# Novice Neg – Right to Strike TopicFramework

#### I negate the resolution, Resolved: A just government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike.

#### The criterion is maximizing utility.

#### Two justifications:

#### First, all consequentialist moral theories devolve to life utilitarianism because they all seek to maximize the best consequences, which cannot occur without life.

#### Second, governments must use utilitarianism to make their decisions because they are collective rather than individual agents. Prefer my standard -- it is specific to the agent of the resolution.

**Goodin 90:**

(Robert E. Goodin is professor of government at the University of Essex and professor of philosophy and social and political theory at the Australian National University. He is a Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia and a Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy.“The Utilitarian Response” pages 141-142. 1990.)

Consider, first, the argument from necessity. **Public officials** are obliged to **make** their **choices under uncertainty, and** uncertainty of a very special sort at that. All choices – public and private alike – are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have for them. Public officials, in contrast, **are** relatively **poorly informed** as **to the effects** that **their choices** will **have on individuals**, one by one. What **they** typically do **know** are **generalities**: averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices. But that is all.**That is enough to allow** public **policy-makers to use** the **util**itarian **calculus** – assuming they want to use it at all – **to choose general rules of conduct.** Knowing aggregates and averages, **they** can proceed to **calculate** the **utility payoffs from adopting each alternative possible general rule**. But they cannot be sure that the payoff will do to any given individual or on any particular occasion. Their knowledge of generalities, aggregates and averages is just not sufficiently fine-grained for that.

## Contention 1: Economy

#### The global economy is improving, but it’s fragile – Public policy and labor availability are key factors to continued growth

Ludovic **Subran et al. 9-17**-2021 (Allianz Research senior economists. “GLOBAL ECONOMY: A CAUTIOUS BACK-TO-SCHOOL” Executive summary. <https://www.eulerhermes.com/content/dam/onemarketing/ehndbx/eulerhermes_com/en_gl/erd/publications/pdf/2021_09_16_Q3-SCENARIO.pdf> published 9-17-2021; Accessed 10-11-2021; Wally)

Global growth remains strong but increasingly uneven amid evolving virus dynamics and the gradual removal of policy support. Growth momentum softened over the summer despite a positive impulse from trade. The delta-related uncertainty and soft stops will cost (only) -0.2 to -0.5pp of GDP growth in advanced economies in 2021. Overall, **while** **we expect global growth to remain strong** at +5.5% in 2021 and +4.2% in 2022 amid significant monetary accommodation and fiscal impulse, economic **slack remains sizable** with significant variation across countries. Vaccination rates, unwinding of supply bottlenecks and **policy choices will critically influence the scale of catch-up**. Output will remain below its potential level until the end of 2022, and the output loss relative to the pre-crisis trend is likely to be considerable, especially in Emerging Markets, where scarring tends to be higher. Their recovery continues to lag because of undervaccination, less room to manoeuvre for additional policy support, as well as the Chinese slowdown. Inflation is likely to accelerate this year as the recovery becomes entrenched, mainly reflecting transitory factors that are likely to wane early next year. While inflation expectations remain well-anchored, pockets of elevated inflation are visible in some sectors with stronger pricing power (automotive, building materials, and, to some extent, in retail and warehouse services). Overall, we expect inflation to reach 2.2% in 2021 and 1.5% in 2022 in the Eurozone and 4.1% and 2.2% in the US, broadly in line with the respective inflation targets.  **Price and capacity pressures** on global trade **are likely to persist** going into 2022, albeit less acutely. The **reopening boost to services has eased**, while **labor** and materials **shortages are weighing on manufacturing and construction**. Supplychain disruptions worsened over the past few months and triggered a more visible manufacturing slowdown during the summer, which could amplify adverse spillover effects to Emerging Markets. The rush for restocking amid historically high domestic production shortfalls and low inventories continues to accelerate the recovery in volumes and prices. While restocking should become less of a driver for trade flows in 2022, companies are likely to operate in a “just-in-case” environment as the normalization in shipping capacity is unlikely to occur before 2023. Hence, on the back of the frontloading in 2021 (+0.3pp to +8% in volume), we have revised slightly on the downside our 2022 forecast for global trade growth: -0.2pp to +6%.  Risks to the outlook are broadly balanced, but **pandemic-related uncertainty remains high**. Higher vaccination rates, together with a stronger release of pentup demand and a faster than-expected global recovery, could provide a stronger growth impetus. However, as long as vaccination rates remain below the coverage required to reach herd immunity and continue to differ significantly between most advanced and Emerging Markets, virus mutations will raise the prospects of renewed lockdowns and keep the recovery uneven. In addition, **tighter financial conditions or a premature withdrawal of policy support could undermine the recovery and increase private and public sector vulnerabilities**, with the potential for cliff-edge effects in some countries and further adverse distributional effects. China is providing an early example of the risks of policy normalization in a still uncertain environment. Despite an expected pause in monetary tightening, the regulation drive is unlikely to ease, which could lead to further credit events among the most fragile cases. We continue to believe that a systemic crisis remains a tail risk as authorities have room for policy support if needed.  **Unwinding policy support requires a careful balancing act** **to ensure** an effective rotation towards **private demand and sustainable growth**. The fiscal impulse in most countries remains positive, with both China and the US expected to remain expansionary while the Eurozone has delayed structural tightening due to the supplementary spending in France and Germany. While several Emerging Markets have already started tightening their monetary stance, most central banks in advanced economies have remained accommodative, though normalization is on the horizon. The US Federal Reserve is likely to gradually pivot towards dialing back its accommodative stance, with stronger inflation and growth outturns suggesting economic slack diminishing more quickly than anticipated. Tapering is likely to commence later this year but uncertain virus dynamics and inflation pressures make it difficult to pin down the scale and timing. Capital markets have been unfazed by reemerging uncertainty about the pace of recovery, but risk sentiment underpinning historically high valuations remains crucially dependent on continued policy support. The existing pre-positioning by market players has reduced the downside risks of market disruptions and dislocations in capital flows, especially in Emerging Markets. Against the backdrop of a stabilizing recovery, we expect asset prices to move sideways over the near term as we enter a consolidation phase. Besides accelerating the vaccination rollout, the key policy priority is to calibrate support to the pace of the recovery, while gradually shifting to more targeted measures focusing on growing firms and sectors. Another important challenge is to identify the potential size of the reallocative needs and the role that policy should play in facilitating reallocation in response to the scale of structural transformation.

#### Strikes create structural weaknesses in the economy --- new study finds they decrease productivity, create market vulnerability, and weaken capital --- that’s a death knell for the economy

**Wisniewski et. al. 19** [Tomasz Wisniewski, the Open University.  Brendan Lambe, De Montfort University.  Alexandra Dias, New York University.  “The Influence of General Strikes against Government on Stock Market Behavior.  2019.  Scottish Journal of Political Economy.  https://sci-hub.se/10.1111/sjpe.12224]

While some clarity may have emerged with respect to the outcomes encountered by workers and governments, the literature remains silent with regards to the ramifications faced by employers. It is this void in the body of knowledge that our paper intends to fill. Even if the general strikes are not strictly directed against companies, their value may be adversely affected for several reasons. **First, the unproductive periods** impose costs in terms of **lower**levels of **output and profits**. Although general strikes are typically short in duration, the large number of employees involved has a bearing on the total number of days not worked (Gall, 2013). **Second**, such manifestations of popular dissent **signal to the market** the **workforce’s** **frustration** with the government and its policies. In the case where policy-makers are responsive to the demands being made, a general strike may also signal **the weakening position of capital providers** and other sources of power within the productive process. Corporations may also be forced into a position of carrying the burden of government concessions and the costs of social pacts that are agreed in the aftermath of a general strike. **Third,** in instances where the future response of the government is not known with certainty, additional **investment risk** is created. Such risk will raise the time-varying discount rates leading to lower stock valuations and increased market volatility. **Fourth**, conceding to workers’ demands may lead to **a** **deterioration in a government’s financial position**, which will **exert upward pressure on bond yields and discount rates**. This, in turn, would further aggravate the falls in stock prices. Our findings in this study reflect the abovementioned considerations. Through investigating a large sample spanning an array of countries, **we demonstrate** a **valuation**impact **that is** both **statistically and economically significant**. Since the magnitude of the fall in stock prices coinciding with the occurrence of a general strike is substantial, investors should pay particular attention to this type of event. Furthermore, **we record significant increases in stock index return volatility** and Value-at-Risk1 in the year of the event, which could be indicative of the policy uncertainty that arises alongside mass strike action. Such findings should be brought into consideration by those on both sides of the divide who are engaged in the collective bargaining process. **Market vulnerability** around times of mass strike action could be particularly distressing to shareholders who are not internationally diversified. The problem is of concern not only to frontline investors but extends to a wider swathe of the population invested in the market through pension funds. It is neither in the interest of trade unions nor governments to adversely affect the value of retirement portfolios. For this reason, both parties should seek alternative resolutions that do not involve walkouts. This means that in order to avoid costly economic frictions, governments should be wary of situations which may inflame worker indignation. Similarly, trade unions should consider the full welfare implications for their members before staging a mass protest.

#### The impact is Asymmetric balancing – In a world of decline small actors become global security threats

**Mann ’14** (Eric Mann is a special agent with a United States federal agency, with significant domestic and international counterintelligence and counter-terrorism experience. Worked as a special assistant for a U.S. Senator and served as a presidential appointee for the U.S. Congress. He is currently responsible for an internal security and vulnerability assessment program. Bachelors @ University of South Carolina, Graduate degree in Homeland Security @ Georgetown. “AUSTERITY, ECONOMIC DECLINE, AND FINANCIAL WEAPONS OF WAR: A NEW PARADIGM FOR GLOBAL SECURITY,” May 2014, <https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/37262/MANN-THESIS-2014.pdf>)

The conclusions reached in this thesis demonstrate how **economic considerations** within states **can figure prominently into** the calculus for **future conflicts**. The findings also suggest that security issues with economic or financial underpinnings will transcend classical determinants of war and conflict, and change the manner by which rival states engage in hostile acts toward one another. The research shows that security concerns emanating from **economic uncertainty** and the inherent vulnerabilities within global financial markets **will present new challenges for national security**, **and** provide developing **states new asymmetric options for balancing** **against stronger states**.¶ The security areas, identified in the proceeding chapters, are **likely to mature into global security threats** in the immediate future. As the case study on South Korea suggest, the overlapping security issues associated with economic decline and reduced military spending by the United States will affect allied confidence in America’s security guarantees. The study shows that this outcome could cause regional instability or realignments of strategic partnerships in the Asia-pacific region with ramifications for U.S. national security. **Rival states** and non-state groups **may** also **become emboldened to challenge America**’s status in the unipolar international system.¶ The potential risks associated with stolen or **loose WMD**, resulting from poor security, **can** also **pose a threat to** U.S. national **security**. The case study on Pakistan, Syria and North Korea show how financial constraints affect weapons security making weapons vulnerable to theft, and how **financial factors can influence WMD proliferation** by contributing to the motivating factors behind a trusted insider’s decision to sell weapons technology. The inherent **vulnerabilities within** the global financial **markets will provide terrorists’** organizations and other non-state groups, who object to the current international system or distribution of power, with **opportunities to** disrupt global finance and perhaps **weaken America’s status**. A more ominous threat originates from states intent on increasing diversification of foreign currency holdings, establishing alternatives to the dollar for

## Contention 2: Military

#### Public employees can’t strike in the United States now

Debra **D'Agostino**, 1-25-**2019**, (Debra D’Agostino is a founding partner of the Federal Practice Group. She has more than a decade of experience in employment law and has represented clients in matters before the EEOC, MSPB, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal and D.C. and 4th Circuits and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims., "Why Feds Don’t Strike," Government Executive, https://www.govexec.com/management/2019/01/why-feds-dont-strike/154438/, Published 1-25-2019 Accessed 10-11-2021 Wally)

It’s the law. Specifically, 5 U.S.C. §7311, specifies that **federal employees may not participate in a strike, assert the right to strike, or even belong to a union that “asserts the right to strike against the** government of the **United States**.” Driving the point home, 18 U.S.C. §1918 makes it **a felony to strike against the United States** or belong to a union that asserts the right to strike against the United States. What’s more, the Office of Personnel Management can declare an individual who participates in a strike unsuitable for federal employment. Forever. **Most famously**, almost 40 years ago in 1981, about 13,000 **air-traffic controllers** went on strike after negotiations over pay and schedules broke down between the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization and the Federal Aviation Administration. President Reagan declared the strike a “peril to national safety” and ordered the air-traffic controllers back to work. In the end, President Reagan fired 11,000 controllers and barred them from ever working for the federal government again. Almost 40 years later, most federal employees are still familiar with how that strike played out, which is one reason Border Patrol Agents, Customs and Border Protection Officers, Secret Service Agents, TSA Officers, and others reported for duty, many working grueling overtime shifts, without pay. The U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, which adjudicated the appeals of several air-traffic controllers who were fired by Reagan, held that if an employee is charged with striking, it is the employee’s voluntary withholding of services in concert with others, not their actual participation on a picket line which is the basis of the charge of striking. In other words, **a federal employee can be fired by striking from their living room**. The U.S. **Court of Appeals** for the Federal Circuit **upheld this premise** in a separate case. In another decision, the MSPB held that participation in a strike justifies removal regardless of the duration of the strike. Particularly relevant today, the MSPB explained that the validity of the grievance does not justify strike participation. The Federal Circuit has also rejected arguments that removal of the strikers actually disputed and injured the public more than the strike itself, finding that judgment was “solely a policy choice reserved to the executive branch.” In short, there are good reasons why, in addition to dedication to country, these civil servants “excepted” from the furlough and required to work without pay continue working. Given that many unpaid workers include air-traffic controllers, federal law enforcement officers, and Homeland Security Department employees, shutdowns may in fact create a safety risk to the American public. We can only ask these civil servants to carry so much burden.

#### Right to strike for military personnel undermines military readiness – Specifically decks United States chain of command around the world by building animosity and decreasing reflexivity

MAURIZIO **FALSONE**, **02-23**-2021 (University of Venice, visiting researcher @ Fordham Law. “Union Freedoms in the Armed Forces: Still a Taboo?” Industrial Law Journal (2021). [https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Maurizio-Falsone/publication/349546094\_Union\_Freedoms\_in\_the\_Armed\_Forces\_Still\_a\_Taboo/links/603e3efba6fdcc9c78087b8c/Union-Freedoms-in-the-Armed-Forces-Still-a-Taboo.pdf Published 2-23-2021](https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Maurizio-Falsone/publication/349546094_Union_Freedoms_in_the_Armed_Forces_Still_a_Taboo/links/603e3efba6fdcc9c78087b8c/Union-Freedoms-in-the-Armed-Forces-Still-a-Taboo.pdf%20Published%202-23-2021); Accessed 10-11-2021 Wally)

Sceptics focus on **preserving** the **armed forces’ uniqueness,** which includes **the extraordinary power of lawful violence against possible internal or external attacks**. In fact, this public function **requires the utmost efficiency and soldiers’ utter readiness**. Similarly, the power handled by the ranks **requires** the **total loyalty of both soldiers and officers** to safeguard public authorities and defer to political institutions. This uniqueness is secured from a legal standpoint by recognising autonomous and distinct orders at the national level, which allows the deprivation of civil32 and labour rights. 11 Sceptics are concerned about **unions’** typical **activities** (**strikes, work slowdowns, and work stoppages**) but claim that the mere will to form and join military associations to protect collective interests **threatens the military hierarchy**. 33 They argue that the **coupling of unions with the chain of command is conducive to a power dualism** since the latter is the organisational nexus within which soldiers’ interests are traditionally administered and protected. This would fundamentally **undermine the esprit de corps**, which is the collective spirit that inspires enthusiasm, devotion, and strong regard for the group’s honour. From this perspective, such duality might provoke officers to abdicate their traditional role in deference to the obligation to handle union leaders’ claims. Similarly, they argue that it would **promote a sense of ‘alterity’ among the troops vis-à-vis the military leadership.** **These factors could lead to an ‘us-and-them’ attitude that**, in principle, **conflicts with military unity**. Conversely, others note that such dualism has an opposite effect, which is likewise dangerous: union leaders and the chains of command responsible for handling the soldiers’ interests might favour collaboration over an ‘us–them’ approach. In this light, this potential **partnership** may **embolden** the **military leaders’ position before the government and political parties,** **compromising** the institutional **subordination** to the civilian power and forewarning the of armed forces. 34 12 Arguments against military unionisation on other grounds have also been voiced. Some indicate the risk of unpredictable labour costs 35 as a consequence of bargaining; others argue that existing military associations (eg families or veterans’ associations) already fulfil many functions fulfilled by unions without threatening the military system. 36 Finally, in **de-unionised countries,** **such as the United States** or Australia, some argue that the positive experiences of **North European military unions** are irrelevant owing to the crucial differences between American and Scandinavian union frameworks. 37 Additionally, it has been affirmed that such experiences **fail to consider the global responsibilities that the US armed forces are required to manage worldwide**. 38

#### Readiness is key to prevent nuclear great power war

**Dowd** **15** - senior fellow at the Sagamore Institute for Policy Research and a contributing editor for the American Legion magazine

(Alan, “Shield & Sword: The Case for Military Deterrence”, 12/31/15, <https://providencemag.com/2015/12/shield-sword-the-case-for-military-deterrence/>, Providence Magazine)

Surely, the same principle applies in the realm of nations. Our world teems with violent regimes and vicious [humans]. And something precious—our notion of peace, sovereignty, liberty, civilization itself—sits exposed to all that danger. In a world where might makes right, **the only thing that keeps the peace**, defends our sovereignty and liberty, and upholds civilization **is** the willingness to use our resources to keep the dangers at bay. Yet too many policymakers disregard the wisdom of military **deterrence**, and too many people of faith forget that the aim of deterrence is, by definition, to prevent wars, not start them. Some people of faith oppose the threat of military force, let alone the use of military force, because of Christ’s message of peace. This is understandable in the abstract, but we must keep in mind two truths. First, governments are held to a different standard than individuals, and hence are expected to do certain things individuals aren’t expected to do—and arguably shouldn’t do certain things individuals should do. For example, a government that turned the other cheek when attacked would be conquered by its foes, leaving countless innocents defenseless. A government that put away the sword—that neglected its defenses—would invite aggression, thus jeopardizing its people. Second, all uses of force are not the same. The sheriff who uses force to apprehend a murderer is decidedly different from the criminal who uses force to commit a murder. The policemen posted outside a sporting event to deter violence are decidedly different from those who plot violence. Moral relativism is anything but a virtue. Some lament the fact that we live in such a violent world, but that’s precisely the point. Because we live in a violent world, governments must take steps to deter those who can be deterred—and neutralize those who cannot. In this regard, it pays to recall that Jesus had sterner words for scholars and scribes than He did for soldiers. In fact, when a centurion asked Jesus for help, He didn’t admonish the military commander to put down his sword. Instead, He commended him for his faith.[i] “Even in the Gospels,” soldier-scholar Ralph Peters reminds us, “it is assumed that soldiers are, however regrettably, necessary.”[ii] They are necessary not only for waging war but, preferably, for maintaining peace. **It’s a paradoxical truth that military readiness can keep the peace**. The Romans had a phrase for it: Si vis pacem, para bellum. “If you wish for peace, prepare for war.” President George Washington put it more genteelly: “There is nothing so likely to produce peace as to be well prepared to meet an enemy.” Or, in the same way, “We infinitely desire peace,” President Theodore Roosevelt declared. “And the surest way of obtaining it is to show that we are not afraid of war.” After **the West gambled civilization’**s very **existence in the** 1920s and 19**30s** on hopes that war could somehow be outlawed, the men who crafted the blueprint for waging the Cold War returned to peace through strength. Winston Churchill proposed “defense through deterrents.” President Harry Truman called NATO “an integrated international force whose object is to maintain peace through strength…we devoutly pray that our present course of action will succeed and maintain peace without war.”[iii] President Dwight Eisenhower explained, “**Our arms must be** mighty, **ready for instant action**, **so that no** potential **aggressor may be tempted** to risk its own destruction.” President John Kennedy vowed to “strengthen our military power to the point where no aggressor will dare attack.” And President Ronald Reagan steered the Cold War to a peaceful end by noting, “None of the four wars in my lifetime came about because we were too strong.” Reagan also argued, “Our military strength is a prerequisite for peace.”[iv] Even so, arms alone aren’t enough to deter war. After all, the great powers were armed to the teeth in 1914. But since they weren’t clear about their intentions and treaty commitments, a small crisis on the fringes of Europe mushroomed into a global war. Neither is clarity alone enough to deter war. After all, President Woodrow Wilson’s admonitions to the Kaiser were clear, but America lacked the military strength at the onset of war to make those words matter and thus deter German aggression. In other words, America was unable to deter. “The purpose of a deterrence force is to create a set of conditions that would cause an adversary to conclude that the cost of any particular act against the United States of America or her allies is far higher than the potential benefit of that act,” explains Gen. Kevin Chilton, former commander of U.S. Strategic Command. It is a “cost-benefit calculus.”[v] So, given the anemic state of America’s military before 1917, the Kaiser calculated that the benefits of attacking U.S. ships and trying to lure Mexico into an alliance outweighed the costs. That proved to be a grave miscalculation. **In order** for the adversary **not to miscalculate**, a few factors must hold. First, **consequences must be clear**, which was not the case on the eve of World War I. Critics of deterrence often cite World War I to argue that arms races trigger wars. But if it were that simple, then a) there wouldn’t have been a World War II, since the Allies allowed their arsenals to atrophy after 1918, and b) there would have been a World War III, since Washington and Moscow engaged in an unprecedented arms race. The reality is that **miscalculation lit the fuse of World War I. The antidote**, as alluded to above, **is strength plus clarity**. A second important factor to avoid miscalculation: The adversary must be rational, which means it can grasp and fear consequences. Fear is an essential ingredient of deterrence. It pays to recall that deterrence comes from the Latin dēterreō: “to frighten off.”[vi] Of course, as Churchill conceded, “The deterrent does not cover the case of lunatics.”[vii] Mass-murderers masquerading as holy men and death-wish dictators may be immune from deterrence. (The secondary benefit of the peace-through-strength model is that it equips those who embrace it with the capacity to defeat these sorts of enemies rapidly and return to the status quo ante.) Third, **the consequences of military confrontation must be credible and tangible**, which was the case during most of the Cold War. Not only did Washington and Moscow construct vast military arsenals to deter one another; they were clear about their treaty commitments and about the consequences of any threat to those commitments. Recall how Eisenhower answered Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s boast about the Red Army’s overwhelming conventional advantage in Germany: “If you attack us in Germany,” the steely American commander-in-chief fired back, “there will be nothing conventional about our response.”[viii] Eisenhower’s words were unambiguously clear, and unlike Wilson, he wielded the military strength to give them credibility. Discussing military deterrence in the context of Christianity may seem incongruent to some readers. But for a pair of reasons it is not. First, deterrence is not just a matter of GDPs and geopolitics. In fact, scripture often uses the language of deterrence and preparedness. For example, in the first chapter of Numbers the Lord directs Moses and Aaron to count “all the men in Israel who are twenty years old or more and able to serve in the army.” This ancient selective-service system is a form of military readiness. Similarly, I Chronicles 27 provides detail about the Israelites’ massive standing army: twelve divisions of 24,000 men each. II Chronicles 17 explains the military preparations made by King Jehoshaphat of Judah, a king highly revered for his piety, who built forts, maintained armories in strategically located cities “with large supplies” and fielded an army of more than a million men “armed for battle.” Not surprisingly, “the fear of the Lord fell on all the kingdoms of the lands surrounding Judah, so that they did not go to war against Jehoshaphat.” In the New Testament, Paul writes in Romans 13 that “Rulers hold no terror for those who do right, but for those who do wrong…Rulers do not bear the sword for no reason.” Again, this is the language of deterrence. Those who follow the law within a country and who respect codes of conduct between countries have nothing to fear. Those who don’t have much to fear. Likewise, to explain the importance of calculating the costs of following Him, Jesus asks in Luke 14, “What king would go to war against another king without first sitting down to consider whether his 10,000 soldiers could go up against the 20,000 coming against him? And if he didn’t think he could win, he would send a representative to discuss terms of peace while his enemy was still a long way off.” In a sense, both kings are wise—one because he recognizes that he’s outnumbered; the other because he makes sure that he’s not. Put another way, both kings subscribe to peace through strength. Again, as with the Centurion earlier, Jesus could have rebuked the martial character of these kings, but he did not. This is not just description but commendation. We ignore their example at our peril. Secondly, it is not incongruent if we understand military deterrence as a means to prevent great-power war—the kind that kills by the millions, the kind humanity has not endured for seven decades. We know we will not experience the biblical notion of peace—of shalom, peace with harmony and justice—until Christ returns to make all things new. In the interim, in a broken world, the alternatives to peace through strength leave much to be desired: peace through hope, peace through violence, or peace through submission. But these options are inadequate. The sheer destructiveness and totality of great-power war testify that crossing our fingers and hoping for peace is not a Christian option. Wishful thinking, romanticizing reality, is the surest way to invite what Churchill called “temptations to a trial of strength.” Moreover, the likelihood that the next great-power war would involve multiple nuclear-weapons states means that it could end civilization. Therefore, a posture that leaves peer adversaries doubting the West’s capabilities and resolve—thus inviting miscalculation—is not only unsound, but immoral and inhumane—unchristian. “Deterrence of war is more humanitarian than anything,” Gen. Park Yong Ok, a longtime South Korean military official, argues. “If we fail to deter war, a tremendous number of civilians will be killed.”[ix] Peace through violence has been tried throughout history. Pharaoh, Caesar and Genghis Khan, Lenin, Hitler, Stalin and Mao, all attained a kind of peace by employing brutal forms of violence. However, this is not the kind of “peace” under which God’s crowning creation can flourish; neither would the world long tolerate such a scorched-earth “peace.” This option, too, the Christian rejects. Finally, the civilized world could bring about peace simply by not resisting the enemies of civilization—by not blunting the Islamic State’s blitzkrieg of Iraq; by not defending the 38th Parallel; by not standing up to Beijing’s land-grab in the South China Sea or Moscow’s bullying of the Baltics or al-Qaeda’s death creed; by not having armies or, for that matter, police. As Reagan said, “There’s only one guaranteed way you can have peace—and you can have it in the next second—surrender.”[x] The world has tried these alternatives to peace through strength, and the outcomes have been disastrous. After World War I, Western powers disarmed and convinced themselves they had waged the war to end all wars. By 1938, as Churchill concluded after Munich, the Allies had been “reduced…from a position of security so overwhelming and so unchallengeable that we never cared to think about it.”[xi] Like predators in the wilderness, the Axis powers sensed weakness and attacked. In October 1945—not three months after the Missouri steamed into Tokyo Bay—Gen. George Marshall decried the “disintegration not only of the Armed Forces, but apparently…all conception of world responsibility,” warily asking, “Are we already, at this early date, inviting that same international disrespect that prevailed before this war?”[xii] Stalin answered Marshall’s question by gobbling up half of Europe, blockading Berlin, and arming Kim Il-Sung in patient preparation for the invasion of South Korea.[xiii] The U.S. military had taken up positions in Korea in 1945, but withdrew all combat forces in 1949.[xiv] Then, in 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson announced that Japan, Alaska and the Philippines fell within America’s “defensive perimeter.”[xv] Korea didn’t. Stalin noticed. Without a U.S. deterrent in place, Stalin gave Kim a green light to invade. Washington then reversed course and rushed American forces back into Korea, and the Korean peninsula plunged into one of the most ferocious wars in history. The cost of miscalculation in Washington and Moscow: 38,000 Americans, 103,250 South Korean troops, 316,000 North Korean troops, 422,000 Chinese troops and 2 million civilian casualties.[xvi] The North Korean tyranny— now under command of Kim’s grandson—still dreams of conquering South Korea. The difference between 2015 and 1950 is that tens of thousands of battle-ready U.S. and ROK troops are stationed on the border. They’ve been there every day since 1953. The lesson of history is that waging war is far more costly than maintaining a military capable of deterring war. As Washington observed, “Timely disbursements to prepare for danger frequently prevent much greater disbursements to repel it.” Just compare military allocations, as a percentage of GDP, during times of war and times of peace: In the eight years before entering World War I, the United States devoted an average of 0.7 percent of GDP to defense; during the war, U.S. defense spending spiked to 16.1 percent of GDP. In the decade before entering World War II, the United States spent an average of 1.1 percent of GDP on defense; during the war, the U.S. diverted an average of 27 percent of GDP to the military annually. During the Cold War, Washington spent an average of 7 percent of GDP on defense to deter Moscow; it worked. Yet it seems we have forgotten those hard-learned lessons. In his book The World America Made, Robert Kagan explains how “**America’s most important role has been to dampen and deter** the normal **tendencies of** other **great powers to compete** and jostle with one another in ways that historically have led to war.” This role has depended on America’s military might. “**There is no better recipe for** great-power **peace**,” Kagan concludes, “**than certainty** about who holds the upper hand.”[xvii]