

## 1

#### Interp: Debaters must disclose round reports on the 2021-2022 NDCA LD wiki for every round they have debated this season. Round reports disclose which positions (AC, NC, K, T, Theory, etc.) were read/gone for in every speech.

#### Violation: screenshot in the doc – they have none – look in the round reports column





#### Standards:

#### 1] Level Playing Field – big schools can go around and collect flows but independents are left in the dark so round reports are key for them to prep- they give you an idea of overall what layers debaters like going for so you can best prepare your strategy against them. Accessibility first and independent voter – it's an impact multiplier.

#### 2] Strategy Education – round reports help novices understand the context in which positions are read by good debaters and help with brainstorming potential 1NCs vs affs – helps compensate for kids who can't afford coaches to prep out affs.

#### 3] Pre-round prep –1ARs gives especially give an idea of what type of debater someone is – they could go for 1AR theory every round– otherwise I enter every round unknowing whereas you have an idea of what you want to go for from the start – key to good clash

#### [1] DTD on 1ac theory and disclosure – a) disclosure cannot be drop the argument because it would just drop you because you’re the norm b) deterrence

#### [2] No RVI on ac theory – otherwise the neg would dump for 7 mins on a shell and moot the possibility of a 1ar out – any reason why they get an rvi is nonunique because you would have to respond to 6 minutes of the 1AC regardless of if its theory or a contention

#### [3] Competing Interps – 1] reasonability is arbitrary – impossible to know what is reasonable until you establish a brightline 2] bites judge intervention cuz they have to gut check what they think is good 3] reasonability collapses cuz u use offense defense to evaluate offense under the BL 4] norms – you can sidestep norms by selectively choosing a different brightline you meet every round.

#### [4] Fairness is a voter because debate is a game governed by rules and you can’t tell who actually won if the layer was skewed.

**1AC – China**

**1AC – Footnote**

Counter Solvency Advocates –

XI Lashout DA –

[Neel V. Patel, Neel is a space reporter for MIT Technology Review. 1-21-2021, "China’s surging private space industry is out to challenge the US," MIT Technology Review, <https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/01/21/1016513/china-private-commercial-space-industry-dominance/> accessed 12/14/21] Adam

Space Commercialization DA –

Klein 19, John J. Understanding space strategy: the art of war in space. Routledge, 2019. (a Senior Fellow and Strategist at Falcon Research, Inc. and Adjunct Professor at George Washington University’s Space Policy Institute) *Elmer*

Innovation DA –

Joshua Hampson 1-25-2017 "The Future of Space Commercialization" <https://republicans-science.house.gov/sites/republicans.science.house.gov/files/documents/TheFutureofSpaceCommercializationFinal.pdf> (Security Studies Fellow at the Niskanen Center) *Elmer*

**1AC – Plan**

**Plan: The Peoples Republic of China ought to prohibit appropriation of space by private entities.**

**1AC – Adv**

**The Advantage is Primacy.**

**The US is in the lead now but China’s set to surpass – space becomes a new frontier for war, influence, and property.**

**Kharpal 21** [Arjun Kharpal, 5-29-2021, “China once said it couldn’t put a potato in space. Now it’s eyeing Mars,” CNBC, [https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/30/china-space-goals-ccp-100th-anniversary.html //](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/30/china-space-goals-ccp-100th-anniversary.html%20//) JB]

GUANGZHOU, China — In 1957, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, the first artificial satellite, which sparked a space race with the U.S. China, however, was nowhere to be seen. While the U.S. and the Soviet Union were battling for superiority in this new domain, Mao Zedong, one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party (**CCP**), reportedly **said**: “**China cannot even put a potato in space**.” Fast forward more than six decades and President [**Xi** Jinping](https://www.cnbc.com/xi-jinping/), China’s current leader, **is seen congratulating** [three **astronauts** who were sent](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/17/china-launches-first-astronauts-to-its-self-developed-space-station.html) to the country’s own **space station** earlier this month. Since Mao’s comments, [**China** has **launched satellites**](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/23/beidou-china-completes-rival-to-the-us-owned-gps-system.html), sent humans to space and is **now**[**planning to build a base on Mars**](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/24/china-plans-to-send-its-first-crewed-mission-to-mars-in-2033.html)**, achievements** and ambitions Beijing has highlighted as the **centennial of the CCP’s founding approaches**. Space is now another **battleground between the U.S. and China** amid a **broader technological rivalry for supremacy**, one that could have **scientific and military implications on Earth**. “President **Xi** Jinping has **declared that China’s ‘Space Dream’ is to overtake all nations and become the leading space power by 2045**,” said Christopher Newman, professor of space law and policy at the U.K.’s Northumbria University. “This all feeds into **China’s ambition to be the world’s single science and technology superpower**.” In March, [China highlighted space as a “frontier technology”](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/05/china-to-focus-on-frontier-tech-from-chips-to-quantum-computing.html) it would focus on and research into the “origin and evolution of the universe.” But there are other implications too. “It is important for China and the US because it can advance **technological development**” in areas such as “**national security** and some **socioeconomic development**,” according to Sa’id Mosteshar, director of the London Institute of Space Policy and Law, and research fellow Christoph Beischl. While experts doubt it could spiral into war in space, **extra-terrestrial activities** can support **military operations on Earth**. Space achievements are also about the optics. Through **space exploration** to the Moon or to Mars, “China and the U.S. display their technological sophistication to the domestic audience and the world, increasing their domestic and **international prestige, domestic legitimacy** and **international influence**,” Mosteshar and Beischl said. China’s space program kicked off in the late 1950s but it was only recently that the world’s second-largest economy was able to tout major successes. In June last year, **China** [completed its own global **satellite** navigation system called **Beidou**](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/23/beidou-china-completes-rival-to-the-us-owned-gps-system.html), a rival to the U.S. government-owned Global Positioning System (GPS). [Experts said](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/22/beidou-china-aims-to-complete-gps-system-that-rivals-us.html) it will **help China’s military systems** stay **online in the event of a conflict**. In December, a Chinese spacecraft returned to Earth [carrying rock samples from the moon](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/17/china-brings-moon-rocks-back-to-earth-in-a-first-for-the-country.html), a first for the country. Last month, [China sent a crewed mission](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/17/china-launches-first-astronauts-to-its-self-developed-space-station.html) to its self-developed space station which is [still being built](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/04/29/china-launches-key-module-of-space-station-planned-for-2022-.html). It was China’s first time sending humans to space since 2016. Beijing has now turned its sight on Mars. [China hopes to send its first crewed mission to the Red Planet in 2033](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/24/china-plans-to-send-its-first-crewed-mission-to-mars-in-2033.html) after landing a [spacecraft there in May](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/05/15/china-completes-historic-mars-spacecraft-landing.html). China has been a lot more aggressive in recent years in **filing for patents** related to space technologies as it **sets up for** some of these **future missions**. Between January 2000 and June 2021, **Chinese entities filed 6,634 patents related to space travel**, including vehicles and equipment, according to data compiled for CNBC by GreyB, a patent research firm. But nearly 90% of those patent requests were submitted in the last five-and-a-half years. Between January 2016 and June 2021, the top three patent requests came from Chinese entities, followed by U.S. planemaker [Boeing](https://www.cnbc.com/quotes/BA). It highlights how rapidly **China** is hoping to **develop the technologies** required for more advanced space flights. **Patents are seen as one way to help define** and control standards for next-generation technologies — [a goal for China in many different sectors](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/27/china-standards-2035-explained.html), including telecommunications to **artificial intelligence**. “These patents do not just signify the level of innovation in China related to space, but also a well thought of strategy to protect these innovations to gain economic advantage for its space related tech,” said Vikas Jha, assistant vice president for intellectual property solutions at GreyB. “In the near future, **most** of the **patents** in cosmonautics will be **owned by China** (unless others follow suit), meaning **China** can become a **gatekeeper for the use of space tech for both private players and governments**. This is in line with the **Chinese strategy** of become a superpower not just on Earth, but also in space.” The **U.S. and China are already** battling for **dominance** in areas **from semiconductor development to artificial intelligence**. Space will be another frontier, even as the U.S. is dominating in that area for now. “**The United States** remains **ahead** overall in all areas of space capability, **but China is rapidly closing that lead**,” Scott Pace, director of the Space Policy Institute at The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, told CNBC. “The United States has a strong policy for space exploration, a clear direction, and capable allies and partners,” he said. “The challenge for the United States is not so much what China does, but how well and **how quickly the United States implements its own plans**.” But widening **political differences between China and the U.S. can** also **spill** into the space arena. One example is a disagreement last year between the **two nations over** the so-called **Artemis Accords**, an agreement led by NASA that looks to create rules around responsible and fair space exploration. Australia, Canada, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the United Arab Emirates, and the U.K all signed up. China didn’t. “The **polarisation of space activity** along geopolitical lines pause **is a key and possibly existential threat to human space activity**,” Northumbria University’s Newman said. “To China and its allies, the Accords represent an attempt to bypass traditional forum for international decision making,” he added. “It is therefore becoming increasingly **difficult to achieve** the kind of unified **agreements** that are necessary in order **to deal with** problems such as **space debris**, space traffic management and the **exploitation of extra-terrestrial resources**.”

**Appropriation is key to meet China’s goals through space resources and tech**

**Campo 21** [Jose A. Martin del Campo, J.D. Candidate at Texas A&M University School of Law, 3-23-2021, “Finders K Finders Keepers: Who Has Say Over Private Property in Space,” Texas A&M Journal of Property Law, https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1155&context=journal-of-property-law]/Kankee

I. INTRODUCTION On October 4, 1957, the Space Age officially began when the Soviet Union launched Sputnik into orbit, the first successful, human-made satellite.1 A little more than a decade later, on July 20, 1969, American astronauts Neil Armstrong and Edwin “Buzz” Aldrin became the first humans to land and step foot on the moon.2 Neil Armstrong marked the completion of John F. Kenney’s national goal of landing an astronaut on the moon when he radioed back to Earth “[t]hat’s one small step for man, one giant leap for mankind.”3 The launch of Sputnik, the moon landing, and other endeavors achieved by the scientific community, kick-started a chain of events leading to the current ambition of exploring outer space and mining resources throughout the solar system. The push for unlocking low-cost space travel and space industrialization by entrepreneurs, like Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos, propels the search for extraterrestrial materials such as water and minerals.4 According to NASA, minerals found in the asteroid belt between Mars and Jupiter contain an estimated value of approximately $100 billion for every person on Earth.5 However, **uncertainty** lingers because private entities are **unsure** that they will possess **property rights** to their payload or the mined celestial body.6 Celestial bodies refer to naturally occurring objects in space. The United States Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee (“COMSTAC”), an advisory body to the Federal Aviation Administration’s (“FAA”) Office of Commercial Space Transportation (“FAA-AST”), has undertaken review regarding the granting of private property licenses.7 COMSTAC expressed a desire to confirm that private entity resource extractions may be owned and utilized as it deems appropriate.8 The current framework of space law is a combination of agreements with the foundation of space law consisting of the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (“Outer Space Treaty”).9 At the time of signing, the Outer Space Treaty hoped to foster cooperative and peaceful exploration of outer space without discrimination of any kind.10 However, **Article II** of the **O**uter **S**pace **T**reaty contains the bane of private property rights in outer space, which **forbids** the **national appropriation** of the moon and other celestial bodies.11 While the Outer Space Treaty explicitly mentions the prohibition of public entities claiming celestial bodies, private enterprises risk **failing** to have their interest in property rights **recognized** by the global community. Private entities and investors grapple with the issues pertaining to their rights to mine and extract resources from outer space legally. Without further international **recognition** of their property rights, private entities may **shy away from** exploring the concept of celestial mining. The issue of not knowing what laws are **applicable**, or to whom private companies are accountable, **impedes** the **progress** private entities make in achieving their goal of harvesting extraterrestrial resources. Private entities fear that the **non-appropriation** clause of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, the epicenter of the issue, will **strip** them of the right to transport their mined resources back to Earth. A new legal regime will likely need to be formed that facilitates the continuation of innovation and promotes the exploration of outer space. Whether or not past private and public international doctrines, i.e., the law of the sea, may provide guidance in creating a new doctrine of space law is yet to be determined. The advancement in modern technology, along with the depletion of natural resources, creates a unique opportunity for private entities to resolve this issue through the exploitation of outer space. Space law is once again relevant due to its inadequacies in protecting the property rights of said entities in space. Part II will explore the different treaties and principles that gave rise to space law, and Part III will analyze whether the application of such principles should continue, or if the establishment of a new regime offers a more beneficial long-term solution. Part IV will then explore the structure of a new outer space regime and the enforcement of property rights. II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES INFLUENCING THE DEVELOPMENT OF SPACE LAW

**It’s exponential – more and more companies will follow**

**Jiang Zhao 18** [Shengli Jiang & Yun Zhao (2018) “The Aftermath of the US Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act: What’s Left for China?” [https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c3a4/fb6e0f91f4d8a13ddac4b0f949f6c3afa5c0.pdf //](https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c3a4/fb6e0f91f4d8a13ddac4b0f949f6c3afa5c0.pdf%20//) JB]

Olinga argued that the legal regime prohibiting the **appropriation** of space resources deprives **private entities** of the guarantee for payback of costs invested in the exploration and utilization of space resources, and **makes them lose** the driving force of further conducting the **exploration** and utilization.81 As a consequence, whole activities of **exploring** and utilizing space resources could **get into** the trouble of **slow development** or even **stagnation**. Therefore, it is strongly argued that **private entities should be granted** the right of **appropriation over space resources**, so that **they may engage in** the **exploration** and utilization of **space resources more positively**, under the attraction of expected profits to be derived from the exploration and utilization.82 It is necessary **to attract private entities** to engage in the exploration and utilization of space resources, so as **to conform** **to** the current trend of the **booming** development of the commercial **space industry**; maximize the **economic value** of space resources; and stimulate the development of space science and technology in return.83 The negative results from the appropriation of space resources will be far beyond the benefits to be brought thereby. That is, the international rule of law, the peace, and security of outer space should take the priority to the interests from the exploration and utilization of space resources.

**Space becomes a new domain where China establishes primacy and appropriation is their golden ticket**

**Jiang Zhao 18** [Shengli Jiang & Yun Zhao (2018) “The Aftermath of the US Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act: What’s Left for China?” [https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c3a4/fb6e0f91f4d8a13ddac4b0f949f6c3afa5c0.pdf //](https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c3a4/fb6e0f91f4d8a13ddac4b0f949f6c3afa5c0.pdf%20//) JB]

China is a “responsible major country” of **space activities**.96 It should thus take corresponding positions in response to the adoption of the Act. With rapid development of space science and technology, **China** will be ready to **engage** in the exploration and **utilization of space resources** in the near future.97 Space resources have high value but limited quantity. As **space science** and technology **for** exploring and **utilizing** those space **resources** may be used for both **civilian** and **military purposes**, it is necessary for China to firmly **refute** the **legality of granting private entities** the right of **appropriation over space resources** for global common interest. In addition, China should **not** follow the **unilateral approach** of appropriating space resources. Instead, it should actively promote the improvement of the existing space legal regime, taking the leading role in establishing an **international mechanism** governing the exploration and **utilization of space resources**. In this process, China should take full account of due interests of the whole international community in the exploration and utilization of space resources, as well as maintain the international rule of law for the peace and security of outer space.98 On the domestic level, meanwhile, China is in the process of drafting its national space law which will provide legal basis for the space industry.99 This law is expected to clarify the legal status of space resources, the attribution of the right of appropriation, the right to use and profits over space resources, and the rules for the exploration and utilization of space resources by both governmental and private entities. On the international law level, China should play a more active role in the international space law-making process regarding space commercialization and privatization.100 In this course, China is willing to **establish** a **global governance** mechanism for space exploration and utilization. This part will focus on an international mechanism for the space mining activities.

**Scenario 1 is Primacy –**

**Space dominance is key to US hegemony**

**Weichert 17** [(Brandon J., a former Congressional staff member who holds a Master of Arts in Statecraft & National Security Affairs from the Institute of World Politics in Washington, D.C. He is the founder of The Weichert Report: An Online Journal of Geopolitics, and is currently completing a book on national security space policy.) “The High Ground: The Case for U.S. Space Dominance,” Science Direct, 2017. <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0030438717300108>] RR

**The global order is currently disordered.** New states with completely different values from the United States are rising to prominence. Many of those states possess strategic cultures opposed to the American hegemony that has defined the post-Cold War order.

Yet, the United States still maintains greater power, wealth, and capabilities than the other states seeking to displace her. **For the United States to maintain its hegemonic position, it must also maintain a dominant position in space**. As has been noted before, space is the ultimate high ground from which a state can dominate all of the other strategic domains (land, air, sea, and cyberspace). The United States has enjoyed the benefits from dominating this region. Yet, states like China and Russia are moving forward with their own plans not only to deny America access to space, but also to dominate this realm. **These states would then benefit from commanding the high ground of space at America’s expense**.

Since at least the Nixon Administration, space has come to be viewed in a militarized light. By the end of the Cold War, space had not only been militarized, but many were searching for a way to weaponize it. Just as the drift toward militarization of space was inexorable, so too is the desire for weaponization. As rival states begin to hone their space skills, the United States should seek to obtain the first move advantage **by capitalizing on its already sizable lead in space by weaponizing it first**. The placing of weapons in orbit would not only increase the costs of attacking existing U.S. space architecture, but it would also lend itself to increasing global stability by raising the costs of aggressive behavior on belligerents. Whatever negatives the weaponization of space may have, nothing is more negative for America than to find itself losing its dominance of space to a state that has placed weapons in orbit first.

To be passive and allow temporary budgetary constraints to dictate longterm space strategy will damage irrevocably the U.S. position in orbit. Our enemies are aware of our shortsighted preference for space superiority over dominance and are moving toward degrading the American advantage in space.23 Space dominance will not only rebuff rising states from challenging the United States, but it will also **lend stability to the world order**. This proactive stance was the goal of Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative. **It must be the goal of U.S. policymakers today.**24

**Primacy solves arms races, land grabs, rogue states, and great power war.**

**Brands 18** [Hal, Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments." American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump." Page 129-133]

Since World War II, the United States has had a military **second to none**. Since the Cold War, America has **committed** to having **overwhelming military primacy**. The idea, as George W. Bush declared in 2002, that America must possess “strengths beyond challenge” has featured in every major U.S. strategy document for a quarter century; it has also been reflected in concrete terms.6 From the early 1990s, for example, the **U**nited **S**tates consistently accounted for around 35 to 45 percent of world defense spending and maintained **peerless global power-projection capabilities**.7 Perhaps more important, U.S. primacy was also unrivaled in key overseas **strategic regions**—**Europe, East Asia, the Middle East**. From **thrashing Saddam** Hussein’s million-man Iraqi military during Operation Desert Storm, to deploying—with impunity—two carrier strike groups off Taiwan during the China-Taiwan crisis of 1995– 96, Washington has been able to project military power **superior** to anything a **regional rival** could employ even **on its own geopolitical doorstep.** This **military dominance** has constituted the **hard-power backbone** of an ambitious global strategy. After the Cold War, U.S. policymakers committed to averting a return to the **unstable multipolarity** of earlier eras, and to perpetuating the more favorable unipolar order. They committed to building on the successes of the postwar era by further advancing **liberal political values** and an open international **economy**, and to **suppressing** international scourges such as **rogue states**, **nuclear proliferation**, and catastrophic **terrorism**. And because they recognized that military force remained the ultima ratio regum, they understood the **centrality** of military preponderance. Washington would **need** the **military power** necessary to **underwrite** worldwide **alliance commitments**. It would have to preserve **substantial overmatch** versus any potential **great-power rival.** It must be able to answer the sharpest challenges to the international system, such as Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 or jihadist extremism after 9/11. Finally, because prevailing global **norms** generally reflect **hard-power realities**, America would need the superiority to assure that its own **values remained ascendant**. It was impolitic to say that U.S. strategy and the international order required “**strengths beyond challenge**,” but it was not at all inaccurate. American primacy, moreover, was eminently affordable. At the height of the Cold War, the United States spent over 12 percent of GDP on defense. Since the mid-1990s, the number has usually been between 3 and 4 percent.8 In a historically favorable international environment, Washington could enjoy primacy—and its geopolitical fruits—on the cheap. Yet U.S. strategy also heeded, at least until recently, the fact that there was a limit to how cheaply that primacy could be had. The American military did shrink significantly during the 1990s, but U.S. officials understood that if Washington cut back too far, its primacy would erode to a point where it ceased to deliver its geopolitical benefits. **Alliances** would **lose credibility**; the stability of key **regions** would be **eroded**; **rivals would be emboldened**; **international crises would go unaddressed**. American primacy was thus like a **reasonably priced insurance policy**. It required nontrivial expenditures, but protected against far costlier outcomes.9 Washington paid its insurance premiums for two decades after the Cold War. But more recently American primacy and strategic solvency have been imperiled. THE DARKENING HORIZON For most of the post–Cold War era, the international system was— by historical standards—remarkably benign. Dangers existed, and as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated, they could manifest with horrific effect. But for two decades after the Soviet collapse, the world was characterized by **remarkably low levels of great-power competition,** high levels of **security** in key theaters such as **Europe** and **East Asia**, and the **comparative weakness** of those “**rogue” actors**—Iran, Iraq, North Korea, al-Qaeda—who most aggressively challenged American power. During the 1990s, some observers even spoke of a “strategic pause,” the idea being that the end of the Cold War had afforded the United States a respite from normal levels of geopolitical danger and competition. Now, however, **the strategic horizon is darkening**, due to four factors. First, **great-power military competition is back**. The world’s two leading authoritarian powers—**China** and **Russia**—are seeking **regional hegemony**, contesting global norms such as nonaggression and freedom of navigation, and developing the **military punch** to underwrite these ambitions. Notwithstanding severe economic and demographic problems, Russia has conducted a major military **modernization** emphasizing **nuclear weapons**, high-end conventional capabilities, and rapid-deployment and special operations forces— and utilized many of these capabilities in conflicts in Ukraine and Syria.10 China, meanwhile, has carried out a **buildup of historic proportions,** with constant-dollar defense outlays rising from US$26 billion in 1995 to US$226 billion in 2016.11 Ominously, these expenditures have funded development of **power-projection** and antiaccess/area denial (**A2/AD) tools** necessary to threaten China’s neighbors and complicate U.S. intervention on their behalf. Washington has grown accustomed to having a generational military lead; Russian and Chinese modernization efforts are now creating a **far more competitive environment.** Second, the **international outlaws** are no longer so **weak**. **North Korea’s** conventional forces have atrophied, but it has amassed a growing **nuclear arsenal** and is developing an intercontinental delivery capability that will soon allow it to threaten not just America’s regional allies but also the **continental United States**.12 **Iran** remains a **nuclear threshold state,** one that continues to develop ballistic missiles and A2/AD capabilities while employing **sectarian** and **proxy forces** across the Middle East. The Islamic State, for its part, is headed for defeat, but has displayed military capabilities **unprecedented** for any **terrorist group**, and shown that **counterterrorism** will continue to place **significant operational demands** on U.S. forces whether in this context or in others. Rogue actors have long preoccupied American planners, but **the rogues are now more capable** than at any time in decades. Third, the **democratization of technology** has allowed more actors to **contest American superiority** in dangerous ways. The spread of **antisatellite** and **cyberwarfare** capabilities; the proliferation of man-portable air defense systems and ballistic missiles; the increasing availability of key elements of the precision-strike complex— these phenomena have had a **military leveling effect** by giving weaker actors **capabilities** which were **formerly unique** to technologically advanced states. As such technologies “**proliferate worldwide**,” Air Force Chief of Staff General David Goldfein commented in 2016, “the **technology** and **capability gaps** between America and our adversaries are **closing dangerously fast**.”13 Indeed, as these capabilities spread, fourth-generation systems (such as F-15s and F-16s) may provide **decreasing utility** against even **non-great-power competitors**, and **far more fifth-generation capabilities may be needed to perpetuate American overmatch**. Finally, the number of challenges has **multiplied**. During the 1990s and early 2000s, Washington faced rogue states and jihadist extremism—but not intense great-power rivalry. America faced conflicts in the Middle East—but East Asia and Europe were comparatively secure. Now, the old threats still exist—but the more **permissive conditions** have **vanished**. The **U**nited **S**tates confronts **rogue states**, lethal **jihadist organizations**, and **great-power competition**; there are severe challenges in all **three Eurasian theaters**. “I don’t **recall a time** when we have been confronted with a **more diverse array of threats**, whether it’s the nation state threats posed by **Russia** and **China** and particularly their substantial nuclear capabilities, or non-nation states of the likes of ISIL, Al Qaida, etc.,” Director of National Intelligence James Clapper commented in 2016. Trends in the strategic landscape constituted a veritable “**litany of doom**.”14 The United States thus faces not just more significant, but also more numerous, challenges to its **military dominance** than it has for at least a **quarter century**.

**Chinese leadership in technology causes extinction.**

**Kroenig 18** [Matthew, Associate Professor of Government and Foreign Service at Georgetown University and Deputy Director for Strategy in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council, and Bharath Gopalaswamy, Director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council, holds a PhD in mechanical engineering with a specialization in numerical acoustics from Trinity College, Dublin, Nov 2018, “Will disruptive technology cause nuclear war?”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, [https://thebulletin.org/2018/11/will-disruptive-technology-cause-nuclear-war](https://thebulletin.org/2018/11/will-disruptive-technology-cause-nuclear-war/)]

Recently, analysts have argued that emerging technologies with military applications may undermine nuclear stability (see here, here, and here), but the logic of these arguments is debatable and overlooks a more straightforward reason why new technology might cause **nuclear conflict**: by **upending** the **existing balance of power** among nuclear-armed states. This latter concern is more probable and dangerous and demands an immediate policy response. For more than 70 years, the world has avoided major power conflict, and many attribute this era of peace to nuclear weapons. In situations of mutually assured destruction (MAD), neither side has an incentive to start a conflict because doing so will only result in its own annihilation. The key to this model of deterrence is the maintenance of secure second-strike capabilities—the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and respond with a devastating counterattack. Recently analysts have begun to worry, however, that new strategic military technologies may make it possible for a state to conduct a successful first strike on an enemy. For example, Chinese colleagues have complained to me in Track II dialogues that the United States may decide to launch a sophisticated cyberattack against Chinese nuclear command and control, essentially turning off China’s nuclear forces. Then, Washington will follow up with a massive strike with conventional cruise and hypersonic missiles to destroy China’s nuclear weapons. Finally, if any Chinese forces happen to survive, the United States can simply mop up China’s ragged retaliatory strike with advanced missile defenses. China will be disarmed and US nuclear weapons will still be sitting on the shelf, untouched. If the United States, or any other state acquires such a first-strike capability, then the logic of MAD would be undermined. Washington may be tempted to launch a nuclear first strike. Or China may choose instead to use its nuclear weapons early in a conflict before they can be wiped out—the so-called “use ‘em or lose ‘em” problem. According to this logic, therefore, the appropriate policy response would be to ban outright or control any new weapon systems that might threaten second-strike capabilities. This way of thinking about new technology and stability, however, is open to question. Would any US president truly decide to launch a massive, bolt-out-of-the-blue nuclear attack because he or she thought s/he could get away with it? And why does it make sense for the country in the inferior position, in this case China, to intentionally start a nuclear war that it will almost certainly lose? More important, this conceptualization of how new technology affects stability is too narrow, focused exclusively on how new military technologies might be used against nuclear forces directly. Rather, we should think more broadly about how new technology might affect global politics, and, for this, it is helpful to turn to scholarly international relations theory. The **dominant theory** of the causes of war in the academy is the “**bargaining model of war**.” This theory identifies **rapid shifts** in the **balance of power** as a **primary cause of conflict**. International politics often presents states with conflicts that they can settle through peaceful bargaining, but when bargaining breaks down, war results. Shifts in the **balance of power** are problematic because they **undermine effective bargaining**. After all, why agree to a deal today if your bargaining position will be stronger tomorrow? And, a clear understanding of the military balance of power can contribute to peace. (Why start a war you are likely to lose?) But shifts in the balance of power muddy understandings of which states have the advantage. You may see where this is going. New technologies threaten to create potentially **destabilizing shifts** in the balance of power. For decades, stability in Europe and Asia has been supported by US military power. In recent years, however, the balance of power in Asia has begun to shift, as **China has increased its military capabilities**. Already, Beijing has become more assertive in the region, claiming contested territory in the South China Sea. And the results of Russia’s military modernization have been on full display in its ongoing intervention in Ukraine. Moreover, China may have the lead over the United States in emerging technologies that could be **decisive** for the future of **military acquisitions** and **warfare**, including 3D printing, hypersonic missiles, quantum computing, 5G wireless connectivity, and artificial intelligence (AI). And Russian President Vladimir Putin is building new unmanned vehicles while ominously declaring, “Whoever leads in AI will rule the world.” If China or Russia are able to incorporate new technologies into their militaries before the United States, then this could lead to the kind of rapid shift in the balance of power that often causes war. If Beijing believes emerging technologies provide it with a newfound, local military advantage over the United States, for example, it may be more willing than previously **to initiate conflict over Taiwan**. And if Putin thinks new tech has strengthened his hand, he may be more tempted to launch a Ukraine-style invasion of a NATO member. Either scenario could bring these **nuclear powers into direct conflict** with the United States, and **once nuclear armed states are at war**, there is an **inherent risk** of **nuclear conflict** through limited nuclear war strategies, nuclear **brinkmanship**, or simple **accident** or **inadvertent escalation**. This framing of the problem leads to a different set of policy implications. The concern is not simply technologies that threaten to undermine nuclear second-strike capabilities directly, but, rather, any technologies that can result in a meaningful shift in the broader balance of power. And the solution is not to preserve second-strike capabilities, but to **preserve prevailing power balances** more broadly. When it comes to new technology, this means that the United States should seek to maintain an innovation edge. Washington should also work with other states, including its nuclear-armed rivals, to develop a **new set of arms control** and nonproliferation agreements and export controls to deny these newer and potentially destabilizing technologies to potentially hostile states. These are no easy tasks, but the consequences of Washington losing the race for **technological superiority** to its **autocratic challengers** just might mean **nuclear Armageddon**.

**Reject heg bad arguments – their evidence is epistemologically suspect**

**Gilsinan 20** [(Kathy, a St. Louis-based contributing writer at The Atlantic. Her book, The Helpers: Profiles From the Front Lines of the Pandemic, comes out in March 2022. She was previously an editor at World Politics Review.) “How China Is Planning to Win Back the World” The Atlantic, 5/28/2020. https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/05/china-disinformation-propaganda-united-states-xi-jinping/612085/] BC

This was a bizarre salvo in China’s propaganda war with the United States over the coronavirus, and it showcased Beijing’s latest information weaponry. **Misleading spin, obfuscation, concealment, and hyperbole have been hallmarks of the Chinese Communist Party’s propaganda campaign**, before and during the coronavirus era. But the pandemic appears to have given rise to more forceful attacks on foreign governments, as well as a **new level of flirtation with outright disinformation.**

The party has never waged a global struggle quite like this one—**and its battle with the U.S.** over where the virus came from and whose failures made the pandemic worse have marked a serious deterioration in the two countries’ ties. Just months ago, Trump was praising Xi Jinping for how he handled the outbreak; now Trump is toying with cutting off relations with the Chinese government altogether.

Seven decades ago, Mao Zedong publicly embraced a benevolent view of propaganda, as if he were a latter-day prophet spreading the communist gospel: “**We should carry on constant propaganda among the people on the facts of world progress and the bright future ahead so that they will build their confidence in victory**,” he mused in 1945. Just a few months ago, **Xi Jinping urged state journalists to spread “positive propaganda” for the “correct guidance of public opinion.”** Indeed, Beijing’s global propaganda efforts in recent years have been more about promoting China’s virtues than about spreading **acrimony** and **confusion**, à la Russian information ops and election meddling. Moscow wants a weakened and divided West, one that leaves Russia free to dominate its self-appointed sphere of influence—but Russia in 2016 was also an economically sluggish, oil-dependent nation with an economy a tenth the size of America’s, and lacked the resources to remake the world in its image.

**Beijing has a much bigger prize in mind and a much longer-term plan to get it: The contest isn’t about who gets to run the U.S. It’s about who deserves to run the world**. And China, with its economy poised to overtake that of the United States, **has already plowed billions into crafting an image as a responsible global leader**, and billions more into **cultivating global dependence on Chinese investments and Chinese markets.**

“While the [Chinese Communist Party] has long sought to be a global influencer, their efforts today are aggressive and sophisticated,” Bill Evanina, the director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, wrote in an email. “In short, they’re looking to reshape the history of coronavirus and protect their reputation at home and around the world.”

Before the coronavirus hit, the party was becoming bolder in its propaganda efforts overseas as China grew richer and more powerful, trying to promote around the world the orthodoxy it enforced at home, about the **beneficence and goodness of the CCP**. This involved publicizing Chinese investments in the developing world, arm-twisting diplomats to toe a pro-China line, ruthlessly trying to stifle even other countries’ freedom to dissent—to the point of sanctioning Norway in 2010 when the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded its peace prize to the imprisoned democracy activist Liu Xiaobo, who died in 2017. Xi has elevated the role of propaganda even further as he has vowed to build China’s power and prosperity, declaring, “The superiority of our system will be fully demonstrated through a brighter future.”

The coronavirus outbreak and the global outcry against China’s failures of transparency and containment were not part of the plan. They sparked an international backlash that, by Beijing’s reported reckoning, was worse than anything it had faced since the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. So Beijing leaped to seize, or at least confuse, the global story of the virus and its cast of heroes and villains.

This has involved unleashing techniques Russia perfected during the U.S. presidential election in 2016. “We’ve seen China adopt Russian-style social media manipulation tactics like using bots and trolls to amplify disinformation on COVID-19,” Lea Gabrielle, the special envoy and coordinator for the State Department’s Global Engagement Center, wrote to me in an email. “Both countries repress information within their countries while taking advantage of the open and free information environments in democracies to push conspiracy theories that seek to undermine those environments.”

As the world realized the virus was spreading out of control, Chinese diplomats, official media, and Twitter influencers launched an aggressive frenzy of defense, scrambling to preserve the Chinese Communist Party’s cratering reputation at home and overseas. And then they went on offense, with an assist from perhaps thousands of fake or hacked Twitter accounts, according to the investigative site ProPublica. The result was a coordinated campaign of attacks on the United States, and the spread of disinformation and confusion about where the virus really came from and whose screwup it was, really, that led to so much death.

Other countries’ faltering responses to the virus have only bolstered this narrative, and the CCP has gleefully trumpeted America’s failures in particular. “Loose political system in the US allows more than 4000 people to die of pandemic every day,” Hu Xijin, the editor in chief of the Global Times newspaper, tweeted in April. “Americans are so good tempered.” **Beyond the immediate crisis, this kind of narrative also serves the longer-term goal.** In the words of Matt Schrader, a former China analyst with the Alliance for Securing Democracy at the German Marshall Fund: “**Ultimately it’s about the [Chinese Communist Party] being the most powerful political entity on the planet.”**

The CCP has evolved in its themes and tactics over the course of the coronavirus information war so far, as it battles to bolster its own reputation and **degrade that of the United States**. The campaign has been widespread and highly focused at the same time. **And the party has grown even more emboldened in the belief that it’s too big to fail, and that the reeling world may condemn it but still depends on it.**

**1AC – Framing**

**I value morality.**

**The metaethic is naturalism.**

**The standard is act hedonistic util.**

**[1] Pleasure and pain are the starting point for moral reasoning—they’re our most baseline desires and the only things that explain the intrinsic value of objects or actions**

**Moen 16**, Ole Martin (PhD, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo). "An Argument for Hedonism." Journal of Value Inquiry 50.2 (2016): 267.

Let us start by observing, empirically, that **a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value** and disvalue **is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable**. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for **there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels**, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” **are** here **understood inclusively**, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative. 2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store**, I might ask: “What for**?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. **The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good**. 3 As Aristotle observes: “**We never ask** [a man] **what** his **end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself**.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that **if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad**. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that **pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value**. Although **pleasure and pain thus seem to be good candidates for intrinsic value and disvalue**, several objections have been raised against this suggestion: (1) that pleasure and pain have instrumental but not intrinsic value/disvalue; (2) that pleasure and pain gain their value/disvalue derivatively, in virtue of satisfying/frustrating our desires; (3) that there is a subset of pleasures that are not intrinsically valuable (so-called “evil pleasures”) and a subset of pains that are not intrinsically disvaluable (so-called “noble pains”), and (4) that pain asymbolia, masochism, and practices such as wiggling a loose tooth render it implausible that pain is intrinsically disvaluable. I shall argue that these objections fail. Though it is, of course, an open question whether other objections to P1 might be more successful, I shall assume that if (1)–(4) fail, we are justified in believing that P1 is true itself a paragon of freedom—there will always be some agents able to interfere substantially with one’s choices. The effective level of protection one enjoys, and hence one’s actual degree of freedom, will vary according to multiple factors: how powerful one is, how powerful individuals in one’s vicinity are, how frequent police patrols are, and so on. Now, we saw above that what makes a slave unfree on Pettit’s view is the fact that his master has the power to interfere arbitrarily with his choices; in other words, what makes the slave unfree is the power relation that obtains between his master and him. The difﬁculty is that, in light of the facts I just mentioned, there is no reason to think that this power relation will be unique. A similar relation could obtain between the master and someone other than the slave: absent perfect state control, the master may very well have enough power to interfere in the lives of countless individuals. Yet it would be wrong to infer that these individuals lack freedom in the way the slave does; if they lack anything, it seems to be security. A problematic power relation can also obtain between the slave and someone other than the master, since there may be citizens who are more powerful than the master and who can therefore interfere with the slave’s choices at their discretion. Once again, it would be wrong to infer that these individuals make the slave unfree in the same way that the master does. Something appears to be missing from Pettit’s view. If I live in a particularly nasty part of town, then it may turn out that, when all the relevant factors are taken into account, I am just as vulnerable to outside interference as are the slaves in the royal palace, yet it does not follow that our conditions are equivalent from the point of view of freedom. As a matter of fact, we may be equally vulnerable to outside interference, but as a matter of right, our standings could not be more different. I have legal recourse against anyone who interferes with my freedom; the recourse may not be very effective—presumably it is not, if my overall vulnerability to outside interference is comparable to that of a slave— but I still have full legal standing.68 By contrast, the slave lacks legal recourse against the interventions of one speciﬁc individual: his master. It is that fact, on a Kantian view—a fact about the legal relation in which a slave stands to his master—that sets slaves apart from freemen. The point may appear trivial, but it does get something right: whereas one cannot identify a power relation that obtains uniquely between a slave and his master, the legal relation between them is undeniably unique. A master’s right to interfere with respect to his slave does not extend to freemen, regardless of how vulnerable they might be as a matter of fact, and citizens other than the master do not have the right to order the slave around, regardless of how powerful they might be. This suggests that Kant is correct in thinking that the ideal of freedom is essentially linked to a person’s having full legal standing. More speciﬁcally, he is correct in holding that the importance of rights is not exhausted by their contribution to the level of protection that an individual enjoys, as it must be on an instrumental view like Pettit’s. Although it does matter that rights be enforced with reasonable effectiveness, the sheer fact that one has adequate legal rights is essential to one’s standing as a free citizen. In this respect, Kant stays faithful to the idea that freedom is primarily a matter of standing—a standing that the freeman has and that the slave lacks. Pettit himself frequently insists on the idea, but he fails to do it justice when he claims that freedom is simply a matter of being adequately (and reliably) shielded against the strength of others. As Kant recognizes, the standing of a free citizen is a more complex matter than that. One could perhaps worry that the idea of legal standing is something of a red herring here—that it must ultimately be reducible to a complex network of power relations and, hence, that the position I attribute to Kant differs only nominally from Pettit’s. That seems to me doubtful. Viewing legal standing as essential to freedom makes sense only if our conception of the former includes conceptions of what constitutes a fully adequate scheme of legal rights, appropriate legal recourse, justiﬁed punishment, and so on. Only if one believes that these notions all boil down to power relations will Kant’s position appear similar to Pettit’s. On any other view—and certainly that includes most views recently defended by philosophers—the notion of legal standing will outstrip the power relations that ground Pettit’s theory.

**[2] Extinction is bad and outweighs**

**MacAskill 14** [William, Oxford Philosopher and youngest tenured philosopher in the world, Normative Uncertainty, 2014]

The human race might go extinct from a number of causes: asteroids, supervolcanoes, runaway climate change, pandemics, nuclear war, and the development and use of dangerous new technologies such as synthetic biology, all pose risks (even if very small) to the continued survival of the human race.184 And different moral views give opposing answers to question of whether this would be a good or a bad thing. It might seem obvious that human extinction would be a very bad thing, both because of the loss of potential future lives, and because of the loss of the scientific and artistic progress that we would make in the future. But the issue is at least unclear. The continuation of the human race would be a mixed bag: inevitably, it would involve both upsides and downsides. And if one regards it as much more important to avoid bad things happening than to promote good things happening then one could plausibly regard human extinction as a good thing.For example, one might regard the prevention of bads as being in general more important that the promotion of goods, as defended historically by G. E. Moore,185 and more recently by Thomas Hurka.186 One could weight the prevention of suffering as being much more important that the promotion of happiness. Or one could weight the prevention of objective bads, such as war and genocide, as being much more important than the promotion of objective goods, such as scientific and artistic progress. If the human race continues its future will inevitably involve suffering as well as happiness, and objective bads as well as objective goods. So, if one weights the bads sufficiently heavily against the goods, or if one is sufficiently pessimistic about humanity’s ability to achieve good outcomes, then one will regard human extinction as a good thing.187 However, even if we believe in a moral view according to which human extinction would be a good thing, we still have strong reason to prevent near-term human extinction. To see this, we must note three points. First, we should note that the extinction of the human race is an extremely high stakes moral issue. Humanity could be around for a very long time: if humans survive as long as the median mammal species, we will last another two million years. On this estimate, the number of humans in existence in the The future, given that we don’t go extinct any time soon, would be 2×10^14. So if it is good to bring new people into existence, then it’s very good to prevent human extinction. Second, human extinction is by its nature an irreversible scenario. If we continue to exist, then we always have the option of letting ourselves go extinct in the future (or, perhaps more realistically, of considerably reducing population size). But if we go extinct, then we can’t magically bring ourselves back into existence at a later date. Third, we should expect ourselves to progress, morally, over the next few centuries, as we have progressed in the past. So we should expect that in a few centuries’ time we will have better evidence about how to evaluate human extinction than we currently have. Given these three factors, it would be better to prevent the near-term extinction of the human race, even if we thought that the extinction of the human race would actually be a very good thing. To make this concrete, I’ll give the following simple but illustrative model. Suppose that we have 0.8 credence that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 0.2 certain that it’s a good thing to produce new people; and the degree to which it is good to produce new people, if it is good, is the same as the degree to which it is bad to produce new people, if it is bad. That is, I’m supposing, for simplicity, that we know that one new life has one unit of value; we just don’t know whether that unit is positive or negative. And let’s use our estimate of 2×10^14 people who would exist in the future, if we avoid near-term human extinction. Given our stipulated credences, the expected benefit of letting the human race go extinct now would be (.8-.2)×(2×10^14) = 1.2×(10^14). Suppose that, if we let the human race continue and did research for 300 years, we would know for certain whether or not additional people are of positive or negative value. If so, then with the credences above we should think it 80% likely that we will find out that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 20% likely that we will find out that it’s a good thing to produce new people. So there’s an 80% chance of a loss of 3×(10^10) (because of the delay of letting the human race go extinct), the expected value of which is 2.4×(10^10). But there’s also a 20% chance of a gain of 2×(10^14), the expected value of which is 4×(10^13). That is, in expected value terms, the cost of waiting for a few hundred years is vanishingly small compared with the benefit of keeping one’s options open while one gains new information.