms of social control directed against minor deviance or uncontrolled flows are expanding into a war against difference and a systematic denial of the ‘right to have rights’ (Robinson, 2007). The project is not simply an extension of liberal-democratic models of social control, but breaks with such models in directly criminalizing nonconformity from a prescribed way of life and attempting to extensively regulate everyday life through repression. This new repressive model, expressing a kind of neo-totalitarianism, should be taken to include such measures and structures as the rise of gated communities, CCTV, RFID, ID cards, ASBOs, dispersal zones, paramilitary policing methods, the ‘social cleansing’ of groups such as homeless people and street drinkers from public spaces, increasing restrictions on protests and attacks on ‘extremist’ groups, the use of extreme sentencing against minor deviance, and of course the swathe of “anti-terrorism” laws which provide a pretext for expanded repression. This increasingly vicious state response leads to extremely intrusive state measures. The magazine Datacide analyses the wave of repression as ‘the real subsumption of every singularity in the domain of the State. From now on if your attributes don't quite extend to crime, a judge's word suffices to ensure that crime will reach out and embrace your attributes’ (Hyland n.d.). To decompose networks, the state seeks to shadow them ever more closely. The closure of space is an inherent aspect of this project of control. While open space is a necessary enabling good from the standpoint of active desire, it is perceived as a threat by the terrified state, because it is space in which demonised Others can gather and recompose networks outside state control. Hence, for the threatened state, open space is space for the enemy, space of risk. Given that open space is in contrast necessary for difference to function (since otherwise it is excluded as unrepresentable or excessive), the attempts to render all space closed and governable involve a constant war on difference which expands ever more deeply into everyday life. As Guattari aptly argues, neoliberal capitalism tends to construe difference as unwanted ‘noise’ (1996: 137). Society thus becomes a hothouse of constant crackdowns and surveillance, which at best simulates, and at worst creates, a situation where horizontal connections either cannot emerge or are constantly persecuted. Theories such as those of Agamben and Kropotkin show the predisposition of the state to pursue total control. But why is the state pursuing this project now? To understand this, one must recognise the multiple ways in which capitalism can handle difference. Hence, there are two poles the state can pursue, social-democratic (adding axioms) or totalitarian (subtracting axioms), which have the same function in relation to capitalism, but are quite different in other regards. State terror involves the replacement of addition of axioms (inclusion through representation) with subtraction of axioms (repression of difference). This parallels the distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power in international relations. Crucially, ‘hard’ power is deflationary (Mann 2005: 83-4). While ideological integration can be increased by intensified command, ‘soft’ power over anyone who remains outside the dominant frame is dissipated. Everyday deviance becomes resistance because of the project of control which attacks it. It also becomes necessarily more insurrectionary, in direct response to the cumulative attempts to stamp it out through micro-regulation. What the state gains in coercive power, it loses in its ability to influence or engage with its other. But the state, operating under intense uncertainty and fear, is giving up trying to seem legitimate across a field of difference. A recent example of this concerns the treatment of whistleblowers: Bradley [Chelsea] Manning and by extent the publisher Julian Assange in the WikiLeaks case (for a discussion of affect see Karatzogianni, 2012) and Edward Snowden in relation to the recent revelations about NSA surveillance program PRISM (Poitras and Greenwald’s video Interview with Edward Snowden, 9 June 2013). This is not to say that it dispenses with articulation. It simply restricts it tautologically to its own ideological space (Negri 2003: 27). Legitimation is replaced by information, technocracy and a simulation of participation (Negri 2003: 90, 111.). There is a peculiarly close relationship between the state logic of command and the field of what is variously termed ‘ideology’ (in Althusser), ‘mythology’ (in Barthes) and ‘fantasy’ (in Lacan): second- order significations embedded in everyday representations, through which a simulated lifeworld is created, in which people live in passivity, creating their real performative connection to their conditions of existence and bringing them into psychological complicity in their own repression. Such phenomena are crucial to the construction of demonised Others which provides the discursive basis for projects of state control. ‘[Conflict is] deflected... through the automatic micro-functioning of ideology through information systems. This is the normal, ‘everyday’ fascism, whose most noticeable feature is how unnoticeable it is’ (Negri 1998a: 190). In denial of generalisable rights, the in-group defines social space for itself and itself alone. The result is a denial of basic dignity and rights to those who fall outside "society", who, in line with their metaphysical status, are to be cast out, locked away, or put beyond a society defined as being for "us and us only" (the mythical division between social and anti-social). The neo-totalitarian state resurrects the tendency to build a state ideology, but this ideology is now disguised as a shared referent of polyarchic parties and nominally free media. Failing to think in statist terms is no longer any different from criminal intent. Romantically crossing an airport barrier for a goodbye kiss is taken as a major crime, for the state, being terrified, responds disproportionately; the romantic is blamed for producing this response (Baker and Robins, 2010). He should have thought like the state to begin with, and not corrupted its functioning with trivialities such as love. Such is the core of the terror-state: constant exertion of energy to ward off constant anxiety, at the cost of a war on difference. Networks under Threat - Network Terror Thesis 3: Networked movements escape the state-form. Thesis 4: State terror targets and terrifies movements. Thesis 5: Movement terror is an outcome of state terror against movements. At the intersection of the threatened state and the sources of its anxiety lies the collapse of marginal integration and ‘addition of axioms’ in neoliberalism. Capitalism has been clenching its fists on the world for some time, and many spaces and people are falling through its fingers. The formal sector of the economy is shrinking, leaving behind it swathes of social life marginalized from capitalist inclusion. Much of the global periphery is in effect being forcibly ‘delinked’ from the world economy as inclusion through patronage is scaled down due to neoliberalism. For instance, ‘Sub-Saharan Africa has almost dropped out of the formal international economy’ (Mann, 2005: 55-6). Religious, militia and informal economic organisations have replaced the state on the ground across swathes of Africa, and ‘whole regions have now become virtually independent, probably for the foreseeable future, of all central control’ (Bayart, Ellis and Hibou, 1999: 19-20). These spaces are the locus of the state’s fear of ‘black holes’ where state power breaks down and insurgents can flourish (Korteweg, 2008; Innes, 2008). On a human scale, exclusion, or ‘forced escape’, is even more noticeable. Arif Dirlik argues that capitalism controls enough resources that it no longer needs to control the majority of people; it can simply ignore and exclude four-fifths of the world (1994: 54-5). William Robinson refers to a new stratum of ‘supernumeraries’ in countries like Haiti, who are completely marginalised from production, useless to capitalism and prone to revolt (1996: 342, 378). This became even more evident with the extreme recent seismic event in January 2010 a paradigmatic failure to save lives. This stratum is another locus of the state’s fears. Such people are in Žižek’s terms the ‘social symptom’ of the current world order, ‘the part which, although inherent to the existing universal order, has no ‘proper place’ within it’ (Žižek, 1999, p. 224). Hence, as Caffentzis puts it, ‘Once again, as at the dawn of capitalism, the physiognomy of the world proletariat is that of the pauper, the vagabond, the criminal, the panhandler, the refugee sweatshop worker, the mercenary, the rioter’ (1992: 321). Viewed in affirmative terms, these excluded sites and peoples are associated with the network form. The last few decades have seen a proliferation of network-based movements -- some emancipatory, others less so -- drawing their membership from marginalised groups and creating autonomous zones in marginal spaces. In the South, such movements often grow out of the everyday networks of survival which ‘provide an infrastructure for the community and a measure of functional autonomy’ (Hecht and Simone, 1994: 14-15; c.f. Lomnitz, 1977; Chatterjee 1993). The discontented excluded lie at the heart of today’s asymmetrical wars. For instance, Giustozzi has investigated the origins of the Pakistani Taleban, revealing that it flourishes mainly among young people who do not receive ‘peace, income, a sense of purpose, a social network’ from the established structure of tribal power (Giustozzi 2007: 39), while Watts (2007) has referred to what is known locally as the ‘restive youth problem’ as central to the conflict in the Niger Delta. One can also refer here to mass protest revolts such as those in Greece and the French banlieues, and spectacular revolts against state power in which police stations and state symbols are attacked, such as the Boko Haram revolt in Nigeria and the uprising of Primero Comando da Capital (PCC) in Sao Paolo. Ignoring for the moment the distinctions among such movements, their vitality can clearly be traced to their networked and marginal loci. Resisting or eluding the terror-state’s grab for space, horizontal networks flow around the state’s restrictions, moving into residual unregulated spaces, gaps in the state’s capacity to repress, across national borders, or into the virtual. Repression drives dissent from open to clandestine forms, creating a field of diffuse resistance and deviance, which ‘returns’ as intractable social problems and inert effects**.**

#### The [insert aff plan] is doomed to failure if it is tied to discussions of [insert aff impact scenario]. Space has the radical potential to be different and you should affirm a subversion of their politic—no perms.

Battaglia 12 [Debbora Battaglia is a professor at Mount Holyoke College. “Arresting hospitality: the case of the 'handshake in space,” The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, Vol. 18, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41506671>., 12-14-2021 amrita]

Towards an extra-territorial ethics of hospitality While acknowledging that anthropologists of play and ludic limits could have a field day with some of this paper's ethnographic material,26 I have tried to do something more far-reaching here – seeking in the complex exchanges of various natural, techno- cultural, and social force-fields the features of an extra-territorial ethics of hospitality, for shaping possible nature-culture futures on the ground. Circling by degrees around 'handshake' scenarios that are basically all about social relations crafted in small actions of non-sovereignty, I seek to posit the diplomatic strategy of suspending welcome as an emblematic action of denying power claimed in the name of territory (Boden)27: Apollo and Soyuz may have sourced to state structures and geopolitical security concerns, but the project could go beyond these. Denying rights to hosting, authoring, or authorizing hospitality other than mutually (as we saw in the hard fact of androgynous technology and manoeuvres for mutual rescue), astronauts and cosmonauts replaced sovereign claims to space with their own relational code — one in which 'the welcomed guest is treated as a friend or ally, as opposed to the stranger treated as an enemy (friend/enemy, hospitality/hostility)' (Derrida 2000: 4). But the ethnography exceeds Derrida's anthropocentrism. Because both spacecraft and humans are as much of space as in it, we are moved to appreciate the value of cutting 'guest' and 'host' free to engage nature-culture relations. To take up sidelong the point that Agamben (2005) carries forward from Carl Schmitt for defining sovereignty, space-as-itself is here the only possible sovereign power: that to which exceptions to human laws source. It is in this sense that the cosmonauts and astronauts of Apollo-Soyuz were acting both humbly and boldly as 'little gods' who would deny a politics of territory a place of privilege in space or on Earth, even as the nations to which they owed their allegiance committed to this value officially in rhetorics of colonization and/or conquest. It is thus that space creates space for a God concept in the company of which both religious orthodoxies and orthodox science can only be uncomfortable (cf. Derrida 2002). It follows that forms of civility become visible in this instance as protentive actions for laws not only in suspension but in submission to space-as-itself — the extreme testing-ground of laws beyond arbitrage, by which the values of the nominal are not only appreciated but strongly felt, as fieldworking astronauts' and cosmonauts' first-person narratives show. Long-duration space station missions enabled by the techno-logical advances of ASTP will in future lend their micro-spaces more readily to narratives and images of sovereignty, including the sovereignty of property. But not in the spacetime of the welcome withheld. It is because purposeful ruptures of nominal conduct interfere with nature-culture business-as-usual that hospitality can abide there, as it were in the aporia. Beyond being merely tolerated, gifts of disruption within insider space communities seized the moment for ‘worlding’ differently than by fixed rules of engagement. Bruno Latour writes in War of the worlds: what about peace?, ‘Modernism distinguishes itself from its successor—what should it be called? "Second modernity"? ... — in this one small respect: from now on the battle is about the making of the common world and the outcome is uncertain. That's all. And that's enough to change everything’ (2002: 33, emphasis added). Derrida takes this anthropological turn when he speaks of hospitality arising not from 'the love of man as a sentimental motive' — it is not about philanthropy — but (quoting Kant) from 'the right of a stranger not to be treated with hostility when he arrives on someone else's territory'. Hospitality is to be thought of as a universal ‘obligation, a right, and a duty all regulated by law’ (2000: 4).28 And this is more or less precisely stated by the USSR Command Centre spokesperson in a post-flight statement to the world press: The flight was conducted in accordance with an agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America. This document foresaw the execution of projects for the creation of joint means of motion and docking of the Soviet and American manned spacecraft and stations, with the purpose of increasing the safety of spaceflights and securing the possibility of realizing in the future joint scientific experiments.29