## 1

#### The desire to fill the insatiable lack creates experiences of impairment that structures the disability drive. Able bodies persistence with distancing themselves from disability cements an order of signification that relies on ableist value systems.

Mollow 15 [The Disability Drive by Anna Mollow A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in English in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Kent Puckett, Chair Professor Celeste G. Langan Professor Melinda Y. Chen Spring 2015 // WHSRS and Lex VM]

**Tropes of disability are also present in** what Edelman reads as Jean Baudrillard‟s “panicky offensive against **reproduction without** heterogenital **copulation**,” in which sex is described as devolving into a “useless function” and humans are distinguished (unsuccessfully, Edelman argues) from “the order of the virus” (qtd. in Edelman 64, 62).111 Edelman‟s apt reading of these remarks by Baudrillard in relation to what was once called “the gay plague,” as well as his own plays on the word “bent,” suggest that it can be difficult, in homophobic and ableist culture, to distinguish between queerness and disability (62, 90).112 Anti-queer religious leaders, Edelman notes, characterize queer sexualities as “unhealthy” and “ugly,” and “ministries of hope” offer cures to those who have “grown sick-to-death of being queer” (91, 47). 113 Against the “pathology” or “social disease” as which queerness is diagnosed, queer-baiting of children, Edelman argues, functions as a form of “antigay immunization,” while the narrative of A Christmas Carol serves as an annual “booster shot” (143, 19, 49). These repetitive references to disability suggest that not only queerness but also disability might be a fitting name for what Edelman, alluding to the death drive, calls “the remainder of the Real internal to the Symbolic order” (25). Indeed, **disability metaphors are often the closest approximations that Edelman can find for the “unnameable” death drive (25). The terms that Edelman uses to describe the death drive include “wound,” “fracture,” “stupid enjoyment,” “mindless violence,” “lifeless machinery,” “senseless compulsion,” “disfiguration,” and a “shutdown of life‟s vital machinery”** (No Future 22; “Kid” 28; No Future 38, 23, 27, 38, 37, 44). Although **these signifiers** do not directly refer to specific impairments, they do, taken together, **evoke the physical and mental injury and dysfunction as which disability is commonly understood**. And then there is Edelman‟s term “**sinthomosexuality,” a neologism formed by “grafting, at an awkward join**,” the word “sexuality” onto Lacan‟s term “sinthome.” With its “awkward” “grafting,” the word “sinthomosexuality**” embodies disability** at the level of the letter.114 Etymologically, too, Edelman‟s term harkens back to disability: “sinthome” is an archaic way of spelling the French word for “symptom” (qtd. in Edelman 33). The root meaning of “sinthomosexuality,” then, is something like “symptom-sexuality.” However, Lacan‟s “sinthome” means more than simply “symptom”: **it refers**, Edelman explains, **to “the particular way each subject manages to knot together the orders of the Symbolic, the Imaginary, and the Real**” (35). **The sinthome is the only means by which the subject can access the Symbolic order of meaning production; but paradoxically, because each subject‟s sinthome is arbitrary and** meaningless (as individual as a fingerprint), the **sinthome also threatens the Symbolic order** to which it provides access (36). Both this access and this threat are figured as disability. **In order to be constituted as a subject and to take one‟s place within the Symbolic order, one must be metaphorically blind: the cost of subjectivity is “blindness to this determination by the sinthome,” “blindness to the arbitrary fixation of enjoyment responsible for [the subject‟s] consistency**,” “blindness” to the functioning of the sinthome (Edelman 36, 38). **The alternative to subjectivity as disability would be**, according to remarks that Edelman attributes to Lacan, “**radical psychotic autism**” (qtd. in Edelman 37).115 That is, **whatever might alleviate our constitutive “blindness” by exposing “the sinthome as meaningless knot” must effect a “disfiguration”** (Edelman 38), the consequences of which would be “pure autism” (Žižek 81, qtd. in Edelman 38). On the one side, blindness; on the other, disfiguration, psychosis, autism: **when it comes to recognizing the senselessness of one‟s sinthome, it seems we‟re disabled if we do, disabled if we don‟t.** This is why I have proposed that the “death drive”—a force that has less to do with literal death than with a strange persistence of life in death, or of death in life (perhaps like the “life not worth living” of which disability is often supposed to consist)—would more accurately be termed the “disability drive.” Writing of the contingency of disability as an identity category, Michael Bérubé observes: **Any of us who identify as “nondisabled” must know that our self-designation is inevitably temporary, and that a car crash, a virus, a degenerative genetic disease, or a precedent-setting legal decision could change our status in ways over which we have no control whatsoever. If it is obvious why most nondisabled people resist this line of thinking, it should be equally obvious why that resistance must somehow be overcome.** (viii) Could part of this resistance be attributable to a fear that, in the car crash or other identity- shattering event, it might be the driver‟s own hand that makes that disabling turn, that is, that the driver might be driven by an impulse, unwanted and unconscious, toward something beyond the principles of pleasure and health? **Applying the name “the disability drive” to this “beyond” affords insight into the reasons that images of disability so powerfully excite and repel**, becoming, as Tobin Siebers writes, “**sources of fear and fascination for able-bodied people, who cannot bear to look at the unruly sight before them but also cannot bear not to look”** (178). Later in this chapter, I will define the affect that Siebers references here as “primary pity.” For now, though, I simply want to point out that Siebers‟s important observation can be extended by noting that **it is not only nondisabled people who react to images of disability with a mixture of aversion and attraction.** Disabled people may also respond in this way, especially when contemplating impairments other than those that currently disable us.116 Building on Douglas Baynton‟s famous assertion that “**disability is everywhere,...once you begin looking for it,” I suggest that the same may be true in regard to the disability drive: this ego-undoing psychic force shapes the subjectivities of disabled and nondisabled subjects alike** (52).

#### The drive is tied up with primary pity which reflects disability upon the ego threatening its ability status – which invokes secondary pity to overcorrect for the shattered-ego necessitating disabled death.

Mollow 2 [The Disability Drive by Anna Mollow A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in English in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Kent Puckett, Chair Professor Celeste G. Langan Professor Melinda Y. Chen Spring 2015 // WHSRS and Lex VM]

A great deal of the pain and pleasure of primary pity center on questions about what, or who, this fallen self is. When most people think about pity, we refer to an affect in which, to adopt Edelman‟s phrase, we purport to “feel for the other.” But as with primary narcissism, in which the self has not yet been constituted, and therefore cannot be said to enter into intersubjective relations with an “other,” primary pity entails a mixing up of self and other such that the ego, in becoming permeable to pain that may properly belong to “someone else,” is profoundly threatened in its integrity. Primary pity is that intense pain-pleasure complex that is provoked by the image of a suffering other who, it seems momentarily, both is and is not one‟s self. This affective response can feel unbearable, as seen in Siebers‟s formulation: one “cannot bear to look…but also cannot bear not to look.” Primary pity is difficult to bear because it involves a drive toward disability (one cannot bear not to look), which menaces the ego‟s investments in health, pleasure, and control—because to contemplate another person‟s suffering is to confront the question, “Could this happen to me?” Such a prospect, although frightening, may also be compelling; in this way, primary pity replicates the self-rupturing aspects of sexuality. Indeed, the unbearability of primary pity reflects its coextensiveness with sexuality. Sex, or the Unbearable, a book coauthored by Edelman and by Lauren Berlant, argues that sex “unleashes unbearable contradictions that we nonetheless struggle to bear” (back cover). This claim accords with Freud‟s account of sexuality as a “pleasurable” “unpleasure” that the ego can never fully master or control (Three 49,75). As Leo Bersani puts it in his reading of Freud, “the pleasurable unpleasurable tension of sexual enjoyment occurs when the body‟s „normal‟ range of sensation is exceeded, and when the organization of the self is momentarily disturbed”; thus, “sexuality would be that which is intolerable to the structured self” (Freudian 38). Primary pity is also intolerable to the structured self, because it entails a fascination with the fantasy of a self in a state of disintegration or disablement. Secondary pity is something else, although it cannot wholly be differentiated from primary pity. Secondary pity attempts to heal primary pity‟s self-rupturing effects by converting primary pity into a feeling that is bearable. As with secondary narcissism, secondary pity involves both an attempt to get back to that ego-shattering state of painfully pleasurable primary pity, and at the same time to defend against that threat to the ego by aggrandizing oneself at someone else‟s expense. Secondary pity refers to all those ego-bolstering behaviors that most people think of when they talk about pity. Disabled people are all too familiar with these behaviors: the saccharin sympathy, the telethon rituals of “conspicuous contribution,” the insistence that “they” (i.e., nondisabled people) could never endure such suffering. More commonly known in our culture simply as “pity,” secondary pity encompasses our culture‟s most clichéd reactions to disability: charity, tears, and calls for a cure. Correlatives of these commonplace manifestations of secondary pity are the obligatory claims that disabled people‟s suffering is “inspiring.” Indeed, the speed with which conventional cultural representations of disability segue from overt expressions of pity to celebrations of “the triumph of the human spirit” highlights the ways in which secondary pity, as a defense against primary pity‟s incursions, reinforces the ego‟s fantasy of sovereignty. Secondary pity, in other words, can be seen as a variation of secondary narcissism: these affects enlarge the ego of the pitier or the narcissist at the expense of someone else. But primary pity is not the same as either primary narcissism, secondary narcissism, or secondary pity. Unlike primary narcissism, a feeling that emerges out of a relation to the world in which notions of “self” and “other” do not obtain, primary pity does depend upon the constructs of self and other, although these constructions are unstable and are continually threatening to come undone. Primary pity can thus be envisioned as a threshold category occupying a liminal position between the total denial of the other that is inherent to primary narcissism and the rigid structure of (superior) self and (inferior) other that constitutes secondary narcissism and secondary pity. My concept of primary versus secondary pity also differs from Freud‟s primarysecondary narcissism distinction at the level of genealogy. Like Freud‟s account of primary and secondary narcissisms, my model of primary and secondary pities involves a temporal transition; but whereas Freud imagines the movement from primary to secondary narcissism as a passage from an earlier to a later stage of an individual‟s development, the temporal shift from primary to secondary pity happens much more quickly than this. It happens in an instant: that moment in which we feel primary pity and then, almost before we can blink, deny that we feel or have felt it. The denial is understandable: who wants to admit that one gets pleasure from the sight of another person‟s suffering—or, to make matters worse, that this pleasure derives in part from the specter of disability‟s transferability, the possibility that this suffering could be—and, fantasmatically, perhaps already is—an image of one‟s own self undone? Indeed, the model of primary pity that I have been constructing may sound a bit too close to sadism for some people‟s liking. Pity does come close to sadism, and at the same time, to masochism, which Freud theorizes as sadism‟s obverse. In “Mourning and Melancholia,” an essay that can be read as a sequel to “On Narcissism,” Freud approaches a distinction between primary and secondary masochism, which accords with my primary-secondary pity heuristic.122 If the story that I traced in “On Narcissism” could be summarized as “child gets breast; child loses breast; child gets breast back, albeit in a secondary, adulterated form,” the tale that Freud tells about masochism takes much the same form. In this story, subject loves object; subject loses object; and subject tries to get object back by becoming object, that is, by identifying with the object in such a way that object starts to seem—and perhaps in some ways is—part of subject‟s self. This last phase is a dysfunctional and disabling form of identification, Freud makes clear. Subject is still angry at object for having left it, and it takes out that anger on the object that is now part of itself. This is the reason that people suffering from melancholia are so hard on themselves, Freud says; the “diminution in…self-regard” that typically accompanies melancholia results from the subject‟s attacks on the loved-and-lost object that the subject has incorporated into its ego (“Mourning” 246). Freud had not wanted there to be such a thing as primary masochism; for a long time, he had insisted that sadism, or “aggression,” was the primary instinct, and that masochism was only a turning-inward of this originary aggression. But in “Mourning and Melancholia,” although Freud does not yet use the term “primary masochism,” he nonetheless gets at this concept. The problem of suicide, Freud notes in this essay, raises the possibility that the ego “can treat itself as an object” that it wants to destroy (252). When it comes to such an extreme act as suicide, the possibility of carrying “such a purpose through to execution” must, Freud surmises, involve more than a sadistic wish to punish others. Perhaps, then, there is an innate desire to destroy one‟s own self, Freud hypothesizes. If so, this self would not be a single thing: it would be “me” and at the same time, the lost object whose image “I” have internalized. Freud‟s notion of a primary masochism is tied very closely to his conceptualization of the drive. Beyond the Pleasure Principle, the text in which Freud first used the term “death drive,” was published three years after “Mourning and Melancholia.” In the later text, Freud‟s speculations about the death drive lead him to acknowledge that “there might be such a thing as primary masochism” (66). After all, Freud points out, the idea that either sadism or masochism definitively takes precedence over the other does not ultimately make much sense, as “there is no difference in principle between an instinct turning from the object to the ego and its turning from the ego to an object” (66). If sadism and masochism are ultimately indistinguishable obverses of each other, then pity, in both its primary and its secondary forms, would have to be both sadistic and masochistic. This is a deeply troubling possibility, but I suggest that trying to overcome pity will only make matters worse. There are many ways of trying to overcome primary pity, and each one ultimately aggravates the violence of primary pity. One way is the “pitiless” refusal of compassion that Edelman advocates (70). Another is the disability activist “No pity” injunction. A third example is secondary pity, as in the query, commonly addressed to disabled people, “Have you ever thought of killing yourself?”123 In this question, disabled people correctly hear the wish, “I‟d like to kill you.” Indeed, primary pity is so unsettling that our culture has been driven to “mercifully” kill people in the name of secondary pity. We have also been driven to lock people in institutions, to let them languish on the streets, to stare, to punish, and to sentimentalize—all, I would suggest, in the interest of not owning, not naming, not acknowledging that self-shattering, ego-dissolving, instantaneous and intolerable moment of primary pity. Because primary pity is tied up with the disability drive, it must, like the drive itself, be regarded as unrepresentable. However, I will quote at length from a passage of writing that comes close not only to representing primary pity but also perhaps to producing it. In his memoir, One More Theory About Happiness, Paul Guest describes an experience that he had in the hospital after sustaining a spinal cord injury when he was twelve years old: My stomach still roiled and it was hard to keep anything down. Late one night, a doctor came to my bedside, leaning over me, his hands knotted together. He seemed vexed, not quite ready to say anything. Used to the look, I waited. And then he began. “The acids in your stomach, Paul, because of everything you‟re going through, it‟s like your body, everything about it, is upset. That‟s why you feel so nauseous all the time. We‟re going to treat that by putting a tube into your nose and down into your stomach, so we can give you medicine, OK?” When he walked away, I felt something begin to give way inside me. Up until then, I‟d faced more misery and indignity than I would have thought possible. I lay there, numb and sick in a diaper, helpless. It was too much to bear, too frightening, a last invasion I could experience and not break, utterly. When he returned with nurses, I was already sobbing. Anyone so limited could hardly fight, but I tried. I tried. The neck collar prevented much movement, and any was dangerous, but I turned my head side to side, just slightly, a pitiful, unacceptable range. Fat tears rolled down my face like marbles. I begged them all, no, no, no, please no. “Hold him, hold him still,” the doctor said. Nurses gripped my head on either side. From a sterile pack, the doctor fished out a long transparent tube and dabbed its head in a clear lubricant. He paused almost as if to warn me but then said nothing.

#### The 1ACs belief of a better future is tied to rehabilitation where the signifier of the Child is placed forward which deems the disabled child a threat to society and is thus eradicated from the political.

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“Let us begin our reexamination of Tiny Tim with a discussion of No Future, a text in which Tiny Tim takes a prominent position. No Future is a text with a target: the book takes aim at “the Child whose innocence solicits our defense,” a trope that Edelman names as the emblem of an ideology that he terms “reproductive futurism” (2). According to Edelman, commonplace cultural invocations of the figure of the Child (“not to be confused with the lived experiences of any historical children”) uphold “the absolute privilege of heteronormativity” (11, 2). Defying pronatalist social imperatives, Edelman names queerness as “the side of those not fighting for the children‟” (3) and urges queers to accept the culture‟s projection of the death drive onto us by saying explicitly what Law and the Pope and the whole of the Symbolic order for which they stand hear anyway in each and every expression or manifestation of queer sexuality: Fuck the social order and the Child in whose name we‟re collectively terrorized; fuck Annie; fuck the waif from Les Mis; fuck the poor, innocent kid on the Net; fuck Laws both with capital ls and with small; fuck the whole network of Symbolic relations and the future that serves as its prop. (No Future 29) Elsewhere, I have argued that No Future‟s impassioned polemic is one that disability studies might take to heart. Indeed, the figure that Edelman calls “the disciplinary image of the ‘innocent’ Child” is inextricable not only from queerness but also from disability (19). For example, the Child is the centerpiece of the telethon, a ritual display of pity that demeans disabled people. When Jerry Lewis counters disability activists‟ objections to his assertion that a disabled person is “half a person,” he insists that he is only fighting for the Children: “Please, I’m begging for survival. I want my kids alive,” he implores (in Johnson, Too Late 53, 58). If the Child makes an excellent alibi for ableism, perhaps this is because, as Edelman points out, the idea of not fighting for this figure is unthinkable. Thus, when Harriet McBryde Johnson hands out leaflets protesting the Muscular Dystrophy Association, a confused passerby cannot make sense of what her protest is about. “You‟re against Jerry Lewis!” he exclaims (61). The passerby’s surprise is likely informed by a logic similar to that which, in Edelman‟s analysis, undergirds the use of the word “choice” by advocates of legal abortion: “Who would, after all, come out for abortion or stand against reproduction, against futurity, and so against life?” (16). Similarly, why would anyone come out for disability, and so against the Child who, without a cure, might never walk, might never lead a normal life, might not even have a future at all? The logic of the telethon, in other words, relies on an ideology that might be defined as “rehabilitative futurism,” a term that I coin to overlap and intersect with Edelman‟s notion of “reproductive futurism.” If, as Edelman maintains, the future is envisaged in terms of a fantasmatic “Child,” then the survival of this future-figured-as-Child is threatened by both queerness and disability. Futurity is habitually imagined in terms that fantasize the eradication of disability: a recovery of a “crippled” or “hobbled” economy, a cure for society’s ills, an end to suffering and disease. Eugenic ideologies are also grounded in both reproductive and rehabilitative futurism: procreation by the fit and elimination of the disabled, eugenicists promised, would bring forth a better future.” (68-69)

#### The affs call for a better democracy is nothing but a call for visibility. Democracy operates through recognition of socially tolerable identities which always excludes disabled folk who are mutually exclusive from democratic notions of civilization. Visibility through democratic identity construction is a stamp of approval that is never afforded to us because we will never “fit in.”

McRuer 17 (McRuer, Robert. “No Future for Crips: Disorderly Conduct in the New World Order; or, Disability Studies on the Verge of a Nervous Breakdown.” Culture – Theory – Disability: Encounters between Disability Studies and Cultural Studies, edited by Anne Waldschmidt et al., Transcript Verlag, Bielefeld, 2017, pp. 63–78. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv1xxs3r.9. Accessed 2 Aug. 2020.) //Lex VM

While not disagreeing with D’Lugo (or Almodóvar himself, for that matter), I am uncomfortable, at this point, with the stark distinction between Old Spain and New Spain, particularly because that binary opposition fails to do justice to the new New Spain – to the ways, that is, in which neoliberalism has taken hold in Spain. The new New Spain is, at this point, one of the most gayfriendly locations in the world. Not only is an openly gay filmmaker one of the country’s most recognizable, globally-disseminated commodities, but 70% of the population supported gay marriage at the time of its ratification in 2004 (when Bad Education premiered), representations of ‘tolerance’ or acceptance of homosexuality abound, and Madrid, Barcelona, Sitges, and other locations are major gay tourist sites marketed to gay-identified consumers everywhere. The San Francisco gay travel magazine Passport announces, for instance, “Few cities in Europe boast the kind of frenetic fun people can experience in Madrid […]. A few may be coy about their sexuality outside the gay quarters or at work, but once they get to Chuecea [Madrid’s most famous gay neighborhood] – well, you’ll have to see it with your own eyes” (cited in Giorgio 60). In this context, I argue, ‘Old Spain,’ even as it does persist in spectral forms, is at times a bit of a straw target. I also contend that neoliberal tolerance or even celebration of gay people is more complicated than it at first appears and that those complications are legible in a film like Bad Education. Gabriel Giorgio, in his essay “Madrid en Tránsito: Travelers, Visibility, and Gay Identity,” argues that “in a democracy that still needs to demonstrate its strength and its resemblance to the older, so-called advanced democracies of the United States and northern Europe, gay visibility [in Spain] stands out as a symbol, a token of social tolerance and achieved freedom” (61). To borrow a line from a courtroom scene in another Spanish film of 2004, Alejandro Amenábar’s Mar adentro (The Sea Inside), where lawyers are attempting to make precisely this sharp distinction between a dark past and a bright present: “We are a civilized nation.” If, in the New Spain gender and sexual difference marked ‘freedom’ and ‘liberation’ in opposition to the ‘repression’ of the fascist past, in the new New Spain, gay bodies now mark civilization and tolerance as opposed to barbarism and irrationality. Gay identity (indeed, identity in general) is, I argue, disciplined in this new, neoliberal formation. Giorgio insists that gayness “sets in motion a narrative that locates bodies in a geopolitical order, making them visible in some ways and determining their visibility under different conditions” (73). For Giorgio, a legible gay identity in Spain now marketed globally to gay and non-gay consumers (decidedly different conditions from the immediate post-Franco years) ghosts larger economic and cultural processes. For Giorgio in his essay, the new New Spain is ‘open’ and ‘tolerant’ in relation to gay identity, but this tolerance can mask other forms of exploitation, such as the exploitation of immigrant labor and immigrant bodies. Bad Education, in my reading, can be interpreted as exposing or disordering this neoliberal pedagogy. Tellingly, Almodóvar gives us, in the film (this would be, in fact, a nutshell summary of the film), a gay filmmaker (Enrique) caught up in processes or histories much larger than himself. And, indeed, outside the film, Almodóvar likewise cannot fully control the uses to which his own body and identity are put – as one of Spain’s most recognizable commodities, he is inescapably a character in the new gay-friendly story about a tolerant, civilized, cosmopolitan Spain. Bad Education, however, seduces you with gay and transgender identities that you learn to tolerate or even love, and then strikes back against that compulsory affect, pulling the rug out from under you and giving you a figure that is almost impossible to love, a figure that has no future in the new social order, a disorderly and drug-addicted crip who fails spectacularly even as she types the unfinished sentence “Enrique, I think I have succeeded…” (and remember here what I said earlier about no unequivocal achievements or successes in modernity). Since I invoked The Sea Inside a moment ago, one might conclude that disability in general functions somewhat differently from sex and gender in the new New Spain. The Sea Inside arguably puts forward quite negative views of disability, because it is a film about a quadriplegic, Ramón Sampedro (Javier Bardem), who feels his life has no value and who thus petitions the state for the right to end that life. The award-winning film (it won the Oscar for best foreign film in 2004) both represents the seemingly ‘rational’ desire of a quadriplegic to kill himself and schools you in how ‘we’ should respond (in an orderly fashion): “We are a civilized nation,” Ramón Sampedro’s lawyers argue in court as they advocate for his death. One might conclude from the invocation of The Sea Inside, in other words, that even as some gay bodies are now tolerated or ‘included,’ disabled bodies are still ‘excluded’ in expected ways and that a disabled life is necessarily perceived as intolerable. Yet as I said at the beginning, my concern is the disability movement in a moment of danger (our own, neoliberal moment) and – as Michel Foucault famously recognized, arguing “not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous” (231- 232) – moments of danger always present a range of possible responses or outcomes. As it narrates for itself a story of civilization and tolerance, then, the new New Spain can, without question, in a very familiar (although I would call it residual) move, position recognizably disabled bodies like Sampedro’s as expendable. But recognizably disabled bodies can also be disciplined in ways not unlike recognizably gay bodies, and this, I would say, represents a more emergent neoliberal discourse in Spain (and elsewhere) today, a discourse again organized around identity and again ghosting much larger and exploitative cultural and economic processes: As Jesús Hernández, accessibility director of Spain’s ONCE Foundation (Spain’s largest disability organization) insists, in relation to the new disabled tourism, “No te preocupes de mis derechos, preocúpate de mi cartera” – “don’t overly concern yourself about my rights, pay attention to my wallet!” (“Preocúpate”). Bad Education is a crip film because it paradoxically keeps alive the notion that there is no future for crips even as it critically disorders or critiques the futures we are inheriting (and ‘critique’ is necessarily futural, so my point here is that the film – simultaneously futural and antifutural – hands us a logical contradiction that exceeds Edelman’s over-simplified embrace of queer negativity). The real Ignacio dies, in the film, imbibing a substance that she herself needs but cannot biologically ‘tolerate.’ Similarly, at another level, through figurations that cannot be tolerated or re-membered to fit the new social order but that also can never be entirely forgotten, Almodóvar presents us with impossible bodies engaged in disorderly conduct – with (put differently) disorderly specters that we, in the interest of always-expanding notions of crip justice, must attend to.

#### Strikes leads to the policing, exclusion and silencing of disabled kids.

Curtiss 19 [David Curtiss, "What Happens to Vulnerable Students When Teachers Strike? (Opinion)", Education Week, 2-21-2019, https://www.edweek.org/teaching-learning/opinion-what-happens-to-vulnerable-students-when-teachers-strike/2019/02, accessed: 10-21-2021.] //Lex VM

When the Los Angeles Unified School District decided to relight the match of protest last month, teachers across the nation also caught flame. Denver. West Virginia. Oakland, Calif. In the past year, teacher strikes have reemerged as an effective tool to answer the long-standing demands of frustrated educators who need better pay, improved facilities, and more resources for high-need schools. During these strikes, much of the attention has been given to the most visible people in our schools: teachers, parents, and vocal and well-performing students. However, working as a special education paraprofessional for a public elementary school in South Los Angeles, I know that students of color, particularly those with disabilities, hardly ever get consideration when major decisions like these are made. During the LAUSD strike, just a third of the district’s 600,000 students showed up to school on the strike’s first day. Students and families were forced to find all sorts of creative ways to facilitate learning, including taking advantage of free entry to museums and zoos, teaching classes at home, or rallying with teachers. Though the strike produced historic wins for teachers, it did not come without significant drawbacks for students whose voices have been historically suppressed in our schools." For low-income students and students with disabilities at high-need schools, many of those options were not feasible. Instead, non-credentialed school staff such as myself—along with sanitation workers, office personnel, and yard and recreational support—worked tirelessly to keep schools running for students in attendance. I saw the strike’s impact on the day-to-day experience of these students in high-need schools, even well after the strike has ended. Though the strike produced historic wins for teachers, it did not come without significant drawbacks for students whose voices have been historically suppressed in our schools: students of color, particularly black boys, with disabilities. On January 14, the first day of the strike, droves of 4th, 5th, and 6th graders noisily filled our school’s auditorium for programming. This was standard protocol at many schools, but it was nearly impossible for our administrator to redirect the children’s attention to schoolwork amidst the mass confusion that both students and staff were experiencing. One student with whom I work closely, a boisterous and excitable 11-year-old black boy with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, paced up and down the auditorium floor. As he greeted friends and danced to pass time, a school administrator ferociously snapped at him to leave the auditorium. Stunned, the student (along with some nervous staff like me) waited for clarification. Where would he go? All classrooms serving this age group at our school remained locked during the strike. It was raining outside. The school administrator told him he could keep himself occupied by walking around the school. It was clear to me that the administrator, overwhelmed and with little support, made an exceptionally bad call. The student’s entire grade level was inside the auditorium with the only available credentialed staff. But what some might excuse as a temporary lapse in judgment was unfortunately all too common during the strike for students like him. Although most administrators meant well, a general lack of understanding about the biased ways schools see children of color and students with disabilities created a hostile space for many children during the strike. Since resources were more scarce than usual during the strike, students in our school who were already considered “defiant” were now being chastised for little more than showing up. Many of their key advocates—the teachers who are more skilled in supporting their needs—were on the picket lines. I watched as students were sent home for arbitrary and vague reasons or assigned mandatory escorts to the bathroom and class. In one case, the police were even called in to deal with a classroom infraction for a kindergarten student. The encounter left a young black boy screaming and crying in our school halls. See Also: Discipline Disparities Grow for Students of Color I am proud to have witnessed the work of teachers during the Los Angeles strike. However, I cannot be proud of the way many of our schools resort to punishing and policing our students, particularly disabled children of color. Although the strike is over for my city, we have no way of knowing the far-reaching effects it will have on students’ sense of safety and trust in their schools. So other school districts contemplating these types of strikes must ask: Are our strides coming at the expense of our most marginalized students? There is no perfect solution, but there are a few ways schools can better prepare for demonstrations involving teachers. Teachers must collectively consider the broader impact of leaving disadvantaged students in classrooms without them and strategize how they can work with others inside their school to protect students. Schools can proactively train administration along with other school staff, such as assistants and recreational providers, on how they may unconsciously pathologize disability and nonwhiteness. Teachers and teachers’ unions can also train parents, particularly those in vulnerable and under-resourced areas, to know their rights and ensure their children are not mistreated or neglected. And once strikes are over, teachers and other school staff can intentionally tend to students whose needs might have been overlooked. Let us not forget that teacher strikes have a greater potential to harm children who are people of color, poor, and live with a disability.

#### The starting point of the 1AC is epistemically flawed and an independent link – fiat is illusory and anything that doesn’t begin from the question of disability allows for ableism to infiltrate modes of thought which means we’re an epistemic prerequisite. Thus, the role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best methodologically challenges ableism.

**Campbell 13** Fiona Kumari (2013): Problematizing Vulnerability: Engaging Studies in Ableism and Disability Jurisprudence, Fiona Kumari Campbell undertakes research in Studies in Ableism, coloniality, disability studies as well as explorations about Buddhist formations of disability. Trained in sociology, theology and legal studies; she is interested in ways that law, new technologies and the governance of marginal populations produces understandings of the productive citizen, normative bodies, ideas of periphery and ways that ablement privileges and entitles certain groups in society. Campbell is the author of Contours of Ableism: The Production of Disability and Abledness (Palgrave, 2009) and numerous other journal articles and book chapters. SJCP//JG

Studies in Ableism What is meant by the concept of ableism? The literature suggests that the term is often used fluidly with limited definitional or conceptual specificity. The work of Carlson (2001)5 and Campbell (2001) represented a turning point in bringing attention to this new site of subordination not just in terms of disablement but also ableism’s application to other devalued groups. Ableism is deeply seeded at the level of knowledge systems of life, personhood and liveability. Ableism is not just a matter of ignorance or negative attitudes towards disabled people; it is a schema of perfection, a deep way of thinking about bodies, wholeness and permeability.6 As such integrating ableism into social research and advocacy strategies represents a significant challenge to practice as ableism moves beyond the more familiar territory of social inclusion and usual indices of exclusion to the very divisions of life. Bringing together the study of existence and knowledge systems, ableism is difficult to pin down. Ableism is a set of processes and practices that arise and decline through sequences of causal convergences influenced by the elements of time, space, bodily inflections and circumstance. Ability and the corresponding notion of ableism are intertwined. Compulsory ablebodiedness is implicated in the very foundations of social theory, therapeutic jurisprudence, advocacy, medicine and law; or in the mappings of human anatomy. Summarised by Campbell (2001, 44) Ableism refers to; …A network of beliefs processes and practices that produces a particular kind of self and body (the bodily standard) that is projected as the perfect, speciestypical and therefore essential and fully human. Disability then is cast as a diminished state of being human. Writing today (2013) I add an addition to this definition: ‘The ableist bodily configuration is immutable, permanent and laden with qualities of perfectionism or the enhancement imperative orientated towards a self-contained improvability’. Sentiency applies to not just the human but the ‘animal’ world. As a category to differentiate the normal from the pathological, the concept of abledness is predicated on some preexisting notion about the nature of typical species functioning that is beyond culture and historical context. Ableism does not just stop at propagating what is typical for each species. An ableist imaginary tells us what a healthy body means – a normal mind, the pace, the tenor of thinking and the kinds of emotions and affect that are suitable to express. Of course these ‘fictional’ characteristics then are promoted as a natural ideal. This abled imaginary relies upon the existence of an unacknowledged imagined shared community of able-bodied/minded people held together by a common ableist world view that asserts the preferability and compulsoriness of the norms of ableism. Such ableist schemas erase differences in the ways humans express our emotions, use our thinking and bodies in different cultures and in different situations. This in turn enacts bodily Otherness rendered sometimes as the ‘disabled’, ‘perverted’ or ‘abnormal body’, clearly demarcating the boundaries of normal and pathological. A critical feature of an ableist orientation is a belief that impairment or disability is inherently negative and at its essence is a form of harm in need of improvement, cure or indeed eradication.

#### Vote negative to endorse an unwavering pessimism and radical failure – we reject the political and notions of futurism in exchange for an affirmation of disability’s abjection as something beautiful.

**Selck 16** Michael (2016): Crip Pessimism: The Language of Dis/ability and the Culture that Isn't, Southern Illinois University Carbondale, SJCP//JG

The disabled are dying and with them dis/abled culture is being eradicated. In the time between formulating this project and its completion already too many disabled souls have been taken from this world, including pivotal disability studies influences for this research. I barely had enough time to mourn the loss of disability advocate and inspiration porn critic Stella Young before grieving the loss of disability studies exemplar Tobin Siebers. Attached to the grief I feel as a result of the fading disability studies community is the perpetual grief I harbor since my disabled Father’s suicide and in turn the grief concomitant to the claiming of a disabled identity. I choose to start out this project with grief because it communicates the tenor of this research; this is not the disability studies project of inspiration or utopia. My entry point to the disability studies dialogue is riddled with grief, anger, and pain and it is as such that this project plots a course of disability research that attempts to make a space free from the ideological constraints of optimism. The language surrounding dis/ability is highly political. Entire words, phrases, and identities are stretched between, in, and out of the nexus of dis/ability. The choice, for instance, to include a backslash in the word dis/ability represents for Goodley (2014) a desire to delineate and expand each of the categories in the face of global neoliberalism. My initial research inquired about the impact of dis/abled terms and phrases. I went to interrogate rhetoric like “special education”, “handicapable”, and one of the most glaringly overused insults in the American education system “retard”. The scholarship I was coming up with was plentiful but was for the most part located entirely outside of intercultural communication programs like the one I was attending. For the most part the few and far between intercultural communication projects about dis/ability I was able to locate were without modal complexity and didn’t bear semblance to so many of my own experiences. I was beginning to notice a layer of optimism that has been communicatively imprinted upon the negotiation of dis/abled identity. The angst started to manifest as I questioned if I was in the correct field or if dis/ability even was ‘cultural’. I felt a very real cultural erasure of dis/ability in academia and ultimately that glaring lack of consideration is what pushed me to performance studies. I first worked to close the apparent research gap by crafting a collaborative performance titled Under the Mantle (UTM), which put dis/ability, communication scholarship, and pessimist philosophy on stage. The larger purpose of this research report is to antagonize the erasure of dis/ability from communication studies by autoethnographically analyzing the crip-pessimist performance art project Under The Mantle. This research report will first detail the components of the theoretical work that was drawn on to create UTM. Next I offer a literature review to demonstrate the combination of optimism and neglect dis/ability has undergone in intercultural communication models. Following that section I mark my shift to performance methods as I explain how narrative autoethnography can illuminate cultural misconceptions regarding the dis/abled. In the last sections of this report I offer a textual analysis of the performance UTM and analyze three significant arguments of the instillation before concluding. Contextualizing Critical Dis/Ability Theory Often used interchangeably, critical disability theory (CDT) and critical disability studies (CDS) contest dis/ablism (Goodley, 2011, 2014; Devlin & Pothier, 2006; Hosking, 2008). There are several unique additions made to CDS with every new instantiation. Scholars in European countries and Canada attend to the theory, with United States academics often underrepresented. There are three concurrent themes of CDT that I will synthesize in this section with some dis/ability studies authors claiming there are as many as seven themes of CDT (Hosking, 2008). In the introduction to their edited collection of dis/ability essays, Richard Devlin and Dianne Pothier (2006) present three themes of CDT as, first, to highlight the unequal status to which persons with disabilities are confined; second, to destabilize necessitarian assumptions that reinforce the marginalization of persons with disabilities; and third, to help generate the individual and collective practical agency of persons with disabilities in the struggles for recognition and redistribution. (p. 18, emphasis mine) Already the connections between the CDT and the critical communication paradigm are visible as each respectively forefronts notions of power, privilege, identity, and agency. Outlined in more detail, the first theme of CDT argues that there is systemic micro and macro level discrimination against bodies with disabilities. To some critical communication scholars, this theme might be obvious, but it seldom is when “the resulting exclusion of those who do not fit able-bodied norms may not be noticeable or even intelligible” (Delvin & Pothier, 2006, p. 7). As the bumper sticker on my laptop proudly disclaims, “Not all disabilities are visible,” which necessarily adds a level of nuance and complexity to the way that dis/ability studies attend to the prospect of discrimination and violence. Often times, “social organization according to able-bodied norms is just taken as natural, normal, inevitable, necessary, even progress” (Delvin & Pothier, 2006, p. 7). It might be true that the lack of collaborative work between critical communication studies and dis/ability studies is because neoliberalism is supremely effective at rebranding marginalized oppression as a marker of its progress. The implications of this assertion are dire but essential to the basis of crip-pessimism. Theoretical approaches based in pessimism and skepticism are often necessary to distinguish the instruments of self destruction that have been mistaken for those of self betterment. Thus, a key question remains, what is regarded as progress and to whom does it count? The politics of progress call for the second tenet of CDT, which is a destabilization of neoliberal practices that strip power and agency from bodies with disabilities. Devlin and Pothier (2006) use the language of “anti-necessitarian” (p. 2), which refers to the efficacy of social organizations and an unflinching skepticism of liberalism. For Shildrick and Price (1999), “disabled bodies call into question the ‘giveness’ of the ‘natural body’ and, instead, posit a corporeality that is fluid in its investments and meanings” (p. 1). Anti-necessitarian logics ask questions that remain innocuous to the critical communication paradigm. Can the architectural proliferation of stairs and multiple levels on buildings be attributed to neoliberalism and active disablism? If stairs seem to focus too exclusively on physical impairments, then what about the sensitivity of the building’s lighting, acoustics, and spatiality? Finally, if neoliberalism fights to protect its grand narrative of progress then is the social exclusion of bodies with disabilities necessary for the day-to-day operation of our globalized world? As Donaldson (2002) posits: “theories of gendered, raced, sexed, classed, and disabled bodies offer us critical languages for ‘denaturalising’ impairment’” (p. 112) at the level of the subjective and inter-subjective. The third theme of CDT is to attend to the agency of bodies with disabilities in the struggle for recognition. One key element of extending agency to the disabled is the use of social experience. Experience is subjective “but experience remains intimately connected to political and social existence, and therefore individuals and societies are capable of learning from their experiences” (Siebers, 2008, p. 82). Though absolutely necessary, it is not enough to write treatises on the oppression of the disabled over time. Academics, theorists, intercultural trainers, and storytellers alike should be aware of the constant risks of representation. Representation and context are at the core of critical disability studies. The notion of agency is as unstable as the notions of dis/ability. There is no one-size-fits-all human rights based approach that will be suitable to address all disabled experiences, as the theoretical call for crip-pessimism will remind us. Instead of a universal abstract Rawlsian concept of social justice, CDS “attend(s) to the relational components of dis/ablism” (Goodley, 2011, p. 159). By a Rawlsian concept of social justice I mean a model that relies on distributive justice with utopist equality at its core. Where utopist equality projects highlight human sameness to the point of purity. CDT unavoidably invites a discussion about difference into the folds as postmodern and post-structural thinkers position the self as defined constantly in relation to others. Therein lies the difference between an equality model and a justice model of social identity. Often in the attempt to open up spaces for reconsidering self and other, CDS celebrates disability as a positive identity marker. This essay offers a strong argument of caution that the inclusion of CDS in critical communication studies might rely too heavily on celebrations of disabled identity. Nothing better demonstrates that reliance on celebrating identity than the myriad language choices used to describe a disabled identity including: differently-abled, special needs, person with disability, disabled person, temporarily able-bodied, and others. Often, able- bodied audiences have a tendency to sensationalize the presence of disability in a space that has not traditionally welcomed it. Examples of this are highlighted by the increasingly popular discussion of ‘inspiration porn’ (Young, 2014) and Hollywood’s representation of disability. The tendency is to inspirationalize the disabled for achieving tasks that would not be celebrated if they were accomplished by an unimpaired body. Crossing the street, showing up on time, entering a building by oneself are all tasks profoundly routine to the non-disabled and yet simultaneously cherished as markers of progress for the disabled. Philosophical pessimism is articulated next as a way to temper the risk of sensationalizing dis/ability. The theories ultimately fuse together like orchids and wasps to generate the larger theme of crip-pessimism. Philosophical Pessimism Throughout the 19th century pessimism was one of the most popular intellectual and philosophical strains, crossing countries and continents. Authors such as Rousseau, Leopardi, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche overwhelmingly created and lead the spirit of pessimism. Contemporarily however, the word ‘pessimism’ is pejorative and describes a body’s emotional discontent rather than intellectual engagement with the world. Dienstag (2009) writes, “Since pessimism is perceived more as a disposition than as a theory, pessimists are seen primarily as dissenters from whatever the prevailing consensus of their time happens to be, rather than as constituting a continuous alternative” (p. 3). Power is responsible for ontological shifts, and during shifts some populations benefit while others are harmed. The turn in thinking about pessimism from an intellectual position to an emotional state has been particularly gratuitous for bodies with disabilities. I come to pessimism because of my experience with disability. My anxiety disorder comes with an exteriority of anti-social behavior that has branded me pessimistic. The concern for my anxiety in public situations is often commented on as overly critical, negative, narcissistic, and most often pessimistic. I experience an anxious state of becoming different, and after years of failing to rehabilitate my sameness to able-bodied standards, I have come to a comfort with pessimism. I choose to include pessimism as a theoretical crutch to avoid communication studies’ sensationalism of disability. I imagine that when critical communication studies does bridge the dis/ability research gap that it might, at least initially, extend some neoliberal logics at the expense of CDS. This might manifest by scholars simply asserting disabled personhood where it does not institutionally, culturally, or individually exist. I find that CDT and philosophical pessimism combine in unique and valuable ways, particularly around tensions of personhood, abstract ideal humanism, and neoliberalism. Neoliberalism should be understood as “the superiority of individualized, market-based competition over other modes of organization. This basic principle is the hallmark of neo-liberal thought— one with old roots that lay partly in Anglo economics and partly in German schools of liberalism” (Mudge, 2008, p. 706-707). There are four components of pessimism outlined by Joshua Foa Dienstag (2006) in his book Pessimism: Philosophy, Ethic, Spirit that I wish to explore difference through. They are as following that: (1) time is a burden, (2) history is ironic, (3) human existence is absurd, and finally (4) resignation or affirmation. To write about pessimism necessarily involves questions of time, temporality, and history. The development of philosophical pessimism, specifically, the theories regarding the burden of time-consciousness, begins with difference. For the pessimist, the concept of time begets a differentiation between human and animal. Being a dog-owner myself, I have heard the colloquial aphorism that dogs, as all animals, have no concept of time. Pessimists understand time consciousness as a unique, but ultimately loathsome, trait of the human condition. Even in projects that appear to be geared toward sameness there are always unperceived and neglected populations. For example, even the U.S. constitution alleges persons of color were (and still are often) racially subjugated as property instead of considered to be fully human. The notion of difference is at the center of the pessimist’s position on time-consciousness because the philosophy accepts that the conditions of our existence are subject to relentless unpredictable change. “To the pessimists, however, the human condition is existentially unique— its uniqueness consisting precisely in the capacity for time-consciousness” (Dienstag, 2009, p. 20). For the pessimist nothing is ever the same, everything is always different, and to inhabit linear time means that everything in existence is always rushing off into the past. The advent of human time consciousness is also what leads the pessimist to find the course of history to be ironic. History is ironic for the pessimist because progress is always related to a greater set of unperceived consequences. As suggested above, philosophical pessimism acknowledges that change occurs; technologies develop and improve over time. Pessimists ask if those improvements are related to a greater set of costs that are not immediately recognizable. (Dienstag, 2006, p. 25) Similar to critical disability theory, pessimism interrogates power and privilege. Pessimists rely on the logic of difference to chart consequences. Consequences go unperceived because they occur across populations with disproportionate access to power, populations that are often culturally unintelligible. For instance, the massive boom in mobile technologies like cell phones and laptops has created vast pits of ‘e-waste’ in Africa, surges in child labor, and conflict over rare earth minerals (Vidal, 2013). Pessimists use difference to tease out the distinction between the instruments of suffering and those of betterment. The third philosophical pessimistic position is that human existence is absurd. The absurdity of existence “is illustrated by the persistent mismatch between human purposes and the means available to achieve them: or again, between our desire for happiness and our capacity to encounter or sustain it” (Dienstag, 2006, p. 32). Difference is built upon exanimations of power, which is both fluid and transferable but ultimately permanent. Classical western philosophy has an optimistic pragmatism built into it that posits there must be an answer to our questions. Alternatively, the pessimist embraces uncertainty, ambiguity, and intersubjectivity. Pessimism encourages a sense of comfort around the idea of multiple, coexistent, and perhaps competing histories. Neoliberal optimism is the logic of conflict as materially reconcilable, rather than antagonistically irreconcilable. The fourth and final tenet of pessimism that we are to examine asks what we are to do about our dire human condition. There are multiplicities of rationales that ultimately inform the pessimistic dualism to either resign from life or affirm it entirely. I defer to an existential or Nietzschean pessimism that recognizes suffering is inevitable for two reasons. First, human time-consciousness necessitates an awareness of our impending death. Second, mutually assured value systems will always intersubjectively exist. The choice to affirm life in its entirety is a pessimistic choice. Embracing life as both miserable and beautiful, fleeting and enduring, validates the perpetually fragmented subject seeking a world that exists beyond good and evil and instead just is.

#### No perms: (a) view it as artificially distinct since it’s key to fully flesh out the individual intricacies of both methods and create more concrete proposals (b) justifies infinite aff conditionality – allowings permutations allows infinite new 1AR advocacies which skews 1 mins of the 1NC and destroys neg ground (c) hold the 1AC method by itself since anything else endorses bad scholarship since it justifies severence – justifying both in the aff solves.

## Case

### OV

#### Permissibility and presumption negate – [1] affirming regardless of doubt is cruel optimism that furthers ableist structures [2] negation is the only way that ends calls to futurism [3] if we prove ableist bodies cannot function under your fw that means it cannot guide action proves permissible action is 100 percent impossible.

### Util

#### [1] That’s a Link – their focus on pleasure is in reality a momentary investment into the jouissance of the drive to understand the real which translates itself into the disability drive as the subject rejects itself in asylum without being able to make any change

#### [2] Independently drop them for reading utilitarianism it is an unsafe philosophy that normalizes repugnant conclusions. Safety is prima facie because we concede to the validity of safety when not we are scared of our bodily security to debate in this round.

#### [A] Util dehumanizes disability and the curing of secondary pity to increase the disabled’s “welfare”

Stein 01 Mark is the author of Distributive Justice and Disability: Utilitarianism against Egalitarianism (Yale University Press, 2006) [Stein, Mark S. “Utilitarianism and the Disabled: Distribution of Life.” Social Theory and Practice, vol. 27, no. 4, 2001, pp. 561–578. JSTOR, [www.jstor.org/stable/23559190. Accessed 23 Nov. 2020](http://www.jstor.org/stable/23559190.%20Accessed%2023%20Nov.%202020).] //Lex AKo

**If the disabled have on average less welfare** than nondisabled people, it seems to follow that the disabled benefit less from continued life than do nondisabled people. **Utilitarianism would therefore place a lower value on disabled life** than on nondisabled life, and if a choice had to be made between saving the lives of disabled people and saving the lives of nondisabled people, utilitarianism would counsel us **to give less preference to the disabled**. So, for example, disabled people would receive less preference, in the distribution of life-saving organ transplants, than nondisabled people. Moreover, the utilitarian preference against disabled people in the distribution of life would appear to be exactly **proportional to the** utili tarian **preference in** favor of disabled people in the **distribution of resources**. However **morally urgent it might be to cure a given disabled person**, **increasing her welfare**, it would seem that the same moral ur gency must attach to a decision to preserve the life of a nondisabled person in preference to that disabled person, assuming that only one of them 13Mark Stein, "Utilitarianism and the Disabled: Distribution of Resources," Bioethics 16 (2002), forthcoming. 14See ibid.

#### [B] Util excludes people who can’t feel happiness, which results in their manipulation.

**Peter** 07 “Utilitarianism Is Unjust.” On Philosophy, N.P, 8 Sept. 2007, onphilosophy.wordpress.com/2007/09/08/utilitarianism-is-unjust/. //Massa

According to this principle utilitarianism is unjust because it treats people differently based on their capacity for happiness**;** although utilitarians can appeal to their principles to justify this different treatment, so can racists, and like the racist the utilitarian arguments are not based on objective facts. But before we get into the details allow me to give examples of some groups of people who would be treated unfairly in a purely utilitarian system. The first are those who have no capacity for happiness or unhappiness. There are rare people born without this ability, and we can easily imagine possible species (such as the Vulcans from Star Trek) or conscious computers (such as Data, also from Star Trek) who lack it as well. Utilitarianism cares only about maximizing happiness or pleasure, and so these people effectively wouldn’t count; their treatment would be invisible to the system. Since we can’t make the Vulcans unhappy we would be free to exploit them, turn them into slaves, or whatever else would make us happy. And since we can’t make them happy there is no reason for the system to give them any of the rights or privileges that make us happy. Since they aren’t made unhappy by this treatment the total amount of happiness may be increased, and hence utilitarianism as a system would endorse it. Also treated unfairly are people who are in a permanent state of unhappiness. It isn’t inconceivable that someone might have a condition that prevents them from being happy, and, although many such people might choose to end their lives, there would probably be some who would still choose life. A utilitarian system would take that choice away from them, and to execute them immediately, since they will always be unhappy (negative happiness) eliminating them would increase the total amount of happiness. If such actions could be considered just it would only be if we could somehow convince these people that abusing them on the basis of their capacity for happiness is reasonable, which means convincing them of the validity of utilitarianism.

### Framing

#### Util justifies death good:

#### 1] Death is a net better state of existence since existers suffer pain and pleasure, but the non-existent don’t feel either. Thus, it follows that non-existence is a net better state since the absence of pain is morally good even if it isn’t experience by anyone while the absence of pleasure is neither good or bad. Even if live can be pleasurable, you still negate since non existence is always good while pleasure in life is variable.

#### 2] An obligation to maximize happiness causes infinite pain since no matter how much happiness one has, there is always a moral obligation to acquire more which A] Prevents that pleasure from being utilized and B] is cruelly optimistic because you are chasing an insatiable desire. Only death offers a final escape.

#### 3] Even if killing people is bad, death good outweighs since the pain caused by 8 billion deaths is less than infinite future lives. Additionally, extinction is inevitable, so extinction first doesn’t matter since this debate is just a question of whether or not we should go extinct sooner or later.

# Accessible formatting

## 1

#### The desire to fill the insatiable lack creates experiences of impairment that structures the disability drive. Able bodies persistence with distancing themselves from disability cements an order of signification that relies on ableist value systems.

Mollow 15

disability might be fitting for “the remainder of the Real internal to the Symbolic order” **disability metaphors are** **approximations** **for the** **drive** **terms** **include** **disfiguration** **these signifiers** refer to **disability** “sinthomosexuality**” embodies disability** **it** **is the** **means by which the subject can access** **meaning** **because each** **is** individual **also threatens the Symbolic** **to be constituted as a subject** **one must be** **blind** **to** **determination** **of enjoyment** to **alleviate** **blindness”** **must effect a “disfiguration”** **when** **recognizing the** **sinthome,** **we‟re disabled if we do, disabled if we don‟t.** **the disability drive** **affords** **reasons that images of disability** **excite and repel** **for able-bodied people** **this** **psychic force shapes** **subjectivities**

#### The drive is tied up with primary pity which reflects disability upon the ego threatening its ability status – which invokes secondary pity to overcorrect for the shattered-ego necessitating disabled death.

Mollow 2

primary pity entails a mixing up of self and other such that the ego belong to “someone else,” This affective response can feel unbearable because it involves a drive toward disability which menaces the ego‟s investments in health, and control to contemplate another person‟s suffering is to question, “Could this happen to me?” Secondary pity attempts to heal primary pity and defend the ego at someone else‟s expense. secondary pity encompasses charity, tears, and calls for a cure. these affects enlarge the ego of the pitier primary pity is so unsettling that We have been driven to lock people in institutions, to stare, to punish, and sentimentalize in not acknowledging that pity

#### The 1ACs belief of a better future is tied to rehabilitation where the signifier of the Child is placed forward which deems the disabled child a threat to society and is thus eradicated from the political.

Mollow 3

the image of the Child” is inextricable from disability the Child is a ritual display of pity that demeans disabled people. the Child makes an excellent alibi for ableism because the idea of not fighting is unthinkable. Who would stand against futurity, and life why would anyone come out against the Child who, without a cure, might never have a future The logic relies on “rehabilitative futurism,” is envisaged in terms of a fantasmatic “Child,” that eradication of disability: a recovery of a “hobbled” economy

#### The affs call for a better democracy is nothing but a call for visibility. Democracy operates through recognition of socially tolerable identities which always excludes disabled folk who are mutually exclusive from democratic notions of civilization. Visibility through democratic identity construction is a stamp of approval that is never afforded to us because we will never “fit in.”

McRuer 17

neoliberal tolerance is complicated in advanced democracies visibility stands out as a symbol, a token of social tolerance and freedom identity sets in motion a narrative that locates bodies in a geopolitical order making them visible a legible gay identity in Spain now marketed globally to consumers this tolerance can mask other forms of exploitation the new social order puts forward negative views of disability, because it has no value and petitions the state for the right to end that life. “We are a civilized nation,” that even as some gay bodies are now tolerated or ‘included,’ disabled bodies are ‘excluded’ and perceived as intolerable there is no future for crips through figurations that cannot be tolerated to fit the new social order but that also can never be forgotten

#### Strikes leads to the policing, exclusion and silencing of disabled kids.

Curtiss 19

strikes give to the visible students with disabilities, hardly get consideration LAUSD strike families were forced to facilitate learning teaching at home, or rallying For students with disabilities those were not feasible. students voices have been suppressed On the first day of the strike student with a d h d paced As he greeted friends a admin snapped at him to leave Where would he go? lack of understanding about biased schools create hostile space during strike resources were scarce defiant” were now chastised the police were even called schools resort to policing disabled children teacher strikes harm children who live with a disability.

#### The starting point of the 1AC is epistemically flawed and an independent link – fiat is illusory and anything that doesn’t begin from the question of disability allows for ableism to infiltrate modes of thought which means we’re an epistemic prerequisite. Thus, the role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best methodologically challenges ableism.

**Campbell 13**

Ableism is seeded at the level of knowledge systems a schema of perfection deep way of thinking about bodies integrating ableism into advocacy represents challenge to practice as ableism moves ableist imaginary tells us what a healthy body means relies upon the existence of an unacknowledged community of people held together

#### Vote negative to endorse an unwavering pessimism and radical failure – we reject the political and notions of futurism in exchange for an affirmation of disability’s abjection as something beautiful.

**Selck 16**

disability free from ideological constraints of optimism Often times organization to able-bodied taken as inevitable after failing to rehabilitate able-bodied standards come to a comfort with pessimism The choice to affirm life in its entirety is a pessimistic choice Embracing life as miserable and beautiful

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#### [A] Util dehumanizes disability and the curing of secondary pity to increase the disabled’s “welfare”

Stein 01

**If** **disabled have** **less welfare** it seems the disabled benefit less from life **Utili** **would** **place** **lower value on disabled life** **proportional to the** **preference in** **distribution of resources** **to cure a** **disabled person**, **increasing** **welfare**

#### [B] Util excludes people who can’t feel happiness, which results in their manipulation.

**Peter** 07

utilitarianism treats people on capacity for happiness those who have no capacity wouldn’t count; we would be free to exploit them, treated unfairly are who are in permanent unhappiness. util system would execute them since eliminating would increase happiness

### AT: Actor Spec

#### [1] Is ought fallacy – just because policies use it doesn’t mean they should – it’s not unfeasible to K politics one can demand radical change through infiltrating politics.

#### [2] That’s a link –

#### [1] Answers prove that Util is false proves that Util is impossible to use not just hard.

#### [2] Policy makers make wrong predictions all the time

#### [3] Just because util gets resolved in hypothetically debate rounds, doesn’t mean that it’s a coherent moral theory.

### AT: Extinction/Moen

#### [1] extinction – this is totally irrelevant because we read a fiat K which means you can’t weigh hypotheticals BUT even if you intervene and let them.

#### [2] VTL is non unique for disabled folk who are antagonism to civil society that produce able-bodiness. ONLY this leap in the name of preventing future eradication can risk clearing the grounds for future generations of disabled life their project is parasitic because it furthers the occupation of abled bodies at the expense of disabled folk – that’s Mollow.

### Framing

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#### Util justifies death good:

#### 1] Death is a net better state of existence since existers suffer pain and pleasure, but the non-existent don’t feel either. Thus, it follows that non-existence is a net better state since the absence of pain is morally good even if it isn’t experience by anyone while the absence of pleasure is neither good or bad. Even if live can be pleasurable, you still negate since non existence is always good while pleasure in life is variable.

#### 2] An obligation to maximize happiness causes infinite pain since no matter how much happiness one has, there is always a moral obligation to acquire more which A] Prevents that pleasure from being utilized and B] is cruelly optimistic because you are chasing an insatiable desire. Only death offers a final escape.

#### 3] Even if killing people is bad, death good outweighs since the pain caused by 8 billion deaths is less than infinite future lives. Additionally, extinction is inevitable, so extinction first doesn’t matter since this debate is just a question of whether or not we should go extinct sooner or later.

p