# **1NC vs Policy aff**

## **K v2**

#### The desire to fill the insatiable lack creates experiences of impairment that structures the disability drive. The drive is tied up with primary pity which reflects disability upon the ego threatening its ability status – which invokes secondary pity to overcorrect for the shattered-ego necessitating disabled death.

**Mollow 15** [The Disability Drive by Anna Mollow A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in English in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Kent Puckett, Chair Professor Celeste G. Langan Professor Melinda Y. Chen Spring 2015 // WHSRS and Lex VM]

A great deal of the pain and pleasure of primary pity center on questions about what, or who, this fallen self is. When most people think about pity, we refer to an affect in which, to adopt Edelman‟s phrase, we purport to “feel for the other.” But as with primary narcissism, in which the self has not yet been constituted, and therefore cannot be said to enter into intersubjective relations with an “other,” **primary pity entails a mixing up of self and other such that the ego, in becoming permeable to pain that may properly belong to “someone else,” is profoundly threatened in its integrity. Primary pity is that intense pain-pleasure complex that is provoked by the image of a suffering other who, it seems momentarily, both is and is not one‟s self. This affective response can feel unbearable, as seen in Siebers‟s formulation: one “cannot bear to look…but also cannot bear not to look.” Primary pity is difficult to bear because it involves a drive toward disability (one cannot bear not to look), which menaces the ego‟s investments in health, pleasure, and control—because to contemplate another person‟s suffering is to confront the question, “Could this happen to me?”** Such a prospect, although frightening, may also be compelling; in this way, primary pity replicates the self-rupturing aspects of sexuality. Indeed, the unbearability of primary pity reflects its coextensiveness with sexuality. Sex, or the Unbearable, a book coauthored by Edelman and by Lauren Berlant, argues that sex “unleashes unbearable contradictions that we nonetheless struggle to bear” (back cover). This claim accords with Freud‟s account of sexuality as a “pleasurable” “unpleasure” that the ego can never fully master or control (Three 49,75). As Leo Bersani puts it in his reading of Freud, “the pleasurable unpleasurable tension of sexual enjoyment occurs when the body‟s „normal‟ range of sensation is exceeded, and when the organization of the self is momentarily disturbed”; thus, “sexuality would be that which is intolerable to the structured self” (Freudian 38). Primary pity is also intolerable to the structured self, because it entails a fascination with the fantasy of a self in a state of disintegration or disablement. Secondary pity is something else, although it cannot wholly be differentiated from primary pity. **Secondary pity attempts to heal primary pity‟s self-rupturing effects by converting primary pity into a feeling that is bearable. As with secondary narcissism, secondary pity involves both an attempt to get back to that ego-shattering state of painfully pleasurable primary pity, and at the same time to defend against that threat to the ego by aggrandizing oneself at someone else‟s expense.** Secondary pity refers to all those ego-bolstering behaviors that most people think of when they talk about pity. Disabled people are all too familiar with these behaviors: the saccharin sympathy, the telethon rituals of “conspicuous contribution,” the insistence that “they” (i.e., nondisabled people) could never endure such suffering. More commonly known in our culture simply as “pity,” **secondary pity encompasses our culture‟s most clichéd reactions to disability: charity, tears, and calls for a cure.** Correlatives of these commonplace manifestations of secondary pity are the obligatory claims that disabled people‟s suffering is “inspiring.” Indeed, the speed with which conventional cultural representations of disability segue from overt expressions of pity to celebrations of “the triumph of the human spirit” highlights the ways in which secondary pity, as a defense against primary pity‟s incursions, reinforces the ego‟s fantasy of sovereignty. Secondary pity, in other words, can be seen as a variation of secondary narcissism: **these affects enlarge the ego of the pitier or the narcissist at the expense of someone else.** But primary pity is not the same as either primary narcissism, secondary narcissism, or secondary pity. Unlike primary narcissism, a feeling that emerges out of a relation to the world in which notions of “self” and “other” do not obtain, primary pity does depend upon the constructs of self and other, although these constructions are unstable and are continually threatening to come undone. Primary pity can thus be envisioned as a threshold category occupying a liminal position between the total denial of the other that is inherent to primary narcissism and the rigid structure of (superior) self and (inferior) other that constitutes secondary narcissism and secondary pity. My concept of primary versus secondary pity also differs from Freud‟s primarysecondary narcissism distinction at the level of genealogy. Like Freud‟s account of primary and secondary narcissisms, my model of primary and secondary pities involves a temporal transition; but whereas Freud imagines the movement from primary to secondary narcissism as a passage from an earlier to a later stage of an individual‟s development, the temporal shift from primary to secondary pity happens much more quickly than this. It happens in an instant: **that moment in which we feel primary pity and then, almost before we can blink, deny that we feel or have felt it**. The denial is understandable: who wants to admit that one gets pleasure from the sight of another person‟s suffering—or, to make matters worse, that this pleasure derives in part from the specter of disability‟s transferability, the possibility that this suffering could be—and, fantasmatically, perhaps already is—an image of one‟s own self undone? Indeed, the model of primary pity that I have been constructing may sound a bit too close to sadism for some people‟s liking. Pity does come close to sadism, and at the same time, to masochism, which Freud theorizes as sadism‟s obverse. In “Mourning and Melancholia,” an essay that can be read as a sequel to “On Narcissism,” Freud approaches a distinction between primary and secondary masochism, which accords with my primary-secondary pity heuristic.122 If the story that I traced in “On Narcissism” could be summarized as “child gets breast; child loses breast; child gets breast back, albeit in a secondary, adulterated form,” the tale that Freud tells about masochism takes much the same form. In this story, subject loves object; subject loses object; and subject tries to get object back by becoming object, that is, by identifying with the object in such a way that object starts to seem—and perhaps in some ways is—part of subject‟s self. This last phase is a dysfunctional and disabling form of identification, Freud makes clear. Subject is still angry at object for having left it, and it takes out that anger on the object that is now part of itself. This is the reason that people suffering from melancholia are so hard on themselves, Freud says; the “diminution in…self-regard” that typically accompanies melancholia results from the subject‟s attacks on the loved-and-lost object that the subject has incorporated into its ego (“Mourning” 246). Freud had not wanted there to be such a thing as primary masochism; for a long time, he had insisted that sadism, or “aggression,” was the primary instinct, and that masochism was only a turning-inward of this originary aggression. But in “Mourning and Melancholia,” although Freud does not yet use the term “primary masochism,” he nonetheless gets at this concept. The problem of suicide, Freud notes in this essay, raises the possibility that the ego “can treat itself as an object” that it wants to destroy (252). When it comes to such an extreme act as suicide, the possibility of carrying “such a purpose through to execution” must, Freud surmises, involve more than a sadistic wish to punish others. Perhaps, then, there is an innate desire to destroy one‟s own self, Freud hypothesizes. If so, this self would not be a single thing: it would be “me” and at the same time, the lost object whose image “I” have internalized. Freud‟s notion of a primary masochism is tied very closely to his conceptualization of the drive. Beyond the Pleasure Principle, the text in which Freud first used the term “death drive,” was published three years after “Mourning and Melancholia.” In the later text, Freud‟s speculations about the death drive lead him to acknowledge that “there might be such a thing as primary masochism” (66). After all, Freud points out, the idea that either sadism or masochism definitively takes precedence over the other does not ultimately make much sense, as “there is no difference in principle between an instinct turning from the object to the ego and its turning from the ego to an object” (66). If sadism and masochism are ultimately indistinguishable obverses of each other, then pity, in both its primary and its secondary forms, would have to be both sadistic and masochistic. This is a deeply troubling possibility, but I suggest that trying to overcome pity will only make matters worse. There are many ways of trying to overcome primary pity, and each one ultimately aggravates the violence of primary pity. One way is the “pitiless” refusal of compassion that Edelman advocates (70). Another is the disability activist “No pity” injunction. A third example is secondary pity, as in the query, commonly addressed to disabled people, “Have you ever thought of killing yourself?”123 In this question, disabled people correctly hear the wish, “I‟d like to kill you.” Indeed, **primary pity is so unsettling that our culture has been driven to “mercifully” kill people in the name of secondary pity. We have also been driven to lock people in institutions, to let them languish on the streets, to stare, to punish, and to sentimentalize—all, I would suggest, in the interest of not owning, not naming, not acknowledging that self-shattering, ego-dissolving, instantaneous and intolerable moment of primary pity. Because primary pity is tied up with the disability drive, it must, like the drive itself, be regarded as unrepresentable. However, I will quote at length from a passage of writing that comes close not only to representing primary pity but also perhaps to producing it.** In his memoir, One More Theory About Happiness, Paul Guest describes an experience that he had in the hospital after sustaining a spinal cord injury when he was twelve years old: My stomach still roiled and it was hard to keep anything down. Late one night, a doctor came to my bedside, leaning over me, his hands knotted together. He seemed vexed, not quite ready to say anything. Used to the look, I waited. And then he began. “The acids in your stomach, Paul, because of everything you‟re going through, it‟s like your body, everything about it, is upset. That‟s why you feel so nauseous all the time. We‟re going to treat that by putting a tube into your nose and down into your stomach, so we can give you medicine, OK?” When he walked away, I felt something begin to give way inside me. Up until then, I‟d faced more misery and indignity than I would have thought possible. I lay there, numb and sick in a diaper, helpless. It was too much to bear, too frightening, a last invasion I could experience and not break, utterly. When he returned with nurses, I was already sobbing. Anyone so limited could hardly fight, but I tried. I tried. The neck collar prevented much movement, and any was dangerous, but I turned my head side to side, just slightly, a pitiful, unacceptable range. Fat tears rolled down my face like marbles. I begged them all, no, no, no, please no. “Hold him, hold him still,” the doctor said. Nurses gripped my head on either side. From a sterile pack, the doctor fished out a long transparent tube and dabbed its head in a clear lubricant. He paused almost as if to warn me but then said nothing.

#### The 1ACs belief of a better future is tied to rehabilitation where the signifier of the Child is placed forward which deems the disabled child a threat to society and is thus eradicated.

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“Let us begin our reexamination of Tiny Tim with a discussion of No Future, a text in which Tiny Tim takes a prominent position. No Future is a text with a target: the book takes aim at “the Child whose innocence solicits our defense,” a trope that Edelman names as the emblem of an ideology that he terms “reproductive futurism” (2). According to Edelman, commonplace cultural invocations of the figure of the Child (“not to be confused with the lived experiences of any historical children”) uphold “the absolute privilege of heteronormativity” (11, 2). Defying pronatalist social imperatives, Edelman names queerness as “the side of those not fighting for the children‟” (3) and urges queers to accept the culture‟s projection of the death drive onto us by saying explicitly what Law and the Pope and the whole of the Symbolic order for which they stand hear anyway in each and every expression or manifestation of queer sexuality: **Fuck the social order and the Child in whose name we‟re collectively terrorized; fuck Annie; fuck the waif from Les Mis; fuck the poor, innocent kid on the Net; fuck Laws both with capital ls and with small; fuck the whole network of Symbolic relations and the future that serves as its prop**. (No Future 29) Elsewhere, I have argued that No Future‟s impassioned polemic is one that disability studies might take to heart. Indeed, the figure that Edelman calls “**the disciplinary image of the ‘innocent’ Child” is inextricable** not only from queerness but also **from disability** (19). **For example, the Child is the centerpiece of the telethon, a ritual display of pity that demeans disabled people.** When **Jerry Lewis counters disability activists‟ objections to his assertion that a disabled person is “half a person,” he insists that he is only fighting for the Children: “Please, I’m begging for survival. I want my kids alive,” he implores** (in Johnson, Too Late 53, 58). If **the Child makes an excellent alibi for ableism, perhaps this is because**, as Edelman points out, **the idea of not fighting for this figure is unthinkable.** Thus, **when Harriet McBryde Johnson hands out leaflets protesting the Muscular Dystrophy Association, a confused passerby cannot make sense of what her protest is about. “You‟re against Jerry Lewis!” he exclaims (61). The passerby’s surprise is likely informed by a logic** similar to that **which**, in Edelman‟s analysis, **undergirds the use of the word “choice” by advocates of legal abortion: “Who would, after all, come out for abortion or stand against reproduction, against futurity, and so against life?”** (16). Similarly, **why would anyone come out for disability, and so against the Child who, without a cure, might never walk, might never lead a normal life, might not even have a future at all? The logic** of the telethon, in other words, **relies on an ideology that might be defined as “rehabilitative futurism,”** a term that I coin to overlap and intersect with Edelman‟s notion of “reproductive futurism.” If, as Edelman maintains, **the future is envisaged in terms of a fantasmatic “Child,” then the survival of this future-figured-as-Child is threatened by** both queerness and **disability**. **Futurity is habitually imagined in terms that fantasize the eradication of disability: a recovery of a “crippled” or “hobbled” economy, a cure for society’s ills, an end to suffering and disease. Eugenic ideologies are also grounded in both reproductive and rehabilitative futurism: procreation by the fit and elimination of the disabled, eugenicists promised, would bring forth a better future.” (68-69)**

#### The only ethical alternative is to affirm crippessimism – only a refusal of the world can disrupt the current notion of optimism. Thus, the role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best disrupts notions of progress within civil society. If we win the starting point is ableist they cannot weigh the consequence of it.

**Selck 16** [Selck, Michael L. "Crip Pessimism: The Language of Dis/ability and the Culture that Isn't." (Jan 2016) // WHSRS and Lex VM]

“**The** disabled are dying and with them **dis/abled culture is being eradicated**. In the time between formulating this project and its completion already too many disabled souls have been taken from this world, including pivotal disability studies influences for this research. I barely had enough time to mourn the loss of disability advocate and inspiration porn critic Stella Young before grieving the loss of disability studies exemplar Tobin Siebers. Attached to the grief I feel as a result of the fading disability studies community is the perpetual grief I harbor since my disabled Father’s suicide and in turn the grief concomitant to the claiming of a disabled identity. I choose to start out this project with grief because it communicates the tenor of this research; this is not the disability studies project of inspiration or utopia. My entry point to the **disability** studies dialogue **is riddled with grief, anger, and pain and it is as such that this project plots a course of disability research that attempts to make a space free from the ideological constraints of optimism.** The language surrounding dis/ability is highly political. Entire words, phrases, and identities are stretched between, in, and out of the nexus of dis/ability. The choice, for instance, to include a backslash in the word dis/ability represents for Goodley (2014) a desire to delineate and expand each of the categories in the face of global neoliberalism. My initial research inquired about the impact of dis/abled terms and phrases. I went to interrogate rhetoric like “special education”, “handicapable”, and one of the most glaringly overused insults in the American education system “retard”. The scholarship I was coming up with was plentiful but was for the most part located entirely **outside of intercultural communication programs** like the one I was attending. For the most part the few and far between intercultural communication projects about dis/ability I was able to locate were without modal complexity and didn’t bear semblance to so many of my own experiences. **I was beginning to notice a layer of optimism that has been communicatively imprinted upon the negotiation of dis/abled identity**. The angst started to manifest as I questioned if I was in the correct field or if dis/ability even was ‘cultural’. I felt a very real **cultural erasure of dis/ability in academia** and ultimately that glaring lack of consideration is what **pushed** me to performance studies. I first worked to close the apparent research gap by crafting **a collaborative performance** titled Under the Mantle (UTM), which put dis/ability, communication scholarship, and pessimist philosophy on stage. **The** larger **purpose** of this research report **is to antagonize the erasure of dis/ability from communication studies by** autoethnographically **analyzing the crip-pessimist performance** art project Under The Mantle.” (1-2) This research report will first detail the components of the theoretical work that was drawn on to create UTM. Next I offer a literature review to demonstrate the combination of optimism and neglect dis/ability has undergone in intercultural communication models. Following that section I mark my shift to performance methods as I explain how narrative autoethnography can illuminate cultural misconceptions regarding the dis/abled. In the last sections of this report I offer a textual analysis of the performance UTM and analyze three significant arguments of the instillation before concluding. Contextualizing Critical Dis/Ability Theory Often used interchangeably, critical disability theory (CDT) and critical disability studies (CDS) contest dis/ablism (Goodley, 2011, 2014; Devlin & Pothier, 2006; Hosking, 2008). There are several unique additions made to CDS with every new instantiation. Scholars in European countries and Canada attend to the theory, with United States academics often underrepresented. There are three concurrent themes of CDT that I will synthesize in this section with some dis/ability studies authors claiming there are as many as seven themes of CDT (Hosking, 2008). In the introduction to their edited collection of dis/ability essays, Richard Devlin and Dianne Pothier (2006) present three themes of CDT as, first, to highlight the unequal status to which persons with disabilities are confined; second, to destabilize necessitarian assumptions that reinforce the marginalization of persons with disabilities; and third, to help generate the individual and collective practical agency of persons with disabilities in the struggles for recognition and redistribution. (p. 18, emphasis mine) Already the connections between the CDT and the critical communication paradigm are visible as each respectively forefronts notions of power, privilege, identity, and agency. Outlined in more detail, the first theme of CDT argues that there is systemic micro and macro level discrimination against bodies with disabilities. To some critical communication scholars, this theme might be obvious, but it seldom is when “the resulting exclusion of those who do not fit able-bodied norms may not be noticeable or even intelligible” (Delvin & Pothier, 2006, p. 7). As the bumper sticker on my laptop proudly disclaims, “Not all disabilities are visible,” which necessarily adds a level of nuance and complexity to the way that dis/ability studies attend to the prospect of discrimination and violence. **Often times, “social organization according to able-bodied norms is just taken as natural, normal, inevitable, necessary, even progress” (Delvin & Pothier, 2006, p. 7). It might be true that the lack of collaborative work between critical communication studies and dis/ability studies is because neoliberalism is supremely effective at rebranding marginalized oppression as a marker of its progress**. The implications of this assertion are dire but essential to the basis of crip-pessimism. **Theoretical approaches based in pessimism** and skepticism **are** often **necessary to distinguish the instruments of self destruction that have been mistaken for those of self betterment**. Thus, a key question remains, **what is regarded as progress and to whom does it count? The politics of progress call for the second tenet of CDT, which is a destabilization of neoliberal practices that strip power and agency from bodies with disabilities.** Devlin and Pothier (2006) use the language of “anti-necessitarian” (p. 2), which refers to the efficacy of social organizations and an unflinching skepticism of liberalism. For Shildrick and Price (1999), “disabled bodies call into question the ‘giveness’ of the ‘natural body’ and, instead, posit a corporeality that is fluid in its investments and meanings” (p. 1). Anti-necessitarian logics ask questions that remain innocuous to the critical communication paradigm. Can the architectural proliferation of stairs and multiple levels on buildings be attributed to neoliberalism and active disablism? If stairs seem to focus too exclusively on physical impairments, then what about the sensitivity of the building’s lighting, acoustics, and spatiality? Finally, if neoliberalism fights to protect its grand narrative of progress then is the social exclusion of bodies with disabilities necessary for the day-to-day operation of our globalized world? As Donaldson (2002) posits: “theories of gendered, raced, sexed, classed, and disabled bodies offer us critical languages for ‘denaturalising’ impairment’” (p. 112) at the level of the subjective and inter-subjective. The third theme of CDT is to attend to the agency of bodies with disabilities in the struggle for recognition. One key element of extending agency to the disabled is the use of social experience. Experience is subjective “but experience remains intimately connected to political and social existence, and therefore individuals and societies are capable of learning from their experiences” (Siebers, 2008, p. 82). Though absolutely necessary, it is not enough to write treatises on the oppression of the disabled over time. Academics, theorists, intercultural trainers, and storytellers alike should be aware of the constant risks of representation. Representation and context are at the core of critical disability studies. The notion of agency is as unstable as the notions of dis/ability. **There is no one-size-fits-all human rights based approach that will be suitable to address all disabled experiences, as the theoretical call for crip-pessimism will remind us.** Instead of a universal abstract Rawlsian concept of social justice, CDS “attend(s) to the relational components of dis/ablism” (Goodley, 2011, p. 159). By a Rawlsian concept of social justice I mean a model that relies on distributive justice with utopist equality at its core. Where utopist equality projects highlight human sameness to the point of purity. CDT unavoidably invites a discussion about difference into the folds as postmodern and post-structural thinkers position the self as defined constantly in relation to others. Therein lies the difference between an equality model and a justice model of social identity. Often in the attempt to open up spaces for reconsidering self and other, CDS celebrates disability as a positive identity marker. This essay offers a strong argument of caution that the inclusion of CDS in critical communication studies might rely too heavily on celebrations of disabled identity. Nothing better demonstrates that reliance on celebrating identity than the myriad language choices used to describe a disabled identity including: differently-abled, special needs, person with disability, disabled person, temporarily able-bodied, and others. Often, able- bodied audiences have a tendency to sensationalize the presence of disability in a space that has not traditionally welcomed it. Examples of this are highlighted by the increasingly popular discussion of ‘inspiration porn’ (Young, 2014) and Hollywood’s representation of disability. The tendency is to inspirationalize the disabled for achieving tasks that would not be celebrated if they were accomplished by an unimpaired body. Crossing the street, showing up on time, entering a building by oneself are all tasks profoundly routine to the non-disabled and yet simultaneously cherished as markers of progress for the disabled. **Philosophical pessimism is articulated next as a way to temper the risk of sensationalizing dis/ability**. The theories ultimately fuse together like orchids and wasps to generate the larger theme of crip-pessimism. Philosophical Pessimism Throughout the 19th century pessimism was one of the most popular intellectual and philosophical strains, crossing countries and continents. Authors such as Rousseau, Leopardi, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche overwhelmingly created and lead the spirit of pessimism. Contemporarily however, the word ‘pessimism’ is pejorative and describes a body’s emotional discontent rather than intellectual engagement with the world. Dienstag (2009) writes, “Since pessimism is perceived more as a disposition than as a theory, pessimists are seen primarily as dissenters from whatever the prevailing consensus of their time happens to be, rather than as constituting a continuous alternative” (p. 3). Power is responsible for ontological shifts, and during shifts some populations benefit while others are harmed. The turn in thinking about pessimism from an intellectual position to an emotional state has been particularly gratuitous for bodies with disabilities. **I come to pessimism because of my experience with disability. My anxiety disorder comes with an exteriority of anti-social behavior that has branded me pessimistic. The concern for my anxiety in public situations is often commented on as overly critical, negative, narcissistic, and most often pessimistic. I experience an anxious state of becoming different, and after years of failing to rehabilitate my sameness to able-bodied standards, I have come to a comfort with pessimism.**

## **2**

#### Interpretation: Debaters must put a year and citation for every piece of evidence they read.

#### Violation: The First card in contention 2 is missing both.

#### 1] Evidence ethics – without citations we have no idea whether your evidence is real or if your ust making up good offense to win the debate. They’ll say they cited the same author in another card but that doesn’t check since without the year or title we don’t know where its from. Ev ethics is an indepnedet voter its an academic D-rule and outweighs since if they are lying about ev then they could be lying about there whole case

## **Case**

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### **Link Wall v Delueze**

### **Framework Wall**

#### **[1] Disability Drive Hijack – The disability drive constructs the lack which explains where deleuzian desire comes from and the unchanging affective response to disability through pity. Proves our thesis hijacks yours and comes prior.**

#### **[2] Temporality Link - even if identity is constantly changing it bites into our thesis of temporality. We are all temporally abled and through action we can become disabled through overwhelming affect like when war causes PTSD which we always avoid since embracing disability fundamentally denies our ability to become.**

#### **[3] Productivity Link – Deleuze says the desire to be affective is due to our unconscious strives for productivity, we try to maximize it and construct it which disability fundamentally denies and is seen as unproductive and useless within assemblages.**

#### **[4] Fluidity Link - disability is always static – Affective experiences and actions are always psychologically violent where the becoming abled body forwards the ideology that we must cure the disabled object to give them the ability to become.**

#### **[5] Ego Death Link - trying to express ourselves and become the other through interaction leads to primary pity where we become permeable to the pain of the disabled object by mixing up the self and the other causing a state of ego death which threatens our ability to become which immediately invokes secondary pity where we eliminate and cure disability so we never have to contemplate the thought of not being able to become.**

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#### **[6] Affect theory re-centers an ablebodyminded subject – policing of normative affect is rooted in medicalization of disability.**

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Affect theory draws on and engages many of the same concerns as disability and mad studies, including the complex cultural and clinical legacies of psychoanalytic theory, trauma studies, post-structuralism, posthumanism, and the current transition from the linguistic to the somatic turn, but so far there has been little dialogue between these fields. There is a shared interest in challenging the Cartesian dualism of bodyminds, a strong investment in grappling with the old and new materialisms, and a desire to engage the sciences and philosophy in order to expand our understanding of bodyminds as they are situated within force fields of object relations, social structures, and historically charged yet locally specific political economies. Two of the most prominent intellectual trajectories within contemporary affect theory—those associated with Brian Massumi (via Gilles Deleuze and Baruch Spinoza) and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (via Silvan Tomkins)—theorize terms like virtuality, embodiment, and affect itself through strategic engagements with cognitive science and neuroscience. Though in divergent ways, these theoretical itineraries mobilize insights from the "mind sciences" of recent decades in order to challenge the liberal mythos of the autonomous, willful, and "rational" self.24 Yet the critical uptake of **affect theory has** often unwittingly **reconstituted the body–mind dualism** that disability and mad studies scholarship and activism have productively challenged. For instance, the "return" to the body and its materiality frequently associated with affect theory's much-vaunted efforts to point beyond rational, "intentionalist" models of the subject (often in favor of an emphasis on the "pre-conscious" or "nonconscious" sensations) have too often entirely **skirted the** very problem and **historical contingency of ideas about rational "intentionality"** itself.25 How might these theoretical impasses and oversights be worked through by **centering, instead of a**n implicitly **normative bodymind, the mad** or otherwise **pathologized subject?** /// Additionally, as many of this forum's contributors note, in its attempts to move beyond liberal models of subjectivity and autonomy, affect theory too often overlooks (or **takes for granted**) **the fractured and uneven historical positionalities and experiences of those who were never considered human** and are still not treated as such. In centering "madness," this forum not only turns its attention to those who do not, according to José Esteban Muñoz, "feel quite right within the protocols of normative affect and comportment" but also insists that the policing and pathologization of **normative affect is produced by** historical processes of **racialization, settler colonialism, and heteronormative ablenationalism**.26[End Page 297] Augmenting the invaluable contributions of affect theory to the project of American studies, our contributors approach their various topics of inquiry from a different angle—asking how critical disability and mad studies perspectives compel us to revisit what Lawrence Grossberg describes as affect theory's essential emphasis on "the notion of a gap between what can be rendered meaningful or knowable and what is nevertheless livable."27/// As the contributors to this forum discuss across a diverse range of contexts, the various (often concomitant) processes of medicalization and criminalization through which particular emotional and affective states, experiences, or modes of behavior have been pathologized as "mad" or "mentally ill" call for a scholarly approach that is **as attentive to the politics of affect as it is to** the historically contingent meanings of **madness and disability**. The forum thus features scholarship that troubles the ways in which madness, mental illness, and psychiatric disability have been **studied without consideration for the lived reality of an ablesanist social order**. In grappling with these questions, we have endeavored to address affect theory's lacunae through what the disability studies scholar Jina Kim has termed "crip of color" perspectives and reading practices.28 Indeed, many of the contributors to the forum build on earlier interventions by queer of color critique and critical race theory in order to call attention to the ways in which **affect theory** (and academic projects across disciplines that employ its terms) **has all too often conceptualized** emotions, feelings, and **affects**—and the social relations they index—**in able-bodyminded terms**.29 Through this approach, the forum highlights the historically structuring roles of racial, gendered, and sexual difference within the implicitly **able-bodyminded logics of** liberal (and neoliberal) rationality and its **affect**ive correlates. ///

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#### [7] There are two outcomes of an affective encounter between subjects [1] the successful sensory motor relationship – affect is internalized to produce action, or [2] The Sensory-Motor Break – affect is too intense for the subject to produce action, incapacitating them.

**Barber 16** [Daniel Colucciello Barber "World-Making and Grammatical Impasse" from Project MUSE, JHU, 12-1-2016, https://read.dukeupress.edu/qui-parle/article-abstract/25/1-2/179/10323/World-Making-and-Grammatical-Impasse, DOA:7-25-2020 // WHSRS and Lex VM]

“**Deleuze, when he speaks of the sensory-motor break, refers to the lack of a capacity to establish and maintain a successful link between two moments: the first of** these is the moment **of being affected by** the sensation of the world **(the “sensory”)**, while **the second** of **these is the mo-ment of acting upon or moving within that world (the “motor”). The successful**19 **operation of the sensory-motor link is** therefore **evident insofar as the subject is able to remain active upon or within the world that affects it.** In such a case, the affect caused by the **sensation of the world is able to be integrated into a narrative of action or movement. On the other hand, the sensory-motor break concerns the encounter with an affect that—due to its intensity—undoes the link between the subject and the world.** This break disintegrates the narrative(s) by which action, or any form thereof, is imagined to be adequate to such affection. **That which the subject senses in the world comes to affect the subject with an intensity that outstrips that subject’s capacity to act. The subject is unable to narrate its successful movement within the world by which it is affected; the world is too much for the capacitation implied by action or movement.** Consequently, to think of the world is not to think of a stage of action; it is rather to think of a power—overwhelming and perduring—that binds to inaction. **Deleuze names this subject without action as “the seer”** (c, 170). **The absence of any form of action and the definition of thought as the seer are coeval**: on one hand, it **is because the subject cannot act or move that it finds itself bound to** (a relatively **passive) seeing; on the other, it is because the subject undergoes visions of immeasurable affective intensity that thought—positioned, in its inherited sense, at the site of the subject—is defined without action. Thought, as the seer, is stunned, ~~paralyzed~~, or—following Deleuze’s mention of “a strange fossilization”** (c, 169)—**petrified.** If the successful operation of the sensory-motor link emphasizes a transitive power, then **insistence on the seer emphasizes an intransitive power. Such intransitivity lacks the capacity for action, but it is not a matter of withdrawal from reality. On the contrary, the capacity for action is revealed as inadequate to reality, as something that depends on a denial of reality, whereas intransitivity marks an intensified encounter with such reality. One is a seer, without transit from sensation to action, because one is affected by reality in its essential intensity, its essential breaking.**20  The inherited definition of the subject, or “man”—a name that I will, following Deleuze’s own terminology, henceforth use21—entails a basic capacitation. This capacity stems from a division between man and world. The notion that man has the capacity to act in response to such affection, to transform affection into movement within the world, requires the ultimate independence of man from the world. It is this division that grounds the sensory-motor link: although man is affected by the world, his independence enables him to convert affec- tion toward an action into or onto the world. **The breaking of the sensory-motor link precludes** man, and in do- ing so it precludes **the ground for the possibility of another world.** This is because the possibility of a world other than “this world” (c, 172)—**where “this world” names the world that is sensed and that af- fects here and now**—derives its ground from the independence of man.22 The division between this world and another world, or the transit from the former to the latter, is enabled by the division be- tween man and world: man, due to his division from (this) world, provides a space of action that can produce or discover a (new) world; the independence of man from world—the invocation of an actor that, while intertwined with and affected by the world, is not ultimately defined by this world—provides the ground for transit to another world. **To adhere to the insistence of the sensory-motor break** on the incapacitation of man, on the necessary dismantling of that which presumes to be independent from the world, **is thereby to dismantle the ground of possibility.**” The stakes of such dismantling are stressed and raised by the fact that Deleuze marks the “break in the link between man and the world” (c, 169) according to the intolerable: “The sensory-motor break makes man a seer who finds himself struck by something in- tolerable in the world, and confronted by something unthinkable in thought” (c, 169). **The dismantling of a ground of possibility for another world, then, is furthermore the dismantling of a ground of possibility for a world in which the intolerable will be or would have been superseded. There is only this world, the intolerability of the here and now.** Far from providing a ground for the possibility of escape from this world, man is collapsed into it: “Man is not himself a world other than the one in which he experiences the intolerable and feels himself trapped” (c, 170). To invoke the intolerable is to mark the immeasurability of affect with regard to man, or to thought as action. What is central is that the intolerable is too much for the thought of man—hence the parallel- ism of “something intolerable in the world” and “something unthink- able in thought.” **Intolerability concerns not only the wretchedness of world but also the incapacity of thought—as man, as action—to become adequate to, to truly encounter and articulate, such wretched- ness.** In other words, if there is to be an adequate thought of this reality encountered as wretched, then **there must be a dismantling of thought as man or action. Anything less than such dismantling amounts to the denial and reproduction of the selfsame wretchedness**. This entails the articulation of a thought that is incommensurable with the actor called man. Thought must be articulated without any trace of its inherited definition as that which is possessed by man, or as that by which man exercises his capacity. Yet the weight and perva- sive overdetermination of this inheritance means that the appearance of such an articulation is foreclosed. It is in view of this foreclosure that Deleuze, when invoking a thought incommensurable with in- heritance, resorts to a radically direct negativity: such an incommen- surable thought is defined, quite simply and all the more opaquely, as the unthought. To characterize the unthought in terms of negativity is not to im- ply that the unthought negates thought on the basis of a ground. On the contrary, the negativity here at issue is without ground; it is an ungrounding that proceeds from nowhere. **This ungrounding is a matter of the immanence of the unthought and the intolerable. To be affected by the intolerable, by that which is too much for thought, is simultaneously to be bound to the unthought**; the unthought, then, cannot be divided from the affection marked as the intolerable. Re- fusing any such division, the unthought is immanently bound to the too much of affection; the “un-” of the unthought is entailed by its immanence with immeasurable affect. This immanence of the unthought and the intolerable is irre- ducible to the link between man and the world. The sensory-motor link of man and the world establishes a dynamic of division and in- tertwining, such that **the gap between divided terms** (man and the world) **produces the possibility and production of relationality**. The unthought and the intolerable, however, are immanent to one anoth- er; they cannot be divided from each other in the first place. It is in virtue of this refusal of division that there is no relational possibility: relationality depends on a gap that itself depends on division, and it is precisely this division that unthought-intolerable immanence ut- terly refuses. **Sensory-motor circulation is a matter of (the aspiration toward successful) relationality, or transitive action, whereas breaking is a matter of nonrelationality, or intransitivity.** This is to say that while thought breaks as unthought, and while the world breaks as intol- erable, the thought-world relation does not break as unthought- intolerable relation. The breaking of thought and of world is co- eval with the breaking of the very possibility of (the) relationality (invoked between them); breaking extends not only to the terms of relation (thought and the world) but to relationality itself. Conse- quently, **thought-world relation breaks as nonrelational immanence, as immanence that has no division through which, and thus no ground on which, to circulate. Such negative immanence—indexed by the “un-” (of unthought), the “in-” (of intolerability), the “non-” (of nonrelationality)—is groundless.**

## **Case**

#### **Our ROTB outweighs [against active Desire ROTB]–**

#### **[1] Coopts yours - attempts at stability continues the eugenic project. which proves our alt solves the aff since it**

#### **[2] Cruel hope - the disabled object is locked away in institutions, tortured and eliminated due to their lack of ability. Only our ROTB questions your modes of optimism**

#### **[3] We have proven embracing active desire incapacitates disabled bodies which means our ROTB is the only one that can discuss ableist discourse.**

# **1NC vs Policy Affs v2**

## **K v2**

#### The desire to fill the insatiable lack creates experiences of impairment that structures the disability drive. The drive is tied up with primary pity which reflects disability upon the ego threatening its ability status – which invokes secondary pity to overcorrect for the shattered-ego necessitating disabled death.

**Mollow 15**

primary pity entails a mixing up of self and other such that the ego belong to “someone else,” This affective response can feel unbearable because it involves a drive toward disability which menaces the ego‟s investments in health, and control to contemplate another person‟s suffering is to question, “Could this happen to me?” Secondary pity attempts to heal primary pity and defend the ego at someone else‟s expense. secondary pity encompasses charity, tears, and calls for a cure. these affects enlarge the ego of the pitier primary pity is so unsettling that We have been driven to lock people in institutions, to stare, to punish, and sentimentalize in not acknowledging that pity Because primary pity is tied up with the disability drive it must be

#### The 1ACs belief of a better future is tied to rehabilitation where the signifier of the Child is placed forward which deems the disabled child a threat to society and is thus eradicated.

**Mollow 2**

unrepresentable the image of the Child” is inextricable from disability the Child is a ritual display of pity that demeans disabled people. the Child makes an excellent alibi for ableism because the idea of not fighting is unthinkable. Who would stand against futurity, and life why would anyone come out against the Child who, without a cure, might never have a future The logic relies on “rehabilitative futurism,” is envisaged in terms of a fantasmatic “Child,” that eradication of disability: a recovery of a “hobbled” economy

#### The only ethical alternative is to affirm crippessimism – only a refusal of the world can disrupt the current notion of optimism. Thus, the role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best disrupts notions of progress within civil society. If we win the starting point is ableist they cannot weigh the consequence of it.

**Selck 16**

disability is riddled with pain that attempts to make a space free of optimism The purpose is to antagonize the erasure of dis/ability by analyzing the crip-pessimist neoliberalism is effective at rebranding oppression as progress politics of progress strip agency from bodies with disabilities There is no approach that will address disabled experiences, as the call for crip-pessimism will remind us. after failing to rehabilitate able-bodied standards come to a comfort with pessimism

## **2**

#### Interpretation: Debaters must put a year and citation for every piece of evidence they read.

#### Violation: The First card in contention 2 is missing both.

#### 1] Evidence ethics – without citations we have no idea whether your evidence is real or if your ust making up good offense to win the debate. They’ll say they cited the same author in another card but that doesn’t check since without the year or title we don’t know where its from. Ev ethics is an indepnedet voter its an academic D-rule and outweighs since if they are lying about ev then they could be lying about there whole case

## **Case**

### **Overview**

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### **Framework Wall**

#### **[1] Disability Drive Hijack – The disability drive constructs the lack which explains where deleuzian desire comes from and the unchanging affective response to disability through pity. Proves our thesis hijacks yours and comes prior.**

#### **[2] Temporality Link - even if identity is constantly changing it bites into our thesis of temporality. We are all temporally abled and through action we can become disabled through overwhelming affect like when war causes PTSD which we always avoid since embracing disability fundamentally denies our ability to become.**

#### **[3] Productivity Link – Deleuze says the desire to be affective is due to our unconscious strives for productivity, we try to maximize it and construct it which disability fundamentally denies and is seen as unproductive and useless within assemblages.**

#### **[4] Fluidity Link - disability is always static – Affective experiences and actions are always psychologically violent where the becoming abled body forwards the ideology that we must cure the disabled object to give them the ability to become.**

#### **[5] Ego Death Link - trying to express ourselves and become the other through interaction leads to primary pity where we become permeable to the pain of the disabled object by mixing up the self and the other causing a state of ego death which threatens our ability to become which immediately invokes secondary pity where we eliminate and cure disability so we never have to contemplate the thought of not being able to become.**

#### 

#### **[6] Affect theory re-centers an ablebodyminded subject – policing of normative affect is rooted in medicalization of disability.**

**Aho et. al. 17.**

**affect theory reconstituted the body–mind dualism** and **skirted historical ideas about rational "intentionality"** How might these impasses be worked through by **centering, instead of a** **normative bodymind, the mad** **subject?** in attempts to move beyond liberal subjectivity affect theory **takes for granted**) **the uneven historical positionalities of those who were never considered human** centering "madness,"insists that **normative affect is produced by racialization, colonialism, and ablenationalism**. madness, and disability have been **studied without consideration for the lived reality of an ablesanist social order**. ) **has conceptualized affects** **in able-bodyminded terms**.

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**the sensory-motor break, refers to lack of capacity to maintain affected the sensory-motor link is evident insofar as the subject is active affect** **is integrated into action the sensory-motor break due to its intensity—undoes the link between the subject and the world. The subject is unable to narrate movement the world is too much for capacitation the subject affective intensity that thoughtis defined without action. the capacity for action is inadequate something that depends on denial one is affected by reality in its intensity, The breaking of the sensory-motor link precludes** **another world. “this world” names the world that is sensed and that af- fects here and now**—. **To adhere to the break**, **is to dismantle possibility.**”**. Anything less than dismantling amounts to denial of wretchedness**. **breaking is a matter of nonrelationality,**

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