## The single standard is resisting oppression.

**I define resisting oppression as utilizing methods that can resist the structural violence of oppression. I give resisting capitalism the most weight because it serves as a catalyst for all other forms of oppression.**

## 1. We must examine capitalism first in order to understand the dominant system of modernity that excludes other sites of knowledge production, maintaining racism and sexism.

### Baker 08

(Michael, University of Rochester, Graduate Student School of Education and Human Development, “Teaching and Learning About and Beyond Eurocentrism: A Proposal for the Creation of an Other School”, March 16, 2008, http://academia.edu/1516858/Teaching\_and\_Learning\_About\_and\_Beyond\_Eurocentrism\_A\_Proposal\_for\_the\_Creation\_of\_an\_Other\_School, accessed 7/13/14) ||||The Other School would be oriented around an alternative framework for knowledge and understanding that we might call the decolonial paradigm, since its central aim is to decolonize thinking and being, in part, through dialogue (not just the study of cultures as objects of knowledge) with the diversity of ways of knowing and being that have been devalued and eclipsed in Eurocentric education. The decolonial paradigm of education would focus on concepts of culture and power. Culture is not separate from politics and economics, contrary to the taken-for-granted disciplinary divisions. “….**political and economic structures are not entities in themselves, but are imagined**, framed and enacted by individuals formed **in a certain type of subjectivity**; a subjectivity that is also **framed in the dominant structure of knowledge**” (Mignolo, 2005, p. 112). **The cultural group** (in the U.S. -- Anglo-American) **with the** most **money and the** most **political power is also the dominant culture reproduced in the school curriculum**. Most of us (particularly if we not white) recognize that a racial hierarchy exists and is maintained by the dominant cultural group (for example, see Huntington, 2004). Cultural diversity in “multicultural education” is often more a way to manage or contain difference while maintaining the racial hierarchy. Multiculturalism only became an issue and concept in education during the unsettling 60s, when ethnic groups labeled “racial minorities” raised their voices demanding that the promises of modernity be made available to them as well as to whites. Racism is not simply the result of individual prejudice and hateful expressions, but the consequence of the relations of power that are historical and structural. The power side of culture can be conveniently neutralized in the classroom as teachers and students learn about “diversity” without examining how these differences have been constructed, how they are reproduced in the curriculum, and how these constructions continue to serve the white power elite. In English classes for example, “students read works that movingly depict personal struggles against discrimination, without gaining any sense of how English literature was used to teach people their distance from the center of civilization” (Willinsky, 1989, p. ). ¶ Multicultural education needs to include the study of “how five centuries of studying, classifying, and ordering humanity within an imperial context gave rise to peculiar and powerful ideas of race, culture, and nation that were, in effect, conceptual instruments that the West used both to divide up and to educate the world” (Willinsky, 1989, pp. 2-3). Race, in other words, is a “mental category of modernity” (Quijano, 2000, p. 536), created along with European colonization of the Americas and the emergence of capitalism in the Atlantic commercial circuit in the sixteenth century. Modernity/coloniality came together in the sixteenth century during the emergence of the Atlantic commercial circuit that propelled an incipient **European capitalism** and **charted the racial** geopolitical **map of the world**. **Racial classification and** the divisions and **control of labor are historically intertwined** – **the two parts of colonial matrix of power** (Quijano, 1999; Quijano & Wallerstein, 1992). Types of work, incomes earned, and geographical location among the world’s population today profoundly reflect this racial capitalist hierarchy and domination – the coloniality of power. Coloniality of power has been since the sixteenth century and is still today an epistemic principle for classifying the non-European world in relation to Europe on the principle of skin color and brain capacity (i.e., race and rationality). **Ethnicities** (local community identities based on shared knowledge, faith, language, memories, tastes etc.) **have been racialized within this modern matrix of power** (Sardar, Nandy & Wyn Davies1993). ¶ Multicultural education therefore should be understood and consequently taught within the colonial horizon of modernity, since the sixteenth century. Racism is a symptom of the persistence of coloniality of power and the colonial difference. ¶ One of the achievements of imperial reason was to affirm European or white, Christian, male, heterosexual, American, as a superior identity by constructing inferior identities and expelling them to the outside of the normative sphere of the real (Mignolo, 2006). Cultural differences then would be recognized as part of the colonial difference in the 500-year history of control and domination by the white, European, heterosexual, Christian, male through the intersection of race, religion, gender, class, nationality and sexuality. **The coloniality of power is a European imposed** racial **classification system** that emerged 500 years ago **and** expanded along with (**is constitutive of**) the modern/colonial world **capitalist-system**. **Race, class, gender,** and **sexuality and religion intersect as hierarchical elements within the** modern/colonial capitalist **system of classification and power relations**.

## 2. Challenging Capitalism is a prerequisite for any moral questions because the very system has no moral calculus, simply one for market values.

### Trainer 96

(Ted, University of New South Wales, “Towards a Sustainable Economy”, Jon Carpenter Oxford Publishing, pages 79-80) The need for a moral economy Clearly, a **major problem with** our **economic theory** and practice **is** that **they leave little place for morality**. Many extremely **important decisions affecting people's welfare are made without** reference to what would be **moral**ly acceptable. **They are made** solely **on the basis of what will make** most **money**. It has been argued above that there are many other, usually much more important factors, such as what things humans need, what developments would build better cornrnunities and political systems, what would preserve cultural uniqueness, and especially what would maximise ecological sustainability. Decisions which maximise returns to owners of capital often have adverse effects in several or all of these areas, yet in our economy this factor is allowed to determine what is done. No other economic system humans have ever developed has functioned in this way. All previous economies ensured that 'moral' factors, such as social customs setting a 'just price', were the main determinants of economic activity. Market forces and the profit motive were typically given little or no role. Our present economic system and the theory which underlies it obscure the great misery they cause. They deceive us into accepting grossly inhuman consequences. Several sections of this book explain how our economic system is the main factor producing the hunger and deprivation suffered by hundreds of millions of people. Yet this causal connection is not well understood, because **we have been led to believe that the market system is natural**, efficient and desirable, and that it 'rewards factors of production in proportion to their contributions'. **This** prevailing ideology **leads most people to believe that we are not exploiting the Third World** and we are not causing hunger; we are only trading with them, investing and doing normal business. As Bookchin says, ' ... our present economy is grossly immoral... **The economists have literally** "demoralised" us and **turned us into moral cretins'**. I Similarly, economic theory claims that when an item becomes scarce its price rises automatically, as if this is a law of nature independent of human will. In fact, the price rises only because individual sellers eager to maximise their income put it up as quickly as they can. Our economic theory obscures the fact that it is not scarcity but human greed which makes prices rise. Above all, economic theory leads us to think that the supremely important goal is to 'get the economy going', to stimulate growth. The fact that this siphons wealth to the rich, deprives the poor, develops the wrong industries and in the Third World starve millions is obscured.

# C1: Objectivity’s Relation to the Bourgeoisie

## 1. Objectivity still requires reporters to decide what to report on- what’s important.

## Wijnberg 17

<https://thecorrespondent.com/6138/why-objective-journalism-is-a-misleading-and-dangerous-illusion/157316940-eb6c348e>

Rob Wijnberg is the founding editor of The Correspondent. At age 27, he became Europe's youngest editor-in-chief at Dutch print daily nrc.next. He studied philosophy at the University of Amsterdam and has written six books on news, media and philosophy.

**Behind every report**, every feature, every news item, **lies a worldview rooted in assumptions** ontological (what’s real?), epistemological (what’s true?), methodological (how do we find out?), and moral (why does it matter?). Or, to put it in Gelauffian terms, **all news comes from a position.** Why doesn’t the evening newscast ever lead with crop circles made by UFOs? Because the editorial department takes the position that UFOs don’t exist. Why doesn’t the news ever lead with a delayed train between St. Petersburg and Novosibirsk? Because the editors take the position that a late Russian train doesn’t matter here.Why does the news never open with the biggest, most powerful Dutch company in the world, the oil and gas trader Vitol? Because the editors take the position that Vitol isn’t doing anything wrong. The reverse is true too: why does the news open with a Trump tweet, a bombing in Syria, a domestic policy proposal, chaos at a national transportation hub? Because the editors take the position that statements by a US president, wars in the Middle East, our own leaders’ plans, and travel snafus in our own country matter. And why does the news always call bombings by ISIS “terrorist attacks” and those by Western governments “bombardments”? Because the editors take the position that that’s what they are. **Why does the news always frame the growth of the economy as something positive** and not as a disaster for the climate, the environment, or the corals in the ocean? **Because the editors take the position that economic growth is good.** So **when an editor claims not to take a position** on the news, he or she **[they are]** is **making the most basic misrepresentation possible.**

## 2. News is controlled by the hegemony of big business- this means only their interests are seen as ‘important’ enough to report on - this means that with objective news, the interests of big business ALWAYS come first.

### Reese 2000

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15295039009360187>

Reese is the Jesse H. Jones Professor of Journalism, Director of the School of Journalism and the Associate Dean for Academic Affairs in the Moody College of Communication at University of Texas.

The news media play an essential role in maintaining the authority of the political system. Thus, the **news paradigm can be seen** as operating within this larger ideological sphere, particularly **in relation to hegemonic processes. Hegemony** may be **defined as** the "systematic (but not necessarily or even usually deliberate) **engineering of mass consent to** the **established order"** (Gitlin, 1980, p. 253). By not appearing openly coercive, this control is all the more effective. The concept of **hegemony**, as developed by Gramsci, **entails** moral, political, and intellectual **leadership** within a social system; the **ruling group** does not simply impose a class ideology on others but rather **provides** the articulating **principle by which** diverse **ideological elements are unified** into a world-view. As Mouffe (1981) puts it, complex ideological ensembles existing at a given moment are the result of a constant process of Transformation. The media function in this process to "certify the limits within which all competing definitions of reality will contend" (Gitlin, 1980, p. 254). **Media** reproduce a consistent ideology without being instructed directly by the state. This leads Hall (1985, p. 101) to ask, "How is it that they are driven again and again, to such a limited repertoire within the ideological field?" The answer, in large part, is that they **accept** the **frames imposed** on events **by officials** and marginalize **and delegitimize voices that fall outside** the dominant **elite circles.** By perpetuating as commonsensical notions of who ought to be treated as authoritative, these routines help the system maintain control without sacrificing legitimacy. **Despite journalism's** stated **goal of depicting reality, the news** media-tightly interlocked at the top levels with other powerful institutions--**have an interest in preserving the** larger liberal, **capitalist system** by helping maintain the boundaries of acceptable political discourse. The media establish what is normal and deviant by the way they portray people and ideas. Journalists may frequently conflict with representatives of government and business, but this is a reformist antagonism that does not threaten underlying hegemonic principles (e.g., Dreier, 1982; Parenti, 1978). The journalistic paradigm, therefore, has been developed, sustained, interpreted, and modified within this larger hegemonic context. Elements of the paradigm may contest the dominant ideology, but this tension is part of the hegemonic process and must be negotiated on an ideological field articulated by ruling interests. As self-perceived professional truth tellers who objectively cover events, journalists naturally resist being overtly manipulated by sources or their own managers. The paradigm provides them with enough latitude to satisfy their professional objectives without treading on core societal values (e.g., the desirability of private property, democracy). Indeed, the self-policing character of the news paradigm is essential for its hegemonic effectiveness. Values that pose a threat cannot be suppressed directly by ruling interests; doing so would contradict the commonsensical notion thin their own autonomous position. Instead, the media enforce their own boundaries by insisting that reporters with nonmainstream values keep them out of news accounts and through the natural workings of their own routines. For example, that the media are free to report from wi**by relying** heavily **on official statements** made through routine channels (Sigal, 1973), **journalists give these sources the power**, by default, **to frame** much of their **reality.** This helps solve the key problem of defining news: **News is what** authorities and other institutional **elites say it is.** Official and corporate sources make themselves even more attractive to journalists by "subsidizing" the media's cost of gathering information about them (Gandy, 1982). By making it easier to be covered, through predictable and prearranged packaged pronouncements, these sources can crowd out less strategically advantaged voices. The media benefit by being assured of efficient channels through which to get an acceptable raw information product. The logic of the news paradigm must take into account and help justify this state of affairs. The notion of objectivity rests on assumptions that are eminently compatible with hegemonic requirements. Hackett (1984, p. 242) observes that the rules of impartiality not only disguise ideological messages in the media but are an essential part of their ideological functioning. Prevailing definitions of situations are reinforced, while viewpoints outside the consensus are rendered irrational and illegitimate. Thus, while **journalists are being "objective" when they let prominent sources dictate the news**, if they use their own expertise to draw conclusions they are considered biased. Giving serious attention to non-official sources is discouraged as “unnewsworthy." The press, for example, largely treated Ronald Reagan uncritically during his first term, because no opposing elites were able or willing to mount an effective challenge and thus make themselves available as oppositional media voices (Hertsgaard, 1988). By accepting valueless reporting as the norm, the media accept and reinforce the boundaries, values, and ideological "rules of the game" established and interpreted by elite sources. Journalists threaten the paradigm when they express values openly, particularly values outside the societal mainstream. (Normally, radical writers can be dismissed as falling clearly outside the mainstream paradigm, but MacDougall could not, having worked in the mainstream press for almost 25 years.) The editing process is particularly compatible with hegemonic requirements. Editors rise to their positions only after fully internalizing the norms of the journalistic paradigm (e.g., Breed, 1955). Although reporters are presumably in closer contact with the reality of their stories, editors are considered less apt to succumb to bias than reporters, who may get "wrapped up" in a story and be blinded to the "big picture." High-ranking editors, particularly at major papers, are also more directly in touch with the values of official and other elite sources and are reluctant to exceed these boundaries. In the early 1960s, for example, David Halberstam was a highly knowledgeable reporter in Vietnam, yet he often had difficulty getting his stateside editors to accept his pessimistic version of the war. The editors had received a more optimistic version from Pentagon and administration officials and were reluctant to contradict it (Sheehan, 1988). If the individual political views of the communicator are the chief barrier to fully objective reporting of "the facts," it follows that mainstream journalists should not find strongly held values to be occupationally useful. Indeed, Gans ( I 979) found few journalists in the national media who would admit to consciously held values. He did locate those at 7zme and Newsweek who were identified as house radicals and house conservatives. These were the rarities, however, and served primarily to identify boundary markers and help the other journalists feel free of ideology. (Important from a hegemonic perspective is his finding that the house radicals eventually tired of political differences and quit, while the conservatives remained.) In MacDougall's experience, most Left journalists have found mainstream journalism uncomfortable; he cited Chomsky's observation that he knows of no socialists in the strikingly uniform media (MacDougall, 1988a, p. 15). MacDougall also noted the reaction of Los Angeles 7,mes publisher Otis Chandler when asked in 1977 about Times staffer Robert Scheer, former editor of the leftist publication Rampart.,: "A radical? 1f that were true he wouldn't be here" (MacDougall, 19886, p. 12). Of course, journalists hold many values that aren't obvious because they are safely within the range of core societal values. Sources notice journalists' values only when those values differ markedly from their own. MacDougall (1988a), for example, said that sources he spoke with while at The Wall Street journal were more candid because they assumed he was as soft on business as the writers for the editorial pages. Referring to the Columbia University School of Journalism, for example, MacDougall noted (p. 16) that this "trade school" gives reporters the mind set needed to thrive in the mainstream press," during the 1950s this mind set included vigorous anti-communism (in addition to valueless reporting).

# C2: Impacts on the Proletariat

## 1. Major Media often misrepresents and erases the working class in favor of appeasing the capitalist system

### Savage and Martin 19

<https://www.jacobinmag.com/2019/03/no-longer-newsworthy-review-working-class-media>

Savage is a staff writer by jacobinmag. Martin is a Professor of Digital Journalism and Communication Studies at the University of Northern Iowa and an award-winning author. The article represents the views of Martin in his book *No Longer Newsworthy*.

A particular image of the worker — generally white, male, and employed in the manual trades — has been a recurring idiom of Americana for at least a century. It’s revealing, given this ubiquity, that since 2016 the white male worker has also become a persistent object of media fascination and puzzlement: the central character in a seemingly endless deluge of newspaper reports and longform essays in which metropolitan journalists depart their coastal havens for exotic safaris into the hinterland, intent on discovering and investigating “**working class** Americans” (who **are** often**, incorrectly, depicted as** implicitly **white and male**) **in** their natural habitats. As the University of Iowa’s Christopher R. Martin notes at the outset of his forthcoming book *No Longer Newsworthy*, “Who are these people?” fast became the anguished cry of **major media outlets** in the wake of Donald Trump’s shock 2016 election victory — and the subject of a whole genre aimed at providing a primarily middle-class readership with a neat and compelling answer. But, he argues, such attention should not be misconstrued as earnest concern or a renewed interest in the working class as such. **The real**ly existing **working class —** vast and **diverse —** in fact **remains** largely **invisible, except** as a reductive caricature **opportunistically invoked by** politicians and **media elites.** This is the thesis of Martin’s effort in media criticism, which charts the press’s persistent erasure and misrepresentation of America’s working-class majority and the gradual transformation of the journalistic lexicon into a language virtually indistinguishable from that of management, capital, and the bipartisan neoliberal consensus. Central to this story is the decline of labor reporting, once a mainstay of major dailies. Today, by contrast, as Martin puts it: “A conference gathering of labor/workforce beat reporters from the country’s leading newspapers could fit into a single booth at an Applebee’s.” Of the country’s top twenty-five newspapers, he notes, a majority no longer covers the workplace/labor beat on a full-time basis, and the landscape for such reporting appears to be even bleaker on television (one 2013 survey cited by Martin, for example, reveals that only 0.3 percent of network TV news in the years 2008, 2009, and 2011 covered labor issues). Much of the book is concerned with accounting for this decline, which, for the author, is both the result of conscious political effort and a myopic shift in the business model embraced by major newspapers. The former argument is fairly non-controversial, though illustrated in great detail via (among other things) a careful examination of the rhetoric around workers and labor used by various presidents, and the news **media’s increasingly pro-corporate framing** of jobs and economic issues. As to how a changing business model **has served to disempower and erase the** American **working class**, Martin posits that a shift in the 1960s and 1970s towards an advertising model aimed at an upscale middle-class readership is the primary culprit. With the rise of television, the newspaper industry grew ever more consolidated and concerned with addressing and reflecting the interests and lifestyles of a predominantly middle-class audience. In Martin’s words: [In] this new vision of how a newspaper should serve its community, the **newspapers** and their corporate owners only **wanted the *right kind* of readers, those who were** ‘well-to-do’, ‘affluent moderns’, ‘influentials’, and **people with** plenty of ‘effective **buying power**’ **and ‘giant**-sized household **incomes’.** Nearly every newspaper began publicizing their readership as if they were the children of Garrison Keillor’s fictional Lake Wobegon: all above average. As a consequence, he argues, the entire language of the news media began to shift: the labor beat gave way to lifestyle and consumer-oriented content; workers became “employees,” engaged not in collective action but in the individualized aspirational culture encouraged by neoliberal capitalism — no longer participating in economic affairs as active subjects but instead “hailed” (in the author’s words) as “passive objects” in a system of private enterprise directed by entrepreneurs and CEOs. The erasure and disempowerment of workers *as a class* contributed to another significant development in the American media landscape explored in Martin’s narrative, namely the rise of populist conservative outlets able to capture the market niche vacated by major newspapers by trading in faux anti-elitism and cultural politics. This is not, he stresses, to be mistaken for actual representation of the working class, which is considerably more diverse (in both the ideological and demographic senses) than implied by the white, male, conservative caricature usually invoked by the right-wing media. Some of the book’s most interesting moments involve detailed case studies showing the media’s treatment of the working class at its best and worst: a 1941 New York transit strike, for example, during which the *New York Times* largely centered the contract dispute between workers and their employer in its reporting — contrasted with examples from decades later showcasing the way newspapers now tend to focus on how labor actions affect consumers and cause inconvenience for members of the middle class. Another important case study involves the media’s treatment of (then-president-elect) Trump’s visit to a Carrier facility in Indiana, which mostly overlooked the diversity of the plant’s workforce and the efforts of United Steelworkers Local 1999 to prevent jobs from being outsourced. As Martin puts it: The national news organizations that covered the Carrier story did so mainly from a political perspective. These Carrier workers were the working class, blue collar, Middle America, white male breadwinners who were Trump’s voter base . . . The news media’s general focus on white male Carrier workers as subjects denied the fact that the Carrier workers were far more diverse in terms of gender, race, and politics than the role they were given in the story (as white, male, ardent Trump supporters). Even when ostensibly given media attention, then, the working class was essentially reduced to caricature: invoked primarily to bolster a post-election narrative favored by political and media elites. As with any history so vast and detailed, parts of Martin’s story beg irritating (and, given the book’s scope, largely semantic) questions of cause and effect. How much weight, for example, do we afford the print media’s commercial turn in the 1970s versus the decades-long march to the right in American politics and culture that took off under Reagan? How much of a role did the growing invisibility of the working class play in enabling the wider political shift, or was it itself more a consequence of politics and shifting material conditions (such as the decline of union density or the outsourcing of manufacturing jobs)? These may be questions worth investigating, but they need not distract from the insightful commentary offered in *No Longer Newsworthy* — at once an important work of Trump-era criticism and an urgently needed condemnation of a **media culture** that persistently **erases** and misrepresents **the lives** and concerns **of** America’s **diverse working-class** majority.

## 2. The working-class is struggling in their day-to-day life, and not just from income inequality. The oppression is harming their physical and mental health - and it’s literally killing them.

### Leonhardt and Thomspon 20

<https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/03/06/opinion/working-class-death-rate.html>

## David Leonhardt is a senior writer for The New York Times. He writes The Morning, The Times’s flagship daily newsletter, and also writes for Sunday Review.

## Stuart A. Thompson is a reporter in the technology department covering misinformation and disinformation. Before joining the newsroom, Mr. Thompson was the head of Opinion’s visual journalism department, focusing on telling stories in new ways using data and visuals. Previously, he worked as the graphics director at The Wall Street Journal, where he was part of a large team that won the Pulitzer Prize for the series “Medicare Unmasked.” In 2018, he was on a team of Pulitzer Prize finalists for a series on domestic gun violence called “The Home Front.”

**Inequality has risen** more in the United States — and middle-class **incomes have stagnated** more **severely** — than in France, Germany, Japan or elsewhere. Large **corporations have increased their market share,** and **labor unions have shriveled, leaving workers with little** bargaining **power. Outsourcing** has become the norm, which **means** that **executives** often **see low-wage workers** not as colleagues but **as expenses.** And the **U**nited **S**tates **suffers from** by far **the** world’s **most expensive health-care system.** It **acts as a tax on workers and drains resources** that could otherwise be spent on schools, day care, roads, public transit and more. Despite its unparalleled spending, the American medical system also fails to keep many people healthy. The two economists initially focused on non-Hispanic whites because the mortality trends were worst for them. Deaths rates from suicide, alcoholism and drug abuse among whites surpassed the rates for blacks shortly after 2000, for example. But the black working class is hardly thriving -- and deaths of despair have surged among them in the last few years. Overall life expectancy remains significantly higher for whites than blacks. So, of course, do incomes and wealth. Many of the **problems afflicting the working class span racial groups**, **and** Case and Deaton emphasize that these problems **aren’t merely financial. Life** for many middle- and low-income Americans **can lack structure, status and meaning. People don’t** always **know what** days or **hours they will be working** the following week. **They** often **don’t officially work for the company** where they spend their days, **which robs them of** the **pride** that comes from being part of a shared enterprise. “Many people used to associate the meaning of their life with what their corporation or institution was doing,” says Deaton, a Nobel laureate in economics. Miners and factory workers identified themselves as such. Warehouse workers, especially those whose paycheck is signed by a staffing company, rarely feel the same connection. The result of these trends has been a “coming apart,” as Case and Deaton put it, of day-to-day life for whites without a college degree versus those with a college degree: Surveys show that **a growing number of working-class** Americans **find it difficult to do basic things,** like climb a flight of stairs or socialize, partly **because of chronic problems with** their **mental or physical health**: Given all of these alarming social indicators, it’s not surprising that some other causes of death — in addition to suicide, alcoholism and drug overdose — have also started rising for Americans without a college degree. Heart disease is the most significant, exacerbated by obesity, drinking and drug use. **The** combined **result is a** divergence in the life expectancy of white college graduates and non-graduates. Overall mortality for whites between the ages of 45 and 54 has held roughly steady in the last 25 years. But that average hides a **big increase in death rates** for non-graduates and a big decline for graduates.

## 3. The only solution is to introduce specifically working-class targeted media outlets to share in their experiences- something that is impossible under the ‘objective’ lens, where the only experience displayed is that of the wealthy and powerful. This can give workers new hope and encourage organization.

### Murphy 19

<https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/why-we-need-a-working-class-media>

Carla Murphy is an immigrant and first generation college student. She was a reporter for over a decade before becoming more involved in journalistic reform. She teaches classes about the intersections of class and journalism at Boston College. She also writes various articles and essays focused on the same concepts.

**We need a** corrective. I want to propose three minimum components for a new **working-class media.** The **first** is anger. **The U**nited **S**tates **is** now **a country where Forbes** magazine, without irony, **describes** twenty-one-year-old **Kylie Jenner as** a “**self-made**” billionaire. Stories matter in culture wars. **I’m not** yet **accustomed**—and neither do I want to be—**to the well-off stealing my** Horatio Alger **tale of ascending a slicked-up class ladder.** I can imagine that others in the working class, similarly shaped by watching our parents or guardians sacrifice for us, might also feel disoriented, if not disgusted, when **media avatars of privilege appropriate *our* uplift narrative. Second, we need a view of society** and ourselves **from the underside of power.** So much of my coming of age in the United States filters through the lightness that my single mother lost in those early years when she worked as a low-level administrative assistant. She laughed less, watched more. My first winter coat in the United States was too thin. It was a knee-length pretty pale lavender with a chevron stitch-pattern but not enough puff. It was a shitty winter but why guilt her? I knew she was doing her best. Early on I saw how easily an individual can be disappeared into a disregarded mass because of how you look, your accent, or lack of formal education. I learned how family and community are treated when little **people with** big **authority** believe you don’t have power: police with their guns, teachers with their words, social workers with their notes, government workers with their gruffness, politicians with their talk, researchers with their knowledge, doctors and nurses with their contempt. It’s not that these occupations or people are bad. It’s that **they have power over others, and those on the underside know it’s** easily **abused.** These childhood lessons fundamentally shape the perspectives of adults who grew up in poor and working-class households, regardless of current political affiliation or how much individual income they might earn. **Third, the working class must appear in** our **media as more than a problem** to be solved or studied. I look to the UK where writing about the class system is as common as writing about race in the United States. Even there, though, only our struggles draw mainstream attention, writes Kerry Hudson in the Guardian, adding, “The ‘working-class experience’ is as broad and varied as anything you could call ‘middle-’ or ‘upper-class.’” **Economic hardship does not mean the absence of joy, love, pleasure, duty, care.** Just as black **folks disengage from media that only makes room for** black **pain**, the same can be said for **the working class**—particularly young people—**watch**ing **one-dimensional representations of their lives.**

## 4. This option is the only way to give the working class an opportunity to realize their worth, and encourage them to push back against the wealthy who are keeping them down.

#### **Turn—Trust in media is increasing precisely because it's less objective and more connected to people’s perspectives. Because “relational trust” causes the same impacts the Aff tries to solve**

**Moran 21**

Moran, Rachel. “Trust And Authenticity As Tools For Journalism And Partisan Disinformation.” Social Science Research Council. July 27, 2021. Web. February 12, 2022.

<https://items.ssrc.org/beyond-disinformation/trust-and-authenticity-as-tools-forjournalism-and-partisan-disinformation/>.

Scholars and practitioners of journalism tend to think about the “crisis of trust” in journalism as an issue of growing distrust. On the contrary, trust in news media is thriving, but it exists unequally and is often tied to a vision of authenticity, and a vision of journalism, that is far different than the journalism we require for a functioning democracy. In part this is due to changes in the source of trust in journalism—trust is no longer concretely tied to professionalized practice. **We don’t necessarily trust the news because it is produced by professional journalists undertaking methodological and institutionalized practices**. Instead, trust is relational. We build relationships of trust with news outlets, journalists, and the news itself, because it aligns with our vision of what journalism should be and should achieve—a vision that is increasingly ideological. Consequently, surveys of trust in journalism present a fractured picture of trust in news media and polarization over what should be considered a trusted news outlet. A centering of relational trust in journalism retains positive consequences, as seen in the “death of objectivity” and the rise of “engaged journalism.” However, changes in the source of news media trust have also brought about new markers of information credibility, such as personal authenticity, ideological transparency, and social media popularity, that allows partisan actors to spread dis- and misinformation under the guise of journalism.