#### Presumption and permissibility affirm – a) We always default to assuming something true until proven false, or it would be almost impossible to make any claim at all because if the entire burden of proof is to show truth b) If agents had to reflect on every action they take and justify why it was a good one we would never be able to take an action because we would have to justify actions that are morally neutral ie drinking water is not morally right or wrong but if I had to justify my action every time I decided upon a course of action I would never be able to make decisions. C) Epistemics – we wouldn’t be able to start a strand of reasoning since we’d have to question that reason – means that presuming neg is incoherent because it relies on some presumptive truths about ethics and the world in general

## Framing

#### The starting point of the framework are the constitutive parts of what it means to be human, our virtues are defined by the interaction of reason, our experiences, and our animal intuitions to create a coherent moral theory Bagnoli 17: Lex FV

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/constructivism-metaethics/#ArisCons

To this extent, this metaethical view shares the ambitions of Kantian constructivism to ground normative truths in features of rational agency. In contrast to Kantian models, however, Aristotelians hold that the principles of sound practical reason are neither formal nor procedural. Rather, they are grounded in a substantive account of the good life, which is inspired by ancient eudaimonism. The wise and virtuous agents form the standard of practical rationality through the exercise of their virtues of intellect and character (Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics, II.6.) The negative case for Aristotelian constructivism consists in the critique of the Kantian account of practical reasoning, its form, reach, and powers. Under attack is the claim that practical reasoning is law-like, i.e., governed by the requirement of universality. According to some critics, Kantians have a difficult to explain how to apply universal rational principles to concrete cases (Höffe 1993; LeBar 2013b; Millgram 2005: chapter 6). In this respect, the Aristotelians claim to have a significant advantage because Aristotelian constructivism allows practical reasoning to adapt to particular cases. Aristotelian constructivism works out a story about the norms for success in judgment, which is considered a problem for Kant and an unrecognized lacuna in contemporary Kantian ethics (Millgram 2005: chapter 6). Because of their appeal to moral laws, Kantians are often criticized for a rigor or for empty formalism. In either case, Kantian ethics seems incapable to account for the relevance of circumstances for ethical judgments. This is a problem that Kantian constructivists address (O’Neill 1975; Herman 1993), but inadequately, according to the Aristotelians (LeBar 2013b.) To identify the substantive standards of practical reasoning, Aristotelian constructivism starts with a study of the complexity of our rational animal nature, which excludes that the principles constitutive of human rationality can be merely formal. In contrast to Kantian self-legislation, Aristotelian constructivism emphasizes the interplay between rational and animal nature, focusing especially on training and shaping the affective and sensitive aspects of our nature. In particular, it emphasizes the transformative effects of reflection on passions and desires, and the possibility of developing a ‘second nature’, thanks to complex processes such as habituation, and education (LeBar 2008: 197). The key feature of this account is the claim that practical rationality does not merely direct our affective responses toward adequate objects but also structurally transforms our animal sensibility into character. The relevant norms and their applications to practical reasoning are the work of practical wisdom (phronesis), in conjunction with the excellences of character, as Aristotle suggests (LeBar 2013a).

#### There are two kinds of moral systems: Duty based ethics which ask what I should do, and Agent based ethics which what kind of person should I be, in order to determine the qualities of a good actor. Only agent based ethics gives us a more complete view of ethical life and avoids the internal contradictions of a duty based system.

Stan **Hooft**, Professor of philosophy at Deakin University in Australia, Understanding Virtue Ethics, published November 30, 2005 ///AHS PB

Duty ethics is said to make use of “thin” concepts, whereas virtue ethics uses “thick” concepts. This is an implication of saying that duty ethics uses deontic terms and is primarily concerned with whether an action is right or wrong. These are “thin” concepts because they do not offer us much in the way of a description of the action. We do not learn anything about an action when we describe it as “wrong” except that it is morally forbidden. To say of murder that it is wrong is to give no clue as to what it is about an act of murder that makes it wrong or what it is about the agent that attracts our moral condemnation. Indeed, it might even be a tautology that tells us nothing. Aft er all a “murder” is defined as a wrongful killing of a human being. So to say that murder is wrong is to say something that is true by definition. It gives us no substantive information at all. To describe an action as “courageous” or “generous”, on the other hand, is to convey considerably more information. In the fi rst case it suggests that the situation in which the action was performed was one of danger to the agent. It suggests that the agent acted with fortitude and commitment in the face of that danger. It suggests that such fortitude and commitment are excellent ways of being a human being. In this way, because a lot of meaning is conveyed in it, the word “courageous” is deemed to be a “thick” concept. Virtue terms are generally thick in this way. IV

#### Only Virtue Ethics is capable of solving the problem of regress Greco 11

<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/epistemology-virtue/#Ske>

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According to a familiar skeptical argument, all knowledge must be grounded in good reasons, and this threatens to require an infinite (and impossible) regress of reasons. VE, says Sosa, explains why not all knowledge requires grounding in reasons. Knowledge is true belief grounded in intellectual virtue, and not all intellectual virtues involve grounding in reasons. Some virtues are virtues of reasoning: some intellectual excellences are dispositions to infer conclusions from premises already believed. But not all intellectual excellences are like that. Good memory and accurate perception are intellectual excellences but don't involve inference from believed premises. In healthy human beings, perception reliably produces belief on the basis of perceptual experience, and memory reliably and non-inferentially produces beliefs about the past. Sound reasoning (of various sorts) is also a reliable source of belief, and this explains why sound reasoning is an intellectual virtue. But a virtue theory need not privilege some virtues over others-knowledge is true belief grounded in the intellectual virtues of the knower, reasoning or otherwise. (Sosa 1980)

#### Thus the standard is promoting flourishing through the 6 virtues Peterson & Seligman 1:

Peterson, C., & P., S. M. E. (2004). Character strengths and virtues a handbook and classification. American Psychological Association.

Courage

French philosopher Comte-Sponville (2001), arguing for the universality of courage, reminded us that while fears and the acts to defeat them vary from society to society, the capacity to overcome fear “is always more valued than cowardice or faintheartedness” (p. 44). D. Putnam (1997) offered an inclusive account of courage by delineating three types: physical, moral, and psychological. Physical courage is the type involved in overcoming the fear of physical injury or death in order to save others or oneself. Moral courage entails maintaining ethical integrity or authenticity at the risk of losing friends, employment, privacy, or prestige. Psychological courage includes that sort required to confront a debilitating illness or destructive habit or situation; it is the bravery inherent in facing one’s inner demons. We follow Putnam’s lead and include all three characterizations in the core virtue of courage. We also do not limit our definition to single astonishing acts— chronic courageousness counts, too (see Finfgeld, 1999). This brings us to a perhaps obvious but necessary remark on courage: It has an inner life as well as an outer one. That is, courage is composed of not just observable acts but also the cognitions, emotions, motivations, and decisions that bring them about. Thus, as we examine the ubiquity of courage, although most of the examples that follow are of the physical or soldier-in-battle variety, what we mean abstractly is closer to Cicero’s (1949) definition: Courage is “the deliberate facing of dangers and bearing of toils” (De inventione, II.LIV.163). We mean courage to include physical valor, yes, but also integrity and perseverance—any act of willfully overcoming into what it is so easy to slip: security, comfort, complacency. We mean doing what is right, even when one has much to lose. Or, to return to Comte-Sponville (2001), “Without courage, we cannot hold out against the worst in ourselves or others” (p. 50).

Justice

The core virtue justice, as already stated, refers generally to that which makes life fair. Intuitively, perhaps, that means the equality of everyone. But we are all well aware that life is not fair, and that “some animals are more equal than others,” which is why we need the more pragmatic rendition of justice, that of the laws that give fairness a fair shot (see Rawls, 2001). In Western industrialized nations, justice generally translates to the notion of equity—the belief that rewards should be apportioned according to contributions or merit (Walster, Walster, & Bersheid, 1978) and that people ultimately get what they deserve (M. J. Lerner, 1980). This particular concept of justice is not universal—collectivist cultures tend to prefer the notion of equality or need when making fairness-based decisions (Murphy-Berman & Berman, 2002; Murphy-Berman, Berman, Singh, Pachauri, & Kumar, 1984; Sampson, 1975). However, whether a culture views justice as equity (“everyone agrees that justice in distribution must be in accordance with some kind of merit”; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 2000, 1131a) or equality/need (“from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs”; K. Marx, “Critique of the Gotha Program,” 1875/1977, p. 569), the shared notion is that some standard should be in practice to protect intuitive notions of what is fair (see N. J. Finkel, 1995, 2000). Hence, the exemplars of justice are those that are civic in nature—fairness, leadership, citizenship, and teamwork.

Humanity

Though both may involve improving another’s welfare, we separate the core virtues of justice and humanity. By humanity we are referring to the virtues involved in relating to another—the interpersonal strengths. Certainly justice involves the interpersonal (how could it not?), but it is usually virtuous only when impersonally so (“for fairness’ sake”). Put another way, whereas the virtue of justice lies in impartiality, the virtue of humanity relies on doing more than what is only fair—showing generosity even when an equitable exchange would suffice, kindness even if it cannot (or will not) be returned, and understanding even when punishment is due. Virtues of humanity are rendered within psychology as altruistic or prosocial behavior. Many species, not just primates, appear to behave in ways that reflect altruism (de Waal, 2000; Krebs & Davies, 1993). While there is argument that all altruism is the result of kin protection (Dawkins, 1976; S. E. Taylor, Klein, Lewis, Gruenewald, Gurung, & Updegraff, 2000), social exchange (Foa & Foa, 1975), capitulation to social norms (L. Berkowitz, 1972), or gardenvariety egoism (Cialdini, 1991), other theorists have noted that humans sometimes display altruism where the possibility of any advantageous outcome is quite remote, and suggest that empathy and sympathy underlie such admirable behaviors (Batson, 2001; Knight, Johnson, Carlo, & Eisenberg, 1994; ZahnWaxler, Radke-Yarrow, & King, 1983). Moreover, sympathy can sometimes lead us to violate the principles of fairness, supporting the notion that altruism and justice are independent prosocial motivations (Batson, Klein, Highberger, & Shaw, 1995). Regardless of the real reasons for altruism and prosocial behaviors among humans, the fact remains that we are quite capable of and often willing to engage in acts of generosity, kindness, or benevolence that are consensually recognized and valued and that elevate those who witness them (Haidt, 2000; see also Fredrickson, 2001).

Temperance

“Everything in moderation,” or so the saying goes. Temperance is the virtue of control over excess. Usually the term is used as a signifier for abstinence, particularly from several of the more pleasant appetites—eating, drinking, smoking, sex. We mean the term more generally to include any form of auspicious self-restraint. For instance, temperance translated into psychological terminology becomes self-efficacy or self-regulation, that practiced ability to monitor and manage one’s emotions, motivation, and behavior in the absence of outside help (Bandura, 1997; Kopp & Wyer, 1994), the failure of which leads rather impressively to all sorts of personal and social problems (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994; Block, Gjerde, & Block, 1991; Eisenberg, Fabes, Guthrie, & Reiser, 2000). All this shows, however, is that intemperance is unhealthy, not that temperance is all that great. On the plus side, Baumeister and Exline (2000) stated, “Having strength of character means having the capacity to do what is right and avoid what is wrong. Self-control, when applied to adaptive or virtuous goals, is essentially that capacity” (p. 33). Indeed, children, adolescents, and adults who consistently exercise the muscle of self-control are happier, more productive, and more successful individuals (Eisenberg et al., 2000; Mischel, Shoda, & Peake, 1988; Pintrich, 2000; Tsui & Ashford, 1994; Zimmerman, 2002). Moreover, because the individual benefits of temperance tend to prompt social ones, Heatherton and Vohs (1998) argued for the natural selection of self-control, pointing out that “inhibitions are important for harmonious social interactions, and evolution has undoubtedly favored those who could control undesirable impulses” (p. 212). Thus, temperance is a form of self-denial that is ultimately generous to the self or others—prudence and humility are prime examples.

Transcendence

The transcendent, according to Kant (1781/1998), is that which is beyond human knowledge. We define it here in the broad sense as the connection to something higher—the belief that there is meaning or purpose larger than ourselves. Transcendence, in other words, is the opposite of nihilism, the contention that life has no meaning. In Man’s Search for Meaning, Frankl (1946/1984) described what he termed the self-transcendence of human existence: Being human always points, and is directed, to something, or someone, other than oneself—be it a meaning to fulfill or another human being to encounter. The more one forgets himself—by giving himself to a cause to serve or another person to love—the more human he is and the more he actualizes himself. (p. 133) We follow this lead and separate transcendence from religiosity or even spirituality, although both of the latter concepts are examples of what transcendence means. Whereas religiosity implies connection to formal institutions and spirituality does not, both refer to beliefs and practices regarding the sacred, defined as a divine being, higher power, or ultimate reality (L. K. George, Larson, Koenig, & McCullough, 2000; see also Gallup & Jones, 2000). We believe that what is transcendent does need to be sacred but does not need to be divine. Thus, transcendence can be something or someone earthly that inspires awe, hope, or even gratitude—anything that makes our everyday concerns seem trifling and the self seem small. Transcendnce, in other words, is that which reminds us of how tiny we are but that simultaneously lifts us out of a sense of complete insignificance.

Wisdom

What distinguishes wisdom? It is a type of intelligence but not one synonymous with IQ, g (general intelligence), or academic honors. It is knowledge, yes, but not reducible to the mere sum of books read, or lectures attended, or facts acquired. Perhaps it has something to do with living through hardship, emerging a better person able to share what has been learned with others. “Wisdom,” wrote Kramer (2000), “involves exceptional breadth and depth of knowledge about the conditions of life and human affairs and reflective judgment about the application of this knowledge” (p. 84). According to the researchers at the Berlin Max Planck Institute, wisdom is “good judgment and advice about important but uncertain matters of life” (Baltes & Smith, 1990, p. 87). Erikson (1963) believed wisdom to be the lasting outcome of a favorable resolution of the last psychosocial stage of adult life—ego integrity (acceptance of the triumphs and disappointments of one’s life) versus despair (the ultimate belief that one’s life has been wasted). And Sternberg (1998) argued that wisdom: is involved when practical intelligence is applied to maximizing not just one’s own or someone else’s self-interest, but rather a balance of various self-interests (intrapersonal) with the interests of others (interpersonal) and of other aspects of the context in which one lives (extrapersonal), such as one’s city or country or environment or even God. (p. 354) Hence we define this core virtue as knowledge hard fought for, and then used for good. Wisdom is a form of noble intelligence—in the presence of which no one is resentful and everyone appreciative. The strengths that wisdom encompasses are those entailing the acquisition and use of knowledge into human affairs, such as creativity, curiosity, judgment, and perspective.

#### Prefer additionally:

#### Actionability: Only Virtue Ethics provides both components of moral guidance, the guidance of what to do in a given situation, and the tools to determine what situation warrants action Lindemann 05: Lex FV

[Monica Lindemann, B.A. University of North Texas, “Environmental Education: Ancient Wisdom Applied” 2005 pg 44-46, found at link https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc4859/m2/1/high\_res\_d/thesis.pdf]

One of the major problems that ethical theories face today is to determine the precise connection between the recognition of ethical dilemmas by a moral agent and his subsequent motivation to act. Frequently, philosophers argue, it is not enough for a moral agent to know ethical principles that apply only to universalized situations; something else has to occur for the agent to truly jump into gear. Simply knowing theoretical ethical principles does not provide the agent with the fine-tuned perception necessary to actually recognize a specific situation as deserving of action. This is one of the reasons why rule-based systems of ethics are problematic, as they already assume that the moral agent has discerned ethical salience in a given situation. However, that is not necessarily the case. In other words, knowing that “one should be benevolent to those less fortunate” does not give any specific information as to what action to take when one is faced with a homeless person on the street, for instance. In such a situation, one first has to recognize that the other person has a good of his or her own, is in need, and thus deserving of help. In the same way, the rule does not provide information regarding what form the aid should take: should one simply give the person money for food? Or should one try to help in more profound ways, such as finding him or her a job etc.? All these scenarios already depend on the moral perception of the moral agent; that is, the situation first has to be perceived to be a moral one, for otherwise moral activity is not at all required. As Blum puts it: The point is that perception occurs prior to deliberation, and prior to taking the situation to be one in which one needs to deliberate. It is precisely because the situation is seen in a certain way that the agent takes it as one in which he feels moved to deliberate. Therefore, the significance of moral perception for subsequent action is undeniable. The question now becomes: What is moral perception and how does it develop in a moral agent? Clearly, rules and regulations in and by themselves are not guides to moral perception, since they only prescribe how to act once a moral situation is already perceived as requiring action. Therefore, deontological and utilitarian theories of ethics generally begin too far down the road, as they already presuppose the moral perception of the moral agent. The principles provided can only be applied if the situation has been recognized as a moral one. However, moral perception appears to be a component of the characteristics and dispositions of a person, as they are an integral part of how a person dwells in and interacts with the world. Thus, moral perception, which is essential and prior to any moral judgment, is closely linked to ethical theories of virtue, as the virtues are generally regarded to shape an agent’s understanding of his or her moral environment.

#### Constitutivism: Virtue Ethics is fundamentally constitutive to humans as it is biologically and evolutionarily coded into to us Peterson & Seligman 2:

Peterson, C., & P., S. M. E. (2004). Character strengths and virtues a handbook and classification. American Psychological Association.

To summarize, our survey of influential religious and philosophical traditions reveals six broad virtue classes to be ubiquitous. This conclusion has important implications for our attempt to classify positive traits. Most significantly, we have a nonarbitrary basis for focusing on certain virtues rather than others. Much of the ongoing societal discourse on “character” is tilted in one direction or another by less than universal political and personal values. Although our classification is decidedly about such values, it is descriptive of what is ubiquitous, rather than prescriptive or idiosyncratic. As explained in chapter 1, we use these core virtues to organize our longer list of more specific character strengths. We opt for this strategy for several reasons, including the aforementioned complexity of the general virtues. In each case, we can think of several ways to achieve the general virtue, and our eventual measurement goal led us to focus on these more specific routes (what we term strengths) to the High Six. Thus, the virtue of “humanity” is achieved by the strengths of kindness and generosity on the one hand versus loving and being loved on the other. The virtue of temperance similarly has several routes: modesty and humility, self-control and self-regulation, and prudence and caution. The practical implication of this classification is that it suggests which character strengths are similar and which are not. The ubiquity of these core virtues suggests the possibility of universality and eventually a deep theory about moral excellence phrased in evolutionary terms (Wright, 1994). One possibility is that these are purely cultural: acquired characteristics that long-lived, moneyed, literate, citified societies with massive division of labor select for. Another possibility is that the High Six are purely biological, that they define the “moral animal.” And a third possibility, the one we lean to, is that they are evolutionarily predisposed. These particular styles of behaving may have emerged, been selected for, and been sustained because each allows a crucial survival problem to be solved. Without biologically predisposed mechanisms that allowed our ancestors to generate, recognize, and celebrate corrective virtues, their social groups would have died out quickly. The ubiquitous virtues, we believe, are what allow the human animal to struggle against and to triumph over what is darkest within us.

#### States uniquely use V-Ethics:

**The purpose of the state is to promote virtue, otherwise practical action is impossible.**

Aaron Ross **Powell**, Director and Editor of [Libertarianism.org](http://www.libertarianism.org/), a project of the Cato Institute, The State Through the Lens of Virtue, May 23, **2013**, <https://www.libertarianism.org/blog/state-through-lens-virtue> ///AHS PB

There are two senses in which we might think about the telos of the state. First, **if we create a state at all, we create it to fulfill some purpose**–just like any other tool. The telos of a knife is to cut. The telos of a hammer is to pound nails. The telos of the state is what we made it to accomplish: a well-functioning society. Yet **“the state” doesn’t exist as a thing in itself. Instead it’s a collection of people authorized to behave in certain ways** and with certain authority over the rest of us. So the second way to think about the state’s telos is to look at those people. A doctor is a human, and so has the telos of humans generally: achieving eudaimonia. But “doctor” is also a profession with a purpose of its own: promoting health. Thus the telos of a doctor, when he or she acts in her capacity as a doctor, is health. The profession of doctor brings its own set of situational virtues that don’t necessarily apply outside of doctoring. Agents of the state, then, have the telos of their profession, which will be closely tied–if not identical–to the telos of the broader state-as-tool. These **virtues govern what it means to be a good politician, a good bureaucrat, a good public servant, and so on.**This second sense of the state’s telos addresses a potential concern raised by[methodological individualism](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Methodological_individualism). This is the claim that social phenomena are nothing but the aggregate actions of individuals, and it’s a position libertarians generally accept. Thus to talk about “the state” having virtues or a purpose or needs would seem to violate methodological individualism. But if we instead talk about the telos of those agents vested with the authority of the state, then we’re talking only about individuals, and so avoid the violation. Still, I think it’s probably easier and clearer to just talk about the state’s virtues and the state’s goals, and just assume that what we really mean is the virtues and goals of those individual agents. Okay, so now our state-as-virtue-ethical-entity has a telos. **It exists to enable the well-functioning society. To fulfill that purpose, it needs to act in accord with the virtues, do so with practical wisdom, and have the goods needed for both.**The state’s “virtues” will be those traits crucial to the well-functioning society. Justice is an obvious one. A state that is not motivated by justice and does not seek to create justice in the world will not be a good state. But justice isn’t alone here. A good state will also be fair. It will respect its citizens. And so on. But **even if the “state” has a virtuous character** (i.e., all the people who make decisions about what it’ll do are of right character), **it will also need the practical wisdom to take right action (i.e., action that is actually in accord with the virtues).** As I’ll discuss two posts from now, understanding practical wisdom as it applies to state action is one way to approach Hayek’s knowledge problem. Even if the state has the proper motivations, it lacks the knowledge–and thus the wisdom–to realize its goals. No matter how virtuous economic planners are, they lack sufficient information to adequately plan an economy. A socialist state can never possess practical wisdom. Finally, a state needs whatever goods are required to act in accord with the virtues that apply to it and with the aim of achieving its telos. For example, if one of the state’s proper duties is the provision of police and courts, then it will need some way to pay for them. Otherwise, it won’t attain (that portion of) its telos.

**And intuitions are reliable and form the foundation for all philosophical thought: 1] Every argument is based on an unjustifiable intuitive premise about the world such as pleasure exists(/practical reason/other starting point) exists and 2] We accept and reject moral arguments in relation to preexisting intuitions: IE you wouldn’t except an ethical system that allowed racism even if it was logically justified.**

**Education – Virtue Ethics is uniquely useful in applying philosophy to meaningful social critique. That means that VE is key to actually allowing phil to affect and inform how we live our lives. This precedes and turns any edu impact coming out of the AC. The debate space is itself a social community can be critiqued and changed, and this means that my framework comes as a preq to actually knowing what we ought to do with debate.**

**Accessibility – Virtue Ethics is useful for debate because only it provides a method for the integration of many different pluralistic values stemming from many different cultural and mental ones. This is key for debate b/c it is a highly pluralistic space full of ppl from different backgrounds, which means that VE is key to fostering inclusion in the space for these people**

## Offense

#### Thus we defend the resolution as a general principle

#### Intellectual property runs counter to the virtues of research Opderbeck 07:

Opderbeck, D. W. (2007). A Virtue-Centered approach to the Biotechnology Commons (or, the Virtuous Penguin). SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.945473

Similarly, Pellegrino and Thomasma's concepts of fidelity to trust and self effacement apply directly to biotechnology research. As they note, when a researcher accepts public funds and benefits from public facilities and research-conducive social arrangements, the researcher enters into a "covenant with society in which the primary goods cannot be power, personal profit, prestige, or pride." Such financial and reputational rewards are "external" to the practice of research and ought not to dominate the internal goods such as increasing knowledge and developing useful technology. Moreover, because the research community depends on access to the research of others, a virtuous researcher must be able to balance legitimate self-interest with an understanding that her results should be accessible to others. Pellegrino and Thomasma particularly criticize the "industrial model" of research. As they note, "[g]aining the competitive edge, establishing priority and ownership of information, cornering the market, getting the patent, choosing research topics on their future investment possibilities-these are the values of industry. They encourage the wrong kind of self-interest and frustrate the primary aim of research." A practice such as open access publishing, which embodies an open source ethos, is particularly valuable because it builds on the internal goods of the biotechnology community. In addition, the virtue of justice can play an important role in a virtue ethics approach to biotechnology. Justice as a virtue is "the strict habit of rendering what is due to others." Justice includes the principle of beneficence and the virtue of benevolence, as well as a commitment to social justice. Pellegrino and Thomasma identify "skimming and dumping"-the practice of treating only the best paying patients and not treating the poor-as examples of poor policies that virtuous practitioners should strive to avoid. Similar concerns apply to the biotechnology research community, particularly concerning the allocation of research support.

#### IP actively hurts people through negative innovation, and actively disincentivizes treating the poor Feldman Et al 08/10:

Feldman, R. C., Hyman, D. A., Price, W. N., & Ratain, M. J. (2021). Negative innovation: When patents are bad for patients. Nature Biotechnology, 39(8), 914–916. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41587-021-00999-0

In the health care space, these incentives have resulted in extraordinary success stories, but the same incentives can also result in a range of undesirable consequences, including excessive development of similar (but not better) products (‘me-too drugs’), the focus on drugs for diseases that affect wealthy people and wealthy countries rather than diseases that disproportionately affect the poor and developing nations, and a lack of innovation for types of medicines that may return fewer profits, such as antibiotics. Similarly, drug companies will not research the utility of a known (and hence unpatentable) chemical, since the ability to obtain patent protection is central to their business model. Past literature has highlighted these problems but has largely overlooked the problem of ‘negative innovation’, in which patent law drives innovation into spaces that are affirmatively harmful to patients. By this, we mean scenarios whereby patents create incentives to bring a product to market in a way that is relatively harmful to consumers, and the existence of a patent (and the associated rents) discourages the patentee from taking steps to improve the product so as to prevent the adverse health outcomes. Of course, there are other patent-driven situations of problematic utility, including scenarios that result in purely financial harms, such as drugs that are no better than existing options but are more expensive; scenarios where a small, heightened risk of direct physical harm is offset by lower prices for the drug in question; and scenarios where there is no existing product on the market and inadequate incentives to develop such a product, so any physical harm is the result of the underlying disease or illness. Finally, there is a general concern that inadequate new information about existing products is generated in the current system. All of these scenarios are different in kind from negative innovation, which results in a harmful (but profitable) product. We focus on this dangerous but overlooked space of the patent landscape, wherein patents themselves lead fairly directly to patient harm.

#### Biotech extensively utilizes publicly funded research in their research Cleary et al 18:

Galkina Cleary, E., Beierlein, J. M., Khanuja, N. S., McNamee, L. M., & Ledley, F. D. (2018). Contribution of NIH funding to new drug APPROVALS 2010–2016. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 115(10), 2329–2334. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1715368115

This report shows that NIH funding contributed to published research associated with every one of the 210 new drugs approved by the Food and Drug Administration from 2010–2016. Collectively, this research involved >200,000 years of grant funding totaling more than $100 billion. The analysis shows that >90% of this funding represents basic research related to the biological targets for drug action rather than the drugs themselves. The role of NIH funding thus complements industry research and development, which focuses predominantly on applied research. This work underscores the breath and significance of public investment in the development of new therapeutics and the risk that reduced research funding would slow the pipeline for treating morbid disease.

# UV

#### [1] 1AR theory – a) AFF gets it because otherwise the neg can engage in infinite abuse, making debate impossible, b) drop the debater – the short 1AR irreparably skewed from abuse on substance and time investment on theory c) competing interps – 1AR interps aren’t bidirectional and the neg should have to defend their norm since they have more time. Also, aff theory outweighs neg theory or T: the aff reading theory is a much larger strategic loss because 1 minute of it is ¼ of the 1AR versus 1/7 of the 1NC which means that there is probably more abuse if I’m willing to devote that much more time.

#### [2] a) Give us new 2AR weighing b/c we need it to check back against new 2n weighing, most reciprocal b) We only get 10 minutes of weighing to their 13 without this c) Time crunched 1ar has no time to weigh and cover substance

#### Redefine the aff under T and theory instead of dropping the debater a) substance education - bidirectional T means you can always read frivolous T, destroys the time we get on substance b) time skew, the 1AR can't win theory and substance since it’s so time crunched and the 2NR dumps on whatever I undercover

#### The negative may only garner offense from one theoretical violation – a) k2 education because one shell means we can quickly go back to substance b) checks bad interps because the negative is forced to read an interpretation which is more likely to have actual abuse

#### [3] Reject new paradigm issues or theory interpretations in the 2nr (a) judge intervention – judges have to insert intervention to see if the 2NR shells are true enough to o/w the 2ar CI (b) 6 min 2nr collapse can check back against 1ar abuse since we have to extend offense twice