**TW: this case contains mentions graphic imagery**

**First is definitions**

#### **Objectivity in journalism is fact-based, non-subjective reporting**

**McLaughlin 16** [Greg McLaughlin, senior lecturer in media and journalism at the University of Ulster, 2016, “Journalism, Objectivity and War,” The War Correspondent, https://sci-hub.se/https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt19qgf0x.7]/Kankee

objectivity under fire Objectivity in journalism has come under serious critique from academics (Glasgow University Media Group, 1976; Lichtenberg, 1996; Streckfuss, 1990; Parenti, 1993). They suggest in various ways that the news media do not simply report and reflect our social world but that they more or less play an active part in shaping, even constructing it; that they represent sectional interests rather than society as a whole.2 When these criticisms are leveled at journalists, their traditional defence is their practice of objectivity but what does it mean to be objective in journalism in the first place? According to Michael Schudson (1978), **objectivity** is based on the assumption that a series of ‘**facts**’ or truth claims about the world can be **validated** by the rules and **procedures** of a professional community. The **distortions** and **biases**, the subjective value judgements of the individual or of particular interest groups, are **filtered out** so that among journalists at any rate, ‘The belief in objectivity is a **faith in** “**facts**”, a **distrust** of “**values**”, and a **commitment** to their **segregation’** (p. 6). Gaye Tuchman refers to this method as ‘a **strategic** **ritual’**, a method of newsgathering and reporting that protects the journalist from charges of bias or libel (1972, p. 661ff). Radical critiques measure journalistic claims to objectivity against analyses of how the news media produce and represent their version of reality according to sectional interests. Bias is not in the eye of the beholder but is structured within the entire news process; the news filters and constructs reality according to a dominant or institutional ideology (Glasgow University Media Group, 1976). ‘What passes for objectivity’, for American scholar Michael Parenti, ‘is the acceptance of a social reality shaped by the dominant forces of society – without any critical examination of that reality’s hidden agendas, its class interests, and

#### **My value is human dignity, which is defined as an individual or group's sense of self-respect and self-worth as well as physical and psychological integrity and empowerment.**

#### **All values are an end to Human Dignity.**

**Wood 07-(Human Dignity, Right and the Realm of Ends by Allen Wood. Stanford University. web.stanford.edu/~allenw/.../keynote2007.doc.) [sasha]**

The Kantian conception of human dignity, however, goes even farther. Kant uses the word ‘dignity’ in a very precise sense. As a basic conception of value, he contrasts ‘dignity’ with ‘price’ (G 4:434). What has price has a kind of value that may be rationally sacrificed or traded away for something else having an equal or greater value. The market price of a commodity, for example, is the ratio at which it may be exchanged for other commodities whose value is deemed equal for the purposes of exchange. **Dignity,** however, **is a value that is incomparable and absolute. It cannot be measured against other values in this way, because it can never rationally be sacrificed or traded away** for anything at all, not even for something else having dignity. Though human beings come and go, the value of a human being is absolute and irreplaceable. It cannot be substituted for, even by the value of another human being. […] In a recent article, Laurie Ackermann argues that equality is an ‘attributive’ rather than a ‘predicative’ term. That is, he holds that to call people equal depends for its meaning on the implicit idea that they are equal in some particular respect – for instance, equal in human dignity. The human equality based on human dignity is not merely a formal equality, like that involved in “treating like cases alike.” Treating like cases alike under the same rules is a canon of fairness or rationality in any system. But it could apply even if people were assumed *not* to be equals. In a social order based on unequal social status, it would require that we treat two dukes in the same way, and two slaves in the same way, but that we not treat a duke as we would a count, a noble as we would a commoner, or a slave as we would a free person. Human dignity, however, requires that all people be treated as alike in dignity, however they might differ in other properties. Equality based on human dignity is also not like the equality of two bills or coins you might find in your pocket. For these are equal only in what Kant would call ‘price’**. Human dignity is equal only in the sense that as a value that is absolute, it is a value that cannot be compared or exchanged, hence a value that cannot be unequal.** The fundamental egalitarianism built into the idea of human dignity can be understood as the most direct basis of many modern political and legal conceptions and principles. These include that governmental authority ought properly to exist and be exercised only with the consent of the governed, that political power should be based on the rule of law, not the arbitrary power of individuals or groups, and that everyone falling under such as system should have the right to participate in the decisions that determine what these laws are and who should be granted the authority to enforce them. These were principles fundamentally denied under apartheid, but even in what we call ‘democratic’ constitutions no honest person can fail to see much in our existing social arrangements that fails to live up to them. […] Perhaps the easiest way go wrong here is to confuse the dignity of a human being with the value of a certain kind of state of affairs or result, namely, the human being’s existing or continuing to exist. This confusion leads some people to think that the chief, perhaps the only, meaning of human dignity is what they like to call “the sanctity of human life.” We are all the more susceptible to this confusion because that if humanity has dignity, then it is true that the existence and continuation of a human life does have great value, and is even the basis of important human rights. But this is only an inference from the fact that humanity has dignity. And it is not even the most immediate inference, or the one having the highest priority. I think **a** more immediate **conclusion from the fact that humanity is an end in itself is that human beings should never be treated in a manner that degrades or humiliates them, should not be treated as inferior in status to others, or made subject to the arbitrary will of others, or be deprived of control over their own lives, or excluded from participation in the collective life of the human society to which they belong. As regards the value of human life, there can be terrible circumstances in which people must sacrifice their lives in order to retain their human dignity. So human dignity is a value prior to that of human life**. Kant held notoriously strict views about the prohibition of suicide, and if we confuse humanity as an end in itself with the value of the preservation of human existence, we might suppose that they follow directly from the idea that humanity is an end in itself. But the most defensible Kantian position on this issue seems to me one which says that in some circumstances the choice to end one’s life is the only way to protect one’s dignity from a state of helpless and hopeless suffering and incapacitation that is degrading to humanity. Kant was aware of this position, and took it seriously, even if in the end he was too rigidly traditional to accept it (MS 6:422-424, VE 27:342-344, 369-375).

#### **Thus, my criterion is resisting structural violence. Only actively resisting systems and institutions that violate human dignity will make us aware of the issue and give us the ability to counteract it.**

**Winter and Leighton 99 [Deborah DuNann Winter and Dana C. Leighton  Winter :Psychologist that specializes in Social Psych, Counseling Psych, Historical and Contemporary Issues, Peace Psychology. Leighton: PhD graduate student in the Psychology Department at the University of Arkansas. “Peace, conflict, and violence: Peace psychology in the 21st century.” 1999]**

Finally, **to recognize the operation of structural violence forces us to ask questions about how and why we tolerate it,** questions which often have painful answers for the privileged elite who unconsciously support it. A final question of this section is how and why we allow ourselves to be so oblivious to structural violence. Susan Opotow offers an intriguing set of answers, in her article Social Injustice. She argues that **our normal** perceptual/**cognitive processes divide people into in-groups and out-groups. Those outside our group lie outside our scope of justice.** Injustice that would be instantaneously confronted if it occurred to someone we love or know is barely noticed if it occurs to strangers or those who are invisible or irrelevant. We do not seem to be able to open our minds and our hearts to everyone, so **we draw conceptual lines between those who are in and out of our moral circle. Those who fall outside are morally excluded, and be- come either invisible, or demeaned in some way so that we do not have to acknowledge the injustice they suffer.** **Moral exclusion** is a human failing, but Opotow argues convincingly that it **is an outcome of** everyday **social cognition**. To reduce its nefarious effects, **we must be vigilant in noticing** and listening to oppressed, invisible, **outsiders.** Inclusionary thinking can be fostered by relationships, communication, and apprecia tion of diversity. Like Opotow, all the authors in this section point out that **structural violence is not inevitable if we become aware of its operation,** and build systematic ways to mitigate its effects. Learning about structural violence may be discouraging, overwhelming, or maddening, but these papers encourage us to step beyond guilt and anger, and begin to think about how to reduce structural violence. All the authors in this section note that the same structures (such as global communication and normal social cognition) which feed structural violence, can also be used to empower citizens to reduce it. In the long run, reducing structural violence by reclaiming neighborhoods, demanding social jus- tice and living wages, providing prenatal care, alleviating sexism, and celebrating local cultures, will be our most surefooted path to building lasting peace.

**Thus i affirm resolved: in a democracy, a free press ought to prioritize objectivity over advocacy**

**The first contention is disaster news**

**Graphic imagery in media causes reportage deadlock - perpetual debates over whether something is too important to not show vs too distressing causes a stoppage of news. Lewis 16’**

Lewis, Helen. “How Newsrooms Handle Graphic Images Of Violence.” Nieman Reports. January 05, 2016. Web. February 13, 2022. [.https://niemanreports.org/articles/how-newsrooms-handle-graphic-images-of-violence/](https://niemanreports.org/articles/how-newsrooms-handle-graphic-images-of-violence/)

**There was no blood, no violence, no panic. Just a little boy’s body washed ashore, one of thousands of victims of the refugee crisis unfolding along the borders of Europe.** Yet **the images of Alan Kurdi lying on a beach at Bodrum,** Turkey, published in September, **provoked fierce debate** in newsrooms and on social media **about** **whether** **the sight of a dead toddler was too distressing to show—or too important to ignore**. Several frames were available. Some showed Kurdi’s body face down on the beach; others showed a policeman cradling the boy in his arms. **In France, Libération was criticized for not printing the photographs at all. In Germany, Bild received so many complaints for publishing a photo on its back page that it removed all images** from its September 8 issue to make a point. “We must force ourselves to look,” wrote Julian Reichelt, editor in chief of bild.de. **“Without pictures the world would be more ignorant, the needy even more invisible, more lost. … Photographs are the screams of the world.”** Liz **Sly**, Beirut bureau chief for The Washington Post, **tweeted** one of the photos—**and was surprised by criticisms that she was violating Kurdi’s dignity.** “That puzzled me because I spend every day looking at these images of death,” she says, “and anyone in the region does, anyone who covers Syria—at least half a dozen pictures of dead children every day. Perhaps we’re violating their dignity by not publicizing them and having them die in silence in the dark.” With the ongoing conflict in Syria and Iraq, frequent mass shootings in the U.S., and terrorist incidents such as the massacre in Paris, **newsrooms are faced with constant decisions over the use of graphic or distressing images.** What rules, if any, should news organizations follow when deciding whether to publish such images? Has the easy availability of graphic content on social media numbed audiences to tragedy? What effect does the production and consumption of such images have on journalists, editors, and their audiences? And does publishing emotive pictures like that of Alan Kurdi risk tipping stories from reportage into advocacy? Yet the discussion is also familiar. Many of the most iconic news images of the last 100 years—a 9-yearold girl fleeing a napalm attack in Vietnam; the burned Iraqi soldier who died climbing from a car in the first Gulf War; Richard Drew’s “Falling Man” who jumped from a World Trade Center tower on 9/11; the dead passengers of the downed Malaysian Airlines plane in Ukraine—have been accompanied by debates about the ethics of their publication. **Part of their power stems precisely from the fact that they show moments of pain and death usually hidden from view. It’s difficult to look at these images, and difficult to look away.**

**To clarify - talking about violence is fine, but the way that the media uses disastrous images is both disrespectful and unproductive - choose a more objective path**

**Abbas writes**

Abbas, Asma. “Liberalism And Human Suffering: Materialist Reflections On Politics, Ethics, And Aesthetics.” Web. February 13, 2022.

In Martha Nussbaum’s celebration of cosmopolitanism, the familiar move of the invocation of the worst sufferings of mankind is bound to shut up and line everyone else in submission, not to the pain of others (as it may appear), but more fundamentally to iterations of who I am as one who suffers, as one who responds to suffering, and as one troubled by each of those questions rather than having settled them.47 Nussbaum or Shklar, in their philosophical commitments to different metaphysics (even in explicit noncommitments to metaphysics), do not even consider that their invocation of events of unimaginable suffering as cautionary tales for all of humanity is beholden to the sublime in ways complicit with liberalism’s political economy of suffering. In being so, **they inadvertently evacuate the political in favor of some formalistic ethical certitude that may carry its own violent obliterations, dysfunctionalizing political judgment in submission to ethical judgments already made for us.** The ethicization of discourse on suffering, and **the submission to the violence of violence, is a parallel to the death of the political.** Similarly, as long as the aesthetic follows this logic—**that representation is unethical and violent in nature and that we must somehow leave it behind**—**it will be limited in its vision, unable to see the deep and necessary ontological connection between suffering and representation.** Beyond considering aesthetics at play in the artistry of rights and interests that privileges the Western scopic and rhetoricist regimes, the aesthetic must be seen as more closely derived from aisthesis (perception from the senses). The resulting essential, ontic, and experiential proximity to suffering may allow us to radically reimagine our subjection to injuries, interests, and rights. The elements of a historical materialism of suffering introduced over the course of this chapter—necessity, hope, and a materialist sensuous ethos—reconsider woundedness and victimhood in order to illuminate the multiplicity of relations that are, and can be, had to our own and others’ suffering. They expose the presumptions and certainties regarding the imperatives suffering poses for sufferers that codify a basic distance from suffering and an inability to insinuate the question of suffering in our comportments, orientations, and internal relations of simultaneity to the world. A righteous or tolerant pluralism of sufferings, enacted wounds, and relations to our own and others’ suffering is not my objective here. One only has to consider, to build to a different end, how the judgments, actions, and reactions of many among us cannot help but reject consolations that come from codified knowledges and certitudes, such as those pertaining to what suffering is, how we must despise it, and how we must fix it. Then, one only has to question the imperatives these knowledges and certitudes pose for all of us, and examine the utilitarian charm of the beguiling tragedy of “powerless” institutions and other conscriptions of sympathy, empathy, voice, and desire for a markedly different world. This may involve not giving liberal institutions or fervent recruiters of various marginalities the power to set the terms of honoring the suffering and hope of others, and not giving them the power to corner our pathos, in a moment of ethical noblesse, by emphasizing how another’s suffering is impenetrable and unknowable. As much as this ethical noblesse upholds the letting be of the other, it is a preservation, first and foremost, of oneself—perversely reminiscent of the confusing touch-me-not of the Christ back from the dead, a Christ whose triumph over death ironically inspires entire cultures built on surplus fear, suffering, and death as offerings for those with terminal senses but endless lives (often the courtesy of the same historical cryogenics). It is imperative to reject both the righteous or tolerant pluralism of sufferings and the touch-me-not version of seemingly other-centered politics in favor of seeing our sufferings and our labors as coconstitutive of the world we inhabit. What would it mean, as Louis puts it to the Rabbi, to “incorporate sickness into one’s sense of how things are supposed to go,” to convoke a politics that is “good with death” but asks for “more life”? Perhaps the sufferer not be incidental to the suffering when suffering is defined as a problem only in the terms we can pretend to solve, only to fail at that, too. **Perhaps liberal politics should accept that statistics of diseases, mortalities, and morbidities, calculated in terms of the loss in human productivity, on the one hand, and those of prison populations and philanthropic gifts, on the other, are not graceful confessions of its mastery of suffering or death.** It is not that there are no sufferings to be named, interpreted, and tended to. However, it is important to remember that this is not a random, altruistic, or unmediated process, and it benefits those with the agency and position to act on another’s suffering. Perhaps **politics should be able to speak to, and for, the reserve army of those with abject, yetto-be-interpreted-and-recompensed sufferings, and those who have no ability to be injured outside of the terms native to liberal capitalist discourse.** Perhaps **politics can diverge from its reliance on certain frames of suffering in order to address the ubiquity and ordinariness of human tragedy and suffering.** Perhaps, still, if politics is concerned with the creation and maintenance of forms of life, then the activities of this making, when they negotiate with the past, present, and future, necessitate a look at the way old and new wounds are enacted in order to yield forms that are different. Ultimately, perhaps **liberalism’s colonization of suffering, and its moral dominion over it, needs to be resisted and loosened.** Questioning the forms in which we suffer and are told to do so is not the same as altogether questioning the reality or centrality of suffering and our responsibility to it. The ways in which we suffer tell us what we need and do not need, what our bodies can and cannot bear. Politics must be pushed to engineer the passing of certain forms of suffering, not the passing of suffering altogether. The claim to having nailed the problem of suffering becomes suspect when **politics learns from suffering not via the question of justice but, more immediately, as it responds to the suffering that is life;** when it is urgent to understand those ways of suffering that do not follow liberal logics; when attending to bodies who suffer, remember, and act out of their wounds differently is extremely necessary; when the question of the suffering of action is inseparable from the actions of the suffering; when our experience of the world and its ethical, political, and aesthetic moments is not prior to or outside of justice, but constitutive of it; and when the need to understand necessity, the lack of choice, and the ordinariness of tragedy is part of the same story as the clumsiness of our responses to grand disaster. This is an offering toward a politics that is not modeled on the liberal, capitalist, and colonizing ideals of healthy agents who are asked to live diametrically across from the pole of victimhood. Such an approach would factor in the material experiences of destruction, tragedy, violence, defeat, wounds, memory, hope, and survival that risk obliteration even by many well-meaning victim-centered politics. The imagining of such a politics is not merely premised on suffering as something to be undone. Rather, it holds on to the ability to suffer as something to be striven for, grasped anew, and salvaged from the arbitrary dissipations imposed on it by global powers who not only refuse to take responsibility for the plight that they have every role in creating and locating but also shamelessly arbitrate how the wounded can make their suffering matter. Modern schemes for solving the problem of human suffering succumb to their own hubris, even as they set the terms of joy and sorrow, love and death, life and hope, salvation and freedom, that those subject to these schemes ought to have a role in determining. Maybe these schemes have no relevance to those who suffer abjectly, or maybe the latter have lost their senses living among the dead who tyrannize us and the dead who beseech us. It is time that we confront the nauseating exploitations and self-affirming decrepitude of Western liberal capitalist arbitrations of where suffering must live and where it must die—these moralities keep themselves alive and ascendant by always invoking their choice exceptions, fixating on those marginal relations to suffering and life signified in the savage acts of, say blowing up one’s own and others’ bodies, often regarded as savage for no other reason than their violation of some silly rational choice maxim. There are many other exceptions that confront these dominations, not the least of which are the forms of acculturations, past and present, that see the realm of ethics as deeper and richer than the space of individual moralities acted out. Similarly, some of these exceptions to learn from hold and honor suffering as an inherently social act, as a welcome burden to carry with and for each other. If it is indeed the case that the world is so because the colonized have not stopped regurgitating, then the incipient fascisms in the metropoles today ought to make us wonder whether our problem as people of this world is not that there is not enough liberalism, but that, at best, liberalism is insufficient, and, at worst, it is complicit. Perhaps the majority of the world needs a politics that is material enough to speak to, and with, their silences, their pain, their losses, their defeats, their victories, their dispensabilities, their mutilations, their self-injuries, their fidelities, their betrayals, their memories, their justice, their humor, and their hope. At stake in such an imagining is nothing less than the possibility of newer forms of joy, desire, hope, and life itself.

**Advocates historically use shocking or horrific imagery to make their point - objectivity doesn't do this. Horrific imagery can create a lasting impression and destroy the victims dignity**

**Snyder 21’**

Snyder, Beth. “How Moral Shock Makes An Impression.” Faunalytics. January 19, 2021. Web. February 13, 2022. .<https://faunalytics.org/how-moral-shock-makes-an-impression/>

Explicitly **violent visuals** of nonhuman animals **have been used by animal advocates throughout the history of the movement. Undercover footage and photos** of animals in factory farms, slaughterhouses, and laboratories **are key components of** the strategies of **animal advocacy groups worldwide.** This can be a **highly impactful** and effective tool **for making an impression** on those not yet in the movement, and for maintaining motivation among advocates. To better understand the role of graphic images in animal advocacy, the author of this study conducted interviews with 60 animal advocates in Denmark, Sweden, and Spain to learn what effect explicit visuals of animal exploitation have had on them, and how they have used these visuals in their advocacy work. She recruited interview subjects using the snowball method, with participants referring her to additional participants. The participant pool was diverse in age, gender, years of activism, and advocacy strategies, though it was skewed in the same ways as the animal advocacy movement at large — female, educated, young, and white. Interviewees reported that **exposure to graphic visuals often causes a reaction of moral shock** — a visceral reaction to something ethically appalling that impels someone to action. It is the very fact that these images are so jarring that makes them effective at rousing people from apathy and ignorance to action. In most circumstances we try to avoid subjecting ourselves or others to the kind of distress that graphic visuals cause, but **sanitized depictions cannot fully convey the urgency** and magnitude of the problem. This is why some **advocates take it upon themselves to periodically revisit graphic footage and photos in spite of the distress it causes them.** They find it motivates them to continue to work to alleviate the suffering they see. **Some also see it as a moral duty to bear witness** to the true nature of human animals’ exploitation of nonhuman animals. **Other advocates find that repeated exposure to the horrors of animal exploitation merely makes them feel hopeless, and has a negative impact on their work.** This is one among several potential drawbacks of the moral shock strategy, which must be carefully navigated in order to advocate most effectively. Some advocates believe that **over-use of violent images could desensitize viewers and normalize the violence shown.** It can also **undermine the dignity of the individuals depicted.** In an attempt to expose the exploitation of nonhuman animals, **we** may **inadvertently commodify them further** in the eyes of those we are trying to reach. Others share a concern that visuals that are too graphic will backfire, and leave viewers so upset that they avoid the issue altogether. Those who are sensitive to the suffering of nonhuman animals can become highly motivated advocates, but not if we alienate them before they have a chance to engage with the issue

**It’s important to acknowledge issues, but overexaggerated representations of disasters create doomism.**

**Atkin 17’**, Emily. “The Power And Peril Of Climate Disaster Porn.” The New Republic. July 10, 2017. Web. February 13, 2022. . <https://newrepublic.com/article/143788/power-peril-climate-disaster-porn>

The article has generated significant controversy, and not just from the usual denier crowd. “I am not a fan of this sort of doomist framing,” Michael Mann, a climate scientist who often warns of the potentially devastating impacts of global warming, wrote in a lengthy Facebook post. “**It is important to be up front about the risks of unmitigated climate change, and I frequently criticize those who understate the risks. But there is also a danger in overstating the science in a way that presents the problem as unsolvable, and feeds a sense of doom, inevitability and hopelessness.”** In a Medium post, Daniel Aldana Cohen, an assistant sociology professor at the University of Pennsylvania who works on climate politics, called the piece **“climate disaster porn.”** The complaints about the science in Wallace-Wells’s article are mostly quibbles. Climate scientist Kevin Trenberth took issue with a section titled “The End of Food,” noting that while climate change could have a significant impact on food systems, food itself won’t disappear. “It **is overly dramatic** but has a basis in fact,” he said. Mann only disputed the threat posed by the release of methane frozen in permafrost, and the characterization of a study about the pace of global warming. He left the rest of the piece untouched.

**The impact of Doomism is political gridlock**

**Snow 19’**

**Snow**, Deborah. “Why Doomism Is Part Of The Latest Frontier In The Climate Wars.” The Sydney Morning Herald. October 19, 2019. Web. February 13, 2022. \***bracketed for ableist language\*** .<https://www.smh.com.au/environment/climate-change/why-doomism-is-part-of-the-latest-frontier-in-the-climate-wars-20191018-p531y7.html>

Once if you were a climate scientist the chief enemy was denial. Now, says Michael E. Mann, it’s more likely to be “doomism”: **the idea that taking action to reduce the threat of runaway climate change is pointless because it’s already too late. Doomism**, argues the internationally renowned climate scientist, **is part of the latest frontier in the climate wars** - a new tool being **exploited by those resisting change** in the way the world does business. It sits alongside what he calls **“soft denialism”** (climate change is happening but it's OK, we can adapt) **and “deflection”** (sowing division by making it all about individual lifestyle choices). Such tactics, he says, are in some ways “even more pernicious” than the old arguments flatly rejecting humaninduced climate change. “**The greatest threat I see to climate action is the [gridlock] that comes from disengagement, disillusionment, despair,”** he told The Sydney Morning Herald and The Age on a flying visit from the United States this week. “**It would be one thing if we were really doomed** … as a scientist it would be disingenuous of me to argue otherwise. **But** the science tells us **we can still** make the reductions in carbon emissions necessary to **avert the worst impacts** of climate change. Yes **there is urgency, but we still have agency.**” The daily news cycle has served up grim warnings this year: the intensity and scale of wildfires from the Amazon to the Arctic, prolonged drought, hurricanes and storms of ever greater impact, the retreat of glaciers, and evidence of the melting of the Greenland ice sheet and destabilisation of the West Antarctic ice sheet, happening now decades earlier than the predictions made 10 to 15 years ago

**Contention 2 Advocacy media endorses ethnic cleansing**

**Advocacy promotes media bias and government controlled media censors objective reporting to favor their own narratives**

**Mohan 21’**

Jahani Mohan june 28, 2021 “Media Bias and Democracy in India”

<https://www.stimson.org/2021/media-bias-and-democracy-in-india/>

**As the COVID-19 pandemic rages out of contro**l **in India,** many are rightly focusing on the content of stories on the death toll and months of lockdown. **The lack of journalistic integrity** behind some of the stories deepens this grim situation. In April, [reports emerged](https://www.medianama.com/2021/04/223-twitter-mp-minister-censor/) that, **at the request of the Indian government, Twitter censored 52 tweets criticizing the government’s handling of the pandemic. Meanwhile, pro-government TV channels** [**blamed**](https://www.dw.com/en/covid-why-is-india-censoring-media-during-public-health-crisis/a-57353096) **the farmers’ protests for limited oxygen supplies for COVID-19** patients, though supplies were [actually scarce](https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2021/05/05/989461528/why-is-india-running-out-of-oxygen) due to poor public health infrastructure. **This** reporting **is not only misleading and traumatic** to those affected by the pandemic, **but also poses a major threat to India’s vibrant democracy.** Even before the pandemic, media bias in India existed across the largest newspapers throughout the country, and political forces shape this bias. For example, funds from **the** government are critical to many newspapers’ operations and budgets, and the current **Bhartiya Janata Party** **(BJP) government has previously** [**refused to advertise**](https://www.reuters.com/article/india-media-idINKCN1TT1R6) **with newspapers that do not support its initiatives. This pressure leads media to endorse government policies, creating unbalanced reporting where media bias can affect political behavior in favor of the incumbent.** Many media outlets enjoy a symbiotic relationship with the government, in turn receiving attention, funding, and prominence. **These trends damage India’s democracy and also put journalists critical of the government in danger, threatening their right to physical safety**.Funds from the government are critical to many newspapers’ operations and budgets, and the current Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) government has previously refused to advertise with newspapers that do not support its initiatives.

**With the example of the Rwandan Genocide, News Radio advocacy acted out a plan to slowly implement hate speech and extremism to Rwandin listeners.**

**Jonas 11’**

ANGELA HEFTI & LAURA AUSSERLADSCHEIDER JONAS “FROM HATE SPEECH TO INCITEMENT TO GENOCIDE: THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE” 2011 <https://www.bu.edu/ilj/files/2020/08/Article_HeftiJonas.pdf>

<https://www.bu.edu/ilj/files/2020/08/Article_HeftiJonas.pdf>

Free speech is essential in any democratic society. Voiced in a politically charged context, however, hateful speech can incite the “crime of crimes”— genocide. **Democracy cannot be served if free speech is manipulated as a tool to incite the violation of human rights. Limits must be imposed on the media in its enjoyment of free speech.** This paper seeks to establish these limits by using the case of the role of the media in the Rwandan genocide. T**he Rwandan example shows how the media can manipulate an entire population to commit heinous crimes**. It also demonstrates that a context of political unrest can constitute the breeding grounds for incitement to genocide. Currently, President Donald Trump’s speech towards Muslims, although hateful, cannot be considered incitement to genocide. This paper should be seen as a much needed **reminder of what can be done when hateful and untrue messages are broadcasted on new media.**

**Jonas continutes**

**RTLM’s role was part of a sophisticated plan that systematically influenced the Hutu with propaganda and lies to bring about the genocide.**116 William Schabas described the importance of the media within the Rwandan context in 1994 as follows, **“A well-read and well-informed genocidaire will know that at the early stages of planning of the ‘crime of crimes,’ his or her money is best spent not in purchasing machetes, or Kalatchnikovs, or Zyklon B gas, but rather investing in radio transmitters and photocopy machines.”** 117 In 1990 only the national Radio Rwanda existed.118 After the Arusha Accords in 1993, Radio Rwanda even agreed to broadcast RPF messages.119 **At first, Radio Rwanda did not circulate hate messages**,120 **however, during the genocide, Radio Rwanda turned into an extremist radio station**.121 In response, the RPF established their own Radio Muhabura, which had limited reach and, although it glorified the RPF,122 tried to minimize the ethnic divide between Hutu and Tutsi.123 With the relatively neutral Radio Rwanda and the RPF’s Radio Muhabara, the Hutu extremists soon started to plan their own extremist radio, RTLM.124

**The non static function of advocacy media causes one side to reject any info that contradicts them.**

**Mishra 19’**

Prem Anand Mishra “India needs Aazadi from Biased Media: It is killing Indian democracy” 25 nov 19

https://www.nationalheraldindia.com/opinion/india-needs-aazadi-from-biased-media-it-is-killing-indian-democracy

The function of any independent media is to have that investigative curiosity **but this self -appointed defenders of the free press have become road blockers of the truth.** **Stereotyping is not static, it’s a functional process and it aims to construct a myth. These media houses have sold their critical power to separate its truths from their errors. Hatred has become India’s newest religion and fake news is an everyday ritual.** This whole culture has polluted the rationality of Indians at large who have been consistently pushed to behave in a certain manner otherwise to face the wrath. **Indian democracy is failing because the vast majority of citizens do not recognize media biases and supplemented propaganda.** Those **Media** houses are **writing a wrong history by spreading fake news as gospels.** Mischievous speculations and constant disinformation have been whipping large section of Indian into a frenzy. **Lies spread faster than truth and the role of social media has become a major source of recycling absurdities coming from these mainstream media.** In this totalitarian coordination, social media has become instrumental in spreading lies. This mischief from these sold-out media along with social media as a major source of hatred and propaganda has reduced people’s ability to oppose unpopular ideas without any official ban. There is a constant exercise of silencing the unpleasant voice. Media has become a game of circus to divert people, to maintain the status quo, to support the ill policies of demonetisation, crippling the economy, hard truth on unemployment and worsening performance on poverty alleviation. JNU is thus a victim of that nexus between the current regime and its patronized ‘*Godi media’*. Indian democracy is in retreat. Universities which are a centre for critical thinking have been vilified without any evidence and demonised by shared lies. Falsehood has become a reality and journalistic wisdom has been sold to financial or Ideological reasons. But prejudices are not always inversely proportional to education. A large section of Indians has surrendered their sovereign thinking with the passive recitation of facts and swallowing a large volume of distorted facts on an everyday basis as a rush of dopamine. Indian **masses have developed the art of ‘confirmation biases’ to embrace information that supports their beliefs and rejects information that contradicts them. Voltaire was not wrong when he said, ‘those who make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities.’** There is a distinction between news and truth and it is essential in forming people’s opinion. The famous journalist Walter Lippman once said, ‘What one normally gets is not truth but fact, and that fact is circumscribed by a variety of reporters, fear of libel, and that which is superficial. News, therefore, stereotype, standardization judgment and disregard for subtlety’. These media biases have one grand agenda: fake news. There is a constant exercise of turning Indian public into a passive consumer by spreading lies in the name of a free press but deep within there is an orthodoxy, a body of ideas which it is assumed that people will accept without questioning. One needs to remember that If you can’t exercise your freedom you are inviting a tyranny. Independent thoughts are the only critical voice that stops that tyranny. For the people at large need to ask before submitting to any lies: where is the evidence? Distortions can’t be facts and lies however comfortable they sound can’t replace the truth. **Malcolm X was dead right when he said ‘media has the power to make the innocent guilty and to make the guilty innocent, and that's the power because they control the minds of the masses’.**

**Non Objective news spread ethnic division that prompted hatred against the Tutsi and labeled them as traitors. Manipulation of truth is exactly what fueled the genocide in the first place**

**Jonas 11’**

ANGELA HEFTI & LAURA AUSSERLADSCHEIDER JONAS “FROM HATE SPEECH TO INCITEMENT TO GENOCIDE: THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE” 2011 <https://www.bu.edu/ilj/files/2020/08/Article_HeftiJonas.pdf>

It is important to consider RTLM’s propaganda tactics in order to understand how it was possible that thousands of people could be convinced to take up arms against the Tutsi.169 **By spreading lies, personal attacks, and prophecy of impending Tutsi attacks, RTLM created an atmosphere of fear among the Hutu that prompted them to take action.**170 One propaganda tactic included the media’s constant reference to “the truth,” which it pretended to know and conveyed as one message.171 In reality, **the media manipulated the truth and made its audience believe that its word was reality.**172 RTLM frequently claimed that its information came from political authorities, intellectuals, and university professors, which impressed some Rwandans and made them accept the cruel jokes against the Tutsi and their misrepresentations as reality.173 **Cynical and hypocritical broadcasts added to the genocidal environment**.174 RTLM encouraged its listeners by stating that they would never be held accountable for their acts if they won against the Tutsi.175 **Broadcasters also used religion to justify the attacks against the Tutsi.**176 Prayers sometimes preceded the violent acts.177 **Consequently, the policy of Tutsi extermination seemed to be tolerated and even endorsed by religion**.178 Given that 90% of Rwandans were Christians, the references to religion made the propagated violence acceptable.179 **False claims portraying the Tutsi as traitors in times of economic crisis caused contempt for the Tutsi**.180 In October 1993, the media had already underlined the different physical features and the supposedly different origins of the Hutu and the Tutsi.181 By relying on a theory of Tutsi immigration in pre-colonial times, the thought that the Tutsi had no right to inhabit Rwanda was put in the mind of the Hutu living in an overcrowded Rwanda.182 Additionally, the media

**The impact is two fold: first is death**

**The Rwandan genocide caused the death of 800,000 Tutsi**

**Verpoorten 05’**

[Marijke Verpoorten](https://www.cairn-int.info/publications-of-Marijke-Verpoorten--11689.htm) “The Death Toll of the Rwandan Genocide: A Detailed Analysis for Gikongoro Province”

<https://www.cairn-int.info/article-E_POPU_504_0401--the-death-toll-of-the-rwandan-genocide-a.htm>

Many readers may question the estimates regarding the number of survivors. Indeed, we will probably never really know how many Tutsi managed to survive without seeking refuge in camps, and counting in the camps was also prone to error. Moreover, since it is no longer politically correct in Rwanda to talk about ethnicity, the latest census of 2002 does not provide information on the current size of the Tutsi population. Another problem is the reliability of the 1991 census. Two criticisms have been put forward. First, to avoid discrimination, an undetermined number of Tutsi registered as Hutu. Second, the Habyarimana regime is said to have deliberately under-reported the number of Tutsi in order to keep their school enrolment and public employment quotas low. Until now, this allegation has not been documented. However, this strong suspicion alone led G. Prunier (1998) to estimate the actual Tutsi population in 1994 at 12% of the total population instead of 8%, the estimate put forward by the Habyarimana regime. If we repeat the same exercise as above with this larger proportion, **the death toll of the genocide increases from around 500,000 to some 800,000 Tutsi killed** (Prunier, 1998, p. 264), **representing the annihilation of about 84% of the Tutsi population in 1994.**

**The second is dehumanization:**

**Discrimination and ethnic cleansing is irreversible destruction of human dignity**

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[A] **discriminatory** form of **aggression that destroys the dignity of those in the group under attack.** It **creates a lesser status** not only in the eyes of the group members themselves but also in the eyes of others who perceive **and treat them as less than human**. The **denigration of persons on the basis of their ethnic identity** or other group membership in and of itself, as well as in its other consequences**, can be an irreversible harm.**