**Evinced by its exigence in the Cold War, space exploration remains an enterprise rooted in securing White settler futurities. In America’s second iteration of Manifest Destiny, the figure of the “alien enemy combatant” ensures a militaristic distraction as society averts its gaze from the reiteration of expansionist violence.**

#### Park, 16

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Until the mid-20th century, however, characterizations of outer space remained mostly theoretical. This changed with the advent of modern physics and engineering; suddenly, the stars were quite literally in our grasp. The time between the first aerial circumnavigation and the first orbit of Earth from space was less than 40 years. The Cold War’s Space Race and real-life Star Wars (more officially known as the Strategic Defense Initiative) were fought between U.S. and Communist powers to establish dominance over the skies. For the first time, the battle over space surpassed ideology and entered physical reality. **The Space Race undoubtedly yielded important scientific discoveries, but this was secondary to political and military agendas concerning missiles and nuclear armament**. And although the conversation around international space programs has evolved to include talks of peace, collaboration, and friendly science, billions of dollars are still spent every year by the United States government on military space initiatives. Now that human space exploration seems destined to occur in our lifetime, it is more important than ever that we remain vigilant about its potential costs. Despite the aspirational nature of outer space – exemplified in the deployment of space communicators such as Bill Nye and Neil DeGrasse Tyson into STEM classrooms – it’s hard not to notice the imperialist undertones lurking within the seemingly benign discourse of curiosity. On July 22, the most recent installment in the Star Trek franchise premiered with the following familiar words: “Space: the final frontier. These are the voyages of the starship Enterprise. Its five-year mission: to explore strange new worlds, to seek out new life and new civilizations, to boldly go where no man has gone before.” As a Trek devotee myself, I have been known to tear up at these words, to lose myself in their cheap sentimentality, to dream one day of traveling outer space for myself. But on closer examination, they construct space as a territory to be penetrated, explored, and possibly conquered. **The concept of the “final frontier” is not new: Manifest Destiny**, for example, was a narrative that encouraged and **legitimized 19th-century American expansionism**. But the frontier has traditionally been an inhospitable, bloody place for people of color. The phrases “to boldly go” and “explore strange new worlds,” while perhaps intended to captivate the imagination, belong to a broader rhetoric of imperialism and exploitation. After all, the European “discovery” of the Americas resulted in the loss of 95% of the indigenous population and the subsequent establishment of the Trans-Atlantic slave trade. Although the original Star Trek creatives (to their credit) likely developed the Prime Directive as a critique of U.S. foreign policy in Southeast Asia, contemporary works of **science fiction** are **replete with narratives of settler colonialism**. The short-lived TV show Firefly (2002), in which humans terraform planets for colonization, borrows heavily from colonial/pioneer imagery in an ode to westerns (and from techno-Orientalismas well, but that’s another story). While scientists like to nitpick the technical verisimilitude in these depictions, they are also deeply committed to the possible colonization of Mars, as outlined in a 36-page NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) document titled Journey to Mars: Pioneering Next Steps in Space Exploration. We seem not to have much choice in the matter, however. The ever-present fear of alien enemy combatants invading Earth not only fuels TV and movie franchises but also ensures that society look to authoritarian institutions (such as the military) with gratitude and relief **instead of suspicion**. Even the more domestic threat of resource scarcity and environmental collapse looms over any attempt

**Placement of space infrastructure carves a colonial geography of extraction, sacrifice and risk-made possible by the emptying of people with prior land-use regimes or territorial claims-the utilization of so-called peripheral spaces is part and parcel with the marginalization of subjects used to embody the waste of modernity, destroying any possibility of outer space participation. Klinger 19** (Julie Michelle Klinger - geographer and Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University. "Environmental Geopolitics and Outer Space" Geopolitics <http://www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/files/2019/03/Environmental-Geopolitics-and-Outer-Space.pdf>, DOA: 5/27/19, kbb)

Reaching outer space requires Earthly infrastructure, which means that space launches have concrete footprints that change according to developments in launch technologies. The placement of outer space related infrastructure on Earth is a question of environmental (in)justice. Which sites are chosen, who is expropriated, and which environments are impacted is subject to strategic geopolitical calculations, which, more often than not, employ classical geopolitical reasoning (Hickman and Dolman 2002; Ingold 2006; Meira Filho, Guimarães Fortes, and Barcelos 2014; NDRI 2006). Launch sites are tightly controlled to reduce the risk of interference or failure, therefore situating launch sites in remote areas is often explained in terms of safety and security (Zapata and Murray 2008). No doubt this is important: rockets are composed of many tonnes of material and combustive fuel, so they must be launched in places where damage from routine as well as potentially catastrophic explosions can be contained. For humans to reach “the final frontier,” they must first find a frontier space on Earth that can be made into an empty space in which controlled explosions can be routine. Frontiers are seldom as empty as those aiming to conquer them would claim. Where they are not populated by people, they are filled with other sorts of meanings and life forms (Klinger 2017; Tsing 2005). Potential launch sites and testing ranges deemed by government authorities to be simultaneously remote, safe, and suitable to contain the risks of rocket launch must first be made empty of people, with prior land use regimes or territorial claims pushed beyond designated buffer zones (Gorman 2007; Mitchell 2017). Hence the placement of space infrastructure follows colonial geographies of extraction, sacrifice, and risk (Mitchell 2017; Redfield 2001). As Gorman (2007) put it: “because of their distance from the metropole, these places lend themselves to hosting prisons, detention camps, military installations, nuclear weapons, and nuclear waste. All of these establishments, including rocket ranges, have inspired reactions of protest.” These so-called 12 J. M. KLINGER ‘peripheral’ spaces are nevertheless central to their inhabitants and their neighbors, who question the logic of extraglobal conquest in the face of unresolved Earthly injustices. Consider, for example, the case of the launch site in Alcântara, Brazil, which has been well documented by Araújo and Filho (2006) and Mitchell (2017). Through a close examination of local, national, and international politics, these authors document how the government’s racialized approach to the subsistence communities displaced by space infrastructure deepened structural inequalities. Grassroots opposition to the launch site grew not out of an a priori ideological opposition of poor people to national progress in outer space, as some officials alleged, but rather resulted from the failure to account for the food insecurity generated by state resettlement projects. The resettlement schemes were themselves misinformed by impoverished notions of local livelihoods. Local claims against the deprivations caused by statesponsored space practices have deepened schisms between the military and civilian space programs at the federal government level. Through the lens of classical geopolitics, these structural inequalities scarcely register, with the result that the ‘crawling’ progress of Brazil’s space program is pathologized as poor management practices symptomatic of an inadequately implemented national development vision (Amaral 2010). Critical geopolitics helps deconstruct the nationalist performativity of such endeavors by considering the political and economic value placed on the spectacle of spaceflight (Boczkowska 2017; Macdonald 2008, 2010; Sage 2016). Feminist geopolitics draws our attention to the racialized and gendered dispossession advanced by the state, through the construction of space infrastructure and exercised through access to land. The fact that environmental and public health impacts were only considered by the authorities after years of mobilization by Black social movements, religious communities, and scholars highlights the ways in which inattention to the local in the pursuit of space power perpetuates environmental injustice, which in turn interrupts national plans for space progress. Rocket launches affect local and global environments through the construction of infrastructure, the exposure of local environments to toxic residues, and the dispersal of pollutants in land, air, and sea. Rockets are the only source of direct anthropogenic emissions sources in the stratosphere. Ozone-depleting substances (ODS) such as nitrous oxide, hydrogen chlorine, and aluminum oxide are emitted by rockets, and can destroy 105 ozone molecules before degrading (Voigt et al. 2013). The ozone layer prevents cancer and cataract-causing ultraviolet-b waves from reaching the Earth. As of 2013, rocket launches accounted for less than 1% of ODS emissions. As other ODS are phased out under the Montreal Protocol and the frequency of lower cost space launches increases, the proportion and quantity is likely to increase (Durrieu and Nelson 2013; Ross et al. 2009). GEOPOLITICS 13 Although affluent economies in the northern hemisphere are responsible for most ODS emissions (Polvani 2011; Rousseaux et al. 1999), the geography of exposure disproportionately affects an overall higher population in remote regions and in the southern hemisphere (Norval et al. 2011; Robinson and Erickson 2015; Thompson et al. 2011) because ozone depletion is most serious in regions where high altitude stratospheric clouds are most likely to form: above the polar regions and major mountain ranges (Carslaw et al. 1998; Perlwitz et al. 2008). This is an example of environmental injustice on a global scale, where the global south bears the environmental burden of actions predominately taken in the global north, rocket launches included. In the process, global power relations are reinscribed through the uneven distribution of harm to peripheral and southern bodies, mediated in this case through the redistribution of gases in the stratosphere that increase exposure to solar radiation. Coming closer to Earth, environmental geopolitics of outer space are manifest in the dispersal of particulate matter into ecosystems surrounding active launch sites. This is more than a strictly local environmental concern, because which spaces are subject to the hazards of launch sites involves careful calculations weighing financial cost, state power, and multifarious territorial interests. With each launch, surrounding areas are showered with toxins, heavy metals, and acids over a distance that varies widely with wind, weather, and precipitation patterns at the moment of lift-off.3 The most researched of these pollutants are hydrogen chloride, aluminum oxide, and various aerosolized heavy metals. Release of these pollutants from rocket launches results in localized regional acid rain (Madsen 1981), plant death, fish kills, and failed seed germination of native plants in launch sites (Marion, Black, and Zedler 1989; Schmalzer et al. 1992). These effects, and research on them, are mostly concentrated within one kilometer of the launch site. But they have been recorded several kilometers away under certain weather conditions (Schmalzer et al. 1998). Recent studies on the concentration of trace elements in wildlife in areas near NASA launch activities in Florida, USA, found that more than half of the adults and juvenile alligators had “greater than toxic levels” of trace elements in their liver (Horai et al. 2014). Both the subject, and the vague statement of findings, highlights the lack of research into the impacts on downstream human and non-human communities. In contrast to the precautions taken to protect workers in buildings adjacent to facilities where these technologies are developed (Bolch et al. 1990; Chrostowski, Gan, and Campbell 2010), much less consideration is given to communities within the dynamic pollutant shadow of rocket launches. In Kazakhstan, Russia, and China, researchers have begun examining the effects of the highly toxic liquid propellant, unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine 14 J. M. KLINGER (UDMH), which has been in use since the dawn of the space age. It has noted carcinogenic, mutagenic, convulsant, teratogenic, and embryotoxic effects (Carlsen, Kenesova, and Batyrbekova 2007), and it has been found to cause DNA damage and chromosomal aberrations in rodents living near the Baikonur cosmodrome in Kazakhstan (Kolumbayeva et al. 2014). Despite these known hazards, methods to detect UDMH at the trace concentrations at which toxic effects begin to manifest in humans do not yet exist (Kenessov, Bakaikina, and Ormanbekovna 2015), meaning that there is no knowledge of how this circulates in the environment, bioaccumulates up the food chain, or could potentially be sequestered through soil or plant filtration. The lack of technology or methodology to adequately track the dispersal of hazardous pollutants that have been used for decades in the surrounding environment illustrates another aspect of environmental injustice: the preference on the part of political and economic elites to create spaces of waste rather than allocate adequate resources to maintain safe and non-toxic environments.4 The hyper-local politics of basic livelihood security shape long-term access to outer space and space geopolitics at multiple scales. Attending to the local matters is important, not just because it sheds light on broader geopolitical processes, but because failing to do so leaves the substantive matters of human engagement with outer space entirely overlooked, at best. At worst, ignoring local environmental conditions recasts them as places to be “left behind,” casualties in a Darwinian race to the cosmos in which the poor have no place. Attending to the environmental geopolitics of outer space on Earth shows the co-production of Earth and space. Earthly environments and social relations are remade in our evolving relationship with outer space and reconceived alongside evolving deliberations on the prospects for human survival.

**This reality begs the question of who or what falls to the sacrificial logics of Whiteness to inhabit the skies? Before any discussions about the privatization versus public dominion of outer space, we need to interrogate the injustices around Anti-Asian violence proliferating in our inner spaces of debate. Accessibility is a prerequisite question to ANY framework/procedural arguments, and flips predictability, teams can make because it is grounded in debate participation at the level of the body.**

**In the fight for “Outer Space”-there is palpable anxiety invoked by the antithesis to Man’s colonizing mission.**

**The elusive Yellow Peril.**

#### The Western imaginary of Asia becomes a site contoured by hypo- or hyper-technological terms- As proven by the barrage of DAs and Affs on the topic characterizing “Chinese adventurism as the internal link to nuke war” or “Chinese tech theft destabilizing the region”, Asian countries are cast either as aspirational allies or threatening rivals, and always used to exclude the figure of the Yellow Other.

Roh et al 15. \*David S. Roh is associate professor of English and director of the Digital Matters Lab at the University of Utah, where he specializes in digital humanities and Asian American literature. \*\*Betsy Huang is an associate professor of English and former inaugural Chief Officer of Diversity and Inclusion at Clark University. \*\*\*Greta A. Niu writes about Asian stuff and tech [“Techno-Orientalism,” 2015, *Imagining Asia in Speculative*]//vikas

Throughout the twentieth century, variations of that premodern-hypermodern dynamic in speculative visions of Asia and Asians have been recycled numerous times. 2 Exemplars include the villainous Khan Noonien Singh in Gene Roddenberry’s Star Trek universe, the leader of a group of superhumans who attempt to take control of the Starship Enterprise; the Chinese scientist Dr. X in Neal Stephenson’s novel, The Diamond Age (1995),a counterfeiter using “a gallimaufry of contraband technology” (73) to steal Western innovations; and most recently The Mandarin in Iron Man 3 (2013), a clear revival of Dr. Fu Manchu played cleverly by Ben Kingsley in a tongue-in-cheek fashion. 3 But **Western speculations of an Asianized future are not always consolidated in a singular fictional figure** as in Fu Manchu, Dr. X, or The Mandarin. **The yellow peril anxiety of an earlier, industrial-age era** embodied by Fu Manchu **found new forms across cultures and hemispheres as Asian economies become more visible competitors in the age of globalization and rapid technological innovations**. One needs to witness only the speculative fictional worlds of Maureen McHugh’s novel China Mountain Zhang (1992), Joss Whedon’s television series Firefly (2002), and Gary Shteyngart’s novel Super Sad True Love Story (2010) to trace persisting anxieties over the past three decades of a China dominated future. All of **these worlds feature Western protagonists struggling to navigate a sociopolitical landscape in which China is the dominant global empire with a superior technological edge**. Beyond the focus on China, paradigmatic works such as William Gibson’s Japan-based oeuvre (including Neuromancer), Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner, and the Wachowskis’ The Matrix films have also burnished in the Western consciousness Asian-influenced visions of the future underpinned by a familiar yet estranged mixture of Orientalist sensibilities.

**These** examples **perfectly illustrate** our definition of **techno-**Orientalism: the **phenomenon of imagining Asia and Asians in** hypo- or hypertechnological terms **in** cultural productions **and** political discourse.4 **Techno-Orientalist imaginations are infused with** the **languages and codes of the technological and the futuristic**. These **developed alongside industrial advances in the West and** have become **part of the West’s project of securing dominance as architects of the future**, **a project** that **requires configurations of the East as the very technology with which to shape it.** Techno-Orientalist speculations of an Asianized future **have become** ever more prevalent **in the wake of neoliberal** trade policies that enabled greater flow of information and capital **between the East and the West**. Substantial criticism of techno-Orientalism emerged in the mid-1990s when cultural theorists began to trace its manifestations and theorize its causes and implications. Kevin Morley and David Robins, Toshiya Ueno, and Kumiko Sato, principal trailblazers of the field, laid much of the valuable groundwork. Morley and Robins’s Spaces of Identity: Global Media, Electronic Landscapes, and Cultural Boundaries (Routledge, 1995), in which a definition of “techno-Orientalism” first saw print, remains the most cited in critical assessments of technological and Orientalist discourses; however, Ueno has probably written most extensively about techno-Orientalism as a discursive cultural phenomenon in the era of what he identifies as the “post-Fordist social environment of globalization” (223). “The basis of Orientalism and xenophobia is the subordination of Others through a sort of ‘mirror of cultural conceit,’” Ueno explains. “**The Orient exists in so far as the West needs it**, **because it brings the project of the West into focus**” (223).

Whereas Orientalism, as a strategy of representational containment, arrests Asia in traditional, and often premodern imagery, **techno-Orientalism presents a broader, dynamic, and often** contradictory spectrum **of images**, constructed by the East and West alike, **of an “Orient” undergoing rapid economic and cultural transformations**. **Techno-Orientalism**, like Orientalism, **places great emphasis on the project of modernity**—cultures privilege modernity and fear losing their perceived “edge” over others. Stretching beyond Orientalism’s premise of a hegemonic West’s representational authority over the East, **techno-Orientalism’s scope is** much more expansive and bidirectional, its discourses mutually constituted by the flow of trade and capital across the hemispheres. As Ueno observes, techno-Orientalism is first and foremost an effect of globalism. “If the Orient was invented by the West,” he writes, “then **the Techno-Orient was also invented by the world of information capitalism**” (228). **Technological developments**, driven by the imperial aspirations and the appetites of consumerist societies on both sides of the Pacific, **propel the engines of invention and production**. In its wake, **Western nations** vying for cultural and economic dominance with Asian nations **find in techno-Orientalism an** expressive vehicle for their aspirations and fears. Our volume, Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media, documents past and current constructions of the role of Asia in a technologized future and critically examines this proliferating phenomenon.

Dr. Fu Manchu illustrates just one way in which techno-Orientalist imagery pervades Western cultural productions in the early twentieth century. The principal locales of techno-Orientalist projects as they developed in the late twentieth century have primarily been Japan and China. Ueno, whose influential analyses of “Japanimation” in the mid-1990s seeded the field of techno-Orientalist studies, observes, “In Techno-Orientalism, Japan is not only located geographically, but is also projected chronologically. Jean Baudrillard once called Japan a satellite in orbit. Now Japan has been located in the future of technology” (228). Morley and Robins put a finer point on the temporal dimension of the spatial construction: “If the future is technological, and if technology has become ‘Japanised,’ then the syllogism would suggest that the future is now Japanese, too. The postmodern era will be the Pacific era. Japan is the future, and it is a future that seems to be transcending and displacing Western modernity” (168).

Whereas Japan’s dubious honor as the original techno-Orient was bestowed in the eighties with the help of the cyberpunk movement, the techno-Orientalizing of China occurred roughly a decade later. 5 China was not yet a competitor in the global economy in the1980s, when the West focused its wary gaze on what it saw as an invasion of Japanese capital investments and imports into Western economies. When China was recognized as a newly industrialized country (NIC) in the 1990s and its influence in the global economy increased, it, too, became once again a target of techno-Orientalist fashioning. The discourse on China’s “rise” in the U.S. context, consistent with techno-Orientalist contradictions, has focused on constructing its people as a vast, subaltern-like labor force and as a giant consumer market whose appetite for Western cultural products, if nurtured, could secure U.S. global cultural and economic dominance. This dual image of China as both developing-world producers and first world consumers presents a representational challenge for the West: Is China a human factory? Or is it a consumerist society, like the United States, whose enormous purchasing power dictates the future of technological innovations and economies?

**Japan and China are** thus **signified** differently in the techno-Orientalist vocabulary. Both are constructed **as competitors and therefore** threats **to the U.S. economy**; but **while Japan competes with the United States for dominance in technological innovation**, **China competes with the United States in labor and production**. To put it in starker terms, Japan creates technology, but China is the technology. In the eyes of the West, **both are crucial engines of the future**: **Japan innovates and China manufactures**. And as Asia, writ large, becomes a greater consumerist force than the West,6 its threat/value dualism commensurately increases. These differences in the technological signification of **Japan and China manifest themselves in the fictive forecasts of the Asian-tinged future**. If **Japan is a screen on which the West has** projected its technological fantasies, then **China is a screen on which the West projects its** fears of being colonized, mechanized, and instrumentalized in **its own pursuit of technological dominance**.

**India**, another NIC, **has also found itself under the techno-Orientalist gaze** as a consequence of U.S. outsourcing practices. Asa much maligned business strategy, outsourcing has provoked extremely negative public sentiments in the United States. These opinions find expression in a particular strand of techno-Orientalist discourse that consolidates China and India as the chief threats to the U.S. service and labor sectors. These **Asian nations serve as the scapegoats for corporate decisions to move service and manufacturing jobs** abroad and bear the brunt of the resulting xenophobic antipathies. **Chinese and Indian workers**, for instance, **are routinely portrayed in techno-Orientalist and technophobic vocabularies**; **call center employees in India adopt Western Christian names and mimic the linguistic and idiomatic style of Americans**, **a practice so ubiquitous as to be parodied cinematically** in romantic comedies such as Outsourced (2006), **conjuring images of Dickian androids** (or Blade Runner’s “replicants”) **who simulate human behavior and** threaten the distinction between “real” and “fake” Americans. Glossy spreads of endless rows of Chinese workers in corporate factories and towns in mainstream magazines such as Time and Wired seal the visual vocabulary of Asians as the cogs of hyperproduction. In the NIC contexts, **techno-Orientalist discourse constructs Asians as** mere simulacra **and maintains a** prevailing sense of the inhumanity of Asian labor—**the** very antithesis of **Western liberal** humanism**.**

#### Endorsing a method of transpacific reimagining is key to interrogating disciplinary spaces in order to re-orient towards questions of land, sovereignty and the limitations of the nation-state from the starting point of the “Transpacific” while destabilizing the homogenous tropes that prop up techno-Orientalist fantasies under the guise of “realist” rhetoric. The ROJ is to vote for the best resistance strategy to challenge structural oppression. Watson, 17

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The essays assembled here compose a significant scholarly intervention less because of any straightforwardly "Pacific" or "futuristic" content than their attentiveness to the material, ideational, racial, and technological productions of transpacific space and time-of its diasporas, immobilities, military and trade alliances, ecological networks, as well as the nostalgic pasts and leveraged futures that subtend them. Thus, Pacific Ocean monsters rewrite sentimentalized military narratives into a script for transpacific economic futures (Suzuki), while a Westernized Vietnamese diaspora sublate memories of war for a vision of ethnic entrepreneurialism and "technological futurity" (Nguyen). American visions of cutting-edge technologies of the future unwittingly demonstrate the globalized logics of labor, gender, and race (Nishime), and the Great Pacific Garbage Patch reveals an unexpected chain of signifiers yoking together Asian American racial formation, plasticity, and ecological crisis (Huang). Finally, Afropolitan literature makes visible the way in which China's investment in Africa triangulates the United States, Africa, and Asia, while helping confirm "futurity in the Pacific" (Fan). Along the way, these authors introduce us to a host of new critical vocabularies: ethnic platforms; transcorporeal imaginings; plastiglomerates and the racialization of plastic; the sexualization of techno-orientalism; and Afropolitan Orientalism. Such terms and insights put pressure on the often-ingrained assumptions of our disciplinary practices and expand our traditional vocabularies of cultural and historical studies of Asia and Asian America. The transpacific, to be sure, offers no disciplinary recipe for oppositional critique. An emergent field, its contours have nevertheless been thoughtfully theorized by several scholars. If Hoskins and Nguyen have outlined a possible map of transpacific studies, they do so less as a fully formed disciplinary agenda, and more as a methodological question with many interlocking parts. How, they ask, might we think through the absences and blind spots of American studies, Asian studies, and Asian American studies (and we could add Australian studies) without reproducing "intellectual imperialism or an insistence on the United States as the primary object of inquiry"?6 How to "generate a more complex, subtle knowledge of the world that is multicentered rather than bipolar in perspective"?7 With their simultaneous attention to forms of transnational mobility but also immobility, to American imperialism but also inter-Asian subimperialism, and to continental Asia as well as Pacific islands, they sketch out ways to think about the Pacific less as "a single geographic center" and more as "a complex network of connections."8 Complementing Hoskins and Nguyen's foregrounding of the spatial (and intellectual) resiting that transpacific thinking demands, Yunte Huang's Transpacific Imaginations has interrogated its temporal entanglements. Identifying the Pacific as the "final frontier" in Hegel's Universal History,9 Huang theorizes the transpacific as "both a contact zone between competing geopolitical ambitions and a gap between literature and history that is riddled with distortions, halftruths, longings, and affective burdens never fully realized in the unevenly temporalized space of the transpacific."10 A transpacific lens thus uses insight and strengths from different fields to enrich and cross-pollinate knowledge production. If the focus of postcolonial studies has been the enduring aftermath of imperial epistemologies and hierarchies, and that of American and Asian American studies the critique of racial formation and the management of the U.S. body politic, area studies has offered sustained, in-depth nation-based studies and valuable methodologies. The transpacific, in drawing from these critical traditions, might allow the histories of struggle and migration that characterized life under Spanish, Japanese, Dutch, British, and French colonial rule to inflect understandings of Cold War decolonization and the rise of the American Pacific Empire. At the same time, it may consider the ongoing formation of racial hierarchies within the United States and postcolonial Pacific nations, alongside the interlinked cultural and material politics of flexible citizenries, gleaming urban hubs of Asian capital, subaltern labor migration, and the taxonomy of refugees. All the while, the interrogation of disciplinary spaces and formations maintains attention on the relationship between power and knowledge production, reminding us that that the transpacific is always a space of both complicity and critique. In 2015, I gave a paper on the "Pacific Solution" to a group of American students studying abroad at the New York University campus in Sydney. Reflecting the changing demographics of NYU, the group consisted of roughly equal numbers of white and nonwhite students, the latter from various East Asian and South Asian backgrounds. All seemed to be enjoying their transpacific sojourn and spoke to me excitedly of the "multicultural" atmosphere of Sydney, of the vibrant local Chinatown, of their engagement with Aboriginal Australian cultural artifacts, and of thrilling weekend trips to New Zealand and the Great Barrier Reef. Giving a paper on the grim history of the Pacific Solution in the gorgeous, heritage-listed former government building leased by NYU-just blocks from the sparkling waters of Sydney Harbor-I very much felt like the Pacific party-pooper whom everyone regretted inviting. Surprised and even visibly disturbed after hearing of the regional colonial and postcolonial histories (and futures) informing the Pacific Solution, several students admitted to me afterwards of "knowing very little" about the detention regime sanctioned by the very country whose hospitality they were enjoying. In what amounts to a mini version of a transpacific partnership, my institution now encourages me to promote the Sydney study abroad site, which I have done-with ambivalence-by helping set up a postcolonial, transpacific literature course there. A few months after my talk in Sydney, I was returning to the United States via a circuitous, three-week transpacific travel itinerary: Brisbane (to see family); Surabaya (where I met K-Pop-obsessed Indonesian students who had taught themselves Korean); Singapore (to visit my cousin's Korean and Chinese-Indonesian family); Seoul (where I am often mistaken for Japanese); and finally back to New York via Seattle. Appropriately, it was while in transit that the editors of this JAAS issue contacted me with their generous invitation to write a postscript. Perfect, I initially thought, since I was myself at that moment embodying such a "transpacific" journey. And yet, as Hoskins and Nguyen remind us, attending to both the subjects and objects of movement across the Pacific means that "diasporic populations cannot be considered in isolation, but must be considered in relation to other diasporas and domestic minorities in networks of affiliation and disaffiliation, of alliance and exploitation, of cooperation and conflict."11 With reflection, of course, it was clear that my own easy journey around the perimeter of the Pacific Rim-paralleling the version of the Pacific the NYU students experienced-expresses only the most superficial of transpacific themes: that of elite movement and consumption. Such a trajectory reproduces what Epeli Hau'ofa memorably called the "hole in the doughnut" view of the Pacific, whose oceanic expanse is disconnected and irrelevant to the flows of Asian, Australian, and U.S. knowledge and capital.12 Moreover, as Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson have argued in their extended study of neoliberal forms of sovereignty and labor, my hassle-free transpacific passage was predicated on the very externalization of securitized, militarized "borderscapes" to locations like Nauru and Manus Island, underwritten by a vision of xenophobic national futures that now reverberates between Canberra and Washington DC.13 What "tactical approaches to futurity," to quote Bahng and Mok again, might short circuit such exclusionary transpacific alliances? There is no easy counter-"solution" by which we erase all blind spots, conceptual assumptions, and doughnut holes. Nor can we easily prevent our scholarship from being appropriated by the corporate university's ideals of entrepreneurial, border-crossing scholarship. Yet, without assuming it can be completely free from either the neoliberal university or the xenophobic state, the transpacific as a methodological question cuts across and calls attention to imperial epistemologies, forms of capitalist speculation and neoliberal securitization, while foregrounding forms of encounter and imaginings that may resist such logics. In their cutting-edge parsings of power, race, knowledge, and temporality as they obtain in the contemporary Pacific, these essays make necessary and consequential contributions to the futures of transpacific studies. It is through such a transpacific optic that the entangled histories, complicities, and possibilities for more just Pacific futures emerge.

#### You should prioritize the retooling of rhetoric in debate – the aff illuminates and intervenes within the embedded asymmetric protocols and relations of this activity which create a counter-force to Anti-Asian violence. Wan & Young, 21

[Amy J. Wan is the author of Producing Good Citizens: Literacy Training in Anxious Times (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2014). Drawing from literacy studies, composition history, and citizenship theory, it analyzes how literacy is imagined to solve inequality by conferring, defining, and producing the status of citizenship and by extension, how literacy training instructs individuals to enact civic obligations, whether local or national. An article from this project, “In the Name of Citizenship,” was awarded the Richard Ohmann Outstanding Article Award in 2012. Her current research examines contemporary policy around language diversity, multilingual writers, and international students in the context of diversity and access rhetoric in U.S. higher education in the twentieth century and of the twenty-first century rhetoric of the global university. In addition to her interest in how literacy is used for citizen-making in school and non-school settings, she has also written about rhetorics of public policy, specifically on immigration policy and labor reform. Morris Young is Director of English 100, Professor of English, and faculty affiliate in Asian American Studies at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. His research and teaching focus on the relationship between writing and identity, the intersections of literacy and rhetorical studies, and Asian American literature and culture. Morris’s current research interests take up rhetorical space as both metaphor and material and how this shapes rhetorical activity in response to exigencies of exclusion, marginalization, and containment. His book, Minor Re/Visions: Asian American Literacy Narratives as a Rhetoric of Citizenship (2004) received the 2004 W. Ross Winterowd Award and the 2006 CCCC Outstanding Book Award. His co-edited collection (with LuMing Mao), Representations: Doing Asian American Rhetoric(2008), received honorable mention for the 2009 MLA Mina P. Shaughnessy Award. “Asian American Rhetorical Activity across Time and Space,” 2021, https://www.mla.org/Publications/MLA-Book-Publications/Contribute-to-a-Book-in-Development/Asian-American-Rhetorical-Activity-across-Time-and-Space] Cgilbert

The rise of anti-Asian discourse in the United States in the twenty-first century seems born out of a particular historical moment framed by the COVID-19 pandemic, autocratic United States political leaders, and the emergence of white supremacist groups from out of the shadows. Yet a long history of anti-Asian violence, United States laws and policies that discriminated against people of Asian descent, and racist representations has existed for well over a century. We have seen the establishment of immigration laws that barred Asians from entry or naturalization, the denial of property ownership and the suspension of civil liberties of citizens of the United States, anti-Asian organizations campaigning against immigration, and the perniciousness of stereotypes that sexualize Asian women or elide racism through model minority tropes. Often cast as inscrutable or unintelligible regardless of accent, language, or citizenship status or as somehow outside United States discourses about race, Asians and Asian Americans have a long history of responding to both the everyday and extreme exigencies of racism, imagining possible futures, and creating communities through rhetorical activities across genres, forms, modalities, and technologies. Interventions: Asian American Rhetorical Activity across Time and Space seeks to identify and contextualize this complex activity across historical, cultural, social, and disciplinary sites to center the rhetorical, political, and expressive work of Asian Americans. Over the last twenty-five years, a body of scholarship focusing on Asian American rhetoric has defined and theorized Asian American rhetoric, examined its texts and modalities, and explored the contexts under which it is generated and enacted, especially in resisting social and economic injustice and asserting discursive agency. In Representations: Doing Asian American Rhetoric, LuMing Mao and Morris Young define Asian American rhetoric as “the systemic, effective use and development by Asian Americans of symbolic resources, including this new American language, in social, cultural, and political contexts” (3). In “Beyond Representation: Spatial, Temporal and Embodied Trans/Formations of Asian/Asian American Rhetoric,” Terese Guinsatao Monberg and Morris Young attend to the transnational dimensions of Asian American rhetoric, paying attention to mobility of rhetorical activity, the movement of contexts that create the exigency and rhetorical response, the affordances of evolving communication technologies, and the relation of Asian American rhetorical studies to a broader theoretical discourse generated within Asian American studies and rhetorical studies. Building on these examinations of Asian American rhetoric, this edited collection of essays aims to think broadly about the decolonial, feminist, queer, and intersectional work that Asian American rhetoric can and must do to address the underlying asymmetric relations of power that feed anti-Asian racism and other systemic oppression. Its goal is to offer an intervention by expanding and situating our understanding of Asian American rhetoric in broader theoretical discourses, disciplinary methodologies, languages and materials, and social, historical, cultural, and political contexts. Although Asian American functions to locate this rhetorical activity in terms of who performs it, in what contexts, and under what circumstances, Asian American also instantiates the nation-state as an organizing formation that may institutionalize systemic oppression and structural racism or perhaps perform its own violence in contexts such as relations with Native Hawaiians, indigenous nations, or other racialized communities in the United States. Thus, in theorizing Asian American rhetoric we must be able to interrogate its reliance on institutionalized power, consider the tactical affordances of claiming Asian America, and understand Asian America/n as a contested term.

#### As a communicative activity, debate must be held accountable for implicit, and asymmetric rhetorical protocols that maintain orientalist logics that predetermine what conversations are noted as valuable. Intervening at the level of debate is important to correct for baked-in bias. An aff ballot signals a rejection of Whiteness’ monopolization on contemporary discourse about China [in debate].

Roche 20 (Gerald Roche, Anthropologist and Senior Research Fellow in the Department of Politics, Media, and Philosophy at La Trobe University, “The Epidemiology of Sinophobia,” January-April 2020, <https://madeinchinajournal.com/2020/02/17/the-epidemiology-of-sinophobia/>)

Since the outbreak of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19), numerous reports have described a rise in Sinophobia and anti-Asian racism around the world, with occurrences being reported in Australia (Young 2020), France (BBC 2020), Canada (Miller 2020), and many other countries (Rich 2020). This racism started online. Commentators zoomed in on single incidents—like a video of a Chinese influencer eating a bat in Palau, Micronesia, a few years ago—and generalised them to moralised population traits and visions of cosmic retribution. This logic suggested that the virus was caused by disgusting eating habits and poor hygiene, and that people making these ‘lifestyle choices’ deserved to become sick, suffer, and die. How could so many people, unable to find Wuhan on a map and completely unqualified to make any claims about the origin and spread of viruses, feel so confident in making these judgements? In a 1985 article subtitled ‘Towards an Epidemiology of Representations’, the anthropologist Dan Sperber provides us with a way of better understanding this phenomenon. Sperber asks why some ideas circulate, and stick, better than others. His answer, in part, is that this happens because they are evocative. They resonate with, and bring to mind, other representations we are already familiar with. So, when the images of bat-eating circulated online, they evoked pre-existing representations of Chinese people, and Asians in general. This enabled commentators to feel confident in claiming to understand the etiology of the virus and, in doing so, dismiss the suffering of the affected people while even suggesting they actually deserved it. We might call the sum-total of these representations, which demote Asian lives to a plane of insignificance, ‘white supremacy’. — We need to understand this broader context of white supremacy, and the way it has produced hostile indifference to people trapped in the virus outbreak, to appreciate why the reaction of some ‘China watchers’ (journalists, academics, and others), has been so problematic. In response to the rising incidences of anti-Asian racism, these commentators have attempted to downplay or dismiss the significance of this phenomenon. Some have claimed that racism is not ‘the real issue,’ or have suggested that choosing to analyse and discuss Sinophobia is intellectually lazy. Others have claimed that denunciations of Sinophobia are only valid if they also denounce the harms of the Chinese state, such as the Xinjiang concentration camps. None of these people deny the existence of Sinophobia, but they do dismiss its significance. We can therefore label their claims ‘implicatory denialism’, a term introduced by Stanley Cohen in the book States of Denial: Knowing about Atrocities and Suffering (2013). Implicatory denialism, he states, does not involve the denial of facts, but ‘[w]hat are denied or minimized are the psychological, political, or moral implications that conventionally follow’ (Cohen 2013: 8). Understanding why this sort of denialism is a problem does not require us to understand the motivations, intentions, or rationalisations of people who engage in implicatory denialism. Racism is structural, and so are its impacts. It does not matter what people intend, it matters what impact they have. So, we need to ask who this denialism harms and helps, and how. — To begin with, downplaying racism helps racists. In an atmosphere of pervasive white supremacy, racists love seeing people in positions of authority say that racism is not important. These statements act as a form of dog-whistle politics. Racists are emboldened by authority figures suggesting that people talk about race too much. And as the philosopher Jennifer Saul (2018) points out, these dog-whistle effects can occur whether it is the speaker’s intention or not. In addition to empowering racists and contributing to an atmosphere of white supremacy, denialism impacts people who are targeted by Sinophobia. Responding to claims of racism with implicatory denialism sends a clear message that certain people’s lived experiences are not important. ‘Yes, you are suffering, but let’s focus on the REAL issue.’ Some people seem to understand that they are sending this message when they engage in implicatory denialism. To avoid the interpretation that they are wilfully compounding someone’s suffering, they may package their statements in formulations such as ‘I don’t mean to downplay anyone’s suffering but…’ Once again, Jennifer Saul (2019) provides us with a useful term to describe this pragmatic strategy: she calls it a ‘fig leaf’, capturing the way that it acts as woefully insufficient means of concealment. — We can further think about how statements of implicatory denialism harm targets of Sinophobia by comparing them to slurs, as described by Jane Hill in her book The Everyday Language of White Racism (2008). For both slurs and implicatory denialism, the impact of the speech acts comes from their historicity, not from speakers’ intentions. They evoke both a collective history of subordination and individual experiences of lived discrimination. Like slurs, acts of denialism evoke a history. In this case, it is a history of other denials, of the sort used to uphold ‘colourblind racism’, which is the idea that racism is something that was overcome decades ago and has since ceased to exist as a meaningful social force. Eduardo Bonillo-Silva, in his book Racism Without Racists (2018), provides a vivid description of the rhetorical contortions that are needed to maintain this view. At the centre of these rhetorical manoeuvres is denial; denying the existence or significance of racism is central to maintaining it. Therefore, reacting to accounts of Sinophobia with implicatory denialism not only negates the reality of racialised suffering, but also makes it clear that the commentator will allow that suffering to continue, by stifling anti-racist speech. This empowers racists, upholds white supremacy, and compounds the suffering of people facing Sinophobia. — We should do everything we can to stop the spread of coronavirus and to help alleviate the suffering of people who have contracted it. But we need to realise that for most of us, our capacity to do either thing will be limited. What we can do is intervene in the spread of Sinophobia and anti-Asian racism where we are, and in the contexts where our speech acts are heard and interpreted, and help alleviate the suffering of those around us.

**Thus Private appropriation of space is unjust, as it calcifies Techno-orientalist fantasies within the debate space. Endorse the method of Transpacific Reimagining.**

**Theory**

**Reject multiple 1NC shells – they can read one fleshed-out theory argument which promotes clash and sufficiently checks abuse while preserving substance – crowdout o/w on timeframe since we only have a few months to debate the topic – and o/w on education bc research skills are the main portable benefit to debate – six shells in the 1NC makes the 1AR impossible b/c of time skew and makes it impossible for the 1AR to win both theory and substance**