

I Affirm Resolved: In a democracy, a free press ought to prioritize objectivity over advocacy.

Observation:

The AFF's burden is to prove that the objectivity model ought to be prioritized over the advocacy model for a free press in a democracy

Objectivity in journalism refers to a methodology of reporting facts in a way that is **precise, consistent, and transparent.**

American Press Institute 22

(American Press Institute, a nonprofit committed to educating on journalism and preserving the craft, "The Lost Meaning of Objectivity in Journalism" 2022.

<https://www.americanpressinstitute.org/journalism-essentials/bias-objectivity/lost-meaning-objectivity/>)

One of the great confusions about journalism, write Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel in [The Elements of Journalism](#), is the concept of **objectivity**.

When the concept originally evolved, it was **not meant to imply** that **journalists** were **free of bias**. Quite the contrary.

The term began to appear as part of journalism after the turn of the 20th century, particularly in the 1920s, out of a growing recognition that journalists were full of bias, often unconsciously. **Objectivity called for journalists to develop a consistent method of testing information – a transparent approach to evidence – precisely so that personal and cultural biases would not undermine the accuracy of their work.**

In the latter part of the 19th century, journalists talked about something called "realism" rather than objectivity. This was the idea that if reporters simply dug out the facts and ordered them together, truth would reveal itself rather naturally.

"Objectivity called for journalists to develop a consistent method of testing information – a transparent approach to evidence"

Realism emerged at a time when journalism was separating from political party affiliations and becoming more accurate. It coincided with the invention of what journalists call the inverted pyramid, in which a journalist lines the facts up from the most important to the least important, thinking it helps audiences understand things naturally.

At the beginning of the 20th century, however, some journalists began to worry about the naïveté of realism. In part, reporters and editors were becoming more aware of the rise of propaganda and the role of press agents.

At a time when Freud was developing his theories of the unconscious and painters like Picasso were experimenting with Cubism, journalists were also developing a greater recognition of human subjectivity.

"The method is objective, not the journalist."

In 1919, Walter Lippmann and Charles Merz, an associate editor for the New York World, wrote an influential and scathing account of how cultural blinders had distorted the New York Times coverage of the Russian Revolution. "In the large, the news about Russia is a case of seeing not what was, but what men wished to see," they wrote. Lippmann and others began to look for ways for the individual journalist "to remain clear and free of his irrational, his unexamined, his unacknowledged prejudgments in observing, understanding and presenting the news."

Journalism, Lippmann declared, was being practiced by "untrained accidental witnesses." Good intentions, or what some might call "honest efforts" by journalists, were not enough. Faith in the rugged individualism of the tough reporter, what Lippmann called the "cynicism of the trade," was also not enough. Nor were some of the new innovations of the times, like bylines, or columnists.

The solution, Lippmann argued, was for journalists to acquire more of "the scientific spirit ... There is but one kind of unity possible in a world as diverse as ours. It is unity of method, rather than aim; the unity of disciplined experiment." Lippmann meant by this that journalism **should aspire to** "a common intellectual method and **a common area of valid fact.**"

To begin, Lippmann thought, the fledgling field of journalist education should be transformed from "trade schools designed to fit men for higher salaries in the existing structure." Instead, the field should make its cornerstone the study of evidence and verification.

Although this was an era of faith in science, Lippmann had few illusions. "It does not matter that the news is not susceptible to mathematical statement. In fact, just because news is complex and slippery, good reporting requires the exercise of the highest scientific virtues."

In the original concept, in other words, the method is objective, not the journalist. The **key was in the discipline of the craft**, not the aim.

This point has **some important implications**.

One is that **the impartial voice employed by many news organizations – that familiar, supposedly neutral style of newswriting – is not a fundamental principle of journalism**. Rather, it is an often helpful device news organizations use to highlight that they are trying to produce something obtained by objective methods.

The second implication is that **this neutral voice, without a discipline of verification, creates** a veneer covering something hollow. Journalists who select sources to express what is really their own point of view, and then use the neutral voice to make it seem objective, are engaged in **a form of deception. This damages the credibility of the craft** by making it seem unprincipled, dishonest, and biased.

"The impartial voice employed by many news organizations – that familiar, supposedly neutral style of newswriting – is not a fundamental principle of journalism."

Reporters have gone on to refine the concept Lippmann had in mind, but usually only privately, and in the name of technique or reporting routines rather than journalism's larger purpose. The notion of an objective method of reporting exists in pieces, handed down by word of mouth from reporter to reporter.

Developmental psychologist William Damon at Stanford, for instance, has identified various "strategies" journalists have developed to verify reporting. Damon asked his interviewees where they learned these concepts. Overwhelmingly the answer was: by trial and error and on my own or from a friend. Rarely did journalists report learning them in journalism school or from their editors.

Many useful books have been written. IRE (Investigative Reporters and Editors) for instance, has tried to develop a methodology for how to use public records, read documents, and produce Freedom of Information Act requests.

By and large, however, these informal strategies have not been pulled together into the widely understood discipline that Lippmann and others imagined. There is nothing approaching standard rules of evidence, as in the law, or an agreed-upon method of observation, as in the conduct of scientific experiments.

Nor have older conventions of verification been expanded to match the new forms of journalism. Although journalism may have developed various techniques and conventions for determining facts, it has done less to develop a system for testing the reliability of journalistic interpretation.

This guide, like many of the others in API's Journalism Essentials section, is largely based on the research and teachings of the Committee of Concerned Journalists — a consortium of reporters, editors, producers, publishers, owners and academics that for 10 years facilitated a discussion among thousands of journalists about what they did, how they did it, and why it was important. The author, Walter Dean, was CCJ training director and API Executive Director Tom Rosenstiel formerly co-chaired the committee.

This definition should be favored for these reasons:

1. Agent Specificity: This definition is built out of journalistic practices, and the resolution refers specifically to journalism with a "free press."

2. Ground: - Gives the AFF more equal ground because AFF doesn't have to prove objectivity exists. If debate allowed to be about objectivity existing, NEG would immediately close on just going for objectivity doesn't exist, presumption vote. That gives NEG inequitably more ground and space to operate.

Smith and Reader 11

(Suzy Smith, associate professor at Ball State University, and Rebeckah M. Reader, scholar, "Habitat for Humanity of Madison County: a Working Example of Advocacy Journalism" 11/17/2011.

<https://cardinalscholar.bsu.edu/handle/123456789/195182?show=full>)

Habitat for Humanity is a global nonprofit organization that creates affordable and sustainable homes for low-income families. This creative project serves to promote the work of Habitat for Humanity of Madison County. As a journalistic piece, given the accepted definition, this project falls short. This project, however, is not meant to be an objective piece of journalism. It is meant to act as a tool to educate, inform and promote. This creative project therefore serves as an example of advocacy journalism. There is **not one accepted definition for advocacy journalism but every suggested definition includes the journalist taking an active role in determining a desired result**. In other words, **the journalist purposefully** and transparently **adopts a biased viewpoint for some positive purpose**. This

common understanding found in nearly every suggested definition is the basis for this project. In the case of Habitat for Humanity of Madison County, the journalist presents the organization as a positive way to provide low-income families with homes. Madison County's story is right in history and so is Habitat for Humanity's. This story is told to educate and confirm the need that still exists in America for an organization like Habitat for Humanity.

Thus, the definition of advocacy in this round is in journalism purposefully adopting a biased viewpoint for some purpose.

This definition should be favored for these reasons:

1. **Overview** - Above card closes on broad definition how it is generally employed, not hyper minute definition. Works in broad generalities like the resolution.
2. **Ground** - This definition doesn't let NEG steal AFF ground by claiming the advocacy model still employs the objective model.

The single standard is minimizing oppression.

First, this framing is a prerequisite to all other framings, because it is the only way to take everyone into account.

Butler 03

(Butler, Judith. "Violence, Mourning, Politics" Studies in Gender & Sexuality 4.1 (2003) 20-23)

We cannot understand vulnerability as a deprivation, however, unless we understand the need that is thwarted. Such infants still must be apprehended as given over, as given over to no one or to some insufficient support, or to an abandonment. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to understand how humans suffer from oppression without seeing how this primary condition is exploited and exploitable, thwarted and denied. The condition of primary vulnerability, of being given over to the touch of the other, even if there is no other there, and

no support for our lives, signifies a primary helplessness and need, one to which any society must attend. **Lives are supported and maintained differently, and there are radically different ways in which human physical vulnerability is distributed across the globe. Certain lives will be highly protected, and the abrogation of their claims to sanctity will be sufficient to mobilize the forces of war. Other lives will not** find such fast and furious support and will not even **qualify as "grievable."** A hierarchy of grief could no doubt be enumerated. We have seen it already, in the genre of the obituary, where lives are quickly tidied up and summarized, humanized, usually married, or on the way to be, heterosexual, happy, monogamous. But this is just a sign of another differential relation to life, since we seldom, if ever, hear the names of the thousands of Palestinians who have died by Israeli military with United States support, or any number of Afghani people, children and adults. Do they have names and faces, personal histories, family, favorite hobbies, slogans by which they live? What defense against the apprehension of loss is at work in the blithe way in which we accept deaths caused by military means with a shrug or with self-righteousness or with clear vindictiveness? To what extent have Arab peoples, predominantly practitioners of Islam, fallen outside the "human" as it has been naturalized in its "Western" mold by the contemporary workings of humanism? What are the cultural contours of the human at work here?

How do our cultural frames for thinking the human set limits on the kinds of losses we can avow as loss? After all, **if someone is lost, and that person is not someone, then what and where is the loss, and how does mourning take place?** This last is surely a question that lesbian, gay, and bi-studies has asked in relation to violence against sexual minorities; that transgendered people have asked as they are singled out for harassment and sometimes murder; that intersexed people have asked, whose formative years are so often marked by unwanted violence against their bodies in the name of a normative notion of the human, a normative notion of what the body of a human must be. This question is no doubt, as well, the basis of a profound affinity between movements centering on gender and sexuality and efforts to counter the normative human morphologies and capacities that condemn or efface those who are physically challenged. It must also be part of the affinity with anti racist struggles, given the racial differential that undergirds the culturally viable notions of the human, ones that we see acted out in dramatic and terrifying ways in the global arena at the present time. I am referring not only to humans who, in a way, are not humans, but also to a conception of the human that is based upon their exclusion. It is not a matter of a simple entry of the excluded into an established ontology, but an insurrection at the level of ontology, a critical opening up of the questions, What is real? Whose lives are real? How might reality be remade? Those who are unreal have, in a sense, already suffered the violence of derealization. What, then, is the relation between violence and those lives considered as "unreal"? Does violence affect that unreality? Does violence take place on the condition of that unreality? If violence is done against those who are unreal, then, from the perspective of violence, it fails to injure or negate those lives since those lives are already negated. But they have a strange way of remaining animated and so must be negated again (and again). They cannot be

mourned because they are always already lost or, rather, never “were,” and they must be killed, since they seem to live on, stubbornly, in this state of deadness. Violence renews itself in the face of the apparent inexhaustibility of its object. **The derealization of the “Other” means that it is neither alive nor dead, but interminably spectral.** The infinite paranoia that imagines the war against terrorism as a war without end will be one that justifies itself endlessly in relation to the spectral infinity of its enemy, regardless of whether or not there are good grounds to suspect the continuing operation of terror cells with violent aims. How do we understand this derealization? It is one thing to argue that first, on the level of discourse, **certain lives** are not considered lives at all, they cannot be humanized, that they **fit no dominant frame for the human**, and that their dehumanization occurs first, at this level, and that this level then gives rise to a physical violence that in some sense delivers the message of dehumanization that is already at work in the culture. It is another thing to say that **discourse itself effects violence through omission**. If 200,000 Iraqi children were killed during the Gulf War and its aftermath (Garfield, 1999), do we have an image, a frame for any of those lives, singly or collectively? Is there a story we might find about those deaths in the media? Are there names attached to those children? There is no obituary for the war casualties that the United States inflicts, and there cannot be. If there were to be an obituary, there would have had to have been a life, a life worth noting, a life worth valuing and preserving, a life that qualifies for recognition. Although we might argue that it would be impractical to write obituaries for all those people, or for all people, I think we have to ask, again and again, how the obituary functions as the instrument by which grievability is publicly distributed. It is the means by which a life becomes, or fails to become, a publicly grievable life, an icon for national self-recognition, the means by which a life becomes noteworthy. As a result, **we have to think of the obituary as an act of nation building**. And the matter is not a simple one, for, **if a life is not grievable**, it is not quite a life; **it does not qualify as a life** and is not worth a note. It is already the unburied, if not the unburi-able.

Secon, the debate cannot just exclude those harmed by oppression.

Alston and Timmons 14

(Jonathan Alston, Head Debate Coach at Newark’s Science Park High School, and Aaron Timmons, Head Coach at the Greenhill School. “Nobody Knows the Trouble I See (And In National Circuit Lincoln-Douglas Debate, Does Anyone Really Care?” April 2014, VBriefly.)

The writers of the article seem deeply offended and or confused by an argument that many students around the country have recently found it necessary to make. Students pushing back against the idea that they have to prove that rape or genocide is bad have taken to routinely using the works of Dr. Shanara Reid Brinkley, Tim Wise, Henry Giroux, Tommy Curry, Chris Vincent, (former CEDA and NDT Champion), Elijah Smith and others to warrant the benefit to making arguments that challenge structural oppression. Though **debate is** a game, it is a game **about issues that have real consequences. We teach future generations** how **to deal with issues of** freedom and **oppression**. Often the evidence shows that debaters go on **to** become leaders and **impact** policy in **the** real **world**. This means that it is appropriate for **the judge’s role {is} to be an educator** responsible for training future generations. **Justifications of moral frameworks that don’t preclude rape, slavery and genocide are dangerous because rights are only important so long as a critical mass of society believes that they should exist.**

Contention 1: Corporate Capture

Without the objective method, the press will publish pieces only serving to enrich the government and corporate sponsors.

Vanderwicken 95

(Peter Vanderwicken, head of corporate communications and JP Morgan and co. and experienced journalist, “Why the News is Not the Truth” 1995. <https://hbr.org/1995/05/why-the-news-is-not-the-truth>)

The U.S. press, like the U.S. government, is a corrupt and troubled institution. Corrupt not so much in the sense that it accepts bribes but in a systemic sense. It fails to do what it claims to do, what it should do, and what society expects it to do.

The news media and the government are entwined in a vicious circle of mutual manipulation, mythmaking, and self-interest. Journalists need crises to dramatize news, and government officials need to appear to be responding to crises. Too often, the crises are not really crises but joint fabrications. The two institutions have become so ensnared in a symbiotic web of lies that the news media are unable to tell the public what is true and the government is unable to govern effectively. That is the thesis advanced by Paul H.

Weaver, a former political scientist (at Harvard University), journalist (at Fortune magazine), and corporate communications executive (at Ford Motor Company), in his provocative analysis entitled *News and the Culture of Lying: How Journalism Really Works*.

Journalists and politicians have become ensnared in a symbiotic web of lies that misleads the public.

Take, for example, the long effort in the 1980s to eliminate the federal deficit, centered on the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Amendment. For several years, newspapers, magazines, and television newscasts ran hundreds of stories on the debates over Gramm-Rudman, the views of all sorts of experts on the urgent need for deficit reduction, and the eventual enactment of the legislation. Politicians postured—and were described—as working diligently to get a grip on the deficit. Anyone who read a newspaper or watched television news received the message that Congress and the Reagan administration were heroically and painfully struggling to contain government spending and reduce the deficit.

Behind the smoke screen, however, congressional committees and federal officials were increasing spending and adding new programs in the routine annual budgeting and appropriations processes. When journalists reported on a new program, they usually characterized it as good news—the government tackling another problem—rather than as an addition to the budget and the deficit. Journalists conspired with politicians to create an image of a government fighting to end the deficit crisis, but they ignored the routine procedures that increased the deficit. As a result, Weaver writes, “there were no news stories about government adding to the deficit even though that was what was happening.”

The news media and the government have created a charade that serves their own interests but misleads the public. Officials oblige the media's need for drama by fabricating crises and stage-managing their responses, thereby enhancing their own prestige and power. Journalists dutifully report those fabrications. Both parties know the articles are self-aggrandizing manipulations and fail to inform the public about the more complex but boring issues of government policy and activity.

What has emerged, Weaver argues, **is a culture of lying**. “The culture of lying,” he writes, “is the discourse and behavior of officials seeking to enlist the powers of journalism in support of their goals, and of journalists seeking to co-opt public and private officials into their efforts to find and cover stories of crisis and emergency response. It is the medium through which we Americans conduct most of our public business (and a lot of our private business) these days.” The result, he says, is a distortion of the constitutional role of government into an institution that must continually resolve or appear to resolve crises; it functions in “a new and powerful permanent emergency mode of operation.”

The **architect of the transformation was** not a political leader or a constitutional convention but **Joseph Pulitzer**, who in 1883 bought the sleepy New York World and in 20 years made it the country's largest newspaper. Pulitzer accomplished that by bringing drama to news—**by turning news articles into stories with a plot, actors in conflict, and colorful details**. In the late nineteenth century, most newspaper accounts of government actions were couched in institutional formats, much like the minutes of a board meeting and about as interesting. Pulitzer turned them into stories with a sharp dramatic focus that both implied and aroused intense public interest. Most newspapers of the time looked like the front page of the Wall Street Journal still does. Pulitzer made stories dramatic by adding blaring headlines, big pictures, and eye-catching graphics. His journalism took events out of their dry, institutional contexts and made them emotional rather than rational, immediate rather than considered, and sensational rather than informative. The press became a stage on which the actions of government were a series of dramas.

Pulitzer's journalism has become a model for the multistage theater of recent decades.

The rise of television has increased the demand for drama in news, and the explosion in lobbyists and special-interest groups has expanded the number of actors and the range of conflicts.

Business had to learn to play the game as well. Indeed, in recent decades, roughly since the founding of the Business Roundtable in the late 1970s, **many companies have become adept at promoting the version of reality they want the public and government officials to believe**. Weaver himself was hired at Ford as, in effect, a corporate propagandist. **Companies now routinely use persuasion and image making, whether to attract political allies through philanthropy (Philip Morris Companies), to promote their economic interests (Mobil Oil Corporation), or to deflect critics of their products and processes (McDonald's Corporation).**

As a result, business has become a prominent player in the manipulation of perception and in the corruption of the public policy process. Weaver recounts that during his years at Ford, **executives were given scripts before being interviewed by journalists** to ensure that they would make the points the company wished to make: **“They were literally performing.”** What the scripts said was almost never what people in the company really thought but what Ford wanted the media, the government, and the public to think.

When President Jimmy Carter asked the 400 largest corporations to limit wage and price increases to contain inflation in 1978, most Ford Motor executives were cynical and thought the move would make inflation worse. But that isn't what they said. Ford issued a statement welcoming the president's initiative and endorsing its goal. The company noted that, although its own pricing plans called for increases greater than the president's guidelines, it supported his program. Ford's image makers decided that it would be politically dangerous to oppose the anti-inflation effort publicly and hoped that the company's seeming support would help restrain its suppliers from increasing prices and its workers from demanding higher wages. Ford's statement itself was a cynical lie.

At Ford, Weaver learned that news often has a dual identity, an external façade and an internal reality, much like the Japanese duality of *tatemae* (appearance) and *honne* (reality). "On the surface there was a made-up public story put out for the purpose of manipulating others in ways favorable to the story makers," he writes. "Behind that was another story, known to those immediately involved and to outsiders with the knowledge to decode it, concerning the making of the public story and the private objectives it was meant to advance. The two stories, or realities, were often wildly at odds with each other. **In the real world, the role of the press was to promote public illusions and private privilege.**"

The press corrupts itself, the public policy process, and the public's perceptions, Weaver argues, **when it seeks out and propagates dueling cover stories, with their drama, conflict, and quotable advocates, but fails to discover or report the underlying realities.** The press prints the news but not the truth. **It reports in detail the competing propaganda of the conflicting**

interests but largely neglects the substance of the issue in conflict. A recent example is the coverage of the health care debate. The Media Research Center studied the television networks' evening newscasts between June 15 and July 15, 1994. Of the 68 reports on health care reform, 56 focused on political aspects, and only 12 dealt with the economic or individual impacts of various proposals, as reported in the Wall Street Journal.

The media's practice of focusing on the manipulators and their machinations rather than on substantive issues is perhaps unavoidable because it reflects several aspects of American culture. Personalities are more compelling than institutions, facts are often uncertain, attention spans (and television sound bites) are brief, and simplification—often oversimplification—is the norm. But the media's focus on façades has several consequences.

One is that news can change perceptions, and perceptions often become reality. Adverse leaks or innuendos about a government official often lead to his or her loss of influence, resignation, or dismissal. The stock market is also fertile ground for planted stories. Rumors or allegations spread by short sellers often drive a stock's price down. There may be nothing wrong with either the official's performance or the stock's value, but **the willingness of the press to report innuendos and rumors as**

news changes reality. The subjects of such reports, which are usually fabrications created by opponents, must be prepared to defend themselves instantly. The mere appearance of a disparaging report in the press changes perceptions and, unless effectively rebutted, will change reality and the truth. That is why government officials and politicians—and, increasingly, companies and other institutions—pay as much attention to communications as to policy.

Indeed, **much of what appears in the newspapers as business news is nothing more than corporate propaganda.** When I was an executive at a large public-relations agency, I was often amused to observe how many of the stories in the Wall Street Journal and the business section of the New York Times were essentially news releases the agency had issued the previous day. On some days, most of the stories were clearly identifiable as coming—some nearly word for word—from announcements by corporations or government agencies.

Much of what appears in the press as business news is corporate propaganda.

In an environment in which perceptions can quickly affect policy, companies need to be as alert and aggressive as politicians, government officials, and other interest groups are in ensuring that their positions are favorably represented in the media. New technology can often help them respond quickly to challenges, accusations, or misstatements. An incident that happened when I managed communications for a large global bank illustrates the ability of organizations to influence the presentation of news and hence the perceptions of the public and of government officials. A Wall Street Journal reporter finished interviewing bank officials on a complex and sensitive matter at about 5 p.m. in New York City. Three hours later, at 8 a.m. in Hong Kong, his story appeared in the Journal's Asian edition. The bank's Hong Kong office faxed us the story, which had interpreted our position somewhat unfavorably. My office promptly called the Journal's copy desk in New York City to clarify the bank's position. A more favorable account appeared the next morning in the newspaper's European and U.S. editions.

One consequence of the prevalence of propaganda in the press is that the public's confidence in all institutions gradually erodes. As people begin to realize that they are being misled, manipulated, and lied to, they resent it. From 1973 to 1993, only Congress fell further in public esteem than the press, according to surveys of public confidence by the University of Michigan. The decline in confidence reflects a widening feeling that the news media are contentious, unfair, inaccurate, and under the thumb of powerful institutions, a 1989 survey by Gallup for the Times-Mirror Center for the People and the Press concluded.

From 1973 to 1993, only Congress fell further in esteem than the press.

Perhaps **the most serious consequence of journalists' focus on crises and conflicts is that both they and the public become blind to systemic issues.** The focus on the politics of Gramm-Rudman

obscured the fact that, for complex institutional reasons, government spending and deficits were continuing to rise. The savings-and-loan debacle of the 1980s became so large and costly because the press was unable to focus on it until it became a crisis. **The** legislative mistakes and policy failures that had **caused** it were **too complex, too hard to explain,**

and too boring. Until there was a rash of savings-and-loan failures, enabling the press to show front-page pictures of angry depositors trying to withdraw their money, there was no news and no crisis, and government was unable to respond.

The press's inability to report events or trends that are not crises is not limited to public affairs and domestic news. In his amusing and anecdotal book *Who Stole the News?: Why We Can't Keep Up with What Happens in the World*, longtime Associated Press special correspondent Mort Rosenblum argues that foreign correspondents sacrifice

coverage of important but undramatic long-term trends in favor of dramatic events whose real importance may be minimal. Coups and earthquakes, he says, are what editors want to report. But when reporters try to cover "crucial trends taking shape at the normal pace of human events—slowly...editors have trouble packaging them." Rosenblum, like Weaver, argues that the press is far too willing to accept government officials' self-promoting versions of events. He quotes Reuven Frank, a former president of NBC News, as asserting, "News is whatever the goddamn government says it is." In a long account of the United Nations operation in Somalia a couple of years ago, Rosenblum contends that the German air force was far more efficient and effective in delivering aid than U.S. forces were. Yet few U.S. readers or viewers learned anything about the Germans' work or even knew that Germans had participated in the relief effort.

What we learn about foreign news is as dependent on crises and dramatic pictures as our domestic news is. **"The system is geared as much to amuse and divert as it is to inform,"** Rosenblum writes, "and it responds inadequately when suddenly called upon to explain something...complex and menacing."

Weaver makes a similar point. The real failing of the press, he argues, is that it has become a victim of the man-bites-dog syndrome. "What's actually going on in the real world is the ordinary business of ordinary institutions," he writes. "What officials and reporters converge on, therefore, are travesties, not real events. The news stops representing the real world and begins to falsify it. The barter transaction between newsmaker and journalist degenerates into an exercise in deceit, manipulation, and exploitation."

The NEG world is one where the press becomes advocates for corporations, not marginalized groups. The comparative is the objective method vs. corporate capture.

An example of this is the Iraq War. The press didn't advocate for Iraqi citizens, they advocated for corporate interests.

Ludes 08

(Jim Ludes, executive director of the American Security Project, "Complicit Enablers: The Press and War in Iraq" May 30, 2008. <https://www.americansecurityproject.org/complicit-enablers-the-press-and-the-war-in-iraq/>)

Scott McClellan has gotten enough press for his new memoir of his service as Press Secretary for President George W. Bush. I'm not going to bother dissecting all the issues he raises, but there is one that is particularly relevant. Among his "revelations," he contends now that the **White House press corps dropped the ball** and did not raise its performance to the level demanded by circumstances **in** the months before war came to **Iraq**.

Specifically, he called **the press, "complicit enablers" in the selling of the war to the American public.**

Jessica Yellin, now of CNN, confirmed that:

The **press corps was under enormous pressure from corporate executives, frankly, to make sure that this was a war presented in way that consistent with the patriotic fever in the nation and the president's high approval rating.**

Even CBS anchor Katie Couric reported feeling **pressure from corporate executives to "squash any kind of dissent or any kind of questioning. . . " of the war.**

Of course, little of this is really news. A variety of different outlets have reported on the poor performance of American journalists in the lead-up to the war in Iraq. Perhaps **most alarming was the press corps' lack of skepticism. Assertion was reported as fact. Innuendo was repeated and amplified, and the Iraqi National Congress provided dubious sources to the New York Times where Judith Miller helped convince the public that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and war was the only option.** For articles that demonstrate these shortcomings, see Bill Moyer's site [here](#).

In fact, very few Americans got it right in the lead-up to the war. Jonathan Landay and Warren Strobel, reporters for what was then Knight Ridder (now McClatchey), were two of them. During those critical months of 2002 and 2003, Landay and Strobel reported on [disputes within the intelligence community](#) over the Iraqi nuclear threat, [divergent opinions in the administration](#) over Iraq policy, and, as early as September 2001, the [lack of connections between Iraq and al Qaeda](#).

Landay and Strobel had a healthy skepticism of administration claims about Iraq's alleged WMD programs. They followed that skepticism where it led them—to good reporting on important issues. Unlike so much of the other coverage at the time, the work of the team at Knight Ridder stands the test of time.

Nearly six years later, are members of the press still “complicit enablers?” Certainly, as the war has grown less popular, many journalists have asked more difficult questions. But I don't want a “Fourth Estate” that blows with the prevailing wind. I want journalists, imbued with a wise skepticism, that report facts and present researched stories, not repeat unchallenged assertions—regardless of who makes them.

If the objective method was employed, the press wouldn't have spun the war positively. The invasion was based on a lie that could've easily been uncovered with the objective method. The toll of the war was not little either, not a small thing that can be forgiven.

Reuters Staff 08

(Reuters Staff, reporting by Luke Baker, editing Andrew Roche, “Iraq Conflict Has Killed a Million Iraqis: Survey” 1/30/2008.
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-deaths-survey/iraq-conflict-has-killed-a-million-iraqis-survey-idUSL3048857920080130>)

More than one million Iraqis have died as a result of the conflict in their country since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003

More than one million Iraqis have died as a result of the conflict in their country since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003, according to research conducted by one of Britain's leading polling groups.

The survey, conducted by Opinion Research Business (ORB) with 2,414 adults in face-to-face interviews, found that 20 percent of people had had at least one death in their household as a result of the conflict, rather than natural causes.

The last complete census in Iraq conducted in 1997 found 4.05 million households in the country, a figure ORB used to calculate that approximately 1.03 million people had died as a result of the war, the researchers found.

The margin of error in the survey, conducted in August and September 2007, was 1.7 percent, giving a range of deaths of 946,258 to 1.12 million.

ORB originally found that 1.2 million people had died, but decided to go back and conduct more research in rural areas to make the survey as comprehensive as possible and then came up with the revised figure.

The research covered 15 of Iraq's 18 provinces. Those that not covered included two of Iraq's more volatile regions -- Kerbala and Anbar -- and the northern province of Arbil, where local authorities refused them a permit to work.

Estimates of deaths in Iraq have been highly controversial in the past.

This doesn't count US deaths or the economic toll of the war even. With advocacy the press will continue to push harmful narratives content with the consequence of the deaths of millions. They have tried to redeem Iraq, and spur on new interventions.

Hammond et al. 19

(Phillip Hammond, British politician, Tara McCormack, lecturer at the University of Leicester, and Sumaya al Nahed, senior lecturer in journalism at the University of West London, “Chapter 3: Advocacy journalism, the politics of humanitarian intervention and the Syrian war” 2019.

[https://openresearch.lsbu.ac.uk/download/f1f9cc89c1e877e9947784cc7ee492fffd5d1314ecd5d17747d664f5295db0e3/200536/Advocacy journalism the politics of huma.pdf](https://openresearch.lsbu.ac.uk/download/f1f9cc89c1e877e9947784cc7ee492fffd5d1314ecd5d17747d664f5295db0e3/200536/Advocacy%20journalism%20the%20politics%20of%20humanitarian%20intervention.pdf))

Since 2011 the international media have done much to highlight the suffering of civilians in the on-going **war in Syria**, including through innovative forms of reporting such as VR journalism and news games.¹ Yet in some respects **coverage has harked back to** an earlier era, recalling the style of ‘attached’ or **advocacy journalism** that developed in the 1990s.

As in much Western reporting of the wars of that period, some **journalists have understood the conflict in simplified, black-and-white terms** and called for ‘something to be done’ to counter an evil regime and rescue innocent victims. Such coverage – like Western policy itself – has only occasionally involved direct and overt military interventionism (Briggs et al. 2017: 167). Yet a subtler but no less significant **use of ‘emotive phrases...such as, “History will judge us” ...“We cannot look the other way”**...and “What will the world think” **has**

beaten a steady drum for escalating international involvement in the conflict (Milojevich and Beattie 2018: 831–2). This **narcissistic approach, characteristic of 1990s-style advocacy journalism** (Hume 1997), has led many to interpret the Syrian war as a test for Western selfunderstanding. In the Telegraph (24 August 2013), for example, Matthew d’Ancona said that the ‘Syrian conflict holds a mirror up to Britain and asks us what sort of nation we want to be’; while the BBC’s Gavin Hewitt interpreted it as a ‘test for Europe’ (BBC, 27 August 2013). In its editorial columns, the Guardian depicted the battle for Aleppo as ‘a rebuke to America and the world’ (10 February 2016), where ‘the credibility of western strategies’ was ‘hang[ing] in the balance’ (3 August), and as ‘a humiliation for the UN’ (30 November). Columnist Natalie Nougayrède described the conflict as ‘a moral defeat for Europeans’, affecting ‘how we relate to the world, to ourselves and to the values we like to profess’ (Guardian, 27 February 2018). **Times columnist Philip Collins acknowledged that ‘Intervention...will mean chaos’, but shrugged this off**: ‘there is chaos already’, he argued, and it was ‘important to add weight to our moral impulse’ (Times, 24 February 2012). For Collins – formerly a speechwriter for Tony Blair – the problem was that the ‘idea of liberal intervention...fell apart in Iraq’. Syria, he maintained, was the ‘counterfactual for Iraq’, showing ‘what Iraq would have been like, sooner or later’ and thereby providing a retrospective justification for the 2003 invasion. **Jonathan Freedland pursued a similar line in the Guardian** (10 February 2012): **Iraq had ‘tainted’** for a generation the idea once known as **“liberal interventionism”**, he said, but this made ‘no moral sense’. Initially, it perhaps **seemed possible to rehabilitate this idea**. Freedland had **made** a similar, but more optimistic **argument about Libya**, where, he **maintained, ‘the case for intervention remains strong’** (Guardian, 22 March 2011); and Collins **hoped** that **the ‘success of our intervention in Libya...is redeeming the argument that was lost in Iraq’** (Times, 24 February 2012). In August 2013, the parliamentary defeat of British government proposals for airstrikes in Syria, and President Barack Obama’s reversal of his earlier decision to take direct action if the ‘red line’ of chemical weapons use was crossed, put full-blown Western military intervention off the immediate agenda – although the US and its allies carried out air strikes in 2017 and 2018. **As the ‘successful’ Libyan intervention also fell apart in bloodshed and chaos, the prospect of rehabilitating liberal interventionism in Syria receded even further**. The myth of Western inaction Beginning in 2011 in the context of protests in several Arab states, the Syrian uprising rapidly became an internationalised, multi-sided civil war. From the start, America, Britain and other European governments explicitly argued that President Bashar al-Assad could not remain in power, inevitably emboldening the rebels. By summer 2011, an ‘activist’ in Damascus was telling the Washington Post: ‘It was as if someone told us, “We have your back”...we’ve entered a new phase now because what the US has done is tell [Assad] there’s no way out now except to fight’ (19 August 2011). Western governments were soon not only stripping the Syrian government of legitimacy but also backing those they thought should overthrow and replace it. As the Washington Post reported in 2016, the ‘centerpiece of the US strategy to press [Assad] to step aside’ was a ‘covert CIA program that has trained and armed thousands of Syrian fighters’ (23 October 2016). By this point, the strategy was seen by some insiders as having fallen apart – the Post article quoted a ‘senior US official’ wondering ‘whether agency-supported fighters can still be considered moderate, and whether the program can accomplish anything beyond adding to the carnage in Syria’ – and the CIA programme was reportedly ended in 2017. Yet it is questionable whether the public claims – that the US and its allies were only helping ‘moderate’ groups, which had been ‘vetted’ to exclude extremists – were ever accurate (Gambill 2012). A more realistic assessment of US policy was offered by Jeffrey Sachs: ‘We started a war to overthrow a regime...a major war effort, shrouded in secrecy, never debated by Congress, never explained to the American people....And this created chaos.’²

Contention 2: Education

Objective journalism is crucial for education as it allows one to get facts, and not just a journalist’s interpretation.

Williams and Stroud 20

(Kat Williams, graduate research associate for the Media Ethics Initiative, Scott R. Stroud P.h.D., associate professor of communication studies. “Objectivity in Journalism” 7/24/2020. <https://mediaengagement.org/research/objectivity-in-journalism/>)

Despite assumptions that the professional objective model has always been the standard of journalism, Matthew Pressman, an assistant professor of journalism at Seton Hall University and the author of *On Press: The Liberal Values That Shaped the News*, provides a history of the news media which reveals this assumption to be far from true. He explains that at their inception, American newspapers were actually “proudly partisan,” but after a long series of mergers and closings in the 1920s, surviving paper companies had to change this approach in favor of appealing to a wider audience. Because “overt partisanship in the news pages would alienate large parts of the target audience,” journalists soon adopted neutral voices in their reporting so they could sell more papers and keep their businesses open (Pressman, 2019).

Though the country is not facing the same economic hardships as it was back then, the same argument can be made today that appealing to a broader audience is ultimately desirable – not just to keep a news company afloat, but to provide a space where broad sections of the public can receive the exact same information and use it to form their own interpretation of events. Even if it hasn't been the standard forever, those who hold the professional objective model in high regard nonetheless believe it is one we should keep because **“the injection of opinion and insinuation deprives viewers and readers of a neutral set of facts upon which to make their own decisions and opinions”** (Solomon, 2018). In other words, **for a journalist to include their own voice is to risk exerting influence over their audience**, whereas the publication of “only facts” allows for the consumers to make judgements for themselves, not be told what to think by a reporter. As journalist George Reedy used to tell his students before his passing: **“You don’t use a bullhorn filled with opinion and emotion when a flashlight’s illumination of facts will do”** (Solomon, 2018).

Given recent advancements in technology, these points may be even more consequential today than they were before the 1920s. As most Americans now own a smart device, have access to news coverage 24/7, and even have the ability to communicate with strangers online, supplying unbiased coverage could be the best way to encourage dialogue among diverse people. In fact, the casual acceptance of non-objective journalism may already be negatively affecting civil discourse and citizen unity, evidenced by the proliferation of echo chambers on social media. As people engage in confirmation bias, seeking out comforting partisan news pages on sites like Facebook, they only see one-sided stories and engage only with members of that community who already share the same opinions. Thus, rather than seeking out neutral stories and connecting with people unlike themselves, they become entrenched in their beliefs and estranged from others. Perhaps if biased journalism didn't exist, neither would such technology-fueled polarization.

Education is crucial to minimizing oppression as it is a way to achieve liberation.

Sanga 17

(Innocent Sanga, scholar at The Catholic University of Eastern Africa, Department of Philosophy & Religious Studies, “Education as a Tool for Liberation: Seeking Nyerere’s Understanding”

<https://ariess.org/education-as-a-tool-for-liberation-seeking-nyereres-understanding/>)

Nyerere **understood education as a tool for liberating both an individual and the society**; a tool **which should liberate an individual socially, economically**, psychologically, **culturally**, physically, intellectually **and spiritually**. Further, education should add value to learners through effective transformation that lead to the growth of society and development of a nation. The main purpose of this paper was to examine the concept of Education as a Tool for Liberation in Nyerere’s understanding. The paper presents a theoretical framework based on Dewey, upon whom Nyerere’s concept of education for liberation could have taken roots from. Dewey **viewed education as a problem-solving process which should liberate** not only an individual but also a society. For him, a genuinely liberated society could be more splendidly achieved through education which must change as per the changing needs and prerequisites of the evolving society. The paper also covers various elements of education as a liberating tool. Nyerere brought out various liberating elements of education including psycho-physical elements, mental-moral elements, socio-political elements and economic elements of education. Given Nyerere’s understanding of education, this paper is expected to provide a more realistic view of education as a liberating tool that should be used to address various contemporary societal issues.

Thus You Must Affirm!