#### Communicative spaces like debate form a heteronormative hyper reality creating resignifications of gender through the signifier of reproduction, rendering queerness fungible to create acceptable forms of anti queerness further excluding it from the conversation – Form v content

Sichler 10 Karen Sichler is a Ph.D. candidate in Mass Communications and a graduate teaching assistant for the Institute of Women’s Studies at the University of Georgia. [Sichler, Karen. “Post Queerness : Hyperreal Gender and the End of the Quest for Origins.” (2010).] //Lex AKo

One of the **main issues confronting queerly** gendered **bodies**/individuals **concerns the** lack of admission to cultural intelligibility by the **heteronormative mindset dominating mainstream culture**, resulting **in social invisibility** or a lack of acknowledgement. **Queer bodies hover outside the** power **structure** of society **due to** their **perceived lack of “realness”** or “originality” **within the heternormative** social structure. By **maintaining** a biblically-inspired emphasis on the **reproductive aspect of sexuality** and the corresponding gendered performances, **queer bodies are not permitted to communicate** or engage **with the current normative standards** as created, established and maintained by the dyadic, mainstream gender structure. By relying on a social structure that emphasizes the true or original in assessing worth, bodies/individuals exhibiting/performing **a queer** or non-normative gender **cannot communicate within** the same **heternormative arena due to a lack of common ground**. In Butler’s estimation: **Gender reality** is created through **sustained social performances** means that the very notions of an essential sex and a true or abiding masculinity or femininity are also constituted as part of the strategy that conceals gender’s performative character and the performative possibilities for proliferating gender configurations outside the **restricting** frames of masculinist domination and **compulsory heterosexuality**.36 By emphasizing an essentialist view, such assessments locate the gender norm within either the first or second order of reality within the hyperreal model. The **queer copies** are thus perceived as little more than cheap knockoffs of “straight” or properly gendered/ sexual behavior. Butler, like Baudrillard, calls into **question the semiotic** value of origin and **reality**. However, for Baudrillard in the third and fourth orders of reality the signified rather than the signifier possesses the label of “original” thus valued. Butler, by contrast, imbues the queer copy with value but remains **within the heternormative structure**. In Undoing Gender, Butler describes her original foray into gender by the following: Categories like butch and femme were not copies of a more original heterosexuality, but they showed how the so-called originals, men and women within the heterosexual frame, are similarly constructed, performatively established. So the ostensible copy is not explained through reference to the origin, but the origin is understood to be as performative as the copy.37 While **assigning value to queer bodies**, Butler’s paradigm still requires **the signifier** to be intelligible. Under the rubric of either **simulation** or virtual reality, the signified takes precedence as the signifier either appears after the copy is realized (in the third order) or **never materializes at all** (in the fourth order). **By resignifying** the understanding of copy, therefore, an empowered view of gender can be achieved. Butler admits in her essay “Imitation and **gender insubordination**,” that “gender is a kind of imitation for which there is no original; in fact, it is a kind of imitation that produces the very notion of the original as an effect and consequence of the imitation itself.”38 Thus, placing it in the interstitial space between the third/simulation and fourth/ **virtual orders of reality becomes a natural extension of** Butler’s view of gender. As an “original” form does not exist for gender, the multiple **copies, which** are **promulgated by the individual** bodies, are, in fact, primary expressions of gender. When one returns to the performative or active element of gender, another hyperreal aspect comes to forefront. Due to the constant POST IDENTITY 55 SICHLER reconstruction or **resignification in every act of gender**, each movement, look or moment **creates a** new, minutely **different creation**. Butler, in “Variations on sex and gender,” also emphasizes the mobile appearance of gender when she writes: Gender is **not traceable to a definable origin because it** itself **is an originating activity** incessantly **taking place**. No longer understood as a product of cultural and psychic relations long past, **gender is a contemporary** way of **organizing** past and future **cultural norms**, a way of **situating oneself in and through those norms**, an active style of living of one’s body in the world.39 By **ensconcing the temporal condition of gender** in either the present or future, gender can dislodge itself from the historical sediment that burdens it. Conclusion Any attacks on gender, regardless of the structure of reality one employs, occupy a difficult position in society. According to Butler: The structuring reality of sexual difference is not one that one can wish away or argue against, or even make claims about in any reasonable way. It is more like a necessary background to the possibility of thinking, of language, of being a body in the world. And those who seek to take issue with it are arguing with the structure that makes their argument possibility.40 By taking up the argument with our seemingly impenetrable corporeal selves, critics like Judith Butler cause us to call into question the ways in which our bodies exist in the world. The construct of hyperreal gender can be applied to multiple avenues of critical inquiry. With the continuing importance of cyber theory both by itself and in tandem with queer theory, hyperreal gender can be used to describe how bodies are gendered in the non-territorial plane of existence.

#### Your philosophy says to procreate is our intrinsic sexual function to uphold for future production of rational agents so by indulging in queer sexual acts without procreation treats the subject and their partners as a mere means because they are not following their intrinsic properties destroying their agency

**Schaff 01:** (Lecturer in Philosophy at California State University) Schaff, Kory. “Kant, Political Liberalism, and the Ethics of Same-Sex Relations.” Journal of Social Philosophy, Blackwell Publishers, 2001, mindchanging.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/Schaff-Kant-Same-Sex.pdf. //Lex AKo

Several events over the last few years have contributed to the ongoing discussion of the ethics and politics of same-sex relations. The “Defense of Marriage Act,” supporting the institution of marriage between heterosexuals, passed Congress in 1996, thereby attempting to limit or undermine state and local legislation expanding domestic partnership laws to include same-sex couples. In July 1998, full-page advertisements in several of the nation’s largest circulating newspapers appeared, sponsored by a coalition of conservative and Christian organizations who claimed that homosexuals could be “cured” through a combination of religious and pseudoscientific treatment. Then in October 1998, the heinous torture and murder of Matthew Shepard, a gay University of Wyoming student, reinvigorated the national debate over whether hate crimes legislation should be expanded to include protection of homosexuals. Finally, the politics of same-sex relations pressed forward when Vermont passed legislation that expanded the legal rights of same-sex couples as a “civil union.” The national debate goes on. Noticeably absent from the more traditional philosophical discussions of ethical, political, and legal theory is the inclusion of same-sex relations as a specific area of inquiry. “Queer theory,” the current paradigm for discussing issues of same-sex relations, has by and large remained at the margins of orthodox moral, political, and legal theorizing, relegated to cultural and literary criticism or the vague and opaque “language-games of postmodernism.”1 Philosophy has been slow to come to terms with gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transsexual dimensions of ethical theory, leaving such issues, for example, to feminist debates over gender and sex.2 The present paper assesses the traditional ethical perspective underlying the rhetoric of moralism condemning homosexuality. In contemporary Anglo-American moral and political philosophy, Kant figures large in discussions about personhood, autonomy, and justice. Yet Kant himself condemns same-sex relations with reference to his ethical theory. Feminist critiques of Kant’s views on women and marriage play a prominent role in salvaging those features of his practical philosophy that remain important, while nonetheless “leaving behind” (to use Barbara Herman’s phrase) those that are historically antiquated or eliminable on other grounds.3 I shall attempt to do much the same thing here. I take Kant’s views on same-sex relations to be the product of a certain religious and historical background, but it is important to note that the religious moral condemnation of homosexuality characteristic of his view continues even today. It is the aim of this JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 32 No. 3, Fall 2001, 446–462. © 2001 Blackwell Publishers paper to argue that Kant’s claims about same-sex relations are internally inconsistent with the formal moral theory he constructs. Kant discusses the ethics of same-sex relations in the context of sexual relations generally. Although there are duties to others, especially within the governing terms of the marriage contract, I shall not focus on this aspect of his sexual ethics, since much has already been written on Kant’s views of marriage and women. This essay takes as its subject what Kant calls the crimina carnis, or those sexual acts that so contradict one’s own humanity that they are “unmentionable” and even “nauseating” (LE 170).4 Although such acts include masturbation, bestiality, and homosexuality, I scrutinize only the assessment and moral condemnation of same-sex activity.5 Kant advances two kinds of arguments to reach the conclusion that same-sex relations are immoral. The first argument is that from “natural ends,” which holds that same-sex activity does not conform to the natural constraints of procreation that ground the ethical legitimacy of human sexual activity. The second (and most common) is his “means-ends” argument, which holds that individuals outside the marriage contract instrumentally use one another during sexual activity, thereby reducing themselves to a mere means, which is a violation of the categorical imperative. I argue that there is nothing in Kant’s moral theory that legitimates condemnation of same-sex relations and that the arguments from natural ends are unjustified by the constraints placed upon morality to avoid the empirical determination of judgments. In order to make clear why same-sex activity does not contradict the requirements of the moral law, we need to understand Kant’s account of legitimate sexual activity. I provide this reconstruction in the first section, drawing upon the Lectures on Ethics and Metaphysics of Morals. In the second section, I critique the first kind of argument that grounds Kant’s assessment, that from natural ends. I show how it is based upon underlying teleological premises and raise doubts concerning Kant’s reliance on “regulative ideas” in making a consistent ethical theory. In the third section, I argue that same-sex activity that conforms to the conditions of the moral law, especially given the concepts of consent and reciprocity, are in conformity with Kant’s formal requirement of the law of pure practical reason, and therefore cannot justifiably be condemned on those grounds. Finally, I conclude with some discussion about Rawls and political liberalism. I hope to show how the present Kantian revival in ethical theory can place itself in opposition to the conservative and homophobic hysteria surrounding debates on political and legal issues such as same-sex “marriage.” I. Sexual Persons, Natural Ends, and Moral Duties Kant positions the ethical question of sexual desire in the following framework: (1) a conception of the sexual person, (2) the natural ends of sexual activity, (3) duties to others in sexual relations, and (4) duties to oneself as a sexual person. I shall examine each of these briefly as the background against which I level criticisms of Kant’s assessment of same-sex relations. Kant and Same-Sex Relations 447 In large part, this requires an exegetical reconstruction of Kant’s arguments in various texts, but it is important to situate Kant’s sexual ethics generally. 1. The Sexual Person Kant’s conception of the person includes a sexual component, but as commentators elsewhere have noted, this component is marginal relative to the strict emphasis on reason without sensible influence. One commentator, in fact, calls this Kant’s “subjection of the sensible.”6 For Kant, the condition of life “consists in the union of the soul with the body” (LE 155), so subsequent care must be exercised appropriately regarding its functions. Contrasting his own view with that of those “visionary moralists” who think “that everything is to be gained by weakening and destroying the whole sensibility of the body,” Kant claims that “discipline of the body consists in the ability to live in conformity with one’s purpose” (158, emphasis added). He holds the former views to be “fanatical and monkish” (presumably) compared to his own and ironically attributes such views to individuals like Diogenes the Cynic.7 On his view, an individual must care for her body “made frugal in its needs and temperate in its pleasures” (158). Although one then cannot just deny the body those things it requires to function (nutrition, for example), he holds that “it is better to keep within the limits of these needs, and even to fall a little short of them” (159, emphasis added). The sexual dimension of the person is conceptualized as purposeful in functional terms. Kant also views the body as the source of the sensible affiliation of sexual desire. Both of these features, however, are part of the complete picture constituting the human being. Human beings, embodied as they are, have a natural sexual dimension entailed by such embodiment. “It is true that without it [sexuality] a man would be incomplete; he would rightly believe that he lacked the necessary organs, and this would make him imperfect as a human being” (LE 164, emphasis added). The sexual dimension of persons is part of their somatic selves, especially their sexual organs. Within the constraints of rationality and the subjection of the body to the government of reason, these parts of the body become the focus of correct and appropriate action, a problem for ethics. Kant uses an analogy about control over the body to that of government, a clear allusion to Plato: “This mastery of the mind over the body, or, in other words, of intellect over sensibility, can well be compared to a state with a good or bad government” (158).8 2. The Natural Ends of Sexual Activity In order to conclude whether sexual activity is moral or not, Kant has a conception of correct human functioning informed by natural ends. Much of this discussion takes place in the Rechtslehre of the Metaphysics of Morals. It is surprising that the discussion about the functioning of sex in natural terms should take place in that part of Kant’s ethical theory concerned with legal and juridical questions. The parallels between the lawlike, regulative 448 Kory Schaff quality that Kant identifies in natural processes and the lawlike regularity of the doctrine of right are important in this context. Kant defines sexual union as “the reciprocal use that one human being makes of the sexual organs and capacities of another” and distinguishes a “natural” versus an “unnatural” kind (MDR 6:277). The proper sexual functioning of persons is placed squarely in the doctrine of right because of duties to others involved in the concept of contract, that is, marriage. “Natural sexual union takes place either in accordance with mere animal nature (vaga libido, venus volgivaga, fornicatio) or in accordance with law” (6:277). The institution of marriage is the form of law that separates out sexual acts that fall outside that form. (Later, we shall see how the special designation of sex between unmarried heterosexuals as “natural” is unwarranted.) The natural “form” of sex, then, is between man and woman. Over and above this natural form of sexual union there is a natural “use.” And the use of sexual organs in the natural form must also conform to their natural “end.” The natural end of this form and its use is procreation, “an end of nature, for which it implanted the inclinations of the sexes for each other” (6:278). There is a triad configuration in the natural end of human sexual activity: form, use, and purpose. Given these, it is clear what kind of sexual activity follows as a natural and ethically legitimate expression of the sexual component of persons: monogamous heterosexual marriage. We should note that each of the three parts has its source in separate, albeit related, concerns. The form (heterosexual) and the purpose (procreation) are to be viewed in terms of the natural teleology of human beings as reproducing organisms. The second part of use seems more troubling. Despite the natural ends that help to define the lawlike, regulative dimension of sexuality, why should use be constrained by this “proper” end? Is it possible to misuse “nature” in some respect when it comes time to use one’s sexual capabilities? 3. Duties to Others in Sexual Relations It is at this point that the bulk of our ethical concerns supervene. We are now required to consider duties to others regarding the proper use of sexual activity in order to conclude whether it is moral. Since the sexual dimension of a person is “objectified” on Kant’s view, a kind of mapping of nature onto the body and especially the organs, he holds that in a sexual act, “a human being makes himself into a thing, which conflicts with the right of humanity in his own person” (MDR 6:278). There is only one condition under which a person can will himself into a thing for another’s use: “that while one person is acquired by the other as if it were a thing, the one who is acquired acquires the other in turn; for in this way each reclaims itself and restores its personality” (6:278). In other words, to ensure one is not merely reducing oneself to a thing, the reduction of oneself to a thing for use must be mutual. Both individuals must give themselves up in order to avoid just one of them being used merely as an instrument. The qualification “as if” that I emphasized is important to note, for it also indicates the underlying regulative judgments Kant is making regarding human sexuality, which I treat at length in the next section. Kant and Same-Sex Relations 449 Kant’s discussion is slippery at this point. We should note that in other places he indicates that the reduction of oneself to a thing in the sexual act is natural: “This is the only case in which a human being is designed by nature as the Object of another’s enjoyment” (LE 163). Since transcendental freedom makes it possible for us to reflect on our natural desires and modify them accordingly, Kant thinks that this natural design of use can be regulated ethically. But in still other places, Kant indicates that using another’s parts in sexual activity necessarily requires the use of the whole of the person, since “acquiring a member of a human being is at the same time acquiring the whole person, since a person is an absolute unity” (MDR 6:278). Marriage is the form of this natural use of sexual activity, and “it is possible for them to do so only under this condition.” The logical connection is perplexing. In the sexual act, an agent reduces herself to a thing, since sexual activity is the use of a thing for one’s enjoyment. But an agent cannot reduce herself to a mere thing, since her whole person is a unity. So, in order not to reduce herself to a thing, her whole person must be respected. In order to do this, she must ensure the mutual reduction of sexual organs between herself and her partner. But doesn’t this just follow naturally from design? If persons are a unity, how can one thing be separated out? If this is the design of nature, then both agents automatically share in a mutual reduction of their persons during sexual activity. Why does Kant require the marriage contract in order to ensure that mutual reduction takes the form of law? So there is an element of conceptual (sexual) confusion on his part. Kant thought that the natural design of the sexual dimension of individuals results in instrumental use. But since this is happening on the part of both agents involved, the mutual reduction that ensures one recovers one’s whole humanity follows naturally. For Kant, the proper form and purpose of sexual activity is clearly driving the conceptualization of its proper use. Here, we must note the social institution of marriage creeping through the back door of the discussion of nature’s design. Kant maintains that only the institution of marriage fulfills the conditions within which heterosexual individuals can have full disposable rights over one another, avoiding the reduction of themselves to mere things in sexual activity. But the idea of “acquirement” results in an excessively contract-oriented discussion of marriage, something for which Kant has been criticized from Hegel to contemporary feminists.9 Disregarding statements elsewhere that men have full disposable rights over their wives that women do not have over their husbands, Kant’s discussion of sexual activity founders on this question of proper use (cf. A 166–73). Duties to others on sexual matters turn out to be situated for Kant solely in the marriage contract, which falls within the domain of right. But why do we need marriage to sanction the mutual reduction of persons to things in sexual activity when this is already built into nature’s design of persons as sexual beings? We should keep this objection in mind when examining the claim that same-sex activity is unnatural. 4. Duties to Oneself as a Sexual Person Regarding duties to oneself, Kant asks: 450 Kory Schaff What is now in question is whether a person’s use of his sexual capacity is subject to a limiting law of duty with regard to the person himself or whether he is authorized to direct the use of his sexual attributes to mere animal pleasure, without having in view the preservation of the species, and would not thereby be acting contrary to himself. (MDV §7, 6:424, emphasis added) The duty to oneself on sexual matters turns on the interconnection of all prior considerations. But the most salient feature is that of natural purpose emphasized above. Kant himself claims that “it is not so easy to produce a rational proof that unnatural, and even merely unpurposive [unzweckmäßigen], use of one’s sexual attributes is inadmissible as being a violation of duty to oneself (and indeed, as far as its unnatural use is concerned, a violation in the highest degree)” (6:425, emphasis added). Acting on animal impulses includes a whole set of physiological functions, ranging from sleeping to digestion. When we get a drink of water because we are thirsty, it seems counterintuitive to claim that we are mistreating our humanity or using ourselves as a mere means. Unlike Aristotle, Kant wants to hold that an individual gets a drink of water because she judges her thirst to be a sufficient reason for it. Again, transcendental freedom allows us to adopt a reflexive position regarding these biologically determined functions. But it isn’t clear why so many constraints are placed upon sexual activity, since it is only natural that individuals involved in it reduce themselves mutually to mere things, thus avoiding the charge of mere use. This is an important qualification to note about the categorical imperative and its formulation of the means-ends distinction. Kant holds that one can be a means as long as one is at the same time always regarded as an end: “Humanity itself is a dignity; for a human being cannot be used merely as a means by any human being (either by others or by himself) but must always be used at the same time as an end” (MDV §38, 6:462; cf. G 36, CPrR 91). Since Kant views sexual activity as the reduction of oneself to a means, one has a duty to oneself to avoid it. “The ground of proof is, indeed, that by it the human being surrenders his personality (throwing it away), since he uses himself merely as a means to satisfy an animal impulse” (MDV 6:425). Kant singles out same-sex activity as an “unnatural use” and “violation of the highest degree” precisely because it falls in a category completely outside the configuration of natural sex as sexual activity among agents of the opposite sex in the marriage contract. The contract is a sanctioned relation that Kant claims restores humanity to the agents who engage in sexual activity that debases them instrumentally. Not only does same-sex activity violate natural ends, it also violates duties to oneself, since the satisfaction of a desire is not constrained by the proper form and ends of heterosexual marriage and procreation. II. Crimina carnis contra naturam Kant groups homosexuality with other acts that count as contrary to nature, including masturbation and bestiality.10 Masturbation is contrary to Kant and Same-Sex Relations 451 nature because it fails to reciprocate the use of a thing with an appropriate corresponding object (another person) and is thus a mistreatment of oneself. Bestiality is even more culpable on this score, since it substitutes a nonhuman animal as its sexual object. Homosexuals substitute the same sex for their object, which is unacceptable on the grounds that it is contrary to the natural ends of human sexual functioning. All three examples are abuses, according to Kant, because they have as their correlating objects ones that do not fit within the framework described above: a natural form (heterosexual), use (mutual reduction sanctioned by marriage), and purpose (procreation). Given these constraints, sexual activity is ethically unproblematic if and only if conditions governing sexual activity itself have been met. These external (we may want to think of them as “contextual”) conditions are the form of marriage and the purpose of reproduction. The conditions established by Kant, however, do contain two implicit ethical constraints in terms of sexual use: consent and reciprocity. The use of one another’s sexual organs is the main problem for Kant. For there to be a correct and unproblematic use we require as well the two concepts of consent and reciprocity. Consent is necessary in order to satisfy the requirement of not using others as means to our own ends against their will, and reciprocity is needed to ensure that one person isn’t merely reduced to a means in the sexual activity itself. What I want to argue is that the underlying premise of the natural purposes of sexual activity is unwarranted and that same-sex relations are morally unproblematic on this score. If we can demonstrate that Kant is unjustified in his use of teleological arguments from natural ends, then all other constraints being satisfied (consent and reciprocity), there is nothing morally condemnable about same-sex activity. The arguments from natural ends are unwarranted given Kant’s own claims about the practical deployment of reason as the form of law without appeals to empirical considerations. Once this is demonstrated, the constraints of consent and reciprocity serve as the only basis for making moral evaluations of human sexual relations. I shall turn to this last part of the argument in the next section. In the Lectures on Ethics, Kant makes explicit use of two arguments from natural ends in order to identify the legitimate purposes of sexual acts. The first is related to a person’s use of her sexual functioning. He refers to sexual impulse as “an appetite for enjoying another human being” (163). Although there are many ways one person can use another with his consent, “there is no way in which a human being can be made an Object of indulgence for another except through sexual impulse” (163). Accordingly, he distinguishes “human love,” which includes such things as affection and promoting the interests of the other, as opposed to sexual desire, which “makes of the loved person an Object of appetite” (163). There is a teleological judgment in this formulation of human sexuality. For Kant, the sexual dimension of a person is designed by nature for instrumental use. He cannot allow the risk of the instrumental use of persons through nature’s design to be a justification for unconstrained sexual activity that runs counter to the moral law. Ensuring mutual reduction is necessary to avoid merely using one 452 Kory Schaff another. And requiring the proper form and purpose to contextualize the sexual activity is necessary to avoid merely using oneself. This second requirement amounts to the other argument from natural ends regarding the purpose of sexual activity. Since a person cannot use herself merely to enjoy an animal impulse, some other end is required to avoid violating duties to oneself. The teleological premise involved here is that sexual union is for the purpose of propagating the species. All sexual activity that falls outside marriage and is not for procreation is then viewed as crimina carnis. In order for sex to enjoy its natural functioning among ethical agents, we require both marriage, to have full disposable rights over the whole person, and procreation, because otherwise the end of the species has been violated. Same-sex relations meet neither of these requirements and so run afoul as contrary to both natural human “instinct” and “animal” nature:

#### Vying attachment to the fantasy, the subject immerses in political projections that require a subject for those futures to apply, casting this lack onto queers. To access imaginary futures, society requires reproductive futurism, which exists in opposition to queerness rendering it ontologically negative. Form v Content conceded in cross x when asked should a white debater lose the round for saying the N word the opponent said ye s warrant for cant weigh case against K

Edelman 2 [Lee Edelman (English Professor @ Tufts). “No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive,” Duke University Press, December 2004, Pg. 1-3, 7-9, <https://www.dukeupress.edu/no-future//>] //Lex AKo

But what helped him most in these public appeals on behalf of America's children was the social consensus that such an appeal is impossible to refuse. Indeed, though these public service announcements concluded with the sort of rhetorical flourish associated with hard-fought **political** campaigns ("We're fighting for the children. Whose side are you on?"), that rhetoric was intended to avow that this issue, like an ideological Mobius strip, only permitt**ed one side**. **Such** "**self-evident" one-sidedness-the affirmation of a value so unquestioned, because so obviously unquestionable, as that of the Child** whose innocence solicits our defense-is precisely, of course, what distinguishes public service announcements from the partisan discourse of political argumentation.But it is also, I suggest, what **makes** such announcements so oppressively political-political not in the partisan terms implied by the media consultant, but **political in a far more insidious way:** political insofar as the fantasy subtending **the image of the Child invariably shapes the logic within which the political itself must be thought. That logic compels us,** to the extent that we would register as politically responsible, **to submit to the framing of political** debate-and, indeed, of the political field-**as** defined by the terms of what this book describes as **reproductive futurism: terms that impose an ideological limit on political discourse as such, preserving in the process the absolute privilege of heteronormativity by rendering unthinkable,** by casting outside the political domain**, the possibility of a queer resistance to this organizing principle of communal relation. For politics,** however radical the means by which specific constituenciesattempt to produce a more desirable social order, remains at its core, conservative insofar as it works to affirm a structure,to authenticate social order, which it then intends to **transmit to the future in the form of its inner Child. That Child remains the perpetual horizon of every acknowledged politics, the fantasmatic beneficiary of every political intervention.** Even proponents of abortion rights, while promoting the freedom of women to control their own bodies through reproductive choice, recurrently frame their political struggle, mirroring their anti-abortion foes, as a "fight for our children -for our daughters and our sons," and thus as a fight for the future.2 What, in that case, would it signify not to be "fighting for the children"? How could one take the other "side," when taking any side at all necessarily constrains one to take the side of, by virtue of taking a side within, a political order that returns to the Child as the image of the future it intends? Impossibly, against all reason, my project stakes its claim to the very space that "politics" makes unthinkable: the space outside the framework within which politics as we know it appears and so outside the conflict of visions that share as their pre· supposition that the body politic must survive. Indeed, at the heart of my polemical engagement with the cultural text of politics and the politics of cultural texts lies a simple provocation: that **queerness names the side of those not “fighting for the children,” the side outside the consensus by which all politics confirms the absolute value of reproductive futurism.** The ups and downs of political fortune may measure the social order’s pulse, but queerness, by contrast, figures, outside and beyond its political symptoms, **the place of the social order’s death drive:** a place, to be sure, of abjection expressed in the stigma, sometimes fatal, that follows from reading that figure literally, and hence a place from which liberal politics strives- and strives quite reasonable, given its unlimited faith in reason, to disassociate the queer. More radically, though, as I argue her, queerness attains its ethical value precisely insofar as it accedes to that place, accepting its figural status as resistance to the viability of the social while insisting on the inextricability of such resistance from every social structure

#### The result is queer overkill – Liberal democracy creates a category of human that excludes the queer. Antiqueer violence manifests to end queer life – a death beyond death – OW extinction through infinite pain

Stanley 11(assistant professor in the Department of Gender and Sexuality Studies at the University of California) <https://queerhistory.files.wordpress.com/2011/06/near-life-queer-death-eric-stanley.pdf> Near Life, Queer Death: Overkill and Ontological Capture. Social Text 107. Vol, 29, No. 2. Duke University Press. Eric Stanley. AQ. Accessed 11/05/18.

Overkill is a term used to indicate such excessive violence that it pushes a body beyond death. Overkill is often determined by the postmortem removal of body parts, as with the partial decapitation in the case of Lauryn Paige and the dissection of Rashawn Brazell. The temporality of violence, the biological time when the heart stops pushing and pulling blood, yet the killing is not finished, suggests the aim is not simply the end of a specific life, but the ending of all queer life. This is the time of queer death, when the utility of violence gives way to the pleasure in the other’s mortality. If queers, along with others, approximate nothing, then the task of ending, of killing, that which is nothing must go beyond normative times of life and death. In other words, if Lauryn was dead after the first few stab wounds to the throat, then what do the remaining fifty wounds signify? The legal theory that is offered to nullify the practice of overkill often functions under the name of the trans- or gay-panic defense. Both of these defense strategies argue that the murderer became so enraged after the “discovery” of either genitalia or someone’s sexuality they were forced to protect themselves from the threat of queerness. Estanislao Martinez of Fresno, California, used the trans-panic defense and received a four-year prison sentence after admittedly stabbing J. Robles, a Latina transwoman, at least twenty times with a pair of scissors. Importantly, this defense is often used, as in the cases of Robles and Paige, after the murderer has engaged in some kind of sex with the victim. The logic of the trans-panic defense as an explanation for overkill, in its gory semiotics, offers us a way of understanding queers as the nothing of Mbembe’s query. Overkill names the technologies necessary to do away with that which is already gone. Queers then are the specters of life whose threat is so unimaginable that one is “forced,” not simply to murder, but to push them backward out of time, out of History, and into that which comes before. 27 In thinking the overkill of Paige and Brazell, I return to Mbembe’s query, “But what does it mean to do violence to what is nothing?”28 This question in its elegant brutality repeats with each case I offer. By resituating this question in the positive, the “something” that is more often than not translated as the human is made to appear. Of interest here, the category of the human assumes generality, yet can only be activated through the specificity of historical and politically located intersection. To this end, the human, the “something” of this query, within the context of the liberal democracy, names rights-bearing subjects, or those who can stand as subjects before the law. The human, then, makes the nothing not only possible but necessary. Following this logic, the work of death, of the death that is already nothing, not quite human, binds the categorical (mis)recognition of humanity. The human, then, resides in the space of life and under the domain of rights, whereas the queer inhabits the place of compromised personhood and the zone of death. As perpetual and axiomatic threat to the human, the queer is the negated double of the subject of liberal democracy. Understanding the nothing as the unavoidable shadow of the human serves to counter the arguments that suggest overkill and antiqueer violence at large are a pathological break and that the severe nature of these killings signals something extreme. In contrast, overkill is precisely not outside of, but is that which constitutes liberal democracy as such. Overkill then is the proper expression to the riddle of the queer nothingness. Put another way, the spectacular material-semiotics of overkill should not be read as (only) individual pathology; these vicious acts must indict the very social worlds of which they are ambassadors. Overkill is what it means, what it must mean, to do violence to what is nothing.

#### Vote negative to affirm the weaponization of queerness to turn the death drive and kill the Child accepting present destruction than future annihilation. Thus the role of the ballot is to vote for the debater with the best method of traversing the fantasy for a chance of social life within social death

Baedan 12 baedan, 2012, “baedan,” Journal of Queer Nihilism, The Anarchist Library, <https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/baedan-baedan> //Lex AKo™

The campaign promises a fulfilling world which exists beyond the nightmare of high school, yet somehow fails to mention the waking nightmares of debt, work, family, disease, depression and anxiety which the future must surely deliver. Of these videos the most vile and perhaps the most telling is a recent release by the San Francisco Police Department depicting queer police officers telling their coming-out stories and assuring the viewers of the better future to come. Along with these assurances, they further implore queer youth to call on the police department if in need, declaring “it will get better, and until it does, we’ll be here for you.” The future will continue its mirage-like spectacle, promising redemption yet continually deferring its delivery. The further we progress down its path, the farther we’ll be from the utopia it teases us with. We’ll consistently arrive where we imagined the future would take us, only to 22 find that the desert of modern life continues to stretch out in every direction—that the passage of time has continued to deliver us up anew for pure repetition of the same: the same exploitation, alienation, depression, meaninglessness. If queerness is to be our weapon, we must fanatically avoid any tendency toward reproductive futurism that would dull our daggers. We must refuse the institutions of the future, whether high schools or police departments, that eternally immiserate our present. If we are to cease the skyward growth of the pile of queer bodies sacrificed at the feet of the future, we must silence the chorus of it-gets-betters and attack, here and now, at whatever is making it unbearable. If it is our intention to participate in insurrection against domestication and capital’s futurity, we mustn’t be deceived by the fleeing utopias of reproductive futurism. Instead we must situate ourselves within our present, and studiously explore the methods of sabotage, interruption, expropriation and destruction than refuse futurity’s domination. Or, as Edelman puts it: If the fate of the queer is to figure the fate that cuts the thread of futurity… then the only oppositional status to which our queerness could ever lead would depend on our taking seriously the place of the death drive we’re called on to figure and insisting, against the cult of the Child and the political order it reinforces, that we, as Guy Hocquenghem made clear, are “not the signifier of what might become a new form of ‘social organization,’” that we do not intend a new politics, a better society, a brighter tomorrow, since all of these fantasies reproduce the past, through displacement, in the form of the future. We choose instead not to choose the Child, as disciplinary image of the Imaginary past or as site of a projective identification with an always impossible future. The queerness we propose, in Hocquenghem’s words, “is unaware of the passing of generations as stages on the road to better living. It knows nothing about ‘sacrifice now for the sake of future generations… it knows that civilization alone is mortal.” Even more: it delights in that mortality as the negation of everything that would define itself, moralistically, as pro-life. It is we who must bury the subject in the tomb-like hollow of the signifier, pronouncing at last the words for which we’re condemned should we speak them or not: that we are the advocates of abortion; that the Child as futurity’s emblem must die; that the future is mere repetition and just as lethal as the past. Our queerness has nothing to offer a symbolic that lives by denying that nothingness except an insistence on the haunting excess that this nothingness entails, an insistence of the negativity that pierces the fantasy screen of futurity, shattering narrative temporality with irony’s always explosive force. And so what is queerest about us, queerest within us, and queerest despite us is this willingness to insist intransitively—to insist that the future stops here.