## CP

#### CP: The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust in all instances except Active Debris Removal.

#### Governments ought to permit the appropriation of outer space for designated safety zones and tech stationing for active debris removal by private entities.

#### Debris removal is necessary and only private entities have the incentive and capability to do it.

**Giordano 21** (David Giordano is the Vice President of Mentorship for CBLA. Elsewhere at Columbia Law School, he serves on the Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, and is the Treasurer of Columbia OutLaws. During his 1L Summer, David was an intern at the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Division of Corporation Finance. Prior to law school, David worked as a Corporate Paralegal at the New York office of Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP. David attended The George Washington University where he obtained a B.A. in psychology. “Space Debris: Another Frontier in the Commercialization of Space”. October 31, 2021.)

As **satellites** and other projectiles blast into orbit, upon collision they **can disintegrate into** shards, sometimes just centimeters wide, that remain in orbit, risking further collision. Hollywood captured the potential perils of **fairly large pieces of space debris** in the opening minutes of the 2013 film [*Gravity*](https://www.warnerbros.com/movies/gravity), where space junk threatens the lives of astronauts on a mission. Outside the realms of fictional space-thrillers, **even the smallest pieces of space junk can present real danger**. In 2016, a tiny piece of **space junk**, believed to be a paint chip or a piece of metal no more than a few thousandths of a millimeter across, [cracked the window of the International Space Station](https://www.popsci.com/paint-chip-likely-caused-window-damage-on-space-station/). In May 2021, a piece of space **debris** [punctured](https://www.nbcnews.com/science/space/space-junk-damages-international-space-stations-robotic-arm-rcna1067) **the robotic arm of the I**nternational **S**pace **S**tation. This is seriously concerning, as, [according to the European Space Agency](https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Clean_Space/How_many_space_debris_objects_are_currently_in_orbit), there are 670,000 pieces of space debris larger than 1cm and 170,000,000 between 1mm and 1cm in width. Unfortunately, **public action and policy struggles to keep up with these risks**. International law affords little clarity on the problem, as its control is a novel, [emerging field](https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/08/23/1032386/space-traffic-maritime-law-ruth-stilwell/) with many technical [tracking](https://www.space.com/space-situational-awareness-house-hearing-february-2020.html) and [removal](https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/space-junk-removal-is-not-going-smoothly/#:~:text=There%20is%20no%20doubt%20that,antisatellite%20weapon%2C%E2%80%9D%20she%20says.) challenges. **None of the existing space treaties** [directly tackle the issue](https://oxfordre.com/planetaryscience/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190647926.001.0001/acrefore-9780190647926-e-70), rendering [responsibility for it](https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss1/6/) ambiguous. Absent such responsibility, [legal incentives are non-existent](https://www.courthousenews.com/lack-of-space-law-complicates-growing-debris-problem/)**.** [Guidelines are occasionally issued](https://www.unoosa.org/pdf/limited/l/AC105_2014_CRP14E.pdf) by international governing bodies, but provide little legal significance and are [more targeted at the practicalities of tracking and removal](https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss1/6/). The nation best positioned to notify space actors of collision risks is the United States, and the burden of that task currently falls on the [Department of Defense](https://www.govexec.com/media/d1-mission-space.pdf). However, the Trump administration issued a [directive in 2018](https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/18/national-space-council-trump-signs-space-debris-directive.html), shifting the responsibility from the DoD to the Department of Commerce, and the [transition has yet to materialize](https://www.govexec.com/media/d1-mission-space.pdf), leaving DoD struggling to keep pace [with increasing commercial activity](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/aerospace-and-defense/our-insights/look-out-below-what-will-happen-to-the-space-debris-in-orbit). In the face of public paralysis, **addressing the problem through industry looks more and more attractive.** This has led some to call for a new legal order that still leaves room for government, but reframes who the rules exist to serve. Rather than our current, rudimentary treaty regime designed to [prevent international conflict](https://www.theverge.com/2017/1/27/14398492/outer-space-treaty-50-anniversary-exploration-guidelines), [commentators](https://space.nss.org/wp-content/uploads/NSS-Position-Paper-Space-Debris-Removal-2019.pdf) have called for an additional regime resembling [maritime law](https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/08/23/1032386/space-traffic-maritime-law-ruth-stilwell/) that preserves the interests of a more diverse set of stakeholders, including those in the future that can bring technology and interests to space that may not yet exist. These commentators shun the common conception that space regulation should resemble air-traffic control, which is suited to a narrower set of uses (transport). Under such a “maritime” regime, the light touch of central regulatory bodies, and perhaps their non-existence, is preferred, just as it has been on the seas. This way, individual nations have a degree of flexibility in instituting controls they see fit while leaving room for industry to address problems and introduce new uses for space. Furthermore, **governments seem ready and willing to construct the legal and incentive framework in concert with such private action.** [In a joint statement this summer](https://www.gov.uk/government/news/g7-nations-commit-to-the-safe-and-sustainable-use-of-space), **G7 members expressed openness to resolving** the technical aspects of the **debris** problem **with private institutions, and there is** some **promising progress**. Apple co-founder [Steve Wozniak](https://www.space.com/apple-cofounder-steve-wozniak-space-junk-company) signaled his plans to address the problem through a new company with a telling name: Privateer Space. **Astroscale**, a UK-based company, successfully **launched a pair of satellites** in the Spring of 2021 [that will remove certain space debris from orbit](https://astroscale.com/astroscale-celebrates-successful-launch-of-elsa-d/)**.** Astroscale also [stated their desire](https://astroscale.com/space-sustainability/) to work with governments and international governing bodies to craft policy with private efforts to control the problem top of mind. In light of public policy’s silence on space debris, the initiative of actors like Astroscale involving themselves in policy may be advised, as it could [promote further private investment](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1NCO5Vvjf-kgoZLNfgaOn4bDj_CAfyD1Qhz2oW3TrcHc/edit) in technology for space **debris removal**. A popular [policy recommendation](https://reason.org/policy-brief/u-s-space-traffic-management-and-orbital-debris-policy/) among experts is the establishment of public-private partnerships, and Astroscale has entered several such agreements including with [Japan](https://www.satellitetoday.com/in-space-services/2021/07/27/space-clean-up-company-astroscale-signs-partnerships-with-mhi-and-japanese-government/) and the [European Space Agency](https://spacenews.com/astroscale-clearspace-aim-to-make-a-bundle-removing-debris/). Other **actors include** [ClearSpace](https://www.space.com/esa-startup-clearspace-debris-removal-2025)**,** [OneWeb](https://www.hou.usra.edu/meetings/orbitaldebris2019/orbital2019paper/pdf/6077.pdf)**, and** [D-Orbit](https://www.satellitetoday.com/in-space-services/2021/09/10/esa-awards-d-orbit-uk-contract-for-debris-removal-demonstration/)**.** Some may want to push back against further private involvement. The congestion of space is, in part, industry’s fault, and if we conceptualize orbital space as a common resource, it might be right to fear the effects of the [Tragedy of the Commons](https://www.britannica.com/science/tragedy-of-the-commons). Critics may seek to bolster international treaties, give legal teeth to the guidelines occasionally issued by the UN, and preserve the public posture of the heavens. These may be welcome adjustments, but unlike a pond that industry overfishes or a well that industry dries up, here industry is working to add more fish and water. Moreover, governments stand to benefit from this private decluttering, as well, as [they are expected](https://astroscale.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Reg-V-Development-of-Global-Policy-for-Active-Debris-Removal-Services-v2.0.pdf) to be major customers of some of these private actors. As for the public posture, space has long been a commercial place. Telecommunications companies and government contractors historically depend on space. As the number of commercial satellites set to launch skyrockets, it seems natural to craft policies that are responsive to their interests and provide incentives to remedy issues created in the course of spacefaring, such as space debris. **In light of the** long silence of international law on such issues and the demonstrated **motivation by private actors**, **space debris represents the latest frontier in the abdication of space from the public concern to the private.**

#### Appropriation means to take possession

Dictionary ND, Dictionary.com, “appropriation”, <https://www.dictionary.com/browse/appropriation>, DD AG

the act of appropriating or taking possession of something, often without permission or consent.

#### Orbital Capture requires taking possession of space junk

Mathewson 21, Samathna Mathewson, May 16, 2021, Samantha Mathewson joined Space.com as an intern in the summer of 2016. She received a B.A. in Journalism and Environmental Science at the University of New Haven, in Connecticut. Previously, her work has been published in Nature World News. When not writing or reading about science, Samantha enjoys traveling to new places and taking photos! You can follow her on Twitter @Sam\_Ashley13.  “ESA partners with startup to launch first debris removal mission in 2025” <https://www.space.com/esa-startup-clearspace-debris-removal-2025> Livingston RB

The recent fall to Earth of a massive Chinese rocket has renewed concerns about the perils of space junk and one project from the European Space Agency might be able to help.

The European Space Agency (ESA) announced plans to launch a [space debris](https://www.space.com/16518-space-junk.html) removal mission in 2025 with the help of a Swiss start-up called ClearSpace. The mission, [dubbed ClearSpace-1](https://www.space.com/esa-space-junk-removal-kamikaze-robot.html), will use an experimental, four-armed robot to capture a Vega Secondary Payload Adapter (Vespa) left behind by [ESA's Vega launcher](https://www.space.com/vega-rocket-launch-rideshare-mission-webcast.html) in 2013. The piece of space junk is located about 500 miles (800 kilometers) above Earth and weighs roughly 220 lbs. (100 kilograms).  "Think of all of the orbital captures that have occurred up until this point and they have all taken place with cooperative, fully-controlled target objects," Jan Wörner, ESA Director General at the time, [said in a December statement](https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/ESA_purchases_world-first_debris_removal_mission_from_start-up) from the space agency. "With space debris, by definition no such control is possible: instead the objects are adrift, often tumbling randomly." ESA recently signed a $104 million (€86 million) contract with ClearSpace to accomplish this feat. The team will use the ClearSpace-1 robot to [capture Vespa](https://www.space.com/20960-europe-vega-rocket-launch-tonight.html) from low Earth orbit and drag it down into Earth's atmosphere, where both spacecraft will burn up. If all goes according to plan, the mission will be the first removal of a previously generated piece of space debris from orbit, according to the statement. "This first capture and disposal of an uncooperative space object represents an extremely challenging achievement," Wörner said in the statement. "With overall satellite numbers set to grow rapidly in the coming decade, regular removals are becoming essential to keep debris levels under control, to prevent a cascade of collisions that threaten to make the debris problem much worse."

Low Earth orbit is [cluttered with debris](https://www.space.com/space-situational-awareness-house-hearing-february-2020.html), ranging from inactive satellites to the upper stages of launch vehicles and discarded bits left over from separation. These pieces of space junk move at tens of thousands of miles per hour and could collide with and cause damage to active satellites and spacecraft in their path.

#### Even stopping new launches doesn’t solve, but a small reduction every year does

**ESA no date**, European Space Agency, “Active debris removal” The European Space Agency (ESA) is Europe’s gateway to space. Its mission is to shape the development of Europe’s space capability and ensure that investment in space continues to deliver benefits to the citizens of Europe and the world. <https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Space_Debris/Active_debris_removal> Livingston RB

Limiting launch rates neither feasible nor helpful Therefore, limiting the launch rate or a further reduction of the allowed lifetime in orbit after the end of the mission (which would be two options to reduce the overall number of intact objects in space) do not seem feasible, because they cannot be mandated. For all new objects, strong compliance with post-mission mitigation measures would allow maintaining the number of intact objects at a level similar to the current one, and avoid having to deal with more objects in addition to those already in orbit. Therefore, in order to reduce the number of big objects in LEO, the only option is to actively remove large objects now in orbit and having a long remaining lifetime in space. This would provide several benefits: The most critical objects (those that would generate the most fragments in case of any collision, and that have a higher collision risk) could be removed from the environment first; Decommissioned objects could also be removed; A controlled deorbit could be performed (as large removal targets typically are also most critical in terms of on-­ground risk). Studies at ESA and NASA show that with a removal sequence planned according to a target selection based on mass, area, or cumulative collision risk, the environment can be stabilised when on the order of 5–10 objects are removed from LEO per year (although the effectiveness of each removal decreases as more objects are removed).

#### Their own ev says only we solve

#### 1] Megaconstellations make management impossible

Boley/Byers, 5/20/2021 – University of British Columbia Professors

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Aaron C. Boley & Michael Byers, “Satellite mega-constellations create risks in Low Earth Orbit, the atmosphere and on Earth”, Scientific Reports volume 11, Article number: 10642 (2021), 20 May 2021, <https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-021-89909-7.pdf>, accessed 12/1/21, sb

Thousands of satellites and 1500 rocket bodies provide considerable mass in LEO, which can break into debris upon collisions, explosions, or degradation in the harsh space environment. Fragmentations increase the cross-section of orbiting material, and with it, the collision probability per time. Eventually, collisions could dominate on-orbit evolution, a situation called the Kessler Syndrome3. There are already over 12,000 trackable debris pieces in LEO, with these being typically 10 cm in diameter or larger. Including sizes down to 1 cm, there are about a million inferred debris pieces, all of which threaten satellites, spacecraft and astronauts due to their orbits crisscrossing at high relative speeds. Simulations of the long-term evolution of debris suggest that LEO is already in the protracted initial stages of the Kessler Syndrome, but that this could be managed through active debris removal4. The addition of satellite mega-constellations and the general proliferation of low-cost satellites in LEO stresses the environment further5,6,7,8. Results The overall setting The rapid development of the space environment through mega-constellations, predominately by the ongoing construction of Starlink, is shown by the cumulative payload distribution function (Fig. 1). From an environmental perspective, the slope change in the distribution function defines NewSpace, an era of dominance by commercial actors. Before 2015, changes in the total on-orbit objects came principally from fragmentations, with effects of the 2007 Chinese anti-satellite test and the 2009 Kosmos-2251/Iridium-33 collisions being evident on the graph. Although the volume of space is large, individual satellites and satellite systems have specific functions, with associated altitudes and inclinations (Fig. 2). This increases congestion and requires active management for station keeping and collision avoidance9, with automatic collision-avoidance technology still under development. Improved space situational awareness is required, with data from operators as well as ground- and space-based sensors being widely and freely shared10. Improved communications between satellite operators are also necessary: in 2019, the European Space Agency moved an Earth observation satellite to avoid colliding with a Starlink satellite, after failing to reach SpaceX by e-mail. Internationally adopted ‘right of way’ rules are needed10 to prevent games of ‘chicken’, as companies seek to preserve thruster fuel and avoid service interruptions. SpaceX and NASA recently announced11 a cooperative agreement to help reduce the risk of collisions, but this is only one operator and one agency. When completed, Starlink will include about as many satellites as there are trackable debris pieces today, while its total mass will equal all the mass currently in LEO—over 3000 tonnes. The satellites will be placed in narrow orbital shells, creating unprecedented congestion, with 1258 already in orbit (as of 30 March 2021). OneWeb has already placed an initial 146 satellites, and Amazon, Telesat, GW and other companies, operating under different national regulatory regimes, are soon likely to follow. Enhanced collision risk Mega-constellations are composed of mass-produced satellites with few backup systems. This consumer electronic model allows for short upgrade cycles and rapid expansions of capabilities, but also considerable discarded equipment. SpaceX will actively de-orbit its satellites at the end of their 5–6-year operational lives. However, this process takes 6 months, so roughly 10% will be de-orbiting at any time. If other companies do likewise, thousands of de-orbiting satellites will be slowly passing through the same congested space, posing collision risks. Failures will increase these numbers, although the long-term failure rate is difficult to project. Figure 3 is similar to the righthand portion of Fig. 2 but includes the Starlink and OneWeb mega-constellations as filed (and amended) with the FCC (see “Methods”). The large density spikes show that some shells will have satellite number densities in excess of n=10−6 km−3. Deorbiting satellites will be tracked and operational satellites can manoeuvre to avoid close conjunctions. However, this depends on ongoing communication and cooperation between operators, which at present is ad hoc and voluntary. A recent letter12 to the FCC from SpaceX suggests that some companies might be less-than-fully transparent about events13 in LEO. Despite the congestion and traffic management challenges, FCC filings by SpaceX suggest that collision avoidance manoeuvres can in fact maintain collision-free operations in orbital shells and that the probability of a collision between a non-responsive satellite and tracked debris is negligible. However, the filings do not account for untracked debris6, including untracked debris decaying through the shells used by Starlink. Using simple estimates (see “Methods”), the probability that a single piece of untracked debris will hit any satellite in the Starlink 550 km shell is about 0.003 after one year. Thus, if at any time there are 230 pieces of untracked debris decaying through the 550 km orbital shell, there is a 50% chance that there will be one or more collisions between satellites in the shell and the debris. As discussed further in “Methods”, such a situation is plausible. Depending on the balance between the de-orbit and the collision rates, if subsequent fragmentation events lead to similar amounts of debris within that orbital shell, a runaway cascade of collisions could occur. Fragmentation events are not confined to their local orbits, either. The India 2019 ASAT test was conducted at an altitude below 300 km in an effort to minimize long-lived debris. Nevertheless, debris was placed on orbits with apogees in excess of 1000 km. As of 30 March 2021, three tracked debris pieces remain in orbit14. Such long-lived debris has high eccentricities, and thus can cross multiple orbital shells twice per orbit. A major fragmentation event from a single satellite could affect all operators in LEO. Even if debris collisions were avoidable, meteoroids are always a threat. The cumulative meteoroid flux15 for masses m > 10–2 g is about 1.2 × 10–4 meteoroids m−2 year−1 (see “Methods”). Such masses could cause non-negligible damage to satellites16. Assuming a Starlink constellation of 12,000 satellites (i.e. the initial phase), there is about a 50% chance of 15 or more meteoroid impacts per year at m > 10–2 g. Satellites will have shielding, but events that might be rare to a single satellite could become common across the constellation. One partial response to these congestion and collision concerns is for operators to construct mega-constellations out of a smaller number of satellites. But this does not, individually or collectively, eliminate the need for an all-of-LEO approach to evaluating the effects of the construction and maintenance of any one constellation.

## 2- Horsetrading DA

#### The plan requires clarifying international space law---causes strategic bargaining to extract concessions

Alexander William Salter 16, Assistant Professor of Economics, Rawls College of Business, Texas Tech University, "SPACE DEBRIS: A LAW AND ECONOMICS ANALYSIS OF THE ORBITAL COMMONS", 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 221 (2016), https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/19-2-2-salter-final\_0.pdf

V. MITIGATION VS. REMOVAL

Relying on international law to create an environment conducive to space debris removal initially seems promising. The Virginia school of political economy has convincingly shown the importance of political-legal institutions in creating the incentives that determine whether those who act within those institutions behave cooperatively or predatorily.47 In the context of space debris, the role of nation-states, or their space agencies, would be to create an international legal framework that clearly specifies the rules that will govern space debris removal and the interactions in space more generally. The certainty afforded by clear and nondiscriminatory48 rules would enable the parties of the space debris “social contract” to use efficient strategies for coping with space debris. However, this ideal result is, in practice, far from certain. To borrow a concept from Buchanan and Tullock’s framework,49 the costs of amending the rules in the case of international space law are exceptionally high. Although a social contract is beneficial in that it prevents stronger nation-states from imposing their will on weaker nation-states, it also creates incentives for the main spacefaring nations to block reforms that are overall welfare-enhancing but that do not sufficiently or directly benefit the stronger nations.

The 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (more commonly known as the Outer Space Treaty) is the foundation for current international space law.50 All major spacefaring nations are signatories. Article VIII of this treaty is the largest legal barrier to space debris removal efforts. This article stipulates that parties to the treaty retain jurisdiction over objects they launch into space, whether in orbit or on a celestial body such as the Moon. This article means that American organizations, whether private firms or the government, cannot remove pieces of Chinese or Russian debris without the permission of their respective governments. Perhaps contrary to intuition, consent will probably not be easy to secure.

A major difficulty lies in the realization that much debris is valuable scrap material that is already in orbit. A significant fraction of the costs associated with putting spacecraft in orbit comes from escaping Earth’s gravity well. The presence of valuable material already in space can justifiably be claimed as a valuable resource for repairs to current spacecraft and eventual manufacturing in space. As an example, approximately 1,000 tons of aluminum orbit as debris from the upper stages of launch vehicles alone. Launching those materials into orbit could cost between $5 billion and $10 billion and would take several years.51 Another difficulty lies in the fact that no definition of space debris is currently accepted internationally. This could prove problematic for removal efforts, if there is disagreement as to whether a given object is useless space junk, or a potentially useful space asset. Although this ambiguity may appear purely semantic, resolving it does pose some legal difficulties. Doing so would require consensus among the spacefaring nations. The negotiation process for obtaining consent would be costly.

Less obvious, but still important, is the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, normally referred to as the Liability Convention. The Liability Convention expanded on the issue of liability in Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty. Under the Liability Convention, any government “shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its space objects on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft, and liable for damage due to its faults in space.”52 In other words, if a US party attempts to remove debris and accidentally damages another nation’s space objects, the US government would be liable for damages. More generally, because launching states would bear costs associated with accidents during debris removal, those states may be unwilling to participate in or permit such efforts. In theory, insurance can partly remediate the costs, but that remediation would still make debris removal engagement less appealing.

A global effort to remediate debris would, by necessity, involve the three major spacefaring nations: the United States, Russia, and China.53 However, any effort would also require—at a minimum—a significant clarification and—at most —a complete overhaul of existing space law.54 One cannot assume that parties to the necessary political bargains would limit parleying to space-related issues. Agreements between sovereign nation-states must be self-enforcing.55 To secure consent, various parties to the change in the international legal-institutional framework may bargain strategically and may hold out for unrelated concessions as a way of maximizing private surplus. The costs, especially the decision-making costs, of changing the legal framework to secure a global response to a global commons problem are potentially quite high.

#### Russia uses negotiations to push the PPWT---erodes US space dominance---unilat solves

Michael Listner 18, JD, Regent University School of Law, the founder and principal of the legal and policy think-tank/consultation firm Space Law and Policy Solutions, Sept 17 2018, "The art of lawfare and the real war in outer space", The Space Review, www.thespacereview.com/article/3571/1

A battle for primacy in outer space took place on August 14, 2018, among the Russian Federation, the United States, and, indirectly, the People’s Republic of China. This battle did not involve the exotic technology of science fiction, antisatellite weapons (ASATs), or the incapacitation of satellites; it was not part of a hot war and did not even occur in outer space. Rather, it took place in the halls of the Conference of Disarmament in Geneva, Switzerland, and concerned the interdiction of the hypothetical deployment of instrumentalities of a hot war in outer space. The carefully orchestrated arena for this battle by the proponents of banning so-called space weapons involved methodologies, institutions, and agents of international law but was undermined by a vigorous counterattack by the United States using the same forum and suite of instruments so skillfully levied against it.1 This battle, of course, is not a single instance but the latest skirmish of a much larger conflict involving real war in space.

There’s been significant attention—and overstatem­ent— about the effect of a proposed Space Force by the United States, including an arms race and dominance as articulated by the United States,2 yet little attention has been given to the contest that continues to be fought over outer space using the tools of international law and policy, both of which are instruments of “lawfare.” Maj. General Charles N. Dunlap, Jr. (retired)3 first defined lawfare in the paper “Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st Conflicts,” as “a method of warfare where law is used as a means of realizing a military objective.”4 This definition can be expanded to the use of hard law, soft law, and non-governmental organizations and institutions within the international arena to achieve a national objective and geopolitical end that would otherwise require the use of hard power. As observed by General Dunlap, lawfare imputes the teachings of Sun Tzu in particular this teaching: “The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.”5

Lawfare is not a new concept and has been used in many domains, but the tools brought to bear have become more prolific, and the domain of outer space has been and continues to be a theater where it is applied. The earliest example of lawfare (even though the term was not yet coined) in outer space occurred pre-Sputnik with Soviet Union attempting to use customary law to make claims of sovereignty extending beyond the atmosphere to the space above its territory. This claim was preempted by the launch of Sputnik 1 and the act of the satellite flying over the territory of other nations.6 The Eisenhower Administration saw this as an opportunity to meet a national space policy goal and likewise used customary law as an implement of lawfare and successfully created the principle of free access to outer space, which it utilized for photoreconnaissance activities in lieu of overflights of another nation’s sovereign airspace.7 The Soviet Union unsuccessfully attempted to defeat this move using lawfare in the United Nations through a proposal that would have prohibited the use of outer space for the purpose of intelligence gathering.8

Since that setback, the art of lawfare in outer space has settled on the objective ascribed to another teaching of Sun Tzu:

“With regard to precipitous heights, if you proceed your adversary, occupy the raised and sunny spots, and there wait for him to come up. Remember, if the enemy has occupied precipitous heights before you, do not follow him, but retreat and try to entice him away.”9

The second part of this teaching exemplifies the role of lawfare in the present war in outer space: to employ the tools and institutions of international law as a means to legally corner an adversary and gain geopolitical advantage in soft power, with the aim of slowing and eroding the advantage that adversary has attained through preeminence in the domain of outer space, and replace it with their own. This objective is accomplished by two general means: legally-binding measures, most commonly in the form of treaties, and so-called non-binding measures couched as sustainability.

Lawfare in space continued in the intervening years between Sputnik-1 and the signature and ratification of the Outer Space Treaty and afterward. The weapon of choice: disarmament proposals for outer space. Provisions for banning so-called space weapons in the Outer Space Treaty were rejected by the Soviet Union in favor of separate arms control measures.10 These measures included proposals, some of which related to the proscription of ASATs, designed to not only gain an advantage in outer space but to gauge political intent and resolve.11

The lawfare offensive escalated after the proposed Strategic Defense Initiative with an effort curtail space-based missile defense technology through a ban on so-called space weapons and a proverbial arms race in outer space. The Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), introduced in 1985, continues to seek a legally binding measure to place any weapon in outer space, including those designed for self-defense. It spawned measures such as the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT), co-sponsored by Russia and China. This and other measures have met resistance as unverifiable and certainly are not likely to gain the advice and consent of the US Senate for ratification. The end game of the use of lawfare in the form of efforts like PAROS—the latest attempt at which was defeated in Geneva—is to propose legally binding measures that proponents would ignore to their advantage in any event. The sponsors and advocates of these hard-law measures recognize they will not come to fruition but, in the process of promoting them, will enhance their soft power and moral authority, which can be applied to entice their adversary down.

Non-binding resolutions and measures in the form of political agreements and guidelines are being used concurrently in the lawfare engagement in outer space, where proposals for legally binding measures alone fall short of the goal of creating hard law and challenging dominance in outer space. These resolutions and measures, which emphasize sustainability, are designed to perform an end run around the formalities of a treaty to entice agreement on issues that would otherwise be unacceptable in a hard-law agreement. These measures have the dual effect to create soft-power support on the one hand and hard law on the other. This tool of lawfare, which uses clichés of cooperation and sustainability, is a ploy that applies the ambiguous nature of customary international law to achieve what cannot be done through treaties: to “entice the adversary away” and create legal and political constraints to bind and degrade its use of outer space or prevent it from maintaining its superiority, all the while allowing others to play catchup and replace one form of dominance with another. While lawfare is by nature asymmetric, this indirect approach could be considered a subset an irregular tactic of lawfare, as opposed to the use of formal treaties in lawfare.

The crux is that, like space objects used in outer space, international law and its implements are dual-use in that they can be used for proactive ends or weaponized, with those using the appliances of lawfare to encourage cession of the high ground choosing the latter rather than the former. The decision to weaponize international law and its institutions to prosecute this war in space brings into question the efficacy of new rules or norms. Indeed, the idea of expanding the jurisprudence of outer space through custom, as being suggested by the United States, and more recently gap-filling rules being suggested by academia that could become custom, presents the real chance that, rather than the creation of the ploughshare of sustainability, new and more effective swords for lawfare will be forged.

To paraphrase Sun Tzu, “all war is deception.” In the case of outer space, the pretext in the current war in space is that an arms race and a hot war in outer space is inevitable, and can only be avoided by formal rules or international governance. Conversely, a hot war can be prevented in no small part by using lawfare to engage in the contemporary war in space using the tools of, and the abundant resources found in, the experience of attorneys and litigators in particular to supplement and support diplomats to extend the velvet glove when applicable, and bare knuckles when necessary. If the August 14 statement in Geneva is any indicator, the United States may have just done that and begun the shift from light-touch diplomacy to bringing its legal warriors to bear in full-contact lawfare to engage and win the current war in outer space and help deter a more serious hot war from occurring without sacrificing the superiority it possesses in outer space.

#### The PPWT prohibits space-based missile defense

Jack M. Beard 16, Associate Professor of Law at the University of Nebraska College of Law, Feb 15 2016, "Soft Law ’s Failure on the Horizon: The International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities", University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Vol. 38, No. 2, 2016, <https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1086&context=spacelaw>

B. Avoid Arms Control Traps in Space

Any successful effort to achieve legally binding restrictions on military activities or weapons in space must focus on specific, definable, and limited objectives or run afoul of issues that have historically ensured deadlock among suspicious and insecure adversaries.306 Some seemingly desirable goals, however, are likely to ensure failure.

The first such problematic goal involves attempting to use arms control agreements or other instruments to comprehensively ensure peace in space. Unfortunately, the integration of modern military systems on earth, sea, air and space guarantees that at some point states seeking to disrupt or deny the ability of an adversary (such as the United States) to project power will find space capabilities to be a particularly appealing target, especially in the early stages of a crisis or conflict.307 The presence of so many things of military value in space thus makes actions by an adversary to neutralize, disrupt or destroy these things likely during a major conflict on earth.308

The second problematic arms control goal in space that seems certain to ensure stalemate involves attempting to define and prohibit military technologies with a view to broadly prevent the weaponization of space. Clearly defining a space weapon for purposes of any legally binding arms control agreement is a daunting task, one which is made particularly challenging by the “essentially military nature of space technology.”309 As noted, space technologies are routinely viewed as dual-use in nature, meaning that they can be readily employed for both civilian and military uses. Determining the ultimate purpose of many space technologies may thus depend on discerning the intentions of states, a process perhaps better suited for psychological than legal evaluation. 310

Further complicating the classification of space military technologies is the inherent difficulty in distinguishing most space weapons on the basis of their offensive and defensive roles or even their specific missions.311 For example, this problem lies at the heart of debates over the status and future of ballistic missile defense (BMD) programs, since the technology underlying BMD systems and offensive ASAT weapons is often indistinguishable.312 Vague and broad soft law instruments do not resolve this problem, but create instead their own confusion and insecurity. Vague and broad provisions in legally binding agreements that do not or cannot distinguish between these missions are similarly problematic.

These issues, particularly difficulties in distinguishing ASAT and BMD systems, have figured prominently in complicating negotiations on space weapons over previous decades.313 Similarly, these concerns were a significant factor in initial U.S. opposition to the arms control measure proposed by China and Russia (the PPWT) since it prohibits states from placing any type of weapon in outer space (regardless of its military mission), thus effectively prohibiting the deployment of ballistic missile defense systems. 314 Furthermore, even if clear legal restrictions could be developed, verifying compliance with respect to technology in orbit around Earth would be very difficult (a point conceded even by China with respect to its own proposed PPWT).315

#### Causes rogue state missile threats---that escalates

Patrick M. Shanahan 19, Acting Secretary of Defense from January to June 2019, previously vice president and general manager of Boeing Missile Defense Systems, Jan 2019, "2019 MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW", US Department of Defense, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jan/17/2002080666/-1/-1/1/2019-MISSILE-DEFENSE-REVIEW.PDF

U.S. Homeland Missile Defense will Stay Ahead of Rogue States’ Missile Threats

Technology trends point to the possibility of increasing rogue state missile threats to the U.S. homeland. Vulnerability to rogue state missile threats would endanger the American people and infrastructure, undermine the U.S. diplomatic position of strength, and could lead potential adversaries to mistakenly perceive the United States as susceptible to coercive escalation threats intended to preclude U.S. resolve to resist aggression abroad. Such misperceptions risk undermining our deterrence posture and messaging, and could lead adversaries to dangerous miscalculations regarding our commitment and resolve.

It is therefore imperative that U.S. missile defense capabilities provide effective protection against rogue state missile threats to the homeland now and into the future. The United States is technically capable of doing so and has adopted an active missile defense force-sizing measure for protection of the homeland. DoD will develop, acquire, and maintain the U.S. homeland missile defense capabilities necessary to effectively protect against possible missile attacks on the homeland posed by the long-range missile arsenals of rogue states, defined today as North Korea and Iran, and to support the other missile defense roles identified in this MDR.

This force-sizing measure for active U.S. missile defense is fully consistent with the 2018 NPR, and in order to keep pace with the threat, DoD will utilize existing defense systems and an increasing mix of advanced technologies, such as kinetic or directed-energy boost-phase defenses, and other advanced systems. It is technically challenging but feasible over time, affordable, and a strategic imperative. It will require the examination and possible fielding of advanced technologies to provide greater efficiencies for U.S. active missile defense capabilities, including space-based sensors and boost-phase defense capabilities. Further, because the related requirements will evolve as the long-range threat posed by rogue states evolves, it does not allow a static U.S. homeland defense architecture. Rather, it calls for a missile defense architecture that can adapt to emerging and unanticipated threats, including by adding capacity and the capability to surge missile defense as necessary in times of crisis or conflict.

In coming years, rogue state missile threats to the U.S. homeland will likely expand in numbers and complexity. There are and will remain inherent uncertainties regarding the potential pace and scope of that expansion. Consequently, the United States will not accept any limitation or constraint on the development or deployment of missile defense capabilities needed to protect the homeland against rogue missile threats. Accepting limits now could constrain or preclude missile defense technologies and options necessary in the future to effectively protect the American people.

As U.S. active defenses for the homeland continue to improve to stay ahead of rogue states’ missile threats, they could also provide a measure of protection against accidental or unauthorized missile launches. This defensive capability could be significant in the event of destabilizing domestic developments in any potential adversary armed with strategic weapons, and as long-range missile capabilities proliferate in coming years.

U.S. missile defense capabilities will be sized to provide continuing effective protection of the U.S. homeland against rogue states’ offensive missile threats. The United States relies on nuclear deterrence to address the large and more sophisticated Russian and Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities, as well as to deter attacks from any source consistent with long-standing U.S. declaratory policy as re-affirmed in the 2018 NPR.

## Space War

#### No space wars --- dependence on space creates a de facto taboo

Triezenberg, 17

Bonnie Triezenberg, Senior engineer at RAND. Previously, she was the senior technical fellow at the Boeing Company, specializing in agile systems and software development. “Deterring Space War: An Exploratory Analysis Incorporating Prospect Theory into a Game Theoretic Model of Space Warfare,” RAND Corporation. 2017. <https://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertations/RGSD400.html>

The above discussion suggests that a likely means to achieve deterrence of acts of war in outer space is to increase civilian dependence on space to support day-to-day life—if everyone on earth is equally dependent on space, no one has an incentive to destroy space. Largely by accident, this dependence appears to have, in fact, occurred. The space age was born in an age of affluence and rapid economic expansion; space quickly became a domain of international commerce as well as a domain of national military use. Space assets and the systems they enable have transformed social, infrastructure and information uses perhaps more visibly than they have transformed military uses. In fact, in the current satellite database published by the Union of Concerned Scientists, of the 1461 satellites in orbit 40% support purely commercial ventures, while only 16% have a strictly military use.46 The first commercial broadcast by a satellite in geo-synchronous orbit was of international news between Europe and the United States.47 The first telephony uniting the far flung islands of Indonesia was enabled by satellite48. Those of us who are old enough remember the 1960s “magic” of intercontinental phone calls and international “breaking news” delivered by satellite. Today, most social and infrastructure uses of space are taken for granted – even in remote locales of Africa, people expect to be able to monitor the weather, communicate seamlessly with colleagues and to find their way to new and unfamiliar locations using the GPS in their phones. All of us use space every day.49 These unrestricted economic and social uses of space may be the best deterrent, making everyone on all sides of combat equally dependent on space and heightening the taboo against weaponizing space or threatening space assets with weapons.

#### Attacks don’t escalate

--no retaliation – nukes are categorically different than space bc existential

--space is like cyber – attacks are unfortunate but not worthy of a nuke response

--nuke threats not credible bc nobody thinks space is at that lvl

Lewis, 13 – Senior fellow and Program Director at the Center for Strategic and

International Studies

James A. Lewis, “Reconsidering Deterrence for Space and Cyberspace,” in Anti-satellite Weapons, Deterrence and Sino-American Space Relations, September 2013. <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a587431.pdf>

Unlike other military technologies, nuclear weapons pose an existential threat. If used, damage and casualties would be massive. In contrast, neither cyberattacks nor ASAT attacks pose the same level of destructiveness; they certainly are not existential threats. If there was some way credibly to threaten the use of nuclear weapons after a cyberattack, deterrence might be possible. However, a nuclear threat in response to these attacks would not be proportional and the threat to use nuclear weapons is likely to be discounted by opponents. There are powerful norms that constrain the use of these weapons, and therefore, a threat to use nuclear weapons in response to cyberattacks would be dramatic but not credible. Calls for a nuclear response to cyberattacks would be dismissed as frivolous. Threats to use military force to retaliate against an act that would not be considered as justifying the use of force in self-defense under international law or practice will likely be dismissed by opponents as bluster.

Grego 18 – Laura, Senior Scientist in the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, Postdoctoral Researcher at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, PhD in Experimental Physics at the California Institute of Technology, Space and Crisis Stability, Union of Concerned Scientists, 3-19-18, <https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/7804-grego-space-and-crisis-stabilitypdf>

Why space is a particular problem for crisis stability For a number of reasons, space poses particular challenges in preventing a crisis from starting or from being managed well. Some of these are to do with the physical nature of space, such as the short timelines and difficulty of attribution inherent in space operations. Some are due to the way space is used, such as the entanglement of strategic and tactical missions and the prevalence of dual-use technologies. Some are due to the history of space, such the absence of a shared understanding of appropriate behaviors and consequences, and a dearth of stabilizing personal and institutional relationships. While some of these have terrestrial equivalents, taken together, they present a special challenge. The vulnerability of satellites and first strike incentives Satellites are inherently fragile and difficult to protect; in the language of strategic planners, space is an “offense-dominant” regime. This can lead to a number of pressures to strike first that don‘t exist for other, better-protected domains. Satellites travel on predictable orbits, and many pass repeatedly over all of the earth‘s nations. Low-earth orbiting satellites are reachable by missiles much less capable than those needed to launch satellites into orbit, as well as by directed energy which can interfere with sensors or with communications channels. Because launch mass is at a premium, satellite armor is impractical. Maneuvers on orbit need costly amounts of fuel, which has to be brought along on launch, limiting satellites‘ ability to move away from threats. And so, these very valuable satellites are also inherently vulnerable and may present as attractive targets. Thus, an actor with substantial dependence on space has an incentive to strike first if hostilities look probable, to ensure these valuable assets are not lost. Even if both (or all) sides in a conflict prefer not to engage in war, this weakness may provide an incentive to approach it closely anyway. A RAND Corporation monograph commissioned by the Air Force15 described the issue this way: First-strike stability is a concept that Glenn Kent and David Thaler developed in 1989 to examine the structural dynamics of mutual deterrence between two or more nuclear states.16 It is similar to crisis stability, which Charles Glaser described as ―a measure of the countries‘ incentives not to preempt in a crisis, that is, not to attack first in order to beat the attack of the enemy,‖17 except that it does not delve into the psychological factors present in specific crises. Rather, first strike stability focuses on each side‘s force posture and the balance of capabilities and vulnerabilities that could make a crisis unstable should a confrontation occur. For example, in the case of the United States, the fact that conventional weapons are so heavily dependent on vulnerable satellites may create incentives for the US to strike first terrestrially in the lead up to a confrontation, before its space-derived advantages are eroded by anti-satellite attacks.18 Indeed, any actor for which satellites or space-based weapons are an important part of its military posture, whether for support missions or on-orbit weapons, will feel “use it or lose it” pressure because of the inherent vulnerability of satellites. Short timelines and difficulty of attribution The compressed timelines characteristic of crises combine with these “use it or lose it” pressures to shrink timelines. This dynamic couples dangerously with the inherent difficulty of determining the causes of satellite degradation, whether malicious or from natural causes, in a timely way. Space is a difficult environment in which to operate. Satellites orbit amidst increasing amounts of debris. A collision with a debris object the size of a marble could be catastrophic for a satellite, but objects of that size cannot be reliably tracked. So a failure due to a collision with a small piece of untracked debris may be left open to other interpretations. Satellite electronics are also subject to high levels of damaging radiation. Because of their remoteness, satellites as a rule cannot be repaired or maintained. While on-board diagnostics and space surveillance can help the user understand what went wrong, it is difficult to have a complete picture on short timescales. Satellite failure on-orbit is a regular occurrence19 (indeed, many satellites are kept in service long past their intended lifetimes). In the past, when fewer actors had access to satellite-disrupting technologies, satellite failures were usually ascribed to “natural” causes. But increasingly, even during times of peace operators may assume malicious intent. More to the point, in a crisis when the costs of inaction may be perceived to be costly, there is an incentive to choose the worst-case interpretation of events even if the information is incomplete or inconclusive. Entanglement of strategic and tactical missions During the Cold War, nuclear and conventional arms were well separated, and escalation pathways were relatively clear. While space-based assets performed critical strategic missions, including early warning of ballistic missile launch and secure communications in a crisis, there was a relatively clear sense that these targets were off limits, as attacks could undermine nuclear deterrence. In the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, the US and Soviet Union pledged not to interfere with each other‘s ―national technical means‖ of verifying compliance with the agreement, yet another recognition that attacking strategically important satellites could be destabilizing.20 There was also restraint in building the hardware that could hold these assets at risk. However, where the lines between strategic satellite missions and other missions are blurred, these norms can be weakened. For example, the satellites that provide early warning of ballistic missile launch are associated with nuclear deterrent posture, but also are critical sensors for missile defenses. Strategic surveillance and missile warning satellites also support efforts to locate and destroy mobile conventional missile launchers. Interfering with an early warning sensor satellite might be intended to dissuade an adversary from using nuclear weapons first by degrading their missile defenses and thus hindering their first-strike posture. However, for a state that uses early warning satellites to enable a “hair trigger” or launch-on-attack posture, the interference with such a satellite might instead be interpreted as a precursor to a nuclear attack. It may accelerate the use of nuclear weapons rather than inhibit it. Misperception and dual-use technologies Some space technologies and activities can be used both for relatively benign purposes but also for hostile ones. It may be difficult for an actor to understand the intent behind the development, testing, use, and stockpiling of these technologies, and see threats where there are none. (Or miss a threat until it is too late.) This may start a cycle of action and reaction based on misperception. For example, relatively low-mass satellites can now maneuver autonomously and closely approach other satellites without their cooperation; this may be for peaceful purposes such as satellite maintenance or the building of complex space structures, or for more controversial reasons such as intelligence-gathering or anti-satellite attacks. Ground-based lasers can be used to dazzle the sensors of an adversary‘s remote sensing satellites, and with sufficient power, they may damage those sensors. The power needed to dazzle a satellite is low, achievable with commercially available lasers coupled to a mirror which can track the satellite. Laser ranging networks use low-powered lasers to track satellites and to monitor precisely the Earth‘s shape and gravitational field, and use similar technologies. 21 Higher-powered lasers coupled with satellite-tracking optics have fewer legitimate uses. Because midcourse missile defense systems are intended to destroy long-range ballistic missile warheads, which travel at speeds and altitudes comparable to those of satellites, such defense systems also have inherent ASAT capabilities. In fact, while the technologies being developed for long-range missile defenses might not prove very effective against ballistic missiles—for example, because of the countermeasure problems associated with midcourse missile defense— they could be far more effective against satellites. This capacity is not just theoretical. In 2007, China demonstrated a direct-ascent anti-satellite capability which could be used both in an ASAT and missile defense role, and in 2009, the United States used a ship-based missile defense interceptor to destroy a satellite, as well. US plans indicated a projected inventory of missile defense interceptors with capability to reach all low earth orbiting satellites in the dozens in the 2020s, and in the hundreds by 2030.22 Discrimination The consequences of interfering with a satellite may be vastly different depending on who is affected and how, and whether the satellite represents a legitimate military objective. However, it will not always be clear who the owners and operators of a satellite are, and users of a satellite‘s services may be numerous and not public. Registration of satellites is incomplete23 and current ownership is not necessarily updated in a readily available repository. The identification of a satellite as military or civilian may be deliberately obscured. Or its value as a military asset may change over time; for example, the share of capacity of a commercial satellite used by military customers may wax and wane. A potential adversary‘s satellite may have different or additional missions that are more vital to that adversary than an outsider may perceive. An ASAT attack that creates persistent debris could result in significant collateral damage to a wide range of other actors; unlike terrestrial attacks, these consequences are not limited geographically, and could harm other users unpredictably. In 2015, the Pentagon‘s annual wargame**,** or simulated conflict, involving space assets focused on a future regional conflict. The official report out24warnedthatit was hard to keep the conflict contained geographically when using anti-satellite weapons: As the wargame unfolded, a regional crisis quickly escalated, partly because of the interconnectedness of a multi-domain fight involving a capable adversary. The wargame participants emphasized the challenges in containing horizontal escalation once space control capabilities are employedto achieve limited national objectives. Lack of shared understanding of consequences/proportionalityStates havefairly similar understandings of the implications of military actions on the ground, in the air, and at sea,built over decades of experience. The United States and the Soviet Union/Russia have built some shared understanding of each other‘s strategic thinking on nuclear weapons, though this is less true for other states with nuclear weapons. But in the context of nuclear weapons, there is an arguable understanding about the crisis escalation based on the type of weapon (strategic or tactical) and the target (counterforce—against other nuclear targets, or countervalue—against civilian targets). Because of a lack of experience in hostilities that target space-based capabilities, it is not entirely clear what the proper response to a space activity is and where the escalation thresholds or “red lines” lie. Exacerbating this is the asymmetry in space investments; not all actors will assign the same value to a given target or same escalatory nature to different weapons.

## Debris

### AT Space Junk

**The probability for actual collision in space is extremely low – below 0.1% chance. It’ll stay this way as long as NASA’s actions in the squo are the same.**

**Salter 16** (Salter, Alexander William. SPACE DEBRIS: A LAW AND ECONOMICS ANALYSIS OF THE ORBITAL COMMONS. Stanford Law School, 2016, www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/19-2-2-salter-final\_0.pdf)//DebateDrills AY

The probability of a collision is currently low. Bradley and Wein estimate that the maximum probability in LEO of a collision over the lifetime of a spacecraft remains below one in one thousand, conditional on continued compliance with NASA’s deorbiting guidelines.3 However, the possibility of a future “snowballing” effect, whereby debris collides with other objects, further congesting orbit space, remains a significant concern.4 Levin and Carroll estimate the average immediate destruction of wealth created by a collision to be approximately $30 million, with an additional $200 million in damages to all currently existing space assets from the debris created by the initial collision.5 The expected value of destroyed wealth because of collisions, currently small because of the low probability of a collision, can quickly become significant if future collisions result in runaway debris growth. Given the possibility of high future costs, private and public actors should, for their own benefit, direct attention to the space debris problem now. Global satellite revenue in 2014 totaled $195.2 billion.6 That stream of economic activity is most threatened by significantly increased concentrations of space debris in orbit. Other activities within the “space economy” ($320 billion in revenue in 2013) that are potentially threatened include human spaceflight and nonorbital spacecraft.7 Private-sector space activities planned for the more distant future, including space tourism and asteroid mining, will also be affected if access to orbit is complicated by space debris.

#### 1. Space junk in our atmosphere isn’t part of outer space, Merriam webster defines outer space as “space immediately outside the earth’s atmosphere”<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/outer%20space>

#### 2. The space junk has been put there by PUBLIC entities like governments as well as private entities, even a ban on private entities in space couldn’t solve the problem. As long as anyone is launching anything it is inevitable

**Polyakov 21**, Dr. Max Polyakov, Founder, Noosphere Ventures, Firefly Aerospace, EOS Data Analytics, 5-5-2021, "Where does space junk come from – and how do we clean it up?," World Economic Forum,<https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2021/05/why-we-need-to-clean-up-space-junk-debris-low-earth-orbit-pollution-satellite-rocket-noosphere-firefly/> Livingston RB

Where does space junk come from? **As long as humans launch objects into orbit, space debris is inevitable.** Rocket launches leave boosters, fairings, interstages, and other debris in LEO. So do rocket explosions, which currently account for seven of the top 10 debris-creating events. **Human presence also creates orbital flotsam** – such as cameras, pliers, an astronaut’s glove, a wrench, a spatula, even a tool bag lost during space walks. Some debris is created naturally from the impacts of micrometeoroids – dust-sized fragments of asteroids and comets. With limited lifetimes, **operational satellites can become space debris**. Satellites run out of maneuvering fuel, batteries wear out, solar panels degrade – causing an orbital debris feedback loop, in which the problem is exacerbated when solar panels are sandblasted by micrometeoroids and tiny debris. As with rocket debris, spent satellites eventually re-enter Earth’s atmosphere and burn up, but the process can take years – and the higher they orbit above Earth, the longer those orbits take to decay.

**Time frame – Kessler effect 200 years away**

**Stubbe 17** [(Peter, PhD in law @ Johann Wolfgang Goethe University Frankfurt) “State Accountability for Space Debris: A Legal Study of Responsibility for Polluting the Space Environment and Liability for Damage Caused by Space Debris,” Koninklijke Brill Publishing, ISBN 978-90-04-31407-8, p. 27-31] TDI

The prediction of possible scenarios of the future evolution of the debris p o p ulation involves many uncertainties. Long-term forecasting means the prediction of the evolution of the future debris environment in time periods of decades or even centuries. Predictions are based on models84 that work with certain assumptions, and altering these parameters significantly influences the outcomes of the predictions. Assumptions on the future space traffic and on the initial object environment are particularly critical to the results of modeling efforts.85 A well-known pattern for the evolution of the debris population is the so-called Kessler effect’, which assumes that there is a certain collision probability among space objects because many satellites operate in similar orbital regions. These collisions create fragments, and thus additional objects in the respective orbits, which in turn enhances the risk of further collisions. Consequently, the num ber of objects and collisions increases exponentially and eventually results in the formation of a self-sustaining debris belt aroundthe Earth. While it has long been assumed that such a process of collisional cascading is likely to occur only in a very long-term perspective (meaning a time 1 n of several hundred years),87 a consensus has evolved in recent years that an uncontrolled growth of the debris population in certain altitudes could become reality much sooner.88 In fact, a recent cooperative study undertaken by various space agencies in the scope of i a d c shows that the current l e o debris population is unstable, even if current mitigation measures are applied. The study concludes: Even with a 90% implementation of the commonly-adopted mitigation measures [...] the l e o debris population is expected to increase by an average of 30% in the next 200 years. The population growth is primarily driven by catastrophic collisions between 700 and 1000 km altitudes and such collisions are likely to occur every 5 to 9 years.89

#### Boley and Beyers 20 on dust is specific to the MOON which is NOT in outer space pls child

**Wall 19** https://www.space.com/earth-atmosphere-extends-beyond-moon.html

Tiny wisps of Earth air stretch way out into deep space, far beyond the moon's orbit, a new study suggests.

Earth's "geocorona" — a tenuous cloud of hydrogen atoms — extends up to 390,000 miles (630,000 kilometers) into space, according to the new research. For perspective: [The moon](https://www.space.com/55-earths-moon-formation-composition-and-orbit.html) orbits Earth at an average distance of 239,000 miles (384,600 km).

"The moon flies through [Earth's atmosphere](https://www.space.com/17683-earth-atmosphere.html)," study lead author Igor Baliukin, of Russia's Space Research Institute, said in a statement. "We were not aware of it until we dusted off observations made over two decades ago by the SOHO spacecraft." [[Earth Quiz: Do You Really Know Your Planet?](https://www.space.com/15351-earth-quiz-planet.html)]