## 1

**CP: Do the AFF but Abed’s imagination**

**Allows us to turn away from the ableist norms in society through speculative fiction**

**Hartley 19**

**(David Hartley, University of Manchester, 2019, ""Some Flies Are Too Awesome For The Wall": Fantastical Autistic Agency And Neuroqueer Narrative Disturbance With Community'S Abed Nadir," Liverpool Hope University,** [**https://www.academia.edu/39951758/\_Some\_Flies\_are\_Too\_Awesome\_for\_the\_Wall\_Fantastical\_Autistic\_Agency\_and\_Neuroqueer\_Narrative\_Disturbance\_with\_Communitys\_Abed\_Nadir**](https://www.academia.edu/39951758/_Some_Flies_are_Too_Awesome_for_the_Wall_Fantastical_Autistic_Agency_and_Neuroqueer_Narrative_Disturbance_with_Communitys_Abed_Nadir) **)**

Here, Rodas does not refer to the grammatical element, but to a term used in the study of poetry; ‘poetic apostrophe’. These are the moments in poetry when the flow of a poem is interrupted in order to directly address an abstract person or thing who is not necessarily present. For example: ‘Twinkle, twinkle, little star, how I wonder what you are.’ Rodas matches this to what she calls ‘autistic language overflow’ which repurposes the DSM definition; ‘lengthy monologues on one subject regardless of interjection from others’ (Rodas, 45). For Rodas, autistic apostrophe induces readers and viewers to ‘**try on ideas about discursive reciprocity more complex than those ordinarily brought to ordinary conversation**’ (48). Here, **Abed is enacting an apostrophic gesture towards the audience who watch the TV show that he likes to imagine he is part of.** He is giving these viewers (who of course are us) the narrative they are here to see: a magical, festive journey, and any of **his friends who attempt to deny this reality** are  International Conference on Educational, Cultural and Disability Studies, July 3-4th, Liverpool Hope **dispatched, one-by-one**. It does turn out to be true that Abed is struggling with some personal issues. He normally spends this day, December 9th, with his mother watching Xmas movies, but this she has rejected him in favour of her new family. However**, it is not through engagement with Duncan’s medical intervention** or, more profoundly, Duncan’s insistence on reality that enables Abed to overcome his maternal rejection. Instead, it is through the indulgence of his ejaculatory imagination, performed with an apostrophic gesture, through the ricochets of parody, while he retains ultimate authorial control. Here he is at the end rejecting Duncan’s reality, with the help of his friends:

 <Clip of Abed escaping from Duncan who insists on abandoning the ‘delusion’ in favour of ‘reality’. He is helped in his escape by his friends who now fully cooperate with his ‘delusion’ to the annoyance of Duncan>

**The key is that Abed is not rejecting reality, instead rejecting a form of reality which is not helpful for him, replacing it with another that is.** On the level of genre, there is interesting point to be made here about the fantastical nature of Abed’s journey. As Sami Schalk has recently argued, ‘speculative fiction has the ability to critique the denial of individual experiences of reality without suggesting that mental disability is not real’ (Schalk, 67). In other words, **the fantastical nature of this episode means that Abed’s autism can be aligned with the heroism rather than the tragedy,** while medical rhetoric becomes the villain, and a belief in homogenous reality is exposed as founded on ableism. **Through careful use of neuroqueer poetic, tied closely to the subversions of fantastical narrative, the integrity of autistic authorial control is maintained rather than expelled.**

#### The Neg advocates for the use of speculative fiction  allowing for the use  these narrative to  re-imagine things we thought we knew

(Sami **Schalk**, 3-1-2018, "Bodyminds Reimagined

(Dis)Ability, Race, And Gender In Black Women’S Speculative Fiction," Duke University Press, <https://www.dukeupress.edu/bodyminds-reimagined> )

Reading Butler led me to the worlds of black speculative fiction and Afrofuturism, to feminist speculative fiction and queer speculative fiction, to new conferences, new colleagues, new friends, and ultimately to writing this book. Butler’s work also led me to ask questions like: **What might it mean to imagine disability differently? Differently from the stereotypical stories of pity, helplessness, and victimhood, of evil, bitterness, and abjection, of nonsexuality and isolation, of overcoming and supercrips?** What would it mean to imagine disability differently than these dominant cultural narratives we typically encounter? What might it mean to imagine blackness differently? Womanhood differently? Sexuality differently? If, as Gloria Anzaldúa claims**, “nothing happens in the ‘real’ world unless it first happens in the images in our heads,” then changing the narratives of (dis)ability,** race, and gender, changing the way marginalized people are represented and conceived in contemporary cultural productions, can also change the way such people are talked about, treated, and understood in the “real” world (“La conciencia de la mestiza” 385). **Speculative fiction allows us to imagine otherwise, to envision an alternative world or future in which what exists now has changed or disappeared and what does not exist now, like the ability to live on the moon or interact with the gods, is suddenly real. For marginalized people, this can mean imagining a future or alternative space away from oppression or in which relations between currently empowered and disempowered groups are altered or improved. Speculative fiction can also be a space to imagine the worst, to think about what could be if current inequalities and injustices are allowed to continue.** Marie Jakober writes that **“the great gift of speculative fiction** [is that] it makes us think, and specifically, it makes us think differently. It makes us examine things we have never examined. Even better, **it makes us re-imagine things we thought we knew**” (30; original emphasis). The black women writers in this book have made me think differently, examine texts differently, and imagine and reimagine (dis)ability, race, and gender in ways I never had before. In honor of Butler and the many writers her work eventually lead me to, I begin this book with the often-stated (and hashtagged) assertion that representation matters in material, concrete, and life-affirming—life-changing—ways. Representation matters.

## 2

#### Peter Singer is ableist as fuck. Voter them down for Justifying Euginiecs

Siebers 09 [Tobin, Co-Chair of the Initiative on Disability Studies and Professor of English at the University of Michigan, October 28, “The Aesthetics of Human Disqualification, pg. 3-10/AKG]

Disqualification as a symbolic process removes individuals from the ranks of quality human beings, putting them at risk of unequal treatment, bodily harm, and death. That people may be subjected to violence if they do not achieve a prescribed level of quality is an injustice rarely questioned. In fact, even though we may redefine what we mean by quality people, for example as historical minorities are allowed to move into their ranks, we have not yet ceased to believe that nonquality human beings do exist and that they should be treated differently from people of quality. Harriet McBryde Johnson’s debate with Peter Singer provides a recent example of the widespread belief in the existence of nonquality human beings (Johnson). Johnson, a disability activist, argues that all disabled people qualify as persons who have the same rights as everyone else. Singer, a moral philosopher at Princeton University, claims to the contrary that people with certain disabilities should be euthanized, especially if they are thought to be in pain, because they do not qualify as persons. Similarly, Martha Nussbaum, the University of Chicago moral philosopher, establishes a threshold below which “a fully human life, a life worthy of human dignity,” is not possible (181). In particular, she notes that the onset of certain disabilities may reduce a person to the status of former human being: “we may say of some conditions of a being, let us say a permanent vegetative state of a (former) human being, that this just is not a human life at all” (181). Surprisingly little thought and energy have been given to disputing the belief that nonquality human beings do exist. This belief is so robust that it supports the most serious and characteristic injustices of our day. Disqualification at this moment in time justifies discrimination, servitude, imprisonment, involuntary institutionalization, euthanasia, human and civil rights violations, military intervention, compulsory sterilization, police actions, assisted suicide, capital punishment, and murder. It is my contention that disqualification finds support in the way that bodies appear and in their specific appearances—that is, disqualification is justified through the accusation of mental or physical inferiority based on aesthetic principles. Disqualification is produced by naturalizing inferiority as the justification for unequal treatment, violence, and oppression. According to Snyder and Mitchell, disability serves in the modern period as “the master trope of human disqualification.” They argue that disability represents a marker of otherness that establishes differences between human beings not as acceptable or valuable variations but as dangerous deviations. Douglas Baynton provides compelling examples from the modern era, explaining that during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the United States disability identity disqualified other identities defined by gender, race, class, and nationality. Women were deemed inferior because they were said to have mental and physical disabilities. People of color had fewer rights than other persons based on accusations of biological inferiority. Immigrants were excluded from entry into the United States when they were poor, sick, or failed standardized tests, even though the populations already living there were poor, sick, and failed standardized tests. In every case, disability identity served to justify oppression by amplifying ideas about inferiority already attached to other minority identities. Disability is the trope by which the assumed inferiority of these other minority identities achieved expression. The appearance of lesser mental and physical abilities disqualifies people as inferior and justifies their oppression. It is now possible to recognize disability as a trope used to posit the inferiority of certain minority populations, but it remains extremely difficult to understand that mental and physical markers of inferiority are also tropes placed in the service of disability oppression. Before disability can be used as a disqualifier, disability, too, has to be disqualified. Beneath the troping of blackness as inbuilt inferiority, for example, lies the troping of disability as inferior. Beneath the troping of femininity as biological deficiency lies the troping of disability as deficiency. The mental and physical properties of bodies become the natural symbols of inferiority via a process of disqualification that seems biological, not cultural—which is why disability discrimination seems to be a medical rather than a social problem. If we consider how difficult it is at this moment to disqualify people as inferior on the basis of their racial, sexual, gender, or class characteristics, we may come to recognize the ground that we must cover in the future before we experience the same difficulty disqualifying people as inferior on the basis of disability. We might also recognize the work that disability performs at present in situations where race, sexuality, gender, and class are used to disqualify people as physically or mentally inferior. Aesthetics studies the way that some bodies make other bodies feel. Bodies, minimally defined, are what appear in the world. They involve manifestations of physical appearance, whether this appearance is defined as the physical manifestation itself or as the particular appearance of a given physical manifestation. Bodies include in my definition human bodies, paintings, sculpture, buildings, the entire range of human artifacts as well as animals and objects in the natural world. Aesthetics, moreover, has always stressed that feelings produced in bodies by other bodies are involuntary, as if they represented a form of unconscious communication between bodies, a contagious possession of one body by another. Aesthetics is the domain in which the sensation of otherness is felt at its most powerful, strange, and frightening. Whether the effect is beauty and pleasure, ugliness and pain, or sublimity and terror, the emotional impact of one body on another is experienced as an assault on autonomy and a testament to the power of otherness. Aesthetics is the human science most concerned with invitations to think and feel otherwise about our own influence, interests, and imagination. Of course, when bodies produce feelings of pleasure or pain, they also invite judgments about whether they should be accepted or rejected in the human community. People thought to experience more pleasure or pain than others or to produce unusual levels of pleasure and pain in other bodies are among the bodies most discriminated against, actively excluded, and violated on the current scene, be they disabled, sexed, gendered, or racialized bodies. Disabled people, but also sex workers, gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered people, and people of color, are tortured and killed because of beliefs about their relationship to pain and pleasure (Siebers 2009). This is why aesthetic disqualification is not merely a matter for art critics or museum directors but a political process of concern to us all. An understanding of aesthetics is crucial because it reveals the operative principles of disqualification used in minority oppression. Oppression is the systematic victimization of one group by another. It is a form of intergroup violence. That oppression involves “groups,” and not “individuals,” means that it concerns identities, and this means, furthermore, that oppression always focuses on how the body appears, both on how it appears as a public and physical presence and on its specific and various appearances. Oppression is justified most often by the attribution of natural inferiority—what some call “in-built” or “biological” inferiority. Natural inferiority is always somatic, focusing on the mental and physical features of the group, and it figures as disability. The prototype of biological inferiority is disability. The representation of inferiority always comes back to the appearance of the body and the way the body makes other bodies feel. This is why the study of oppression requires an understanding of aesthetics—not only because oppression uses aesthetic judgments for its violence but also because the signposts of how oppression works are visible in the history of art, where aesthetic judgments about the creation and appreciation of bodies are openly discussed. One additional thought must be noted before I treat some analytic examples from the historical record. First, despite my statement that disability now serves as the master trope of human disqualification, it is not a matter of reducing other minority identities to disability identity. Rather, it is a matter of understanding the work done by disability in oppressive systems. In disability oppression, the physical and mental properties of the body are socially constructed as disqualifying defects, but this specific type of social construction happens to be integral at the present moment to the symbolic requirements of oppression in general. In every oppressive system of our day, I want to claim, the oppressed identity is represented in some way as disabled, and although it is hard to understand, the same process obtains when disability is the oppressed identity. “Racism” disqualifies on the basis of race, providing justification for the inferiority of certain skin colors, bloodlines, and physical features. “Sexism” disqualifies on the basis of sex/gender as a direct representation of mental and physical inferiority. “Classism” disqualifies on the basis of family lineage and socioeconomic power as proof of inferior genealogical status. “Ableism” disqualifies on the basis of mental and physical differences, first selecting and then stigmatizing them as disabilities. The oppressive system occults in each case the fact that the disqualified identity is socially constructed, a mere convention, representing signs of incompetence, weakness, or inferiority as undeniable facts of nature. As racism, sexism, and classism fall away slowly as justifications for human inferiority—and the critiques of these prejudices prove powerful examples of how to fight oppression—the prejudice against disability remains in full force, providing seemingly credible reasons for the belief in human inferiority and the oppressive systems built upon it. This usage will continue, I expect, until we reach a historical moment when we know as much about the social construction of disability as we now know about the social construction of race, class, gender, and sexuality. Disability represents at this moment in time the final frontier of justifiable human inferiority.

Vote them down for safety – their model of debate excludes certain bodies by describing them as nonhuman debate should be a safe space for everyone and safety is an impact multipler. If you aren’t in the activity you can’t access the benefits of debate in the first place.

## 3

**The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best challenges ableism through the resolution**

**Prefer –**

**The ROB is to vote for the debater who best challenges ableism**

**Prefer –**

**[1] Assumptions of ableism are inherent in systems of knowledge production thus ableism is an a priori question \*A Campbell 13\*C**

**Campbell 13 (Fiona Kumari Campbell, Adjunct Professor in the Department of Disability Studies at Griffith University. Wednesday 27 November 2013. Problematizing Vulnerability: Engaging Studies in Ableism and Disability Jurisprudence. Keynote speech at Disability at the Margins: Vulnerability, Empowerment and the Criminal Law)**

What is meant by the concept of ableism? The literature suggests that the term is often used fluidly with limited definitional or conceptual specificity. The work of Carlson (2001)5 and Campbell (2001) represented a turning point in bringing attention to this new site of subordination not just in terms of disablement but also ableism’s application to other devalued groups. **Ableism is** deeply **seeded at the level of knowledge systems** of life, personhood and liveability. **Ableism is not just** a matter of ignorance or **negative attitudes** towards disabled people; **it is a schema of perfection**, **a** deep **way of thinking about bodies**, wholeness and permeability.6 As such integrating ableism into social research and advocacy strategies represents a significant challenge to practice as ableism moves beyond the more familiar territory of social inclusion and usual indices of exclusion to the very divisions of life. Bringing together the study of existence and knowledge systems, ableism is difficult to pin down. Ableism is a set of processes and practices that arise and decline through sequences of causal convergences influenced by the elements of time, space, bodily inflections and circumstance. Ability and the corresponding notion of ableism are intertwined. **Compulsory ablebodiedness is implicated in the** very **foundations of social theory**, therapeutic jurisprudence, advocacy, medicine and law; or in the mappings of human anatomy. Summarised by Campbell (2001, 44) Ableism refers to; …A network of beliefs processes and practices that produces a particular kind of self and body (the bodily standard) that is projected as the perfect, speciestypical and therefore essential and fully human. Disability then is cast as a diminished state of being human. Writing today (2013) I add an addition to this definition: ‘The ableist bodily configuration is immutable, permanent and laden with qualities of perfectionism or the enhancement imperative orientated towards a self-contained improvability’. Sentiency applies to not just the human but the ‘animal’ world. As a category to differentiate the normal from the pathological, the concept of **abledness is predicated on** some **preexisting notion about the nature of typical** species **functioning** that is beyond culture and historical context. **Ableism** does not just stop at propagating what is typical for each species. An ableist imaginary **tells us what** a healthy body means – a normal mind, the pace, the tenor of **thinking and** the kinds of **emotions** and affect that **are suitable to express**. Of course these ‘fictional’ characteristics then are promoted as a natural ideal. This abled imaginary relies upon the existence of an unacknowledged imagined shared community of able-bodied/minded people held together by a common ableist world view that asserts the preferability and compulsoriness of the norms of ableism. Such ableist schemas erase differences in the ways humans express our emotions, use our thinking and bodies in different cultures and in different situations. This in turn enacts bodily Otherness rendered sometimes as the ‘disabled’, ‘perverted’ or ‘abnormal body’, clearly demarcating the boundaries of normal and pathological. A critical feature of an ableist orientation is a belief that impairment or disability is inherently negative and at its essence is a form of harm in need of improvement, cure or indeed eradication. Studies in Ableism (SiA) inverts traditional approaches, by shifting our concentration to what the study of disability tells us about the production, operation and maintenance of ableism. In not looking solely at disability, we can focus on how the abled able-bodied, non-disabled identity is maintained and privileged. Disability does not even need to be in the picture. SiA’s interest in abledness means that the theoretical foundations are readily [is]applicable to the study of difference and the dividing practices of race, gender, location and sexual orientation. **Reframing our focus** from disability to ableism prompts different preoccupations: • What does the study of the politics of ‘vulnerability’ tells us about what it me ty ans to be ‘non-vulnerable’? • Indeed how is the very conceptualisation of ‘autonomy’ framed in the light of discourses of ‘vulnerability’? • In representing vulnerabilias universal does this detract from the specificity of disability experiences? SiA examines the ways that concepts of wellbeing, vulnerability and deficiency circulate throughout society and impact upon economic, social, legal and ethical choices. Principally SiA focuses on the limits of tolerance and possessive individualism. Extending the theorization of disability, studies in ableism **can enrich our understanding of the** production of vulnerability and the **terms of engagement in** civic **life** and the possibilities of social inclusion. I now turn to unpacking the nuances and structure of a theory of ableism.

**Presumption and Permissibility Negate. Aff has an obligation to prove that the world is good for disabled individuals. The disadvantage is disabled exhaustion where we are constantly told the aff is good for disabled individuals be in reality it doesn’t do anything.**

**Now Negate**

1. **Disability require negation as laws used to prop up ableism rendering disabled people invisible**

**Campbell 03 (Fiona Kumari, Associate Professor in Law for Griffith Law School, and a Adjunct Professor in Disability Studies at the Unviersity of Kelaniya “The Great Divide: Ableism and Technologies of Disability Production.” PhD Thesis. 2003.Pg. 142.**

**Law plays an exacting and explicit role in this subjectifying activity of government.  Legal intersections/interventions facilitate this subjectification by allocating and regulating populations into fixed and discrete ontological categories (such as disability, gender, sex, race) in order that the subjects assigned to those categories can be rendered visible and calculable (Foucault, 1976: especially 135-159; Foucault, 1994 orig. 1970).  The fixity of disability (which is assume to be a pre-given property of human bodies) within both legislative and case law not only establishes the boundaries of permissible inquiry it also establishes the legal fiction of ‘disability’ in the first place.  It is this reification of disability (frequently based on bio-medical technologies and ascriptions) that reinforces the centrality of the ableist body and the terms of its negotiation. The formulations of disability often engaged by disability activists and enshrined in disability related law, in effect discursively entrench and thus reinscribe the very oppressive ontological figurings of disability that many of us would like to escape.  Alternative renderings of disability, if they are not able to ‘fit’ such prescribed ‘fictions,’ are barred from entry into legal and other discourses.  Consider, for instance, the instructions given in a recent staff survey produced by the Equity Section of Queensland University of Technology (QUT) (2000).  The QUT equity survey instructs: “You should answer ‘yes’ to question 2 only if you are a person with a disability which is likely to last, or has lasted two or more years.  Please note that if you use spectacles, contact lenses or other aids to fully correct your vision or hearing, you do not need to indicate that you are a person with a disability and would answer ‘no’ (emphasis added). (Equity Section Queensland University of Technology, 2000).” As we can see, defining disability in terms of what it ‘is’ and ‘is not’ performs an emblematic function that re-cognises the relationship between impairment and disability and civil**

## 4

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#### Value stems from the authority to place value on certain choices which intrinsically gives the value-giver value, implying a meta-ethic of intrinsic value.

#### Meta-ethics outweigh: A] they determine the validity of the standard debate itself instead of just leading to a standard, B] Its axiomatically prior to resolve before the standard. Util’s technocratic adherence to cost-benefit analysis inevitably prioritizes ability over disability and inevitably euthanizes the disabled infant.

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2 A KANTIAN PROPOSAL

With the descriptive definition in hand, we can then ask normative questions about disability beyond the question of whether it is bad for a particular person to be disabled according to a certain theory of well-being. For example, we can ask questions about disability rights such as: • Should officials extend rights to disabled people that they do not extend to nondisabled people? • Should officials provide disabled people with resources that they do not provide nondisabled people? • Should officials prohibit people from discriminating against disabled people? • Should officials require that people accommodate disabled people? • Is it permissible to cause a person to be disabled? • Is it permissible to cause a person to be nondisabled? It is perhaps unsurprising that proponents of welfarist approaches to disability are likely to answer these questions on the basis of a broadly consequentialist moral theory.3 For these theorists of disability, it is a short walk from a conception of disability that is defined with reference to normative concepts to normative conclusions about how disabled people should be treated.

But I have suggested that these normative associations with disability require further argument and cannot be established via definition. And I am skeptical that these questions should be answered with reference to considerations related to well-being. Rather, I will argue that we should think of disabilities as mere differences and **refrain** from evaluating these questions about the ethics of disability withreference to consequentialist considerations. Consequentialist considerations are often cited in philosophical discussions of disability. For example, ethicists have argued that disabled people should have the same rights as nondisabled people and deserve equal treatment, while explaining these claims by an appeal to disabled people’s interests (Harris 2001). Similarly, arguments on behalf of providing disabled people with additional resources appeal to considerations, such as diminishing marginal utility or disabled people’s interest in receiving additional resources (Arneson 2015). Consequence-minded philosophers are hesitant, however, when it comes questions about **whether it is permissible to create a disabled person**, on the grounds they predict that a disabled life will be worse in expectation than a nondisabled life (Savulescu 2001; McMahan 2005; Kahane 2009). For similar reasons, some consequentialist philosophers have even submitted that it can be permissible to euthanize a disabled infant and replace her with a nondisabled infant in circumstances where a disabled child’s life would otherwise prevent parents from conceiving a nondisabled child (Singer 2011, p. 163). In contrast, I propose that we can set aside questions of well-being while answering the aforementioned questions about disability rights because, like other questions of rights, disability rights do not depend on whether having a disability is good or bad for a person. Moreover, I also propose that questions about disability rights do not even depend on whether a person’s physical conditions qualify as a disability because, more generally, the scope of a person’s rights do not depend on physical features of her body. My argument for this claim relies on a broadly Kantian framework. For this reason, a quick detour into Kantian ethics may be helpful in explaining my claim that we should not consider questions of well-being when settling questions about disability rights. Kant was interested in questions about how to treat people, such as the questions listed above.4 Kant’s goal was to discover principles of action that applied in all circumstances, simply by reflecting on the nature of action. So, for example, you might reflect on the fact that deciding to eat an apple gives you a reason to eat the apple, and infer from that that your ability to decide to act is a source of reasons. Those reasons have authority, Kant argued, because you confer value on your choices by making them. And **from that you should infer that you are a source of value**, and that your value issues from your ability to make choices. Based on an argument like this, Kant concluded that people should act in ways that treat humanity, or human autonomy, as a source of value in itself and not merely as a means to one’s own ends.He called this the Formula of Humanity.5 People disagree about whether Kant’s argument for the Formula of Humanity or some version of it can successfully explain the whole of the moral landscape. And people also disagree about which substantive choices this formal constraint requires. Christine Korsgaard offers one interpretation of the Formula of Humanity that shows how we can deduce substantive moral principles by reflecting on what it is to act (Korsgaard 1996, p. 107). She argues that we should think of moral reasons as the objective reasons we have whatever our inclinations or desires (in contrast to the subjective reasons we have only in virtue of our desires) (Korsgaard 1996, p. 121). She then argues that people have objective reasons to respect other people’s choices because the only thing that each person has reason to value is the capacity to value, which is same capacity as the capacity to choose. Crucially, **well-being is not unconditionally valuable for people in this universal way because the choices that promote one person’s well-being will not promote another’s**. In contrast, each person does have an unconditional reason to respect other people’s choices because once you recognize the value of your own ability to choose, “you must view anyone who has the power of rational choice as having, in virtue of that power, a value conferring status” (Korsgaard 1996, p. 123). In practice then, Kant’s argument requires that each person refrain from interfering with other people’s choices, but people are not required to attend to conditionally valuable features of others, such as features of their well-being. David Velleman and Stephen Darwall develop Kant’s argument in different ways but with similar conclusions for our purposes. Velleman argues that **people have a kind of value, in virtue of their autonomy, that cannot be traded off for the sake of greater well-being**, and that the value of a person does not depend on her properties, such as the color of her hair (Velleman 1999a, b). Morality, Velleman argues, is largely indifferent to whether a person’s desires are satisfied or whether she is happy. Instead, morality requires protection of and respect for autonomy. Darwall is skeptical that Kant’s project of deriving moral principles simply by reflecting on the nature of action can succeed (Darwall 2009). Instead, he proposes that we can derive moral principles by reflecting on the nature of moral address within a moral community. On his view, people within a moral community must hold one another to the same standards. And while Darwall doesn’t say much about the substantive content of those standards, he does clarify that members of the moral community are required to respect each person’s equal standing to act as an independent agent within the moral community. About this duty to respect Darwall writes, What we attend to [by respecting someone] is not (at least not primarily) what is for someone’s welfare or good, but, among other things, what she herself values and holds good from her point of view as an equal independent agent. (Darwall 2009) For this reason, Darwall argues that it is disrespectful to paternalistically interfere with someone in order to promote her well-being. This is just a sketch of an argument in favor of a moral theory that does not accord welfarist considerations much weight when answering practical questions about how to treat people. But I think something like this sketch is the right way to think about rights in general, and disability rights in particular. However, I am not committed to the particulars of Kant’s or Korsgaard’s specific derivations of rights. For example, one might reject the claim that moral reasons are the objective reasons that all people must recognize regardless of their desires. But even if one holds that moral reasons are ultimately subjective, it is not clear that people have rights in virtue of welfarist considerations. Michael Smith argues that a person has moral reason to do what she would desire that she do were she fully informed and rational (Smith 2011, p. 357). And Smith concludes that such a being would desire that no one interfere with the exercise of her rational capacities and that she does what she can to ensure that she has rational capacities to exercise in the future, but she would not necessarily desire the promotion of her well-being (Smith 2011). Others arrive at similar conclusions via a different route.6 The conclusion of all these arguments is that considerations of well-being do not bear on questions about people’s rights and duties. Utilitarianism, the view that we ought to promote the well-being of the greatest number of people, is the clearest philosophical rival to the Kantian approach. Against utilitarianism, Kantians reply that this kind of reasoning permits people to be used as means for the promotion of overall well-being. In principle, utilitarianism permits killing the one to save the many. Kantian ethics prohibits this kind of conduct. Each person has moral status in virtue of her autonomy that places everyone else under a duty to respect her choices as long as she is complying with her own duty to respect the choices of others. In this way, the Kantian approach protects individuals from being treated as means for the promotion of others’ (or their own) well-being. Turning to disability rights, Kantians would therefore emphasize that it is a mistake to focus on whether it is good or bad for a person’s well-being to be disabled. So Kantians would echo the familiar critiques of utilitarian approaches that are advanced within the disability rights community, such as objections to the use of Quality Adjusted Life Years in decisions about resource allocation and objections to policies that permit euthanasia for disabled infants but not for nondisabled infants. In contrast, Kantians answer questions about disability rights with reference to the claims that disabled and nondisabled people have with reference to the value that is intrinsic to all autonomous people.7

#### Thus, the standard is respecting disability freedom. Impact calculus: A) freedom is a property of agency, not an additive consequence. Adding two circles together does not make anything more circular than what was before, just like two humans are not freer than one human. B) even if the net effect of the aff is more freedom, the means by which you have achieved that freedom is an inherently coercive action so you don’t address the appropriate response. I answer whether the state is even in the position to coerce in the first place.

#### Prefer additionally:

#### 1] Regress --- agents can always ask “why should I do this” an infinite amount of times when deciding the ethicality of an action – only strict deontic rules solve by setting concrete maxims agents cannot violate – otherwise anything becomes permissible since agents can find one loophole in the infinite chain of questions.

#### Now negate –

#### The aff violates the categorical imperative and is non-universalizable- governments have a binding obligation to protect creations

**Van Dyke 18** Raymond Van Dyke, 7-17-2018, "The Categorical Imperative for Innovation and Patenting," IPWatchdog, <https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/07/17/categorical-imperative-innovation-patenting/id=99178/> SJ//DA recut SJKS

As we shall see, applying **Kantian logic entails first acknowledging some basic principles; that the people have a right to express themselves, that that expression (the fruits of their labor) has value and is theirs (unless consent is given otherwise), and that government is obligated to protect people and their property. Thus, an inventor or creator has a right in their own creation, which cannot be taken from them without their consent.** So, employing this canon, **a proposed Categorical Imperative (CI) is the following Statement: creators should be protected against the unlawful taking of their creation by others. Applying this Statement to everyone, i.e., does the Statement hold water if everyone does this, leads to a yes determination. Whether a child, a book or a prototype, creations of all sorts should be protected, and this CI stands.** This result also dovetails with the purpose of government: to protect the people and their possessions by providing laws to that effect, whether for the protection of tangible or intangible things. **However, a contrary proposal can be postulated: everyone should be able to use the creations of another without charge. Can this Statement rise to the level of a CI? This proposal, upon analysis would also lead to chaos. Hollywood, for example, unable to protect their films, television shows or any content, would either be out of business or have robust encryption and other trade secret protections, which would seriously undermine content distribution and consumer enjoyment.** Likewise, inventors, unable to license or sell their innovations or make any money to cover R&D, would not bother to invent or also resort to strong trade secret. Why even create? This approach thus undermines and greatly hinders the distribution of ideas in a free society, which is contrary to the paradigm of the U.S. patent and copyright systems, which promotes dissemination. By allowing freeriding, innovation and creativity would be thwarted (or at least not encouraged) and trade secret protection would become the mainstay for society with the heightened distrust.

#### Util dehumanizes disability and the curing of secondary pity to increase the disabled’s “welfare”

**Stein 01 Mark is the author of Distributive Justice and Disability: Utilitarianism against Egalitarianism (Yale University Press, 2006) [Stein, Mark S. “Utilitarianism and the Disabled: Distribution of Life.” Social Theory and Practice, vol. 27, no. 4, 2001, pp. 561–578. JSTOR,** [**www.jstor.org/stable/23559190. Accessed 23 Nov. 2020**](http://www.jstor.org/stable/23559190.%20Accessed%2023%20Nov.%202020)**.] //Lex AKo**

**If the disabled have on average less welfare than nondisabled people, it seems to follow that the disabled benefit less from continued life than do nondisabled people. Utilitarianism would therefore place a lower value on disabled life than on nondisabled life, and if a choice had to be made between saving the lives of disabled people and saving the lives of nondisabled people, utilitarianism would counsel us to give less preference to the disabled. So, for example, disabled people would receive less preference, in the distribution of life-saving organ transplants, than nondisabled people. Moreover, the utilitarian preference against disabled people in the distribution of life would appear to be exactly proportional to the utili tarian preference in favor of disabled people in the distribution of resources. However morally urgent it might be to cure a given disabled person, increasing her welfare, it would seem that the same moral ur gency must attach to a decision to preserve the life of a nondisabled person in preference to that disabled person, assuming that only one of them 13Mark Stein, "Utilitarianism and the Disabled: Distribution of Resources," Bioethics 16 (2002), forthcoming. 14See ibid.**

# Acessiable formating

## 1

**CP: Do the AFF but Abed’s imagination**

**Allows us to turn away from the ableist norms in society through speculative fiction**

**Hartley 19**

**try on ideas about discursive reciprocity more complex than those ordinarily brought to ordinary conversation**’ **Abed is enacting an apostrophic gesture towards the audience** **who watch the TV show that he likes to imagine he is part of.** **his friends who attempt to deny this reality** **dispatched, one-by-one** **it is not through engagement with Duncan’s medical intervention** **The key is that Abed is not rejecting reality, instead rejecting a form of reality which is not helpful for him, replacing it with another that is.** **the fantastical nature of this episode means that Abed’s autism can be aligned with the heroism rather than the tragedy** **Through careful use of neuroqueer poetic, tied closely to the subversions of fantastical narrative, the integrity of autistic authorial control is maintained rather than expelled.**

#### The Neg advocates for the use of speculative fiction  allowing for the use  these narrative to  re-imagine things we thought we knew

**Schalk**, 18

**might it mean to imagine disability differently? Differently from the stereotypical stories of pity, helplessness, and victimhood, of evil, bitterness, and abjection, of nonsexuality and isolation** **“nothing happens in the ‘real’ world unless it first happens in the images in our heads,” then changing the narratives of (dis)ability,** **Speculative fiction allows us to imagine otherwise, to envision an alternative world or future in which what exists now has changed or disappeared and what does not exist now, For marginalized people, this can mean imagining a future or alternative space Speculative fiction can also be a space to imagine the worst, to think about what could be if current inequalities and injustices are allowed to continue.**, **it makes us re-imagine things we thought we knew**”

## 2

#### Peter Singer is ableist as fuck. Voter them down for Justifying Euginiecs

Siebers 09

Disqualification removes individuals from the ranks of quality human beings, people may be subjected to violence Peter Singer provides a recent example of the widespread belief in the existence of nonquality human beings Singer, claims people with disabilities should be euthanized, especially if they are thought to be in pain, because they do not qualify as persons.

Vote them down for safety – their model of debate excludes certain bodies by describing them as nonhuman debate should be a safe space for everyone and safety is an impact multipler. If you aren’t in the activity you can’t access the benefits of debate in the first place.

## 3

**The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best challenges ableism through the resolution**

**Prefer –**

**The ROB is to vote for the debater who best challenges ableism**

**Prefer –**

**[1] Assumptions of ableism are inherent in systems of knowledge production thus ableism is an a priori question \*A Campbell 13\*C**

**Ableism is** **seeded at the level of knowledge systems** **Ableism is not just** **negative attitudes**  **it is a schema of perfection**, **a** **way of thinking about bodies**,. **Compulsory ablebodiedness is implicated in the** **foundations of social theory**, **abledness is predicated on** **preexisting notion about the nature of typical** **functioning** **Ableism** **tells us what** **thinking and** **emotions are suitable to express**. **Reframing our focus** **can enrich our understanding of the terms of engagement in** **life**

**Presumption and Permissibility Negate. Aff has an obligation to prove that the world is good for disabled individuals. The disadvantage is disabled exhaustion where we are constantly told the aff is good for disabled individuals be in reality it doesn’t do anything.**

**Now Negate**

1. **Disability require negation as laws used to prop up ableism rendering disabled people invisible**

**Campbell 03**

**Law  facilitate regulating populations into fixed and discrete ontological categories in order that the subjects assigned to those categories can be rendered visible and calculable  The fixity of disability within  law establishes the legal fiction of ‘disability’ in the first place.  Alternative renderings of disability, if they are not able to ‘fit’ such prescribed ‘fictions,’ are barred from entry into legal and other discourses.**

## 4

#### 

#### Value stems from the authority to place value on certain choices which intrinsically gives the value-giver value, implying a meta-ethic of intrinsic value.

#### Meta-ethics outweigh: A] they determine the validity of the standard debate itself instead of just leading to a standard, B] Its axiomatically prior to resolve before the standard. Util’s technocratic adherence to cost-benefit analysis inevitably prioritizes ability over disability and inevitably euthanizes the disabled infant.

**Flanigan PhD 18**

we should think of disabilities as mere differences and **refrain** from evaluating questions with consequentialist considerations. Consequence-minded philosophers are hesitant, about **whether it is permissible to create a disabled person**, on the grounds they predict that a disabled life will be worse in expectation than a nondisabled life consequentialist philosophers have even submitted that it can be permissible to euthanize a disabled infant and replace her with a nondisabled infant we can set aside well-being because, disability rights do not depend on whether having a disability is good or bad. My argument  relies on a Kantian framework.you confer value on your choices by making them. And **from that you should infer that you are a source of value**, people should act in ways that treat humanity, or human autonomy, as a source of value in itself and not merely as a means to one’s own ends.**well-being is not unconditionally valuable because the choices that promote one’s well-being will not promote another’s**. **people have value,that cannot be traded off for the sake of greater well-being**, util permits killing one to save many. Each person has moral status in virtue of her autonomy

#### Thus, the standard is respecting disability freedom. Impact calculus: A) freedom is a property of agency, not an additive consequence. Adding two circles together does not make anything more circular than what was before, just like two humans are not freer than one human. B) even if the net effect of the aff is more freedom, the means by which you have achieved that freedom is an inherently coercive action so you don’t address the appropriate response. I answer whether the state is even in the position to coerce in the first place.

#### Prefer additionally:

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#### Now negate –

#### The aff violates the categorical imperative and is non-universalizable- governments have a binding obligation to protect creations

**Van Dyke 18**

**Kant** **entails** **acknowledging** **a right to express themselves** **labor) has value and is theirs** **and** **government is obligated to protect** **their property. Thus, an inventor** **has a** **creation, which cannot be taken** **without** **consent.** **Applying this** **to everyone** **leads to a yes determination** **, a contrary** **proposal would lead to chaos.**

#### Util dehumanizes disability and the curing of secondary pity to increase the disabled’s “welfare”

**Stein 01**

**If** **disabled have** **less welfare** **it seems** **the disabled benefit less from** **life** **Utili** **would** **place** **lower value on disabled life** **proportional to the** **preference in** **distribution of resources** **to cure a** **disabled person, increasing** **welfare**