## Framework- Locke

#### The value for this round ought to be justice, as the resolution asks us to evaluation the justness of an action.

#### Human rights are a prerequisite to justice- if a government doesn’t recognize them, it cannot be just. This means that ignoring human rights is inherently unjust.

Halpine 13, Remarks by WYA Founder Anna Halpine at Europe House, Zagreb, on the occasion of the official launch of the WYA Croatia National Committee, March 2013. “Foundations of Human Dignity” World Youth Allience <https://www.wya.net/press-release/foundations-of-human-dignity/> Livingston RB

The power of the declaration lies in its insistence that human rights are predicated on the dignity of the person. The first line of the Declaration which states “Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,” accords pride of place to the concept of human dignity in the understanding and implementation of human rights. Such pride of place is correct. Since human rights are, technically, legal instruments that bind states, there must be a prior foundation on which they need to be established if they point to a reality of the human condition which states must respect. This the Declaration of Human Rights does.  In noting immediately that human rights are rooted in the “inherent dignity” of each human person, and that recognition of this is the foundation for peace, freedom and justice in the world, the framers of the Declaration of Human Rights committed themselves to the fact that States have an obligation to defend the human person as a pre-requisite to being considered a just state. The order established here is clear, and of the utmost importance. States earn their legitimacy by recognizing that they are the protectors of their citizens, and of the intrinsic dignity that their citizens possess. States do not establish or bestow this dignity.

#### The right to property is a human right according to international law, which is recognized by almost every state on earth and the United Nations, this means violating the right to property is violating human rights.

#### Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is a piece of international law passed by the the UN, explicitly says property is a human right, saying quote

UN 1948, United Nations. (1948). Universal Declaration of Human Rights. <https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/udhr.pdf> Livingston RB

Article 17 1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. 2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.

#### This means that failure to recognize property rights is inherently unjust, as human rights are a prerequisite to justice. Thus, our value criterion is protecting property rights.

## Framework Answers

### Generics – Short

#### 1] Calculative regress—util would require we calculate how much time to spend on our calculations and so on—means we’re never ever to take productive actions.

#### 2] Act util collapses to rule util—people who always try to act in the right way make mistakes and would never be able to make decisions—only rule util solves, where we have the rule that is most likely to, in most instances, do more good. That rule is the NC—protection of freedom is a good base line because without direct violation of each other’s sovereignty, we’re way less likely to do harm to them.

#### 3] Util’s repugnant—it can’t ever recognize things as intrinsically bad—even things like slavery and rape could be obligatory to have some chance of a greater future good

#### 5] Can’t aggregate—people have different conceptions of pleasure and pain—there are people like masochists who enjoy physical pain

### Actor Specificity

#### Empirically denied – states have side constraints – the US coudlnt get rid of the Constitution even if it guaranteed more life.

#### Aggregation- Suffering can not be aggregative – small amounts of pain by individuals can not be combined to make a large amount of pain

## Offense

### Contention 1 is private property in space

#### Private property rights exist in space because current international law only excludes national appropriation

Simberg 12, Rand Simberg, “Property Rights in space” Fall 2012, New Atlantis, <https://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/property-rights-in-space> Livingston RB

Some parties to the treaty, particularly the Soviet Union, wanted space activities to be the sole preserve of governments. But negotiators from the United States managed to achieve a compromise in Article VI of the treaty that, as Kopal writes, “paved the way for the private sector to conduct space activities side by side with States and international intergovernmental organizations.” Under Article VI, signatory governments bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space … whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty. By permitting non-governmental activities in space, albeit under government supervision, this section of the treaty allowed for the creation of the commercial telecommunications, remote-sensing, and spacecraft launching industries, which were then in their infancy and today are thriving. However, as Kopal notes, the treaty “does not contain any principles that would regulate economic activities for the purpose of exploring and exploiting the natural resources of outer space, the Moon and other celestial bodies.” At the time the treaty was negotiated, the issues of economic development in space seemed remote, and so diplomats set them aside as potential obstacles to finding agreement on what they saw as more pressing issues.

#### The Aff needs to prove that there is a distinction between earth and space that actually justifies stripping people of a fundamental human right, otherwise, there is no practical reason why something we consider a fundamental right on earth is unjust in space. Just because something is new and unknown doesn’t mean morality changes.

Spotswood 19, Beth Spotswood, Beth Spotswood is Alta's digital editor, events manager, and a contributing writer. In addition to her work for Alta, Beth writes for the San Francisco Chronicle. 4-4-2019, "Ethics in Space, Morals on Earth," Alta Online, <https://www.altaonline.com/dispatches/a5208/ethics-in-space-morals-on-earth/> Livingston RB

Bronson describes Planet as a technological Batman, “catching bad guys red-handed, and monitoring the machinations of evil profiteering.” But with hundreds of satellites—Planet’s and its competitors’—[snapping and selling photos](https://www.terraserver.com/) of every inch of the planet, there’s rapidly increasing room for misuse of this medium. While scientists are expected to be collaborative, as evidenced by this [2018 Alta piece from Jennifer Ouellette](https://www.altaonline.com/dispatches/a3505/star-wars/) on the many talented minds who collaborated to solve the mystery of gravitational waves, can we expect corporations and governments to work together for the common good? For example, what happens to this technology that we toss into space? Last week, [India shot down](https://www.technologyreview.com/s/613239/why-satellite-mega-constellations-are-a-massive-threat-to-safety-in-space/) one of its own satellites, leaving a debris field of space junk in its wake and ticking off scientists around the world. According to Bronson, ethics in space isn’t the question. Morality on Earth is. He expands on his Alta piece with these thoughts on human standards for space. Society always projects both its fears and its desires onto new technology. But we go through phases where we are much heavier on fear, and it feels like we’re entering such a phase again. Society is unsettled; when we look to space, we want to play the role of the conscience

#### Historically, we have seen that when you change property rights and our idea of them it leads to a violation and weakening of property rights, which is horrible for protecting property rights. This is seen in Kenya.

Ensminger 97, Ensminger, Jean (1997) Changing Property Rights: Reconciling Formal and Informal Rights to Land in Africa. In: The Frontiers of The New Institutional Economics. Academic Press , San Diego, CA, pp. 165-196. ISBN 0122222407. <https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160315-111441599> Livingston RB

When property rights are changed there are always winners and losers. But it stands to reason that the closer the fit between the new and old systems the less the injustice to prevailing distributions. Libecap (1989, pp. 3-4) suggested that the net social gains from changes in property rights will be modest specifically because the difficulty involved in resolving the distribution conflicts that result is so great. There is ample evidence from the Kenyan situation to support his argument. We have already noted that the limitation on the number of heirs resulted in disinheritance. So abhorrent was this perceived miscarriage of social justice that houses merely let titles lapse rather than disinherit family members. But there were other mismatches between customary ststems and formal systems.

## AT: OST

#### OST has zero authority and lack clarity—which creates ineffective regulations

MacWhorter 16 – Kevin, J.D from William and Mary College and Contributor to the William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review, “Sustainable Mining: Incentivizing Asteroid Mining in the Name of Environmentalism”, *William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review,* 2016, <https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1653&context=wmelpr>

Although an academic debate at this point, the legal status of property in space is necessary for any future exploration and exploitation of natural resources in space. Until then, private exploration is severely disincentivized. Further, the technology behind asteroid mining is fast becoming a reality.108 The law must respond. In order to evaluate what the international community needs to accomplish to ensure future exploration, one must explore the international agreements already in place that speak to the issue of property rights. To begin, the United Nations (UN) established the UN Office of Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) in 1958 109 to promote international cooperation in space and promote its peaceful use.110 UNOOSA oversees the UN’s Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) and implements its decisions.111 The UN founded COPUOS to avoid international rivalries in space.112 The OST, the Liability Convention,113 and the Moon Agreement114 are all within the jurisdiction of COPUOS. There are five international agreements that lay a framework of space law and, more importantly, ownership of objects and celestial bodies in space: • The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (OST); 115 • The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Space Objects Launched into Outer Space(ARRA); 116 • The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (Liability Convention); 117 • TheConvention on RegistrationofObjectsLaunched intoOuterSpace (Registration Convention); 118 and • The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Moon Treaty). 119 As with all international law, however, the actual authority of these treaties is debatable, because countries often ignore their precepts or disagree on the meaning of their substance.120 International custom, therefore, is the major indication of what international law exactly is.121 The Law of the Sea is an instructive analogy on that point, and as Lyall and Larsen explain, The practice need not be wholly uniform, but must be undertaken in the belief it is binding and required by law as opposed to being merely convenient or mutually beneficial. 122 Further, international law in general was conceived to deal with relations between States, not to deal with private claims of property. 123 International.

## AT: Space Wars

#### No space wars --- dependence on space creates a de facto taboo

Triezenberg, 17

Bonnie Triezenberg, Senior engineer at RAND. Previously, she was the senior technical fellow at the Boeing Company, specializing in agile systems and software development. “Deterring Space War: An Exploratory Analysis Incorporating Prospect Theory into a Game Theoretic Model of Space Warfare,” RAND Corporation. 2017. <https://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertations/RGSD400.html>

The above discussion suggests that a likely means to achieve deterrence of acts of war in outer space is to increase civilian dependence on space to support day-to-day life—if everyone on earth is equally dependent on space, no one has an incentive to destroy space. Largely by accident, this dependence appears to have, in fact, occurred. The space age was born in an age of affluence and rapid economic expansion; space quickly became a domain of international commerce as well as a domain of national military use. Space assets and the systems they enable have transformed social, infrastructure and information uses perhaps more visibly than they have transformed military uses. In fact, in the current satellite database published by the Union of Concerned Scientists, of the 1461 satellites in orbit 40% support purely commercial ventures, while only 16% have a strictly military use.46 The first commercial broadcast by a satellite in geo-synchronous orbit was of international news between Europe and the United States.47 The first telephony uniting the far flung islands of Indonesia was enabled by satellite48. Those of us who are old enough remember the 1960s “magic” of intercontinental phone calls and international “breaking news” delivered by satellite. Today, most social and infrastructure uses of space are taken for granted – even in remote locales of Africa, people expect to be able to monitor the weather, communicate seamlessly with colleagues and to find their way to new and unfamiliar locations using the GPS in their phones. All of us use space every day.49 These unrestricted economic and social uses of space may be the best deterrent, making everyone on all sides of combat equally dependent on space and heightening the taboo against weaponizing space or threatening space assets with weapons.

#### Transparency inevitable ---Nothing slips by in space

--Surprise attacks either fail bc they’re ragged, or are detected bc the enemy has to load a ton of stuff into space

--Launch capacity is international – would have to ask to do it

--Monitoring satellites is easy – as early as 50s elementary school classes saw stuff – remote sensing means we see everything in space or on the ground

--International nonproliferation agreements democratized site monitoring – we can see states interior regions

--Even if no guarantee, uncertainy means no state would risk it

Handberg, 17 – Faculty and Research, School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs, UCF

Roger Handberg, “Is space war imminent? Exploring the possibility,” Comparative Strategy. 2017. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01495933.2017.1379832?needAccess=true>

Second, surprise requires that sufficient offensive space assets be placed in orbit without triggering a response by other states—the scale of such technology deployment is in itself possibly self-defeating given high costs and a likely lack of launch capacity. In addition, much launch capacity is now international rather than national, so maintaining secrecy becomes even more difficult. Space as an operational environment suffers from excessive transparency, meaning any launches can be monitored and tracked by others with strong evidence as to what is being deployed. One must remember that the original satellite launches in the 1950s were accurately tracked by a British grade-school class as a science project. In addition, at

#### Attacks don’t escalate

--no retaliation – nukes are categorically different than space bc existential

--space is like cyber – attacks are unfortunate but not worthy of a nuke response

--nuke threats not credible bc nobody thinks space is at that lvl

Lewis, 13 – Senior fellow and Program Director at the Center for Strategic and

International Studies

James A. Lewis, “Reconsidering Deterrence for Space and Cyberspace,” in Anti-satellite Weapons, Deterrence and Sino-American Space Relations, September 2013. <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a587431.pdf>

Unlike other military technologies, nuclear weapons pose an existential threat. If used, damage and casualties would be massive. In contrast, neither cyberattacks nor ASAT attacks pose the same level of destructiveness; they certainly are not existential threats. If there was some way credibly to threaten the use of nuclear weapons after a cyberattack, deterrence might be possible. However, a nuclear threat in response to these attacks would not be proportional and the threat to use nuclear weapons is likely to be discounted by opponents. There are powerful norms that constrain the use of these weapons, and therefore, a threat to use nuclear weapons in response to cyberattacks would be dramatic but not credible. Calls for a nuclear response to cyberattacks would be dismissed as frivolous. Threats to use military force to retaliate against an act that would not be considered as justifying the use of force in self-defense under international law or practice will likely be dismissed by opponents as bluster.

Grego 18 – Laura, Senior Scientist in the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, Postdoctoral Researcher at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, PhD in Experimental Physics at the California Institute of Technology, Space and Crisis Stability, Union of Concerned Scientists, 3-19-18, <https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/7804-grego-space-and-crisis-stabilitypdf>

Why space is a particular problem for crisis stability For a number of reasons, space poses particular challenges in preventing a crisis from starting or from being managed well. Some of these are to do with the physical nature of space, such as the short timelines and difficulty of attribution inherent in space operations. Some are due to the way space is used, such as the entanglement of strategic and tactical missions and the prevalence of dual-use technologies. Some are due to the history of space, such the absence of a shared understanding of appropriate behaviors and consequences, and a dearth of stabilizing personal and institutional relationships. While some of these have terrestrial equivalents, taken together, they present a special challenge. The vulnerability of satellites and first strike incentives Satellites are inherently fragile and difficult to protect; in the language of strategic planners, space is an “offense-dominant” regime. This can lead to a number of pressures to strike first that don‘t exist for other, better-protected domains. Satellites travel on predictable orbits, and many pass repeatedly over all of the earth‘s nations. Low-earth orbiting satellites are reachable by missiles much less capable than those needed to launch satellites into orbit, as well as by directed energy which can interfere with sensors or with communications channels. Because launch mass is at a premium, satellite armor is impractical. Maneuvers on orbit need costly amounts of fuel, which has to be brought along on launch, limiting satellites‘ ability to move away from threats. And so, these very valuable satellites are also inherently vulnerable and may present as attractive targets. Thus, an actor with substantial dependence on space has an incentive to strike first if hostilities look probable, to ensure these valuable assets are not lost. Even if both (or all) sides in a conflict prefer not to engage in war, this weakness may provide an incentive to approach it closely anyway. A RAND Corporation monograph commissioned by the Air Force15 described the issue this way: First-strike stability is a concept that Glenn Kent and David Thaler developed in 1989 to examine the structural dynamics of mutual deterrence between two or more nuclear states.16 It is similar to crisis stability, which Charles Glaser described as ―a measure of the countries‘ incentives not to preempt in a crisis, that is, not to attack first in order to beat the attack of the enemy,‖17 except that it does not delve into the psychological factors present in specific crises. Rather, first strike stability focuses on each side‘s force posture and the balance of capabilities and vulnerabilities that could make a crisis unstable should a confrontation occur. For example, in the case of the United States, the fact that conventional weapons are so heavily dependent on vulnerable satellites may create incentives for the US to strike first terrestrially in the lead up to a confrontation, before its space-derived advantages are eroded by anti-satellite attacks.18 Indeed, any actor for which satellites or space-based weapons are an important part of its military posture, whether for support missions or on-orbit weapons, will feel “use it or lose it” pressure because of the inherent vulnerability of satellites. Short timelines and difficulty of attribution The compressed timelines characteristic of crises combine with these “use it or lose it” pressures to shrink timelines. This dynamic couples dangerously with the inherent difficulty of determining the causes of satellite degradation, whether malicious or from natural causes, in a timely way. Space is a difficult environment in which to operate. Satellites orbit amidst increasing amounts of debris. A collision with a debris object the size of a marble could be catastrophic for a satellite, but objects of that size cannot be reliably tracked. So a failure due to a collision with a small piece of untracked debris may be left open to other interpretations. Satellite electronics are also subject to high levels of damaging radiation. Because of their remoteness, satellites as a rule cannot be repaired or maintained. While on-board diagnostics and space surveillance can help the user understand what went wrong, it is difficult to have a complete picture on short timescales. Satellite failure on-orbit is a regular occurrence19 (indeed, many satellites are kept in service long past their intended lifetimes). In the past, when fewer actors had access to satellite-disrupting technologies, satellite failures were usually ascribed to “natural” causes. But increasingly, even during times of peace operators may assume malicious intent. More to the point, in a crisis when the costs of inaction may be perceived to be costly, there is an incentive to choose the worst-case interpretation of events even if the information is incomplete or inconclusive. Entanglement of strategic and tactical missions During the Cold War, nuclear and conventional arms were well separated, and escalation pathways were relatively clear. While space-based assets performed critical strategic missions, including early warning of ballistic missile launch and secure communications in a crisis, there was a relatively clear sense that these targets were off limits, as attacks could undermine nuclear deterrence. In the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, the US and Soviet Union pledged not to interfere with each other‘s ―national technical means‖ of verifying compliance with the agreement, yet another recognition that attacking strategically important satellites could be destabilizing.20 There was also restraint in building the hardware that could hold these assets at risk. However, where the lines between strategic satellite missions and other missions are blurred, these norms can be weakened. For example, the satellites that provide early warning of ballistic missile launch are associated with nuclear deterrent posture, but also are critical sensors for missile defenses. Strategic surveillance and missile warning satellites also support efforts to locate and destroy mobile conventional missile launchers. Interfering with an early warning sensor satellite might be intended to dissuade an adversary from using nuclear weapons first by degrading their missile defenses and thus hindering their first-strike posture. However, for a state that uses early warning satellites to enable a “hair trigger” or launch-on-attack posture, the interference with such a satellite might instead be interpreted as a precursor to a nuclear attack. It may accelerate the use of nuclear weapons rather than inhibit it. Misperception and dual-use technologies Some space technologies and activities can be used both for relatively benign purposes but also for hostile ones. It may be difficult for an actor to understand the intent behind the development, testing, use, and stockpiling of these technologies, and see threats where there are none. (Or miss a threat until it is too late.) This may start a cycle of action and reaction based on misperception. For example, relatively low-mass satellites can now maneuver autonomously and closely approach other satellites without their cooperation; this may be for peaceful purposes such as satellite maintenance or the building of complex space structures, or for more controversial reasons such as intelligence-gathering or anti-satellite attacks. Ground-based lasers can be used to dazzle the sensors of an adversary‘s remote sensing satellites, and with sufficient power, they may damage those sensors. The power needed to dazzle a satellite is low, achievable with commercially available lasers coupled to a mirror which can track the satellite. Laser ranging networks use low-powered lasers to track satellites and to monitor precisely the Earth‘s shape and gravitational field, and use similar technologies. 21 Higher-powered lasers coupled with satellite-tracking optics have fewer legitimate uses. Because midcourse missile defense systems are intended to destroy long-range ballistic missile warheads, which travel at speeds and altitudes comparable to those of satellites, such defense systems also have inherent ASAT capabilities. In fact, while the technologies being developed for long-range missile defenses might not prove very effective against ballistic missiles—for example, because of the countermeasure problems associated with midcourse missile defense— they could be far more effective against satellites. This capacity is not just theoretical. In 2007, China demonstrated a direct-ascent anti-satellite capability which could be used both in an ASAT and missile defense role, and in 2009, the United States used a ship-based missile defense interceptor to destroy a satellite, as well. US plans indicated a projected inventory of missile defense interceptors with capability to reach all low earth orbiting satellites in the dozens in the 2020s, and in the hundreds by 2030.22 Discrimination The consequences of interfering with a satellite may be vastly different depending on who is affected and how, and whether the satellite represents a legitimate military objective. However, it will not always be clear who the owners and operators of a satellite are, and users of a satellite‘s services may be numerous and not public. Registration of satellites is incomplete23 and current ownership is not necessarily updated in a readily available repository. The identification of a satellite as military or civilian may be deliberately obscured. Or its value as a military asset may change over time; for example, the share of capacity of a commercial satellite used by military customers may wax and wane. A potential adversary‘s satellite may have different or additional missions that are more vital to that adversary than an outsider may perceive. An ASAT attack that creates persistent debris could result in significant collateral damage to a wide range of other actors; unlike terrestrial attacks, these consequences are not limited geographically, and could harm other users unpredictably. In 2015, the Pentagon‘s annual wargame**,** or simulated conflict, involving space assets focused on a future regional conflict. The official report out24warnedthatit was hard to keep the conflict contained geographically when using anti-satellite weapons: As the wargame unfolded, a regional crisis quickly escalated, partly because of the interconnectedness of a multi-domain fight involving a capable adversary. The wargame participants emphasized the challenges in containing horizontal escalation once space control capabilities are employedto achieve limited national objectives. Lack of shared understanding of consequences/proportionalityStates havefairly similar understandings of the implications of military actions on the ground, in the air, and at sea,built over decades of experience. The United States and the Soviet Union/Russia have built some shared understanding of each other‘s strategic thinking on nuclear weapons, though this is less true for other states with nuclear weapons. But in the context of nuclear weapons, there is an arguable understanding about the crisis escalation based on the type of weapon (strategic or tactical) and the target (counterforce—against other nuclear targets, or countervalue—against civilian targets). Because of a lack of experience in hostilities that target space-based capabilities, it is not entirely clear what the proper response to a space activity is and where the escalation thresholds or “red lines” lie. Exacerbating this is the asymmetry in space investments; not all actors will assign the same value to a given target or same escalatory nature to different weapons.

### AT Space Junk

**The probability for actual collision in space is extremely low – below 0.1% chance. It’ll stay this way as long as NASA’s actions in the squo are the same.**

**Salter 16** (Salter, Alexander William. SPACE DEBRIS: A LAW AND ECONOMICS ANALYSIS OF THE ORBITAL COMMONS. Stanford Law School, 2016, www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/19-2-2-salter-final\_0.pdf)//DebateDrills AY

The probability of a collision is currently low. Bradley and Wein estimate that the maximum probability in LEO of a collision over the lifetime of a spacecraft remains below one in one thousand, conditional on continued compliance with NASA’s deorbiting guidelines.3 However, the possibility of a future “snowballing” effect, whereby debris collides with other objects, further congesting orbit space, remains a significant concern.4 Levin and Carroll estimate the average immediate destruction of wealth created by a collision to be approximately $30 million, with an additional $200 million in damages to all currently existing space assets from the debris created by the initial collision.5 The expected value of destroyed wealth because of collisions, currently small because of the low probability of a collision, can quickly become significant if future collisions result in runaway debris growth. Given the possibility of high future costs, private and public actors should, for their own benefit, direct attention to the space debris problem now. Global satellite revenue in 2014 totaled $195.2 billion.6 That stream of economic activity is most threatened by significantly increased concentrations of space debris in orbit. Other activities within the “space economy” ($320 billion in revenue in 2013) that are potentially threatened include human spaceflight and nonorbital spacecraft.7 Private-sector space activities planned for the more distant future, including space tourism and asteroid mining, will also be affected if access to orbit is complicated by space debris.

#### 1. Space junk in our atmosphere isn’t part of outer space, Merriam webster defines outer space as “space immediately outside the earth’s atmosphere”<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/outer%20space>

#### 2. The space junk has been put there by PUBLIC entities like governments as well as private entities, even a ban on private entities in space couldn’t solve the problem. As long as anyone is launching anything it is inevitable

**Polyakov 21**, Dr. Max Polyakov, Founder, Noosphere Ventures, Firefly Aerospace, EOS Data Analytics, 5-5-2021, "Where does space junk come from – and how do we clean it up?," World Economic Forum,<https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2021/05/why-we-need-to-clean-up-space-junk-debris-low-earth-orbit-pollution-satellite-rocket-noosphere-firefly/> Livingston RB

Where does space junk come from? **As long as humans launch objects into orbit, space debris is inevitable.** Rocket launches leave boosters, fairings, interstages, and other debris in LEO. So do rocket explosions, which currently account for seven of the top 10 debris-creating events. **Human presence also creates orbital flotsam** – such as cameras, pliers, an astronaut’s glove, a wrench, a spatula, even a tool bag lost during space walks. Some debris is created naturally from the impacts of micrometeoroids – dust-sized fragments of asteroids and comets. With limited lifetimes, **operational satellites can become space debris**. Satellites run out of maneuvering fuel, batteries wear out, solar panels degrade – causing an orbital debris feedback loop, in which the problem is exacerbated when solar panels are sandblasted by micrometeoroids and tiny debris. As with rocket debris, spent satellites eventually re-enter Earth’s atmosphere and burn up, but the process can take years – and the higher they orbit above Earth, the longer those orbits take to decay.

**Time frame – Kessler effect 200 years away**

**Stubbe 17** [(Peter, PhD in law @ Johann Wolfgang Goethe University Frankfurt) “State Accountability for Space Debris: A Legal Study of Responsibility for Polluting the Space Environment and Liability for Damage Caused by Space Debris,” Koninklijke Brill Publishing, ISBN 978-90-04-31407-8, p. 27-31] TDI

The prediction of possible scenarios of the future evolution of the debris p o p ulation involves many uncertainties. Long-term forecasting means the prediction of the evolution of the future debris environment in time periods of decades or even centuries. Predictions are based on models84 that work with certain assumptions, and altering these parameters significantly influences the outcomes of the predictions. Assumptions on the future space traffic and on the initial object environment are particularly critical to the results of modeling efforts.85 A well-known pattern for the evolution of the debris population is the so-called Kessler effect’, which assumes that there is a certain collision probability among space objects because many satellites operate in similar orbital regions. These collisions create fragments, and thus additional objects in the respective orbits, which in turn enhances the risk of further collisions. Consequently, the num ber of objects and collisions increases exponentially and eventually results in the formation of a self-sustaining debris belt aroundthe Earth. While it has long been assumed that such a process of collisional cascading is likely to occur only in a very long-term perspective (meaning a time 1 n of several hundred years),87 a consensus has evolved in recent years that an uncontrolled growth of the debris population in certain altitudes could become reality much sooner.88 In fact, a recent cooperative study undertaken by various space agencies in the scope of i a d c shows that the current l e o debris population is unstable, even if current mitigation measures are applied. The study concludes: Even with a 90% implementation of the commonly-adopted mitigation measures [...] the l e o debris population is expected to increase by an average of 30% in the next 200 years. The population growth is primarily driven by catastrophic collisions between 700 and 1000 km altitudes and such collisions are likely to occur every 5 to 9 years.89