# Emory 22 R2 AC

#### The resolution is undergirded by a dualistic understanding of systems and being - instrumentalism relies on the flawed conception of a unified subject and static identity, which reinforces inherently static dichotomies – traditionally “male” vs. traditionally “female” spaces– those that fail to conform become viewed as the witch-like monstrous other, to be either eradicated or forced to conform – instead of forcing us to adhere to strictures of conformity, allow us to frame discourse and identity through becoming – the body is a plane on which chaotic, everchanging forces act, and embracing this is key

Ella **Brians**. 20**11**. [Ella Brians (B.A., Amherst College, French and Philosophy; M.A., New School for Social Research, Philosophy) works on poetry and poetics from Romanticism to Modernism in English, French and German], The ‘Virtual’ Body and the Strange Persistence of the Flesh: Deleuze, Cyberspace and the Posthuman, Deleuze and the Body. <https://edinburgh.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.3366/edinburgh/9780748638642.001.0001/upso-9780748638642-chapter-6>. EC

This brings us, finally, to Deleuze. Ann Weinstone has grouped Deleuze’s work with the ‘major philosophical and techno-scientific sources for progressive posthumanism’ (Weinstone 2004: 10). I am wary of embracing the term ‘posthuman’ in relation to Deleuze’s work. Its use to indicate mutually exclusive theoretical stances means that it risks meaning everything and nothing, while muddying the conceptual field. However, given its popular currency in cultural theory, this is probably a losing battle. If we want to situate Deleuze in regard to this discourse and ask whether he is a posthumanist, then I contend that the answer depends very much on which form of posthumanism we have in mind. It seems evident to me that of the two views outlined here (admittedly, with a speed and superfi ciality that risks caricature), Deleuze’s thought would align quite well with the ‘materialist’, and would be vigorously opposed to the ‘dualist’. That is to say, if by ‘posthumanist’ we mean that he questions Enlightenment rationality and the unity of the subject, while insisting on a form of critique that encompasses both material conditions and cultural codings, then it would be fair to call Deleuze a posthumanist. If we mean, instead, that Deleuze and Guattari’s becoming-machine and machinic assemblages can be equated to Moravec’s exhortations literally to ‘upload’ human consciousness into superior machines, then the term is not only inaccurate, but it also risks a gross misunderstanding of Deleuze’s, and Deleuze and Guattari’s, overall project. However, as the last sentence indicates, the first question we face in deciding where to situate Deleuze and Guattari’s work in the posthumanist debates is what to make of certain superficial resonances between some of Deleuze and Guattari’s more ecstatic statements and a Moravecian image of merging with machines. How do we respond to those who see congruities between Deleuze and Guattari’s machinic production, Body without Organs (BwO) and assemblages on one hand, and Moravec’s merging of intelligence into machines on the other? Is Moravec’s vision of mind merging with machine not just an example of the kind of impure minglings, assemblages, and cross-pollinations that Deleuze and Guattari urge us towards? Is it, in fact, not the inevitable result of Deleuze and Guattari’s own de-privileging of the human and their blurring of the boundary between the organic and non-organic? In short, is Moravec’s ‘becoming machine’ not a prime example of what it would mean to embrace a Deleuze and Guattarian ontology of becoming? A cursory reading of Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus, or a chance encounter with select excerpts, might indeed leave one with the impression that Deleuze and Guattari are promoting a kind of ‘becoming’ that would ultimately transcend the ‘merely’ human body. The language is undeniably there: the talk of ‘freedom’ and ‘liberation’, the image of becoming almost anything other than human, the machinic assemblages. Taken out of context, phrases like ‘the real difference is not between the living and the machine’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 285) might seem to support a Moravecian view. The obvious fi rst response is that what Deleuze and Guattari mean by machines, whether they speak of ‘desiring-machines’, ‘social machines’, ‘organic machines’, ‘war machines’, or ‘machinic assemblages’, is simply not what Moravec or Kurzweil means by machines. Deleuze and Guattari are not talking about computers, or steam engines for that matter, when they discuss whether there is a difference between the living and the machine (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 285). ‘Machines’ offer Deleuze and Guattari a way to talk about the differential interactions of forces and processes of individuation that underlie, connect, and structure all entities, whether mineral, animal, or machine. This leads us to the longer response, which is that such a cursory, impressionistic reading misses the fact that Deleuze and Guattari’s many ‘machines’ are part of a larger ontological critique – one, moreover, that is firmly situated in a materialist refusal of transcendence that is incompatible with a Moravecian worldview. Deleuze laid out the basis of this ontological critique in 1968 in the first fully developed statement of his own thought, Difference and Repetition.8 Hayles has identified the shift from humanism to the posthuman with a ‘significant shift in underlying assumptions about subjectivity’ towards a conception of the subject as ‘an amalgam, a collection of heterogeneous components, a material-informational entity whose boundaries undergo continuous construction and reconstruction’ (Hayles 1999: 3). In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze lays the groundwork for just such an ambitious and fundamental shift in the conception of subjectivity. Situating his critique squarely against Aristotle, Plato, **Hegel, and Kant, Deleuze argues against a representational metaphysics and epistemology that relies on the reification of categories and produces a dualistic and transcendent ‘image of thought’. The shift that Deleuze proposes is nothing less than a complete re-evaluation of the Western philosophical canon. At the heart of this re-evaluation is a critique of ‘the subject’ and the logic of identity` that makes this subject possible.** Drawing on Duns Scotus, Spinoza, and Nietzsche, Deleuze calls into question the negations and either/or structures that efface real differences and argues for a mode of thought that does not subjugate difference to identity (Deleuze 1994: esp. 281–2). Instead, he offers a theory of forces that are differentiated by varying degrees of intensity. These differences in intensity produce more differentiations in an exponential process that finally produces entities that we recognize as discrete objects, individuals, and eventually, subjects. Deleuze’s point here is that difference is prior to and produces individuals. This has two consequences: the individual is the result of a series of differentiations, not an essence; and as a contingent result of an ongoing process, the ‘individual’ (here we can fi ll in ‘object’, ‘self’, or any entity) is merely shorthand for a relatively stable state of affairs that is both partially determined by previous states and open to change. Another important point that will be relevant in Deleuze and Guattari’s work, and in relation to posthumanism, is that on this ontological account there are no firm or absolute boundaries between one ‘thing’ and the next. Boundaries exist, as zones of consistency, but they remain permeable and open to transformation, or becoming other. It is in Difference and Repetition that Deleuze introduces and argues for ‘**becoming’ as a more accurate description of our ontological situation than Platonic ‘being’**. In his work with Guattari, ‘becoming’ is often taken as just a trendy catch phrase. Turning to Difference and Repetition, we see that ‘**becoming’ is crucial to the fundamental shift in subjectivity for which Deleuze argues**. Becoming refers both to the endless process of differentiation and to our relation to our own subjectivity. Deleuze’s concept of becoming is indebted to Nietzsche, who advocates ‘[b]ecoming as inventing, willing, self-negating, self-overcoming: no subject but a doing, positing, creative’ (Nietzsche 2003: 138). In displacing identity and being with difference and becoming, Deleuze argues for a new understanding of subjectivity as a process, a ‘doing’ that is at once creative and critical. In contrast to the unifi ed Platonic or Kantian subject, Deleuze paints a picture of identity as decentered, distributed, and emerging from a series of highly complex interactions between pre-personal forces. The result is a subjectivity that is remarkably similar to what Hayles describes as ‘posthuman’. Crucially, identity is revealed not as an essence, but as ‘an amalgam of heterogeneous elements’ that include biological and evolutionary processes, social and cultural codings, and accidents of history. The forms that life takes and the particular individuals and identities that arise are both determined to some extent and open to change or becoming other than what they are at any given moment. The self must be made, but it is always constituted in a context. This vision of subjectivity as emerging out of a process of becoming is resolutely materialist. If we have any doubt of this, we need only recall the source of the opposition between being and becoming. In the Republic, Plato rejects Heraclitean flux on the grounds that this material chaos, this becoming, obscures the unchanging, non-material truth of the Forms (Plato 1991).9 In Platonic terms, becoming is ‘not real’ and ‘not true’. Its materiality, its participation in the physical world of things and stuff and dirt and bodies, makes it incompatible with truth. At best, it is an imperfect representation of a ‘pure’ idea. When Deleuze returns to becoming, he returns to the founding moment of Western metaphysics and purposefully unleashes all the mess and chaos of material flux that Plato wanted to control by consigning it to ‘mere representation’. This vision of subjectivity remains remarkably consistent through Deleuze’s work with Guattari until his late essay ‘Immanence: A Life . . .’. In many ways, it anticipates much of the critical project of what I have provisionally identifi ed as ‘materialist’ posthumanism. A better term might be ‘immanent’ posthumanism. Deleuze’s philosophical commitments align him with those like Haraway and Hayles, for whom the critique of subjectivity spans both the obviously ‘material’ (biological processes) and the ‘cultural’ or ‘social’ codings that make identity intelligible. Though they are not ‘material’ in a physical sense, neither are they merely abstract nor transcendent, ahistorical truths. These social and cultural codings are always immanent to a particular situation or environment. Subtly, for each of these thinkers, these cultural and social codings have ‘real’ – that is, material – effects. For Deleuze, as for Haraway and Hayles, an immanent worldview that takes into account a range of heterogeneous forces is crucial to critiquing a form of subjectivity that, for various reasons, they fi nd to be inaccurate, distorting, and even oppressive. With this in mind, I would like to return to the question of the body in Deleuze and Guattari’s work. The main target of Deleuze and Guattari’s critique in Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus is the same logic of identity that Deleuze fi rst targeted in Difference and Repetition. This logic depends on a strict separation between self and other, inside and outside, natural and unnatural, human and machine, and human and animal, to name just a few. Deleuze and Guattari systematically set about undermining this series of oppositions. In doing so, they repeatedly call into question the ‘fact’ of a unified, contained subject. Traditionally, the boundary of the subject is identified with the boundary of the flesh; I end where my skin ends. This idea depends on a naturalized idea of the body as ‘given’ and obvious. Deleuze and Guattari, however, illustrate how the body must be constituted through ‘codings’, which are the result of the regulation, control, and interactions of various ‘flows’, including the biological, technological, and cultural. In A Thousand Plateaus, they use the example of the face or ‘faciality’ to discuss how a surface, itself the result of the convergence of a thousand tiny flows, is signified as something, as someone (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 167–73). They ask us to be critical of the socially constructed, socially coded, but naturalized face and the underlying logic of identity that supports it. In doing so, they suggest that ‘the body’ is always more than its biological parts or fleshy boundaries. By opening the body beyond the limits of the fl esh, to include its social and cultural codings, Deleuze and Guattari displace the body from what we traditionally think of as the ‘material’ realm, that of biology, while precisely insisting on its materiality. Braidotti clarifi es this seeming contradiction when she writes that: The embodiedness of the subject is for Deleuze a form of bodily materiality, not of the natural, biological kind. He rather takes the body as the complex interplay of highly constructed social and symbolic forces. The body is not an essence, let alone a biological substance; it is a play of forces, **a surface of intensities**; pure simulacra without originals. (Braidotti 1994: 112) The ‘material’ is not merely the biological. There is a whole range of forces that interact to form ‘the body’. For Deleuze, these forces have always been ‘material’. Unlike Moravec, Deleuze and Guattari’s machines are not mobilized to do away with or escape materiality in a general ‘becoming-machine’. Instead, as we have seen, ‘becoming’ has been, from the beginning, an indice for the recognition of materiality and material fl ux. At the same time, drawing on Deleuze’s earlier ontological analysis, Deleuze and Guattari insistently undermine the boundary between the organic and non-organic, the human and the machine, the human and the animal. The blurring or elimination of these boundaries has a strong relation to both forms of posthumanism that I have outlined above. It might also seem to support a Moravecian merging with machines. If there is no real difference between human and machine, then what is lost in merging them? The phrase ‘no real difference’ should be the fi rst indicator that something is wrong here. For Deleuze and Guattari, the undermining of boundaries can never mean that there is no difference. Their point is more complicated: it is precisely **because there are too many differences that these simple binary oppositions are insufficient**. In undermining the boundary between man and machine, Deleuze and Guattari do not aim to efface their differences, but to reveal their interrelation and the fact that ‘calling into question the specific or personal unity of the organism’ and ‘calling in question the structural unity of the machine’ are part of the same ontological critique (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 284). Furthermore, in contrast to both a Moravecian posthumanism and some of their own most ardent supporters, Deleuze and Guattari recognize that there are material consequences of and limitations on our experimentations. Deleuze may repeatedly insist on the Spinozistic question, ‘What can the body do?’, but this does not mean that he believes that the body can do just anything. His theory of forces and intensities is firmly situated in what Hayles describes as ‘the world of energy and matter and the constraints they imply’ (Hayles 1999: 236). There is a signifi cant difference between asking what the body can do and suggesting the body can do anything, or, recalling Moravec, doing away with the body altogether. With this in mind, let us return to the question of where Deleuze’s work fi ts in the cyber theory and posthumanist debates. Deleuze’s project, from beginning to end, attempts to create a ‘signif cant shift in underlying assumptions about subjectivity’. Hayles, following Haraway, identifi es a critique of the liberal humanist subject as a crucial feature of posthumanism, and explicitly recognizes Deleuze and Guattari as being engaged in a similar project (Hayles 1999: 4). Arguably, Deleuze takes this project even further, by returning to the philosophical roots and habits of thought that make a Lockean subject possible. In contrast, Moravec’s ‘bubble of Mind’ preserves key features of the dualist subjectivity identifi ed with Plato and Enlightenment humanism, even as it promises to evolve past the human. As Chris Land observes with reference to Moravec’s ‘uploaded’ brain, ‘this fi gure of the post-human is surprisingly like the ideal of the liberal-humanist subject. Completely disembodied and obscenely rational, it is a pure will that has finally cut itself free of its puppet strings to become a self-contained master’ (Land 2006: 122). Land has suggested the term ‘transhumanism’ as an alternative to distinguish a posthumanism that both critiques the liberal humanist model of subjectivity and affi rms materiality, from that of Moravec, Kurzweil, and other futurists (Land 2006: 113). Weinstone uses the term ‘progressive posthumanism’. Regardless of which term we prefer, what is clear is that Deleuze’s philosophical commitments align him with the strand of cyber theory and posthumanism that not only insists on a critique of subjectivity and a thorough coming to terms with embodiment and materiality, but that also sees these two tasks as intimately interconnected.

#### We must strive to become the monstrosity of the other - before we can reach liberation

**Massumi 99**

Massumi, Brian. *A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Deviations from Deleuze and Guattari*. MIT Press, 1999 (LHZ 1/2/20)

The productive processes of becoming-other and becoming-the-same follow very different paths. Becoming-other goes from the general to the singular, returning thought to the body grasped from the point of view of its transformational potential -- monstrosity. Becoming-the-same moves to avoid that same potential, going from the typical to the general, from the individual grasped from the point of view of its predictability to the Standard of that normality. When Becoming-other starts to succeed, it carries its operations to a higher power, aiming all the more intensely for the connective freedom of fractality. By contrast, it is when becoming-the-same begins to falter that it carries its process to a higher power. When it does, what it aims for isn't the superabstraction of immanence. It contents itself with abstraction plain and simple. It takes the divide-and-conquer approach of ratio analysis to the extreme, carrying thought ever father for the body and the quantum world its inhabits. Rather than taking the material at hand and synthesizing, it strives to make the ultimate separation, and to make it binding: the separation of thought form the body (transcendence). This escalation of segregation is called “morality”: the move from general ideas to the Idea as guarantor of the “Good” Becoming-other is the madness of the imagination. It is eminently ethical, in Spinora’s sense of reading toward an augmentation of the power to live in this world. Morality (molarity) is the delirium of reason. It sets its sights on paradise (lorified generality). Since becoming-other concerns this world, and revels in its “thisness.” we are always already where it wants to take us. To qualify for it, all one must do is to be alive. To succeed at it, one need only live more fully: dissipate (expand energy at a state far from equilibrium). To qualify for molar paradise, on the other hand, it is necessary to pass a test. The select achieve death (maximum entropy). <107-108>

#### I provide the following definition of appropriate:

#### Appropriation is establishing property rights in something formerly un‑owned

Dominiak 17

Łukasz Dominiak (Associate Professor at Nicolaus Copernicus University in Poland; he holds a PhD and habilitation in political philosophy and is a Fellow of the Mises Institute). “Libertarianism and Original Appropriation.” Historia i Polityka, 29/2017: 22. Pp. 43‑56. JDN. https://apcz.umk.pl/HiP/article/view/HiP.2017.026/13714

Having drawn the above distinction between possession and ownership, we are ready to define original appropriation. Thus, original appropriation is acquiring ownership of unowned things. To originally appropriate is to establish property rights, i.e. justi‑ fied claims to physical things that at the moment of acquisition are unowned. What is important to underline again, is that original appropriation is not about taking factual possession of things that are unpossessed or unowned – this process is called occupation and can be conceived as one of the possible investitive facts that can result in original appropriation but should not be confounded with the latter. Neither is it about acquir‑ ing ownership of things already owned. It is about instituting new property rights to unowned things. As Nozick puts it, the topic of “original acquisition of holdings, the appropriation of unheld things includes the issues of how unheld things may come to be held” (2014), i.e. come to be owned. Hence, original appropriation is about creating normative relations between persons and things.

#### Thus, I embrace the job of the witch in undermining and questioning the gender binary that permeates the gender spheres and debate, in order to combat its pervasive violence and achieve liberation. This means I reject the appropriation of outer space by private entities and curse private entities for trying to appropriate space similar to the way heteronormative spaces have tried to appropriate me.

#### It is just after six pm. Your lips quiver in time with your heart.

#### There are questions you really shouldn't ask yourself when you've lost this much sleep:

#### How is your body yours when others name it for you?

#### How do you take it back?

#### You pick at the fleece of your jacket and swallow hard. You've read about this before, in the book that pulled you back into witchcraft: a story of the first time the author flew, burst in an explosion of feathers and light from her ribs, unfurled into the air and left her body under the trees. You want it. You want so badly to leave your bones.

#### This should be easy. You've never lived in your body, not really. The facsimile of ownership inherent in holding an identity that never matched your biology forced you out as soon as you learned it was possible.

#### So here you sit, under a bookcase, warm light from the table in the corner invading your sight. You close your eyes and try--

#### And try--

#### And try to step out.

#### Your mouth tastes like rich brown bread, tongue a hard twist of muscle against your teeth.

#### Did I ever tell you: teeth carry the oxygen of where you grew up. Are yours full of the ions of some wild land, or the terror of your stuffy room where you drew air across your teeth just to prove you could?

#### You wonder why not both. Aren't they both wild and strange in their own way?

#### Can you have both?

#### Do you want both?

#### You peel away from your skin, pull free of the body that's been taken from you. Ephemeral bones stretch and crack.

#### You have no idea what you want to become.

#### That's fine: after all, is it really shapeshifting when you have no real form to return to?

Mutability - HAWKE (Hawke is a full-time student who aspires to be a full-time witch. Ze lives in CA with a couple of middle-aged cats and a steadily-growing bone collection. Those two things are not related, from *Arcane Perfection*, published 2017)

#### This binary persists in political discussions—witches are often talked over and interrupted by men—studies prove this is to assert dominance and power over women and is just an example of hegemonic masculinity. This gives the aff a prefiat impact of liberating witches in the debate space.

Shore 17

*Leslie Shore*. “Gal Interrupted, Why Men Interrupt Women And How To Avert This In The Workplace.” *Forbes*, Forbes Magazine, 3 Jan. 2017, www.forbes.com/sites/womensmedia/2017/01/03/gal-interrupted-why-men-interrupt-women-and-how-to-avert-this-in-the-workplace/?sh=467b7cc317c3

According to world-renowned gender communication expert Deborah Tannen, men speak to determine and achieve **power and status**. Women talk to determine and achieve connection. Given that **in American society speaking is considered the power position**, it is no wonder that men interrupt to take the floor more often. In using conversation to enhance connection, women are much less likely to interrupt, as it is seen as disrespectful. Numerous studies support the claim of women in the workforce who argue that men interrupt them far more often than the reverse. A study titled “[Sex Roles, Interruptions and Silences in Conversations](http://web.stanford.edu/~eckert/PDF/zimmermanwest1975.pdf)” by Don Zimmerman and Candace West, sociologists at the University of California, Santa Barbara, found that “…there are **definite** and **patterned** ways in which the **power and dominance** enjoyed by men in other contexts are exercised in their conversational interaction with women.” In this study, the authors analyzed 31 two-party conversations that they had tape recorded in public places such as cafes, drug stores, and university campuses. Of the 31 conversations, 10 were between two men, 10 between two women, and 11 between and man and a woman. In the two same-sex groups combined, the authors found seven instances of interruption. In the male/female group, however, they found 48 interruptions, 46 of which were instances of a man interrupting a woman.

#### The appropriation of space is a move to colonize space for the use of rich, white men. This comes from the same string of ideology that witch hunts have come from – to make sure white men have immediate access to everything and anything they want.

Bianco 18

Bianco, Marcie.“The Patriarchal Race to Colonize Mars Is Just Another Example of Male Entitlement.” *NBCNews.com*, NBCUniversal News Group, 2 Aug. 2019, www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/patriarchal-race-colonize-mars-just-another-example-male-entitlement-ncna849681

These men, particularly Musk, are not only heavily invested in who can get their rocket into space first, but in colonizing Mars. The desire to colonize — to have unquestioned, unchallenged and automatic access to something, to any type of body, and to use it at will — is a patriarchal one. Indeed, there is no ethical consideration among these billionaires about whether this should be done; rather, the conversation is when it will be done. Because, in the eyes of these intrepid explorers, this is the only way to save humanity. It is the same instinctual and cultural force that teaches men that everything — and everyone — in their line of vision is theirs for the taking. You know, just like walking up to a woman and grabbing her by the pussy. It’s there, so just grab it because you can. “I want to be clear, I think we should be a multi-planet species, not a single planet species on another planet,” [Musk said at the 2015 Vanity Fair New Establishment Summit](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SqEo107j-uw). “What kind of future do you want to have? Do you want to have a future where we are forever confined to one planet…or…one where we are on many planets?” This Columbusing attitude — a strident business acumen laced with an imperialist ethos — comes with an air of benevolence: Musk doesn’t just want to colonize Mars to satisfy his ego. No, he wants to colonize Mars to help his fellow humans. “I really think there are two fundamental paths [for humans]: One path is we stay on Earth forever, and some eventual extinction event wipes us out,” [he said.](https://www.wired.com/2016/09/elon-musk-colonize-mars/) In this way, colonizing Mars is a “[collective life insurance policy](http://www.businessinsider.com/why-elon-musk-doesnt-want-to-live-forever-2015-10).” Although considering the last 500 years of colonization on this planet alone, one could wonder **whose lives**, according to Musk and other rich white men like himself, are worth being insured. But again, this impulse to enter the “space race” isn’t simply the embodiment of the American spirit of invention or forward-thinking entrepreneurship. Neither is it driven by the kind of nationalist Cold War fervor that inspired the creation of America’s space program in the 1950s. Rather, the impulse to colonize — to colonize lands, to colonize peoples, and, now that we may soon be technologically capable of doing so, colonizing space — has its origins in gendered power structures. **Entitlement to power, control, domination and ownership.** The presumed right to use and abuse something and then walk away to conquer and colonize something new. The Friday before SpaceX’s launch, legendary astronaut Buzz Aldrin reiterated to me over lunch that it is imperative that we talk about space exploration in terms of “migration,” rather than using words like “colonize” or “settle” when talking about going to Mars. Through a feminist lens, Aldrin’s deliberate word choice revealed an important reality of the space race: This 21st century form of imperialism is the direct result of men **giving up on the planet they have all but destroyed.**

#### The “we” that colonizes space will be dependent on the power structures that marginalize groups like witches.

**Scharmen**, fred, November 2, 20**21**, Fred Scharmen teaches architecture and urban design at Morgan State University’s School of Architecture and Planning. He is the co-founder of the Working Group on Adaptive Systems, an art and design consultancy based in Baltimore, Maryland. His work as a designer and researcher is about how we imagine new spaces for future worlds, and about who is invited into them. He received his Masters in Architecture from Yale University. His writing has been published in the Journal of Architectural Education, Log, CLOG, Volume, and Domus. His architectural criticism has appeared in the The Architect’s Newspaper, and in the local alt-weekly Baltimore City Paper.  “Space Forces: a Critical History of Our Life in Outer Space” (pages 15-18)

“So, once again, why should we want to go live in space? One of the most crucial terms in that question, the one most in need of disambiguation, is “we.” **Who is the “we” that wants to go? And who is the “we” that gets to go? Who is the “we” that stays behind?** If the argument in favor of living in space is practical, based on the abundance of room and resources, who are the people that should have access to that material, energy, and space? If the argument is based on novelty—new experience, and on the potential for new social models and new knowledge—who collects that knowledge? And who benefits from it? **If the case for space depends on the premise that anyone who goes might have a chance to survive a cataclysm that could end human life on Earth,** **who gets to inherit that future? And whose future is foreclosed? Spaces have subjects: the design and production of a space is also partly the design and production of the people that are invited into that space.** The modernist architect and urban designer Le Corbusier created a system of dimensions and proportions for spatial design “based off of his conception of ideal human dimensions. He used this system to specify everything from the depths of countertops to the heights of buildings and the width of streets, in projects around the world. To justify his choice of six feet as the base height for his reference person, he wrote, “Have you never noticed that in English detective novels, the good-looking men, such as the policemen, are always six feet tall?”4 He had made a universal constant out of a male European authority figure. **Any conception of a specific space is also the conception of a specific “we” who that space is for, and sometimes the conception of that subject reinforces existing power structures instead of offering new ways to live.** When designers, planners, and geographers make space on Earth, all of the givens that define the world tend to broaden the perceived limits of subjectivity within space on this planet. Wherever we humans go on the surface of the planet, we can usually depend on finding breathable air, one g of gravity, and a temperature range that we can mitigate with clothing. Experimental musician and artist Brian Eno ” “wrote about the concept of a “big here” and a “long now” that can change the way people think about duration and location. **On Earth,** I’d add, many take for granted that **there is a “wide we”: one that collectively participates in efforts like space exploration, or collectively suffers from crises like the one happening to the climate. This is an illusion, and one that covers for the unequal distribution of blame, credit, and impact. Such a sense of a “wide we” can also gloss over the way design is used to include and exclude different people from different spaces.** For example, the standard temperatures of office environments are often set according to gendered prejudice, weight standards on objects determine what abilities make people eligible for jobs, and the slope and texture of a surface affects who can walk on it and who can’t. **In built environments in outer space, all of the given constants of Earth become variables: gravity, light levels, atmospheric composition and temperature, ambient sound and noise. And all can be fine-tuned and used, deliberately or accidentally, to include or exclude.** In space, all of the implied questions about how a world is constructed and how that construction is expressed, come to the fore, in a kind of crisis of specificity. This book is a survey of the roughly 150-year history of the idea that humans could and should live in space, off of Earth, for indefinite—maybe functionally infinite—periods of time. This is not a comprehensive account of every development and every layer of this idea, but more like a set of core samples from a timeline too complicated to be completely excavated or catalogued all in one place. The major portion of the book tells the stories of seven paradigms for living in space. Each one has its own unique answers to the question of why humans should go and live there, and each one has its own unique implications for life on Earth. In order to tell these stories, I draw on concepts from multiple spatial disciplines—architecture, landscape architecture, urban design, and geography—and I will also rely on other fields that track the cultural imagination. For the paurposes of this book, there are no hard and fast boundaries between space science and science fiction; both are places where people get to speculate about other worlds. Each of these seven paradigms crosses the blurry boundaries between fiction and science, and the contexts that surround each of them contain opportunities to identify critiques and counter-narratives. **All** of these **plans to make new space for future humans include, implicitly or explicitly, an idea about a “we”—that is, about who those notional humans are.”** **“Whether humans eventually go and live permanently in space or not, we will continue to see an ever more complicated and visible relationship between the creation and control of worlds and the collective subjectivity within them.** Regarding the climate crisis, the historian and postcolonial scholar Dipesh Chakrabarty told interviewer James Graham in a 2016 book, Climates: Architecture and the Planetary Imaginary, **“The moment we ask ‘what should we do?’ we discover that the ‘we’ needs to be constructed.** If the catastrophic changes in Earth’s climate, produced without conscious intention by human intervention, are to be addressed, then deliberate effort will have to be brought to bear on conditions that were previously considered unintended consequences. One way or another, a new world must be constructed, along with Chakrabarty’s new “we.” A “reduction in global carbon production, and a hold on, or reversal of, temperature rise, would be a demonstration of what sociologist and theorist Saskia Sassen calls a “capability”: a new technical skill that hadn’t been available before, whose implications and capacity might not be obvious right away.”

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who most performatively and methodologically breaks traditional, binary norms.

#### Issues devoid of gender are a clear indicator of hegemonic masculinity; this has created a situation where masculine is the norm. The best way to reject hegemonic masculinity is to first question the institutions we take for granted in our society, which means we first have to deconstruct hegemonic masculinity in daily institutions and bring the issues up in political discussions. The debate space encompasses both.

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I became interested in what Hearn and Parker (2001: xii) call “the silent unspoken, not necessarily easily observable, but fundamentally material reality" of institutions. **Silence on gender is a** determining **characteristic of** institutions of **hegemonic masculinity** and this is a key point. **It indicates** a normality and simply "how things are." **men are the standards of normality, equated with what it is to be human**, while this is not spelled out (Connell 1995: 212). **Hegemonic masculinity "naturalizes** the everyday **practices of gendered identities"** (Peterson and True 1998: 21). This has led to the rather perplexing situation in which "men are persons and there is no gender but the feminine” (Butler 1990: 19). Hence, masculinity is not a gender; it is the norm. It should be noted that in the Swedish context, this masculinity norm derives from a standard associated with white, heterosexual, male bodies.  What I focus on is the normality, reproduced within organizations and how that can be approached methodologically. **The goal is to problematize masculinities and the hegemony of men** (cf. Zalgwski 1998a: 1). This is a risky enterprise because **masculine norms**, when hegemonic, are never really a topic of discussion. They remain hidden - silenced — yet **continue** to be affirmed **in** the **daily** practice of the **institutions**. Kathy Ferguson (1993: 8), for one, suggests we challenge that which is widely acceptable, unified, and natural, and instead perceive it as being in need of explanation. **Breaking** the **silence is** to question what seems self-explanatory and turn it into a research puzzle, in a sense, by making the familiar strange. It means giving the self-explanatory a history and a context. Cynthia Enloe (2004; 1993) encourages feminists to use curiosity to ask **challenging** questions about what appear as **norm**al, everyday banalities in order to try to understand and make visible, for example, as she does, the gender of` international relations (IR) both as theory and as practice. **The first step is to question** even the **most banal** or taken-as—given of everyday practices of **world politics**. In her study on women’s collective political organizing in Sweden, Maud Eduards (2002: 157) writes that “the **most forbidden act**" in terms of gender relations is **to name men as** a **political category,** which **transfers men from** a **universal nothing to** a **specific something.** If this is so, how can we actually study such silences? What are the methods by which we can transcend this silence on gender?