#### **The world relies on the fundamental opposition to disability to exist – disabled bodies are modeled as the inverse reflection to the normate which drives the internal ableism and desire to eliminate disabled bodies.**

**Hughes 12**

The stratifying binary of disability and antagonism is maintained by the corporeal standard the body of the ‘normate’ Disability is the opposite of this ideal its ‘inverse reflection’ the emblem of purity structure disability as outside humanity homo monstrosus Ableism rests on the effort to eliminate abjection death It encourages live in the false hope of invulnerability to see death and disability as repulsive woes rather than the existen- tial basis for community the phenomenon of disgust’ Disability produced in the ontologi of abject

**Society views those who don’t fit perfect mold as lesser human being. Thus the only way to truly understand Societal Oppression is through Disability.**

**Siebers 10**

**disabilities reduce person to former being: as “the master trope of disqualification to justify oppression by amplifying inferiority to minority identities. Aesthetics studies that, when bodies produce feelings they invite judgments in the community.. Disabled people, are killed because of beliefs aesthetics reveals disqualification in oppression prototype of inferiority is disability “Ableism” disqualifies differences, stigmatizing them as disabilities. in the frontier of inferiority.**

racism, melancholia conceptually cannibalizes all other affective engagement and tends to prioritize itself over race, even when the two are supposedly sutured together.

#### Disabled black individuals are not represented in discussion of antiblack violence

Rose, (2020

Emmett Till

**was murdered because one of his harmless coping strategies was assumed to be rude**

Racism contributed to the assumption that a black boy was being rude

but the **erasure of misunderstandings related to disability allows for them to keep happening**

we cannot see the full picture on

oppression

without considering disability

The role disability has played in the lives of many famous black people such as Harriet Tubman and Audre Lorde is also regularly ignored

deprives disabled black people of representation

There is a strong stigma against

disability

Tropes like the “strong black woman

#### The aff’s distinction between humans and technology is a form of otherization—mechanic can not be separated from machine this re-affirms humanism

Coonfield 6

in the middle’’ with relations forces us to move from a logic of attribution encumbered by the problem of essence the Human-technology distinction leaving the underlying dualism uninterrogated we believe a myth concerning human nature or a myth that defines humans as tool-using animals we know nothing about a body It’’ is not the body, but ‘‘a body’’ determined by relations of movement and speed, Extended to the problem of tech rather than beginning of two planes of being\*a human and a tech we begin with one plane Human being’’ is conceived ‘‘as part of a dynamic and interconnected whole a biological body can be viewed as operating machinically. Such an approach to bodies and machines does not spell the end of human agency It does spell the end of a particular model of human agency, by an essentialist and problematic human-tool distinction

#### The alternative is to Crip the Black cyborg through space travel Our theory of the cyborg avoids fatalistic presentations of black disability inherent in liberal ideology

Shahar 18

The presence of black disability doesn’t have to connote to the sort of fatalism afrofuturism seeks to avoid It can represent radical shift in existence where one doesn’t have to be able-bodied to have a chance at surviving into the future The black disabled body-mind can explore the abundant possibilities for the world to come, in our body-minds to come. The black cyborg, as an explicitly disabled cyborg, can signal the onset of a new world where advanced adaptive technology isn’t cost prohibitive and thus financially inaccessible. a world where adaptive technology is given to black disabled people for histories of violent, non-consensual medical experimentation black disabled folks finally reap what white supremacy in medicine has sown at the expense of our ancestors’ pain and exploitation black disabled body-minds in the future can be represented in the physical restructuring of society The predominantly black neighborhood can be redesigned to fuse accessibility with the tenants of self-sufficiency that have become cornerstones of black liberation movements Black neighborhoods can re-emerge, victorious in the fight against gentrification

#### Redefine the cyborg as a relational tool that lets us see the world in a different way - Assumptions will pervade and control the direction of scientific creations – its not about creating a perfect human its about addressing the experiences against disabled folx

Williams 19

If humans travel in space, they need to change relations to survive Our future imaginings are rife with assumptions about what people are best suited to exist shaped by historical treatment of marginalized these will iterate into new environment cybernetic feedback loop does not belong to humanity its also frameworks which describe cycles of nature involved in process of adaptation which is a reflexive process bodyminds shaped by technologies with which they interact. crucial to understanding experiences of marginalized allowing them to create a world out of their experience will we craft this system and how they will develop a category which was invented to address experiences has been transformed into a tool which erase experiences We must recognize that disabled neurodivergent, trans Black women queer individuals comprise individual lives and communities of experience which are attuned to adapting to environments should stand at vanguard of cyborg the concept was never about a perfectible it was about survivability coming into a new relational mode with our world.

#### Communicative spaces are structured to exclude disabled bodies- speech has come to constitute the boundary of Humanism, to which disability forms the constitutive negative as a disruption of such networks. Thus the rob is to disrupt communicative humanism.

**St. Pierre 15**

Oral speech shap what it means to be human and articulate truth yet has come at the exclusion of voices not intelligible liberal humanism defers tension by excluding disabled voices, judging against the “universal speaker attempt to contain the boundaries of the human speech assume affectivity and preclude [disabled] voices liberal humanism defines a human according of rationality communication functions in understanding an extension of rationality Disability circumscribes the human by negation carving out from indeterminacy as opposed to a pure and rational Being The so-called disabled permeates speech the disabled throws darkness within the humanist circle threatening the stable conditions of universal” identity and provoking violence of the human politicized networks of informational assemblages marked disabled for which networks do not exist

# Acessiable formating

#### **The world relies on the fundamental opposition to disability to exist – disabled bodies are modeled as the inverse reflection to the normate which drives the internal ableism and desire to eliminate disabled bodies.**

**Hughes 12** [Bill Hughes (professor of Sociology at Glasgow Caledonian University, BA in sociology from the University of Stirling, PhD in political philosophy from the University of Aberdeen). 2012. Accessed 8/9/20. “Civilising Modernity and the Ontological Invalidation of Disabled People.” <https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137023001_2> //Xu]

The stratifying binary of disability/non-disability and the antagonism of the latter towards the former is mediated and maintained, principally, by the emotion of disgust. Disgust is the bile carried in a discursive complex that Campbell (2008: 153) calls ‘ableism’: ‘a network of beliefs, processes and practices that produces a particular kind of self and body (the corporeal standard) that is projected as perfect, species-typical and therefore essential and fully human’. The body produced by ableism is equivalent to what Kristeva (1982: 71) calls the ‘clean and proper body’. It is the body of the ‘normate’, the name that Rosemarie Garland-Thomson (1997) gives to the body that thinks of itself as invulnerable and definitive. It is the hygienic, aspirational body of civilising modernity. It is cast from the increasingly stringent norms and rules about emotional behaviour and bodily display that mark mundane social relations in the lebenswelt (lifeworld). This curious non-disabled body/self has no empirical existence per se. On the contrary, the body of ableism is a normative construct, an invulnerable ideal of being manifest in the imaginary of ‘modernist ontology, epistemology and ethics’ as something ‘secure, distinct, closed and autonomous’ (Shildrick, 2002: 51). It embraces ‘human perfectibility as a normative physical or psychological standard’ and involves ‘a curious disavowal of variation and mortality’ (Kaplan, 2000: 303). It is what we are supposed to aspire to, to learn to be but can never become. It has no grounding in the material world. It is a ‘body schema, a psychic construction of wholeness that … belies its own precariousness and vulnerability’ (Shildrick, 2002: 79). It is a ‘body divorced from time and space; a thoroughly artificial affair’ (Mitchell and Snyder, 2000: 7), the epitome of civilisation, closed off from any connection with the animal side of humanity and from the ways in which our bodily nature wallows in its carnal improprieties. It is a body aghast at the messiness of existence. Disability is the opposite of this ideal body, its ‘inverse reflection’ (Deutsch and Nussbaum, 2000: 13). The disabled body is or has the propensity to be unruly. In the kingdom of the ‘clean and proper body’, disability is the epitome of ‘what not to be’. As a consequence the disabled body can be easily excluded from the mainstream ‘psychic habitus’ (Elias, 2000: 167). The ‘clean and proper’ – a normative body of delicacy, refinement and selfdiscipline – has powerful social consequences most manifest in its normalising dynamics. It is the standard of judgement against which disabled bodies are invalidated and transformed into repellent objects. It is the emblem of purity that by comparison creates existential unease. It apportions the shame and repugnance that underwrite the civilising process (Elias, 2000: 114–19, 414–21). Through ableism, modernity has been able to structure disability as uncivilised, outside or on the margins of humanity. One of the great books of the science of natural history published under the title Systema Naturae by Linnaeus in 1735 distinguishes between homo sapiens and homo monstrosus. In this classification impairment – at its extreme and highly visible end – is excluded from the human family. The distinction is, in itself, an act of violence and invalidation, an object lesson in transforming difference and ‘defect’ into the abominable. The distinction mobilises the aversive emotions of fear and disgust. Ableism is a cruel teacher. It embodies violence at many levels: ‘epistemic, psychic, ontological and physical’ (Campbell, 2008: 159). It is at its most bellicose when it is mediated by disgust: a mediation invoked mostly in the social fabrication of taboo and most compellingly in a context when the human/animal boundary is under threat. Ableism rests on the effort to eliminate from awareness, chaos, abjection, animality and death: all that civilisation seeks to repress. It encourages us to live in the false hope that we will not suffer and die, to adopt a perspective of invulnerability, to confuse morality with beauty and to see death, pain and disability as the repulsive woes of mortality rather than as the existen- tial basis for community and communication. Kolnai (2004: 74) reminds us that, ‘in its full intention, it is death ... that announces itself to us in the phenomenon of disgust’. Disability, in modernity, has been produced in the ontological household of the abject, as the antithesis of communica- tion and community, in a place that we might on occasion peer into only to ‘choke’ on the unsavoury sights that greet us. Disability is put out, put away, hidden, segregated or transformed into its opposite, covered up by whatever medical or aesthetic techniques are available to achieve this end. Any opportunity that disability might have to take its place at the heart of communication and community is thwarted by the ablest sensibilities that push it back down among the disgusting, the sick, the dead and the dying. In fact, as Elias (2000) suggested, the making of ‘civilised’ community and communication in modernity proceeds by exclusion and interdiction, by cutting out and hiding away whatever causes or might come to inspire angar (choking) or anguista (tightness).

**Society views those who don’t fit perfect mold as lesser human being. Thus the only way to truly understand Societal Oppression is through Disability.**

**Siebers 10 [Tobin Siebers, Department of English Language and Literature at the University of Michigan; “The Aesthetics of Human Disqualification”; University of Michigan Press; 10/28/2010; accessed 07/30/19 // WHSRS]**

**Disqualification as a symbolic process removes individuals from the ranks of quality human beings, putting them at risk of unequal treatment, bodily harm, and death. That people may be subjected to violence if they do not achieve a prescribed level of quality is an injustice rarely questioned. In fact, even though we may redefine what we mean by quality people, for example as historical minorities are allowed to move into their ranks, we have not yet ceased to believe that nonquality human beings do exist and that they should be treated differently from people of quality. Harriet McBryde Johnson’s debate with Peter Singer provides a recent example of the widespread belief in the existence of nonquality human beings (Johnson). Johnson, a disability activist, argues that all disabled people qualify as persons who have the same rights as everyone else. Singer, a moral philosopher at Princeton University, claims to the contrary that people with certain disabilities should be euthanized, especially if they are thought to be in pain, because they do not qualify as persons. Similarly, Martha Nussbaum, the University of Chicago moral philosopher, establishes a threshold below which “a fully human life, a life worthy of human dignity,” is not possible (181). In particular, she notes that the onset of certain disabilities may reduce a person to the status of former human being: “we may say of some conditions of a being, let us say a permanent vegetative state of a (former) human being, that this just is not a human life at all” (181). Surprisingly little thought and energy have been given to disputing the belief that nonquality human beings do exist. This belief is so robust that it supports the most serious and characteristic injustices of our day. Disqualification at this moment in time justifies discrimination, servitude, imprisonment, involuntary institutionalization, euthanasia, human and civil rights violations, military intervention, compulsory sterilization, police actions, assisted suicide, capital punishment, and murder. It is my contention that disqualification finds support in the way that bodies appear and in their specific appearances—that is, disqualification is justified through the accusation of mental or physical inferiority based on aesthetic principles. Disqualification is produced by naturalizing inferiority as the justification for unequal treatment, violence, and oppression. According to Snyder and Mitchell, disability serves in the modern period as “the master trope of human disqualification.” They argue that disability represents a marker of otherness that establishes differences between human beings not as acceptable or valuable variations but as dangerous deviations. Douglas Baynton provides compelling examples from the modern era, explaining that during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the United States disability identity disqualified other identities defined by gender, race, class, and nationality. Women were deemed inferior because they were said to have mental and physical disabilities. People of color had fewer rights than other persons based on accusations of biological inferiority. Immigrants were excluded from entry into the United States when they were poor, sick, or failed standardized tests, even though the populations already living there were poor, sick, and failed standardized tests. In every case, disability identity served to justify oppression by amplifying ideas about inferiority already attached to other minority identities. Disability is the trope by which the assumed inferiority of these other minority identities achieved expression. The appearance of lesser mental and physical abilities disqualifies people as inferior and justifies their oppression. It is now possible to recognize disability as a trope used to posit the inferiority of certain minority populations, but it remains extremely difficult to understand that mental and physical markers of inferiority are also tropes placed in the service of disability oppression. Before disability can be used as a disqualifier, disability, too, has to be disqualified. Beneath the troping of blackness as inbuilt inferiority, for example, lies the troping of disability as inferior. Beneath the troping of femininity as biological deficiency lies the troping of disability as deficiency. The mental and physical properties of bodies become the natural symbols of inferiority via a process of disqualification that seems biological, not cultural—which is why disability discrimination seems to be a medical rather than a social problem. If we consider how difficult it is at this moment to disqualify people as inferior on the basis of their racial, sexual, gender, or class characteristics, we may come to recognize the ground that we must cover in the future before we experience the same difficulty disqualifying people as inferior on the basis of disability. We might also recognize the work that disability performs at present in situations where race, sexuality, gender, and class are disqualify people as physically or mentally inferior. Aesthetics studies the way that some bodies make other bodies feel. Bodies, minimally defined, are what appear in the world. They involve manifestations of physical appearance, whether this appearance is defined as the physical manifestation itself or as the particular appearance of a given physical manifestation. Bodies include in my definition human bodies, paintings, sculpture, buildings, the entire range of human artifacts as well as animals and objects in the natural world. Aesthetics, moreover, has always stressed that feelings produced in bodies by other bodies are involuntary, as if they represented a form of unconscious communication between bodies, a contagious possession of one body by another. Aesthetics is the domain in which the sensation of otherness is felt at its most powerful, strange, and frightening. Whether the effect is beauty and pleasure, ugliness and pain, or sublimity and terror, the emotional impact of one body on another is experienced as an assault on autonomy and a testament to the power of otherness. Aesthetics is the human science most concerned with invitations to think and feel otherwise about our own influence, interests, and imagination. Of course, when bodies produce feelings of pleasure or pain, they also invite judgments about whether they should be accepted or rejected in the human community. People thought to experience more pleasure or pain than others or to produce unusual levels of pleasure and pain in other bodies are among the bodies most discriminated against, actively excluded, and violated on the current scene, be they disabled, sexed, gendered, or racialized bodies. Disabled people, but also sex workers, gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered people, and people of color, are tortured and killed because of beliefs about their relationship to pain and pleasure (Siebers 2009). This is why aesthetic disqualification is not merely a matter for art critics or museum directors but a political process of concern to us all. An understanding of aesthetics is crucial because it reveals the operative principles of disqualification used in minority oppression. Oppression is the systematic victimization of one group by another. It is a form of intergroup violence. That oppression involves “groups,” and not “individuals,” means that it concerns identities, and this means, furthermore, that oppression always focuses on how the body appears, both on how it appears as a public and physical presence and on its specific and various appearances. Oppression is justified most often by the attribution of natural inferiority—what some call “in-built” or “biological” inferiority. Natural inferiority is always somatic, focusing on the mental and physical features of the group, and it figures as disability. The prototype of biological inferiority is disability. The representation of inferiority always comes back to the appearance of the body and the way the body makes other bodies feel. This is why the study of oppression requires an understanding of aesthetics—not only because oppression uses aesthetic judgments for its violence but also because the signposts of how oppression works are visible in the history of art, where aesthetic judgments about the creation and appreciation of bodies are openly discussed. One additional thought must be noted before I treat some analytic examples from the historical record. First, despite my statement that disability now serves as the master trope of human disqualification, it is not a matter of reducing other minority identities to disability identity. Rather, it is a matter of understanding the work done by disability in oppressive systems. In disability oppression, the physical and mental properties of the body are socially constructed as disqualifying defects, but this specific type of social construction happens to be integral at the present moment to the symbolic requirements of oppression in general. In every oppressive system of our day, I want to claim, the oppressed identity is represented in some way as disabled, and although it is hard to understand, the same process obtains when disability is the oppressed identity. “Racism” disqualifies on the basis of race, providing justification for the inferiority of certain skin colors, bloodlines, and physical features. “Sexism” disqualifies on the basis of sex/gender as a direct representation of mental and physical inferiority. “Classism” disqualifies on the basis of family lineage and socioeconomic power as proof of inferior genealogical status. “Ableism” disqualifies on the basis of mental and physical differences, first selecting and then stigmatizing them as disabilities. The oppressive system occults in each case the fact that the disqualified identity is socially constructed, a mere convention, representing signs of incompetence, weakness, or inferiority as undeniable facts of nature. As racism, sexism, and classism fall away slowly as justifications for human inferiority—and the critiques of these prejudices prove powerful examples of how to fight oppression—the prejudice against disability remains in full force, providing seemingly credible reasons for the belief in human inferiority and the oppressive systems built upon it. This usage will continue, I expect, until we reach a historical moment when we know as much about the social construction of disability as we now know about the social construction of race, class, gender, and sexuality. Disability represents at this moment in time the final frontier of justifiable human inferiority.**

#### Disabled black individuals are not represented in discussion of antiblack violence

Rose, Abel C., "Blackness and Disability and How Disability is Too Often Forgotten" (2020). Student Publications. 863. https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/student\_scholarship/863/KPOO-CJK

Most Americans, I would hope, have heard of Emmett Till- the black boy brutally murdered in 1955 for allegedly wolf whistling at a white woman. Till’s story illustrates how the common sense argument that a boy should not be killed for wolf whistling at a woman goes out the window when the boy is black and the woman is white. However, there is an important piece of the story that is consistently left out: as a result of polio, Till often stuttered, and when he was having trouble speaking, he would whistle to relax and help control his breathing.1 This shifts the story- instead of being murdered for something that deserved only a simple reprimand, it’s quite likely that **Till was murdered because one of his harmless coping strategies was assumed to be rude**. Racism contributed to the assumption that a black boy was being rude and racism is the only possible reason why anyone could have fathomed that he deserved to die, but the **erasure of misunderstandings related to disability allows for them to keep happening**, and they are most fatal for black people and other people of color. The stigmatization of disability that keeps it in the shadows does us all a disservice because we cannot see the full picture on other issues of oppression such as racism and sexism without considering disability In 1989, Kimberlé Crenshaw coined the term “intersectionality” to refer to the specific oppression black women face on account of being black and women. One of the examples she cited was a large company brought to court for its discriminatory hiring practices in almost never hiring black women, but the company defended itself by pointing out that because they hired black men and white women, they couldn’t be accused of discriminating against black women. Intersectionality argues that black women, on account of being both black and women, face oppression at the intersection of those two things.2 The way that disability interacts with blackness and womanhood is often slightly different, because disability is much more easily made invisible and completely erased from the narrative. As this essay discusses, racism’s continuous violence, both literal and psychological, takes a tole on black people, and so mental health issues often abound in black communities. Women’s pain and symptoms are regularly ignored and dismissed by doctors, and this goes double for black women, which makes it much harder for them to receive care for any illness or disability. It’s widely documented that black people are hit especially hard by police brutality, but not as well known that between a third and fifth of all victims of police brutality are disabled,3 and many of the black people murdered by police are also disabled. The role disability has played in the lives of many famous black people such as Harriet Tubman and Audre Lorde is also regularly ignored, which further deprives disabled black people of representation. Black women’s bodies and disabled bodies have also consistently been othered and objectified, and black people and disabled people in their status as “other” often find themselves needing to prove their worth in a society that does not see their lives as unconditionally valuable. Because they are already constantly discriminated against for their race, disabled black people have good reason to want to keep quiet about their disabilities. There is a strong stigma against talking about mental health and disability, which may be in part due to the fact that many marginalized communities are already stereotyped as being physically flawed, intellectually inferior, and irrational or psychologically unstable, and **disability brings another layer of similar negative connotations**.4 Tropes like the “strong black woman” that set up the expectation that black woman are able to endure any pain and abuse and survive anything without help because of their innate strength make it even harder to admit to disability or discuss it as an issue.5 There is perhaps at times a subconscious perception of being disabled as a failure, as proving the negative stereotypes of inferiority correct, when of course this isn’t the case at all. Disabilities, whether genetic or acquired later in life or both, do not make one inferior, and this truth can coexist with the fact that black people should not have to deal with disabilities and/or mental health issues resulting from racist violence.

#### The aff’s distinction between humans and technology is a form of otherization—mechanic can not be separated from machine this re-affirms humanism

Coonfield 6 (Gordon, (Ph.D., Michigan Technological University, 2004), is Assistant Professor of Communication at Villanova University.) "Thinking machinically, or, the techno-aesthetic of Jackie Chan: Toward a Deleuze-Guattarian media studies." Critical Studies in Media Communication 23.4 (2006): 285-301.] TDI

Third, Deleuze notes that beginning ‘‘in the middle’’ with relations forces us to move from a logic of attribution encumbered by the problem of essence (the human IS, the tool IS) to a logic of conjunction and becoming (... human AND tool ...). Here ‘‘the AND is not even a specific relation or conjunction, it is that which subtends all relations, the path of all relations, which makes relations shoot outside their terms and outside the set of their terms’’ (Deleuze & Parnet, 1987, p. 57). What matters, then, is not what happens on one or another side of the human-tool dualism. To posit that the essence of one is either procured or at stake because of something essential to the other is to make the ‘‘in between’’ opaque. The logic of attribution places the human and the tool in a black box. But beginning in the middle and proceeding by a logic of conjunction focuses on the relation between them, not as a constant with a predetermined outcome, but as a more-or-less probable occurrence under particular conditions. Beginning in the middle means considering the affective capacities produced in the relation between elements (human or otherwise). What happens that is significant is not what a spool does to a television chef, or what the trench rammer does to a thug, but what happens in the middle of these terms, how each communicates something under particular conditions. Subtract even the smallest element, like the plastic tie on the thug’s thumb, and the assemblage changes, because that space of the middle is now elsewhere, in between others.

So far, it might be argued, the position elaborated here continues to sidestep the Human-technology distinction while simply leaving the underlying dualism uninterrogated. But considered from Deleuze’s propositions, the conceptual problem of the proliferation of ‘‘hybrids’’ or ‘‘cyborgs,’’ our due under the Modern Constitution Latour describes, becomes irrelevant. Under the terms of the ‘‘settlement’’ of the Constitution, we must believe either a myth concerning the possibility of a human nature completely unspoiled by technology or, alternatively, a myth that defines humans as tool-using animals, thus making us always already technological hybrids. However, it is necessary simply to push the propositions concerning relations further in order to address the a priori distinction between human and tool. This can be accomplished by considering the implications of these propositions for bodies.

The reconsideration of the body by Deleuze and his collaborators (Deleuze, 1988; Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Deleuze & Parnet, 1987) begins with Spinoza’s ‘‘radical’’ observation: ‘‘We do not know what the body can do’’ (Deleuze, 1988, p. 17). This observation is significant because, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) insist, ‘‘we know nothing about a body until we know what it can do’’ (p. 257). ‘‘It’’ is not something given or determined in advance. ‘‘It’’ is not the body, but ‘‘a body’’ determined by the relations of movement and relative speed, as well as the capacities to affect and be affected in which it is comprised. In this view, bodies are not determined by an essence (terms). There is no ‘‘model’’ or ‘‘molar’’ body of which each is a more or less perfect instance. There are only more or less stable relations established along two axes or lines: the (intensive) latitudinal line of a body’s capacity to affect and be affected, and the (extensive) longitudinal line of a body’s ‘‘particle aggregates,’’ the elements, however large or small, in recurrent communication with one another in extensive relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness.

A Deleuze-Guattarian conception of bodies asks not ‘What IS it?’ Instead it asks ‘‘What can it do?’’ Of what effects and relations is it capable under particular conditions, given the assemblage of which it is part? As Gaitens (1996) notes, in this ‘‘ethological’’ approach bodies are not to be ‘‘categorized’’ in advance according to distinctions between subject and object, cause and effect, human and technological, species and genus. For ethology ‘‘does not claim to know, in advance, what a body is capable of doing or becoming,’’ nor does it ‘‘impose a place of organization’’ a priori on matters. Rather, it ‘‘posits a plane of experimentation, a mapping of extensive relations and intensive capacities that are mobile and dynamic’’ (p. 169). Extended to the problem of technology, rather than beginning from the assumption of two planes of being\*a human and a technological\*we begin with one plane of immanent consistence on which encounters between elements, forces, and bodies happen as events unfold. ‘‘Human being’’ is thus conceived ‘‘as part of a dynamic and interconnected whole, distinguishable from other bodies only by means of the speed and slowness, motion and rest, of the parts which compose it ... . The human body is radically open to its surrounding and can be composed, recomposed and decomposed by other bodies’’ (Gaitens, 1996, p. 165). The machinic, as a mode of organizing or assemblage, is one map for ordering the relations and affects which obtain on this plane of encounters and events. Thus, a biological body, too, can be viewed as operating machinically.

Such an approach to bodies and other machines does not spell the end of human agency, nor does it presage technological colonization of the plane of human being (which is a return to the logic of attribution characteristic of instrumentalism). It does spell the end of a particular model of human agency, one always guaranteed in advance by an essentialist and problematic human-tool distinction. If we know a body only when we know ‘‘what it can do,’’ then knowledge of a body is directly tied to doing. For Deleuze and Guattari, it is only by encountering other bodies that we can determine what a body’s affects are, how it ‘‘can or cannot enter into composition with other affects, with the affects of another body, either to destroy or be destroyed by it, either to exchange actions and passions with it or to join with it in composing a more powerful body’’ (1987, p. 257). Agency, then, is not determined in advance but only by way of a knowledge gained from encountering other bodies, entering into relations of composition that allow the formation of an assemblage more potent than that which the parts alone could achieve, or entering into relations of decomposition that destroy the cohesion and unity of one or the other body’s parts (Deleuze, 1988, p. 19).

#### The alternative is to Crip the Black cyborg through space travel Our theory of the cyborg avoids fatalistic presentations of black disability inherent in liberal ideology

Shahar 18 [Zaynab Shahar, PHD student at Chicago Theological Seminary, *The Body to Come: Afrofuturist Posthumanism and Disability*, She has written about queer/trans poetics and black women’s poetics, <https://uncannymagazine.com/article/the-body-to-come-afrofuturist-posthumanism-and-disability/>] Ronak

The presence of black disability in afrofuturist posthumanism doesn’t have to connote to the sort of fatalism afrofuturism seeks to avoid. It can represent the liberation of the black body-mind, a radical shift in existence where one doesn’t have to be able-bodied to have a chance at surviving into the future. The black disabled body-mind can explore the abundant possibilities for the world to come, in our body-minds to come.

The black cyborg, as an explicitly disabled cyborg, can signal the onset of a new world where advanced adaptive technology isn’t cost prohibitive and thus financially inaccessible. The black disabled cyborg can also signal to a world where adaptive technology is given to black disabled people as part of reparations for histories of violent, non-consensual medical experimentation. The presence of the black disabled cyborg can usher in a world where black disabled folks finally reap what white supremacy in medicine has sown at the expense of our ancestors’ pain and exploitation.

Similarly, the inclusion of black disabled body-minds in the future can be represented in the physical restructuring of society. The predominantly black neighborhood Wormsley’s billboard highlights the disappearance of can be redesigned to fuse accessibility with the tenants of self-sufficiency, environmental, and economic sustainability that have become cornerstones of black liberation movements. Black neighborhoods can re-emerge, victorious in the fight against gentrification; replete with accessible and sustainably designed infrastructures and community resources.

#### Redefine the cyborg as a relational tool that lets us see the world in a different way - Assumptions will pervade and control the direction of scientific creations – its not about creating a perfect human its about addressing the experiences against disabled folx

Williams 19 [Williams, Damien P., Heavenly Bodies: Why It Matters That Cyborgs Have Always Been About Disability, Mental Health, and Marginalization (June 8, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3401342 or [http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3401342]//Lex](http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3401342%5d//Lex) VM

If humans do manage a future in which they travel into and live in space, they will need to change the kinds of embodiments and relations they have in order to survive; to do this, they will need to think in vastly different ways about the nature of technological and scientific projects they undertake. Our societal future imaginings are rife with assumptions about what kind of people are best suited to exist and these have been shaped by the historical positioning and treatment of many marginalized groups. Left unexamined, these assumptions and precedents will likely mutate and iterate into each new environment into which humans spread, and affect every engagement of human and nonhuman relationships. But, if we bring a careful, thorough, and intentional consideration to bear on the project of weaving together biomedical, interpersonal, sociopolitical, and technomoral concerns, then we might be better suited to both do right by those we’ve previously oppressed and agilely adapt to the kinds of concerns that will face us, in the future. As Haraway discusses in her (flawed but possibly still salvageable) “Cyborg Manifesto,” the language of the cybernetic feedback loop does not belong only to humanity as a way to describe its own processes—cybernetic theory and the myth of the cyborg are also frameworks which can be used to describe the cycles and processes of nature, as a whole.[44] Through this understanding, Haraway and others have argued that all of nature is involved in an integrated process of adaptation, augmentation, and implementation which, far from being a simple division between the biological and technological is, instead, a reflexive, co-productive process. Using the theorists and examples above, I’ve argued for an understanding of biotechnological intervention and integration as the truth of our existence with and within technology. Our bodies and minds are shaped by each other and exist as bodyminds, and those bodyminds dictate and are shaped by the technologies with which they interact. In order to carefully construct and live within vastly complex systems, it will be crucial to understanding the lived experiences of those whose embodiments and bodyminds have placed them at a higher likelihood of being marginalized by those who demand a “right kind” of lived experience. Only by allowing them to create a world out of the lessons of their lived experience will we be better able to intentionally craft what this system and its components will learn and how they will develop. What should characterize our understanding of the cyborg, then, is the reflexive, adaptive relationship between the sociotechnical, sociopolitical, ethical, individual, symbolic, and philosophical valences of our various lived experiences. The point in saying that “Cyborgs Have Always Been About Disability, Mental Health, and Marginalization” is not to say that the category of the cyborg should be Disclosed to cyborg anthropologists and philosophers who say “we have always been cyborgs.” Rather, it's about highlighting the fact that a category which was invented specifically to address the lived experiences of marginalized and oppressed people has been co-opted and transformed into a tool by which to erase the experiences of those very same people. We can, and indeed should, still make use of the Harawayan cyborg, the metaphor for entanglement and enmeshment, both as individuals and communities, but we must do so in a way that honours both the original meaning and the evolution of the concept. We must recognize that disabled people, the neurodivergent, trans folx, Black lives, women, queer individuals, and those who sit at the intersection of any number of those components comprise individual lives and communities of experience which are already attuned to changing and adapting to suddenly hostile environments, and it is these kinds of lives which should stand at the vanguard of how we understand what it means to be a cyborg, moving forward. Because the concept of the cyborg was never about a perfectible ideal, it was always about survivability, about coming into a new relational mode with ourselves, our society, and our world.

#### Communicative spaces are structured to exclude disabled bodies- speech has come to constitute the boundary of Humanism, to which disability forms the constitutive negative as a disruption of such networks. Thus the rob is to disrupt communicative humanism.

**St. Pierre 15** [Bracketed for crip to disabled. Joshua St. Pierre (BA in humanities from Briercrest College, Master of Arts in philosophy from the University of Alberta). “Cripping Communication: Speech, Disability, and Exclusion in Liberal Humanist and Posthumanist Discourse.” Communication Theory. Vol 25, Issue 3. Pages 330-348. 3/31/15. Accessed 8/29/20. <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/comt.12054> // Xu]

John Durham Peters has argued that “communication” is a modern invention, stirred by the late 19th century anxieties of isolation and longings for unmediated connection (2000). But while the elusive dream of forging minds together through signs and semantics may be an endemically modern problem, speech has long been a human problem. In particular, performing speech, like performing “the human,” is a risky affair with exclusionary consequences. Oral speech has occupied a dignified position within the humanist lineage, shaping central questions of what it means to be human, imbued with the power to persuade others, serve human affairs, and articulate truth; yet, this pedigree has come at a high cost: the exclusion of voices not deemed rational and intelligible. I propose bringing a disabled, or a crip, analysis to bear on speech communication within humanism and posthumanism. Focusing on the disabled speaker, I accordingly argue that the exclusion of nonnormative voices within liberal humanism results from a tension between the conception of speech as rational and universal, and its embodied particularity that erodes any claim to universality. As the sine qua non of rational human subjectivity, speech is an esteemed, yet volatile, performance that can easily go wrong. Rather than owning up to the necessarily embodied and unstable mediation of human identity, liberal humanism defers the tension immanent within speech by excluding nonnormative and disabled voices, judging them against what I term the “universal speaker,” in a Sisyphean attempt to shore up and contain the boundaries of the human. The ultimately futile movement to free rational discourse from the body entirely is reapproached through the posthumanist shift to text as the principle mode of communication. Pursuing the stuttered trajectory of “rational discourse” in liberal humanism to its disembodied form of “information” in posthumanism, I suggest that speech is largely absent in posthumanist discourse not only because of the incongruity of speech with emerging models of information seemingly free from context, but perhaps more importantly because these discourses assume autoaffectivity and preclude [disabled]crip voices from analysis. Like its humanist predecessor, and contrary to much of its rhetoric, posthumanism shows signs of structural exclusion dependent on having the right sort of informational body: malleable and flexible. Tony Davis insists that “All humanisms, until now, have been imperial. . . . Their embrace suffocates those it does not ignore” (2008, p. 141). While this may ultimately place disabled voices within good company, it remains worrisome that the silencing itself has been largely underrepresented and untheorized. Even disciplines such as communication studies and disability studies, devoted to unearthing genealogies, articulating phenomenological structures, and exploring subaltern modes of existing together, have not paid enough attention to disabled speech. While these disciplines have had very little, if any, contact so far, they have much to offer each other. By bringing these two disciplines into dialogue and writing from disability, I propose that the disabled speaker is perhaps the cyborg par excellence, eschewing communicative purity, autonomy, and self-mastery. The disabled speaker can be employed to critique the latent ableism within humanist and posthumanist discourse, and communication theory more generally, while offering new modes of thinking about posthuman communication as an embodied activity based on noise, relationality, and reciprocity.1 Liberal humanism and speech Liberal humanism is a broad-based political and intellectual emergence within the Enlightenment, which gained full ascendency in the 19th and 20th centuries, valuing “open and undogmatic inquiry, freedom of the individual conscience” and aiming for a “respect for social justice, social and psychological utility, decency, [and] liberality” (Coates & White, 1970, p. 447). At its center, liberal humanism is a marriage between the long humanist tradition and liberal ideals: a dual commitment to “man” and “freedom.” However, in its effort to secure “man” as a completely autonomous being, liberal humanism must first transcend group differences and generalize attributes of humanity in a movement of essentialization. What defines a human in this tradition is accordingly not accidental attributes— for example race, gender, age—but the possession of rationality. The liberal subject, as Katherine Hayles has observed, identifies the self with the rational mind merely in possession of a body (1999, p. 4).This move is unquestionably overdetermined, yet can in large measure be traced back through Cartesian rationalism to the Discourse on the Method. Asserting the cogito, Descartes writes: from this I knew I was a substance whose whole essence or nature is solely to think, and which does not require any place, or depend on any material thing, in order to exist. Accordingly this ‘I’— that is, the soul by which I am what I am—is entirely distinct from the body, and indeed is easier to know than the body, and would not fail to be whatever it is, even if the body did not exist (2009, p. 36, emphasis added). Distinct from the body and free from context, the existence of the rational “I” stands above the historical moment. While Descartes himself is not the brash dualist so often presumed, the methodological distinction between res extensa and res cogitans nevertheless sets the stage for the humanist erasure of embodiment that carries through into posthumanism. Compared to the axiomatically derived self-evidence of the rational self, the body is deemed epistemically untrustworthy, accidental, and historical. Transcribed through liberal humanism, this binary conceives the subject as an inner and universal rationality possessing an external and particular body. The liberal subject emerges as autonomous and unitary, yet as interior, in need of externalizing his/her social and political nature. It is here that speech takes on a significant, yet surprisingly underrepresented, role within liberal humanist discourse. In 1923, H. Wildon Carr, a former president of the Aristotelian Society, argued that the very idea of reason requires discourse because reason is an activity directed outwards. “The origin of speech,” said Carr, “is in the nature of human mentality. Reason in its human form would not and could not exist without speech” (1923–1924, p. 97). A similar position is taken up more recently by Frank E. X. Dance and Carl E. Larson who have contended that speech communication is a pedagogical initiation into humanity. “Speech communication,” they write, “functions so importantly in the life of a human being that the understanding and study of speech communication are at the very core of a liberal education” (1972, p. 6). Toeing the party line, Dance and Larson have maintained that speech communication has three functions: (a) linking the individual with his environment, (b) developing higher mental processes, and (c) regulating behavior (1972, p. 64). Speech is an enactment of reason and therefore of human identity, since “evolutionarily speaking, the hand is shaped by the labor in which it engages, man’s interiority simultaneously shapes and is shaped by speech communication” (1972, p. 71). For Carr, Dance, and Larson, then, speech is an extension of rationality, belonging not to the body, but to the articulation and formation of reason. The liberal humanist assessment of speech exemplified by Carr, Dance, and Larson relies on an ambiguity and slippage between the rational interior and embodied exterior. Speech is given in liberal humanism as a mode of rationality, yet the body is also needed for the enactment of speech. This duality raises troubling questions regarding the boundaries of reason and the self. Does speech modulate from a form of rationality to a conditional act as it passes through the lips? Where does the universal reason stop and contingent embodiment begin? While speech, mediating the threshold between the public and private and the universal and accidental, can be understood as the sine qua non of the liberal humanist subject, it simultaneously occupies an ambiguous position. This ambiguity translates as a fundamental instability in the rational self’s identity and boundary that can be detailed through the voice, chiastically hinging language and the body. The voice is dually constituted by the phonological and the phonetic: the meaning laden, immaterial aspect of the phoneme and its material, auditory support. While the existence of the phonological depends upon the phonetic (however short-lived its existence), the logic of phonocentrism permeating liberal humanism systematically obscures the phonetic as the trace of embodiment. “Requiring the intervention of no determinate surface in the world, being produced in the world as pure auto-affection, [the voice],” explains Derrida, “is a signifying substance completely at our disposition. For the voice meets no obstacle to its emission in the world precisely because it is produced as pure auto-affection” (1973, p. 79). This dominant tradition understands the phonetic, embodied aspect of the voice to be utterly passive and invisible, and thus “the voice” comes from within, circumventing the body, and directly expresses interiority. Yet, tying the signifier to the body, the voice is not so easily divorced from its embodied source. Somewhat overstated by the dysfluent speaker, the phonetic aspect of the voice often does not self-effacingly recede once the phonological function has been dutifully carried out, but rather lingers and stretches, drawing attention to itself and threatening to subvert its linguistic purpose. The voice of one who has cerebral palsy, for example, is decidedly not at his/her complete disposition precisely because the body obtrudes its continuous emission into the world. The conception of the voice as pure auto-affection can be maintained only by abstracting speech from lived experience. I accordingly argue that the rational human materializes himself through the voice precariously; the slippage is manifested both phonetically and affectively. Mladen Dolar (2006) contends that even though the phonetic voice does not contribute to meaning and is therefore inconspicuous when the semantic operation of speech is “properly” carried out, there is always something leftover, whether accent, individuality, or other tonal qualia. The role assigned to the remainder of the voice by Dolar is somewhat peculiar. On the one hand, the remainder is an obstruction overcome when one becomes adjusted to a different accent, for example, and can focus simply upon the intended meaning. The voice in this regard is simply an impediment to the communicative operation of language. Yet on the other hand, Dolar notes that a voice devoid of any remainder would conflate with mechanical iterability and thus lose its human characteristic: Paradoxically, it is the mechanical voice which confronts us with the object voice, its disturbing and uncanny nature, whereas the human touch helps us keep it at bay. The obstacle it appears to present actually enhances the sense-making effect; the seeming distraction contributes to the better fulfillment of the goal (2006, p. 22). The phonetic side effect of the voice enables its recognizability and identification as a human voice. Implicit here is the narrow phonetic line sheltering the human voice in between the mechanical and noise—between merely iterating signifiers and chaotic distraction. At far ends of the spectrum, voices of intellectually disabled people are often read as subhuman at best, while voices with no inflection can be read as eerily mechanical or computerized. Depicting the former phenomenon, a vitriolic letter was recently sent to the caretaker of an autistic boy, in which the anonymous author complained, “You selfishly put your kid outside every day and let him be nothing but a nuisance and a problem to everyone else with that noise polluting whaling [sic] he constantly makes! That noise he makes when he is outside is DREADFUL [sic] . . . It scares the hell out of my normal children! . . . Do the right thing and move or euthanize him!” (“Hateful Letter,” 2013). This instance is repugnant and likely not representative in degree. However, inasmuch as speech and reason are tightly correlated through the linguistic function of the voice, performing the voice in any way that strays beyond codified vocalic boundaries and unsettles the effortless production of meaning calls into question the rationality of the performer “behind” the voice. More moderately disabled voices, like the stuttering voice, are in this regard not outright rejected as a signifying voice like the voices of the (presumed) intellectually disabled. However, recognition can nevertheless be denied in degree. The failure to signify in a quotidian manner results in a desperate struggle for the disabled voice to maintain a uniform performance of reason if the speaker wishes to be afforded the privileges of full participation given to those deemed rational. Speaking as a rational human is a delicate performance that can easily go sideways. The knife-edge of human vocality is honed even finer by taking into account normalized vocal affectivity. Joshua Gunn (2010) has argued that the affective power of the voice is culturally policed because it is fundamentally public; the phonetic aspect of the voice generates “public feelings” that communicate on their own accord. Rhetorical training aims to tame this affective power to match, support, and enliven the semiotic character of the voice. However, citing the public anxiety around “uncontrolled speech” that transgresses vocal norms, Gunn points out how easily the affective force can go awry, so much that he claims “within speech is always a tacit threat of the loss of control” (2010, p. 189). Gunn references the grunting of female tennis players and the unintentional yelps of politicians; yet, it would be helpful here to widen his observation of uncontrolled speech to include such voices as those belonging to the transgendered and the disabled.These voices accentuate the volatile affective power of the voice and the tenuous hold we possess over our bodies. As I have argued elsewhere, “In failing to live up to the ideals set by liberal individualism and capitalism, [dysfluent voices] act as a reminder of the fragile mastery we have of our bodies and of the social downturn that quickly follows the failure to uphold and project this ideal of mastery.” (2012, p. 16). The anxiety-riddled demand for control in public speech arises precisely because the affective power of speech exists in a metastable relation to the body. Rational speech, dispassioned, and disembodied, may at any moment be ruptured and must thus be constantly surveilled and managed. Articulating and simultaneously threatening to occlude rational human identity, the voice thus bears the full weight of the humanist anxiety concerning borders and membership. The “proper” performance of speech is accordingly strongly patrolled within liberal humanist discourse. The universal speaker Iris Young casts the liberal subject in his/her political context, arguing for a conception of “universal citizenship.” In her assessment, the liberal subject transcends his/her self-interested particularity through public discussion and decision making by which private interests can agree on a common good (1989, p. 253). The universal citizen is therefore homogenized, as “citizenship is an expression of the universality of human life; it is a realm of rationality and freedom as opposed to the heteronomous realm of particular need, interest, and desire” (1989, p. 253). The universal citizen transcends differences threatening impartiality and equality by essentializing himself or herself and projecting that self into the politicized public sphere. If to be truly human in liberal humanist discourse is to exercise autonomous reason, and if speaking realizes oneself as a rational and social agent within the public sphere, then having a voice has direct bearing on the universal citizen—so much so that I believe it possible to conceive of what might be termed a “universal speaker.” Because speech plays a pivotal role in the realization of the self as a rational agent, then if one is to speak, he/she must speak in a way that defends the universality of autonomous reason against embodied and historical particularity. Furthermore, the universal speaker, like the universal citizen, must be marked by impartiality. As stated by Young, “impartial reason aims to adopt a point of view outside concrete situations of action, a transcendental ‘view from nowhere’ that carries the perspective, attributes, character, and interests of no particular subject or set of subjects” (1990, p. 100). From this façade of impartiality, it is only a small step to judge who does and does not speak impartially and thereby qualifies as rational and human. To speak as a truly rational agent requires that one speak from nowhere and everywhere, becoming an invisible medium for communication. The universal speaker is a powerful homogenizing trope, for it defines what type of speech production is natural, who gets the right to speak, what speech needs to be taken seriously, and what speech gets to be heard at all. If one is to speak with agency or efficacy, one must speak in the right way; hence the burden within this tradition is to find and retain the “right voice.” In Better Than Well: American Medicine Meets the American Dream, for example, Carl Elliott (2004) notes an anxiety in the struggle of transgendered people to match gendered vocal norms, the accent-reduction clinics in the American south, and the difficult adjustment of disabled speakers to voice synthesizers. At the heart of liberal humanism’s claim to universality and equality, an ugly structure of exclusion of those who are not “universal” shows itself, an exclusion that I argue results from the tension between (a) the desire to conceive of oral communication as rational/universal and (b) the embodied particularity of speech that threatens to undermine its universality. For while speech is peddled as a rational, universal, and nonspatial medium within liberal humanism, the particularity of embodied speech casts a threatening shadow over this claim. Returning to the example of the stuttering voice, Marc Shell argues that having the “right voice” is a necessary sign of membership to a particular group of persons. If you cannot speak, he wryly explains, you are likely not human. If you can somewhat speak you may be human, and if you cannot speak in my particular way, you do not belong to my tribe (2005, p. 50). For the stutterer, however, “all words are test words, passwords, or catchphrases whereby one gains or loses social acceptance or credibility. . . . The concern is not his inability to pronounce some word or phrase fast enough; it is one’s ability to say any word fluently in any language” (2005, p. 51). Shell is quite clearly stating the boundary conditions of the universal speaker. However, just as the vocal markers of ethnic boundaries are contingent, historical, and laden with colonial power, so can the supposed universality of rational human speech be unraveled. Disability studies convincingly challenge the pathologization of individual bodies by articulating the sociocultural structures of ableism that normalize and exclude certain forms of human variation.2 “Disability” is no more self-evident, natural, or stable a concept than “able-bodiedness”: Both are understood through disability studies as a function of contingent sociocultural anxieties and oppressions. Disability circumscribes the human by negation. Following in this vein, we might likewise fray the boundaries of the universal speaker by deterritorializing disabled speech. Consider again Gunn’s claim that “within speech is always a tacit threat of the loss of control” (2010, p. 189). Ubiquitous stutters and vocalic gaffes occur to everyone on a daily basis precisely because communication is fundamentally unstable: the act of carving out meaning from indeterminacy and noise as opposed to a pure and rational articulation of Being. The so-called disabled speech permeates all speech. The delimitation of the disabled speaker is thus necessarily arbitrary: the construction of a deviant and pathologized Other to prop up the universal speaker. More specifically, pathologization individuates “nonrational” speech production and thereby maintains and polices the public/private divide. Disabled speech is conceived as a private affair marked by particularity and embodiedness, while the rational speech of the universal citizen belongs to the public realm. Yet, resituating disability as a distinctly public structure of oppression unmasks “universality” as simply the norms of unmarked and dominant groups. What counts as a particular and impartial voice is a function of conglomerate sexist, classist, racist, and ableist determinations obscured by their dominant positions within society. Vocally passing as universal is a stacked game favoring those who discursively control the boundaries of rationality and the human. To transgress norms of unmarked dominant groups is to risk great social punishment and exclusion. To speak “in the wrong way” not only reveals the speaker to be connected to his/her body, particularity, and context, but also risks blurting out that the emperor is naked— the emperor speaks from a body. In rupturing the mythos of speech, the disabled speaker thus throws darkness within the humanist circle, threatening the ostensibly stable conditions of a generalized and “universal” identity and provoking violence in attempts to shore up the boundaries of the human. Excluding “hyperembodied voices” is thus a dogged mechanism of deferring the tension inherent in liberal humanist speech between universality and particularity, rational autonomy, and embodiment. The (failed) movement to free communication as rational discourse from the body entirely is reapproached through the posthumanist shift to text as the principal mode of communication. Cripping posthumanism There is no single bridge spanning humanism to posthumanism. There are certainly stories to tell about the antihumanism of the 1960s and 1970s, of feminism, cybernetics, Hans Moravec, late capitalism, and of the cascading death of God, man, and the author. Yet, as Donna Haraway duly reminds us, the cyborg is a bastard. Any attempt to pin down its origins is always already a fabrication, a sanitation, an attempt to tell a crooked story straight. Neil Badmington further muddies the water, adapting for posthumanism the Lyotardian-Derridean line that a system always contains the conditions for its critique. Rather than construing humanism and posthumanism as distinct entities in a linear, temporal relation, Badmington argues—akin to Lyotard’s reading of modernism and postmodernism— that “the writing of the posthumanist condition should . . . take the form of a critical practice that occurs inside humanism, consisting not of the wake but the working-through of humanist discourse” (2003, p. 22). Posthumanism has always ghosted humanism, and posthumanism is never a clean break (if it can be called a break at all) from humanism. Just as there is no single nor a complete shift from humanism to posthumanism, so are there many posthumanisms. My affinity toward posthumanism as a generative source for rethinking disabled speech does not extend to them all, insofar as some remain bedded with humanism more than others. For example, early cybernetics remained fixated on defining and maintaining borders of an autonomous and autopoietic subject. In a related vein, transhumanists hoist the banner of human progress with pride. Often conflated with posthumanism, transhumanism has wormed its way into the cultural imaginary with grand ameliorative visions of biotechnology improving the human condition through augmentation and newgenics. Transhumanism, as Cary Wolfe defines it, is simply an “intensification of humanism” (2009, p. xv), a technological extension of the dream of perfectibility that sees bodily limitations as a hurdle to transcend. Disabled speech (and disability more broadly) is accordingly irksome problem for transhumanists to fix, in time, through technology. The posthumanism I intend to redeploy takes its cue from Nayar, who defines what he terms critical posthumanism as “the radical decentering of the traditional sovereign, coherent and autonomous human in order to demonstrate how the human is always already evolving with, constituted by and constitutive of multiple forms of life and machines” (2014, p. 2). The posthuman under this reading cannot be understood in terms of a single locus or a unitary ontology of presence. Rather, he/she is dynamically coconstituted within ecological, technological, and informational networks—a congealing of “heterogeneous components, a material-informational entity whose boundaries undergo continuous construction and reconstruction” (Hayles, 1999, p. 3). Subjectivity is an emergent feature of sympoietic systems (Haraway, 2014), necessarily constrained by and dispersed within the exchanges between systems and environments. “The Human” thus cedes its transcendental status long enjoyed within the Anthropocene. Yet, at the same time, in relinquishing this status, the (post)human no longer needs to frantically police the borders within which it (ostensibly) ruled autonomously. Rather, critical posthumanism recognizes that the borders of the human have always been porous. Owning up to our sympoietic constitution produces a vantage from which the ableist construction and policing of human borders, bodies, and communicative practices can be politicized and critiqued. With the cyborg bastard fully in mind, I suggest that the disabled body is useful in parsing a necessarily crooked and partial transition to posthuman communication. Interrogating the familial tradition of rhetoric from the perspective of disability, Jay Dolmage is here instructive: The body of history has been shaped to look like an idealized human body: proportional, inviolable, autonomous, upright, forward facing (white and masculine). But if you find the rhetorical body, you find tension, trial, and trouble. . . . [W]riting from bodies we would do history differently, not just be recognizing ‘other’ bodies, but also because our histories and rhetorics might more closely represent the difference and diversity of our bodies themselves (2014, p. 16). Reading posthumanism and posthuman communication through disability is accordingly a means of not only recognizing bodies that are often excluded in communication theory (relegated, e.g., to the insulated domain of speech-pathology) but also cripping communication itself. Like the stuttering body, there is perhaps much to gain from resisting the straight and most direct communicative and discursive path. Consider in this regard that for disability theorist Alison Kafer, the cyborg is appealing not in spite of but because of its “multiple, and often contradictory, deployments” (2013, p. 116). To look for and expect disability in posthumanism and communication theory is to invoke a heuristic of instability and indeterminacy that generates multiple meanings and relations. Conscious of the multivariate affinity and inconsonance between humanism and posthumanism, I wish to pull on a few threads to (a) appreciate the transition and reconstitution of the humanist logic excluding disabled speech within posthumanism and (b) redeploy posthumanism to imagine the disabled speaker otherwise. One thin place between humanism and posthumanism that provides an early historical reference point for the cripped movement to posthuman communication is the abstraction of “information” from context and the body by cybernetics and information theory. The work of cybernetic and informational theorists Norbert Wiener and Claude Shannon famously recast communication in terms of pattern/randomness rather than presence/absence. Within this paradigm, similar to within both structuralism and poststructuralism, information is not the one-to-one correlation of a signifier and signified, but, following Saussure, is rather the differentiation between arbitrary relations. By extracting information from the presence/absence binary, immateriality can be constructed on the basis of pattern/randomness. Hayles argues that because a universal informational code can be recognized as underwriting everything that exists, information and materiality can be conceived of as discrete entities, with information occupying the dominant role (1999, p. 11). In this configuration, information is differential insofar as the probabilities of a message alone determine its content. The “meaning” of a message is self-contained and its value is therefore unaffected by situation and context outside the closed information system. “Shannon and Wiener,” remarks Hayles, “wanted information to have a stable value as it moved from one context to another. If it was tied to meaning, it would potentially have to change values every time it was embedded in a new context, because context affects meaning” (1999, p. 53). As such, in “information,” the liberal humanist subject finds a release from the constraints of the body and the context of its production. In Hayles estimation, early cybernetics was thus a means to extend, not subvert, humanist conceptions of man as autopoietic, autonomous, and self-directed. This was accomplished by demonstrating that machines could function like a man and correspondingly that man is essentially an information-processing entity akin to intelligent machines (1999, p. 7). One might argue more specifically, in relation to communication theory, that the effort by Shannon and Weiner to distill information from context resonates with the liberal humanist desire to free rational discourse from the body. By disentangling information from materiality and context, cybernetics somewhat ironically remains tethered to humanist anxieties. Yet, it is worth noting that at the same historical moment, even poststructuralism, putatively motivated by a wariness of immediacy characteristic of humanism, blots out speech in favor of writing. While Derrida and his progeny favor writing inasmuch as speech ostensibly bypasses any impediment to self-presence, the fact that both cybernetics and poststructuralism converge in the erasure of speech is telling. That is, these divergent projects take as their starting point an idealized communicative body; an idealization that adopts the humanist assumption of vocal autoaffectivity. In an ironic twist, even Derrida effaces bodies in the effort to highlight the trace, the body. Working in the poststructuralist lineage, Haraway similarly brackets speech in her articulation of dirty, noisy, posthuman communication. “Cyborg politics,” she writes, “is the struggle for language and the struggle against perfect communication, against the one code that translates all meaning perfectly, the central dogma of phallogocentrism. That is why cyborg politics insist on noise and advocate pollution.” (1990, p. 176).This support for the embodied disruption of communication is curiously prefaced by an insistence that “writing is pre-eminently the technology of cyborgs” (1990, p. 176; my emphasis). For all her rhetoric of embodiment and insistence on the centrality of communication, Haraway seems not to consider speech as an intimate form of embodied communication that resists perfect translation. Hayles as well, setting her sights on theorists such as Wiener and Shannon, intends to reinstitute embodiment in posthumanism, yet never discusses speech as a creative source of noise in the evolution of material-informational systems. Even if interpreted as vestigial poststructuralist anxiety, this puzzling lacuna in posthumanist discourse around speech betrays an ableist presumption of self-presence and resonates with the exclusionary logic of the universal speaker. Yet, if one follows Dolmage in writing from bodies in their diversity, (post) humanism can be read against the grain. Thinking from the perspective of disability not only highlights the points of tension in the stuttered movement toward posthuman communication (as evidenced by both Haraway and Hayles) but also suggests new ways of thinking about speech as embodied and affective, and the relation between communication and the posthuman. Posthumanism and communication Reimagining the stuttering cyborg requires a more nuanced articulation of posthumanism’s relation with both disability and communication. Starting with the former, in decentering the human subject from its position as the transcendental explanans, posthumanism renders “ability” as an emergent aspect of human situatedness within politicized networks. Able-bodiedness is accordingly not an immanent feature of “the body” (as if it could be decoupled from its environment) but is a dynamic index of architectural, economic, industrial, biomedical, discursive, material, informational, affective, political, and sociocultural assemblages. More specifically, able-bodiedness identifies the congruence of these networks with putatively “normal” bodies. As Nayar helpfully points out, networks are inherently political, put in place, and optimized “for certain kinds of bodies to tap into and connect with—and this is what en-ables these bodies.” Bodies marked as disabled are accordingly, and conversely, those “that do not fit into available systems and institutionally created structures” (2014, p. 107). Put simply, disabled bodies are for Nayar those for which networks do not exist. While Nayar’s analysis is helpful, it is perhaps better to say that disabled bodies occupy subaltern networks, because deworlding (to put the phenomenon in Heideggerian parlance) is rarely, if ever, absolute.3 Disability is not a simple aggregate of network conditions, but is constituted in part by feedback loops. That is, disabled people—edged out of, or exploited by, dominant systems—regularly produce new networks that rewire connections between each other and their environments in politically subversive and generative ways. Disabled communities often supplant the neoliberal and meritocratic ideals of productivity, individualism, and self-sufficiency with an ethos of care, interdependency, and slowness. Cripping communication might likewise be understood as a criticoethical practice of reimagining the relations between informational bodies and systems, remapping disabled speech in ways that privilege noise, indeterminacy, affectivity, and sympoiesis.