## FW

### Serial Policy Failure (0.40)

#### The K is a prior question – Orientalism has shaped the way we perceive Asia and form stereotypes. Only challenging the root of the problem ensures effective representations and policy action

Bakli 14 (Sara, Free-lance writer and blogger, Published by Jenn Incorporation, Published April 17 2014, “What is Orientalism, and how is it also racism?”, <http://reappropriate.co/2014/04/what-is-orientalism-and-how-is-it-also-racism/>) RR Jr

A quick consideration of the many anti-Asian stereotypes of today reveal their roots in the over-arching Orientalism that still persists in the West’s conception of the East. We are the Perpetual Foreigner — never quite normal, never quite “one of us”: this is a contemporary recapitulation of the Asian as the “Orientalized Other”. Sexually, many of the gender stereotypes that were first invented during Marco Polo’s time — the hypersexualized lotus blossoms and dragon ladies; the barbaric and cowardly effeminate men — still thrive today. Even the Model Minority myth has its roots in Orientalism: simultaneous awe of exotic Asian cultural traditions that emphasize academia with fear of the intellectual Chinese Yellow Peril threat. Orientalism is frequently mistaken as being synonymous with cultural appropriation and misappropriation because the fantasy of Orientalism has been constructed and reinforced through the misappropriation of exaggerated Eastern cultural traits and practices to build and maintain the East as an exotic place of beauty and terror. When Katy Perry goes all-out geisha, she is invoking and perpetuating the theatre of Orientalism. When challenged, defenders of Orientalism will claim that this theatre is a “love declaration” (as Vincent Vidal writes above), forgetting that these “love declarations” bear little resemblance to the culture from which they are appropriated, and further removes the agency of the East to “represent itself, [thereby preventing] true understanding”, as Said writes. Furthermore, Orientalism refers not just to the cultural appropriation, but to the impact this appropriation has on our percepetion of Asia and Asian-ness. Orientalism is more fundamentally the positioning of Asian people as the proverbial “Other”, always serving as a counter-point to the normative West, forever an orbiting satellite, never able to define itself for itself within the Western cannon. Orientalism eternally casts the Asian person as stereotype, and never allows the Asian body to be “normal”.

### Try or Die (0.55)

#### The ROB is to engage and critique orientalism. We control uniqueness – Orientalism as a social construct is still perpetuated through academic discourse, flips try or die because the debate space is one of our last fighting grounds

Said 85 (Edward, literary theoretician, professor of English, history and comparative literature at Columbia University, Published in 1985, Page 90-91, “Orientalism Reconsidered”, <http://courses.arch.vt.edu/courses/wdunaway/gia5524/said85.pdf>) RR Jr

Now let me quickly sketch the two sets of problems I'd like to deal with here. As a department of thought and expertise, Orientalism of course refers to several overlapping domains: firstly, the changing historical and cultural relationship between Europe and Asia, a relationship with a 4000 year old history; secondly, the scientific discipline in the West according to which beginning in the early 19th century one specialized in the study of various Oriental cultures and traditions; and, thirdly, the ideological suppositions, images, and fantasies about a currently important and politically urgent region of the world called the Orient. The relatively common denominator between these three aspects of Orientalism is the line separating Occident from Orient, and this, I have argued, is less a fact of nature than it is a fact of human production, which I have called imaginative geography. This is, however, neither to say that the division between Orient and Occident is unchanging nor is it to say that it is simply fictional. It is to say emphatically - that as with all aspects of what Vico calls the world of nations, the Orient and the Occident are facts produced by human beings, and as such must be studied as integral components of the social, and not the divine or natural, world. And because the social world includes the person or subject doing the studying as well as the object or realm being studied, it is imperative to include them both in any consideration of Orientalism, for, obviously enough, there could be no Orientalism without, on the one hand, the Orientalists, and on the other, the Orientals. Far from being a crudely political apprehension of what has been called the problem of Orientalism, this is in reality a fact basic to any theory of interpretation, or hermeneutics. Yet, and this is the first set of problems I want to consider, there is still a remarkable unwillingness to discuss the problems of Orientalism in the political or ethical or even epistemological contexts proper to it. This is as true of professional literary critics who have written about my book, as it is of course of the Orientalists themselves. Since it seems to me patently impossible to dismiss the truth of Orientalism's political origin and its continuing political actuality, we are obliged on intellectual as well as political grounds to investigate the resistance to the politics of Orientalism, a resistance that is richly symptomatic of precisely what is denied

## Links

### Discourse (0:54)

#### Technological discourse isn’t neutral, it’s rooted in a techno-orientalist drive which epitomizes East Asian territories as the locus of modern innovation. Their deployment of targeted discourse in the debate space is emblematic of broader civil discourse against East Asian bodies

Lozano-Mendez 10 (Artur, Undergraduate Student Majoring in East Asian Studies, Published in 2010, “TECHNO-ORIENTALISM IN EAST-ASIAN CONTEXTS: REITERATION, DIVERSIFICATION, ADAPTATION”, pg. 184) RR Jr

Techno-orientalism is an orientalist discourse that the West established hegemonically at a global scale as a power-knowledge structure. It is a discourse in the Foucauldian sense that derives from the orientalist knowledge referring to Japan, and also from the orientalist knowledge built around the “imaginative geography” that is usually labeled “East Asia.” Techno-orientalism recycles and adapts objects, archival lore, and even many of the strategies from both discursive formations on Japan and East Asia. At the same time, its rules of formation allow for novelty and the incorporation of new words to the lexicon inherited from those two preexisting discourses. The discursive relations enacting techno-orientalist discourse allow us to reveal what kind of statements about the discursive objects have become central to that discourse. The knowledge generated through techno-orientalist “discursive practice”8 attempted to explain both the role of Japan, first, and then the role of East Asia in the configuration of global economy after World War II, in a context of technological leap and acceleration of globalization.9 Nevertheless, it is not just a matter of objects and the content of statements about them. Discourse is a practice, and so it implies the entanglement of attitude, medium, support, opportunity, expectations (even cultural horizon), and a range of other factors whose relevance is sorted out by the rules of formation. Techno-orientalist discourse both produces and consists of complex and cohesive “technologies of recognition,”10 which frame the perception of everything “Japanese”—they tell us what is to be reckoned “Japanese” to begin with. Such power-knowledge structure relies on “schema of co-figuration” through “regimes of translation.”11 Techno-orientalism is not a substitute of “traditional” orientalism—rather, it co-exists with it coherently.12 Thus, techno-orientalism incorporates and gives a new spin to prejudices and misjudgments that can be traced as far back as the writings by the first Jesuit missionaries that traveled to the archipelago after St. Francis Xavier arrived to Kagoshima in 1549.

### Nationalism

#### The sphere of technology serves as instruments for American expansion to create fantastical narratives on the “Asians horde” and assert the white, masculine identity. The orient is flattened and misshaped by the violent American nationalism and propaganda. (0.44)

Roh et al 15 (Roh, David S. [DAVID S. ROH is an assistant professor of American literature and digital humanities at Old Dominion University. He is the author of *Illegal Literature: Toward a Disruptive Creativity*.], Huang, Betsey [BETSY HUANG is an associate professor of English and chief officer of Diversity and Inclusion at Clark University. She is the author of *Contesting Genres in Contemporary Asian American Fiction*.], Niu, Greta A. [GRETA A. NIU earned her Ph.D. in English from Duke University and has taught at SUNY Brockport, University of Rochester, and St. John Fisher College.], *Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media*, Contributions by David S. Roh, Betsy Huang, Greta A. Niu, Kenneth Hough, Jason Crum, Victor Bascara, Warren Liu, Seo-Young Chu, Abigail De Kosnik, Jinny Huh, Steve Choe, Se Young Kim, Dylan Yeats, Julie Ha Tran, Kathryn Allan, Aimee Bahng, Douglas S. Ishii, Tzarina T. Prater, Catherine Fung, Charles Park. RUTGERS UNIVERSITY PRESS. 2015. Accessed 11 December 2021.)

Asian subjects abound in early twentieth-century U.S. radio programs. From Fu Manchu and the Dragon Lady to Omar Khayyam and the Indo-Asian Consortium, stories of “yellow peril” and the exotic Orient played on the lis-tening public’s cravings for adventure, excitement, and international affairs. Programs such as *Buck Rogers*, *Terry and the Pirates*, *Omar, the Wizard of Per-sia*, *Fu Manchu*, and dozens of others serialized in fifteen-to thirty-minute time slots performed the affairs of rational, modern U.S. whites against the imagined cultural and technological inferiority of the Asian Other. These and other such programs, concomitant with U.S. global expansion, flatten Near East and Far East subjects into one vast foreign horde that, by being robbed of technological prowess, is both dehumanized and exoticized. The programs play on a U.S. desire to be both modern and, ironically, grounded in a more authentic premodern past. In addition to these serials, for-profit network adult programs and government-sponsored programs further nar-rated a white, masculine modern U.S. identity. Male characters are almost universally the protagonists of such serialized programs, women being rel-egated to supporting roles or to domestic spheres. While programs such as The Goldbergs and daytime soap operas feature female protagonists, the trend of adventure-based, techno-Orientalist programs reasserts American masculin-ity and patriarchy, and emphasizes the need to protect American womanhood from Asian hordes. Production companies such as Orson Welles’s Mercury Theatre, the Free World Theatre, and the Free Company, though progressive and working on behalf of organized labor or the Roosevelt administration, or working for Depression-relief efforts, nonetheless participate in a flattening of the Asian Other and play on nativist anxieties in a growing U.S. Empire. These different types of programs underscore the breadth and pervasiveness of techno-Orientalism on the radio. For-profit serial programs, aimed at chil-dren and young adults, generally include fantastical narratives that play on mystical themes and conflate Asian subjects into one vast horde. Government-sponsored companies, aimed at older teens and adults, employ more realistic narratives that emphasize racial, cultural, and nationalistic differences among Asian subjects. Nonetheless, both varieties posit the United States as the locus of cultural and technological power. As hobby broadcasting gave way to licensed commercial programs in the mid-to late 1920s, radio broadcasting became an extremely popular form of entertainment and information for millions of Americans. In this era, sports broadcasts, serialized comedy, and drama programs boomed and garnered wide audiences. In addition, the consumerism of radio grew tremendously in the late 1920s and early 1930s, leading critic James Rorty to call U.S. radio advertising “a grotesque, smirking gargoyle set at the very top of America’s sky-scraping adventure in acquisition” (Denning 435). The radio itself became more ubiquitous as prices of manufactured sets (as opposed to build-it-yourself hobbyist kits popular in the 1920s) became affordable to middle-class families. By 1940, over 80 percent of U.S. households had at least one radio and over 27 percent of automobiles were equipped (Butch 176).1

### Speculative-Fic

#### Futuristic tech development and speculation fetishizes Asianness but lacks accurate representation. Utopias where tech is revolutionary are devoid of Asians while dystopias simplify and scapegoat Asian cultures.

Emerson 17 (Emerson, Sarah [Sarah is a San Francisco-based Motherboard reporter covering the environment, tech culture, and science oddities. You can reach her on email or on Twitter (@SarahNEmerson).] *Cyberpunk Cities Fetishize Asian Culture But Have No Asians.* VICE NEWS. October 10, 2017. TAGGED:TECHMOTHERBOARD JAPAN DIVERSITY SCIENCE FICTION CHINATOWN ASIANS CYBERPUNK BLADE RUNNER 2049 ORIENTALISM. Accessed December 15, 2021.)

The grimy, glitched-out world we saw in **Blade Runner is** back and beautifully remastered. As the title conveys, Blade Runner 2049 picks up decades after the original film—**a sort of post-post-apocalypse, more vividly, and terrifyingly imagined than 1980s cinematography could ever allow. We're back in Los Angeles, and it's still irradiated and miserable. Home to the dregs of humanity**, atoning for the blight their forefathers wrought upon the earth. Replicants hiding in plain sight. Megalithic ziggurats keeping watch over the city, like a pantheon of new corporate gods. Each scene is a self-contained work of art, and I'd have loved it even more if it weren't for one thing. **Like the original, 2049 uses Asianness as a visual cue for the future. You might have missed it, since the film wholly lacks Asian characters. Save for Dave Bautista, who is part-Filipino and played the Replicant Sapper (spoiler: he is promptly killed off), . I've seen it twice now, and spotted one or two others in passing; none with speaking roles. The neon kanji billboards. Neander Wallace's yukata, and Joi's cheongsam. The busy Chinatown. The interactive wall of anime apps. K's rice-filled bento box. The dual Japanese-English text on everything. All signs that point to a vibrant, multicultural city, but somehow devoid of non-white characters. If Asians shaped this cyberpunk future, where are they**? **Blade Runner and 2049 are like Orientalist art. Gorgeous, albeit skewed, depictions of "other" cultures meant to justify colonialism with their backwardness. Only, in these inverted futures, the colonists are invisible megacorps—Japanese, Chinese, Korean—whose temples we see looming over Los Angeles. The reason why signs are bilingual; a future so outlandish that Japanese could be a lingua franca. Where communities are ghettoized beneath Asian-branded skyscrapers, and the enslaved population, Replicants, are overwhelmingly white.** Cyberpunk gained popularity, in part, thanks to Blade Runner and William Gibson's Neuromancer, which was heavily inspired by Japan. This was during the 1980s, amid Japan's technological revolution. At the time, computer manufacturing was being propelled by the new information age, and a global desire for consumer electronics. Brands like Sony and Nintendo became household names. American kids became versed in anime. Japan's economy swelled into the world's second-largest by the turn of the century. Gibson, after visiting Tokyo, once said that "modern Japan simply was cyberpunk. The Japanese themselves knew it and delighted in it." Some Asian cities did look futuristic, even then. Tokyo, for example, with its urban mosaic of fluorescent laneways. The impossibly new juxtaposed with the old. There's a reason why holographic geisha are a common motif in cyberpunk films. **But Cold War anxieties, which were a popular muse for 20th century sci-fi, coupled with Japan's economic ascension, only stoked the West's dystopian fears. It's important to remember that Blade Runner's vision is solidly tethered to the 1980s. The omnipotence of its corporate monoliths was no accident. Creeping globalization is what kept Americans awake at night. Modern cyberpunk circles, too, can perpetuate these stereotypes**. Images uploaded to Reddit's r/cyberpunk as canon often mimic the aesthetic of these films. That's not to say there aren't people pushing the envelope—Neill Blomkamp's District 9 helped to popularize African cyberpunk, for instance—but the genre has been slow to diversify. "Since the late 1970s**, a key idea in Western science fiction has been that Japan represents the future. Japan's 'weird' culture is a figure for an incomprehensible tomorrow," wrote Annalee Newitz about our fetishization of Japan's idiosyncrasies. Today, there's no excuse for imagining a world that's so regressively homogenous. I won't believe the argument that Blade Runner is largely white because most humans left for off-world colonies. That's just silly. This is a film that figured out hologram-on-Replicant sex. When persons of color can't see themselves in speculative futures, that sends a depressing message about the path of human progress.** Thankfully, the pendulum is finally swinging toward a more diverse sci-fi universe. But first Hollywood had to fail miserably at it. The road to representation has been **especially hard for Asian-Americans**. They are, perhaps, the most neglected demographic in film. Often typecast or whitewashed, as we've seen countless times in recent years. "People of color have always been here," said novelist N.K. Jemisin, describing sci-fi as a genre that prides itself on "infinite diversity in infinite combinations," but has yet to equally recognize its non-white authors. Together, Blade Runner and 2049 represent the best of cyberpunk film. But imagine how much better, richer they could've been with a cast that looked the way the real world does, now and in the future. For a universe that's so preoccupied with the soul, in this regard, Blade Runner is utterly devoid of one.

### Economic

#### Expansion of free trade, globalization, and spatial exp to China perpetuates orientalist neocolonialism via forced integration into a Western capitalist economic order

Lee 2 (Chin-Chuan, Professor of Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of Minnesota, “Established Pluralism: US elite media discourse about China policy”, *Journalism Studies*, 3(3), p. 352 – 355) | jsc

Globalization Even if the hawkish voices persisted, the pre- vailing view among America’s opinion makers seemed to have revolved around bringing China into the WTO and other international bodies, in hopes of subjecting it to international norms and the rule of law. From 6 March 1997 onwards, the Times has argued for the very position it criticized: permanently awarding China the normal trading status without attaching human rights conditions. From 1997 to 2000, the editorials enumerated a litany of 13 overlapping reasons, at various levels of abstraction, asserting that China’s WTO mem- bership would (a) advance the West as a catalyst for reform in China; (b) give leverage to reformist Chinese officials; (c) move power away from China’s government bureaucrats to impersonal markets; (d) ease tension between the US and China by turning trade disputes to “an impartial international jury”; (e) help Chinese leaders establish legal predictability, international standards and the rule of law; (f) unite the American human rights and business communities; (g) have a broader reach than supporting individual dissidents; (h) propel Chinese economic institutions toward market discipline; (i) open up China’s markets to the sale of American goods; (j) bring more information through the diffusion of foreign goods, technology, and telecommunications to the Chinese people; (k) allow more scrutiny of China’s intellectual piracy as well as its treatment of workers and the environment; (l) help broaden relations with the Chinese people and open China to democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights; and (m) aid the US in advancing the global cause of liberty and shaping international commercial forces to the advantage of American workers and Chinese democrats. This tall order of benefits resembles what old modernization enthusiasts used to characterize the developmental package as a “seamless web” (Higgins, 1977) and “all good things go together” (Packenham, 1973, p. 20). The WTO, now writ large as the symbol of globalization, is idealized (as was “economic growth” in the 1960s) as a key to triggering political democracy, a comprehensive web replacing the “patchwork quilts” of containment and con- ditional engagement. Curiously, the editorials did not invoke “globalization” to organize this over-arching discourse. It took Friedman (1999) to dene globalization as “the world inte- gration of finance, markets, nation states, and technologies with a free market competition on a scale never before experienced”. This economistic expansion of the Cold War mod- ernization theory showed little regard for the complex, contradictory political and cultural implications of globalization in the post-Cold War era (see Robertson, 1992; Featherstone, 1995; Tomlinson, 1999). Both Friedman and the editorialists treated globalization as if an inevitable and invincible process, ruling out the questions of globalization “on what and whose terms” or at what cost (such as social dislocation and sectoral unemployment). A cacophony of anti-globalization voices consisting of anti- hegemonists (such as Schiller, 1992, pp. 1–43), environmentalists, and labor—not to mention the protests in the streets of Seattle (Washington), Davos (Switzerland), Melbourne (Australia), Prague (Czech Republic), and Genoa (Italy)—was largely marginalized. Also unac- knowledged were criticisms of the WTO for its lack of democratic accountability and its weak- ening of national sovereignty. Now seeing glo- bal capitalism instead of trade sanctions as the best instrument of promoting human rights in China, the Times’s quarrels with Clinton’s policy waned. Friedman (1999) is a high priest of globalization. He brought that gospel to China in the 54 articles he wrote from 1995 (when he become a columnist) to 2000, and later to the African continent as a savior of its hunger and malaise. But his approach tends to be anecdotal, trunc- ated, lacking in theoretical rigor and cogency. In one of his most explicit attempts to relate globalization to China, he observed (17 March 1998): Ideologically, the Chinese Communist Party is dead. The party is still in control, but without any message. No one is beyond the frontier of globalization anymore. The same pressures on advanced economies—to downsize and streamline government, to seek out foreign investors, to plug into global markets and to become more competitive and more diversified—are squeezing Chinese villages as well. Listen to the campaign speeches for village chief here (in China) and tell me they don’t sound as if they’re running for the mayor of Toledo, Ohio. All politics isn’t local. All politics is global. Having blunted the contextual differences between the Chinese village and Toledo, Fried- man coined “globalution” to mean the revolution of globalization. Instead of revol- ution from below (too explosive) or revolution from above (which won’t happen), the “closet globalutionary” Premier Zhu was said to seek revolution from beyond (globalization) over the objection of his hard-line opponents. China could prevent itself from slipping into a Russian-style kleptocracy through global inte- gration. Friedman saw China’s joining the WTO as a “giveaway to the U.S. economy”—Sprint, AOL, and AT&T would be able to buy into companies there and contribute to China’s being “more wired” into the world. The US had leverage with the Chinese who “crave Big Macs, Macintosh, Microsoft, and Mickey Mouse”. Globalization could increase the costs for bad behavior and hold Chinese nationalism in check: “They could burn U.S. flags, but not U.S. dollars.” Criticizing AFL-CIO’s “head-inthe-sand protectionism”, he challenged the Democratic Party to articulate a new progressivism that addresses the worries of working Americans about globalization without resorting to trade barriers. Labor’s concern was as quickly picked up as it was brushed off. Globalization is expected to be a harbinger of the rule-of-law system in China. “Draw red lines for China wherever necessary”, he said, “build bridges wherever possible.” He urged Clinton to adopt George Schultz’s approach of “diplomacy to gardening”: holding regular meetings to resolve disputes over human rights and strategic issues with China. In 1996, he began to promulgate the rule of law as even more important for China than an election. A year later, he rejected MFN as the “wrong club” to use, for it hurt US interests as much as China, and human rights debate should not get reduced to MFN or no MFN. A 1998 article 354 CHIN-CHUAN LEE graphically depicted China as having “gone from Mao to Milken [a convicted US nancier], without ever stopping at Madison”. Another more charitable version had China going “from Mao to Merrill Lynch”. Without the rule of law, he warned that China might be “heading for Thailand II”, even 100 times more ugly than Malaysia, the two victims of the Asian financial meltdown caused by crony capitalism. It was his belief that the Chinese authorities might refuse to free dissidents but could not com- pletely oppose promoting the rule of law. Premier Zhu could not accomplish his econ- omic reform without opening China to “a more consensus-based, pluralistic, popularly sup- ported system of governance”. Reminiscent of an old Orientalist adage: “You are what you are because of us” (Said, 1993, p. 35), Friedman deplored the fact that China did not have British colonial rule (as in India and Hong Kong) or American neocolonialism (as in Japan and South Korea) that left behind “an elite and a bureaucracy steeped in liberal constitutionalism”. He urged that Congress grant tax breaks to US companies that promote rule-of-law practices in China, and also match a $50 million fund (which he hoped the business community would set up) for bringing Chinese law stu- dents, judges, lawyers, even prosecutors, to the US. Friedman proposed what he called “the golden arches of conflict prevention”, asserting reductively that countries with McDonald’s don’t wage wars against one another. He glorified the McDonaldization of global culture as a mark of progress and interconnectedness, to the disregard of many of its scathing critics (such as Alno et al., 1998). As China’s hostility toward Taiwan heightened in 2000, he wrote three articles stating that as they had been woven as Siamese twins in the global economy, China cannot shoot Taiwan without shooting itself, nor can Taiwan pull away from China without pulling its economy down. Bringing China into the WTO would restrain its military adventure against Taiwan and foster changes to make China one day “more like Taiwan”. In Russia, the Communist Party failed to privatize Russian society, but the Chinese people will “privatize the Community Party”. In a rare mention of the negative consequence of globalization, he acknowledged that the main threat to the Chinese regime would not be a resurgence of the coalition of democracy students and intellectuals who led the Tiananmen move- ment, but the workers and farmers who would be laid off after China’s entry into the WTO. Friedman was fond of invoking fabled metaphors and binary allegories to make paired contrasts with vivid literary impact. He said in 1996 that the Russian economy (the more democratic tortoise) was on the verge of taking off, but China’s economic development (the more authoritarian hare) could face problems unless the rule of law was adopted. Hong Kong’s return to China was “not just a slice of the West being given back to the East”, but also “a slice of the future being given back to the past”. Several articles described Taiwan as the future “with the winds of history at its back” and the Chinese communist regime as the past “with the winds of history in its face”. For all its faults, China stood well against Iran: Iran needed “Ayatollah Deng” to develop its econ- omy and ease its repression. While praising China for having crossed the “tomorrow” of the “international dateline” to embrace globalization, he blamed much of the Middle East for being stuck on “yesterday”, warring over who owns which olive trees or the “archaic” questions of identity, culture, religion, and politics. Often hailed as a reasoned liberal voice, Anthony Lewis wrote 19 articles on China during the decade. Without proposing any grand idea, he consistently showed compassion for Chinese dissidents and supported the rule of law in China. Many of his articles were the profiles of major dissidents; four in particular portrayed Wei Jingsheng as the “equivalent of Nelson Mandela and Anatoly Shransky in moral cour- age and suffering” and as a “light in the dark- ness” who “challenged the most powerful tyranny on earth”. In the early 1990s Lewis criticized the fact that Bush refused to “hold China’s tyrants to account” and did nothing for “victims of tyranny”. Later he condemned most Western governments for changing the subject on Chinese brutality, and described Clinton’s “strategic dialogue” with China as being “mocked by growing repression”. Lewis twice took issue with Lee Kuan Yew’s authoritarian notion of “Asian values”. In 1998, he began to endorse initiatives for cooperation between China and the US for the training of lawyers and judges. He also abandoned his position on trade sanctions in hopes of bringing China into “the mainstream of international life”.

#### Economic and cap engagement with China is an attempt to further globalization, reifying Orientalist thought of economic superiority

I think this card is a really good generic link card but needs to be tagged better

Marcuse 4. Peter Marcuse is Professor Emeritus of Urban Planning at Columbia University. He has also taught in Germany, Australia, the Union of South Africa, Canada, Austria, and Brazil. His recent work has been on issues of sustainability, the role of the state in housing development in less developed countries, and on globalism as an extension of Edward Said’s concept of Orientalism. [Marcuse, P. (2004), Said's Orientalism: A Vital Contribution Today. Antipode, 36: 809–817. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8330.2004.00455.x pgs. 809-811]

I want to argue that the richness of Said’s approach can be extended quite directly to an analysis of the concept of Globalism, which in this sense is the inheritor of Orientalism’s mantle. Just as ‘‘Orientalism’’ was used to describe and categorize a specific geo- graphic region, its people and its culture, I want to use the term ‘‘Globalism’’ to suggest the way in which specific real processes at the international level, often lumped together under the term global- ization, are discussed and portrayed in academic and popular circles. Edward Said defined Orientalism as the hegemonic view in the ‘‘West’’ of the inferiority of the ‘‘East’’, a view both anticipating and justifying a colonial relation between dominant and subordinate, manifest in culture, language, ideology, social science, media, and political discourse. In Said’s very influential book with that title, he lays out, in vibrant and often polemical prose, the minute details of the way in which Orientalism pervaded the world view of the leaders of European and United States societies, not as an intentionally malicious racism but rather as an often unconscious and sometimes benevolently intended set of attitudes and preconceptions arising out of relations of power. While Orientalism preceded nineteenth and twentieth century colonialism by several millennia, its earlier expres- sions fueled its later direct use in support of imperial policies in England, France, and finally the United States. Said begins his ana- lysis with a devastating look at a parliamentary speech of Arthur Balfour in 1910, in which the condescending treatment of ‘‘Orientals’’ and the unquestioned belief in ‘‘Western’’ superiority is explicit. He then goes on to trace the manifestations of those same views in an implicit and even concealed but nonetheless pervasive form in litera- ture, movies, public speeches, and works of art. Said’s work is an outstanding example of what Pierre Bourdieu would call human capital in the service of power. ‘‘Globalism’’ is an apt term for the latest manifestation of the infiltration of relations of power into the political and cultural under- standings of our age. I use the term in a very specific and limited sense. Globalism is the lens (trope, metaphor, set of implicit assumptions, world view, discourse) that underlies almost all current policies of most governments in the international arena. It sees the process of globalization as new, as the dominant feature of our time, a structural process independent of specific acts of choice, inevitable in its really existing form, and ultimately beneficial to all, although certain dis- tributional inequities may be seen as needing correction. It is the lens through which a substantial portion of the scholarly and intellectual discussion of globalization sees its subject matter. Globalization, in its really existing form, is the further internation- alization of capital accompanied by and using substantial advances in communications and transportation technology2, with identifiable consequences in cultural, internal and international political relations, changes in the capital/labor balance of power, work processes, roles of national government, urban patterns, etc. Globalism is to really existing globalization as Orientalism is to colonialism. Globalism is the hegemonic metaphor through which the actual process of globalization is seen/presented. It views development in the ‘‘developing world’’ as inevitably following the superior path of development pursued by the ‘‘developed world’’, just as Orientalism sees the ‘‘Orient’’ following (if it can) the superior form of development of the ‘‘Occident’’. If we substitute the G7 for the Occident, and the Third World for the Orient, we can apply Said’s insight with profit, keeping in mind the different roles of racism, geographic coverage, and cultural distortions involved in the parallels. Globalism accepts as obviously true and not requiring proof the inevitable domination of global interests—specifically, globally organized capital—over all spheres of life and all countries of the world. As Orientalism paralleled and legitimated colonialism and imperialism and the domination of Western over ‘‘Third World’’ countries, so Globalism parallels and legitimates the priority of global capitalism over all forms of social organization, and the domination of capital over labor. As Said, in a nuanced discussion, concedes the significant contribution Orientalist scholars have made to accumulat- ing facts and advancing knowledge about other little known societies to an audience in the West, so the contribution of globalist scholars to increasing the knowledge and understanding of the range and modes of operation of global capital must be conceded. Nevertheless, the underlying assumptions in both cases parallel the needs of established power. Orientalism and Globalism in fact overlap in critical ways: implicit racism/chauvinism and unquestioning acceptance of the value systems of the industrial and financial powerful nations (implicit in the acceptance of what ‘‘development’’ means3) fuel both, and serve to buttress domination both within nations and among them. Globalism, like Orientalism, is effective precisely because it pre- tends not to be an ideology, but just scholarship or description of the world as it is. As Pierre Bourdieu put it, ‘‘it goes without saying because it comes without saying’’ (1977:167). Just as Said argues that ‘‘the Orient’’ is an artificial concept, one created, largely, by scholars and writers to describe a subject that does not exist in reality—or rather, to shape something that does exist in reality into a form that makes it manageable and manipulable by dominant powers located largely in the Western industrialized coun- tries—so is ‘‘Globalism’’ an artificial concept, wrapping a set of devel- opments whose real etiology is concealed into a single something that must be accepted as a ‘‘force’’, an actor, to which a whole range of results can then be attributed for which no one or group is respon- sible, which simply becomes part of reality, a given object to be studied and understood, described and quantified. But globalization is not an object, any more than eastern-located countries are an object; they are both names, concepts, artificially created in a parti- cular social and political and historical context, and serving a parti- cular social and political and historical purpose. There is no more a ‘‘force’’ of globalization than there is a ‘‘place’’ called the Orient.

## Impact

### Epistemology

#### Trying to ‘fix’ the East is grounded in paternalistic Orientalism—all their arguments stand on shaky epistemological ground that legitimizes endless violence—turns the case (2:37)

Anand 2007 (Dibyesh, Westminster University International Relations Reader, Western Colonial Representations of the Other, <http://westminsterresearch.wmin.ac.uk/4657/1/Anand_2007_final_author.pdf>, pg. 1-22, BEN)

Within the context of European imperialism, the issue of the representation of natives was often considered as belonging to the realm of scientific objective ethnography, journalistic commentaries, or fiction.2 A clear boundary was said to exist between fiction and non-fiction writing. It was presumed that, unlike fiction, non-fiction writing such as literary and popular journalism, exploration and travel writings, memoirs of colonial officials, and so on are unmediated by the consciously aesthetic requirements of imaginative literature. Emphasis was on the recording of observed facts. However, as argued by scholars from fields as diverse as postcolonial studies,3 anthropology,4 and international relations,5 such views are no longer tenable. Starting with Said,6 the enterprise of postcolonial theory has unpacked the notion of neutral academic expertise and highlighted how **Western knowledge and representations of the non-Western world are neither innocent nor based on some pre-existing ‘reality’, but implicated in the West’s will to power, and its imperial adventures**. The image of a scientific, apolitical, disinterested, knowledge-seeking ‘gentleman’ braving all odds to study non-Western cultures has been revealed as hollow. For instance, Colin Mackenzie, the first surveyor general of Madras in India, was clear about his necessary complicity in the brute realities of colonial power. He conflated the role of the soldier and the scientist and wrote: That science may derive assistance, and knowledge be diffused, in the leisure moments of [military] camps and voyages, is no new discovery; but … I am also desirous of proving that, in the vacant moments of an Indian sojourn and campaign in particular… such collected observations may be found useful, at least in directing the observation of those more highly gifted to matters of utility, if not to record facts of importance to philosophy and science.7 **The mask of objectivity in the colonial discourse hid relations of inequality and domination**. Fiction as well as non-fiction writings were permeated with various strategies of representation. These were not epiphenomenal but central to the ways in which the Other was sought to be known. What Rana Kabbani points out about travel writing holds true for non-fictional writings in general: during imperialism, it ultimately produced ‘a communal image of the East’, which ‘sustained a political structure and was sustained by it.’8 Various forms of representing the non-West – visual (films, television, photographs, paintings, advertisements, and so on) as well as textual (such as fiction, travelogue, journalism, ethnography, and anthropology) – were closely linked to the production of imperial encounters. Asymmetry of productive power is a common trait shared by these encounters. The contemporary neocolonial world too ‘bears witness to the unequal and uneven forces of cultural representation involved in the contest for political and social within the modern world order.’9 It is not only the represented (here the colonised, the third world, the South) who are subjects of and subjected to the process; even the representer (the coloniser, the first world, the West) is constructed by representational practices. This in no way implies similar experiences for the coloniser and the colonised (the representer and the represented). It only indicates that **though everyone is subjected to representational practices, the impact differs according to the existing power relations**. To illustrate this point, while both the West and Tibetans are subjects of Exotica Tibet, and the latter are not mere victims but exercise their agency through creative negotiations, the West does not have to construct its identity according to the perception of Tibetans. Westerners exoticise Tibet, and in turn, Tibetans exoticise the West. But while Western exoticisation has a defining productive impact on Tibetan identity discourse,10 the same cannot be said of Tibetan exoticisation of the West. This reflects the asymmetry in their power relations. A concentration on Western representations does not deny the fact that representational practices were prevalent in non-Western societies too. In fact, historically, all cultures and civilisations have had their own particular representational practices for perceiving those they considered as Other. But – and this is a crucial qualification – **it was only with modern European imperialism that the capacity to convert these representations into truth on a systematic and mass scale emerged**. What makes such representational practices distinctly modern is their productive capacity. Production of knowledge about the Other through representations goes hand in hand with the construction, articulation, and affirmation of differences between the Self and Other, which in turn feeds into the identity politics amongst the representer as well as the represented. The practices of essentialising and stereotyping the Other underlie different strategies of Western representations. Essentialism is the notion that some core meaning or identity is determinate and not subject to interpretation. Ronald Inden writes that essentialist ways of seeing tend to ignore the ‘intricacies of agency’ pertinent to the flux and development of any social system.11 In colonial context, we find essentialism in the reduction of the indigenous people to an ‘essential’ idea of what it means to be ‘native’ – say Africans as singingdancing- fighting, Chinese as duplicitous, Arabs as cruel and oppressors of women, Tibetans as religious, and so on. Imperialism drew its strength from representations of natives as quintessentially lazy, ignorant, deceitful, passive, incapable of self-governing, and the native rulers as corrupt and despotic. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that the British officials involved during the 1903-04 invasion of Tibet saw it as something welcomed by ‘ordinary’ Tibetans seeking deliverance from their Chinese and monastic overlords. Captain Cecil Rawling in a military report in 1905 wrote: ‘It seems to be the general wish of the inhabitants of that country (Tibet) that they should come under British administration.’12 Curiously, Alistair Lamb’s own assessment that ‘when dealing with the primitive peoples of Central Asia, the problem often was not how to expand one’s power but how to prevent its indefinite expansion,’13 too puts the onus of responsibility for imperial expansion on the victims themselves. This is made possible by their essentialist representations as requiring paternal imperialism – a mix of iron fist and velvet glove. A stereotype is a one-sided description of a group/culture resulting from the collapsing of complex differences into a simple ‘cardboard cut-out’, seeing people as pre-set image and ‘more of a formula than a human being.’14 It reduces people to a few, simple characteristics, which are then represented as fixed by nature. ‘Stereotyping reduces, essentialises, naturalises and fixes “difference.”’15 Stereotypes function as a marker between norm and deviancy, between ‘us’ and ‘them’. As Said argues, stereotypical images of the Orient’s separateness – ‘its eccentricity, its backwardness, its silent indifference, its feminine penetrability, its supine malleability’ – have been part of Western discursive practices for a long time.16 Stereotyping flourished to justify imperialism as a civilising mission – the restless, honest, active, exploratory, masculine, enlightened, modern spirit of the ‘white man’ stood in contrast to the laziness, deceit, passivity, fatalism, femininity, backwardness, and traditional spiritlessness of the natives. For example, Captain John Noel’s films Climbing Mount Everest (1922) and The Epic of Everest (1924) developed the ‘contrast between the extroverted, aggressive, and manly British climbers with the introverted, passive, and squalid but mystical Tibetans.’17 Stereotyping is a simplification not because it is a false representation of a given reality but because it is an arrested, fixated form of representation that denies the play of difference. Let me illustrate this with an example from the story of the first two men to reach Mount Everest – Tenzing Norgay and Edmund Hillary. Reaching the summit, Tenzing Norgay says he felt the warm presence of the mountain, buried an offering to the gods, and said in prayer: ‘I am grateful, Chomolungma’; Hillary took photographs to survey the area, urinated on the summit, and later told one of the other climbers George Lowe: ‘Well, George, we knocked the bastard off.’18 This difference in attitude may be due to cultural factors. But to interpret humility as passivity and fix the identity of Tenzing Norgay (read as representative of sherpas and other natives) as essentially passive in contrast to adventurous, scientific Hillary (read as white man) leads to a reified and fixated form of representation (excluding those who do not ‘fit’ in the image – women for instance). Stereotyping is not about expressing cultural difference, but fixing it in a pre-given socio-cultural milieu with extreme power differentials. **Stereotyping served imperialism at both representational and psychic levels – supporting the idea of paternal domination and acting as a kind of perceptual binder protecting the colonisers from discomforting consciousness of either poverty or guilt**.19 It allowed the participants in the massacre of Tibetans at Guru (31 March 1904) that took place during the British invasion of Tibet to blame it on the ‘crass stupidity and childishness of the Tibetan general,’20 malevolent monks, superstitious Tibetan soldiers – everyone except themselves. We must liberate the ordinary natives from their brutal leaders – this sentiment can be seen in Colonel Francis Younghusband’s account of the 1903-04 ‘expedition’ to Tibet where after criticizing Tibetans for being crafty, immoral, over-religious, dirty, and lazy, he says ‘there are in them latent potentialities for good, which only await the right touch to bring them into being.’21 We may recall Napoleon’s proclamation in 1798 upon entering Egypt: ‘Peoples of Egypt, you will be told that I have come to destroy your religion; do not believe it! Reply that I have come to restore your rights, to punish the usurpers, and that I respect more than the Mamluks God, His Prophet, and the Quran.’22 Though in everyday conversation we tend to use stereotype only for negative images, stereotyping has within it dualism and ambivalence23 As Michael Hunt in his study of hierarchy of race and American foreign policy points out, the Americans created for ‘Orientals’ two distinctly different images: ‘a positive one, appropriate for happy times when paternalism and benevolence were in season, and a negative one, suited to those tense periods when abuse or aggrandizement became the order of the day.’24 While sometimes a positive stereotype may be politically and socially helpful for a group, in the long run it reifies and imprisons the represented subjects in their own arrested image. This problem can be seen most clearly in the case of Tibetans who seem to be prisoners of their stereotyped images. Alluding to the real effects of the language of stereotype about Tibet, Donald Lopez points out that it ‘not only creates knowledge about Tibet, in many ways it creates Tibet, a Tibet that Tibetans in exile have come to appropriate and deploy in an effort to gain both standing in exile and independence for their country.’25 However, these stereotypes legitimise only certain goals and actions geared toward achieving them – the prevalent stereotypes paint Tibetans mainly as passive victims requiring outside help. And this outside support comes at a price. As Jamyang Norbu says, ‘however hopeless their cause or marginal their survival, Tibetans are better off living their own reality than being typecast in ethereal roles in the fantasies of the West.’26 In spite of commonalities and consistencies, it is complexity, oppositionality, and ambivalence that lie at the heart of Western colonial representations. **Imaginative practices through which the imperial West came to represent the Other can be interrogated through the various strategies of representation involved**. Though there was always a will to reify the represented, this was undermined by the nature of representation – it was not a singular act, but one necessitating repetition. There always was a paradox in the Western representations of other cultures – an unresolvable tension between transparency and inscrutability, desire and disavowal, difference and 25 familiarity. Therefore Exotica Tibet is not a distinct phenomenon devoid of contrariety; rather, it is defined by a ‘true complexio oppositorum, a rich complexity of contradictions and oppositions.’27 So near, yet so far! As Slavoj Zizek puts it: The very inconsistency of this image of Tibet, with its direct coincidence of opposites seems to bear witness to its fantasmatic status. Tibetans are portrayed as people leading a simple life of spiritual satisfaction, fully accepting their fate, liberated from the excessive craving of the Western subject who is always searching for more, AND as a bunch of filthy, cheating, cruel, sexually promiscuous primitives… The social order is presented as a model of organic harmony, AND as the tyranny of the cruel corrupted theocracy keeping ordinary people ignorant…28 The following section of the paper identifies the most common discursive strategies marshalled in the representation of the non-Western Other in the context of Western imperialism and uses Exotica Tibet as the main empirical site of investigation. Archive is commonly understood as a place or collection containing records, documents, photographs, film, or other materials of historical interest. But archive can be taken to refer to a repository of stored memories, information, myths, rumours, and legends.29 Encounter with the Other did not take place in vacuum – it was understood within pre-given images. What was knowable then was shaped by imperial prerogatives as well as pre-existing ‘knowledge’. This included those found in classical writings, religious and biblical sources, mythology, traveller’s tales (which in any case made little distinction between description and legend), and fictional writings. These provided the cultural framework through which others were seen, described and represented. Orientalism itself performed an archival function – generalisations abounded as the attitude was ‘pick an East, any East’30 (Sardar 1999: 66) and the story will be the same. As Said puts it: ‘In a sense Orientalism was a library or archive of information commonly and, in some of its aspects, unanimously held.’31 In situations where the culture was relatively unknown – like the Tibetan – hearsay, legends, and fantasies performed an ever more important archival function.32 Representers of Tibet especially before the nineteenth century often drew upon these archives, supplementing the rare missionary and travellers’ accounts. Hugh Richardson’s argument that the early allusions of Westerners reveal little more than that the Tibetans had a reputation in neighbouring countries for ‘strange ways and rare magical powers’33 holds true even for the twentieth century. Evaluation of Tibet and its people was based on an archive that made very little distinction between myths, legends, hearsay, and facts. Western writers constructed ‘facts’ not by referring to the place of Tibet but through repetition and cross-reference. Surveillance is a technique through which, under an over-powering gaze, the non-Western subject is rendered ‘a knowable, visible object of disciplinary power.’34 The gaze is not mere innocent curiosity: ‘to gaze implies more than to look at – it signifies a psychological relationship of power, in which the gazer is superior to the object of the gaze.’35 **Through observation, examination and interpretation objects are differentiated, categorised, and identified, and made ready to be acted upon. Objectification (fixing its essence) of the gazed goes hand in hand with its subjectification – gaze and surveillance are productive of identity of the gazed**. Surveillance as a strategy for representing the Other and rendering it disciplined is characterised by the all-knowing gaze of a white ‘man’, the colonial master, the West. It enables both the visual possession of the body of the gazed and an interposition of technique which safely conceals the body of the gazer.36 Observations then are presented as dispassionate, objective facts. The gaze is disembodied – statements are made as if there is no seer behind the observations. This is not to say that non-Westerners are visually impaired, powerless to gaze back at the West. But, the authority of imperialism for a large part of the modern period ensured that mastery and control remained a possession of Western ‘man’. The ‘monarch of all I survey’ rhetorical gesture remained peculiar to the West.37 Establishment of mastery through surveillance, gaze, and observation were accompanied by consolidation of shades of political dominance over the object of the gaze. Appropriation was done in the name of scientific curiosity, ethnographic material gathering, protection of simple masses from their own despotic rulers, or the spread of progress. British colonial and military officials who went inside Tibet often wrote their accounts as scientific exploration, or as exciting adventure,38 or simply as ‘everyday’ observation.39 Behind the innocent sounding descriptions of travel like the ‘narrative of a plant hunter’s adventures and discoveries’40 lay the violence of imperialism. Though their gaze might be considered as one of adventurer or romantic in Europe, the effect on the natives was the same as some steely-eyed militarist – the establishment and institutionalisation of control through political rule and knowledge formation. **To know is a prelude to possess, especially if there is a huge asymmetry of power**. Such asymmetry led to situations where it was perfectly acceptable for a participant in the Tibet mission of 1903-04 to say: ‘In fact the visible riches and treasures of Lhasa fairly made our mouths water. The Tibetans however would not sell, and to our honour be it said; although Lhasa was a fair object to loot, and lay in our power, not a farthings worth was forcibly [author adds this word in pen in a typed text] taken from it.’41 Securing priceless artefacts through coercion and displaying them in the private and public collections in the West was an essential feature of Western imperialism. Paradoxically, the project of rendering the Other knowable and the image of it as primitive and simple went had in hand with recognition that there are elements of inscrutability and mystery that eluded complete understanding of the Other. While discussing his own failure to fathom the unease of Phuntsog, a Tibetan who is seen no longer as ‘authentic’ native as he has learnt the language of the imperialist, Edmund Candler, an early example of embedded reporter (a Daily Mail reporter accompanying the British invasion of Tibet in 1903-04), calls him a ‘strange hybrid product of restless western energies, stirring and muddying the shallows of the Eastern mind. Or are they depths? Who knows? I know nothing, only that these men are inscrutable, and one cannot see into their hearts.’42 Frustrated with the inaccessibility, invisibility and inscrutability of ‘the Orientals’, Western desire subjects them to a relentless investigation. Veil becomes a metaphor for all that invites, titillates, and yet resists Western knowing. It is ‘one of those tropes through which Western fantasies of penetration into the mysteries of the Orient and access to the interiority of the other are fantasmatically achieved.’43 Surveillance and gaze facilitate other representational strategies that fix the Orient, the Other, particularly those that seek to classify, differentiate and provide identity to the Other (and in turn to the Self). Differentiation and Classification, two crucial factors in the formation of the modern subject,44 are also evident in Western representations of the Other. The ideational differentiation between the West and the Rest underpins these representations. The need to articulate one’s personal and collective self in terms of identity comes from an internalisation of this principle of differentiation. Classification occupies a central place in any account of non- Western people. It polices discourses, assigns positions, regulates groups, and enforces boundaries.45 What Lobsang Rampa46 says about his own treatment in the West reflects the dominant Western attitude toward the exhibition of Oriental curiosities: ‘Unfortunately, western people looked upon me as a curio, as a specimen who should be put in a cage and shown off as a freak from the unknown. It made me wonder what would happen to my old friends, the Yetis, if the westerners got hold of them- as they are trying to do.’47 Given the taxonomising predilection and conceit of Western imperialism, we can hardly disagree with Rampa’s conjecture about the fate of the yetis: ‘(If) Western Man had his way, our poor old yetis would be captured, dissected, and preserved in spirit.’48 While some classifications may be essential for understanding, often **the classification of non-Western peoples went hand in hand with the hierarchisation and racialisation of cultures**. Classifying the Other as barbarian or savage validated its dehumanisation and was seen as justification for use of violence to impose European norms.49 At the top were the white Europeans and at the bottom were ‘primitive’ Africans and aboriginal populations in the ‘new world’. Chinese, Arabs, Indians, and others occupied different positions in the hierarchical table. The nineteenth and twentieth century obsession with racialising culture racialising culture can be seen in the case of Tibetans too where different commentators sought to identify characteristics of the Tibetan ‘race’. A typical example was Graham Sandberg who was unflattering in his comments about the ‘Tibetan race as “a weak and cowardly people, their pusillanimity rendering them readily submissive.”’50 The fact that racism has less to do with colour and more to do with power relations becomes evident in the British treatment of Irish as ‘coloured’, as ‘white negroes’51 during the nineteenth century. Captain William Frederick O’Connor observation at the start of the twentieth century about Tibet is illustrative: ‘Common people are cheerful, happy-go-lucky creatures, absurdly like the Irish in their ways, and sometimes even in their features.’52 On the other hand, French traveller Alexandra David-Neel finds that dobdobs, the Lhasa monk ‘police’, looks like a ‘real negro.’53 Differentiation, classification and identification, when combined with racialisation, evolutionism and hierarchisation lead to the debasement and negation of most non-Western natives and idealisation of some.

#### Their discursive constructions of the world aren’t grounded in reality—claims to objectivity only mask Orientalism’s violence (1:35)

Marandi, 2009 (Seyed, Tehran University North American Studies Department Head , Western Media Representations, Iran, and Orientalist Stereotypes, January 2009, http://conflictsforum.org/briefings/western-media-representations.pdf, pg. 2-8, BEN)

**Orientalism** describes the various schools of thought and methods of investigation through which Europe came to know ‘the East.’ According to scholars such as Edward Said, it **was and still is through this discourse and its construction of knowledge that the West has been able to legitimize and maintain its hold over the uncivilized ‘Other.’** A major and repeated feature of Oriental analysis in all its various forms is that it constantly confirms the thesis that the Orient is primitive, mysterious, exotic, and incapable of selfgovernment. However, orientalism should not be looked upon as just the rationalization of colonial rule. Far more important, it seems, is how it knowingly or unknowingly justifies imperialism and colonialism even in advance of their actual manifestation. Orientalism can be “viewed in Foucauldian terms as a discourse: a manifestation of power/knowledge.”1 This is because, as Foucault sees it, discourse is a severely bounded area of social knowledge or “heavily policed cognitive systems which control and delimit both the mode and the means of representation in a given society.”2 **It is a series of statements, through which the world can be known, as it is not recognized by simply analyzing objective data**. Its recognition is brought into being through discourse, which is ideologically loaded, but independent of individual will and judgment. According to Said, discourse is the system of thought by which dominant powers establish spheres of ‘knowledge’ and ‘truth’, and it is through such discursive practices that religions, races, cultures, and classes are represented. Discursive practices are interwoven with social and power relations, while history itself is indivisible from discursive formations. The idea of representation is usually based upon a notion of being faithful to the original. However, representation is largely interwoven with many other things besides ‘truth’. It is defined not just by inherent common subject matter, but also by a common history, tradition, and universe of discourse that exists within a particular field.3 Representation is a phenomenon created by writers, intellectuals, artists, commentators, reporters, travelers, politicians, as well as others working within similar discursive formations. This Foucauldian perspective permits Said to consider numerous ‘Western’ texts, from apparently separate intellectual disciplines such as politics, media, history, linguistics, and literature, among others, as belonging to a single discourse called Orientalism. What brings these texts together is the common culture and ideology intrinsic to the discursive practices through which they produce knowledge about the Orient. These discursive “practices make it difficult for individuals to think outside them – hence they are also seen as exercises of power and control”.4 However, it should be kept in mind that this does not mean that a discourse is either static or cannot admit internal contradictions. It is often the case that orientalist modes of thought and representation are actually able to survive contact with the reality on the ground with which it often seems to be at odds with. One reason for this may be that the need for creating an overall consistency in discourse may constantly prevent the realization of objective analysis as well as commitment to ‘truth’. The stronger the discourse becomes the longer it lives, and the better it is able to bring about consistency within its borders. This is helped through the continued repetition and adaptation of its motifs. Another explanation for the persistent Orientalist mode of representation is Said’s concept of latent and manifest Orientalism. Manifest Orientalism is basically comprised of openly stated ideas about Eastern civilization, history, government, or literature produced at different historical junctures. Latent Orientalism, however, is an “almost unconscious and certainly an untouchable positivity”5 that: […] contains the basic ‘truths’ of the Orient, so that while, for example historians might disagree about particular interpretations of the history of the Orient, underlying assumptions of oriental backwardness would remain unquestioned. As such latent Orientalism has strong affinities with certain concepts of ideology, particularly the ‘negative’ version of ideology as false consciousness, and the durability of ideological formations, especially when allied to strong institutions such as Orientalism, would also help to explain the survival of Orientalist attitudes.6 An important aspect of Said’s Orientalism is that it explains the methods through which ‘the Other’ was constructed by the West as its barbaric, irrational, despotic, and inferior opposite or alter ego. It is a type of surrogate and underground version of the West or the ‘self’.7 **What may be even more significant is that through its position of domination, the West is even able to tell the ‘truth’ to non-Western cultures, in this case the Orient, about their past and present condition, as they are capable of representing the Orient more authentically than the Orient can itself**. Such a ‘truthful’ representation not only aids the colonizer or imperialist in justifying their actions, but it also serves to weaken the resistance of ‘the Other’ as it changes the way in which ‘the Other’ views itself. Many western experts, historians, reporters, and analysts may not necessarily construct an intentionally misleading or dishonest image of the Other (though some do). Many may not even omit facts, which by doing so might lead readers or viewers to unacceptable conclusions (though many do). What often happens is that the truth is quickly mentioned and then the analyst focuses on other issues. In other words, facts are sometimes stated and then buried in a mass of other information, and at times misinformation. The issue at stake here is not about simplification or emphasis, which are both inevitable for reporters and experts alike. The subsequent distortions are perhaps at times necessary in order for a wider audience to understand the topic under discussion. The form of distortion that is of concern here is an ideological one rather than a technical one, where intentionally or otherwise, any chosen emphasis effectively backs some kind of interest. The distortion may not be intentional, because the expert or analyst, whether western or a westernized oriental, has been trained under the illusion that knowledge and education are essentially neutral and are not tools that can be used for contending centers of power, nations, or races. Hence, by emphasizing certain elements and deemphasizing others (if they are at all presented), at times **major crimes and even mass murder can be justified**. This can easily been seen in the discourse of the mainstream media in the ‘West’ regarding western support for Saddam Hussain’s brutal regime as well as it’s use of weapons of mass destruction against Iranian and Iraqi civilians and combatants. The same can be said about the western media’s relative silence and indifference towards the Zionist regime’s barbaric siege of the Gaza Strip. Such crimes against humanity are regularly accepted as appalling, yet somehow necessary in order to protect the interests of the so-called Free World. The media’s treatment of western governments, politicians, and other western or westernized figures of influence in comparison to that of their victims or antagonists, whether they are Iranian politicians, Afghani villagers, or hungry Palestinian children, is regularly influenced by ‘national interests’ and the interests of the ‘free world’. In other words, **the mainstream media takes for granted that western actions are a necessary evil to ward off a greater evil**. Hence, history and the present is told from the point of view of western governments, conquerors, and diplomats, because they deserve universal acceptance in the face of the uncivilized Other. Regardless of the morality of such a Eurocentric approach to world affairs, scholars like Howard Zinn question its very meaningfulness: The pretence is that there really is such a thing as “the United States,” subject to occasional conflicts and quarrels, but fundamentally a community of people with common interests. It is as if there really is a “national interest” represented by the U.S. Constitution, in territorial expansion, in the laws passed by U.S. Congress, the decisions of the courts, the development of capitalism, the culture of education and the mass media…Nations are not communities and never have been. The history of any country, presented as the history of a family, conceals fierce conflicts of interest (sometimes exploding, most often repressed) between conquerors and conquered, masters and slaves, capitalists and workers, dominators and dominated in race and sex. And in such a world of conflict, a world of victims and executioners, it is the job of thinking people, as Albert Camus suggested, not to be on the side of the executioner.8

## Alt

### Alt – Academic Interrogation

#### Techno-orientalist discourse is perpetuated every day, only a confrontation with pedagogical practices centered on modernization theory can break down stereotypes surrounding East Asian functionality. WE DON’T NEED A POLICY ACTION BECAUSE POLICY MAKERS ARE FUNDAMENTALLY TECHNO-ORIENTALIST. THE DEBATE SPACE IS OUR LAST FIGHTING GROUND.

Lozano-Mendez 10 (Artur, Undergraduate Student Majoring in East Asian Studies, Published in 2010, “TECHNO-ORIENTALISM IN EAST-ASIAN CONTEXTS: REITERATION, DIVERSIFICATION, ADAPTATION”, pg. 184-186) RR Jr

Early in the history of exchange with Europeans, Japan was presented as the most conspicuous instance of il mondo alla riversa, “the world upside down”. After many decades of globalization, that topos from the Renaissance clings on to the Western imagination. The following words were written by the Jesuit Alessandro Valignano, who visited the East Indies from 1574 to 1606: “They also have other rites and customs so different from all the other nations that it would seem that they deliberately studied how to differ from everybody (…) because honestly it can be said that Japan is a world upside down compared to the ways of the world in Europe; as it is so different and contrary, that there is almost no issue where they adjust to us.”14 Such all-encompassing othering perceptions spread quickly and rooted deeply. Even today, after many decades of globalization, Japan is presented sometimes as the radical other versus Euro-American cultural horizon. Following the logics of schema of co-figuration, the identity of the West had been supported by antonymous couplings such as civilized–uncivilized, modern–pre-modern, etc. According to Morley and Robins, the idea of the West draws legitimacy from the unequivocal and exclusive correspondence that bound together the words “West–Modernity–Progress”. Thus, techno-orientalism started to take shape when such discursive exclusivity was unmistakably refuted, when the other “refused” to render themselves as the docile signified to a preset signifier. As Morley and Robins write: “Those anxieties must be seen in the context of an increasing sense of insecurity about European and American modernity. Modernity has always been that ‘mysterious and magical word that puts a barrier between the European [and American] ego and the rest of the world’.16 If it was the West that created modernity, it was also modernity that created the imaginary space and identity described as ‘Western’. (...) however, the very dynamism of modernity also worked to undermine its Western foundations. The modernization project was cumulative, future-orientated, based upon the logic of technological progression and progress. Its various elements were also designed to be exported and to transcend their European origins and exclusiveness. Modernization and modernity, with their claims to universalism, could be transposed to other host cultures. In Japan this project found a fertile environment. The technological and futurological imagination has now come to be centered here; the abstract and universalizing force of modernization has passed from Europe to America to Japan.” An instrumental factor in the successful expansion and acceptance of techno-orientalist tenets lay in their early adoption by self-orientalist discourse in Japan. Self-orientalism takes the images supplied by Western orientalism and changes their polarization from negative to positive. The mutual feedback benefits power structures both internationally and within Japan, where the nihonjinron—a trend of publications analyzing the “particularism” of Japanese people—already promotes conformity to specific models of citizenship.18 Thus, discourse informally induces people to adopt certain lifestyles and values. Those perceived cultural traits are turned into cultural assets, and merchandised as such. What the techno-orientalist deformative lens perceives as robotic, gregarious and self-emasculated way of life is presented as a considerate, balanced and reliable behavior. Paradoxically, the culture, tourism and entertainment industries from Japan have been exporting products that undergo symbolic negotiation in Western markets 20 and, all too often, become techno-orientalist avatars. The result of such symbolic negotiation comes naturally since the mainboard of technologies of recognition is already printed with techno-orientalism and the “binary structuring schemata that are constantly utilized by the geopolitics of the modernization theory.”

### Alt Key to Agency

#### Voting an affirmation of agency in the face of Orientalism. Our reconception of social relations opens up a space for the Other to be integrated peacefully

Samman et al 8 (Khaldoun, PhD in Sociology from Binghamton University, Mazhar, PhD in International Affairs from Qatar University, Published in 2008, Published by Paradigm Publishers, Page 215) RR Jr

If the self is conceived as a social relationship (of a human entity to itself), the reified notion of "the social" as comprising a relatedness to an "Other —as presumed in a Newtonian notion of society as a system of interacting human bodies—gives way to a notion of the social as an ensemble of diverse forms of sub-individual self-relations and self-interactions: intrapersonal (self-relations within one's own organism), interpersonal (self-relations across organisms), and extrapersonal (self-relations to the built or natural environments). The fact that in a society or culture, only my relation to myself is seen as a self-relation, and the label of the "social" is reserved only to when I relate to an Other (singular or collective), this may itself signify the presence of an alienated/ing mode of production and living in which the relatedness of members to one another and to their natural/built environments are perceived as relations to "Others." Further inquiry, however, reveals how one's relation to an "other" is intricately constitutive of "oneself' and how one may find a multitude of alienated/ing "Others" populating one's own fragmented inner world-system. Once we adopt a notion of the self as a social relation, and of society as an ensemble of intra-, inter-, and extrapersonal self-relations, it becomes clear why a liberatory strategy based on the notion of the simultaneity of self and global transformations makes good sense. Such a strategy can only be accommodated via adoption of a unit of analysis that simultaneously takes account of the simultaneity of macro and micro, global and inner, world-systemic processes. "As above, so below." Grand imperial expeditions cannot take place apart from the imperial modalities of how each of us internalizes and perpetuates imperial modes of relating to ourselves and "others." My relations to others and to my selves are always twin-born and, as Gloria Anzaldua pointed out, the struggle is always inner and only acted out in broader society. The institutionalized conceptions of society, and practices of sociology, are premised by the presumed singularity of the individual as a "social" actor. The notion that individuals' lives are "determined" by their "social" relations is highly reminiscent of the Newtonian Laws of physics where the bodies, being conceived as billiard balls, respond to external stimuli or forces, and do not possess "forces" of their own to engender alternative motions and directions. In Newtonian sociologies, bodies are predictable entities devoid of their own dynamics. Relationships are thereby conceived as being external to them. Bodies act upon one another. In similar conceptions of society, the "social" is always conceived as being external to the individual, rigidly dichotomized from the self or selves within. In what I have called quantal sociological imagination (2004, 2004b, 2006b), however, such presumed conceptions of "the social" give way to a notion of society in terms of an ensemble of interacting sub-atomic, sub-individual, selves. That people become individuals, i.e., individuate into beings capable of exercising conscious awareness and will, is then treated only as a possibility subject to intentional human efforts and not taken for granted as an in-born attribute.