## 1

**Counterplan:** ☒🙛⓪⑩ 🙥⑥❶⑤⓿🙚⑨⑦③🙦⑤ 🙛🙦⑩ 🙙⑥⑤🙚 ❶⑤🙧🙚⑨🙙⑨⑥❶⑤🙧

#### Linguistic opacity combats structures of ableism

James M. **Wilce 05**, 1-1-2005, “Language and Madness,” A Companion to Linguistic Anthropology, Chapter 18, http://jan.ucc.nau.edu/~jmw22/cv/LanguageMadnessDurantiEd2004%20copy.pdf, doi: 10.1002/9780470996522.ch18 ED \*ellipses in original text

2 MADNESS COMPROMISING THE LINGUISTIC CAPACITIES OF HUMAN BEINGS

The ability to speak coherently enough to respond appropriately to, and help create, recognizable social contexts helps define our sense of full humanness. From primatologist Jane Goodall to linguist John Lyons (1982), many have built concepts of humanness upon the capacity for linguistic interaction. Radical deviation from normal speech interaction can cause interlocutors to judge one not only insane but less than completely human. This section explores the link between madness and fundamental human linguistic and intersubjective capacities. The capacity for language as we know it probably emerged with anatomically modern Homo sapiens roughly 200,000 years ago (Dunbar 1998: 104). This capacity is not reducible to the grammatical delivery of information but must serve diverse social and semiotic needs. The prototypical site of language use is in social interaction. Such interaction requires a "theory of mind" (ToM), the ability to make continual inferences about others' internal dispositions (feelings, intentions, etc.). Linguistic anthropologist Ochs and her colleagues (in press) review the importance of ToM in relation to autism and call for richer theorization of the social in relation to such conditions: "A study of autism ... holds promise for enhancing theories of society and culture, in that both the struggles and the successes of persons diagnosed with autism make evident what is most essential to participation in human society." To think about ToM is to think about intentionaliry. Whether or not we see intentionality as conscious planning (see Duranti, this volume), we can hardly account for normal language use without modeling some intention to do something in relation to interlocutors - persuade, deceive, amuse, etc. - by speaking. But if this is fundamental to our humanity, and if Sass is correct in finding in some persons with schizophrenia "an experiential attitude that would sever the word from any intention-to-signify" (1992: 203), then such madness severely compromises the socially and linguistically engaged mind. 2.1 Madness as human linguistic gifts run amok Using language in face-to-face interaction requires more than just deploying symbols (arbitrary, invariant signs). It requires pragmatic or indexical competence - fitting speech to context, e.g. through appropriate use of deictics (pronouns and demonstratives) and politeness markers. Where would conversation be without deictics like "you" or "I"? Talk works from a "deictic origo" or center to locate "close" and "far," "self" and "other," even while speakers exchange turns and move about in space. Indexicality is key to an anthropological approach to language (Duranti 1997). But madness compromises the capacity to grasp what is indexed, i.e. "the range of socio-cultural dispositions, acts, identities, activities, and institutions indexed moment-by-moment by linguistic and other conventional semiotic features of shifting social situations" (Ochs et al., in press). Linguistic anthropologists know that "the self" is decentered in much talk; for example, "I" does not index the speaker when (s)he is directly quoting someone else. But schizophrenia radically weakens the integrity of the self. Therefore many experts (including sufferers themselves) describe it as one of the most terrifying of all forms of human suffering. Some sufferers feel "their" thoughts are not "their own" - a feeling so foreign to most of us as to be inconceivable. British psychiatrist Crow attributes this crisis to a disturbance in the way the brain makes the indexical distinctions between thought, one's own speech production, and others' speech. This disturbance is potentiated by the way language and the brain evolved. The "speciation event" or split from the hominid line that produced Homo sapiens involved the latcralization of the brain's language-related functions (two hemispheres, specialized but integrated). Lateralization of brain function is less marked in those with schizophrenia (Crow 2000: 122-3). Our ability to index speaker and addressee with "I" and "you" presupposes clear perception of the difference between speech as heard (from others), as produced, and as thought. Brains are able to distinguish the source of words because they are lateralized. Unfortunately, this means that compromised lateralization distorts speech interaction. In arguing that this is precisely what schizophrenia does, Crow (2000) is proposing a model of the brain and its evolution that explains the neuropsychological grounds of indexicality. His model posits schizophrenia as a breakdown therein, with severe repercussions for success in life and reproduction. And yet the disease represents a common genetic inheritance of our species (occurring in about 1 percent of adults around the world). What possible selective advantage could lateralization confer if it potentiates schizophrenia? Language: the genetic mutations that led to functional lateralization (and the possibility of dysfunction) also give us linguistic capacities, including indexicality. Crow's neurolinguistic vision links a central focus of linguistic anthropology - indexicality - with the evolution and modern function of the brain in a way that clarifies the significance of schizophrenia for anthropology. 2.1.1 Metacommunication and madness Indexicality includes more complex contextual engagements than simply perceiving who is speaking and thus distinguishing "I" from "you." It presupposes sociocultural perspective-taking, including awareness of what implicit rules and messages, indirect indexes, or veiled insults are relevant to the "language game" being played in a given context. Gaps between culturally preferred states (such as approving of others) and actual states (such as disapproval) lead to indirect insults, such as damning with faint praise. Decoding these requires taking the speaker's perspective and imagining other utterances (fuller praise) in comparable contexts. Subtle cues in intonation or rhythm guide the decoding of such messages; that is, they are metacommunicative signs,

**\**

## 2

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#### Instructions are clearly given on my wiki as well as a demand for the formatting.

#### 3] Standard: Accessibility –

#### A] Digital magnification limits the amount of on screen text and requires copious amounts of horizontal and vertical scrolling making it difficult to track when not reading some text and simultaneously looking for the next highlighted section.

#### B] Screen reader users read documents audibly, but there is no way to read only the tags and highlighted parts due to their formatting.

#### C] Their formatting is inaccessible for those with ADD or ADHD (like me) because the parts of evidence that are not being read distract them from the parts being read.

**\*T And, Accessibility is key to fairness and education because debate is never fair or educational for those who can’t access the round.**

**\*T And, Accessibility is an independent voter because if debate wasn’t accessible no one would join meaning access is a pre requisite to debate existing.**

**D. Voters:**

**Fairness is a voter it’s a gateway issue unfair rounds skew the judge’s ability to evaluate substance.**

**Education is a voter it’s the benefit and reason debate is funded**

**Drop the Debater.**

**1] Debaters pay attention to who and what is and isn’t winning so voting for the shell helps set a norm**

**2] to deter future violations**

**3] Drop the Argument is the same because we indict the entirety of the AC**

**No RVI’s:**

**1. RVIs lead to baiting theory**

**2. RVIs discourage theory which is self-defeating because theory is a check against abuse**

**3. they shouldn’t win just for being accessible**

**Competing Interpretations:**

**1] reasonability leads to a race to the bottom**

**2] We shouldn’t settle for making debate “reasonably” accessible, make them prove why their interpretation is more accessible.**

**3] Reasonability collapses since we just debate about brightlines**

**4] Reasonability is arbitrary and encourages judge intervention**

**Aff can’t leverage case-**

**1) Truth is determined through contestation which fairness controls the internal link to; means we can’t adjudicate the truth of your warrants.**

**2) Preserve the sanctity of theory form substance; 2 reasons**

**A) key to maintain theory as recourse against abuse; its impossible to check since extinction probably outweighs fairness.**

**B) Conflates the pre and post-fiat distinction; EG. donating to charity doesn’t mean you should win if util is true.**

## 3

**The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best challenges ableism through the resolution**

**Prefer –**

**The ROB is to vote for the debater who best challenges ableism**

**Prefer –**

**[1] Assumptions of ableism are inherent in systems of knowledge production thus ableism is an a priori question \*A Campbell 13\*C**

**Campbell 13 (Fiona Kumari Campbell, Adjunct Professor in the Department of Disability Studies at Griffith University. Wednesday 27 November 2013. Problematizing Vulnerability: Engaging Studies in Ableism and Disability Jurisprudence. Keynote speech at Disability at the Margins: Vulnerability, Empowerment and the Criminal Law)**

What is meant by the concept of ableism? The literature suggests that the term is often used fluidly with limited definitional or conceptual specificity. The work of Carlson (2001)5 and Campbell (2001) represented a turning point in bringing attention to this new site of subordination not just in terms of disablement but also ableism’s application to other devalued groups. **Ableism is** deeply **seeded at the level of knowledge systems** of life, personhood and liveability. **Ableism is not just** a matter of ignorance or **negative attitudes** towards disabled people; **it is a schema of perfection**, **a** deep **way of thinking about bodies**, wholeness and permeability.6 As such integrating ableism into social research and advocacy strategies represents a significant challenge to practice as ableism moves beyond the more familiar territory of social inclusion and usual indices of exclusion to the very divisions of life. Bringing together the study of existence and knowledge systems, ableism is difficult to pin down. Ableism is a set of processes and practices that arise and decline through sequences of causal convergences influenced by the elements of time, space, bodily inflections and circumstance. Ability and the corresponding notion of ableism are intertwined. **Compulsory ablebodiedness is implicated in the** very **foundations of social theory**, therapeutic jurisprudence, advocacy, medicine and law; or in the mappings of human anatomy. Summarised by Campbell (2001, 44) Ableism refers to; …A network of beliefs processes and practices that produces a particular kind of self and body (the bodily standard) that is projected as the perfect, speciestypical and therefore essential and fully human. Disability then is cast as a diminished state of being human. Writing today (2013) I add an addition to this definition: ‘The ableist bodily configuration is immutable, permanent and laden with qualities of perfectionism or the enhancement imperative orientated towards a self-contained improvability’. Sentiency applies to not just the human but the ‘animal’ world. As a category to differentiate the normal from the pathological, the concept of **abledness is predicated on** some **preexisting notion about the nature of typical** species **functioning** that is beyond culture and historical context. **Ableism** does not just stop at propagating what is typical for each species. An ableist imaginary **tells us what** a healthy body means – a normal mind, the pace, the tenor of **thinking and** the kinds of **emotions** and affect that **are suitable to express**. **Reframing our focus** **can enrich our understanding of the terms of engagement in** **life**

**Presumption and Permissibility Negate. Aff has an obligation to prove that the world is good for disabled individuals. The disadvantage is disabled exhaustion where we are constantly told the aff is good for disabled individuals be in reality it doesn’t do anything.**

**Now Negate**

1. **Disability require negation as laws used to prop up ableism rendering disabled people invisible**

**Campbell 03 (Fiona Kumari, Associate Professor in Law for Griffith Law School, and a Adjunct Professor in Disability Studies at the Unviersity of Kelaniya “The Great Divide: Ableism and Technologies of Disability Production.” PhD Thesis. 2003.Pg. 142.**

**Law plays an exacting and explicit role in this subjectifying activity of government.  Legal intersections/interventions facilitate this subjectification by allocating and regulating populations into fixed and discrete ontological categories (such as disability, gender, sex, race) in order that the subjects assigned to those categories can be rendered visible and calculable (Foucault, 1976: especially 135-159; Foucault, 1994 orig. 1970).  The fixity of disability (which is assume to be a pre-given property of human bodies) within both legislative and case law not only establishes the boundaries of permissible inquiry it also establishes the legal fiction of ‘disability’ in the first place.  It is this reification of disability (frequently based on bio-medical technologies and ascriptions) that reinforces the centrality of the ableist body and the terms of its negotiation. The formulations of disability often engaged by disability activists and enshrined in disability related law, in effect discursively entrench and thus reinscribe the very oppressive ontological figurings of disability that many of us would like to escape.  Alternative renderings of disability, if they are not able to ‘fit’ such prescribed ‘fictions,’ are barred from entry into legal and other discourses.  Consider, for instance, the instructions given in a recent staff survey produced by the Equity Section of Queensland University of Technology (QUT) (2000).  The QUT equity survey instructs: “You should answer ‘yes’ to question 2 only if you are a person with a disability which is likely to last, or has lasted two or more years.  Please note that if you use spectacles, contact lenses or other aids to fully correct your vision or hearing, you do not need to indicate that you are a person with a disability and would answer ‘no’ (emphasis added). (Equity Section Queensland University of Technology, 2000).” As we can see, defining disability in terms of what it ‘is’ and ‘is not’ performs an emblematic function that re-cognises the relationship between impairment and disability and civil**

## 4

#### 

#### Value stems from the authority to place value on certain choices which intrinsically gives the value-giver value, implying a meta-ethic of intrinsic value.

#### Meta-ethics outweigh: A] they determine the validity of the standard debate itself instead of just leading to a standard, B] Its axiomatically prior to resolve before the standard. Util’s technocratic adherence to cost-benefit analysis inevitably prioritizes ability over disability and inevitably euthanizes the disabled infant.

Jessica **Flanigan PhD 18**, [Jessica Flanigan is the Richard L. Morrill Chair in Ethics and Democratic Values at the University of Richmond, where she teaches Leadership Ethics, Ethical Decision Making in Healthcare, and Critical Thinking. Her research addresses the ethics of public policy, medicine, and business. In "Pharmaceutical Freedom" (Oxford University Press, 2017) she defends rights of self-medication. In "Debating Sex Work" (Oxford University Press, forthcoming) she defends the decriminalization of sex work. Flanigan has also published in journals such as Philosophical Studies, The Journal of Business Ethics, Leadership, The Journal of Moral Philosophy, and the Journal of Political Philosophy. She is currently writing a book about the ethics of pregnancy and a book about language and ethics. She is a proponent of effective altruism.] 2018, “Kantian Ethics, Well-Being, and Disability,” J. Flanigan, T.L. Price (eds.), The Ethics of Ability and Enhancement, Jepson Studies in Leadership, DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95303-5\_6, file:///C:/Users/218511/Downloads/(Jepson%20Studies%20in%20Leadership)%20Jessica%20Flanigan,%20Terry%20L.%20Price%20(eds.)%20-%20The%20Ethics%20of%20Ability%20and%20Enhancement-Palgrave%20Macmillan%20US%20(2018).pdf ED

2 A KANTIAN PROPOSAL

With the descriptive definition in hand, we can then ask normative questions about disability beyond the question of whether it is bad for a particular person to be disabled according to a certain theory of well-being. For example, we can ask questions about disability rights such as: • Should officials extend rights to disabled people that they do not extend to nondisabled people? • Should officials provide disabled people with resources that they do not provide nondisabled people? • Should officials prohibit people from discriminating against disabled people? • Should officials require that people accommodate disabled people? • Is it permissible to cause a person to be disabled? • Is it permissible to cause a person to be nondisabled? It is perhaps unsurprising that proponents of welfarist approaches to disability are likely to answer these questions on the basis of a broadly consequentialist moral theory.3 For these theorists of disability, it is a short walk from a conception of disability that is defined with reference to normative concepts to normative conclusions about how disabled people should be treated.

But I have suggested that these normative associations with disability require further argument and cannot be established via definition. And I am skeptical that these questions should be answered with reference to considerations related to well-being. Rather, I will argue that we should think of disabilities as mere differences and **refrain** from evaluating these questions about the ethics of disability withreference to consequentialist considerations. Consequentialist considerations are often cited in philosophical discussions of disability. For example, ethicists have argued that disabled people should have the same rights as nondisabled people and deserve equal treatment, while explaining these claims by an appeal to disabled people’s interests (Harris 2001). Similarly, arguments on behalf of providing disabled people with additional resources appeal to considerations, such as diminishing marginal utility or disabled people’s interest in receiving additional resources (Arneson 2015). Consequence-minded philosophers are hesitant, however, when it comes questions about **whether it is permissible to create a disabled person**, on the grounds they predict that a disabled life will be worse in expectation than a nondisabled life (Savulescu 2001; McMahan 2005; Kahane 2009). For similar reasons, some consequentialist philosophers have even submitted that it can be permissible to euthanize a disabled infant and replace her with a nondisabled infant in circumstances where a disabled child’s life would otherwise prevent parents from conceiving a nondisabled child (Singer 2011, p. 163). In contrast, I propose that we can set aside questions of well-being while answering the aforementioned questions about disability rights because, like other questions of rights, disability rights do not depend on whether having a disability is good or bad for a person. Moreover, I also propose that questions about disability rights do not even depend on whether a person’s physical conditions qualify as a disability because, more generally, the scope of a person’s rights do not depend on physical features of her body. My argument for this claim relies on a broadly Kantian framework. For this reason, a quick detour into Kantian ethics may be helpful in explaining my claim that we should not consider questions of well-being when settling questions about disability rights. Kant was interested in questions about how to treat people, such as the questions listed above.4 Kant’s goal was to discover principles of action that applied in all circumstances, simply by reflecting on the nature of action. So, for example, you might reflect on the fact that deciding to eat an apple gives you a reason to eat the apple, and infer from that that your ability to decide to act is a source of reasons. Those reasons have authority, Kant argued, because you confer value on your choices by making them. And **from that you should infer that you are a source of value**, and that your value issues from your ability to make choices. Based on an argument like this, Kant concluded that people should act in ways that treat humanity, or human autonomy, as a source of value in itself and not merely as a means to one’s own ends.He called this the Formula of Humanity.5 People disagree about whether Kant’s argument for the Formula of Humanity or some version of it can successfully explain the whole of the moral landscape. And people also disagree about which substantive choices this formal constraint requires. Christine Korsgaard offers one interpretation of the Formula of Humanity that shows how we can deduce substantive moral principles by reflecting on what it is to act (Korsgaard 1996, p. 107). She argues that we should think of moral reasons as the objective reasons we have whatever our inclinations or desires (in contrast to the subjective reasons we have only in virtue of our desires) (Korsgaard 1996, p. 121). She then argues that people have objective reasons to respect other people’s choices because the only thing that each person has reason to value is the capacity to value, which is same capacity as the capacity to choose. Crucially, **well-being is not unconditionally valuable for people in this universal way because the choices that promote one person’s well-being will not promote another’s**. In contrast, each person does have an unconditional reason to respect other people’s choices because once you recognize the value of your own ability to choose, “you must view anyone who has the power of rational choice as having, in virtue of that power, a value conferring status” (Korsgaard 1996, p. 123). In practice then, Kant’s argument requires that each person refrain from interfering with other people’s choices, but people are not required to attend to conditionally valuable features of others, such as features of their well-being. David Velleman and Stephen Darwall develop Kant’s argument in different ways but with similar conclusions for our purposes. Velleman argues that **people have a kind of value, in virtue of their autonomy, that cannot be traded off for the sake of greater well-being**, and that the value of a person does not depend on her properties, such as the color of her hair (Velleman 1999a, b). Morality, Velleman argues, is largely indifferent to whether a person’s desires are satisfied or whether she is happy. Instead, morality requires protection of and respect for autonomy. Darwall is skeptical that Kant’s project of deriving moral principles simply by reflecting on the nature of action can succeed (Darwall 2009). Instead, he proposes that we can derive moral principles by reflecting on the nature of moral address within a moral community. On his view, people within a moral community must hold one another to the same standards. And while Darwall doesn’t say much about the substantive content of those standards, he does clarify that members of the moral community are required to respect each person’s equal standing to act as an independent agent within the moral community. About this duty to respect Darwall writes, What we attend to [by respecting someone] is not (at least not primarily) what is for someone’s welfare or good, but, among other things, what she herself values and holds good from her point of view as an equal independent agent. (Darwall 2009) For this reason, Darwall argues that it is disrespectful to paternalistically interfere with someone in order to promote her well-being. This is just a sketch of an argument in favor of a moral theory that does not accord welfarist considerations much weight when answering practical questions about how to treat people. But I think something like this sketch is the right way to think about rights in general, and disability rights in particular. However, I am not committed to the particulars of Kant’s or Korsgaard’s specific derivations of rights. For example, one might reject the claim that moral reasons are the objective reasons that all people must recognize regardless of their desires. But even if one holds that moral reasons are ultimately subjective, it is not clear that people have rights in virtue of welfarist considerations. Michael Smith argues that a person has moral reason to do what she would desire that she do were she fully informed and rational (Smith 2011, p. 357). And Smith concludes that such a being would desire that no one interfere with the exercise of her rational capacities and that she does what she can to ensure that she has rational capacities to exercise in the future, but she would not necessarily desire the promotion of her well-being (Smith 2011). Others arrive at similar conclusions via a different route.6 The conclusion of all these arguments is that considerations of well-being do not bear on questions about people’s rights and duties. Utilitarianism, the view that we ought to promote the well-being of the greatest number of people, is the clearest philosophical rival to the Kantian approach. Against utilitarianism, Kantians reply that this kind of reasoning permits people to be used as means for the promotion of overall well-being. In principle, utilitarianism permits killing the one to save the many. Kantian ethics prohibits this kind of conduct. Each person has moral status in virtue of her autonomy that places everyone else under a duty to respect her choices as long as she is complying with her own duty to respect the choices of others. In this way, the Kantian approach protects individuals from being treated as means for the promotion of others’ (or their own) well-being. Turning to disability rights, Kantians would therefore emphasize that it is a mistake to focus on whether it is good or bad for a person’s well-being to be disabled. So Kantians would echo the familiar critiques of utilitarian approaches that are advanced within the disability rights community, such as objections to the use of Quality Adjusted Life Years in decisions about resource allocation and objections to policies that permit euthanasia for disabled infants but not for nondisabled infants. In contrast, Kantians answer questions about disability rights with reference to the claims that disabled and nondisabled people have with reference to the value that is intrinsic to all autonomous people.7

#### Thus, the standard is respecting disability freedom. Impact calculus: A) freedom is a property of agency, not an additive consequence. Adding two circles together does not make anything more circular than what was before, just like two humans are not freer than one human. B) even if the net effect of the aff is more freedom, the means by which you have achieved that freedom is an inherently coercive action so you don’t address the appropriate response. I answer whether the state is even in the position to coerce in the first place.

#### Prefer additionally:

#### 1] Regress --- agents can always ask “why should I do this” an infinite amount of times when deciding the ethicality of an action – only strict deontic rules solve by setting concrete maxims agents cannot violate – otherwise anything becomes permissible since agents can find one loophole in the infinite chain of questions.

#### Now negate –

#### [1] A model of freedom mandates a market-oriented approach to space—that negates

Broker 20 [(Tyler, work has been published in the Gonzaga Law Review, the Albany Law Review and the University of Memphis Law Review.) “Space Law Can Only Be Libertarian Minded,” Above the Law, 1-14-20, <https://abovethelaw.com/2020/01/space-law-can-only-be-libertarian-minded/>] TDI

The impact on human daily life from a transition to the virtually unlimited resource reality of space cannot be overstated. However, when it comes to the law, a minimalist, dare I say libertarian, approach appears as the only applicable system. In the words of NASA, “2020 promises to be a big year for space exploration.” Yet, as Rand Simberg points out in Reason magazine, it is actually private American investment that is currently moving space exploration to “a pace unseen since the 1960s.” According to Simberg, due to this increase in private investment “We are now on the verge of getting affordable private access to orbit for large masses of payload and people.” The impact of that type of affordable travel into space might sound sensational to some, but in reality the benefits that space can offer are far greater than any benefit currently attributed to any major policy proposal being discussed at the national level. The sheer amount of resources available within our current reach/capabilities simply speaks for itself. However, although those new realities will, as Simberg says, “bring to the fore a lot of ideological issues that up to now were just theoretical,” I believe it will also eliminate many economic and legal distinctions we currently utilize today. For example, the sheer number of resources we can already obtain in space means that in the rapidly near future, the distinction between a nonpublic good or a public good will be rendered meaningless. In other words, because the resources available within our solar system exist in such quantities, all goods will become nonrivalrous in their consumption and nonexcludable in their distribution. This would mean government engagement in the public provision of a nonpublic good, even at the trivial level, or what Kevin Williamson defines as socialism, is rendered meaningless or impossible. In fact, in space, I fail to see how any government could even try to legally compel collectivism in the way Simberg fears. Similar to many economic distinctions, however, it appears that many laws, both the good and the bad, will also be rendered meaningless as soon as we begin to utilize the resources within our solar system. For example, if every human being is given access to the resources that allows them to replicate anything anyone else has, or replace anything “taken” from them instantly, what would be the point of theft laws? If you had virtually infinite space in which you can build what we would now call luxurious livable quarters, all without exploiting human labor or fragile Earth ecosystems when you do it, what sense would most property, employment, or commercial law make? Again, this is not a pipe dream, no matter how much our population grows for the next several millennia, the amount of resources within our solar system can sustain such an existence for every human being. Rather than panicking about the future, we should try embracing it, or at least meaningfully preparing for it. Currently, the Outer Space Treaty, or as some call it “the Magna Carta of Space,” is silent on the issue of whether private individuals or corporate entities can own territory in space. Regardless of whether governments allow it, however, private citizens are currently obtaining the ability to travel there, and if human history is any indicator, private homesteading will follow, flag or no flag. We Americans know this is how a Wild West starts, where most regulation becomes the impractical pipe dream. But again, this would be a Wild West where the exploitation of human labor and fragile Earth ecosystem makes no economic sense, where every single human can be granted access to resources that even the wealthiest among us now would envy, and where innovation and imagination become the only things we would recognize as currency. Only a libertarian-type system, that guarantees basic individual rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness could be valued and therefore human fidelity to a set of laws made possible, in such an existence.

#### [2] Banning private space appropriation inhibits the sale and use of spacecraft and fuel- that’s a form of restricting the free economic choices of individuals

**Richman 12**, Sheldon. “The free market doesn’t need government regulation.” Reason, August 5, 2012. // AHS RG

Order grows from market forces. But where do **market forces** come from? They **are the result of human action. Individuals select ends and act to achieve them by adopting suitable means.** Since means are scarce and ends are abundant, **individuals economize in order to accomplish more rather than less.** And they always seek to exchange lower values for higher values (as they see them) and never the other way around. In a world of scarcity, tradeoffs are unavoidable, so one aims to trade up rather than down. (One’s trading partner does the same.) **The result of this**, along with other **features of human action**, and the world at large **is what we call market forces. But really, it is just men and women acting rationally in the world.**

#### Util dehumanizes disability and the curing of secondary pity to increase the disabled’s “welfare”

**Stein 01 Mark is the author of Distributive Justice and Disability: Utilitarianism against Egalitarianism (Yale University Press, 2006) [Stein, Mark S. “Utilitarianism and the Disabled: Distribution of Life.” Social Theory and Practice, vol. 27, no. 4, 2001, pp. 561–578. JSTOR,** [**www.jstor.org/stable/23559190. Accessed 23 Nov. 2020**](http://www.jstor.org/stable/23559190.%20Accessed%2023%20Nov.%202020)**.] //Lex AKo**

**If the disabled have on average less welfare than nondisabled people, it seems to follow that the disabled benefit less from continued life than do nondisabled people. Utilitarianism would therefore place a lower value on disabled life than on nondisabled life, and if a choice had to be made between saving the lives of disabled people and saving the lives of nondisabled people, utilitarianism would counsel us to give less preference to the disabled. So, for example, disabled people would receive less preference, in the distribution of life-saving organ transplants, than nondisabled people. Moreover, the utilitarian preference against disabled people in the distribution of life would appear to be exactly proportional to the utili tarian preference in favor of disabled people in the distribution of resources. However morally urgent it might be to cure a given disabled person, increasing her welfare, it would seem that the same moral ur gency must attach to a decision to preserve the life of a nondisabled person in preference to that disabled person, assuming that only one of them 13Mark Stein, "Utilitarianism and the Disabled: Distribution of Resources," Bioethics 16 (2002), forthcoming. 14See ibid.**

# Acessiable formating

## 1

**Counterplan:** ☒🙛⓪⑩ 🙥⑥❶⑤⓿🙚⑨⑦③🙦⑤ 🙛🙦⑩ 🙙⑥⑤🙚 ❶⑤🙧🙚⑨🙙⑨⑥❶⑤🙧

#### Linguistic opacity combats structures of ableism

. **Wilce 05**,

The ability to speak coherently and create, social contexts helps define humanness. deviation from normal speech cause interlocutors to judge one not only insane but less than completely human. This capacity must serve diverse social and semiotic needs. madness compromises the socially linguistically engaged mind. Our ability to addressee "I" and "you" presupposes clear perception of speech , and thought. Decoding requires the speaker's perspective and imagining other utterances they are metacommunicative signs,

## 2

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#### A] Digital magnification limits the amount of on screen text and requires copious amounts of horizontal and vertical scrolling making it difficult to track when not reading some text and simultaneously looking for the next highlighted section.

#### B] Screen reader users read documents audibly, but there is no way to read only the tags and highlighted parts due to their formatting.

#### C] Their formatting is inaccessible for those with ADD or ADHD (like me) because the parts of evidence that are not being read distract them from the parts being read.

**\*T And, Accessibility is key to fairness and education because debate is never fair or educational for those who can’t access the round.**

**\*T And, Accessibility is an independent voter because if debate wasn’t accessible no one would join meaning access is a pre requisite to debate existing.**

**D. Voters:**

**Fairness is a voter it’s a gateway issue unfair rounds skew the judge’s ability to evaluate substance.**

**Education is a voter it’s the benefit and reason debate is funded**

**Drop the Debater.**

**1] Debaters pay attention to who and what is and isn’t winning so voting for the shell helps set a norm**

**2] to deter future violations**

**3] Drop the Argument is the same because we indict the entirety of the AC**

**No RVI’s:**

**1. RVIs lead to baiting theory**

**2. RVIs discourage theory which is self-defeating because theory is a check against abuse**

**3. they shouldn’t win just for being accessible**

**Competing Interpretations:**

**1] reasonability leads to a race to the bottom**

**2] We shouldn’t settle for making debate “reasonably” accessible, make them prove why their interpretation is more accessible.**

**3] Reasonability collapses since we just debate about brightlines**

**4] Reasonability is arbitrary and encourages judge intervention**

**Aff can’t leverage case-**

**1) Truth is determined through contestation which fairness controls the internal link to; means we can’t adjudicate the truth of your warrants.**

**2) Preserve the sanctity of theory form substance; 2 reasons**

**A) key to maintain theory as recourse against abuse; its impossible to check since extinction probably outweighs fairness.**

**B) Conflates the pre and post-fiat distinction; EG. donating to charity doesn’t mean you should win if util is true.**

## 3

**The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best challenges ableism through the resolution**

**Prefer –**

**The ROB is to vote for the debater who best challenges ableism**

**Prefer –**

**[1] Assumptions of ableism are inherent in systems of knowledge production thus ableism is an a priori question \*A Campbell 13\*C**

**Ableism is** **seeded at the level of knowledge systems** **Ableism is not just** **negative attitudes**  **it is a schema of perfection**, **a** **way of thinking about bodies**,. **Compulsory ablebodiedness is implicated in the** **foundations of social theory**, **abledness is predicated on** **preexisting notion about the nature of typical** **functioning** **Ableism** **tells us what** **thinking and** **emotions are suitable to express**. **Reframing our focus** **can enrich our understanding of the terms of engagement in** **life**

**Presumption and Permissibility Negate. Aff has an obligation to prove that the world is good for disabled individuals. The disadvantage is disabled exhaustion where we are constantly told the aff is good for disabled individuals be in reality it doesn’t do anything.**

**Now Negate**

1. **Disability require negation as laws used to prop up ableism rendering disabled people invisible**

**Campbell 03**

**Law  facilitate regulating populations into fixed and discrete ontological categories in order that the subjects assigned to those categories can be rendered visible and calculable  The fixity of disability within  law establishes the legal fiction of ‘disability’ in the first place.  Alternative renderings of disability, if they are not able to ‘fit’ such prescribed ‘fictions,’ are barred from entry into legal and other discourses.**

## 4

#### 

#### Value stems from the authority to place value on certain choices which intrinsically gives the value-giver value, implying a meta-ethic of intrinsic value.

#### Meta-ethics outweigh: A] they determine the validity of the standard debate itself instead of just leading to a standard, B] Its axiomatically prior to resolve before the standard. Util’s technocratic adherence to cost-benefit analysis inevitably prioritizes ability over disability and inevitably euthanizes the disabled infant.

**Flanigan PhD 18**

we should think of disabilities as mere differences and **refrain** from evaluating questions with consequentialist considerations. Consequence-minded philosophers are hesitant, about **whether it is permissible to create a disabled person**, on the grounds they predict that a disabled life will be worse in expectation than a nondisabled life consequentialist philosophers have even submitted that it can be permissible to euthanize a disabled infant and replace her with a nondisabled infant we can set aside well-being because, disability rights do not depend on whether having a disability is good or bad. My argument  relies on a Kantian framework.you confer value on your choices by making them. **from that you should infer that you are a source of value**, people should act in ways that treat humanity, or human autonomy, as a source of value in itself and not merely as a means to one’s own ends.**well-being is not unconditionally valuable because the choices that promote one’s well-being will not promote another’s**. **people have value,that cannot be traded off for the sake of greater well-being**, util permits killing one to save many. Each person has moral status in virtue of her autonomy

#### Thus, the standard is respecting disability freedom. Impact calculus: A) freedom is a property of agency, not an additive consequence. Adding two circles together does not make anything more circular than what was before, just like two humans are not freer than one human. B) even if the net effect of the aff is more freedom, the means by which you have achieved that freedom is an inherently coercive action so you don’t address the appropriate response. I answer whether the state is even in the position to coerce in the first place.

#### Prefer additionally:

#### 1] Regress --- agents can always ask “why should I do this” an infinite amount of times when deciding the ethicality of an action – only strict deontic rules solve by setting concrete maxims agents cannot violate – otherwise anything becomes permissible since agents can find one loophole in the infinite chain of questions.

#### Now negate –

#### [1] A model of freedom mandates a market-oriented approach to space—that negates

Broker 20

impact from unlimited resource cannot be overstated when law libertarian, approach only applicable system private investment moving space exploration benefits space can offer resources distinction between a nonpublic good or a public good meaningless every human access to the resources allows them to replicate anything anyone has replace anything “taken” infinite space build luxurious quarters exploiting labor or ecosystems Regardless whether governments allow it private citizens currently obtaining the ability to travel there Only libertarian-type system guarantees basic individual rights liberty could be valued set laws in existence

#### [2] Banning private space appropriation inhibits the sale and use of spacecraft and fuel- that’s a form of restricting the free economic choices of individuals

**Richman 12**,

**market forces**

**are the result of human action. Individuals select ends**

**to achieve**

**by adopting suitable means.**

**individuals economize**

**to accomplish more**

**market forces**

**is just**

**acting rationally in the world.**