


## 1

#### Interp: Debaters must disclose tournaments on the 2021-2022 NDCA LD wiki under the actual name of the tournament on tabroom for every round at said tournament. To clarify- when you look up the tournament name from the wiki on tab, the entry must pop up


#### Violation – They put ‘emory’ in their tournament entries but when you search up ‘emory’ on tab, nothing comes up that Nick went to with these pairings. Screenshots in the doc.







Shows I meet




#### Inclusion, 2 internal links-

#### 1] you make the debate space inacessible to small school debaters and novices who compete on the circuit but don’t have knowledge of lingo in order to know what tournament is what. The ability to see the round on tab is uniquely key a) means that debaters can see if you won or lost while you went for a specific argument and your opponent went for another one. They know what you are good at and what your weaknesses are. B) debaters can see what speaks the judge gave you, which provides at least some standard for how well you debated going for x thing.

#### 2] People will never be able to go to new tournaments if they don’t know what the tournament is, if they like your arguments and others who have read similar ones at the tournament, they cant sign up, two reasons a) cant see logistical details like how many people, how much it costs, which controls whether or not they can go to the tournament, even if they somehow knew those things, they lack the ability to find the tab page to enter on. Inclusion ow, other impacts assume that you have the ability to access the round in the first place. Reject reasonability on inclusion impacts- 1% of exclusion is still terrible and enough to affirm on

#### Reject every reason why disclosure is bad- you concede to the validitiy of putting tournament names by putting it on your wiki in the first,

#### They will say the shell is arbitrary but literal wiki rules prove otherwise, the wiki wont let you disclose a round without a valid tournament name



#### Fairness straight turns the aff and answers their ROTB arguments

Bjerg, 11—Department of Management, Politics and Philosophy, Copenhagen Business School (Ole, *Poker: the parody of capitalism* pg 190-198)

In order to understand the conceptual difference, it is important to note that when Baudrillard speaks of the law, he is not referring to law only in the strictly judicial meaning of the term. Baudrillard is rather drawing on a psychoanalytical tradition from Freud and Lacan in which the concept of law stands for any kind of social regularity, such as prohibitions, norms, values, morals, conventions, and so on, that structures the way we act and construct meaning in society. Law constitutes the social order of society. Viewed from the perspective of an individual immersed in the daily life of society, the difference between the law of society and the rule of the game is a difference between necessity and arbitrariness. The law consists not only of a series of prohibitions and norms. It carries also an account of the justification and rationality of the law. The law tells us not only what we should and should not do; it tells us also why we should or should not do this or that. The law claims to be valid and necessary regardless of the opinions held by the individual subject included in the law. The necessity of law is founded on transcendence. This may be the transcendence of a religious order, a principle of reason and rationality, or a system of tradition. In any case the law justifies itself with reference to some order beyond the immediate content of itself. Contrary to the law, the game and the rule are characterized by their arbitrariness. The rule claims no justification beyond its immediate appearance. It does not profess to represent a higher religious order or rational principle. In this way the rule is purely immanent to the game. Furthermore, the rule tells the subject engaged in the game what to do and not to do, but it does not give him [them] any reasons why he [they] should follow the rule. When asked, the rule provides no other justification for itself than the mere reference to the game itself: “Because these are the rules of the game!” Baudrillard sums up the difference between the rule and the law: “The Rule plays on an immanent sequence of arbitrary signs, while the Law is based on a transcendent sequence of necessary signs.”4 Think of the very simple game you can play when walking on the street in which you are not allowed to step on the lines between the flags of the pavement. The game is instituted by the invocation of the rule “Don’t step on the lines!” This rule is purely arbitrary. The game could be played just as well with the complete opposite rule: “You must step on a line for every single step you take!” Furthermore, the rule gives no reason that it should be followed. It has no “formal, moral or psychological structure or superstructure”5 to support its functioning. The functioning of the game is dependent on the voluntary submission to the rule by the players engaging in the game. Compare this to the traffic regulations prescribed by law: “Don’t walk in the street.” “Cross the street only at the green light.” These regulations apply unconditionally and must be obeyed by anyone regardless of whether he wants [they want] to or not. Traffic regulations come with a series of explicit and implicit reasons why they should be followed, for instance, that they secure the social order of the traffic situation for the safety of everyone. The transcendence of law makes the validity of law unconditional. It is not up to the individual subject of law to decide whether he wants to submit to the law or not. Conversely, the purely arbitrary character of the rule sets free the subject and leaves it up to the individual whether he [they] wants to participate in the game and become obliged by the rules of the game or not. In Homo Ludens Huizinga indeed proposes voluntariness and freedom as the first in his list of characteristics of play.6 “because it’s fun” Law as understood by Baudrillard not only constitutes society. In the psychoanalytic tradition that Baudrillard is drawing on, law also plays a crucial role in the very constitution of the subject. To be a subject is to be subject to law. Without law, there would be no subject. At first glance, law manifests itself as a prohibition banning our access to certain objects and acts. We may think of the law as an institution necessary in order to discipline our wild and otherwise uncontrolled desires for different forbidden things such as other people’s property (Thou shalt not steal) or transgressive sexual acts (Thou shalt not commit adultery). In this line of thinking, a society without law would be an anarchical allagainst-all with everybody satisfying her every desire at the expense of everybody else. However, working along similar lines as Baudrillard, Zizek argues that law has also the latent function of structuring our very being as subjects since the law is what institutes our desires in the first place. When the law tells us not to do this or that, it carries an underlying fantasmatic message promising that beyond the prohibition of the law lie the objects that may satisfy the desire of the subject. Inherent in the law is the fantasy of what might happen if the law was not there to prevent me from pursuing my immediate desires. As was the case with the concept of law, it is important to note that the concept of fantasy differs from its usual meaning. Here is how Zizek explains the term: Fantasy is usually c]onceived as a scenario that realizes the subject’s desire. This elementary definition is quite adequate, on condition that we take it literally, what the fantasy stages is not a scene in which our desire is fulfilled, fully satisfied, but on the contrary, a scene that realizes, stages, the desire as such. The fundamental point of psychoanalysis is that desire is not something given in advance, but something that has to be constructed—and it is precisely the role of fantasy to give the coordinates of the subject’s desire, to specify its object, to locate the position the subject assumes in it. It is only through fantasy that the subject is constituted as desiring: through fantasy, we learn how to desire.7 Based on this understanding, Zizek often uses the concept of fantasy in conjunction with the concept of ideology.8 Only on a very superficial level is fantasy opposed to law in the sense that we fantasize about the transgression or even the abolition of law. We might think here of consumerist fantasies of the kind where we imagine gaining access to products that we cannot afford to buy: “If only the law of property or the law of equivalences did not prevent me from having this sweater or that car I would . . .” On another level, fantasy and law work together in structuring the desire of the subject. By restraining the subject’s access to the objects of desire designated by fantasy, law prevents the subject from realizing that the qualities and possibilities for enjoyment imagined to belong to the object are in fact projections of the subject’s own fantasy. In this way, the different laws of the market restraining our access to consumer goods are the condition of possibility for the fantasmatic projections about the amount of happiness, enjoyment, and fulfillment we would attain if we had free and unlimited access to these goods.

Don’t allow crossaps from case A) Fairness acts as an epistemic filter – I wasn’t given a fair shot to answer your arguments so we don’t know if they are true B) the shell indicts the aff so weighing it just proves the abuse

Fairness is a voter a) it’s an intrinsic good – debate is fundamentally a game proven by wins, losses and speaker points which proves its inescapable b) probability – debate can’t alter subjectivity, but it can rectify skews which means the only impact to a ballot is fairness and deciding who wins, c] it link turns the aff – your role of the ballot is to promote discussion but unfairness means the debate turns into a one sided monologue. D] if they don’t care about fairness vote against them since they don’t care if their arguments are evaluated fairly

Procedural fairness outweighs structural A) it makes debate more fair for everybody so its most accessible overall B) it’s the only thing we have control over because we cant control out of round factors.

#### DTD- dta illogical, time skew

#### No RVI’s- illogical, baiting

#### CI- race to top, intervention

Norming outweighs – a] end goal of theory b] controls internal link to in round

NC theory first – 1] Norming, spillover verified 2] Scope – disclosure impacts out of round

## 2

#### Space Commercialization drives Tech Innovation in the Status Quo – it provides a unique impetus.

Hampson 17 Joshua Hampson 1-25-2017 “The Future of Space Commercialization” <https://republicans-science.house.gov/sites/republicans.science.house.gov/files/documents/TheFutureofSpaceCommercializationFinal.pdf> (Security Studies Fellow at the Niskanen Center)//Elmer

The size of the space economy is far larger than many may think. In 2015 alone, the global market amounted to $323 billion. Commercial infrastructure and systems accounted for 76 percent of that 9 total, with satellite television the largest subsection at $95 billion. The global space launch market’s 10 11 share of that total came in at $6 billion dollars. It can be hard to disaggregate how space benefits 12 particular national economies, but in 2009 (the last available report), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) estimated that commercial space transportation and enabled industries generated $208.3 billion in economic activity in the United States alone. Space is not just about 13 satellite television and global transportation; while not commercial, GPS satellites also underpin personal navigation, such as smartphone GPS use, and timing data used for Internet coordination.14 Without that data, there could be problems for a range of Internet and cloud-based services.15 There is also room for growth. The FAA has noted that while the commercial launch sector has not grown dramatically in the last decade, there are indications that there is latent demand. This 16 demand may catalyze an increase in launches and growth of the wider space economy in the next decade. The Satellite Industry Association’s 2015 report highlighted that their section of the space economy outgrew both the American and global economies. The FAA anticipates that growth to 17 continue, with expectations that small payload launch will be a particular industry driver.18 In the future, emerging space industries may contribute even more the American economy. Space tourism and resource recovery—e.g., mining on planets, moons , and asteroids—in particular may become large parts of that industry. Of course, their viability rests on a range of factors, including costs, future regulation, international problems, and assumptions about technological development. However, there is increasing optimism in these areas of economic production. But the space economy is not just about what happens in orbit, or how that alters life on the ground. The growth of this economy can also contribute to new innovations across all walks of life. Technological Innovation Innovation is generally hard to predict; some new technologies seem to come out of nowhere and others only take off when paired with a new application. It is difficult to predict the future, but it is reasonable to expect that a growing space economy would open opportunities for technological and organizational innovation. In terms of technology, the difficult environment of outer space helps incentivize progress along the margins. Because each object launched into orbit costs a significant amount of money—at the moment between $27,000 and $43,000 per pound, though that will likely drop in the future —each 19 reduction in payload size saves money or means more can be launched. At the same time, the ability to fit more capability into a smaller satellite opens outer space to actors that previously were priced out of the market. This is one of the reasons why small, affordable satellites are increasingly pursued by companies or organizations that cannot afford to launch larger traditional satellites. These small 20 satellites also provide non-traditional launchers, such as engineering students or prototypers, the opportunity to learn about satellite production and test new technologies before working on a full-sized satellite. That expansion of developers, experimenters, and testers cannot but help increase innovation opportunities. Technological developments from outer space have been applied to terrestrial life since the earliest days of space exploration. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) maintains a website that lists technologies that have spun off from such research projects. Lightweight 21 nanotubes, useful in protecting astronauts during space exploration, are now being tested for applications in emergency response gear and electrical insulation. The need for certainty about the resiliency of materials used in space led to the development of an analytics tool useful across a range of industries. Temper foam, the material used in memory-foam pillows, was developed for NASA for seat covers. As more companies pursue their own space goals, more innovations will likely come from the commercial sector. Outer space is not just a catalyst for technological development. Satellite constellations and their unique line-of-sight vantage point can provide new perspectives to old industries. Deploying satellites into low-Earth orbit, as Facebook wants to do, can connect large, previously-unreached swathes of 22 humanity to the Internet. Remote sensing technology could change how whole industries operate, such as crop monitoring, herd management, crisis response, and land evaluation, among others. 23 While satellites cannot provide all essential information for some of these industries, they can fill in some useful gaps and work as part of a wider system of tools. Space infrastructure, in helping to change how people connect and perceive Earth, could help spark innovations on the ground as well. These innovations, changes to global networks, and new opportunities could lead to wider economic growth.

#### Strong Innovation solves Extinction.

Matthews 18 Dylan Matthews 10-26-2018 “How to help people millions of years from now” <https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/26/18023366/far-future-effective-altruism-existential-risk-doing-good> (Co-founder of Vox, citing Nick Beckstead @ Rutgers University)//Re-cut by Elmer

If you care about improving human lives, you should overwhelmingly care about those quadrillions of lives rather than the comparatively small number of people alive today. The 7.6 billion people now living, after all, amount to less than 0.003 percent of the population that will live in the future. It’s reasonable to suggest that those quadrillions of future people have, accordingly, hundreds of thousands of times more moral weight than those of us living here today do. That’s the basic argument behind Nick Beckstead’s 2013 Rutgers philosophy dissertation, “On the overwhelming importance of shaping the far future.” It’s a glorious mindfuck of a thesis, not least because Beckstead shows very convincingly that this is a conclusion any plausible moral view would reach. It’s not just something that weird utilitarians have to deal with. And Beckstead, to his considerable credit, walks the walk on this. He works at the Open Philanthropy Project on grants relating to the far future and runs a charitable fund for donors who want to prioritize the far future. And arguments from him and others have turned “long-termism” into a very vibrant, important strand of the effective altruism community. But what does prioritizing the far future even mean? The most literal thing it could mean is preventing human extinction, to ensure that the species persists as long as possible. For the long-term-focused effective altruists I know, that typically means identifying concrete threats to humanity’s continued existence — like unfriendly artificial intelligence, or a pandemic, or global warming/out of control geoengineering — and engaging in activities to prevent that specific eventuality. But in a set of slides he made in 2013, Beckstead makes a compelling case that while that’s certainly part of what caring about the far future entails, approaches that address specific threats to humanity (which he calls “targeted” approaches to the far future) have to complement “broad” approaches, where instead of trying to predict what’s going to kill us all, you just generally try to keep civilization running as best it can, so that it is, as a whole, well-equipped to deal with potential extinction events in the future, not just in 2030 or 2040 but in 3500 or 95000 or even 37 million. In other words, caring about the far future doesn’t mean just paying attention to low-probability risks of total annihilation; it also means acting on pressing needs now. For example: We’re going to be better prepared to prevent extinction from AI or a supervirus or global warming if society as a whole makes a lot of scientific progress. And a significant bottleneck there is that the vast majority of humanity doesn’t get high-enough-quality education to engage in scientific research, if they want to, which reduces the **odds that we have enough trained scientists to come up with the breakthroughs** we need as a civilization to survive and thrive. So maybe one of the best things we can do for the far future is to improve school systems — here and now — to harness the group economist Raj Chetty calls “lost Einsteins” (potential innovators who are thwarted by poverty and inequality in rich countries) and, more importantly, the hundreds of millions of kids in developing countries dealing with even worse education systems than those in depressed communities in the rich world. What if living ethically for the far future means living ethically now? Beckstead mentions some other broad, or very broad, ideas (these are all his descriptions): Help make computers faster so that people everywhere can work more efficiently Change intellectual property law so that technological innovation can happen more quickly Advocate for open borders so that people from poorly governed countries can move to better-governed countries and be more productive Meta-research: improve incentives and norms in academic work to better advance human knowledge Improve education Advocate for political party X to make future people have values more like political party X ”If you look at these areas (economic growth and technological progress, access to information, individual capability, social coordination, motives) a lot of everyday good works contribute,” Beckstead writes. “An implication of this is that a lot of everyday good works are good from a broad perspective, even though hardly anyone thinks explicitly in terms of far future standards.” Look at those examples again: It’s just a list of what normal altruistically motivated people, not effective altruism folks, generally do. Charities in the US love talking about the lost opportunities for innovation that poverty creates. Lots of smart people who want to make a difference become scientists, or try to work as teachers or on improving education policy, and lord knows there are plenty of people who become political party operatives out of a conviction that the moral consequences of the party’s platform are good. All of which is to say: Maybe effective altruists aren’t that special, or at least maybe we don’t have access to that many specific and weird conclusions about how best to help the world. If the far future is what matters, and generally trying to make the world work better is among the best ways to help the far future, then effective altruism just becomes plain ol’ do-goodery.

#### Extinction.

Specktor 19 [Brandon; writes about the science of everyday life for Live Science, and previously for Reader's Digest magazine, where he served as an editor for five years; "Human Civilization Will Crumble by 2050 If We Don't Stop Climate Change Now, New Paper Claims," livescience, 6/4/19; <https://www.livescience.com/65633-climate-change-dooms-humans-by-2050.html>] Justin

The current climate crisis, they say, is larger and more complex than any humans have ever dealt with before. General climate models — like the one that the [United Nations' Panel on Climate Change](https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/) (IPCC) used in 2018 to predict that a global temperature increase of 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit (2 degrees Celsius) could put hundreds of millions of people at risk — fail to account for the **sheer complexity of Earth's many interlinked geological processes**; as such, they fail to adequately predict the scale of the potential consequences. The truth, the authors wrote, is probably far worse than any models can fathom. How the world ends What might an accurate worst-case picture of the planet's climate-addled future actually look like, then? The authors provide one particularly grim scenario that begins with world governments "politely ignoring" the advice of scientists and the will of the public to decarbonize the economy (finding alternative energy sources), resulting in a global temperature increase 5.4 F (3 C) by the year 2050. At this point, the world's ice sheets vanish; brutal droughts kill many of the trees in the [Amazon rainforest](https://www.livescience.com/57266-amazon-river.html) (removing one of the world's largest carbon offsets); and the planet plunges into a feedback loop of ever-hotter, ever-deadlier conditions. "Thirty-five percent of the global land area, and **55 percent of the global population, are subject to more than 20 days a year of** [lethal heat conditions](https://www.livescience.com/55129-how-heat-waves-kill-so-quickly.html), beyond the threshold of human survivability," the authors hypothesized. Meanwhile, droughts, floods and wildfires regularly ravage the land. Nearly **one-third of the world's land surface turns to desert**. Entire **ecosystems collapse**, beginning with the **planet's coral reefs**, the **rainforest and the Arctic ice sheets.** The world's tropics are hit hardest by these new climate extremes, destroying the region's agriculture and turning more than 1 billion people into refugees. This mass movement of refugees — coupled with [shrinking coastlines](https://www.livescience.com/51990-sea-level-rise-unknowns.html) and severe drops in food and water availability — begin to stress the fabric of the world's largest nations, including the United States. Armed conflicts over resources, perhaps culminating in nuclear war, are likely. The result, according to the new paper, is "outright chaos" and perhaps "the end of human global civilization as we know it."

## 3

#### CP Text: States should ban privatized space exploration and colonization.

#### Solves 100% of the aff since they criticize colonization and earth being disposable. If we keep people living on earth this wont happen.

## Case

### Presumption

#### Vote neg on presumption:

#### 1] Systems- the 1AC says institutions create social realities that replicate violence but in-round discourse does nothing to alter conditions. All you do is encourage teams to write better framework blocks.

#### 2] Spillover- they are missing an internal link as to why they need the ballot or why the reading of the aff forwards change. Empirically denied – judges vote on heidigger all the time and nothing happens.

### Framing

#### Counter RoB is to only vote for fiated consequnces and effects of the aff. To clarify no methods offense. Limits

#### Extinction outweighs:

#### A] Structural violence- death causes suffering because people can’t get access to resources and basic necessities

#### B] Moral Uncertianty

#### 1] Extinction outweighs—we’re cognitively biased against it.

GPP 17 (Global Priorities Project, Future of Humanity Institute at the University of Oxford, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,” Global Priorities Project, 2017, <https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf>)

1.2. THE ETHICS OF EXISTENTIAL RISK In his book Reasons and Persons, Oxford philosopher Derek Parfit advanced an influential argument about the importance of avoiding extinction: I believe that if we destroy mankind, as we now can, this outcome will be much worse than most people think. Compare three outcomes: (1) Peace. (2) A nuclear war that kills 99% of the world’s existing population. (3) A nuclear war that kills 100%. (2) would be worse than (1), and (3) would be worse than (2). Which is the greater of these two differences? Most people believe that the greater difference is between (1) and (2).I believe that the difference between (2) and (3) is very much greater**. ...** The Earth will remain habitable for at least another billion years. Civilization began only a few thousand years ago.If we do not destroy mankind, these few thousand years may be only a tiny fraction of the whole of civilized human history.The difference between (2) and (3) may thus be the difference between this tiny fraction and all of the rest of this history.If we compare this possible history to a day, what has occurred so far is only a fraction of a second.65 In this argument, it seems that Parfit is assuming that the survivors of a nuclear war that kills 99% of the population would eventually be able to recover civilisation without long-term effect. As we have seen, this may not be a safe assumption – but for the purposes of this thought experiment, the point stands. What makes existential catastrophes especially bad is that they would “destroy the future,” as another Oxford philosopher, Nick Bostrom, puts it.66This future could potentially be extremely long and full of flourishing, and would therefore have extremely large value. In standard risk analysis, when working out how to respond to risk, we work out the expected value of risk reduction, by weighing the probability that an action will prevent an adverse event against the severity of the event. Because the value of preventing existential catastrophe is so vast, even a tiny probability of prevention has huge expected value.67 Of course, there is persisting reasonable disagreement about ethics and there are a number of ways one might resist this conclusion.68 Therefore, it would be unjustified to be overconfident in Parfit and Bostrom’s argument. In some areas, government policy does give significant weight to future generations. For example, in assessing the risks of nuclear waste storage, governments have considered timeframes of thousands, hundreds of thousands, and even a million years.69 Justifications for this policy usually appeal to principles of intergenerational equity according to which future generations ought to get as much protection as current generations.70 Similarly, widely accepted norms of c development require development that meets the needs of the current generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.71 However, when it comes to existential risk, it would seem that we fail to live up to principles of intergenerational equity.Existential catastrophe would not only give future generations less than the current generations; it would give them nothing. Indeed, reducing existential risk plausibly has a quite low cost for us in comparison with the huge expected value it has for future generations. In spite of this, relatively little is done to reduce existential risk. Unless we give up on norms of intergenerational equity, they give us a strong case for significantly increasing our efforts to reduce existential risks. **1.3. WHY EXISTENTIAL RISKS MAY BE SYSTEMATICALLY UNDERINVESTED IN, AND THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY** In spite of the importance of existential risk reduction, it probably receives less attention than is warranted. As a result, concerted international cooperation is required if we are to receive adequate protection from existential risks. 1.3.1. Why existential risks are likely to be underinvested in There are several reasons why existential risk reduction is likely to be underinvested in.Firstly, it is a global public good.Economic theory predicts that such goods tend to be underprovided.The benefits of existential risk reduction are widely and indivisibly dispersed around the globe from the countries responsible for taking action. Consequently, a country which reduces existential risk gains only a small portion of the benefits but bears the full brunt of the costs. Countries thus have strong incentives to free ride, receiving the benefits of risk reduction without contributing. As a result, too few do what is in the common interest. Secondly, as already suggested above, existential risk reduction is an intergenerational public good: most of the benefits are enjoyed by future generations who have no say in the political process.For these goods, the problem is temporal free riding: the current generation enjoys the benefits of inaction while future generations bear the costs. Thirdly, many existential risks, such as machine superintelligence, engineered pandemics, and solar geoengineering, pose an unprecedented and uncertain future threat. Consequently, it is hard to develop a satisfactory governance regime for them: there are few existing governance instruments which can be applied to these risks, and it is unclear what shape new instruments should take. In this way, our position with regard to these emerging risks is comparable to the one we faced when nuclear weapons first became available. Cognitive biases also lead people to underestimate existential risks.Since there have not been any catastrophes of this magnitude, these risks are not salient to politicians and the public.**72** This is an example of the misapplication of the availability heuristic, a mental shortcut which assumes that something is important only if it can be readily recalled. Another cognitive bias affecting perceptions of existential risk is scope neglect. In a seminal 1992 study, three groups were asked how much they would be willing to pay to save 2,000, 20,000 or 200,000 birds from drowning in uncovered oil ponds. The groups answered $80, $78, and $88, respectively.73 In this case, the size of the benefits had little effect on the scale of the preferred response. People become numbed to the effect of saving lives when the numbers get too large. **74** Scope neglect is a particularly acute problem for existential risk because the numbers at stake are so large.Due to scope neglect, decision-makers are prone to treat existential risks in a similar way to problems which are less severe by many orders of magnitude.A wide range of other cognitive biases

**Their sweeping criticism is useless for confronting the practical dangers of technology—their detached attitude creates the worst forms of calculation. Our focus on solving specific environmental harms avoids these turns.**

Aidan **DAVISON**, Geography and Environmental Studies @ Tasmania, **‘1** [*Technology and the Contested Meanings of Sustainability*, p. 132-136]

Heidegger says that the question that can free us from technology is this: How must we think? To ask What shall we do? is, apparently, to be prey to instrumentalism. It is to seek solutions, rather than to understand ever more deeply our plight and the saving power that grows within it. According to Hubert Dreyfus, an influential interpreter of Heidcgger and one who defends much that I find disturbing in Heidegger’s account, the supreme danger Heidegger describes is one beyond all practical concerns. But, because "Heidegger has not always been clear about what distinguishes his approach from a romantic reaction to the domination of narure,' and because his approach confounds our instrumentalist epistemology,, Dreyfus contends that "we are tempted to translate it into conventional platitudes. Thus. Heidegger ontological concerns are mistakenly assimilated to ecologically minded worries about the devastation of nature Dreyfus emphatically rebukes those who would get caught up in everyday problems: Heidegger’s concern is the human distress caused by the technological under­standing of being, rather than the destruction caused by specific technologies. Consequently, he distinguishes the current problem caused by technology­--ecological destruction, nuclear danger, consumerism, and so on‑-from the destruction that would result should technology solve all of our problems.' What I find **unacceptable** here is the **absolute disjunction** Dreyfus identifies in Heidegger's account **between our ontological distress** in adopting a technological understanding of being and our **embodied distress at the degradation of our eco­logical and social relationships**. By defining our distress at the destruction of nature as "worry" and further labelling this worry a "conventional platitude:' we see clearly the lurking danger of intellectual elitism within the philosopher's elevated gaze on the essential issues, The line between opposing our calculative orientation to thinking and disregarding Dreyfus's conclusion that concerns about the devastation of nature verge on platitudinous is drawn all too easily from **within the comfort of secure professorial life amidst technological affluence**. Just as the ancient Greek thinkers were insulated (sum practical everyday matters by the **normalized tyranny of slavery**, so too are many modern thinkers insulated from **the submerged tyranny** perpetrated **through** modern technosystems' Take. for instance, Drevfus’ assessment of *the* role of technology in contemporary Japanese life: "The television set and the household gods share the same shelf‑the styro­foam cup coexists with the porcelain teacup. We thus see that the Japanese, at least, can enjoy technology without taking over the technological understand­ing of being"" In a more recent paper, he takes this point further. I cannot accept this proposition. Technological ontology is so rapidly becoming ubiquitous in most societies precisely because of modern technol­ogy's surface of plurality adaptability and cultural flexibility. We live in the midst of the hyper real illusion of having gained television sets while not having lost our gods as, all the while, our world is em more flattened towards the one‑dimension of technological cornmodification. No doubt many Japanese visitors to Caucasian technological society arc as impressed by exotic medieval cathedrals Looming alongside the gleaming arches of McDonalds, as was Dreyfus amidst the exotic a of Japanese living rooms. Yet behind these surfaces, the tech­nosystems of hegemonic oppression thrive. In turning on their light switches to better see their altar to divinity and TV Japanese citizens activate, as surely as do those of France, the technosystems of nuclear energy. The shelf itself is likely, as it is in Australia, to be an unacknowledged memorial to the ancient rainforests of Borneo. In eating their traditional sushi, this culture now stimu­lates the technosysterns of drift‑netting. chemical‑intensive aquaculture, and genetic engineering‑ In importing rice, they encourage cash crops rather than self‑sufficiency in Africa. In prudently saving to purchase a new Buddhist statue, they contribute, through their gigantic banks, to the technosysterns of finance that power global capitalism. In the face of the neo‑Heideggerian **appeal to higher concerns**, I think it important to emphasize that the destruction of nature is for **vast numbers of people not an abstract worry but an immediate and direct threat to livelihoods**. Cultural practices and routinely to human and nonhuman life itself The sug­gestion that deep thinking lies in the turn away from the technological world toward the study of ancient Creek philosophy or meditation on eighteenth­century poetry seems pretentious and politically fraught. We are cautioned by Heidegger not to rush headlong into action aimed at solving an evident but. he assures us, nonetheless inessential problem such as the destruction of a river valley through the construction of a hydroelectric dam. Heidegger insists that in our urgent hurry we will miss the real threat, which is not to the valley or even its displaced human residents, but to the pos­sibilities for human thinking itself. Yet there can be no doubt that **our decision to sit quietly meditating on our breath or poetry involves many difficult practi­cal choices. To sit still** *in the* midst of the restlessness of the technological world is as much‑indeed, is more‑ deliberate action than rushing out the door brandishing a placard. Simply sitting and reading Hcidcger implies a host of practical judgments. To put aside books on integrated business management and be bothered with Heideggers ontological questions at all runs counter to the self‑assuredness and instrumentalism of the latemodern world. And remain­ing open to these questions, if we choose to be so bothered, is difficult amid the burly burly of technological life?r Contrary to Dreyfus. I consider that "ecological destruction, inextricably **ontological and corporeal**.The literature of radical ecophilosophy attests to this being so. My concern about the accumulation of carcino­genic *pesticides* and heavy metals in the tissues of my children is at once a concern with the technological diminishment of human pocsibilities and a concern with the practical task of living in more sane, more careful ways. Certainly my preoccupation with the well‑being of my children could be nar­rowly construed as a mere instrumentalizing concern with the survival of my genes Similarly ambivalent are alternatives to harmful, unsustainable practices offered via the ecomodernist drive for ecoefficiency. If I can afford them. I can choose from alternatives such as genetically engineered pest resistance, the sub­stitution of timber in my house, and of lead in petrol and paints, by more sophisticated synthetic products of industrial laboratories. However, history has shown the propensity of such solutions to create new sets of problems, for which new *sets* of technological solutions are soon required. This is, after all, the dynamic of technological profligacy that *defines* modernity There is thus much weight to Dreyfus' argument that to attempt to solve our problems in this way is to move another step further clown the path to fully technologized forms of life that obliterate the possibility of our encountering our relational selfhood. But where does this leave us as we negotiate the ambiguities of daily life? If I choose to reduce toxicity in my family's diet by the collection of rain water, by turning my backyard and local public land over to organic forms of food production, by adopting simple passive design methods to reduce the risk of termite damage, by cycling to avoid the combustion of fuel, or by bartering for the vegetable‑based paints made by a neighbor, am I necessarily falling prey to a death‑defying desire for control? Conversely, are philosophers who spend **long hours** meditating on Hólderlin or the *term in* their everyday practices, thereby released from the oppressive ontological grasp of technology! I think not.

GENUINE PRACTICE AND OUR INNER AND REAL CORE

The problematic distinction that Dreyfus makes between our primary **ontological distress and its** secondary material symptoms derives, in my view, from the distinction that Heidegger drew, after the war, between our essential nature, our “inner and real core' and our everyday latemodern lives: We can use technical devices, and yet with proper use keep ounelves free of them, so that e can let go of them any time. We can use technical devices as they ought to be used, and also let them alone as something which does not affect our inner and real core. We can affirm the unavoidable use of technical devices, and also deny them the right to dominate us, and so to warp, confine, and lay ware our nature." This remarkable passage from his 1955 Memorial Address effectively draws Heidegger's explanation of technology full circle. Beginning with his critique of instrumentalism, through his description of technological ontology and the destining of being, this passage returns us to the instrumentalist promise of technology in the form of the comportment of releasetnent and openness. Of course, Heidegger would present this movement as a spiralling upwards towards the heights of essential questioning. And I do not seek to deny that there is considerable merit in seeing reflection as a spiral movement that returns in to places t have not been before. Nonetheless, his argument is that by adopting our place as artful and meditative dwellers, technologies become instruments once again: we can set them aside at any point This is nothing less than a restate­ment of the instrumentalist assertion that although technologies define the material form of our lives. Our minds are free to define the moral and ontolog­ical form of our lives. In asserting that, provided we preserve our core, the receptiveness of our thinking., we can live in the world of technology yet stay always beyond it, Heidegger elides the simple fact that modem technosystems are designed precisely so that we cannot put them aside at any point. Just how do we "let go at any time" of the technosystems of money? Just how do academics refuse to let computers dominate and lay waste the practices of educa‑tion now that students born in the computer age are unable to conceive sentences without keyboards and university bureaucrats have restructured campus life along digital lines in an effort to maximize the production of competitive educational product?

### Tech good – impact turns their entire aff

#### 1] Warming – globalization is good.

Sylvanus Kwaku Afesorgbor and Binyam Afewerk Demena 18. Assistant Professor, Agri-Food Trade and Policy, University of Guelph; Teaching and research fellow, International Institute of Social Studies. “Globalization may actually be better for the environment.” https://theconversation.com/globalization-may-actually-be-better-for-the-environment-95406

The increasing pace of globalization and how it affects the environment has been a major global concern. Although the research has been fraught with contrasting results, there are many who strongly believe that increased globalization has been harmful to the environment. A large number of environmentalists who support this view base their arguments on the premise that globalization leads to an increase in global demand, resulting in increased production. This indirectly contributes to the exploitation of the environment and the depletion of natural resources. Amid rising environmental concerns, an important question is whether deglobalization would have the opposite impact on the environment. Put differently, if globalization is harmful, then should we expect that the current deglobalization trend will be less harmful for the environment? It’s an important question to ask right now considering the mounting anti-globalization sentiments that have engulfed the Global North. We have not only witnessed Brexit, the election of Donald Trump, the Belgian opposition to the trade agreement between the European Union and Canada in the recent past, but more recently, we have seen anti-globalization sentiments heating up even in the United States, once the strongest architect and proponent of globalization in the world. This is resulting in uncertainty and a near stalemate for NAFTA, steel and aluminium tariff hikes and the potential trade war with China. Is globalization bad for the environment? The adverse effect of globalization on the environment is supported by what’s known as the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis. This school of thought argues that increased gains from globalization are achieved at the expense of the environment because more open economies adopt looser environmental standards. Those who support this bleak view of globalization argue it creates global competition, resulting in a boost in economic activities that deplete the environment and its natural resources. The increased economic activity leads to greater emissions of industrial pollutants and more environmental degradation. The pressure on international firms to remain competitive forces them to adopt cost-saving production techniques that can be environmentally harmful. Deglobalization may worsen emissions But in fact, deglobalization may not necessarily translate into reduced emissions of harmful gases such as CO₂, SO₂, NO₂, but could actually worsen it. Through what’s known as the technique effect, we know globalization can trigger environmentally friendly technological innovations that can be transferred from countries with strict environmental regulations to pollution havens. Globalization doesn’t just entail the movement of manufactured goods, but also the transfer of intermediate, capital goods and technologies. That means multinational corporations with clean state-of-the-art technologies can transfer their green know-how to countries with low environmental standards. It’s widely recognized that multinational firms use cleaner types of energy than local firms, and therefore have more energy-efficient production processes. Deglobalization could mean these environmentally friendly technologies aren’t passed on to countries that are trying to go green. The rise of anti-globalization forces also means less specialization in sectors in which countries have comparative advantages. This can create an inefficient allocation of resources that leads to the dissipation of scarce economic and natural resources. If every country has to produce to meet its domestic demand, in other words, it could result in duplication in production processes and therefore an increase in local emissions. Iran sanctions backfire for the environment Since some countries have weaker environmental standards than others, this could possibly worsen global emissions. A good example of this is Iran, which has been slapped with economic sanctions, making the country less integrated in the world economy. The result has been domestic production that’s wreaked immense havoc on the environment. As result of import bans of crude oil, for example, Iran started refining its own crude oil that contains 10 times the level of pollutants of the oil it used to import. Globalization has another benefit — it’s been at the forefront of creating public awareness about labour and environmental standards through the platforms of international activities such as fair trade and eco labels. The success of this environmental public awareness has resulted in consumer preferences evolving. Producers are therefore able to build their customer base by producing eco-friendly products. Without international trade, consumers would have limited choices, and could be forced to purchase only domestic goods that may have been produced under lax environmental standards.

#### Planet-scale computation is necessary.

Joppa 19, PhD, scientist in the Computational Ecology and Environmental Sciences Group (Lucas, “A Planetary Computer to Avert Environmental Disaster,” Scientific American, <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/a-planetary-computer-to-avert-environmental-disaster/>)

If environmental reports published this year were connected to an alarm system, the sound inside the United Nation's Manhattan headquarters would be deafening—we are facing a five-alarm fire. Myriad reports warned us we must take immediate action to ensure a sustainable supply of clean food, water and air to a human population projected to rapidly grow to 10 billion, all while stemming a globally catastrophic loss of biodiversity and averting the worst economic impacts of a changing climate. The news was devastating, but not unexpected. The specificity around the short window of time to act was, however. The world's leading environmental scientists have spoken, and the message is clear: The best time to act was yesterday, so we better start today. The task is much bigger and time is way shorter than previously thought. While the science says we very likely have no more than 420 gigatons of carbon left to spend, emissions steadily continue to rise every year. Just last year, over 42 gigatons was emitted. That gives us no more than 10 years before we must begin to operate as a carbon neutral planet. Unfortunately, discussions and commitments have yet to translate into measurable change. And change we must. At stake is not only the health of our planet, but the incredible social and economic progress seen across the world for at least the past 150 years. It's not surprising that many found themselves glumly nodding in agreement to Jonathan Franzen's recent article in the New Yorker, titled "What If We Stopped Pretending?" But fatalism never solved a problem. What does is a formula that has been repeated over centuries of human society—when faced with existential challenges, we have successfully and consistently tackled major societal problems through the simple summation of hard work, progressive governance and technological innovation. This ideal is what we must embrace in the era of climate change. While people are mobilizing and governments are meeting, what is missing is the third leg of the stool. Investment in technology solutions aimed at environmental outcomes is sorely needed to accelerate the pace, scale and effectiveness of our response to climate change. The epitome of the innovation we need is best understood as a "planetary computer." A planetary computer will borrow from the approach of today's internet search engines, and extend beyond them in the form of a geospatial decision engine that supports queries about the environmental status of the planet, programmed with algorithms to optimize its health. Think of this less as a giant computer in a stark white room and more of an approach to computing that is planetary in scale and allows us to query every aspect of environmental and nature-based solutions available in real time. We currently lack the data, compute power and scalability to do so. Only when we have a massive amount of planetary data and compute at a similar scale can we begin to answer one of the most complex questions ever posed—how do we manage the earth's natural resources equitably and sustainably to ensure a prosperous and climate-stable future? The game-changing potential of this approach is clear, not only for fighting climate change but building a better future for us all. That is not just the hope of an environmental scientist with a background in computer science but borne out by research. A recent report by PwC United Kingdom found that applying AI in just a few areas could boost global GDP by 4.4 percent while lowering emissions by 4 percent. The Global Commission on Adaptation found that investment in adaptation measures would not only avoid human suffering and economic loss, it would bring benefits that outweigh the costs nearly four to one. The incredible benefits from these nature-based mitigation and adaptation solutions and AI-enabled transformations can only be realized with planetary data and computer power. That will require us to quickly take the three accelerants of the information age—ubiquity of data, advances in algorithms, and access to scalable computing infrastructure—and begin, for the first time in many instances, to apply them to our natural world. The gap in application and deployment becomes clear as we look at a few key nature-based solutions. Consider forests for carbon sequestration. We should be able to answer how many trees there are, where they are, and how fast they are appearing or disappearing. The same goes for species conservation, or healthy freshwater lakes or the rate of sea level rise in a granular sense of space and time. Right now, at best, we have very limited answers at a resolution that is far too broad geographically and for only a few points in time, and far less data for many other nature datasets. The world desperately needs better answers. We cannot create a blueprint of action to give us the world and environmental services we want and need without it. With a planetary computer using planetary data, we can ask—and answer—questions such as, What services can or should we obtain from different places on the earth? en route to a day where we can describe what we want for our future and how to get there. A planetary computer is an ambitious idea. It will require us to build a global network that connects billions, or trillions, of datapoints about our environment with the computing power and machine learning tools to process them into actionable insights that will empower decision makers in every corner of the globe to put sustainability first. And although parts of this plan may seem like science fiction, it could be a reality in the near future.

#### Double bind—either the aff can’t solve because it leaves tech like space appropriation unchallenged OR the aff spills up to challenge tech more broadly—that means it disrupts environmental management via tech and databases.