## 1

#### Permissibility and presumption Negate,

#### 1] unjust implies a prohibition but permissibility is a lack of prohibition which means the neg met their burden of disproving the aff.

#### 2] Safety – It’s ethically safer to presume the squo since we know what the squo is but we can’t know whether the aff will be good or not if ethics are incoherent.

#### 3] Probability – theres infinite ways to disprove the statement this pen is red is false but only one way to prove it true.

#### The standard is consistency with determinism.

#### 1] Thermodynamics – The first law of thermodynamics states energy can neither be created nor destroyed, only converted. Thus, free will, which comes from nothing, can’t translate into physical action.

#### 2] Biology – Every organism has controlled responses to stimuli because of its inherited genes and environment. That applies to humans, i.e. when we cut onions we cry.

#### 3] Physiology – You can always ask why did you take that action? Which would be infinitely regressive. Thus, the only solution is our actions are just complex sets of reflexes. That outweighs, simplest solutions are more likely to be true since theres less room for mistake.

#### 4] Causation – Every effect has a cause by definition, thus free will, which has no cause is illogical.

#### 5] Sociology – Every year, statisticians accurately predict the number of people who get married the next year. This type of data can only be explained through determinism since it shows human behavior is predetermined.

#### 6] Ethics - All frameworks with a bindingness or motivation claim necessitate determinism since that framework would say in a given situation a moral agent must/will act in a specific way. If they deny this justification, it proves their framework triggers permissibility since it’s escapable and can’t guide action.

#### 7] Arbitrariness – if determinism is false then you imply that human acts are random since they aren’t based on any previous cause. Ethics can’t be arbitrary because otherwise it wouldn’t guide action since anything is permissible.

#### 8] The best neuroscientific, psychological, and medical evidence agrees, Lavazza 16

Andrea Lavazza, Neuroethics, Centro Universitario Internazionale, Arezzo, Italy, Free Will and Neuroscience: From Explaining Freedom Away to New Ways of Operationalizing and Measuring It, 2016, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4887467/> ///recut from AHS PB

All these experiments seem to indicate that free will is an illusion. Yet, these relevant experiments can be interpreted in many ways. A possible view is that, in some way, determinism can be observed directly within ourselves. This interpretation might lead to the conclusion that free will is just an illusion. In fact, if one considers as a condition of free will the fact that it should be causa sui (i.e., it should be able to consciously start new causal chains), such a condition is incompatible with determinism as it is usually defined. For it, in fact, all events are linked by casual relations in the form of natural laws, which started long before we were born and which we cannot escape. However, determinism has generally been regarded as a metaphysical claim, not refutable by empirical findings. One could properly talk of automatism in the brain, not of determinism, based on the evidence available. (In any case, endorsing indeterminism might lead to consider our behavior as the causal product of choices that every time produce different results, as if we rolled a dice. This doesn’t seem to make us any freer than if determinism were overturned; cf. Levy, 2011). Most importantly, another feature of freedom seems to be a pure illusion, namely the role of consciousness. The experiments considered thus far heavily question the claim that consciousness actually causes voluntary behavior. Neural activation starts the decisional process culminating in the movement, while consciousness “comes after”, when “things are done”. Therefore, consciousness cannot trigger our voluntary decisions. But the role of consciousness in voluntary choices is part of the definition of free will (but the very definition of consciousness is a matter of debate, cf. Chalmers, 1996). Empirical research in psychology also shows that our mind works and makes choices without our conscious control. As proposed by psychologist Wegner (2002, 2003, 2004) and Aarts et al. (2004), we are “built” to have the impression to consciously control our actions or to have the power to freely choose, even though all that is only a cognitive illusion. Many priming experiments show that people act “mechanically” (even when their behavior might appear suited to the environment and even refined). Automatic cognitive processes, of which we aren’t always aware, originate our decisions, and they were only discovered thanks to the most advanced scientific research. Ultimately, consciousness, which should exercise control and assess the reasons for a choice, is thus allegedly causally ineffective: a mere epiphenomenon, to use the terminology of the philosophy of mind. This is what has been called Zombie Challenge, “based on an amazing wealth of findings in recent cognitive science that demonstrate the surprising ways in which our everyday behavior is controlled by automatic processes that unfold in the complete absence of consciousness” (Vierkant et al., 2013).

#### Negate

#### 1] Obligatory responsibility doesn’t exist because everything is predetermined so the aff is false.

#### 2] Determinism denies the existence of free will which makes willing a moral obligation impossible. Norwitz.

[Michael Norwitz, “Free Will and Determinism,” Philosophy Now, 1991.] SHS ZS

Inwagen presents three premises in his main argument: that **free will is** in fact **incompatible with determinism**, that **moral responsibility is incompatible with** **determinism**, and that (since we have moral responsibility) determinism is false. Hence, he concludes, we have free will. The argument for the first premise runs as follows [p.56]: “**If determinism is true**, then **our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature** and events in the remote past. But **it is not up to us what went on before we were born**, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. **Therefore the consequences of these things** (including our present acts) **are not up to us**.” The argument for the second premise [p. 181]: “**If** (i) **no one is morally responsible for having failed to perform any act**, **and** (ii) **no one is morally responsible for any event**, **and** (iii) **no one is morally responsible for any state of affairs, then there is no such thing as moral responsibility**.” For the third premise van Inwagen does not present a concise summary of his line of argument. He takes it as being self-evident that we have moral responsibility, as we do, after all, continue to hold people morally responsible for their actions.

#### Unjust is defined contrary to justice, absent a conception of justice the resolution is incoherent so negate,

Black’s Laws No Date "What is Unjust?" <https://thelawdictionary.org/unjust/> //Elmer

Contrary to right and justice, or to the enjoyment of his rights by another, or to the standards of conduct furnished by the laws.

## 2

#### Counterplan: States ought to establish a governing authority to distribute property to private entities as outlined in Babcock 21.

#### That solves state of nature and property, Babcock 21

[Hope M. Babcock, 29 October 2021, "22 - Using the Public Trust Doctrine to Manage Property on the Moon", Cambridge University Press, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/cambridge-handbook-of-commons-research-innovations/using-the-public-trust-doctrine-to-manage-property-on-the-moon/18298C56686CA8A396517AB8D217666E, date accessed 1-25-2022] //Lex AT

Having a lottery or an auction of “ownership rights,” or establishing a system of tradable credits might lessen the equity and technical problems with the economic zone management proposal. While an auction theoretically would open up the market in development rights to non spacefaring nations, in practice, only the wealthy nations would be able to effectively bid on and secure those rights.58 However, the idea of tradable credits might work.59 Under an outer space trading system, participant nations, regardless of their space faring capacity, would be allotted a fixed number of resource development credits, allowing the credit holder to extract a certain tonnage of materials or develop a fixed amount of celestial surface, during a specified time period.60 The credits could apply to the amount of the resource a participant was allowed to extract, regardless of location, or could be tied to a particular area of a celestial body. Participants could buy credits from and sell them to other participants.61 The proposal would allow developing nations to benefit from space exploration and exploitation, and participants would run the market reducing the need for an administering international agency. Even though market participants would run the market, an international institution will be needed to allocate tradable credits and devise an allocation methodology that assures non-spacefaring nations receive some benefit. International oversight also will be needed to ensure that nations do not exceed their allotted credits. And tradable credits would need to be anchored by some form of authorization, like a permit, creating another need for a central administrative body. While the idea of tradable development credits is consistent with international law, could assure equitable distribution of the benefits of space development, and provide sufficient incentives for development of these resources, the approach may be too administratively encumbered. The public trust doctrine offers another approach for managing an open access commons. 62 Under this doctrine, the sovereign holds certain common properties in trust in perpetuity for the free and unimpeded use of the general public. The public’s right of access to and use of trust resources is never lost, and neither the government nor private individuals can alienate or otherwise adversely affect those resources unless for a comparable public purpose. Showing its adaptability, supporters of the doctrine are currently arguing in court that it applies to the atmosphere.63 The doctrine places on governments an affirmative, ongoing duty to safeguard the perpetual preservation of trust resources for the benefit of the general public, limiting the sovereign’s power on behalf of both present and future entities. It directs the government not to manage them for private gain and applies to private as well as public resources. Uses of trust resources that are inconsistent with the doctrine can be rescinded. The doctrine effectively places a permanent easement over trust resources that burdens their ownership with an overriding public interest in their preservation. Thus, the public trust doctrine protects the “people’s common heritage,” 64 just as the Moon Treaty protects outer space as part of the common heritage of mankind. A doctrine that imposes an enforceable perpetual duty on the sovereign to preserve trust resources, prevents their alienation for private benefit, and assures public access to them seems a particularly apt property management tool in outer space. The fact that public access to trust resources is so central to the doctrine65 is consistent with international space law’s open access principles. It avoids the problems of alienation and exclusion associated with private property management approaches and does not require the creation of a new administrative authority, as anyone can invoke the doctrine. Of all the management approaches discussed, the public trust doctrine seems the most suited to managing property in outer space. However, the doctrine provides no incentives for development of trust resources.66 Its traditional use has been to curtail development, making it potentially a counter productive solution to the beneficial development of outer space. Allowing limited use of private property management approaches, like tradable development credits, might buffer that effect – a form of overlapping hybridity67 between one type of property, a commons, and a management regime from another, private property, enabled by application of the public trust doctrine. This approach might allow development of outer space, while assuring that it will not just be profitable for a few; rather, space’s development will be sustainable and equitable, ideally for all.

## Case

### Framing

#### Determinism hijacks Kant.

#### 1] Kant says reason is inescapable and agents must always abide by the categorical imperative. That implies determinism since every human always acts in a rational or predictable manner.

#### 2] subjects are deterministic, biological creatures – reason is only instrumental to survival.

Chung [Hun (Professor of Philosophy at the Rochester Institute of Technology). “Understanding Rationality in Hobbes and Hume.” Filozofia, Number 8, pg. 693, 2014, <http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/filozofia/2014/8/687-696.pdf>. 8/14/18]

To this, one might object that the fact that the laws of nature aim for self-preservation and that these laws are discovered by right reason does not, strictly speaking, imply that it is the proper role of reason and rationality to direct one’s ends. Rather, “the laws of nature” is a perfect example that shows how the basic role of reason and rationality is confined to the instrumental role described in clause (b). That is, according to this interpretation, the laws of nature**,** which are discovered by right reason, merely tell people the most effective means to achieve what they most basically want: namely, their own self-preservation.

#### Shmagency objection – this begs the question of why you need to be an agent, you can still have meaning in life without being an agent i.e. mentally disabled people. That’s an indepent voter for inclusion since ur saying disabled ppl cant make ethical decisions or find value in life. Safety ow, you need to be in the activity before anything else.

OV none of their justifications are responsive to determinism because it isn’t concerned on providing a course of action.

On regress, TURN reason is infinitely regressive and circular since you are using reason to justify reason.

On action theory, triggers permissibility, intentions are unverifiable so we can never know what goal you were trying to set bc we can only observe the empirical world that means its impossible to hold people culpable.

On inescapability – a] Emperically denied ppl act based on emotion b] people come to different conclusions when given the same reason c] empirically denied people set bad ends like self harm d] is ought fallacy – just bc we think our ends achieve some goodness doesn’t make them good otherwise it allows contradictions

On space – TURN, I can imagine a world without space. If they deny this arg it proves intentions are unverifiable.

On separateness – TURN intentions can’t construct space in our minds to interpret moral decisions, means ethics is impossible under your FW

On uncertainty – c/a intentions unverifiable and influenced by subjective features like upbringing, culture, identity, etc. SO it can’t unviersalize

Is ought – TURN you just prove we can reason but not why reason is good.

Universalizability – Tailoring objection, Permissibility, no internal link why an action being able to be done by everyone is good, c/a people are different

Ripstein – proves determinism takes out since the only end you can decide on is the one your destiny chooses

Motivations – No people violate the omnilateral will all the time, proven through prisoners dilemma problems WHICH uses reason

Tiberius triggers permissibility – if ethics is always evolving that means the present is alwaysa making wrong decisions also turns ur offense

### Offense

#### Doesn’t prove appropriation of space is intrinsically unjust just that the concept doesn’t exist bc there is currently no state to govern it. Thats consequentialist and triggers presumption. State of nature is also consequentialist bc its reliant on the fact

#### 1] Libertarianism mandates a market-oriented approach to space—that negates

Broker 20 [(Tyler, work has been published in the Gonzaga Law Review, the Albany Law Review and the University of Memphis Law Review.) “Space Law Can Only Be Libertarian Minded,” Above the Law, 1-14-20, <https://abovethelaw.com/2020/01/space-law-can-only-be-libertarian-minded/>] TDI

The impact on human daily life from a transition to the virtually unlimited resource reality of space cannot be overstated. However, when it comes to the law, a minimalist, dare I say libertarian, approach appears as the only applicable system. In the words of NASA, “2020 promises to be a big year for space exploration.” Yet, as Rand Simberg points out in Reason magazine, it is actually private American investment that is currently moving space exploration to “a pace unseen since the 1960s.” According to Simberg, due to this increase in private investment “We are now on the verge of getting affordable private access to orbit for large masses of payload and people.” The impact of that type of affordable travel into space might sound sensational to some, but in reality the benefits that space can offer are far greater than any benefit currently attributed to any major policy proposal being discussed at the national level. The sheer amount of resources available within our current reach/capabilities simply speaks for itself. However, although those new realities will, as Simberg says, “bring to the fore a lot of ideological issues that up to now were just theoretical,” I believe it will also eliminate many economic and legal distinctions we currently utilize today. For example, the sheer number of resources we can already obtain in space means that in the rapidly near future, the distinction between a nonpublic good or a public good will be rendered meaningless. In other words, because the resources available within our solar system exist in such quantities, all goods will become nonrivalrous in their consumption and nonexcludable in their distribution. This would mean government engagement in the public provision of a nonpublic good, even at the trivial level, or what Kevin Williamson defines as socialism, is rendered meaningless or impossible. In fact, in space, I fail to see how any government could even try to legally compel collectivism in the way Simberg fears. Similar to many economic distinctions, however, it appears that many laws, both the good and the bad, will also be rendered meaningless as soon as we begin to utilize the resources within our solar system. For example, if every human being is given access to the resources that allows them to replicate anything anyone else has, or replace anything “taken” from them instantly, what would be the point of theft laws? If you had virtually infinite space in which you can build what we would now call luxurious livable quarters, all without exploiting human labor or fragile Earth ecosystems when you do it, what sense would most property, employment, or commercial law make? Again, this is not a pipe dream, no matter how much our population grows for the next several millennia, the amount of resources within our solar system can sustain such an existence for every human being. Rather than panicking about the future, we should try embracing it, or at least meaningfully preparing for it. Currently, the Outer Space Treaty, or as some call it “the Magna Carta of Space,” is silent on the issue of whether private individuals or corporate entities can own territory in space. Regardless of whether governments allow it, however, private citizens are currently obtaining the ability to travel there, and if human history is any indicator, private homesteading will follow, flag or no flag. We Americans know this is how a Wild West starts, where most regulation becomes the impractical pipe dream. But again, this would be a Wild West where the exploitation of human labor and fragile Earth ecosystem makes no economic sense, where every single human can be granted access to resources that even the wealthiest among us now would envy, and where innovation and imagination become the only things we would recognize as currency. Only a libertarian-type system, that guarantees basic individual rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness could be valued and therefore human fidelity to a set of laws made possible, in such an existence.

#### 2] Forbidding ownership of unowned property is a form of restricting freedom.

Feser 2, (Edward Feser, 1-1-2005, accessed on 12-15-2021, Cambridge University Press, "THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN UNJUST INITIAL ACQUISITION | Social Philosophy and Policy | Cambridge Core", Edward C. Feser is an American philosopher. He is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College in Pasadena, California. [https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)[brackets](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)%5bbrackets) for gen lang]//phs st

There is. An alternative, soft-line approach could acknowledge that the initial acquirer who abuses a monopoly over a water hole (or any similar crucial resource) does commit an injustice against those who are disad- vantaged, but such an approach could still hold that the acquirer never- theless has not committed an injustice in acquisition —his acquisition was, as I have said, neither just nor unjust. Nor does he fail to own what he has acquired; he still cannot be said to have stolen the water from anyone. Rather, his injustice is an unjust use of what he owns, on a par with the unjust use I make of my self-owned fist when I wield it, unprovoked, to bop you on your self-owned nose. In what sense does the water-hole owner use his water unjustly, though? He doesn’t try to drown anyone in it, after all— indeed, the whole problem is that he won’t let anybody near it! Eric Mack gives us the answer we need in what he has put forward as the “self-ownership proviso” (SOP).28 This is a proviso not (as the Lock- ean proviso is) on the initial acquisition of property, but rather on how one can use his property in a way that respects others’ self-ownership rights. It is motivated by consideration of the fact that the talents, abilities, capac- ities, energies, etc., that a person rightfully possesses as a self-owner are inherently “world-interactive”; that is, it is of their very essence that they are directed toward the extra-personal environment.29 Your capacity to use your hand, for instance, is just a capacity to grasp and manipulate external objects; thus, what you own in owning your hand is something essentially grasping and manipulating.30 Now if someone were to cut off your hand or invasively keep you from using it (by tying your arm against your body or holding it behind your back), he would obviously be violating your self-ownership rights. But there are, Mack suggests, other, noninvasive ways in which those rights might be violated. If, to use an example of Mack’s, I effectively nullify your ability to use your hand by creating a device that causes anything you reach for to be propelled beyond your grasp, making it impossible for you ever to grasp or manip- ulate anything, I have violated your right to your hand as much as if I had cut it off or tied it down. I have, in any case, prevented your right to your hand from being anything more than a formal right, one that is practically useless. In the interests of guaranteeing respect for substantive, robust rights of self-ownership, then, “[t]he SOP requires that persons not deploy their legitimate holdings, i.e., their extra-personal property, in ways that severely, albeit noninvasively, disable any person’s world-interactive powers.” 31 The SOP follows, in Mack’s view, from the thesis of self-ownership itself; or, at any rate, the considerations that would lead anyone to accept that thesis should also, in his view, lead one to accept the proviso.32 A brief summary of a few of Mack’s thought experiments should suffice to give a sense of why this is so.33 In what Mack calls the Adam’s Island example, Adam acquires a previously uninhabited island and later refuses a shipwrecked Zelda permission to come ashore, as a result of which she remains struggling at sea (and presumably drowns). In the Paternalist Caging example, instead of drowning, Zelda becomes caught offshore in a cage Adam has constructed for catching large sea mammals, and, rather than releasing her, Adam keeps her in the cage and feeds her regularly. In the Knuckle-Scraper Barrier example, Zelda falls asleep on some unowned ground, whereupon a gang of oafish louts encircles her and, using their bodies and arms as barriers, refuses to let her out of the circle (accusing her of assault if she touches them in order to climb over or break through). In the Disabling Property Barrier example, instead of a human barrier, Adam constructs a plastic shield over and around the unowned plot of ground upon which Zelda sleeps, accusing her of trespassing upon his property when she awakens and tries to escape by breaking through the plastic. And in the (similarly named) Disabling Property Barriers example, seem to suggest an Aristotelian-Thomistic conception of natural function, and though this by no means troubles me, it might not be what Mack himself has in mind (nor, of course, is it something every philosopher is going to sympathize with). Mack’s view nevertheless seems to require something like this conception. And something like it —enough like it to do the job Mack needs to be done, anyway—is arguably to be found in Larry Wright’s well- known reconstruction, in modern Darwinian terms, of the traditional notion of natural function. See Larry Wright, “Functions,” Philosophical Review 82, no. 2 (1973): 139–68. Adam, instead of enclosing Zelda in a plastic barrier, encloses in plastic barriers every external object that Zelda would otherwise be able to use — thus, in effect, enclosing her in a larger, all-encompassing plastic barrier of a more eccentric shape. In all of these cases, Mack says, although Zelda’s formal rights of self-ownership have not been violated—no one has invaded the area enclosed by the surface of her skin —her rights over her self-owned powers, and in particular her ability to exercise those powers, have nevertheless been nullified. But a plausible self-ownership- based theory surely cannot allow for this. It cannot, for instance, allow the innocent Zelda justly to be imprisoned in any of the ways described! If Mack is right, then it seems we have, in the SOP, grounds for holding that a water-hole monopolist would indeed be committing an injustice against anyone he refuses water to, or to whom he charges exorbitant prices for access. The injustice would be a straightforward violation of a person’s rights to self-ownership, a case of nullifying a person’s self- owned powers in a way analogous to Adam’s or the knuckle-scrapers’ nullification of Zelda’s self-owned powers. It would not be an injustice in initial acquisition, however. The water-hole monopolist still owns the water hole as much as he ever did; he just cannot use it in a way that violates other individuals’ self-ownership rights (either by drowning them in it or by nullifying their self-owned powers by denying them access to it when there is no alternative way for them to gain access to the water necessary for the use of their self-owned powers). Is Mack right? The hard-liner might dig in his heels and insist that none of Mack’s examples amount to self-ownership-violating injustices; instead, they are merely subtle but straightforward property rights violations or cases of moral failings of various other sorts (cruelty, selfishness, etc.). The Adam’s Island case, for starters, is roughly analogous to the example of the water-hole monopolist, so that it arguably cannot give any non-question- begging support to the SOP, if the SOP is then supposed to show that the water-hole example involves an injustice. The Disabling Property Barriers case might also be viewed as unable to provide any non-question-begging support, since Adam’s encasing everything in plastic might plausibly be interpreted as his acquiring everything, in which case we are back to a water-hole-type monopoly example. The Knuckle-Scraper Barrier and Dis- abling Property Barrier examples might be explained by saying that in falling asleep on the unowned plot of land, Zelda in effect has come (at least temporarily) to acquire it, and (by virtue of walking) to acquire also the path she took to get to it, so that the knuckle-scrapers and Adam violate her property rights (not her self-ownership rights) in not allowing her to escape. The Paternalist Caging example can perhaps be explained by arguing that in building the cage, Adam has acquired the water route leading to it, so that in swimming this route (and thus getting caught in the cage) Zelda has violated his property rights and, therefore, can justly be caged. Accordingly, the hard-liner might insist, we can explain all of these examples in a hard-line way and thus avoid commitment to the SOP. Such a hard-line response would be ingenious (well, maybe), but still, I think, ultimately doomed to failure. Can the Paternalist Caging example, to start with, plausibly be explained away in the manner that I have suggested? Does Adam commit no injustice against Zelda even if he never lets her out? It will not do to write this off merely as a case of excessive punishment (explaining the injustice of which would presumably not require commitment to the SOP). For suppose Adam says, after a mere five minutes of confinement, “I’m no longer punishing you; you’ve paid your debt and are free to go, as far as I’m concerned. But I’m not going to bother exerting the effort to let you out. I never forced you to get in the cage, after all —you did it on your own —and you have no right to the use of my self-owned cage-opening powers to fix your mistake! So teleport out, if you can. Or get someone else —if you can find someone —to let you out.” Adam would be neither violating Zelda’s rights to external property nor excessively punishing her in this case; nor would he be invasively vio- lating her self-ownership rights. But wouldn’t he still be committing an injustice, however noninvasively? Don’t we need something like the SOP to explain why this is so? The barrier examples, for their part, do not require Zelda’s walking and falling asleep on virgin territory, which thus (arguably) becomes her prop- erty. We can, to appeal to the sort of science-fiction scenario beloved of philosophers, imagine instead a bizarre chance disruption of the structure of space-time that teleports Zelda into Adam’s plastic shell or into the midst of the knuckle-scrapers. There is no question now of their violating her property rights; yet don’t they still commit an injustice by nullifying her self-owned powers in refusing to allow her to exit? Consider a parallel example concerning property ownership itself. If your prized $50,000 copy of Captain America Comics number 1, due to another rupture in space-time or just to a particularly strong wind that blows it out of your hands and through my window, suddenly appears on the floor of my living room, do I have the right to refuse to bring it back out to you or to allow you to come in and get it? Suppose I attempt to justify my refusal by saying, “I won’t touch it, and you’re free to have it back if you can arrange another space-time rupture or gust of wind. But I refuse to exert my self-owned powers to bring it out to you, or to allow you on my property to get it. I never asked for it to appear in my living room, after all!” Would anyone accept this justification? Doesn’t your property right in the comic book require me to give it back to you? The hard-liner might suggest that this example transports the SOP advocate out of the frying pan and into the fire. For if the SOP is true, wouldn’t we also have to commit ourselves to a “property-ownership proviso” (POP) that requires us not to nullify anyone’s ability to use his external private property in a way consistent with its “world-interactive powers”? If I build a miniature submarine in my garage, and you have the only swimming pool within one thousand miles, must you allow me the use of your pool lest you nullify my ability to use the sub? If (to take an example of Cohen’s cited by Mack) I own a corkscrew, must I be provided with wine bottles to open lest the corkscrew sadly fail to fulfill its full potential?34 Mack’s response to this line of thought seems basically to amount to a bit of backpedaling on the claim that his proviso really follows from the notion of self-ownership per se —so as to avoid the conclusion that a (rather unlibertarian and presumably redistributionist) POP would also, in par- allel fashion, follow from the concept of property ownership. His response seems, instead, to emphasize the idea that the considerations favoring self-ownership also favor, via an independent line of reasoning, the SOP.35 In my view, however, a better response would be one that took note of some relevant disanalogies between property in oneself and property in external things. Note first that the self-owned world-interactive powers, the possible use of which the SOP is intended to guarantee, are possessed by a living being who is undergoing development, which involves passing through various stages; therefore, these powers are ones that flourish with use and atrophy or even disappear with disuse.36 To nullify these powers even for a limited time, then, is (very often at least) not merely temporarily to inconvenience their owner, but, rather, to bring about a permanent reduc- tion or even disablement of these powers. By contrast, a submarine (or a corkscrew) retains its powers even when left indefinitely in a garage (or a drawer). This difference in the effect that nullification has on self-owned powers versus extra-personal property plausibly justifies a difference in our judgments concerning the acceptability, from the point of view of justice, of such nullification in the two cases; that is, it justifies adoption of the SOP but not of the POP.37 Second, there is an element of choice (and in particular, of voluntary acquisition) where extra-personal property is concerned that is morally relevant here. One’s self-owned powers, along with the SOP-guaranteed right to the non-nullification of those powers, are not something one chooses or acquires; one just has them —indeed, to a great degree one just is the constellation of those powers, abilities, etc.—and owns them fully. By contrast, extra-personal property is something one chooses to acquire or not to acquire, and as we have seen, one always acquires property rights in various degrees, from partial to full ownership—and this would include the rights guaranteed by a POP. If one chooses to acquire a corkscrew under conditions where wine bottles are unavailable, or are even likely at some point to become unavailable, one can hardly blame others if one finds oneself bottle-less. To fail to acquire POP-like rights regarding the corkscrew (by, say, contracting with someone else to provide one with wine bottles in perpetuity) is not the same thing as to have those rights and then have them violated. Someone who buys a corkscrew and then finds that he cannot use it is like the person who acquires only partial property rights in a water hole that others have already acquired partial use rights over. He cannot complain that his co-owners have violated his rights; he never acquired those other rights in the first place. Similarly, the corkscrew owner cannot complain that he has no bottles to open; he never acquired the right to those bottles, only to the corkscrew. If full ownership of a corkscrew requires POP-like rights over it, then all that follows is that corkscrew owners who lack bottles are not full owners of their corkscrews.

#### 3] Space appropriation and exploration originates from private companies such as Space X and Blue Origin. Preventing such is a restriction on the ability of companies to set and pursue their ends and these companies gain contracts with the government for projects which turns promise breaking offense.