#### Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all constructive speech docs open source with highlighting on the NDCA LD wiki within an hour after debating.

#### Violation – Not on wiki

#### 1] Debate resource inequities—you’ll say people will steal cards, but that’s good—it’s the only way to truly level the playing field for students such as novices in under-privileged programs.

Antonucci 5 [Michael (Debate coach for Georgetown; former coach for Lexington High School); “[eDebate] open source? resp to Morris”; December 8; http://cedadebate.org/pipermail/mailman/2005 December/060990.html]

a. Open source systems are preferable to the various punishment proposals in circulation. It's better to share the wealth than limit production or participation. Various flavors of argument communism appeal to different people, but banning interesting or useful research(ers) seems like the most destructive solution possible. Indeed, open systems may be the only structural, rule-based answer to resource inequities. Every other proposal I've seen obviously fails at the level of enforcement. Revenue sharing (illegal), salary caps (unenforceable and possibly illegal) and personnel restrictions (circumvented faster than you can say 'information is fungible') don't work. This would - for better or worse. b. With the help of a middling competent archivist, an open source system would reduce entry barriers. This is especially true on the novice or JV level. Young teams could plausibly subsist entirely on a diet of scavenged arguments. A novice team might not wish to do so, but the option can't hurt. c. An open source system would fundamentally change the evidence economy without targetting anyone or putting anyone out of a job. It seems much smarter (and less bilious) to change the value of a professional card-cutter's work than send the KGB after specific counter-revolutionary teams.

#### 2] Evidence ethics – open source is the only way to verify before round that cards aren’t miscut – otherwise you could have highlighted unethically. That’s a voter – maintaining ethical ev practices is key to being good academics and we should be able to verify you didn’t cheat, key to fairness- Specifically in her case, no way I Can go through links at the bottom and all the ev is paraphrased,

#### Fairness is a voter – its constitutive of any competitive activity based on skills, wins, and losses – unfair practices skew the judge’s ability to determine the better debater

#### Drop the debater to set a norm – if you lose you’ll open source from now on

#### Competing interps – reasonability is arbitrary and begs the question of what’s reasonable requiring judge intervention

#### No neg rvi – otherwise the 6 minute 2nr can collapse to a short shell and get away with infinite 1nc abuse via sheer brute force and time spent on theory

Graphical user interface

Description automatically generated with low confidence

### Abolish WTO

#### CP Text: The World Trade Organization ought to be abolished and The following 164 countries listed in the speech doc ought to independently reduce intellectual property for medicines

Afghanistan Albania Angola Antigua and Barbuda Argentina Armenia Australia Austria Bahrain, Kingdom of Bangladesh Barbados Belgium Belize Benin Bolivia, Plurinational State of Botswana Brazil Brunei Darussalam Bulgaria Burkina Faso Burundi Cabo Verde Cambodia Cameroon Canada Central African Republic Chad Chile China Colombia Congo Costa Rica Côte d’Ivoire Croatia Cuba Cyprus Czech Republic Democratic Republic of the Congo Denmark Djibouti Dominica Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt El Salvador Estonia Eswatini European Union (formerly EC) Fiji Finland France Gabon Gambia Georgia Germany Ghana Greece Grenada Guatemala Guinea Guinea-Bissau Guyana Haiti Honduras Hong Kong, China Hungary Iceland India Indonesia Ireland Israel Italy Jamaica Japan Jordan Kazakhstan Kenya Korea, Republic of Kuwait, the State of Kyrgyz Republic Lao People’s Democratic Republic Latvia Lesotho Liberia Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxembourg Macao, China Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Maldives Mali Malta Mauritania Mauritius Mexico Moldova, Republic of Mongolia Montenegro Morocco Mozambique Myanmar Namibia Nepal Netherlands New Zealand Nicaragua Niger Nigeria North Macedonia Norway Oman Pakistan Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Qatar Romania Russian Federation Rwanda Saint Kitts and Nevis Saint Lucia Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Samoa Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of Senegal Seychelles Sierra Leone Singapore Slovak Republic Slovenia Solomon Islands South Africa Spain Sri Lanka Suriname Sweden Switzerland Chinese Taipei Tajikistan Tanzania Thailand Togo Tonga Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia Turkey Uganda Ukraine United Arab Emirates United Kingdom United States Uruguay Vanuatu Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of Viet Nam Yemen Zambia Zimbabwe

Josh **Hawley 20**. Senator from Missouri, JD @ Yale, “The W.T.O. Should Be Abolished,” New York Times, May 5, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/05/opinion/hawley-abolish-wto-china.html>, **RJP, DebateDrills**

The coronavirus emergency is not only a public health crisis. With [30 million Americans unemployed](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/30/us-weekly-jobless-claims.html), it is also an economic crisis. And it has exposed a hard truth about the modern global economy: it weakens American workers and has empowered China’s rise. That must change.

The global economic system as we know it is a relic; it requires reform, top to bottom. We should begin with one of its leading institutions, the World Trade Organization.

We should abolish it.

#### Solves the case---abolition allows free trade and permits nations govern without the pitfalls of the WTO

Josh **Hawley 20**. Senator from Missouri, JD @ Yale, “The W.T.O. Should Be Abolished,” New York Times, May 5, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/05/opinion/hawley-abolish-wto-china.html>, **RJP, DebateDrills**

Abandoning the W.T.O. is a start. The United States must seek new arrangements and new rules, in concert with other free nations, to restore America’s economic sovereignty and allow this country to practice again the capitalism that made it strong. History can be our guide. For nearly 50 years before the W.T.O.’s founding, the United States and its allies maintained a network of reciprocal trade that protected our national interests and the nation’s workers. We can do it again, for the 21st century. That means returning production to this country, securing our critical supply chains and encouraging domestic innovation and manufacturing. It means striking trade deals that are truly mutual and truly beneficial for America and walking away when they are not. It means building a new network of trusted friends and partners to resist Chinese economic imperialism.

#### Counterplan competes ---

#### 1] Normal means---it’s a TRIPs waiver, which doesn’t make sense if TRIPs and the WTO doesn’t exist

James **Bacchus 20**. Member of the [Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies](https://www.cato.org/herbert-stiefel-center-trade-policy-studies), the Distinguished University Professor of Global Affairs and director of the Center for Global Economic and Environmental Opportunity at the University of Central Florida. He was a founding judge and was twice the chairman—the chief judge—of the highest court of world trade, the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization in Geneva, Switzerland. “An Unnecessary Proposal: A WTO Waiver of Intellectual Property Rights for COVID-19 Vaccines,” CATO, December 16, 2020, <https://www.cato.org/free-trade-bulletin/unnecessary-proposal-wto-waiver-intellectual-property-rights-covid-19-vaccines>, **RJP, DebateDrills**

In a sign of their increasing frustration with global efforts to ensure that all people everywhere will have access to COVID-19 vaccines, several developing countries have asked other members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to join them in a sweeping waiver of the intellectual property (IP) rights relating to those vaccines. Their waiver request raises anew the recurring debate within the WTO over the right balance between the protection of IP rights and access in poorer countries to urgently needed medicines. But the last thing the WTO needs is another debate over perceived trade obstacles to public health.

#### 2] “Member” is defined as part of a group---the counterplan abolishes the broader group

**Merriam Webster n.d.** “Member,” <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/member>, **RJP, DebateDrills**

**:**one of the individuals composing a group

#### 3] “Member of” means “to be contained in” “to be included in” and “be part of” --- none of those are possible if the broader group is gone.[[1]](#footnote-1)

### 1NC – Chinese Tech Theft

#### Allows rampant Chinese tech theft and enrichment

Josh **Hawley 20**. Senator from Missouri, JD @ Yale, “The W.T.O. Should Be Abolished,” New York Times, May 5, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/05/opinion/hawley-abolish-wto-china.html>, **RJP, DebateDrills**

The reformers wanted all the world to follow the same economic rules, so that capital, products, and people could move easily across national boundaries. Nation-states themselves would become less important in setting economic policy and new, multilateral institutions, like the W.T.O., would take on the role of managing the global economy.

It was a bold vision, and a major departure. The economic system it replaced had been created by America and its allies at the close of the Second World War and pursued more modest aims. The Cold War system sought to build up the free nations’ economies and to contain the Soviet Union. It took the independent nation-state as its basic building block, and encouraged trade and investment between nations as equal sovereigns. This system allowed each country to set its own internal economic policy and control its borders and trade.

But in the early 1990s, with America’s principal adversary gone, Western policymakers were in a messianic frame of mind. President George H.W. Bush [promised](https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-before-the-45th-session-the-united-nations-general-assembly-new-york-new-york) a “new world order” of “open borders, open trade … and open minds,” a new international system based on liberal values to bring peace to the world. He and other internationalists wanted a new economic system to match.

That new order’s universal peace never quite arrived. Instead, the internationalists embroiled America in one foreign war after another. And their liberal economic order fared little better. It sent American production overseas, compromised American supply chains, and cost American jobs, all while enriching Communist China.

Take the World Trade Organization. Its mandate was to promote free trade, but the organization instead allowed some nations to maintain trade barriers and protectionist workarounds, like China, while preventing others from defending themselves, like the United States. Foreign agriculture won concession after concession, while American farmers struggled to get fair access to markets. Meanwhile, the W.T.O. required American workers to compete against Chinese [forced labor](https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/CECC%20Staff%20Report%20March%202020%20-%20Global%20Supply%20Chains%2C%20Forced%20Labor%2C%20and%20the%20Xinjiang%20Uyghur%20Autonomous%20Region.pdf) but did next to nothing to stop Chinese theft of American intellectual property and products.

Under the W.T.O.’s auspices, capital and goods moved across borders easier than before, no doubt, but so did jobs. And too many jobs left America’s borders for elsewhere. As factories closed, workers suffered, from small towns to the urban core. Inflation adjusted, working wages stagnated and upward mobility flatlined.

Enough is enough. The W.T.O. should be abolished, and along with it, the new model global economy. The quest to turn the world into a liberal order of democracies was always misguided. It always depended on unsustainable American sacrifice and force of arms. And its companion economic order has, in similar vein, succeeded mostly in weakening American workers and industry.

We must face facts. The only sure way to confront the single greatest threat to American security in the 21st century, Chinese imperialism, is to rebuild the U.S. economy and to build up the American worker. And that means reforming the global economic system.

#### Specifically, the WTO permits Chinese tech theft.

Stephen **Ezell 21**. Vice President, Global Innovation Policy, Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, “False Promises II: The Continuing Gap Between China’s WTO Commitments and Its Practices,” ITIF, July 26, 2021, <https://itif.org/publications/2021/07/26/false-promises-ii-continuing-gap-between-chinas-wto-commitments-and-its>, **RJP, DebateDrills**

Nearly 20 years after joining the World Trade Organization, China remains woefully short of meeting a broad range of commitments and responsibilities, to the detriment of both its trading partners and the international economic system.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

China’s state-led economic model, driven heavily by innovation-mercantilist practices, stands at odds with the foundational WTO principles of pursuing market-oriented policies while providing non-discrimination, national treatment, and reciprocity.

China has failed to meet numerous WTO commitments on issues such as industrial subsidization, protection of foreign intellectual property, forcing joint ventures and technology transfer, and providing market access to services industries.

China’s behavior toward the WTO and its trading partners is that of a nation that knew what it had to promise to enter the organization, but its subsequent actions have demonstrated it never intended to keep those promises.

Decades of gaming the global trading system and failing to meet WTO commitments have enabled China to accumulate tremendous trade surpluses and foreign currency reserves, which it uses to pursue domestic and foreign policy objectives.

It is time for like-minded nations to join together to forcefully insist that China come into full and immediate compliance with all its WTO commitments and more broadly to contest China’s innovation-mercantilist strategies.

INTRODUCTION

As China nears its 20th year of World Trade Organization (WTO) membership, originally acceding to the organization on December 11, 2001, it has never been further away from faithfully committing to the foundational principles and tenets of the organization and its fundamental obligations and commitments. WTO membership comes with rights to enjoy preferential access to other nations’ markets, but also responsibilities. In particular, it commits nations to support and pursue “open, market-oriented policies” in accordance with the foundational principles of “non-discrimination, market access, reciprocity, and fairness.”1

China has taken full advantage of its WTO rights. It has also largely ignored the responsibilities and commitments through its embrace of state-directed capitalism predicated upon an aggressive innovation mercantilism. This mercantilism denies foreign enterprises access to Chinese markets on reciprocal terms; distorts global markets, including for advanced-technology goods; and deprives nations of the benefits they believed they would receive when granting China accession into the community of trading nations.

In this report, China’s accession to the WTO is recounted along with the trade rules with which it fails to comply. The report also describes the economic benefits China has accrued in part by not complying with its WTO commitments. Lastly, it offers policy recommendations for policymakers from the United States and like-minded nations to address the continuing China trade challenge.

Our initial 2015 Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) report on this topic, on which this report is based, is premised on China’s false promises to the WTO. Even with a full-scale Section 301 investigation initiated by the Trump administration, China has made little progress in fulfilling a wide range of its WTO commitments over the past two decades.2

#### Stopping tech stealing is key to avoid catastrophic war

Timothy R. **Heath 18**. RAND Senior Defense and International Analyst, “Avoiding “Avoiding U.S.-China Competition Is Futile: Why the Best Option Is to Manage Strategic Rivalry”; Asia Policy; Vol 13 No 2; April 2018, RJP, DebateDrills

This article argues that the structural drivers of U.S.-China competition are too deep to resolve through cooperative engagement and that policymakers must instead accept the reality of strategic rivalry and aim to manage it at a lower level of intensity. main argument Rising tensions between China and the U.S. have spurred fears that the two countries could end up in conflict or recreate the Cold War. To avoid these outcomes, analysts have proposed ways to defuse competition and promote cooperation. However, because these arguments do not address the structural drivers underpinning U.S.-China competition, such proposals are unlikely to end the rivalry. Conflict is not inevitable, however, and aggressive strategies that unnecessarily aggravate the sources of rivalry are likely to prove dangerously counterproductive. The best option at this point is, paradoxically, for the U.S. to accept the reality of the growing strategic rivalry and manage it at a lower level of intensity. policy implications • Maintaining a technological edge is critical for the U.S. to successfully manage the rivalry with China. Policies should be pursued to ensure that the U.S. continues to attract and nurture the best science and technology talent and retains its status as the global leader in technology. • To compete with China’s narrative about leading regional integration, the U.S. should both put forth a compelling vision for the region that encompasses widely held economic, security, and political values and continue to bolster its diplomatic and military positions in Asia. • To maintain the U.S.-China rivalry at a stable level, policymakers in both countries should prioritize measures that discourage the mobilization of popular sentiment against the other country and encourage cultural exchanges. • U.S.-China competition will likely become increasingly entwined with rivalries between China and U.S. allies and partners such as Japan and India. U.S. policymakers will need to take into account the independent dynamics of those separate rivalries when managing relations with China. The United States and China find themselves increasingly enmeshed in a strategic rivalry, the basic nature of which remains poorly understood in the United States. To be sure, disagreements between the two countries have gained widespread attention. Disputes involving Chinese confrontations with U.S. allies and partners such as Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan have frequently grabbed the headlines. At other times, disagreements over Chinese trade practices and U.S. military activities in the South China Sea have occasioned discord. All these sources of conflict are genuine, but they mask the main drivers of rivalry, which are twofold. First, the United States and China are locked in a contest for primacy—most clearly in Asia and probably globally as well. The United States has been the dominant power, and China seeks to eventually supplant it. By definition, two different states cannot simultaneously share primacy at either the regional or global level. Second, economic, demographic, and military trajectories suggest that China has the potential to contend in a significant way for leadership at the global systemic level. At this level, the most decisive competition will be for technological leadership. Should China supplant the United States as the world’s premier country in terms of technology, its claim to regional and global supremacy will be difficult to deny. And once it has gained that supremacy, China will be well positioned to restructure institutional arrangements to privilege itself and disadvantage the United States. Although this competition is occurring simultaneously at both levels, observers have focused primarily on the struggle for primacy at the regional level and overlooked or downplayed the competition at the global systemic level.1 To counter China’s pursuit of regional primacy, the United States has bolstered its alliances in Asia (albeit inconsistently), expanded diplomatic outreach to China and rising powers in Southeast Asia, and revised its military posture—efforts captured by President Barack Obama’s “rebalance to Asia.” President Donald Trump may have abandoned the rebalance, but many of the related initiatives remain more or less in place.2 China’s challenge at the global systemic level, especially in the field of technology, has received less attention. Confidence in the proven U.S. ability to produce new technologies and facile assumptions about the difficulties China will face in promoting innovation in new industries have led many to dismiss the challenge posed by China. **But the contest for technological leadership is actually even more consequential than that for regional primacy.** Should China succeed in surpassing the United States as the world’s technological leader, U.S. diplomacy and military power will not suffice to hold the line either in Asia or around the globe**.** Under those conditions, countries throughout the world, including U.S. allies in Asia, will be forced to come to terms with the new leading economy. Military power projection could be far less relevant as China moves to consolidate its leading status at both the regional and global levels in such a scenario. Accordingly, although the United States cannot abandon its efforts to bolster its diplomatic and military position in Asia, the country must step up its efforts to strengthen its faltering lead in new technology development. While China clearly grasps the stakes, it is not clear that the United States does. For example, China’s government has promoted R&D into quantum computing. The investment appears to be paying off, as the country has leaped ahead of the United States in developing quantum communications.3 Similarly, the U.S. Congress has proposed to dispense with subsidies for the purchase of electric vehicles, even as China pushes ahead in its plan to become the lead producer of this technology.4 And while the U.S. government seeks to restrict immigration and discourage foreign students from attending U.S. universities (and staying after they receive their advanced training), China has revised its policies to welcome foreigners, prioritizing those with science and technology expertise. Moreover, Chinese investment in basic R&D is rapidly catching up to that of the United States.5 Studies have also noted a shrinking U.S. lead in science and technology as such investment is beginning to bear fruit.6 Similarly, the United States has lost its once-undisputed lead in the per capita number of engineers and scientists.7 Understanding the nature of the U.S.-China rivalry at the regional and global systemic levels, as well as how these two levels interact with one another, is essential if the United States is to successfully manage the challenge posed by China in a manner that avoids war. This study aims to contribute to that understanding. The article is organized into the following sections: u pp. 95–102 provide an overview of the growing rivalry between China and the United States, including a discussion of the meaning and role of strategic rivalry in interstate conflict and a comparison with the U.S.-China rivalry during the Cold War. u pp. 102–4 review the dynamics of the rivalry at the regional systemic level. u pp. 104–10 analyze the dynamics of the rivalry at the global systemic level. u pp. 110–15 examine why proposals to avoid rivalry through cooperation or aggressive competition are unlikely to succeed. u pp. 115–19 discuss the idea of strategic rivalry management and offer recommendations on ways to sustain the rivalry at a lower level of intensity the growing rivalry between the united states and china Strains between China and the United States have deepened in the past few years over a proliferating array of issues. President Trump has stepped up accusations against China of unfair trade practices and inadequate pressure on North Korea. He also provoked controversy early in his term when he floated the idea of increasing official contacts with Taiwan, which Beijing considers a renegade province.8 These disputes add to tensions that had expanded under President Obama, who moved to strengthen U.S. alliances in Asia, promote a regional trade pact, criticize Chinese behavior in the cyber and maritime domains, and shift more military assets to the Asia-Pacific as part of the rebalance to Asia strategy.9 China has in turn dismissed U.S. concerns about the construction of artificial islands in the South China Sea, intensified its criticism of U.S. security leadership in Asia, and tightened its grip on disputed maritime territories.10 The baleful state of bilateral relations has spurred plenty of finger-pointing. On the Chinese side, officials denounce the United States’ “Cold War mindset” and warn of conflict if Washington does not adjust its policies.11 A 2015 defense white paper described an “intensifying competition” between the great powers.12 Military officials and many Chinese analysts regard increasing tension between the two countries as unavoidable, although they do not regard war as likely. People’s Liberation Army (PLA) deputy chief of staff Qi Jianguo commented that “no conflict and no confrontation does not mean no struggle” between China and the United States.13 According to Chinese official media, polls in China suggest a large majority believes that the United States intends to pursue a containment policy.14 Reflecting this point of view, Niu Xinchun, a scholar at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, argued that the “greatest obstacle to the further integration of emerging countries such as China into the international system comes from the United States.”15 Western officials and commentators tend to blame China for current strains. Senior U.S. leaders have criticized “assertive” Chinese behavior, while some analysts blame Xi Jinping for pushing a more confrontational set of policies.16 Other Western observers worry that a further souring of relations could lead to conflict.17 But even if war remains unlikely, the deepening tensions increase the risks of miscalculation, crises, and potential military clashes involving the world’s two largest powers. Echoing a view widely held among U.S. foreign policy experts and officials, former CIA director General Michael Hayden has warned that mishandling the U.S.-China relationship could be “catastrophic.”18 Rivalry at the Heart of the U.S.-China Relationship This widespread concern reflects a realistic appraisal of the dangers inherent in the U.S.-China relationship. But developing successful policies to manage an increasingly sensitive and complex situation requires an accurate assessment of the phenomenon of interstate rivalry that lies at the heart of that relationship. Rivalry is a concept that, while widely acknowledged, remains poorly understood. To be sure, most experts take for granted the idea that powerful nations compete for status and influence, and they acknowledge the danger posed by a rising power’s challenge to a status quo power. Yet investigation into the phenomenon of rivalry too often stops at these well-trodden findings. Less often discussed are the conclusions regarding the dynamics of rivalry that experts on conflict studies have arrived at within the past few years. Much of this scholarship draws from improvements to the analyses and data regarding interstate crisis and conflict.19 This research has generated useful and interesting insights regarding the start and conclusion of rivalries, crises, and war, although these remain largely unexplored outside academic circles. Analysts have established, for example, that rivalry is perhaps the most important driver of interstate conflict. As defined by political scientists, “rivals” are states that regard each other as “enemies,” sources of real or potential threat, and as competitors. At the root of rivalries thus lie disputes over incompatible goals and perceptions that countries possess both the ability (real or potential) and the intention to harm each other. Wars have historically tended to be fought by pairings of these states and their allies. Rivals have opposed each other in 77% of wars since 1816 and in over 90% of wars since 1945.20 Not only are rivals more likely to fight than non-rivals, but rivals also have a tendency to be recidivists because they are unable to resolve their political differences on the battlefield. Yet that does not always discourage them from trying to do so repeatedly. Rivals that cannot prevail due to parity frequently compete for advantage by building internal strength through arms racing or by leveraging external power through the strengthening of alliances and partnerships. Rivals are also prone to serial militarized crises**.** Mutual perceptions of each other as hostile enemies and the inconclusive outcome of previous militarized disputes typically fuel a pattern of recurrent crises characterized by deepening resentment, distrust, and growing willingness to risk escalation. Studies have also established that the risk of conflict increases sharply after three episodes of militarized crises.21 Rivalries do not progress in a linear direction, however. Their intensity can wax and wane in response to shocks and other important developments. Periods of relative stability can alternate with turbulent periods of tension and conflict. Similarly, cooperative activities can be interspersed with periods of acute tension and hostility. Nevertheless, the link between rivalry, crises, and interstate conflict is pervasive. Drawing from these sources, one can describe the Sino-U.S. relationship as a rivalry characterized as a competition between two major powers over incompatible goals regarding their status, leadership, and influence over a particular region—in this case principally the Asia-Pacific. The dynamics of this type of strategic rivalry differ in significant ways from the far more numerous rivalries over territory that have characterized conflict between so many countries, especially weaker and poorer ones. In contrast with rivalries over territories, strategic rivals do not necessarily share borders, although allies of one power may be engaged in a territorial dispute with the other major power. Strategic rivalries among major powers tend to be especially long-lived, with the average enduring for about 55 years.22 Strategic rivalries are incredibly complex phenomena that include overlapping and often reinforcing layers of disputes over leadership, status, and territory between the principal rivals and their allies. Such rivalries are almost always multilateral affairs that also involve allies and partners, some of which have their own rivalries with the other side. Competition in the economic, political, and military domains can serve as expressions as well as drivers of rivalry, as can sports and cultural competition. Strategic rivalries can be confined to one region, with the basic conflict reducible in some respects to which rival will occupy the top rung of the regional hierarchy. In other cases, however, a rivalry can span regional and global domains either sequentially or simultaneously. The U.S.-China rivalry, for instance, is already both a regional and, to a lesser extent, a global rivalry, but there is still considerable room for competition to expand. The complex and overlapping nature of the disputes makes strategic rivalries extremely crisis- and conflict-prone. Strategic rivalries come in a grim package deal that includes strained and hostile relations, serial crises, and in some cases wars. The comprehensive and multifaceted nature of the disputes also explains why such rivalries have proved so durable and why their wars have been so devastating. Conflict between strategic rivals has historically occasioned the most destructive wars, of which World Wars I and II are the most recent examples. The fact that experts at the time of each historic episode of systemic conflict consistently underestimated the duration or extent of war offers cold comfort to analysts today who seek to predict the trajectory of any conflict that might involve China and the United States. Comparisons of the Current Environment with the U.S.-China Rivalry during the Cold War How did the two countries arrive at this position? The most widely accepted narrative argues that China’s rapid economic growth has provided the resources with which it can press demands on long unresolved issues such as unification with Taiwan. China and the United States may have enjoyed stable relations in the 1980s when they cooperated on a limited basis against the Soviet Union, but that foundation of cooperation eroded considerably once the Soviet bloc dissolved in the early 1990s. Moreover, China’s rapid growth in economic power has given the country fresh resources to press its own demands on the United States and U.S. allies. By 2010, China’s economy had outpaced that of Japan to become the second-largest in the world.23 The persistence of long-standing sources of antagonism, such as the U.S. security partnership with Taiwan, has both reflected and aggravated a broader competition for leadership. For its own reasons, Washington has resisted Beijing’s demands, and the result has been growing fear and distrust.24 The intensifying rivalry between the rising power and the status quo leader is as old as antiquity itself. Indeed, Graham Allison coined the term “Thucydides trap” to describe such a situation, a term that he subsequently applied to the current U.S.-China situation.25 The popular narrative is not entirely incorrect, yet in some ways it remains incomplete. A closer look at history reminds us that antagonism between China and the United States is not unprecedented. In the 1950s and 1960s, the two countries engaged in an intense strategic competition for status and influence in Asia, one that occasionally burned hot, as it did when they clashed on the Korean Peninsula or more indirectly in Vietnam. This Cold War–era rivalry saw a complex network of competing alliances and partnerships, principally in Asia. The United States supported Taiwan and South Korea in bitter disputes with China and its allies, North Korea and the Soviet Union. This rivalry terminated in the 1970s primarily due to Beijing’s decision to counter a growing Soviet menace and the United States’ decision to pursue China as a potential partner for its own rivalry with the Soviet Union. But the existence of a period of intense U.S.-Chinese tension and competition provides a helpful baseline of comparison. What requires explanation is not the fact that the United States and China are engaged in a rivalry but the difference between today’s rivalry and that of the Cold War. What distinguishes the rivalry today from that of the earlier period is both the closer parity in relative power—albeit still more potential than real—between the two countries and the comprehensiveness, complexity, and systemic nature of the disputes between them. Paradoxically, these features make the current rivalry potentially far more threatening to the United States, despite the fact that so far U.S.-China relations have remained peaceful, and even though the U.S. and Chinese militaries fought each other in the Korean War. The dangerous potential of the current rivalry ultimately owes to the risk that China could rise to the position of global system leader and subordinate the United States accordingly. As has happened in previous power transitions, China as a system leader could exploit existing arrangements to its benefit and to the detriment of the outgoing leader, the United States. Due to the enormous rewards that accrue to a systemic leader and the high costs for the state that loses this position**,** struggles for global leadership have historically proved to be especially destructive. The possibility that China and the United States could find themselves in a similar struggle, while unlikely at this point, cannot be ruled out given the reality of the relative decline in U.S. power and the concomitant increase in Chinese comprehensive national power. At the most basic level, this fact may be measured superficially by the U.S. share of world GDP, which eroded from 40% in 1950 to 16% in 2014, adjusted for purchasing power parity. Over the same period, China’s share expanded from around 5% to 17%.26 An important consequence of the narrowing of the gap in comprehensive power has been an intensifying competition for leadership in the international economic and political order. In this way, the popular discussion of the Thucydides trap correctly recognizes the dangers of the U.S.-China competition. This feature contrasts sharply with the previous episode of rivalry. In the 1950s and 1960s, the asymmetry in power meant that the United States and China competed for influence and even clashed militarily in countries along China’s borders, but rarely elsewhere. As a largely rural, impoverished country, China had little stake in the system of global trade promoted by the industrialized West. Excluded from the United Nations, Maoist China also lacked the institutional ability to influence geopolitics and project power much beyond its immediate environs—and even that capability was sorely handicapped. Outside Asia, the United States faced minimal competition from China and generally regarded the Soviet Union as a more pressing threat. By contrast, the current competition features a China fully enmeshed in a political and economic order led by the United States. While generally supportive of this order, China is also seeking to revise aspects of the regional and international order that it regards as obstacles to the country’s revitalization as a great power. The main theater of this competition for influence and leadership is the Asia-Pacific, as it was in the Cold War, but U.S.-China rivalry increasingly is expanding globally. Moreover, unlike the largely military, regional, and ideological Cold War competition, the current contest is far more multifaceted and comprehensive in nature; it includes military, economic, technological, and political dimensions. The following two sections review the state of the competition at both the regional and the global systemic levels. the u.s.-china rivalry at the regional level At the regional level, U.S.-China competition spans the political, economic, and military realms. Politically, the two countries have feuded over the role of liberal values and ideals, a dispute that widened after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. However, the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis elevated the potential threat of conflict between the two countries and may therefore be regarded as the starting point of the current rivalry. Coinciding with impressive gains in China’s economic and military power following two decades of market reforms, the standoff saw Washington and Beijing deploy military assets to back up their respective positions regarding Taiwan’s right to hold a presidential election, elevating the risk of a clash. Since then, the competition for political influence and leadership has intensified. In 2011, the United States announced its rebalance to Asia, which was aimed in part at shoring up U.S. alliances, partnerships, and influence.27 Although on the surface Washington has abandoned the effort, the Trump administration has reintroduced a vision for Asia’s economic and security order premised on values favorable to U.S. interests.28 The 2017 National Security Strategy stated, for example, that the United States upholds a “free and open Indo-Pacific.”29 Beijing, by contrast, has increased its efforts to advance a vision for a regional order premised on Chinese leadership. In recent years, China has promoted major economic and geostrategic initiatives to deepen Asia’s economic integration through the Belt and Road Initiative, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and other initiatives.30 In 2017, China for the first time issued a white paper that outlined the government’s vision for Asia-Pacific security. The paper stated that China takes the advancement of regional prosperity and stability “as its own responsibility.”31 These policies build on directives issued by Xi Jinping in 2013, when he called for policies to bolster China’s attractiveness as a regional leader.32 Economically, the two countries are competing over the evolution of Asia’s economic future—a region anticipated to drive global growth in coming decades. Both countries are also competing to shape the terms of trade. President Trump may have abandoned the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), but his advisers have advocated other measures to shape favorable trade terms.33 Meanwhile, China has stepped up advocacy of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, a proposed free trade agreement for the region that excludes the United States.34 China also has promoted the AIIB, while the United States and Japan continue to instead support the Asian Development Bank.35 Militarily, the growing arms race and the establishment of rival security institutions stand among the most obvious manifestations of an increasing competition in this domain. China and the United States have designed an array of military capabilities and doctrines partly aimed at each other. The PLA has developed weapons systems to counter potential U.S. intervention in any contingency along China’s periphery, which the United States has in turn sought to counter with its own innovations, such as the Joint Operational Access Concept.36 U.S. secretaries of defense Chuck Hagel and Ashton Carter outlined a “third offset” strategy to compete with China and Russia in military technology.37 To promote regional security, the United States has strengthened its military alliances and partnerships, while China has strengthened ties with Russia and argued that regional security is best protected through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, and other Chinese-led institutions. In 2014, Xi indirectly rebuked the United States for seeking to bolster its security leadership in the region, stating that “it is for the people of Asia to uphold the security of Asia.”38

#### US-China war goes nuclear.

[Caitlin Talmadge (10-15-2018), PhD in Political Science from MIT, BA in Government from Harvard, Professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University, “Beijing’s Nuclear Option,” Foreign Affairs, [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option]//recut](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option%5d//recut) SLC PK

As China’s power has grown in recent years, so, too, has the risk of war with the United States. Under President Xi Jinping, China has increased its political and economic pressure on Taiwan and built military installations on coral reefs in the South China Sea, fueling Washington’s fears that Chinese expansionism will threaten U.S. allies and influence in the region. U.S. destroyers have transited the Taiwan Strait, to loud protests from Beijing. American policymakers have wondered aloud whether they should send an aircraft carrier through the strait as well. Chinese fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the South China Sea. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump has brought long-simmering economic disputes to a rolling boil.

A war between the two countries remains unlikely, but the prospect of a military confrontation—resulting, for example, from a Chinese campaign against Taiwan—no longer seems as implausible as it once did. And the odds of such a confrontation going nuclear are higher than most policymakers and analysts think.

Members of China’s strategic com­munity tend to dismiss such concerns. Likewise, U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear weapons from the analysis entirely, treating them as basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict. Asked about the issue in 2015, Dennis Blair, the former commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, estimated the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear crisis as “somewhere between nil and zero.”

This assurance is misguided. If deployed against China, the Pentagon’s preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States’ signature approach to war has been simple: punch deep into enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the opponent’s key military assets at minimal cost. But the Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia, none of which was a nuclear power.

China, by contrast, not only has nuclear weapons; it has also intermingled them with its conventional military forces, making it difficult to attack one without attacking the other. This means that a major U.S. military campaign targeting China’s conventional forces would likely also threaten its nuclear arsenal. Faced with such a threat, Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons while they were still able to.

As U.S. and Chinese leaders navigate a relationship fraught with mutual suspicion, they must come to grips with the fact that a conventional war could skid into a nuclear confrontation. Although this risk is not high in absolute terms, its consequences for the region and the world would be devastating. As long as the United States and China continue to pursue their current grand strategies, the risk is likely to endure. This means that leaders on both sides should dispense with the illusion that they can easily fight a limited war. They should focus instead on managing or resolving the political, economic, and military tensions that might lead to a conflict in the first place.

### Moderna/Manufacturing

**Patent waiver doesn’t solve; patents don’t contain manufacturing instructions**

**Turner and Rourke 21**, Mark Eccleston-Turner and Michelle Rourke, American Society of International Law, “The TRIPS Waiver is Necessary, but it Alone is not Enough to Solve Equitable Access to COVID-19 Vaccines” May 21st 2021, Insights Volume 23 Issue 9<https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/25/issue/9> Livingston RB

Unlike chemical pharmaceuticals (most drugs**), vaccines are large-molecule biological products requiring a great deal of information and know-how to manufacture—information that is not disclosed through patents.** Thus, **waiving patent rights alone will not enable new manufacturers to come online**. The initial text of the proposed waiver by India and South Africa recognizes the crucial role that know-how plays in vaccine manufacturing capacity. However, unlike with patent rights, **there is no** clear, easy **fix contained within the proposed waiver, and pharmaceutical companies will likely strenuously resist such technology transfer. Without knowledge transfer, it will be** extremely **difficult** for LMICs **to start COVID-19 vaccine manufacturing, regardless of the removal** of patent barriers from the **TRIPS** waiver.The TRIPS Agreement recognizes the importance of technology transfer through its Objectives, and Article 66.2 of TRIPS states that "developed country Members shall provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least-developed country Members in order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base." The WHO has set up a mRNA technology transfer hub to provide a mechanism to facilitate the sharing of know-how related to manufacturing mRNA vaccines, but **none of the technology holders have** thus far **engaged** with the hub. This is reflective of wider efforts by **the WHO to** facilitate the **transfer** of **technology from established** vaccine **manufacturers to new manufacturers in developing countries**. In recent history this was most notably attempted through the WHO's Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework (PIP Framework), where the WHO has attempted to use multilateral access and benefit-sharing arrangements to negotiate the sharing of technology in the field of pandemic vaccine manufacturing. To this end, pandemic influenza vaccine manufacturers who wish to receive influenza virus samples from the WHO's network of specialized laboratories must sign a contract with the WHO called a Standard Material Transfer Agreement, committing to at least two of the following options:

**Moderna proves- Puts aff in double bind, either moderna solves the aff or the aff won’t work**

**Silverman 21**, Rachel Silverman, Policy Fellow at the Center For Global Development, Center for Global Development “Would Exempting COVID-19 Vaccines from Intellectual Property Rights Improve Global Access and Equity?”<https://www.cgdev.org/debate/would-exempting-covid-19-vaccines-intellectual-property-rights-improve-global-access> Livingston RB

With thanks to our contributors and commentators, I think this debate has generated greater clarity and nuance—if not necessarily consensus—about whether IP poses a meaningful barrier to COVID-19 vaccine access. We largely agree that knowledge-sharing and tech transfer are the crux of the IP issue—not patents and legal strictures per se**. Moderna**, for example, **has waived IP enforcement for COVID-19 vaccines but has not widely shared its know-how; without the latter, the former action has not generated any generic production.** We are left, in that case, with two broad areas of disagreement and/or uncertainty. First, is an IP waiver important as a first step and/or symbolic gesture, even if it will have limited impact without broader knowledge sharing? Some have argued “yes”—that it provides legal clarity to protect generic manufacturers against retribution and signals a shared commitment to human life and health over company profits and wealthy-country interests. From my perspective, I continue to feel largely agnostic on this point. I recognize the symbolic value and I’m not opposed to **the waiver** per se¸ but given its relatively low impact I continue to think it **is an inefficient use of limited** global advocacy/political **capital for vaccine access**.

## AT: COVID Impacts

#### Even if IP was reduced for COVID vaccines, there would be no change in production

**Abbott 21**, Alden Abbott, Alden Abbott is a senior research fellow with the Mercatus Center at George Mason University and formerly served as the Federal Trade Commission’s General Counsel, May 7 2021, National Review, “Waiving IP Protection for COVID Vaccine Is Anti-innovation and Anti-Public Health”<https://www.nationalreview.com/2021/05/waiving-ip-protection-for-covid-vaccines-is-anti-innovation-and-anti-public-health/> Livingston RB

Waiving intellectual property protections (including patents) for COVID-19 vaccines, which, as U.S. trade representative Katherine Tai announced Wednesday, the Biden administration supports, will if implemented prove disastrous for American innovation — and detrimental to public health as well. Patents are property rights that allow inventors to exclude third parties from copying and using novel patented technologies for 20 years from the time a petition for a patent is filed. Patents are particularly important in the medical field, underpinning the “miracle drugs” and vaccines that save and better countless lives. In October 2020, India and South Africa petitioned the World Trade Organization (WTO) to bypass granting or enforcement of all forms of intellectual property (IP) rights (patents, trade secrets, industrial designs) on COVID-19-related drugs, vaccines, diagnostics, and other medical technologies for the duration of the COVID-19 pandemic. IP rights are protected under the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement overseen by the World Trade Organization. U.S. support for the petition, announced by Tai, strengthens the prospect for its adoption in upcoming WTO negotiations. Patent rights were key to the unprecedentedly rapid development and rollout of COVID-19 vaccines in 2020. A number of highly successful COVID-19 vaccines (including the Moderna and Pfizer vaccines) came about due to earlier innovative mRNA research that was spurred by patents. Significantly, **patents have not affected the mass production of important COVID-19 vaccines.** As former U.S. Patent and Trademark Office chief [Andrei Iancu explains](https://www.statnews.com/2021/04/13/no-evidence-patents-slow-vaccine-access/), vaccine **makers** already **have entered into** a web of **agreements with countries** around the world, and “**almost every factory on the planet that can make these vaccines is already doing so.”** Indeed, patent experts recently indicated that patent-inspired “mRNA vaccines could open the door for the approval of other mRNA-based medicines, creating a wide range of new markets.” Indeed, as Iancu points out, “**there’s** robust collaboration and **cooperation** within the industry **to ensure that vaccines are made quickly and safely.** And **patents** actually **facilitate** such **cooperation**, **because each entity can rest assured that its proprietary technology is protected in the long run.**”

### 1NC – HIV/AIDs

#### Big pharma companies are now turning to developing countries to distribute drugs for cheap – solvency in squo

**McNeil Jr. 19**[science and health reporter specializing in plagues and pestilences. He covers diseases of the world’s poor and wider epidemics, The New York Times, “Drug Companies Are Focusing on the Poor After Decades of Ignoring Them”, June 24, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/24/health/drugs-poor-countries-africa.html>] DD MN

Nearly **20 million Africans are now on H.I.V. treatment — for less than $100 a year. Top-quality drugs for malaria, tuberculosis,**[**hepatitis C**](https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/16/health/hepatitis-c-treatment-egypt.html)[**and some cancers**](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/07/health/africa-cancer-drugs.html)**are now sold at rock-bottom prices in poor countries.**

Once demonized as immoral profiteers, many of **the world’s biggest 20 pharmaceutical companies now** boast about how they **help poor countries and fight neglected diseases**. They [compete](https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2018/11/20/1654460/0/en/Novartis-rises-to-second-place-in-2018-Access-to-Medicine-Index.html) on the Access to Medicine Index,[which scores their charitable efforts](https://accesstomedicinefoundation.org/access-to-medicine-index/2018-ranking).

**Several** of them even **cooperate with the Indian generics companies** they once dismissed as “pirates” **by sub-licensing patents so the generics makers can produce cheap drugs for Africa, Asia and Latin America.**

But there is still opportunity for growth. Most of the industry’s remarkable progress [is limited to a few companies, and their efforts are too reliant on donor dollars](https://accesstomedicinefoundation.org/news/new-study-from-the-foundation-analyses-10-years-of-data-on-pharma-companies-and-access-to-medicine), according to a report issued last month by the Access to Medicine Foundation, which publishes the index, and interviews with experts.

1. https://www.thesaurus.com/browse/be%20a%20member%20of [↑](#footnote-ref-1)