#### Western man is coded as the Vitruvian Man – a white, hyper-able, male according to which difference is measured and exterminated. The fear of differential embodiment is co-constituitive with the colonial ascendance of the West, constructing black and indigenous populations as monstrous and uncivil.

#### Mitchell, Antebi, and Snyder 19 (David T. Mitchell – Professor of English at George Washington University. Susan Antebi – Associate Professor of Spanish and Portuguese at the University of Toronto. Sharon L. Snyder – adjunct professor at George Washington University. “Introduction” Chapter in *The Matter of Disability: Materiality, Biopolitics, and Crip Affect* pgs. 12-23. DOA: 11/15/19, kbb)

#### The colonized subject cannot experience her or his nonbeing outside the particular ideology of western Man as synonymous with human. (Weheliye 26)

#### To fashion the collective alternative methodological approaches that comprise this volume, posthumanist disability theory draws upon the insights of neomaterialism as a way to imagine materiality as enacting its own demands upon the social and discursively overdetermined world of poststructuralism. This is not to dispense with the semiotic slippage so central to post-Derridean analytical techniques, but rather to depriv-ilege the role of discursivity in relation to material agencies. As explained in the previous section, posthumanist methodologies foreground disability’s “strange agencies of natural-cultural processes” as offering multiple pathways for reimagining the alternative flows of dynamic embodiment (Alaimo, Exposed 107). This approach allows us to analyze what we refer to as the fundamental instability of the post-Enlightenment project of classical man. First, posthumanist disability theory positions the Western humanist project, classically represented in Leonardo da Vinci’s model “Vitruvian Man” (1487–90; see figure 2), as incommensurate with contemporary approaches to materiality and embodiment. In The Biopolitics of Disability, Mitchell and Snyder refigure classical man by offering an alternative disability vision of “Vitruvian Man with CP” on their book’s cover (see figure 3). This figuration further exposes the privileged contours of Leonardo’s classical ideal as one that is thoroughly racialized (white), gendered (male), sexualized (heteronormative), aesthetic (symmetrically proportioned), and capacitated (hyperable). The classical “Vitruvian Man” features standards of capacitation that distance him from other embodiments as they are hypermarked by difference and denigrated based on the absence of the unmarked qualities attributed to any historical period’s specific universalized concepts of normativity (Mitchell with Snyder, Biopolitics of Disability iii). Posthumanist disability theory, then, exposes the historically and socially particular constellation of embodied properties that have gone into the making of Western man as a culturally centric, time-bound, and now failing product of the post-Enlightenment. Its quantitative and qualitative proportions have accompanied the ongoing upsurge of territorial and cultural expansions informing the realization of a European world system of global imperialism over other(ed) bodies since the eruption of the “Age of Discovery.” For instance, in Christopher Columbus’s “Letter to the Sovereigns” of March 4, 1493, he describes his New World anthropological encounters through a series of embodied displacements of racialized, gendered fantasies onto the indigenous islanders of what is now mapped as the Caribbean Islands (Zamora 3). One island (Matenino) has a population of all women “without a single man” who “use military weapons and other masculine practices” (Zamora 8); another island (Caribo) is populated by “those who eat human flesh” and grow their “hair very full, like women” and are willing to copulate with Matenino women, while other men fear bodily mutilation from such encounters; there is an island (Jamaica) with all bald inhabitants; and an island (Cuba) of people “who are born with  tails” (Zamora 8). The description arrives despite the fact that Columbus explains he has had little commerce with the indigenous peoples because they run away when his Spanish caravels approach. In Carnal Inscriptions, Susan Antebi argues that Columbus’s lack of actual contact with indigenous people bearing the traits he describes allows for a European notion of monstrosity to function as a metaphor for indigenous alterity that is always projected and displaced. Corporeal otherness thus becomes a justification for exploitation and conquest, but also a site of absence—a flight from a more intra-agential encounter with the materiality of those encountered—that will continue to impact the network of material and discursive relations between imperial and colonial locales (26–28).8 In the same letter containing these demographic fantasies of nonnormatively embodied islanders, Columbus argues that the discovery holds particular promise for the Spanish king and queen who financed the endeavor because a militarized force could dominate such multiplicitous embodiments with its own superior regularity in a matter of weeks. Once colonized, the island resources and slave labor could be extracted and sent back to Spain to boost its coffers. Another key goal of this imperial project was to begin the expansion of a “world system” of colonialism that had the reconquest of Jerusalem from its Muslim inhabitants as the penultimate future objective (Zamora 7). As Aníbal Quijano argues, the colonization of the Americas produces the modern notion of racial difference and global capitalism as intertwined, mutually dependent processes. The resulting and ongoing “coloniality of power” is thus defined through labor exploitation as continuous with racialization, or differentiated and denigrated embodiment (536–40).9 Thus, colonialism, projected fantasies of nonnormative embodiment, Christian crusading, the rise of capitalism, and global conquest form the support pillars of European imperial fantasies from 1493 onward. The figure of classical man in relation to which this imperialist project is imagined situates Leonardo’s “Vitruvian Man” as the instantiation of a biologically superior basis for a justification of conquest. The project of Western man, as black materialist feminist theorists such as Alex Weheliye (2014) and Sylvia Wynter (2014) point out, is eroding in Ozymandias-like ways because of the slow historical decay of properties that have proven increasingly biased based on their emphasis on the deficiency of some bodies. Both Weheliye and Wynters argue that the articulation of the project of Western man can be nothing but incomplete, as it excludes the historical, cultural, and material particularity of people of color from its colorless presentation. In Weheliye’s terms, the principal goal of black studies is “to disrupt the governing conception of humanity as synonymous with Western Man” (5). Likewise, according to Katherine McKittrick, Sylvia Wynters notes that the “correlations in this image [“Vitruvian Man”] between the Human body and the universe hide the fact that the body depicted and the experience upon which Leonardo was relying was a Greco-Roman concept of the human figure” (109). Such a project proves inherently disqualifying for most, and for crip/queer/racialized people in particular as their radically diverse and evolving embodiments challenge the static vision of desirability that Vitruvian Man imposes. Alternatively, posthumanist disability theory positions the spastic, racially hybrid, polymorphously sexualized, androgynous, arms-and-legs-akimbo multiplicity of “Vitruvian Man with CP” in its place. Consequently, in the incomplete and now increasingly abandoned project of Western man, disability can claim some contribution to bringing about this “productive failure.” Halberstam points out in The Queer Art of Failure that what has been historically understood as queer people’s inability to achieve a heteronormative baseline of adulthood in fact represents the unfolding of their alternative cultural and material agencies (31). Such divergent expressions of adulthood are based in the productive eruptive potential of queerness itself. Likewise, Rosi Braidotti points out that “the allegedly abstract ideal of Man as a symbol of Classical Humanity is very much a male of the species; it is a he. Moreover, he is white, European, handsome, and able-bodied” (24). To counter monistic celebrations of Leonardo’s Vitruvian Man as the basis of the project of imagining Western Man, Braidotti offers up the image of “New Vitruvian Woman” (see figure 4) as an alternative to the representation of male embodiment. While whiteness and maleness have long dominated critiques of classical humanism, “handsomeness” and “able-bodiedness” arrive as a startling eruption in Braidotti’s philosophical formulation. This twining of aesthetic with able-bodiedness augments the racialized and engendered coordinates in the realization of Western man’s classical contours. We rarely think of masculine appearance and bodily capacity as qualities of Enlightenment embodiment; likewise, disability, both aesthetic and functional, rarely impresses itself as necessary to exclude so specifically. What is the meaning behind this inclusion of ability in the classical formula of “the human” that Braidotti so tellingly cites without further elaboration? Why might disability prove central to alternative formulations of “the posthuman”? First, in addition to heteronormative masculinity, the creature that Braidotti cites also comes with its class privileges intact. Her analysis borrows from Cary Wolfe’s description of the “Cartesian subject of the cogito” defined as the “subject as citizen, rights-holder, property holder and so on” (“Posthumanities”). As a product of the convergence of gendered, racialized, sexualized, and class characteristics, the classical body of humanism has grown necessarily endangered as a unit of common belonging for the human (and, Wolf would add, nonhuman) species. Braidotti’s calling out of the figure as a “he” brings attention to the fact that the Vitruvian is also excessively able-bodied in presentation. Seven and a half heads tall, four-limbed (if we allow for its display of range of motion that creates an appearance of eight limbs), a fully flexible range of motion in each appendage, sculptured musculature, symmetrically proportioned, and well balanced on one or two legs, the Vitruvian Man defies all specificity of corporeal variation. Such impossible coordination of parts conceals any apparent embodied idiosyncrasy, and thus proves a “pure product” of the kind of human exceptionalism that posthumanist disability theory critiques. Particularly as the world grows increasingly toxic, as medical science harbors the capacity to keep more kinds of bodies alive, and as disabled bodies expand their material presence as participatory subjects in exclusionary humanmade environments, posthumanist disability theory asks how variation might serve as the foundation for modes of reconfiguring, reimagining, and renavigating the world. Posthumanist disability theory thus attempts to reverse this Eurocentric foundational insight by joining in an outpouring of racial/gendered/trans/ classed/disability critiques of the classical humanistic concept of Western man as based on a form of domination over othered bodies that deviate from its zero-degree game of sameness. As Wynter’s philosophy explains, “Once the universality of the Human has been postulated—and we encounter this formulation in many official documents telling us that humans are ‘are all born equal’—hierarchies are needed and put into place to establish differences between all who were ‘born equal’” (McKittrick 109). Specifically for disability, the formula of Western man treats cognitive, physical, sensory, and psychiatric differences as faults localized in individual bodies rather than as revelatory of materiality’s defining multiplicity. Posthumanist philosophers commonly cite “human enhancement” as one cornerstone of this pursuit to seriously decenter the individual figure of Western man as self-contained and biologically intact. Much of this discussion is based on a contemporary technological fetishism of products (or potential products) that take disabled people as their test market in the hopes of moving adaptive devices out into the wider consumer market. As a formidable test market, disabled people are commonly considered to possess materiality in “obvious” need of supplementation, and thus, the direction of “human enhancement” takes on a “helping aura” formerly associated almost exclusively with the rehabilitation therapies (physical, occupational, speech, and others). Donna Haraway famously identifies “paraplegics and severely handicapped people” as having “the most intense experiences of complex hybridization with other communication devices” (“Cyborg Manifesto” 315–16). Many disabled individuals we know describe their relationship to their assistive devices (communication or otherwise) in terms that resonate with “complex hybridization,” but nevertheless Haraway’s definition suggests a relationship of human and machine that comes off as a bit too breezy. These interactions between material bodies and machines generally prove anything but comfort ridden and usually signal the degree to which one arrives, at best, in a détente with supplementary equipment.10 Vitruvian Man has no adaptive technology on his person, and, thus, any prosthetic encumbrance draws crip/queer figures outside the lines of the enfolding circle of symmetrical normalcy in which he finds himself buffered from harm. Like its new materialist predecessors, posthumanist disability theory certainly emerges from recognitions that the Anthropocene has engendered the agency of humanity to such a degree that the human now functions as akin to a geological force capable of affecting all life on the planet (Braidotti 5; Alaimo, Exposed 1). This force has marshaled significant destructive impact on what we know as the material world from the fifteenth century to the present day. Because the dominating figure of Western man has been key to the consolidation of this destructive and anthropocentric framework, posthumanist disability theory has to participate in collapsing the stability of fantasies of embodied normative power. A key challenge is to contest the imposition of a stable mode of desirability and functioning over forms of materiality that are devalued because of their excessive differentiation. The essays included in The Matter of Disability all participate in towing the chain that bends the figure of classical European normative masculinity at the ankles and drags it to the ground. Posthumanist disability theory elaborates on the specific modes of differentiated embodiment materialized and impacted through relations between human and nonhuman, organic and inorganic bodies and environments, and in particular through agricultural and military forms of toxicity that give rise to biopolitical notions of sacrificial subjects such as Mbembe’s “necropolitics” and Giorgio Agamben’s “bare life.” Both of these consciously pursued devaluation schemes are defined as the statesanctioned material destruction and intentional disablement of human bodies and populations deemed expendable (14, 6). Alexander Weheliye champions Mbembe’s approach and depreciates that of Agamben, based on the former’s inclusion of targeted colonized subjects and the latter’s emphasis on a universalized, abstracted concept of subjection to powerknowledge as in the Foucauldian tradition of European philosophy (63). Yet, to be fair, Agamben deals directly with disability populations in his analysis of Nazi eugenic formulations of “life unworthy of life,” while Mbembe and Weheliye leave disablement as a material imposition of violence on bodies. Posthumanist disability theory straddles each of these terrains, as it neither avoids a Marxist tradition of employing disability as proof of industrial capitalism’s destructive power nor eschews attention to materiality’s morphing corporeal rearrangements. Further, part of the reformulation of Western man involves a radical reassessment of the relationality between animal and human bodies (that which Wolfe refers to as “the animal turn” [What Is Posthumanism?]). Whereas humanism has aggressively promoted the controlled breeding of animal and plant bodies in order to increase yield, deny decay, and expand profits, such schemes of genetic direction have produced enormous disability-relevant alterations in human, nonhuman, organic, and inorganic environmental conditions. Pesticide development, for instance, not only alters the nature of what one ingests, but also threatens the migrant, lower-class bodies that clear, maintain, prune, and harvest the fields. In these agrarian locales capacitated labor power is extracted and worn into disabled bodies as a nearly inevitable outcome of the ways in which repetitious movements ultimately deny the very capacities on which they are initially valued. They are also those bodies that get “dusted” by pesticides sprayed across environments by “crop dusters” circling above (Rich 3). Thus, racialized, devalued embodiments become excessively open to exposures that presumably keep the post-Enlightenment body safe. Privilege operates as an ability to seal off one’s body from deleterious encounters with toxicity. Falsely buffered from his own carcinogenic products, Western man gradually ingests a productive portion of the “slow death” he sows and can only fantasize an escape hatch from such hazardous exposures (Berlant 754). His positioning at appropriate distances from the site of production for safekeeping does not prevent the animacies of such toxins from incorporation into his own bodily domain (Chen 218). Additionally, industrial farming has erased the presence of farmers and farmworkers across northern and southern hemispheres and, in moves reminiscent of the dust bowl 1930s, keep extended families adrift, and without access to the education, affiliation, health care, employment tenure, or organization requisite for empowering allies. To a significant extent, this inability to buffer the farmer’s or migrant worker’s exposure to materiality’s rewriting at the core of all being drifts from zones of agricultural production to necropolitical zones of conflict where expendable bodies are defined by forms of state-imposed immobility. The techno-military proliferation of microconflicts on a global scale has given way (largely via drone strikes and the arresting of refugee and immigrant movements) to new levels of administered violence. These new geographical displacements of populations result in a physical dislocation on the outskirts of a more bounded and desirable humanity. Mbembe refers to this placement across a long dureé in abjected physical space as a key characteristic of “the postcolony” (103). The material locations of such bodies position them as targets and thus their expendable peripherality coincides with their immobilizations in various fenced-off elsewheres. Aerial thanatic delivery systems merge artificial intelligence, cybernetic gaming, and human operators in a new formula of death with distance (Braidotti 44–45). As Jasbir Puar points out, the Gaza Strip can be recognized as a physical collection point that defines all bodies within it as expendable with respect to their peripheral location outside and within the borders of Israel (2). Their excessive exposure to death and disability are justified as a result of their immobilized, extreme localization in the occupied territories. While militarized militias use civilian populations as their cover and as governments consciously place those defined as expendable at a physical distance in temporal, makeshift detention camps for the excessively diasporic, those same peripheral citizenries find themselves increasingly subject to what Elaine Scarry describes as the two primary products of war: death and disability (12). Thus, posthumanist disability theory encompasses an extraordinarily complex nexus of mutating bodies, including semipermeable interactions between human, nonhuman, and inorganic animacies; environmental toxicities and the mutating bodies they produce; quantitative and qualitative measurements of capacities, functionalities, and aesthetics; pharmaceutical and cybernetic trafficking in ways of rewriting material subjectivities; a preponderance of blind vendors in a Mexico City subway as the engine of an embodied, affective informal economy; eugenic lineups that take cognitively, psychiatrically, sensorily, and physically disabled bodies to psychiatric killing centers; the advent of tactile poetry that expresses the visceral nature of schizophrenic mindsets; the economic unfoldings of profit where products cause disease and then the same corporate producers provide the therapies to treat the impaired bodies their runoffs produce; amputee fantasies of incapacitated bodies performed by able-bodied actors that retain all but the material specificity of the bodies in question; “tropological confusions” between nonhuman and human animals cross-referenced as mutually devalued and, therefore, euthanasia-worthy; militarized productions of maimed human and nonhuman bodies in fabulations of sexualized hypercapacity; forms of mobility and environmental sensitivity that preclude a more robust participation in “natural” landscapes; as well as the targeting of disabled racialized bodies as unarmed threats to an excessively militarized police force. All of these topics posit the “unique mattering” of posthumanist disability embodiments that reveal uncanny capacities where only unproductive incapacity was imagined to reign. All of these mutated locations can be found and plumbed in the essays that comprise this volume. There is no end to the exhaustive requirements placed upon developing posthumanist disability theory to engage more meaningful global encounters with the intra-active material-discursive agencies unleashed by such developments at the fall of the project of Western man.

#### Pleading for recognition from the state to make any kid of meaningful change is are in vain – the state uses recognition to claim to free the oppressed Additionally turns case – state recognition of personhood allows cooperation’s that the aff is trying to strike against to enjoy life and protection under US law. Weheliye 14 Alexander Weheliye; Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human; 2014

Paradoxically, the particular biological material in question remains the property, at least nominally, of all humanity and is not proper to Moore the individual person: “Lymphokines, unlike a name or a face, have the same molecular structure in every human being and the same, important functions in every human being's immune system. Moreover, the particular genetic material which is responsible for the natural production of lymphokines, and which defendants use to manufacture lymphokines in the laboratory, is also the same in every person; it is no more unique to Moore than the number of vertebrae in the spine or the chemical formula of hemoglobin.”20 So**, while the court grants personhood to human subjects in an individualized fashion that is based on comparatively distinguishing between different humans, when biological material clashes with the interests of capital, the court appeals to the indivisible biological sameness of the Homo sapiens species**. Since the court's ruling does not place this slice of human flesh in the commons for all humans to share**, it tacitly grants corporations the capability of legally possessing this material with the express aim of generating monetary profit**. Considering that **corporations enjoy the benefits of limited personhood and the ability to live forever under U.S. law, corporate entities are entrusted with securing the immortal life of biological matter, while human persons are denied ownership of their supposed essence.**21 My interest here lies not in claiming inalienable ownership rights for cells derived from human bodies such as Lacks's and Moore's but to draw attention to how thoroughly the very core of pure biological matter is framed by neoliberal market logics and by liberal ideas of personhood as property. **We are in dire need of alternatives to the legal conception of personhood that dominates our world, and, in addition, to not lose sight of what remains outside the law, what the law cannot capture**, what it cannot magically transform into the fantastic form of property ownership. Writing about the connections between transgender politics and other forms of identity-based activism that respond to structural inequalities, legal scholar Dean Spade shows how **the focus on inclusion, recognition, and equality based on a narrow legal framework (especially as it pertains to antidiscrimination and hate crime laws) not only hinders the eradication of violence** against trans people and other vulnerable **populations but actually creates the condition of possibility for the continued unequal “distribution of life chances.**” **If demanding recognition and inclusion remains at the center of minority politics, it will lead only to a delimited notion of personhood as property that zeroes in comparatively on only one form of subjugation at the expense of others, thus allowing for the continued existence of hierarchical differences between full humans, not-quite-humans, and nonhumans.** This can be gleaned from the “successes” of the mainstream feminist, civil rights, and lesbian-gay rights movements, which facilitate the incorporation of a privileged minority into the ethnoclass of Man at the cost of the still and/or newly criminalized and disposable populations (women of color, the black poor, trans people, the incarcerated, etc.). **To make claims for inclusion and humanity via the U.S. juridical assemblage removes from view that the law itself has been thoroughly violent in its endorsement of racial slavery, indigenous genocide, Jim Crow, the prison-industrial complex, domestic and international warfare, and so on, and that it continues to be one of the chief instruments in creating and maintaining the racializing assemblages in the world of Man**. Instead of appealing to legal recognition, Julia Oparah suggests counteracting the “racialized (trans)gender entrapment” within the prison-industrial complex and beyond with practices of “maroon abolition” (in reference to the long history of escaped slave contraband settlements in the Americas) to “foreground the ways in which often overlooked African diasporic cultural and political legacies inform and undergird anti-prison work,” while also providing strategies and life worlds not exclusively centered on reforming the law.24 Relatedly, Spade calls for a radical politics articulated from the “ ‘impossible’ worldview of trans political existence,” which redefines “the insistence of government agencies, social service providers, media, and many nontrans activists and nonprofiteers that the existence of trans people is impossible.”25 A relational maroon abolitionism beholden to the practices of black radicalism and that arises from the incompatibility of black trans existence with the world of Man serves as one example of how putatively abject modes of being need not be redeployed within hegemonic frameworks but can be operationalized as variable liminal territories or articulated assemblages in movements to abolish the grounds upon which all forms of subjugation are administered.

#### The very notion of a just government is a false one. The goal of the legal system is to create order out of disorder, the crip is always viewed as chaotic and consequently deviance that cannot be normalized exists within a state of exceptionality.

**Campbell, 2009** (Fiona Kumari , Senior Lecturer in Disability Studies at the School of Human Services & Social Work Griffith University and Adjunct Professor in Disability Studies, Faculty of Medicine, University of Kelaniya, "States of Exceptionality: Provisional Disability, its Mitigation, and Citizenship", <http://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/109813/20_Marshall_Vol3_Ch19_p273-p284.pdf)> (

**Law has traditionally had an ambivalent attitude toward disabled people**, restricting itself to being an arbiter of rules and policies about care and protection. The rule of law and its enactment in common law constitutions focus on the rights of individuals, as enforced by courts. A frequent motif in the literature on the rule of law is that the rule protects against the use of arbitrary power by governments against individuals. Joseph Raz (1977) noted elasticity of the notion of arbitrary power, concluding that “many forms of arbitrary rule are complementary with the rule of law” (p. 2). **When courts construct legal doctrine and write judicial opinions, they do so by organizing and interpreting events and ontologies of personhood according to a narrative in which the events and characters “relate to one another and to some overarching structure, in the context of an opposition or struggle”** (Ewik & Sibley, 1995, p. 200). **However, the elusive nature of impairment** (particular when lived out in a social context) and the problematical difﬁ culties, in some instances, of forecasting prognosis, does not **neatly ﬁt with the law’s focus on rules, formulas, and predictability. Legal responses to the challenges of disablement persistently demonstrate a performative passion for sameness (Stiker, 1999). Not just any sameness, but paradoxically and deliberately, a sameness underpinned by an ontological separation between abled and disabled, where mixtures are absorbed through processes of fabricating or simulating abledness.** In many ways, **law is an attempt to create order out of disorder (i.e., diversity and difference) through a process of puriﬁcation—the establishment and demarcation of distinct zones (disabled/abled, human/nonhuman)**, and through a process of translation that acknowledges the reality of mixtures between these extremes. States of disability and health are far more ambiguous and ambivalent than the establishment zones suggest. The health/disability continuum is continually meditated through context (e.g., **certain mobility differences matter more in distinct environments than others), always ﬂuid and ﬂuctuating according to both internal (organic) and external (environmental) stressors and cultural modalities**. Law is uneasy with bodies that ooze or are leaky**, especially those that are fat, distressed, sick, dying, addicted, and appear impermanent**. I argue that **law reﬂects a broader desire to drive down disability —thus ensuring that this class of enumerated persons remains problematically in a state of exceptionality,** deﬁned by law, rather than being a signiﬁcant part of a country’s population. The state of exceptionality refuses to conceive of disability as a form of difference within the population. The role of bio-medicalism coupled with regulative aspects of the law can be found in many legal deﬁnitions of disability. For instance, in the Indian Person with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act (1995), disability is reduced to diagnostic types: s. 2 (i) and a “person with a disability” to “a person suffering from not less than 40% of any disability as certiﬁed by a medical authority” (s. 2 (t))

#### Deviancy from the western pure subject is the justification for violence – forms of violence are historically intertwined.

Aho et al. 17 (Aho, Tanja & Ben-Moshe, Liat & Hilton, Leon J."Mad Futures: Affect/Theory/Violence." American Quarterly, vol. 69 no. 2, 2017, pp. 291-302. Project MUSE, doi:10.1353/aq.2017.0023 Jwala )

In the summer of 2016 a North Miami police officer shoots a black man lying on his back with his hands raised. The man is Charles Kinsey, a behavioral therapist. So far, this would seem to be an example of the alltoo- common occurrence of racialized police violence in the contemporary United States. Yet next to Kinsey sits his autistic client, Arnaldo Eliud Rios Soto, also a person of color, who is holding a toy truck. Kinsey was shot as he was bringing Rios Soto back to the group “home” from which he had escaped. When the police were first called, it was Rios Soto who was believed to be dangerous by the caller, who reported seeing him “holding something like a gun.” The story becomes even more layered: conflicting reports about whom the officer had attempted to shoot drew attention from disability communities: was the officer targeting the black man lying on the ground, unarmed and with his hands raised, or the autistic man holding a toy truck next to him? Both possibilities might be connected to much longer histories of racialization, affectivity, and disablement, but their coalescence in this violent instance of racialized, able-nationalist arrangements of power speaks to the importance of thinking about the co-constitution of race and disability in the longue durée of racial capitalism and liberal modernity.1 Questions of intensity and excess are at the heart of the interlinked processes of racialization and disablement, often produced through the interplay of rationality and affect. Police forces were established to protect owners at a time when black people were considered unruly property, when indigenous people and other people of color, women, and people with disabilities were construed as “irrational” others against which liberal personhood was constructed. The ongoingness of racialized police violence extends this history and continues to assign to social death and literal death those deemed irrational, unruly, unstable, and unpredictable.2 To draw from Alexander Weheliye’s recent work on Hortense Spillers’s hieroglyphics of the flesh, the “enfleshed” are the foundations on which Western Enlightenment’s political, social, and scientific models have been constructed, and continue to bear its burden even as their embodied and cognitive unruliness resists “the legal idiom of personhood as property.”3 When we revisit the affects of enfleshment and the history of racialization and disablement, we open new paths to understanding the “nastiness” of our current moment.4

#### The alternative is habeas viscus – a re-orientation of our resistance that breaks free from trying to free the body within the law. Weheliye 2 Alexander Weheliye; Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human; 2014

#### The poetics and politics that I have been discussing under the heading of habeas viscus or the flesh are concerned not with inclusion in reigning precincts of the status quo but, in Cedric Robinson's apt phrasing, “the continuing development of a collective consciousness informed by the historical struggles for liberation and motivated by the shared sense of obligation to preserve [and I would add also to reimagine] the collective being, the ontological totality.”31 Though the laws of Man place the flesh outside the ferocious and ravenous perimeters of the legal body, habeas viscus defies domestication both on the basis of particularized personhood as a result of suffering, as in human rights discourse, and on the grounds of the universalized version of western Man. Rather, habeas viscus points to the terrain of humanity as a relational assemblage exterior to the jurisdiction of law given that the law can bequeath or rescind ownership of the body so that it becomes the property of proper persons but does not possess the authority to nullify the politics and poetics of the flesh found in the traditions of the oppressed. As a way of conceptualizing politics, then, habeas viscus diverges from the discourses and institutions that yoke the flesh to political violence in the modus of deviance. Instead, it translates the hieroglyphics of the flesh into a potentiality in any and all things, an originating leap in the imagining of future anterior freedoms and new genres of humanity. To envisage habeas viscus as a forceful assemblage of humanity entails leaving behind the world of Man and some of its attendant humanist pieties. As opposed to depositing the flesh outside politics, the normal, the human, and so on, we need a better understanding of its varied workings in order to disrobe the cloak of Man, which gives the human a long-overdue extreme makeover; or, in the words of Sylvia Wynter, “the struggle of our new millennium will be one between the ongoing imperative of securing the well-being of our present ethnoclass (i.e. western bourgeois) conception of the human, Man, which overrepresents itself as if it were the human itself, and that of securing the well-being, and therefore the full cognitive and behavioral autonomy of the human species itself/ourselves.”32 Claiming and dwelling in the monstrosity of the flesh present some of the weapons in the guerrilla warfare to “secure the full cognitive and behavioral autonomy of the human species,” since these liberate from captivity assemblages of life, thought, and politics from the tradition of the oppressed and, as a result, disfigure the centrality of Man as the sign for the human. As an assemblage of humanity, habeas viscus animates the elsewheres of Man and emancipates the true potentiality that rests in those subjects who live behind the veil of the permanent state of exception: freedom; assemblages of freedom that sway to the temporality of new syncopated beginnings for the human beyond the world and continent of Man.

#### The ROB is to vote for the debater that best exposes the fold – exposing these breaks in knowledge production is a pre-requisite to deconstructing violence because these discussions are always just erased

Pickens 19 – Therí:  Assistant Professor of English at Bates College. Her research focuses on Arab American and African American literatures and cultures, Disability Studies, philosophy, and literary theory, Therí Alyce Pickens, 2019, *Black Madness :: Mad Blackness*, Duke University Press, p 15-16

To that end, I draw on those who read within the folds and breaks, a concept and methodology that attends to connections between discourse and materiality as infinite and inextricably bound. The complex web of re- lationships between Blackness and madness (and race and disability) is con- stituted within the fissures, breaks, and gaps in critical and literary texts. Hortense Spillers’s work in “Interstices: A Drama of Small Words” (1984), and “‘Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe’: An American Grammar Book” (1987), opens up this critical space and methodology in her discussion of the flesh. She depicts the flesh as a text that has, makes, and acquires meaning. The flesh of Black women in particular, since it has been erased from history, in its abrogated status exists within what Deleuze later terms the fold: a space not solely of possibility, but one that continuously gets erased. Since Deleuze develops the fold vis-à-vis Leibniz’s understanding of the Baroque aesthetic (read: within a tradition of Western and Enlightenment thought), I find it useful to think through how the fold shows up in the aesthetic praxis of the artists-theorists under scrutiny. The fold exists within the self, between the self and other, and between groups of others, as a space from which to interpret and understand the various critical and creative possibilities avail- able. In addition, development does not occur on a linear plane: it constantly folds, unfolds, and refolds. Most important for my readings, the fold func- tions as a space that creates and sustains possibility. Spillers’s work not only anticipates Deleuze but also expands its reach by making explicit which sub- jects consistently live within the fold, an idea disability studies scholar Len- nard Davis echoes when he writes about the way ideas and subjects within the fold get erased.48 Yet, the fold as understood by Deleuze is not merely the place where history and aesthetics rest. It is mercurial and oppositional, since, as Hortense Spillers theorized prior to Deleuze, it is emblazoned on Black flesh. Fred Moten’s In the Break: The Aesthetics of the Black Radi- cal Tradition (2003) conceptualizes the “break,” a methodological kissing cousin to the fold, as a racialized space that pinpoints how history, music, and race—as discursive concepts and material consequences—function as oppositional even as they are coextensive. Moten’s “break” signals the kind of rupture that creates and catastrophizes Blackness and madness, which he punctuates by using other words to describe the break like the cut, or the process of breaking, like invagination, or intussuscepted (all of which I borrow).

### 2

#### Reading Curry is black fem-phobic – I’m gonna attach a shit ton of screen-shots and insert sections of curry’s work.

#### He scapegoats Black women as the ones who wanted Black men to be the patriarch – in response to Black hypermasculinity, Curry would blame Black women.

Curry 17 — Tommy J. Curry, Professor of Philosophy at Texas A&M University, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Southern Illinois University, 2017 (“Conclusion: Not MAN but Not Some Nothing,” *The Man-Not: Race, Class, Genre, and the Dilemmas of Black Manhood*, Published by Temple University Press, ISBN 9781439914878, p. kindle 4854-4996)

Intersectionality and Hegemonic Masculinity

While contemporary intersectionality theorists argue that the theory can and, in fact, does apply to Black males, there has been no critical interrogation of the role dominance theory plays in explaining or defining heterosexual Black male behavior under intersectionality. For example, Frank Rudy Cooper’s “Against Bipolar Black Masculinity: Intersectionality, Assimilation, Identity Performance, and Hierarchy” asserts that the analysis of Black male bipolarity (the oscillation between the Good Black and Bad Black male image) “is an intersectional phenomenon because it is the product of the combination of narratives about [B]lackness in general and narratives about [B]lack masculinity in particular.”36 At the same time, however, he asserts that heterosexual Black men, good and bad, are seduced “into taking pleasure in the present hierarchies”37 Despite their material location, in prison or in the boardroom, “heterosexual [B]lack men are taught to emulate the economically-empowered heterosexual white men who set the norms in this culture.”38 Using Michael Kimmel’s essay “Masculinity as Homophobia,” Cooper interprets Raewyn Connell’s theory of hegemonic masculinity to conclude:

The predominant account of normative United States masculinity describes it as fundamentally based on a fear of being associated with denigrated others. To be a full man, one must distinguish oneself from femininity. One accomplishes that by distancing himself from the qualities associated with women and from women themselves. Instead, one treats women as possessions to be displayed as evidence of one’s manhood. Similarly, one must distance oneself from gay men. This is the attempted repudiation of the presence of feminine qualities in men.39

Kimmel cites Connell’s Gender and Power to explain hegemonic masculinity as “the image of masculinity of those men who hold power.” 40 According to Kimmel, “We equate manhood with being strong, successful, capable, reliable, in control.”41 In fact, it is these definitions of manhood that are used to “maintain the power that some men have over other men and that men have over women.” As discussed previously, these notions simply do not apply to racially subordinated males who are targeted by white patriarchy. As decades of data have suggested, Black men and boys simply do not see masculinity either as the ideal for which one should strive or as synonymous with Black manhood.

Cooper argues that heterosexual Black men seek to emulate this normative white masculinity, making them “feel compelled to prove their manhood through acts that distance them from marginalized others.” Perhaps most interesting, he maintains that intersectional disadvantage does not change the impulse of the heterosexual male. Despite their condition or circumstances, “heterosexual [B]lack men will seek to offset their feelings of powerlessness by subordinating others.”42 This explanation highlights the difference between the application of a theory and anthropological assumptions behind a theory. Cooper argues that intersectionality helps us understand the identity-level tensions and conflicts between Black men being designated as good or bad in a white-supremacist society, but behind the analysis of identity is an assumption about the nature of heterosexual Black men. Cooper’s claim does not emerge from any historical or empirical study of heterosexual Black males, but from the familiarity this narrative has among gender theorists—his repetition of the consensus concerning Black males held by his audience. Cooper only cites the anecdotal analysis bell hooks offers of Black males’ political aspirations after emancipation. While hooks admits that newly freed Black men and women were both struggling with the contradictions of gender in which Black women demanded that Black men protect and provide for them, it is only Black men, in their struggle to fulfill this role and be recognized as men, who are deemed patriarchs.43 Like Michele Wallace, hooks is unable to conceptualize (non-feminist-inspired) Black masculinities, especially after racial integration.44 She assumes that the history of Black gender relations can be told as one that conceptualizes Black womanhood as participating in sexism but is much less innocuous in its reproduction of patriarchy than Black males, while the political struggles of Black men are primarily mimetic and motivated by their desire to dominate others. Since hooks provides no citations to substantiate her interpretation of (heterosexual) Black men’s 150-year struggle for freedom in this country, the reader is expected to accept Cooper’s understanding of the Black male personality based solely on the authoritative force of bell hooks’s pronouncement. Regardless of their location, heterosexual Black men, because they are male, are thought always to aspire to the characteristics of white (bourgeois) masculinity. Even in those cases where the Black male is shown to be materially oppressed, Cooper asserts, Black males will subordinate others to compensate for the power they lack.

#### AND He argues that women have privilege in the court system, and they actively use and exploit it in assault cases.

Curry 17 — Tommy J. Curry, Professor of Philosophy at Texas A&M University, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Southern Illinois University, 2017 (“Introduction: Toward a Genre Study of Black Male Death and Dying,” *The Man-Not: Race, Class, Genre, and the Dilemmas of Black Manhood*, Published by Temple University Press, ISBN 9781439914878, p. kindle 705-823)

Black Male Vulnerability as a Foundation: Evaluating the Political Economy of Black Male Erasures from Theory

Black male vulnerability is the term I use to capture the disadvantages that Black males endure compared with other groups; the erasure of Black males’ actual lived experience from theory; and the violence and death Black males suffer in society. The term is not meant simply to express the material disadvantages Black males face due to incarceration, unemployment, police brutality, homicide, domestic and sexual abuse throughout society, or their victimhood. The term is also meant to express the vulnerable condition—the sheer fungibility—of the Black male as a living terror able to be killed, raped, or dehumanized at any moment, given the disposition of those who encounter him. Black male vulnerability is an attempt to capture the Black male’s perpetual susceptibility to the will of others, how he has no resistance to the imposition of others’ fears and anxieties on him. Despite the contemporary intersectional, feminist, and liberal-progressive framings of gender hierarchies that maintain that Black men have some privilege based on their maleness, Black men and boys lag behind on practically every population indicator, from education and income to health and mortality.

Classrooms are hostile environments for young Black boys.105 They are often thought of as lazy, disruptive, and in need of the most discipline.106 Teachers routinely assert that Black boys are less intelligent than whites and Black girls and treat them less favorably as a result.107 Some scholars have even shown that parents have taken up the view that Black boys are less academically gifted than Black girls. These lower parental expectations for Black boys academically leads to not only less parental involvement in their education but also less reward or encouragement for their academic success.108 The negative experiences Black boys endure from kindergarten through twelfth grade have very real consequences for college and beyond. Since the dawn of the twenty-first century, Black men have received fewer than 40 percent of the associate, professional, and doctoral degrees awarded to Black Americans.109 The consequence of Black males earning fewer bachelor’s and doctoral degrees is reflected in the number of Black male professors at Title IV institutions throughout the country. According to the most recent report by the American Association of University Professors, there are roughly 48,000 Black male and about 70,000 Black female professors at Title IV colleges or universities in the United States.110 Black female professors outnumber Black male professors by a little more than 20,000. In contrast to the history of white Americans in higher education, Black men have always been outnumbered by their female counterparts in college enrollment and degree attainment. As the demographer Anne McDaniel explains, “The historical trend in college completion for [B]lacks is not marked by the reversal of a gender gap that once favored males, as it is for whites, but rather entails a longstanding female advantage.”111

Similarly, the economist Rhonda Sharpe notes, “Since 2000, Black women earned twice as many associate’s, bachelor’s and master’s degrees as [B]lack men and nearly twice as many professional and doctorate degrees.”112 The growth of Black women in the university has allowed them, as a group, to attain tenure-track employment at rates comparable that of their non-Black counterparts over the past two decades,113 while Black males are still trying to gain sustainable access to colleges and universities at the baccalaureate level.114 This historical advantage of Black women in education, first remarked on by W.E.B. DuBois in 1927, brings attention to a stark race-sex inequality disregarded by many, if not most, scholars working on race and gender.115 If this gender gap in education continues, warns Wilma Henry, “by 2097, all of the baccalaureate degrees earned by African Americans will be bestowed on African American women.”116 The smaller number of Black males pursuing college as a first choice drives many into labor-intensive blue-collar occupations. While these jobs will offer some economic independence compared with those years spent in college, Black males in these blue-collar occupations rarely climb the economic ladder into the middle class. This lack of class mobility for Black males carries the risk of poverty and unemployment.

Incarceration has also had a devastating impact on Black males’ lifelong economic prospects. At the end of 2009, an estimated 841,000 Black men and 64,800 Black women were in state or federal prisons and local jails.117 According to the Bureau of Justice report on prisoners, “On December 31, 2014, [B]lack males had higher imprisonment rates than prisoners of other races or Hispanic origin within every age group.”118 The economists Derek Neal and Armin Rick found that “the growth of incarceration rates among [B]lack men in recent decades combined with the sharp drop in [B]lack employment rates during the Great Recession have left most [B]lack men in a position relative to white men that is really no better than the position they occupied only a few years after the Civil Rights Act of 1965.”119 The impact of incarceration is not simply rooted in the removal of these Black males from society. Incarceration also marks Black men for years after they are released, making employment and basic sustenance nearly impossible. Evelyn Patterson and Christopher Wildeman’s recent study “Mass Imprisonment and the Life Course Revisited” found that imprisonment has even more devastating effects on Black males’ economic condition and quality of life than previously thought, since incarceration robs Black males of disproportionately more years that they are capable of working. Patterson and Wildeman conclude, “The total amount of time [B]lack men on average spend marked—not in prison but an ex-prisoner and felon—is far larger (at 11.14 years, corresponding to roughly 27 percent of their working lives). . . . [T]his means that [B]lack men spend on average 31 percent—roughly one-third—of their working lives either locked in a state prison or struggling to overcome the negative outcomes that result from their marked status.”120 As Becky Pettit argues, “High rates of incarceration among [B]lack men—and [B]lack men with low levels of education in particular—have profound implications for accounts of their social standing and that of their children, families, and communities where they live prior to and following incarceration.”121 Incarceration, then, is more than simply an institution; it is a socially invigorated stigma that marks poor, uneducated Black males throughout their lives and is far too often related to their impending deaths. But what if society is so dangerous for Black men and boys that prison, despite its deleterious consequences, is preferable? Evelyn Patterson’s “Incarcerating Death: Mortality in U.S. State Correctional Facilities, 1985–1998,” points out that Black men are actually safer in prison than in American society. She writes, “For [B]lack males at every age, death rates were higher for the population outside of prison compared with their same-race counterparts in prison.”122 What are scholars to make of this paradoxical social reality?

Historically, the prison has been explained as an institution that deprives the criminal of freedom. Incarceration is thereby linked to slavery and America’s history of racism by the extent to which Black men are criminalized and then made into prisoners, but rarely do these analyses explore the sexual aspects of imprisonment. As with our notions of racism, and even American slavery, Black males are imagined only in terms of their confrontation with white male power, never in terms of their vulnerability to rape or sexual violence at the hands of white men and women. Regardless of race, we live in a culture that denies the vulnerability of men to rape generally. Rape, when it does happen to men, is thought to be perpetrated only by other men. Women are never thought of as rapists or as perpetrators of sexual violence. As Lara Stemple, Andrew Flores, and Ilan Meyer explain, “Stereotypes about women, which reflect gender and heterosexist biases, include the notion that women are nurturing, submissive help mates to men. The idea that women can be sexually manipulative, dominant, and even violent runs counter to these stereotypes. Yet studies have documented female perpetrated acts that span a wide spectrum of sexual abuse, which include even severe harms such as nonconsensual oral sex, vaginal and anal penetration with a finger or object, and intercourse.”123 Female perpetration of sexual violence does not occur in a vacuum. Female perpetrators are aware of the innocence attributed to femininity and consequently the protection being female offers them from being seen as perpetrators of sexual violence, especially in cases involving imprisoned Black males.

#### AND He Misgenders queer folx

Graphical user interface, text, application, email

Description automatically generated

#### AND Says Black Trans folx are too small of a category to analyze the intersections between transness and violence

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#### And Elitist –

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### case

#### Permissibility and presumption negate –

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#### Vote negative on presumption –

#### 2) The framework triggers permissibility, it doesn’t prescribe action rather it just makes vague notions towards including the oppressed in ethics.

# Accessible formatting

### 1

#### Western man is coded as the Vitruvian Man – a white, hyper-able, male according to which difference is measured and exterminated. The fear of differential embodiment is co-constituitive with the colonial ascendance of the West, constructing black and indigenous populations as monstrous and uncivil.

#### Mitchell, Antebi, and Snyder 19

the Western humanist project represented in da Vinci’s Vitruvian Man is thoroughly racialized sexualized and (hyperable). The Vitruvian Man features standards of capacitation that distance him from hypermarked difference historically and socially particular embodied properties have gone into the making of Western man Its proportions accompanied the upsurge of territorial and cultural expansions informing the realization of a European world system since the “Age of Discovery.” in Columbus’s “Letter to the Sovereigns” he describes his New World through embodied displacements of racialized, gendered fantasies onto indigenous islanders Columbus’s lack of actual contact allows a European notion of monstrosity to function as a metaphor for indigenous alterity Corporeal otherness becomes a justification for conquest, In the same letter Columbus argues that discovery holds promise because a militarized force could dominate such multiplicitous embodiments Once colonized resources and labor could be extracted The resulting “coloniality of power” is thus defined through differentiated and denigrated embodiment fantasies of nonnormative embodiment form the support pillars of European imperial fantasies from 1493 onward this imperialist project imagined Vitruvian Man” as a biologically superior basis for a justification of conquest While whiteness and maleness long dominated critiques of humanism able-bodiedness augments racialized and engendered coordinates in the realization of Western man’s contours Posthumanist disability theory neither avoids employing disability as proof of destructive power nor eschews attention to materiality’s morphing corporeal rearrangements disability embodiments reveal uncanny capacities where only unproductive incapacity was imagined to reign­­

#### Pleading for recognition from the state to make any kid of meaningful change is are in vain – the state uses recognition to claim to free the oppressed Additionally turns case – state recognition of personhood allows cooperation’s that the aff is trying to strike against to enjoy life and protection under US law. Weheliye 14

**corporations enjoy the benefits of limited personhood** **are entrusted with securing the immortal life** **while human persons are denied ownership of their** **essence** **the focus on** **recognition** **based on a** **legal framework** **not only hinders the eradication of violence** **but actually creates unequal “distribution of life chances** **If demanding recognition** **remains at the center of** **politics, it will lead only to a** **notion of personhood as property that zeroes in comparatively on only one form of subjugation at expense of others** **To make claims for inclusion** **via the U.S. juridical assemblage removes from view that the law itself has been thoroughly violent in its endorsement of racial slavery, indigenous genocide,** **prison-industrial complex** **so on, and that it continues to be** **chief instruments in** **maintaining the racializing assemblages**

#### The very notion of a just government is a false one. The goal of the legal system is to create order out of disorder, the crip is always viewed as chaotic and consequently deviance that cannot be normalized exists within a state of exceptionality.

**Campbell, 2009**

**Law has traditionally had an ambivalent attitude toward disabled people** **, the elusive nature of impairment** , does not **ﬁt** **law’s focus on rules, formulas, and predictability** **Legal responses persistently demonstrate a performative passion for** **, a sameness underpinned by an ontological separation between abled and disabled** **law is an attempt to create order out of disorder** **through a process of puriﬁcation—the establishment and demarcation of distinct zones** . Law is uneasy with bodies that ooze or are leaky

#### Deviancy from the western pure subject is the justification for violence – forms of violence are historically intertwined.

Aho et al. 17

In 16 a police officer shoots a black man lying on his back next to Kinsey sits Rios Soto a person of color, holding a toy truck Rios Soto believed to be dangerous “holding something like a gun.” connected to long histories of racialization disablement their coalescence in this instance of racialized, able-nationalist arrangements of power the co-constitution of race and disability Police forces were established at a time when black people were considered unruly property indigenous people and other people of color, women, and people with disabilities were construed as “irrational” others The ongoingness of racialized police violence extends this history to assign social and literal death those deemed irrational and unpredictable When we revisit the history of racialization and disablement we open new paths to understand the “nastiness” of our current moment

#### The alternative is habeas viscus – a re-orientation of our resistance that breaks free from trying to free the body within the law. Weheliye 1

poetics and politics of habeas viscus are concerned not with inclusion in reigning precincts of the status quo but development of a collective consciousness informed by historical struggles for liberation as a relational assemblage exterior to the jurisdiction of law Claiming the flesh present weapons in the guerrilla warfare to “secure the full autonomy of the human habeas viscus animates the elsewheres of Man and emancipates true potentiality who live permanent state of exception:

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