### 1

#### The desire to fill the insatiable lack creates experiences of impairment that structures the disability drive. The drive is tied up with primary pity which reflects disability upon the ego threatening its ability status – which invokes secondary pity to overcorrect for the shattered-ego necessitating disabled death.

Mollow 15 [The Disability Drive by Anna Mollow A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in English in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Kent Puckett, Chair Professor Celeste G. Langan Professor Melinda Y. Chen Spring 2015 // WHSRS and Lex VM]

A great deal of the pain and pleasure of primary pity center on questions about what, or who, this fallen self is. When most people think about pity, we refer to an affect in which, to adopt Edelman‟s phrase, we purport to “feel for the other.” But as with primary narcissism, in which the self has not yet been constituted, and therefore cannot be said to enter into intersubjective relations with an “other,” primary pity entails a mixing up of self and other such that the ego, in becoming permeable to pain that may properly belong to “someone else,” is profoundly threatened in its integrity. Primary pity is that intense pain-pleasure complex that is provoked by the image of a suffering other who, it seems momentarily, both is and is not one‟s self. This affective response can feel unbearable, as seen in Siebers‟s formulation: one “cannot bear to look…but also cannot bear not to look.” Primary pity is difficult to bear because it involves a drive toward disability (one cannot bear not to look), which menaces the ego‟s investments in health, pleasure, and control—because to contemplate another person‟s suffering is to confront the question, “Could this happen to me?” Such a prospect, although frightening, may also be compelling; in this way, primary pity replicates the self-rupturing aspects of sexuality. Indeed, the unbearability of primary pity reflects its coextensiveness with sexuality. Sex, or the Unbearable, a book coauthored by Edelman and by Lauren Berlant, argues that sex “unleashes unbearable contradictions that we nonetheless struggle to bear” (back cover). This claim accords with Freud‟s account of sexuality as a “pleasurable” “unpleasure” that the ego can never fully master or control (Three 49,75). As Leo Bersani puts it in his reading of Freud, “the pleasurable unpleasurable tension of sexual enjoyment occurs when the body‟s „normal‟ range of sensation is exceeded, and when the organization of the self is momentarily disturbed”; thus, “sexuality would be that which is intolerable to the structured self” (Freudian 38). Primary pity is also intolerable to the structured self, because it entails a fascination with the fantasy of a self in a state of disintegration or disablement. Secondary pity is something else, although it cannot wholly be differentiated from primary pity. Secondary pity attempts to heal primary pity‟s self-rupturing effects by converting primary pity into a feeling that is bearable. As with secondary narcissism, secondary pity involves both an attempt to get back to that ego-shattering state of painfully pleasurable primary pity, and at the same time to defend against that threat to the ego by aggrandizing oneself at someone else‟s expense. Secondary pity refers to all those ego-bolstering behaviors that most people think of when they talk about pity. Disabled people are all too familiar with these behaviors: the saccharin sympathy, the telethon rituals of “conspicuous contribution,” the insistence that “they” (i.e., nondisabled people) could never endure such suffering. More commonly known in our culture simply as “pity,” secondary pity encompasses our culture‟s most clichéd reactions to disability: charity, tears, and calls for a cure. Correlatives of these commonplace manifestations of secondary pity are the obligatory claims that disabled people‟s suffering is “inspiring.” Indeed, the speed with which conventional cultural representations of disability segue from overt expressions of pity to celebrations of “the triumph of the human spirit” highlights the ways in which secondary pity, as a defense against primary pity‟s incursions, reinforces the ego‟s fantasy of sovereignty. Secondary pity, in other words, can be seen as a variation of secondary narcissism: these affects enlarge the ego of the pitier or the narcissist at the expense of someone else. But primary pity is not the same as either primary narcissism, secondary narcissism, or secondary pity. Unlike primary narcissism, a feeling that emerges out of a relation to the world in which notions of “self” and “other” do not obtain, primary pity does depend upon the constructs of self and other, although these constructions are unstable and are continually threatening to come undone. Primary pity can thus be envisioned as a threshold category occupying a liminal position between the total denial of the other that is inherent to primary narcissism and the rigid structure of (superior) self and (inferior) other that constitutes secondary narcissism and secondary pity. My concept of primary versus secondary pity also differs from Freud‟s primarysecondary narcissism distinction at the level of genealogy. Like Freud‟s account of primary and secondary narcissisms, my model of primary and secondary pities involves a temporal transition; but whereas Freud imagines the movement from primary to secondary narcissism as a passage from an earlier to a later stage of an individual‟s development, the temporal shift from primary to secondary pity happens much more quickly than this. It happens in an instant: that moment in which we feel primary pity and then, almost before we can blink, deny that we feel or have felt it. The denial is understandable: who wants to admit that one gets pleasure from the sight of another person‟s suffering—or, to make matters worse, that this pleasure derives in part from the specter of disability‟s transferability, the possibility that this suffering could be—and, fantasmatically, perhaps already is—an image of one‟s own self undone? Indeed, the model of primary pity that I have been constructing may sound a bit too close to sadism for some people‟s liking. Pity does come close to sadism, and at the same time, to masochism, which Freud theorizes as sadism‟s obverse. In “Mourning and Melancholia,” an essay that can be read as a sequel to “On Narcissism,” Freud approaches a distinction between primary and secondary masochism, which accords with my primary-secondary pity heuristic.122 If the story that I traced in “On Narcissism” could be summarized as “child gets breast; child loses breast; child gets breast back, albeit in a secondary, adulterated form,” the tale that Freud tells about masochism takes much the same form. In this story, subject loves object; subject loses object; and subject tries to get object back by becoming object, that is, by identifying with the object in such a way that object starts to seem—and perhaps in some ways is—part of subject‟s self. This last phase is a dysfunctional and disabling form of identification, Freud makes clear. Subject is still angry at object for having left it, and it takes out that anger on the object that is now part of itself. This is the reason that people suffering from melancholia are so hard on themselves, Freud says; the “diminution in…self-regard” that typically accompanies melancholia results from the subject‟s attacks on the loved-and-lost object that the subject has incorporated into its ego (“Mourning” 246). Freud had not wanted there to be such a thing as primary masochism; for a long time, he had insisted that sadism, or “aggression,” was the primary instinct, and that masochism was only a turning-inward of this originary aggression. But in “Mourning and Melancholia,” although Freud does not yet use the term “primary masochism,” he nonetheless gets at this concept. The problem of suicide, Freud notes in this essay, raises the possibility that the ego “can treat itself as an object” that it wants to destroy (252). When it comes to such an extreme act as suicide, the possibility of carrying “such a purpose through to execution” must, Freud surmises, involve more than a sadistic wish to punish others. Perhaps, then, there is an innate desire to destroy one‟s own self, Freud hypothesizes. If so, this self would not be a single thing: it would be “me” and at the same time, the lost object whose image “I” have internalized. Freud‟s notion of a primary masochism is tied very closely to his conceptualization of the drive. Beyond the Pleasure Principle, the text in which Freud first used the term “death drive,” was published three years after “Mourning and Melancholia.” In the later text, Freud‟s speculations about the death drive lead him to acknowledge that “there might be such a thing as primary masochism” (66). After all, Freud points out, the idea that either sadism or masochism definitively takes precedence over the other does not ultimately make much sense, as “there is no difference in principle between an instinct turning from the object to the ego and its turning from the ego to an object” (66). If sadism and masochism are ultimately indistinguishable obverses of each other, then pity, in both its primary and its secondary forms, would have to be both sadistic and masochistic. This is a deeply troubling possibility, but I suggest that trying to overcome pity will only make matters worse. There are many ways of trying to overcome primary pity, and each one ultimately aggravates the violence of primary pity. One way is the “pitiless” refusal of compassion that Edelman advocates (70). Another is the disability activist “No pity” injunction. A third example is secondary pity, as in the query, commonly addressed to disabled people, “Have you ever thought of killing yourself?”123 In this question, disabled people correctly hear the wish, “I‟d like to kill you.” Indeed, primary pity is so unsettling that our culture has been driven to “mercifully” kill people in the name of secondary pity. We have also been driven to lock people in institutions, to let them languish on the streets, to stare, to punish, and to sentimentalize—all, I would suggest, in the interest of not owning, not naming, not acknowledging that self-shattering, ego-dissolving, instantaneous and intolerable moment of primary pity. Because primary pity is tied up with the disability drive, it must, like the drive itself, be regarded as unrepresentable. However, I will quote at length from a passage of writing that comes close not only to representing primary pity but also perhaps to producing it. In his memoir, One More Theory About Happiness, Paul Guest describes an experience that he had in the hospital after sustaining a spinal cord injury when he was twelve years old: My stomach still roiled and it was hard to keep anything down. Late one night, a doctor came to my bedside, leaning over me, his hands knotted together. He seemed vexed, not quite ready to say anything. Used to the look, I waited. And then he began. “The acids in your stomach, Paul, because of everything you‟re going through, it‟s like your body, everything about it, is upset. That‟s why you feel so nauseous all the time. We‟re going to treat that by putting a tube into your nose and down into your stomach, so we can give you medicine, OK?” When he walked away, I felt something begin to give way inside me. Up until then, I‟d faced more misery and indignity than I would have thought possible. I lay there, numb and sick in a diaper, helpless. It was too much to bear, too frightening, a last invasion I could experience and not break, utterly. When he returned with nurses, I was already sobbing. Anyone so limited could hardly fight, but I tried. I tried. The neck collar prevented much movement, and any was dangerous, but I turned my head side to side, just slightly, a pitiful, unacceptable range. Fat tears rolled down my face like marbles. I begged them all, no, no, no, please no. “Hold him, hold him still,” the doctor said. Nurses gripped my head on either side. From a sterile pack, the doctor fished out a long transparent tube and dabbed its head in a clear lubricant. He paused almost as if to warn me but then said nothing.

#### The 1ACs belief of a better future is tied to rehabilitation where the signifier of the Child is placed forward which deems the disabled child a threat to society and is thus eradicated from the political.

Mollow 2 [The Disability Drive by Anna Mollow A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in English in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Kent Puckett, Chair Professor Celeste G. Langan Professor Melinda Y. Chen Spring 2015 // WHSRS and Lex VM]

“Let us begin our reexamination of Tiny Tim with a discussion of No Future, a text in which Tiny Tim takes a prominent position. No Future is a text with a target: the book takes aim at “the Child whose innocence solicits our defense,” a trope that Edelman names as the emblem of an ideology that he terms “reproductive futurism” (2). According to Edelman, commonplace cultural invocations of the figure of the Child (“not to be confused with the lived experiences of any historical children”) uphold “the absolute privilege of heteronormativity” (11, 2). Defying pronatalist social imperatives, Edelman names queerness as “the side of those not fighting for the children‟” (3) and urges queers to accept the culture‟s projection of the death drive onto us by saying explicitly what Law and the Pope and the whole of the Symbolic order for which they stand hear anyway in each and every expression or manifestation of queer sexuality: Fuck the social order and the Child in whose name we‟re collectively terrorized; fuck Annie; fuck the waif from Les Mis; fuck the poor, innocent kid on the Net; fuck Laws both with capital ls and with small; fuck the whole network of Symbolic relations and the future that serves as its prop. (No Future 29) Elsewhere, I have argued that No Future‟s impassioned polemic is one that disability studies might take to heart. Indeed, the figure that Edelman calls “the disciplinary image of the ‘innocent’ Child” is inextricable not only from queerness but also from disability (19). For example, the Child is the centerpiece of the telethon, a ritual display of pity that demeans disabled people. When Jerry Lewis counters disability activists‟ objections to his assertion that a disabled person is “half a person,” he insists that he is only fighting for the Children: “Please, I’m begging for survival. I want my kids alive,” he implores (in Johnson, Too Late 53, 58). If the Child makes an excellent alibi for ableism, perhaps this is because, as Edelman points out, the idea of not fighting for this figure is unthinkable. Thus, when Harriet McBryde Johnson hands out leaflets protesting the Muscular Dystrophy Association, a confused passerby cannot make sense of what her protest is about. “You‟re against Jerry Lewis!” he exclaims (61). The passerby’s surprise is likely informed by a logic similar to that which, in Edelman‟s analysis, undergirds the use of the word “choice” by advocates of legal abortion: “Who would, after all, come out for abortion or stand against reproduction, against futurity, and so against life?” (16). Similarly, why would anyone come out for disability, and so against the Child who, without a cure, might never walk, might never lead a normal life, might not even have a future at all? The logic of the telethon, in other words, relies on an ideology that might be defined as “rehabilitative futurism,” a term that I coin to overlap and intersect with Edelman‟s notion of “reproductive futurism.” If, as Edelman maintains, the future is envisaged in terms of a fantasmatic “Child,” then the survival of this future-figured-as-Child is threatened by both queerness and disability. Futurity is habitually imagined in terms that fantasize the eradication of disability: a recovery of a “crippled” or “hobbled” economy, a cure for society’s ills, an end to suffering and disease. Eugenic ideologies are also grounded in both reproductive and rehabilitative futurism: procreation by the fit and elimination of the disabled, eugenicists promised, would bring forth a better future.” (68-69)

#### International norm setting furthers norms of geo-disability through embracing localized ableist perceptions to evade the question of disabled death and place it as an outlaw ontology – only the alt is key to terminal solvency

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**Relations of power** in the new millennium **are marked as an era of deterritorialisation** and re-territorialisation. It is uncertain whether ‘globalisation’ assists in the circulation of diversity or inhibits diversity through the **normalisation of systems of exchange** and recognition.1 Along with binding multilateral treaties, the world is beset by legislative, regulatory and ideoscaped convergence. The denotation and delimitation of that which is **named ‘disabled/disability’ has not escaped these capillarious relations** and indeed the pressure is on to promote international disability norms and classification mapping. Critical disability studies have shown that not only does disability have a history but it also has a context.2 The very reckoning of certain impairments as impairments, let alone representation as disabilities, has changed over time and is geographically as well as culturally contingent. Since the Enlightenment genealogies of disablement point to certain historical continuities in the marking of aberrant bodies constituted as governmental rationalities (motivating discourses) that inform the practices of Fiona Kumari Campbell is at Griffith Law School, Griffith University, Southport, Queensland, Australia. Email: Fiona.Campbell@griffith.edu.au. Third World Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 8, 2011, pp 1455–1474 ISSN 0143-6597 print/ISSN 1360-2241 online/11/081455–20 2011 Southseries Inc., www.thirdworldquarterly.com http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2011.604518 1455 Downloaded by [McGill University Library] at 18:14 07 October 2014 governing disability. **A hegemonic governmental rationality** of impairment **in Western thought postures a belief in disability as inherently negative and thus an outlaw ontology**. I argue that the United Nations **norm standard setting as a form of geodisability** of knowledge delimits **and denotes the kinds of bodies known as disabled and that this epistemic culture of knowledge production reins in** and thus controls anomalous, disabled bodies. The disabled body is figured as an outlaw ontology which nuisances the seamless flow and ordering of universal human organisation. International norms have an effect of reining in renegade nation-states. In this paper a discussion of geodisability knowledge production in the form of international standard setting is pursued within the context of a Sri Lankan case study. Sri Lanka has a population of around 20 926 315 and is a multi-religious society with an estimated 70 per cent of the population being Theravada Buddhist.3 Sri Lanka has recently seen the end of a 25-year terrorist guerrilla insurgency, resulting in large portions of the government budget being spent on defence and a high prevalence of war-induced physical, cognitive and psychological disablement. The body politic of Sri Lanka has been described as having a pathological atmosphere, a culture of terror that is ‘thihaiththupona’, in a state of daze.4 Developments in disability law and policy are produced within this context yet are constrained by ‘geodisability knowledge’, a project that codifies and thus systematises disability. Contentious in literature is the idea of the **pursuit of a universal approach to disability governance** and whether an analysis of such a quest should **occur within the arena of critical discourses of globalisation**. Some writers argue that a focus on globalisation is a distraction from a more pressing concern, that is, the continued eurocentricism of knowledge and the domination of the global North in social policy, law reform and research agenda setting.5 I explore some of these tensions below. To start, I focus on the principal methodological analysis of governmentality and geo-surveillance, highlighting a new application of panopticonism. In section two I move to an elaboration of colonialism and neocolonial effects. Shifting to the micro level I next map impairment (disablement) in the Sri Lankan context. Section four focuses on more macro concerns by exploring what I term ‘imported templates’ of geodisability knowledge that provide interpretative frameworks for overseas aid guidelines, and ultimately shape the very conceptualisation of what is meant by disablement. The paper concludes with a proposal to indigenise critical disability studies (CDS) and contains a discussion of the challenges of education for CDS in an environment where a critical mass of home-grown scholarship is largely absent. I argue that education is a key to re-founding Sri Lankan approaches to disability

#### Scenario planning excludes disability from its scope. When the disabled object engages in simulations it contemplates what it means to be disabled and abled forcing it to imagine rehabilitative futures which requires crip death

Campbell 08 (Dr Fiona Kumari Campbellis a Senior Lecturer in the School of Health and Wellbeing at the University of South Queensland http://www98.griffith.edu.au/dspace/bitstream/handle/10072/21024/50540\_1.pdf “Exploring Internalized Ableism using Critical Race Theory” Disability and Society, Vol. 23 (2), p. 151-162) //Lex VM

Internalized oppression is not the cause of our mistreatment; it is the result of our mistreatment. It would not exist without the real external oppression that forms the social climate in which we exist. Once oppression has been internalized, little force is needed to keep us submissive. We harbour inside ourselves the pain and the memories, the fears and the confusions, the negative self-images and the low expectations, turning them into weapons with which to re-injure ourselves, every day of our lives. (Mason, as cited Marks, 1999, p.25). Internalised ableism means that to assimilate into the norm the referentially disabled individual is required to embrace, indeed to assume an ‘identity’ other than one’s own – and this subject is repeatedly reminded by epistemological formations and individuals with hegemonic subjectifications of their provisional and (real) identity. I am not implying that subjects have a true or real essence. Indeed the subjects' formation is in a constant state of fluidity, multiplicity and (re)formation. However, disabled people often feel compelled to fabricate ‘who’ they are – to adopt postures and comportments that are additional to self. The formation of internalised ableism cannot be simply deduced by assessing the responses of individuals to Althusser’s famous interpolative hailing “Hey you, there” (Althusser & Balibar, 1979). Whilst a subject may respond to “Hey you there, crip!” – it is naïve to assume that an affirmative response to this hailing repressively inaugurates negative disabled subjectification. In fact the adoption of more positive or oppositional ontologies of disability by the subject in question may be unexpectedly enabling. As Susan Park (2000: 91) argues “what is at stake here is not so much the accuracy behind the hailing privilege, but the power of the hailing itself to instantly determine (or elide) that thing it is naming”. Nonetheless, censure and the cancellation of the legitimacy of oppositional subjectivities remains common place as Cherney reminds us with respect to Deaf culture: “If abnormal [sic] bodies must be fixed to fit within dominant cultural views of appropriateness then the Deaf celebration of their differences must be read as an illegitimate model of advocacy”. (Cherney, 1999, p. 33). Foucault’s (1976; 1980) theorisation of power as productive may provide some offerings from which to build a conversation about internalised ableism. I am not so much interested in the ‘external’ effects of that power, but for the moment wish to concentrate on what Judith Butler aptly refers to as the ‘psychic life’ of power. She describes this dimension: … an account of subjection, it seems, must be traced in the turns of psychic life. More specifically, it must be traced in the peculiar turning of a subject against itself that takes place in acts of self-reproach, conscience, and melancholia that work in tandem with processes of social regulation (Butler, 1997b, p.19). In other words, the processes of subject formation cannot be separated from the subject him/herself who is brought into being though those very subjectifying processes. The consequences of taking into oneself negative subjectivities not only regulate and continually form identity (the disabled citizen) but can transcend and surpass the strictures of ableist authorizations. Judith Butler describes this process of the “carrying of a mnemic trace”: One need only consider the way in which the history of having been called an injurious name is embodied, how the words enter the limbs, craft the gesture, bend the spine …how these slurs accumulate over time, dissimulating their history, taking on the semblance of the natural, configuring and restricting the doxa that counts as “reality”. (Butler, 1997b, p. 159) The work of Williams and Williams-Morris (2000) links racism experienced by African Americans to the effects of hurtful words and negative cultural symbols on mental health, especially when marginalized groups embrace negative societal beliefs about themselves. They cite an international study by Fischer et al (1996) which inter alia links poor academic performance with poor social status. Although using different disciplinary language Wolfensberger (1972) in his seven core themes of SRV, identified role circularity as a significant obstacle to be overcome by disabled people wanting socially valued roles. Philosopher Linda Purdy contends it is important to resist conflating disability with the disabled person. She writes My disability is not me, no matter how much it may affect my choices. With this point firmly in mind, it should be possible mentally to separate my existences from the existence of my disability. (Purdy, 1996, p. 68). The problem with Purdy’s conclusion is that it is psychically untenable, not only because it is posited around a type of Cartesian dualism that simply separates being-ness from embodiment, but also because this kind of reasoning disregards the dynamics of subjectivity formation to which Butler (1997a; 1997b) has referred. Whilst the ‘outputs’ of subjectivity are variable the experience of impairment within an ableist context can and does effect formation of self – in other words ‘disability is me’, but that ‘me’ does not need to be enfleshed with negative ontologies of subjectivity. Purdy’s bodily detachment appears locked into a loop that is filled with internalised ableism, a state with negative views of impairment, from which the only escape is disembodiment; the penalty of denial is a flight from her body. This finds agreement in the reasoning of Jean Baudrillard (1983) who posits that it is the simulation, the appearance (representation) that matters. The subject simulates what it is to be ‘disabled’ and by inference ‘abled’ and whilst morphing ableist imperatives, in effect performs a new hyper reality of be-ing disabled. By unwittingly performing ableism disabled people become complicit in their own demise – reinforcing impairment as an outlaw ontology.

#### The alternative is to analyze the disability drive — it comes to terms with the existence of the drive and shatters the fantasy of the ego. Anything else only displaces the lack onto other oppressed groups. The ROTB is to question ideological optimism in the classroom.

Mollow 3 [The Disability Drive by Anna Mollow A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in English in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Kent Puckett, Chair Professor Celeste G. Langan Professor Melinda Y. Chen Spring 2015. Anna Mollow received her Ph.D. in 2015 from the University of California, Berkeley, where she was an Andrew Vincent White and Florence Wales White Scholar and a UC Dissertation-Year Fellow. She is the coeditor, with Robert McRuer, of Sex and Disability (Duke UP, 2012) and the coeditor, with Merri Lisa Johnson, of DSM-CRIP (Social Text Online, 2013). Anna has published numerous articles on disability, queerness, feminism, race, and fatness. Her essays have appeared, or are forthcoming, in African American Review, Body Politics: Zeitschrift für Körpergeschichte, Hypatia: Journal of Feminist Philosophy, The Journal of Literary and Cultural Disability Studies, WSQ: Women’s Studies Quarterly, MELUS: Multi-Ethnic Literature of the United States, The Disability Studies Reader, Michigan Quarterly Review, the Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Critical and Cultural Theory, Disability Studies Quarterly, Bitch: Feminist Response to Pop Culture, Autostraddle, Everyday Feminism, and Huffington Post.] //Lex VM

Questions about activism press us further, too. In using the lenses of psychoanalysis and literary theory to delineate aspects of the cultural politics of disability, I have not laid out a guideline or program for resisting ableist social structures. I have sought instead to show how developing an understanding of the disability drive—and, in particular, attending to the violences that result from individuals‟ and cultures‟ misrecognitions of the drive—may facilitate transformations in how we conceive of our subjectivities. Such transformations, deeply indebted to the feminist maxim that the personal is political, are not individual solutions akin to the overcoming narrative. Rather, by changing how we understand our “insides,” we may contribute to changing the ways that, “outside,” on the level of the social, we relate to each other. As we saw in Chapter 4, something as seemingly personal as an individual‟s “relationship to food” can raise vexing questions that, when we deny that within ourselves that drives these questions, become the basis of damaging social structures of fatphobia, racism, classism, misogyny, and anti-queer prejudice. If the drive won‟t stop doing us, is it possible that we can allow it to do us differently? In the last paragraph of this dissertation, on the day that it is due, I feel as if I should leave you with a message to take home: perhaps a user‟s guide to the drive, a method for learning to love this thing that won‟t leave us. If I were a queer antisocial theorist, I might propose that we shout out, loud and proud, something like this: “We‟re here! We‟re queer! We are the drive! And you‟ll never get used to us!” But such a call, we saw in Chapter 1, performs a fantasy of overcoming the drive by identifying with it (if you can‟t beat it, join it); and the drive is not a force that can be overcome. Were I to articulate my own version of a saying evoking the feeling of the drive, it would go more like this: “Come on; we‟re late; let‟s go—oh no, where are my keys!?” To be clear, I am the last person who should offer advice about handling the loss of one‟s keys. I know the recommendations—stay calm; breathe; retrace your steps—but rarely do I heed them. For me, it‟s closer to: Panic! Berate self! Look for someone to blame! I have no guide for getting over this set of reactions, but I do want to say this: “The Disability Drive” has been an invitation to think collectively about the ways that, when we feel we cannot bear the psychic or social equivalents of losing our keys (keys potentially serving as metaphors for other objects, the loss of which might be more devastating), the impetus to blame someone else can harden into a fixed idea, a truth that one refuses to relinquish. We have analyzed multiple examples of this process: fat people stigmatized as “compulsive eaters,” feminists caricatured as anti-sex identitarians, and chronically ill people dismissed as “hysterical.” If this dissertation has a moral, it is this: the intolerable feeling that arises when we lose keys, control, or other objects that we think we need in order to believe in our selves, originates not from outside us but from within. This is the drive: it always has its keys in hand. We are not done with the drive.

### Case

#### Now do not let them weigh case – 3 answers –

#### [1] Perm solves – comparative worlds can be true in OTHER instances but if we prove their rhetoric is invested in ableist communicative manners you should bracket out substance.

#### [2] Link turns and de-links DEFINITELY solve because you can gain offense against the K off the link debate or you can de-link and collapse to the aff leaving the K with a floating alternative

#### [3] Dialogue turn – there’s infinite consequences based upon plan as a cause can have endless effects, their will to set neg ground based on hypotheticals is an attempt at negotiation the least change since it centers stasis upon WHAT debate is rather than should be – disabled liberation is a continuous project – the name of good intentions cements abled complacency.

#### [1] That’s a Link – their focus on pleasure is in reality a momentary investment into the jouissance of the drive to understand the real which translates itself into the disability drive as the subject rejects itself in asylum without being able to make any change

#### [2] Independently drop them for reading utilitarianism it is an unsafe philosophy that normalizes repugnant conclusions. Safety is prima facie because we concede to the validity of safety when not we are scared of our bodily security to debate in this round.

#### [A] Util dehumanizes disability and the curing of secondary pity to increase the disabled’s “welfare”

Stein 01 Mark is the author of Distributive Justice and Disability: Utilitarianism against Egalitarianism (Yale University Press, 2006) [Stein, Mark S. “Utilitarianism and the Disabled: Distribution of Life.” Social Theory and Practice, vol. 27, no. 4, 2001, pp. 561–578. JSTOR, [www.jstor.org/stable/23559190. Accessed 23 Nov. 2020](http://www.jstor.org/stable/23559190.%20Accessed%2023%20Nov.%202020).] //Lex AKo

**If the disabled have on average less welfare** than nondisabled people, it seems to follow that the disabled benefit less from continued life than do nondisabled people. **Utilitarianism would therefore place a lower value on disabled life** than on nondisabled life, and if a choice had to be made between saving the lives of disabled people and saving the lives of nondisabled people, utilitarianism would counsel us **to give less preference to the disabled**. So, for example, disabled people would receive less preference, in the distribution of life-saving organ transplants, than nondisabled people. Moreover, the utilitarian preference against disabled people in the distribution of life would appear to be exactly **proportional to the** utili tarian **preference in** favor of disabled people in the **distribution of resources**. However morally urgent it might be to cure a given disabled person, increasing her welfare, it would seem that the same moral ur gency must attach to a decision to preserve the life of a nondisabled person in preference to that disabled person, assuming that only one of them 13Mark Stein, "Utilitarianism and the Disabled: Distribution of Resources," Bioethics 16 (2002), forthcoming. 14See ibid.

#### -burns is another Link. Future Generation is exactly the planning that has been used to justify eugenics I.E look at Bostrom with Transhumanism

#### [1] [subpoint] and extinction – this is totally irrelevant because we read a fiat K which means you can’t weigh hypotheticals BUT even if you intervene and let them.

#### [2] VTL is non unique for disabled folk who are antagonism to civil society that produce able-bodiness. ONLY this leap in the name of preventing future eradication can risk clearing the grounds for future generations of disabled life their project is parasitic because it furthers the occupation of abled bodies at the expense of disabled folk – that’s Mollow.

#### [2] Justifying extinction first is an independent voter –

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Callahan 73 Daniel Callahan, Fellow at the Institute of Society and Ethics, 1973 The Tyranny of Survival, Pages 91-93) SJCP//JG

The value of survival could not be so readily abused were it not for its evocative power. But abused it has been. In the name of survival, all manner of social and political evils have been committed against the rights of individuals, including the right to life. The purported threat of Communist domination has for over two decades, fueled the drive of militarists for ever-larger defense budgets, no matter what the cost to other social needs. During World War II, native Japanese Americans were herded, without due process of law, into detention camps. This policy was later upheld by the Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United States (1944) in a general consensus that a threat to national security can justify acts otherwise blatantly unjustifiable. The survival of the Aryan race was one of the official legitimizations of Nazism. Under the banner of survival, the government of South Africa imposed a ruthless apartheid, heedless of the most elementary human rights. The Vietnamese war has been one of the greatest of the many absurdities tolerated in the name of survival, the destruction of villages in order to save them. But it is not only in a political setting that survival has been evokes as a final and unarguable value. The main rationale B.F. Skinner offers in Beyond Freedom and Dignity for the controlled and conditioned society is the need for survival. For Jaques Monod, in Chance and Necessity, survival requires that we overthrow almost all known religious, ethical, and political system.

#### Extinction outweighs sets the bar too low and relate to lenient attitudes toward moral transgressions

**Kahane et al 15** (Guy Kahane, Jim A.C. Everett, Brian D. Earp, Miguel Farias, and Julian Savulescu, \*Director of Studies at the Oxford Uehiro Centre, \*\*Assistant Professor at the University of Kent and Research Associate at the Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics at the University of Oxford, \*\*\*Associate Director of the Yale-Hastings Program in Ethics and Health Policy at Yale University and The Hastings Center, \*\*\*\*Joined Coventry University to lead the Brain Belief and Behaviour research group, \*\*\*\*\*Uehiro Professor of Practical Ethics at the University of Oxford, January 2015, accessed on 10-31-2020, Cognition, "‘Utilitarian’ judgments in sacrificial moral dilemmas do not reflect impartial concern for the greater good", <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4259516/>) \*I don’t endorse ableist rhetoric //Lex Dy

A great deal of recent research has focused on hypothetical moral dilemmas in which one person needs to be sacrificed in order to save the lives of a greater number. It is widely assumed that these far-fetched sacrificial scenarios can shed new light on the fundamental opposition between utilitarian and non-utilitarian approaches to ethics (Greene, 2008; Greene et al., 2004; Singer, 2005). However, such sacrificial dilemmas are merely one context in which utilitarian considerations happen to conflict with opposing moral views (Kahane & Shackel, 2010). To the extent that ‘utilitarian’ judgments in sacrificial dilemmas express concern for the greater good—that is, the utilitarian aim of impartially maximizing aggregate welfare—then we would expect such judgments to be associated with judgments and attitudes that clearly express such concern in other moral contexts. The set of studies presented here directly tested this prediction by investigating the relationship between so-called ‘utilitarian’ judgments in classical sacrificial dilemmas and a genuine impartial concern for the greater good. Across four experiments employing a wide range of measures and investigations of attitudes, behavior and moral judgments, we repeatedly found that this prediction was not borne out: a tendency to endorse the violent sacrifice of one person in order to save a greater number was not (or even negatively) associated with paradigmatic markers of utilitarian concern for the greater good. These included identification with humanity as a whole; donation to charities that help people in need in other countries; judgments about our moral obligations to help children in need in developing countries, and to prevent animal suffering and harm to future generations; and an impartial approach to morality that does not privilege the interests of oneself, one’s family, or one’s country over the greater good. This lack of association remained even when the utilitarian justification for such views was made explicit and unequivocal. By contrast, many (though not all) of these markers of concern for the greater good were inter-correlated. In fact, responses designated as ‘utilitarian’ in the current literature were strongly associated with traits, attitudes and moral judgments (primary psychopathy, rational egoism, and a lenient attitude toward clear moral transgressions) that are diametrically opposed to the impartial concern for the greater good that is at the heart of utilitarian ethics. While prior studies have already associated ‘utilitarian’ judgment with antisocial traits (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011; Glenn et al., 2010; Koenigs et al., 2012; Wiech et al., 2013), here we show that such judgments are also tied to explicit amoral and self-centered judgments. Moreover, while these further associations were largely driven by antisocial tendencies, some (such as the more lenient attitude toward clear moral transgressions) were present even when we controlled for these antisocial traits.

**Javorsky 18- Who is we. The disabled are constaly exclude from these conversations.**

**Mahnken and Junio 13- Political is not inherently a good thing. Repeatly the poltical has been one that excludes disability**

#### [1] The State becomes inevitable when we can’t question it – the only way we can create change and rupture the system is by demanding the impossible. Pragmatic considerations sacrifice the power to pose the question – only a refusal to compromise can effectively confront the structural horror of civil society

#### [2] this justifies comparative worlds which the neg functions under – our alternative is a “scenario” that can be analyzed

#### [3] That doesn’t assume ableist rhetoric tied to their scenario planning that internalizes ableism and quote student activism.

# Acessiable formating

### 1

#### The desire to fill the insatiable lack creates experiences of impairment that structures the disability drive. The drive is tied up with primary pity which reflects disability upon the ego threatening its ability status – which invokes secondary pity to overcorrect for the shattered-ego necessitating disabled death.

Mollow 15

primary pity entails a mixing up of self and other such that the ego belong to “someone else,” This affective response can feel unbearable because it involves a drive toward disability which menaces the ego‟s investments in health, and control to contemplate another person‟s suffering is to question, “Could this happen to me?” Secondary pity attempts to heal primary pity and defend the ego at someone else‟s expense. secondary pity encompasses charity, tears, and calls for a cure. these affects enlarge the ego of the pitier primary pity is so unsettling that We have been driven to lock people in institutions, to stare, to punish, and sentimentalize in not acknowledging that pity Because primary pity is tied up with the disability drive it must be unrepresentable

#### The 1ACs belief of a better future is tied to rehabilitation where the signifier of the Child is placed forward which deems the disabled child a threat to society and is thus eradicated from the political.

Mollow 2 [

the image of the Child” is inextricable from disability the Child is a ritual display of pity that demeans disabled people. the Child makes an excellent alibi for ableism because the idea of not fighting is unthinkable. Who would stand against futurity, and life why would anyone come out against the Child who, without a cure, might never have a future The logic relies on “rehabilitative futurism,” is envisaged in terms of a fantasmatic “Child,” that eradication of disability: a recovery of a “hobbled” economy

#### International norm setting furthers norms of geo-disability through embracing localized ableist perceptions to evade the question of disabled death and place it as an outlaw ontology – only the alt is key to terminal solvency

Campbell 11

**Relations of power** **are marked as** **deterritorialisation** **of exchange** **disability’ has not escaped these** **relations** reckoning disabilities, has changed Since the Enlightenment disablement point in aberrant bodies as governmental rationalities that **postures** **disability as** **an outlaw ontolog** **norm** which nuisances the seamless flow of human organisation Developments in policy are produced within this context systematises disability **pursuit of** **universal** **governance** should **occur within** **critical discourses**

#### Scenario planning excludes disability from its scope. When the disabled object engages in simulations it contemplates what it means to be disabled and abled forcing it to imagine rehabilitative futures which requires crip death

Campbell 08 (

Internalized oppression is the cause of our mistreatment We harbour pain memories fears and confusions turning them into weapons which re-injure ourselves Internalised ableism means to assimilate into the norm to assume an ‘identity’ other than one’s own to separate my existences from my disability is untenable bodily detachment appears locked in internalised ableism simulation matters. The subject simulates what it is to be ‘disabled’ and ‘abled’ and whilst morphing ableist imperatives performs a new reality of be-ing disabled disabled people become complicit in their own demise – reinforcing impairment as ontology.

#### The alternative is to analyze the disability drive — it comes to terms with the existence of the drive and shatters the fantasy of the ego. Anything else only displaces the lack onto other oppressed groups. The ROTB is to question ideological optimism in the classroom.

Mollow 3

I have laid out a program for developing an understanding of the drive and violences from misrecognitions facilitate how we conceive subjectivities changing our “insides,” chang ways that, “outside,” relate We are the drive! performs a fantasy of overcoming the drive it would go like where are my keys!?” Look for someone to blame! no getting over this but think the psychic equivalent of losing keys the impetus to blame someone else ill people dismissed as “hysterical the intolerable feeling that arises when we lose keys originates from within the drive always has its keys in hand

### Case

#### Now do not let them weigh case – 3 answers –

#### [1] Perm solves – comparative worlds can be true in OTHER instances but if we prove their rhetoric is invested in ableist communicative manners you should bracket out substance.

#### [2] Link turns and de-links DEFINITELY solve because you can gain offense against the K off the link debate or you can de-link and collapse to the aff leaving the K with a floating alternative

#### [3] Dialogue turn – there’s infinite consequences based upon plan as a cause can have endless effects, their will to set neg ground based on hypotheticals is an attempt at negotiation the least change since it centers stasis upon WHAT debate is rather than should be – disabled liberation is a continuous project – the name of good intentions cements abled complacency.

**[1] Case one they don’t provide a clear FW out of the 1ac. This means that it’s impossible for me to weigh case**

#### [2] Independently drop them for reading utilitarianism it is an unsafe philosophy that normalizes repugnant conclusions. Safety is prima facie because we concede to the validity of safety when not we are scared of our bodily security to debate in this round.

#### [A] Util dehumanizes disability and the curing of secondary pity to increase the disabled’s “welfare”

Stein 01

**If** **disabled have** **less welfare** it seems the disabled benefit less from life **Utili** **would** **place** **lower value on disabled life** **proportional to the** **preference in** **distribution of resources** to cure a disabled person, increasing welfare

#### -burns is another Link. Future Generation is exactly the planning that has been used to justify eugenics I.E look at Bostrom with Transhumanism

#### [1] [subpoint] and extinction – this is totally irrelevant because we read a fiat K which means you can’t weigh hypotheticals BUT even if you intervene and let them.

#### [2] VTL is non unique for disabled folk who are antagonism to civil society that produce able-bodiness. ONLY this leap in the name of preventing future eradication can risk clearing the grounds for future generations of disabled life their project is parasitic because it furthers the occupation of abled bodies at the expense of disabled folk – that’s Mollow.

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Callahan 73

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**Kahane et al 15**

sacrificial dilemmas are merely one context in which util conflict with moral views studies tested this by investigating the relation between util and genuine concern for the greater good tendency to endorse the sacrifice of one to save a greater number was not (or negatively) associated concern responses designated as ‘utilitarian’ were strongly associated with egoism and lenient attitude toward moral transgressions opposed to the heart of util

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