### 1

#### The desire to fill the insatiable lack creates experiences of impairment that structures the disability drive. The drive is tied up with primary pity which reflects disability upon the ego threatening its ability status – which invokes secondary pity to overcorrect for the shattered-ego necessitating disabled death.

Mollow 15 [The Disability Drive by Anna Mollow A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in English in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Kent Puckett, Chair Professor Celeste G. Langan Professor Melinda Y. Chen Spring 2015 // WHSRS and Lex VM]

A great deal of the pain and pleasure of primary pity center on questions about what, or who, this fallen self is. When most people think about pity, we refer to an affect in which, to adopt Edelman‟s phrase, we purport to “feel for the other.” But as with primary narcissism, in which the self has not yet been constituted, and therefore cannot be said to enter into intersubjective relations with an “other,” primary pity entails a mixing up of self and other such that the ego, in becoming permeable to pain that may properly belong to “someone else,” is profoundly threatened in its integrity. Primary pity is that intense pain-pleasure complex that is provoked by the image of a suffering other who, it seems momentarily, both is and is not one‟s self. This affective response can feel unbearable, as seen in Siebers‟s formulation: one “cannot bear to look…but also cannot bear not to look.” Primary pity is difficult to bear because it involves a drive toward disability (one cannot bear not to look), which menaces the ego‟s investments in health, pleasure, and control—because to contemplate another person‟s suffering is to confront the question, “Could this happen to me?” Such a prospect, although frightening, may also be compelling; in this way, primary pity replicates the self-rupturing aspects of sexuality. Indeed, the unbearability of primary pity reflects its coextensiveness with sexuality. Sex, or the Unbearable, a book coauthored by Edelman and by Lauren Berlant, argues that sex “unleashes unbearable contradictions that we nonetheless struggle to bear” (back cover). This claim accords with Freud‟s account of sexuality as a “pleasurable” “unpleasure” that the ego can never fully master or control (Three 49,75). As Leo Bersani puts it in his reading of Freud, “the pleasurable unpleasurable tension of sexual enjoyment occurs when the body‟s „normal‟ range of sensation is exceeded, and when the organization of the self is momentarily disturbed”; thus, “sexuality would be that which is intolerable to the structured self” (Freudian 38). Primary pity is also intolerable to the structured self, because it entails a fascination with the fantasy of a self in a state of disintegration or disablement. Secondary pity is something else, although it cannot wholly be differentiated from primary pity. Secondary pity attempts to heal primary pity‟s self-rupturing effects by converting primary pity into a feeling that is bearable. As with secondary narcissism, secondary pity involves both an attempt to get back to that ego-shattering state of painfully pleasurable primary pity, and at the same time to defend against that threat to the ego by aggrandizing oneself at someone else‟s expense. Secondary pity refers to all those ego-bolstering behaviors that most people think of when they talk about pity. Disabled people are all too familiar with these behaviors: the saccharin sympathy, the telethon rituals of “conspicuous contribution,” the insistence that “they” (i.e., nondisabled people) could never endure such suffering. More commonly known in our culture simply as “pity,” secondary pity encompasses our culture‟s most clichéd reactions to disability: charity, tears, and calls for a cure. Correlatives of these commonplace manifestations of secondary pity are the obligatory claims that disabled people‟s suffering is “inspiring.” Indeed, the speed with which conventional cultural representations of disability segue from overt expressions of pity to celebrations of “the triumph of the human spirit” highlights the ways in which secondary pity, as a defense against primary pity‟s incursions, reinforces the ego‟s fantasy of sovereignty. Secondary pity, in other words, can be seen as a variation of secondary narcissism: these affects enlarge the ego of the pitier or the narcissist at the expense of someone else. But primary pity is not the same as either primary narcissism, secondary narcissism, or secondary pity. Unlike primary narcissism, a feeling that emerges out of a relation to the world in which notions of “self” and “other” do not obtain, primary pity does depend upon the constructs of self and other, although these constructions are unstable and are continually threatening to come undone. Primary pity can thus be envisioned as a threshold category occupying a liminal position between the total denial of the other that is inherent to primary narcissism and the rigid structure of (superior) self and (inferior) other that constitutes secondary narcissism and secondary pity. My concept of primary versus secondary pity also differs from Freud‟s primarysecondary narcissism distinction at the level of genealogy. Like Freud‟s account of primary and secondary narcissisms, my model of primary and secondary pities involves a temporal transition; but whereas Freud imagines the movement from primary to secondary narcissism as a passage from an earlier to a later stage of an individual‟s development, the temporal shift from primary to secondary pity happens much more quickly than this. It happens in an instant: that moment in which we feel primary pity and then, almost before we can blink, deny that we feel or have felt it. The denial is understandable: who wants to admit that one gets pleasure from the sight of another person‟s suffering—or, to make matters worse, that this pleasure derives in part from the specter of disability‟s transferability, the possibility that this suffering could be—and, fantasmatically, perhaps already is—an image of one‟s own self undone? Indeed, the model of primary pity that I have been constructing may sound a bit too close to sadism for some people‟s liking. Pity does come close to sadism, and at the same time, to masochism, which Freud theorizes as sadism‟s obverse. In “Mourning and Melancholia,” an essay that can be read as a sequel to “On Narcissism,” Freud approaches a distinction between primary and secondary masochism, which accords with my primary-secondary pity heuristic.122 If the story that I traced in “On Narcissism” could be summarized as “child gets breast; child loses breast; child gets breast back, albeit in a secondary, adulterated form,” the tale that Freud tells about masochism takes much the same form. In this story, subject loves object; subject loses object; and subject tries to get object back by becoming object, that is, by identifying with the object in such a way that object starts to seem—and perhaps in some ways is—part of subject‟s self. This last phase is a dysfunctional and disabling form of identification, Freud makes clear. Subject is still angry at object for having left it, and it takes out that anger on the object that is now part of itself. This is the reason that people suffering from melancholia are so hard on themselves, Freud says; the “diminution in…self-regard” that typically accompanies melancholia results from the subject‟s attacks on the loved-and-lost object that the subject has incorporated into its ego (“Mourning” 246). Freud had not wanted there to be such a thing as primary masochism; for a long time, he had insisted that sadism, or “aggression,” was the primary instinct, and that masochism was only a turning-inward of this originary aggression. But in “Mourning and Melancholia,” although Freud does not yet use the term “primary masochism,” he nonetheless gets at this concept. The problem of suicide, Freud notes in this essay, raises the possibility that the ego “can treat itself as an object” that it wants to destroy (252). When it comes to such an extreme act as suicide, the possibility of carrying “such a purpose through to execution” must, Freud surmises, involve more than a sadistic wish to punish others. Perhaps, then, there is an innate desire to destroy one‟s own self, Freud hypothesizes. If so, this self would not be a single thing: it would be “me” and at the same time, the lost object whose image “I” have internalized. Freud‟s notion of a primary masochism is tied very closely to his conceptualization of the drive. Beyond the Pleasure Principle, the text in which Freud first used the term “death drive,” was published three years after “Mourning and Melancholia.” In the later text, Freud‟s speculations about the death drive lead him to acknowledge that “there might be such a thing as primary masochism” (66). After all, Freud points out, the idea that either sadism or masochism definitively takes precedence over the other does not ultimately make much sense, as “there is no difference in principle between an instinct turning from the object to the ego and its turning from the ego to an object” (66). If sadism and masochism are ultimately indistinguishable obverses of each other, then pity, in both its primary and its secondary forms, would have to be both sadistic and masochistic. This is a deeply troubling possibility, but I suggest that trying to overcome pity will only make matters worse. There are many ways of trying to overcome primary pity, and each one ultimately aggravates the violence of primary pity. One way is the “pitiless” refusal of compassion that Edelman advocates (70). Another is the disability activist “No pity” injunction. A third example is secondary pity, as in the query, commonly addressed to disabled people, “Have you ever thought of killing yourself?”123 In this question, disabled people correctly hear the wish, “I‟d like to kill you.” Indeed, primary pity is so unsettling that our culture has been driven to “mercifully” kill people in the name of secondary pity. We have also been driven to lock people in institutions, to let them languish on the streets, to stare, to punish, and to sentimentalize—all, I would suggest, in the interest of not owning, not naming, not acknowledging that self-shattering, ego-dissolving, instantaneous and intolerable moment of primary pity. Because primary pity is tied up with the disability drive, it must, like the drive itself, be regarded as unrepresentable. However, I will quote at length from a passage of writing that comes close not only to representing primary pity but also perhaps to producing it. In his memoir, One More Theory About Happiness, Paul Guest describes an experience that he had in the hospital after sustaining a spinal cord injury when he was twelve years old: My stomach still roiled and it was hard to keep anything down. Late one night, a doctor came to my bedside, leaning over me, his hands knotted together. He seemed vexed, not quite ready to say anything. Used to the look, I waited. And then he began. “The acids in your stomach, Paul, because of everything you‟re going through, it‟s like your body, everything about it, is upset. That‟s why you feel so nauseous all the time. We‟re going to treat that by putting a tube into your nose and down into your stomach, so we can give you medicine, OK?” When he walked away, I felt something begin to give way inside me. Up until then, I‟d faced more misery and indignity than I would have thought possible. I lay there, numb and sick in a diaper, helpless. It was too much to bear, too frightening, a last invasion I could experience and not break, utterly. When he returned with nurses, I was already sobbing. Anyone so limited could hardly fight, but I tried. I tried. The neck collar prevented much movement, and any was dangerous, but I turned my head side to side, just slightly, a pitiful, unacceptable range. Fat tears rolled down my face like marbles. I begged them all, no, no, no, please no. “Hold him, hold him still,” the doctor said. Nurses gripped my head on either side. From a sterile pack, the doctor fished out a long transparent tube and dabbed its head in a clear lubricant. He paused almost as if to warn me but then said nothing.

#### The 1ACs belief of a better future is tied to rehabilitation where the signifier of the Child is placed forward which deems the disabled child a threat to society and is thus eradicated from the political.

Mollow 2 [The Disability Drive by Anna Mollow A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in English in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Kent Puckett, Chair Professor Celeste G. Langan Professor Melinda Y. Chen Spring 2015 // WHSRS and Lex VM]

“Let us begin our reexamination of Tiny Tim with a discussion of No Future, a text in which Tiny Tim takes a prominent position. No Future is a text with a target: the book takes aim at “the Child whose innocence solicits our defense,” a trope that Edelman names as the emblem of an ideology that he terms “reproductive futurism” (2). According to Edelman, commonplace cultural invocations of the figure of the Child (“not to be confused with the lived experiences of any historical children”) uphold “the absolute privilege of heteronormativity” (11, 2). Defying pronatalist social imperatives, Edelman names queerness as “the side of those not fighting for the children‟” (3) and urges queers to accept the culture‟s projection of the death drive onto us by saying explicitly what Law and the Pope and the whole of the Symbolic order for which they stand hear anyway in each and every expression or manifestation of queer sexuality: Fuck the social order and the Child in whose name we‟re collectively terrorized; fuck Annie; fuck the waif from Les Mis; fuck the poor, innocent kid on the Net; fuck Laws both with capital ls and with small; fuck the whole network of Symbolic relations and the future that serves as its prop. (No Future 29) Elsewhere, I have argued that No Future‟s impassioned polemic is one that disability studies might take to heart. Indeed, the figure that Edelman calls “the disciplinary image of the ‘innocent’ Child” is inextricable not only from queerness but also from disability (19). For example, the Child is the centerpiece of the telethon, a ritual display of pity that demeans disabled people. When Jerry Lewis counters disability activists‟ objections to his assertion that a disabled person is “half a person,” he insists that he is only fighting for the Children: “Please, I’m begging for survival. I want my kids alive,” he implores (in Johnson, Too Late 53, 58). If the Child makes an excellent alibi for ableism, perhaps this is because, as Edelman points out, the idea of not fighting for this figure is unthinkable. Thus, when Harriet McBryde Johnson hands out leaflets protesting the Muscular Dystrophy Association, a confused passerby cannot make sense of what her protest is about. “You‟re against Jerry Lewis!” he exclaims (61). The passerby’s surprise is likely informed by a logic similar to that which, in Edelman‟s analysis, undergirds the use of the word “choice” by advocates of legal abortion: “Who would, after all, come out for abortion or stand against reproduction, against futurity, and so against life?” (16). Similarly, why would anyone come out for disability, and so against the Child who, without a cure, might never walk, might never lead a normal life, might not even have a future at all? The logic of the telethon, in other words, relies on an ideology that might be defined as “rehabilitative futurism,” a term that I coin to overlap and intersect with Edelman‟s notion of “reproductive futurism.” If, as Edelman maintains, the future is envisaged in terms of a fantasmatic “Child,” then the survival of this future-figured-as-Child is threatened by both queerness and disability. Futurity is habitually imagined in terms that fantasize the eradication of disability: a recovery of a “crippled” or “hobbled” economy, a cure for society’s ills, an end to suffering and disease. Eugenic ideologies are also grounded in both reproductive and rehabilitative futurism: procreation by the fit and elimination of the disabled, eugenicists promised, would bring forth a better future.” (68-69)

#### Nationalist strategies of hegemony and economics are prefigured by ableist epistemological reduction of the rest of the world.

Soldatic & Biyanwila 06 [Karen and Janaka Graduate School of Education; Organizational and Labour Studies; University of Western Australia, disability and Development: A Critical Southern Standpointon Able-Bodied Masculinity, T ASA Conference 2006, University of Western Australia & Murdoch University, 4-7 December 2006 TASA 2006 Conference Proceedings] //Lex AKo

Authoritarian ethno-nationalism, nature and able-bodied patriarchy **While strengthening conditions for global capital to invest** and operate, the **state’s attempts to gain legitimacy is increasingly based on patriarchal ethno-nationalist strategies**. In contrast to previous closed economy projects, this nationalist **development discourse is committed to market-driven politics**. While there are different versions of this nationalist project, they are **grounded in able-bodied patriarchal constructions of nationhood where the nation is represented as masculine reason**. This depiction of the 8 nation-state as masculine reason excludes wom[x]n from the ‘social’ and ascribes them to ‘nature’. In effect, women are engaged in reproducing the nation, biologically, culturallyas well as symbolically (Yuval-Davis, 1997). By casting the Tsunami as an irrational actof nature, humanity is masculinised while nature is feminised. The **masculinity implied in** patriarchal **ethno-nationalist strategies is an able-bodied masculinity**. The **emphasis on ability relates to how culturally mediated economic activities**, discipline, control, subjugate and reproduce bodies as well as embodiment. The **body is central to the self as a project as well as social status** (Turner, 2001). In effect, the body is shaped by both cultural and material practices. The dominant forms of **masculinity articulated in nationalist projects are an able-bodied masculinity**, which is based on evading the shared frailty of **human beings and the vulnerability as social beings**(Turner. 2001). While the body is “inescapable in the construction of masculinity”, the bodily performance that valorises ability is also related to the de-valuation of the disabled body (Connell, 1995: 56). The **able-bodied masculinity of ethno-nationalist projects overlaps with fascist tendencies** which Connell describes as a “naked assertion of male supremacy” (1995: 193). The **fascist image of masculinity combines disparate dispositions of “unrestrained violence of frontline soldiers”, rationality** (bureaucratic institutionalisation of violence) and ironically, irrationality too (thinking with ‘the blood’,the triumph of the ‘will’) (Connell, 1995:193). In turn, elements of dominance as well astechnical expertise are core features of able-bodied masculinity that subordinate disabledbodies and women.The Southern disabled stand point suggested in this paper emerges from a culturalcritique within the South itself. The dominant representation of nation in terms of able-bodied ethno-nationalist patriarchy is at the heart of this critique. The feminisation of both nation and nature by able-bodied ethno-nationalist patriarchy deploys notions of ‘tradition’ and ‘motherland’ with strategic intent. With women narrowed to their maternaland nurturing function, this representation of women as biological reproducers of thenation is central for the domestication of women while restricting their status as citizens.While relegating women and disabled bodies into the private sphere of the household(Das and Addlakha, 2001; Mohanty, 2002) the patriarchal ethno-nationalist projectsmaintain a masculinised public sphere. Just as a woman’s status as citizen within the 9 public domain is conditioned by the active role of the state constructing relations in theprivate domain, of marriage and the family (Yuval-Davis, 1997), the **citizenship status of disabled bodies are also shaped by similar interventions** (Meekosha and Dowse, 1997).This is even more so for **wom[x]n with disabilities**, who are **regarded as unfit to reproduce the nation** (Das and Addlakha, 2001). In responding to the Tsunami, the ‘**humanity’ of the imperial state merged with able-bodied patriarchal state strategies to separate andevade the inhumanity of** poverty and **war that continue to reproduce disabling structures** and cultures in the South. By contesting the privileged/hegemonic position of theNorthern notions of development, disability, and disasters, the Southern disabledstandpoint is aimed at deepening politics of impairment. Conclusion The **delineation of disability as ‘natural’ and disability caused by war and poverty as ‘cultural’ is a specific value-laden framework**.

#### The alternative is to analyze the disability drive — it comes to terms with the existence of the drive and shatters the fantasy of the ego. Anything else only displaces the lack onto other oppressed groups. The ROTB is to question ideological optimism in the classroom.

Mollow 3 [The Disability Drive by Anna Mollow A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in English in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Kent Puckett, Chair Professor Celeste G. Langan Professor Melinda Y. Chen Spring 2015. Anna Mollow received her Ph.D. in 2015 from the University of California, Berkeley, where she was an Andrew Vincent White and Florence Wales White Scholar and a UC Dissertation-Year Fellow. She is the coeditor, with Robert McRuer, of Sex and Disability (Duke UP, 2012) and the coeditor, with Merri Lisa Johnson, of DSM-CRIP (Social Text Online, 2013). Anna has published numerous articles on disability, queerness, feminism, race, and fatness. Her essays have appeared, or are forthcoming, in African American Review, Body Politics: Zeitschrift für Körpergeschichte, Hypatia: Journal of Feminist Philosophy, The Journal of Literary and Cultural Disability Studies, WSQ: Women’s Studies Quarterly, MELUS: Multi-Ethnic Literature of the United States, The Disability Studies Reader, Michigan Quarterly Review, the Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Critical and Cultural Theory, Disability Studies Quarterly, Bitch: Feminist Response to Pop Culture, Autostraddle, Everyday Feminism, and Huffington Post.] //Lex VM

Questions about activism press us further, too. In using the lenses of psychoanalysis and literary theory to delineate aspects of the cultural politics of disability, I have not laid out a guideline or program for resisting ableist social structures. I have sought instead to show how developing an understanding of the disability drive—and, in particular, attending to the violences that result from individuals‟ and cultures‟ misrecognitions of the drive—may facilitate transformations in how we conceive of our subjectivities. Such transformations, deeply indebted to the feminist maxim that the personal is political, are not individual solutions akin to the overcoming narrative. Rather, by changing how we understand our “insides,” we may contribute to changing the ways that, “outside,” on the level of the social, we relate to each other. As we saw in Chapter 4, something as seemingly personal as an individual‟s “relationship to food” can raise vexing questions that, when we deny that within ourselves that drives these questions, become the basis of damaging social structures of fatphobia, racism, classism, misogyny, and anti-queer prejudice. If the drive won‟t stop doing us, is it possible that we can allow it to do us differently? In the last paragraph of this dissertation, on the day that it is due, I feel as if I should leave you with a message to take home: perhaps a user‟s guide to the drive, a method for learning to love this thing that won‟t leave us. If I were a queer antisocial theorist, I might propose that we shout out, loud and proud, something like this: “We‟re here! We‟re queer! We are the drive! And you‟ll never get used to us!” But such a call, we saw in Chapter 1, performs a fantasy of overcoming the drive by identifying with it (if you can‟t beat it, join it); and the drive is not a force that can be overcome. Were I to articulate my own version of a saying evoking the feeling of the drive, it would go more like this: “Come on; we‟re late; let‟s go—oh no, where are my keys!?” To be clear, I am the last person who should offer advice about handling the loss of one‟s keys. I know the recommendations—stay calm; breathe; retrace your steps—but rarely do I heed them. For me, it‟s closer to: Panic! Berate self! Look for someone to blame! I have no guide for getting over this set of reactions, but I do want to say this: “The Disability Drive” has been an invitation to think collectively about the ways that, when we feel we cannot bear the psychic or social equivalents of losing our keys (keys potentially serving as metaphors for other objects, the loss of which might be more devastating), the impetus to blame someone else can harden into a fixed idea, a truth that one refuses to relinquish. We have analyzed multiple examples of this process: fat people stigmatized as “compulsive eaters,” feminists caricatured as anti-sex identitarians, and chronically ill people dismissed as “hysterical.” If this dissertation has a moral, it is this: the intolerable feeling that arises when we lose keys, control, or other objects that we think we need in order to believe in our selves, originates not from outside us but from within. This is the drive: it always has its keys in hand. We are not done with the drive.

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### Case

#### Now do not let them weigh case – 3 answers –

#### [1] Perm solves – comparative worlds can be true in OTHER instances but if we prove their rhetoric is invested in ableist communicative manners you should bracket out substance.

#### [2] Link turns and de-links DEFINITELY solve because you can gain offense against the K off the link debate or you can de-link and collapse to the aff leaving the K with a floating alternative

#### [3] Dialogue turn – there’s infinite consequences based upon plan as a cause can have endless effects, their will to set neg ground based on hypotheticals is an attempt at negotiation the least change since it centers stasis upon WHAT debate is rather than should be – disabled liberation is a continuous project – the name of good intentions cements abled complacency.

#### [1] Self-sacrificing Actions Objection – Util necessitates self sacrifices because util judges that it is impermissible to devote a more than minimal time to oneself killing your happiness. This guts happiness providing no binding reason for action.

#### [2] Manipulation Objection – Util treats people on their capacity for happiness. People with Anhedonia cannot feel physical happiness which means they are exploitable and executed under util to increase total aggregated pleasure.

#### [3] Naturalistic Fallacy –util is morally incoherent – they have no definition of what constitutes a “good” or “bad” besides pain or pleasure BUT then says pleasure is what constitutes goodness which is tautological. Proves it is unwarranted.

#### [4] Subjective Value Objection - States don’t know what citizens “interests” really are. Citizens have different pleasures based on their own experiences – means states can’t guide action

### AT: Sinhababu/Phenomenal Introspection

#### [1] Not normative: Introspection just points out that I feel X and other could too, not that I have an obligation to do it.

#### [2] Phenomenal introspection is unreliable: We can never view ourselves outside of ourselves, so all conclusions are influenced by subjective biased.

#### [3] Doesn’t prove util: Different people like masochists derive pleasure and pain from different sensations, this proves that it’s impossible to find one particular definition of the good to aggregate.

#### [4] Its impossible for us to verify if other’s feel pain as well and if they do how much they feel, this makes trying to calculate under introspection impossible.

#### [5] Reading Sinhababu evidence is a voting issue he is a sexual harasser and taking a stance with the ballot shows that endorsing his work is not acceptable in philosophy or our community.

**Clark-Younger 18.** Hannah Clark-Younger, “Neil Sinhababu,” philosophicalmisconduct, January 22nd, 2018, <https://philosophicalmisconduct.wordpress.com/2018/01/22/neil-sinhababu/>. NK.

To be honest, **Neil, I am quite sick of seeing your moralistic facebook posts about this issue**, given that **you sexually harassed me and are one of the well-known creeps at philosophy events. When I tell my story** to people who know you, **the response is** usually “**oh I’m not surprised, he’s a creep**”, which leads me to believe **I’m not the only one with a story like this. Many** of them report, **and I have overheard, you saying that** one of **your favourite things about philosophy conferences is flirting with** the **female** graduate **students**. At the 2011 AAP, **when I was a** PhD **student, you groped my breasts** one night when we were out with a bunch of philosophers, **then continued** to do so at least two more times **after I extracted myself** and moved away. When I went to leave the bar, you got up to leave right away, so a friend walked me home because we both felt **you were a threat**. If I gave you the wrong idea, I’m not sure how, as we had met for the first time the night before, and we had discussed how I was going to find out whether the woman I liked was interested in women (and me).

#### [1] That’s a Link – their focus on pleasure is in reality a momentary investment into the jouissance of the drive to understand the real which translates itself into the disability drive as the subject rejects itself in asylum without being able to make any change

#### [2] Independently drop them for reading utilitarianism it is an unsafe philosophy that normalizes repugnant conclusions. Safety is prima facie because we concede to the validity of safety when not we are scared of our bodily security to debate in this round.

#### [A] Util dehumanizes disability and the curing of secondary pity to increase the disabled’s “welfare”

Stein 01 Mark is the author of Distributive Justice and Disability: Utilitarianism against Egalitarianism (Yale University Press, 2006) [Stein, Mark S. “Utilitarianism and the Disabled: Distribution of Life.” Social Theory and Practice, vol. 27, no. 4, 2001, pp. 561–578. JSTOR, [www.jstor.org/stable/23559190. Accessed 23 Nov. 2020](http://www.jstor.org/stable/23559190.%20Accessed%2023%20Nov.%202020).] //Lex AKo

**If the disabled have on average less welfare** than nondisabled people, it seems to follow that the disabled benefit less from continued life than do nondisabled people. **Utilitarianism would therefore place a lower value on disabled life** than on nondisabled life, and if a choice had to be made between saving the lives of disabled people and saving the lives of nondisabled people, utilitarianism would counsel us **to give less preference to the disabled**. So, for example, disabled people would receive less preference, in the distribution of life-saving organ transplants, than nondisabled people. Moreover, the utilitarian preference against disabled people in the distribution of life would appear to be exactly **proportional to the** utili tarian **preference in** favor of disabled people in the **distribution of resources**. However morally urgent it might be to cure a given disabled person, increasing her welfare, it would seem that the same moral ur gency must attach to a decision to preserve the life of a nondisabled person in preference to that disabled person, assuming that only one of them 13Mark Stein, "Utilitarianism and the Disabled: Distribution of Resources," Bioethics 16 (2002), forthcoming. 14See ibid.

#### [B] Util excludes people who can’t feel happiness, which results in their manipulation.

**Peter** 07 “Utilitarianism Is Unjust.” On Philosophy, N.P, 8 Sept. 2007, onphilosophy.wordpress.com/2007/09/08/utilitarianism-is-unjust/. //Massa

According to this principle utilitarianism is unjust because it treats people differently based on their capacity for happiness**;** although utilitarians can appeal to their principles to justify this different treatment, so can racists, and like the racist the utilitarian arguments are not based on objective facts. But before we get into the details allow me to give examples of some groups of people who would be treated unfairly in a purely utilitarian system. The first are those who have no capacity for happiness or unhappiness. There are rare people born without this ability, and we can easily imagine possible species (such as the Vulcans from Star Trek) or conscious computers (such as Data, also from Star Trek) who lack it as well. Utilitarianism cares only about maximizing happiness or pleasure, and so these people effectively wouldn’t count; their treatment would be invisible to the system. Since we can’t make the Vulcans unhappy we would be free to exploit them, turn them into slaves, or whatever else would make us happy. And since we can’t make them happy there is no reason for the system to give them any of the rights or privileges that make us happy. Since they aren’t made unhappy by this treatment the total amount of happiness may be increased, and hence utilitarianism as a system would endorse it. Also treated unfairly are people who are in a permanent state of unhappiness. It isn’t inconceivable that someone might have a condition that prevents them from being happy, and, although many such people might choose to end their lives, there would probably be some who would still choose life. A utilitarian system would take that choice away from them, and to execute them immediately, since they will always be unhappy (negative happiness) eliminating them would increase the total amount of happiness. If such actions could be considered just it would only be if we could somehow convince these people that abusing them on the basis of their capacity for happiness is reasonable, which means convincing them of the validity of utilitarianism.

#### [1] [subpoint] and extinction – this is totally irrelevant because we read a fiat K which means you can’t weigh hypotheticals BUT even if you intervene and let them.

#### [2] VTL is non unique for disabled folk who are antagonism to civil society that produce able-bodiness. ONLY this leap in the name of preventing future eradication can risk clearing the grounds for future generations of disabled life their project is parasitic because it furthers the occupation of abled bodies at the expense of disabled folk – that’s Mollow.

#### [2] Justifying extinction first is an independent voter –

* It justifies atrocities since it allows us to harm some for the benefit of others
* Reject ethics based in preservation–it creates a survival-at-all-costs mentality that justifies violence and makes debate unsafe–comes first since safety is a prior question to people being in debate.

Callahan 73 Daniel Callahan, Fellow at the Institute of Society and Ethics, 1973 The Tyranny of Survival, Pages 91-93) SJCP//JG

The value of survival could not be so readily abused were it not for its evocative power. But abused it has been. In the name of survival, all manner of social and political evils have been committed against the rights of individuals, including the right to life. The purported threat of Communist domination has for over two decades, fueled the drive of militarists for ever-larger defense budgets, no matter what the cost to other social needs. During World War II, native Japanese Americans were herded, without due process of law, into detention camps. This policy was later upheld by the Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United States (1944) in a general consensus that a threat to national security can justify acts otherwise blatantly unjustifiable. The survival of the Aryan race was one of the official legitimizations of Nazism. Under the banner of survival, the government of South Africa imposed a ruthless apartheid, heedless of the most elementary human rights. The Vietnamese war has been one of the greatest of the many absurdities tolerated in the name of survival, the destruction of villages in order to save them. But it is not only in a political setting that survival has been evokes as a final and unarguable value. The main rationale B.F. Skinner offers in Beyond Freedom and Dignity for the controlled and conditioned society is the need for survival. For Jaques Monod, in Chance and Necessity, survival requires that we overthrow almost all known religious, ethical, and political system.

#### Extinction outweighs sets the bar too low and relate to lenient attitudes toward moral transgressions

**Kahane et al 15** (Guy Kahane, Jim A.C. Everett, Brian D. Earp, Miguel Farias, and Julian Savulescu, \*Director of Studies at the Oxford Uehiro Centre, \*\*Assistant Professor at the University of Kent and Research Associate at the Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics at the University of Oxford, \*\*\*Associate Director of the Yale-Hastings Program in Ethics and Health Policy at Yale University and The Hastings Center, \*\*\*\*Joined Coventry University to lead the Brain Belief and Behaviour research group, \*\*\*\*\*Uehiro Professor of Practical Ethics at the University of Oxford, January 2015, accessed on 10-31-2020, Cognition, "‘Utilitarian’ judgments in sacrificial moral dilemmas do not reflect impartial concern for the greater good", <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4259516/>) \*I don’t endorse ableist rhetoric //Lex Dy

A great deal of recent research has focused on hypothetical moral dilemmas in which one person needs to be sacrificed in order to save the lives of a greater number. It is widely assumed that these far-fetched sacrificial scenarios can shed new light on the fundamental opposition between utilitarian and non-utilitarian approaches to ethics (Greene, 2008; Greene et al., 2004; Singer, 2005). However, such sacrificial dilemmas are merely one context in which utilitarian considerations happen to conflict with opposing moral views (Kahane & Shackel, 2010). To the extent that ‘utilitarian’ judgments in sacrificial dilemmas express concern for the greater good—that is, the utilitarian aim of impartially maximizing aggregate welfare—then we would expect such judgments to be associated with judgments and attitudes that clearly express such concern in other moral contexts. The set of studies presented here directly tested this prediction by investigating the relationship between so-called ‘utilitarian’ judgments in classical sacrificial dilemmas and a genuine impartial concern for the greater good. Across four experiments employing a wide range of measures and investigations of attitudes, behavior and moral judgments, we repeatedly found that this prediction was not borne out: a tendency to endorse the violent sacrifice of one person in order to save a greater number was not (or even negatively) associated with paradigmatic markers of utilitarian concern for the greater good. These included identification with humanity as a whole; donation to charities that help people in need in other countries; judgments about our moral obligations to help children in need in developing countries, and to prevent animal suffering and harm to future generations; and an impartial approach to morality that does not privilege the interests of oneself, one’s family, or one’s country over the greater good. This lack of association remained even when the utilitarian justification for such views was made explicit and unequivocal. By contrast, many (though not all) of these markers of concern for the greater good were inter-correlated. In fact, responses designated as ‘utilitarian’ in the current literature were strongly associated with traits, attitudes and moral judgments (primary psychopathy, rational egoism, and a lenient attitude toward clear moral transgressions) that are diametrically opposed to the impartial concern for the greater good that is at the heart of utilitarian ethics. While prior studies have already associated ‘utilitarian’ judgment with antisocial traits (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011; Glenn et al., 2010; Koenigs et al., 2012; Wiech et al., 2013), here we show that such judgments are also tied to explicit amoral and self-centered judgments. Moreover, while these further associations were largely driven by antisocial tendencies, some (such as the more lenient attitude toward clear moral transgressions) were present even when we controlled for these antisocial traits.

### AT: Actor Spec

#### [1] Is ought fallacy – just because policies use it doesn’t mean they should – it’s not unfeasible to K politics one can demand radical change through infiltrating politics.

#### [2] That’s a link –

### TJFs – O/V

#### [1] TJFs are a voting issue – they kill all phil education because people don’t have to explain why your fwk is good. Phil ed o/w since its unique to LD and most specific to the context of us as LD debaters.

#### [2] Jurisdiction – if we prove your framework is incoherent its illogical for the judges to vote on it.

#### Maintaining US hegemony makes war with China inevitable – rising military and economic capabilities, regional rivalries, alliances, will escalate to great power war – Multipolarity from US hege decline preserves some influence while allowing cooperation with China over mutual interest such as economic growth, international security and non-proliferation that ensure peace

Keay 18 (Leo Keay, a graduate in Modern History from Oxford University and a current MA applicant in International Relations, “Sleepwalking into Thucydides's Trap: The Perils of US Hegemony,” [Istituto Affari Internazionali], February 2018, accessed: 7/10/18, http://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/sleepwalking-thucydidess-trap-perils-us-hegemony)//DCai

The threat of great power warfare is the defining geopolitical question of this age. The 2018 National Defence Strategy (NDS) describes the re-emergence of long-term strategic competition with revisionist great powers as “the central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security”.[1] China is America’s chief competitor; seeking to rectify its “century of humiliation”, Beijing aspires to regional influence and power across East Asia. Its growing military capabilities, especially its anti-access/area denial technologies, are intended to achieve strategic dominance in the South China Sea. Meanwhile, it seeks geo-economic influence over the region (and beyond) by becoming the leading provider of infrastructural investment and advanced industrial products to its neighbours.[2] The most sophisticated analysis of this issue consists of Graham T. Allison’s notion of the “Thucydides’s trap”. Drawing on the Greek historian’s maxim that “it was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable”, Allison contends that the growth of a rising power’s capabilities relative to those of a ruling power greatly increases the probability of war. This occurs for two reasons: “rising power syndrome”, whereby the ascending polity exhibits a hubristic sense of self-importance and aggression; and “ruling power syndrome”, whereby the established power suffers from a paranoid sense of insecurity at its own decline.[3] Nevertheless, Allison does believe that Thucydides’s trap can be avoided. In four out of his sixteen historical case studies, ruling powers did peacefully accommodate rising powers. One notable example was the “Great Rapprochement” between Britain and the US at the end of the nineteenth-century.[4] Britain conceded supremacy in the Western hemisphere to the US because it faced a more direct threat to its imperial possessions and naval supremacy from Germany. Britain therefore sacrificed its vested interests in one domain to preserve its vital interests in another.[5] Allison recommends that Washington pursue a similar course, prioritising the avoidance of nuclear war over its strategic and economic primacy in the Pacific.[6] While Professor Allison’s effort to draw lessons from history is praiseworthy, his analysis of the “Great Rapprochement” misses an important point. Unlike twenty-first century America, nineteenth-century Britain was not a hegemon. Despite its naval superiority, Britain was never a significant land power in continental Europe.[7] It was instead a leading member of a multipolar great power system. For this reason, London was used to making significant concessions to other states in order to protect its vital interests. In the 1880s, for instance, it sacrificed zones of informal influence in West Africa to France and East Africa to Germany, in order to safeguard its core possessions of Egypt and South Africa. Accordingly, the “Great Rapprochement” was yet another pragmatic trade-off which came naturally to British statesmen. The US’s position today is different. Since the end of the Cold War it has enjoyed global hegemony, underpinned by its unipolar military capacity and its extensive alliance network. Consequently, Washington is prone to regard any accommodation of Beijing’s ambitions as a unilateral retreat rather than a necessary compromise. President Trump’s National Security Strategy (NSS) exemplifies this outlook.[8]China’s ambitions are described as “antithetical to U.S. values and interests”. Both states are engaged in “a geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order”,[9] whereby China seeks to “displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region”.[10] Washington’s alliance commitments further intensify its rivalry with Beijing. Any failure to side with partners such as Japan and the Philippines in a confrontation with China would weaken the credibility of America’s security guarantees. The NSS therefore calls for “sustained U.S. leadership” against China, providing a “collective response that upholds a regional order respectful of sovereignty and independence”.[11] America, therefore, appears to be suffering from an acute case of “ruling power syndrome”: the stakes of hegemony are so high that any significant concession to Beijing would irrevocably compromise Washington’s position. This is not a unique situation, unipolarity led Napoleon to declare war against Russia in 1812. After coercing all other powers to participate in the continental blockade against Britain, he could not tolerate Russia’s refusal to cooperate. Despite his personal friendship with Tsar Alexander, Napoleon could only see Russian policy in hostile terms, concluding in 1811 that “war will come about, though I don’t want it, neither does he, and though it is equally against the interests of France and of Russia. I have seen this happen so often before”.[12] Rigid alliance structures also magnify the risks of great power conflict. On the eve of the First World War, Europe was divided between the “Dual Alliance” of Germany and Austria-Hungary, and the “Triple Entente” of France, Russia and Great Britain. It was the unshakeable nature of each bloc’s security commitments that transformed Austria-Hungary’s invasion of Serbia into a global military conflict. The only way to avoid future conflagrations is to adopt an attitude of radical humility. America’s leaders must accept that the tectonic shifts of geopolitical power cannot be reversed, only managed so as to minimise friction. This is more profound than the distinction between vital and vested interests suggested by Allison. It requires the ruling power to fundamentally scale down its ambitions to those of a great power. The US must cease to aspire to global hegemony, and instead aim for limited dominance. President Obama had the foresight to appreciate this. As he explained in his 2015 NSS: “America leads from a position of strength. But, this does not mean we can or should attempt to dictate the trajectory of all unfolding events around the world […] our resources and influence are not infinite”.[13] One possible solution could be to return to the fundamentals of nineteenth-century US grand strategy, the Monroe Doctrine. Washington’s priority should be to preserve its strategic autonomy in the Western hemisphere. Consequently, it must continue to safeguard its security in the Pacific by maintaining its military bases and honouring its alliance commitments there. Nevertheless, Washington should ultimately be prepared to cede ascendancy in East Asia to Beijing. Chinese naval dominance within the First Island Chain should be accepted as a fait accompli. Furthermore, the US’s alliances should be defensive pacts providing limited support against unprovoked aggression, not blank cheques offering unconditional assistance. These decisions might appear to compromise the world order that Washington has long worked to sustain. Nevertheless, the costs of losing global hegemony must be weighed against the benefits of retaining limited dominance. Not only would the US avoid war with China, it would be better placed to secure Beijing’s cooperation over numerous issues of mutual interest, chiefly economic growth, international security and nuclear non-proliferation. The US would therefore retain immense influence over world politics, but less as a lone sheriff than a co-partner with China. Much will depend, however, on whether future American leaders embrace the wisdom of humility or yield to the arrogance of power.

#### Unipolarity is responsible for global terrorism – those continuted assymmetric responses make hegemony unsustainalbe

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Three conclusions can be drawn from this paper. First, the peacefulness of the contemporary unipolar system could be discussed beyond the interstate conflict and the likelihood of great powers competition debate. The new forms of asymmetric warfare, particularly the emergence of JSGs and their violent activities at different levels of the global order, could be assessed as another variable in debates on the peacefulness of the system. These actors DYNAMICS OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 59 emerged and operate under the unipolarity conditions. Unipolarity, in this sense, has generated conflict-producing mechanisms and nonstate actors that drove sovereign states in lengthy wars against JSGs. This argument makes a significant contribution to the unipolarity-peace puzzle, which is conventionally addressed from the interstate conflict perspective. Second, unipolarity transformed Islamist-oriented terrorism from domestic to global. In addition to other conflict-generating conditions produced under unipolarity, the United States’ unipolar policies in Muslim regions transformed the traditional near-enemy-centric narrative of jihad into a far-enemy-centric ideology. As a result of the transformation of this doctrine, new forms of JSGs emerged that posed a threat to peace and security at all levels. Finally, because of the unipolarity of the system, global peace depends largely on the sole great power’s foreign and military policies. The US interventionism, due to the absence of a challenging great power, might not generate interstate conflict. However, it would engage the US in asymmetric warfare with nonstate actors that would emerge independently or on behalf of states to disrupt the US hegemony through insurgency, terrorism, and other forms of violence at different levels. These all might not challenge the durability of unipolarity, drastically, but they would disrupt peace and security at all domestic, regional, and global levels.

#### Attempting to sustain unipolarity in an already-multipolar world causes great power war.

Pillar ’18 (Paul; 3/3/18; Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University and Nonresident Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution; The National Interest; “Unipolar Strategy in a Multipolar World”; <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/paul-pillar/unipolar-strategy-multipolar-world-24745>; DT)

Some of what these documents express reflects long-established thinking of a Washington national security establishment, a.k.a. The Blob, one of whose tenets is the maintenance of worldwide U.S. hard-power superiority. But a total disregard for how others might respond assertively rather than submissively to what the United States does is more distinctively Trumpian. The same blithe disregard for such responses is glaringly displayed in Trump’s declaration of a trade war. With a new Cold War developing with Russia, and perhaps another one with China, it would once again behoove U.S. policymakers to acquaint themselves with some of the doctrine dating from the earlier Cold War that stemmed from long study by political scientists and strategists. Two phenomena in particular, both of which are disadvantageous to U.S. interests when they occur and both of which the Trump administration’s posture ignores, are worthy of note. One is the security dilemma, in which what one state does for defensive reasons, another state perceives as offensive and threatening—and is likely to respond in kind. This situation is increasingly applicable to much of what the United States is doing with its hard power, given that it is the most powerful player in the world and that it plays at least as much in other people’s neighborhoods as it does in its own. Security dilemmas can arise not only vis-à-vis Russia and China but also with other states that the United States has defined as adversaries. The other phenomenon is arms racing: the responding to an adversary’s military build-up with a build-up of one’s own, in an attempt to restore the previous balance. And then the adversary builds up some more to try to regain its version of a balance—and so on. Putin’s show-and-tell was part of an arms race already under way. Russia explicitly cites the George W. Bush administration’s withdrawal from the ballistic missile defense (ABM) treaty as a reason for developing the kind of defense-circumventing advanced strategic weapons of which Putin spoke. His government is not making such efforts just because it is “determined” to do so, even when taking into account Putin’s domestic political equities. The ingredients for similar security dilemmas and arms-races, at the conventional as well as nuclear level, between the United States and China is considerable. And insofar as domestic sentiment in China may influence the actions of Chinese leaders during an international crisis, those leaders are less, not more, likely to back down in the face of a military threat from the United States. The multipolarity of today’s world exacerbates security dilemmas and arms races, in ways that extend beyond great powers to middle-level ones. The Bush administration explained its withdrawal from the ABM treaty in terms of a need to defend against “rogue” states. The United States explained the later installation of missile defense systems in Eastern Europe in terms of protecting Europe from Iranian missiles, but Russia saw it as a threat to itself and as an effort to negate the capability of Russian strategic weapons. Some of those who give thought to the original Cold War may think longingly of how Ronald Reagan declared an arms race with the USSR and “won” in the sense of what happened a few years later to the USSR. But that is a wrong lesson to draw, because similar events are not about to recur. Russians already have lived through their history of the break-up of the union, the disarray of the Yeltsin years, and finding a nationalist vibe that Putin skillfully expresses and exploits. Putin isn’t going anywhere soon. Neither, evidently, is Xi Jinping in China, which shows no sign of becoming like the Soviet Union in 1991. The Trump administration is on course, through disregard for the rest of the world’s responses to its own policies, to keep adversaries adversarial, if not more so, and to keep the world just as threatening as ever, if not more so. The military spending may become higher and the bluster may become louder, but Americans will be no safer.

### 1NC---AT: Sino-Russian Alliance

#### No war – it’s hype and systems are redundant

Johnson-Freese and Hitchens 16 [Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese is a member of the Breaking Defense Board of Contributors, a Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College and author of Space Warfare in the 21st Century: Arming the Heavens. Views expressed are those of the author alone. Theresa Hitchens is a Senior Research Scholar at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), and the former Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in Geneva, Switzerland. Stop The Fearmongering Over War In Space: The Sky’s Not Falling, Part 1. December 27, 2016. https://breakingdefense.com/2016/12/stop-the-fearmongering-over-war-in-space-the-skys-not-falling-part-1/]

In the last two years, we’ve seen rising hysteria over a future war in space. Fanning the flames are not only dire assessments from the US military, but also breathless coverage from a cooperative and credulous press. This reporting doesn’t only muddy public debate over whether we really need expensive systems. It could also become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The irony is that nothing makes the currently slim possibility of war in space more likely than fearmongering over the threat of war in space.

Two television programs in the past two years show how egregious this fearmongering can get. In April 2015, the CBS show 60 Minutes ran a segment called “The Battle Above.” In an interview with General John Hyten, the then-chief of U.S. Air Force Space Command, it came across loud and clear that the United States was being forced to prepare for a battle in space — specifically against China — that it really didn’t want.

It was explained by Hyten and other guests that China is building a considerable amount of hardware and accumulating significant know-how regarding space, all threatening to space assets Americans depend on every day. If viewers weren’t frightened after watching the segment, it wasn’t for lack of trying on the part of CBS.

Using terms like “offensive counterspace” as a 1984 NewSpeak euphemism for “weapons,” it was made clear that the United States had no choice but to spend billions of dollars on offensive counterspace technology to not just thwart the Chinese threat, but control and dominate space. While it didn’t actually distort facts — just omit facts about current U.S. space capabilities — the segment was basically a cost-free commercial for the military-industrial complex.

In retrospect though, “The Battle Above” was pretty good compared to CNN’s recent special, War in Space: The Next Battlefield. The latter might as well have been called Sharknado in Space – because the only far-out weapons technology our potential adversaries don’t have, according to the broadcast, seems to be “sharks with frickin’ laser beams attached to their heads!”

First, CNN needs to hire some fact checkers. Saying “unlike its adversaries, the U.S. has not yet weaponized space” is deeply misleading, like saying “unlike his political opponents, President-Elect Donald Trump has not sprouted wings and flown away”: A few (admittedly alarming) weapons tests aside, no country in the world has yet weaponized space. Contrary to CNN, stock market transactions are not timed nor synchronized through GPS, but a closed system. Cruise missiles can find their targets even without GPS, because they have both GPS and precision inertial measurement units onboard, and IMUs don’t rely on satellite data. Oh, and the British rock group Pink Floyd holds the only claim to the Dark Side of the Moon: There is a “far side” of the Moon — the side always turned away from the Earth — but not a “dark side” — which would be a side always turned away from the Sun.

More nefariously, the segment sensationalized nuggets of truth within a barrage of half-truths, backed by a heavy bass, dramatic soundtrack (and gravelly-voiced reporter Jim Sciutto) and accompanied by sexy and scary visuals.

Make no mistake there are dangers in space, and the United States has the most to lose if space assets are lost. The question is how best to protect them. Here are a few facts CNN omitted.

The Reality

The U.S. has all of the technologies described on the CNN segment and deemed potentially offensive: maneuverable satellites, nano-satellites, lasers, jamming capabilities, robotic arms, ballistic missiles that can be used as anti-satellite weapons, etc. In fact, the United States is more technologically advanced than other countries in both military and commercial space.

That technological superiority scares other countries; just as the U.S. military space community is scared of other countries obtaining those technologies in the future. The U.S. military space budget is more than 10 times greater than that of all the countries in the world combined. That also causes other countries concern.

More unsettling still, the United States has long been leery of treaty-based efforts to constrain a potential arms race in outer space, as supported by nearly every other country in the world for decades. Indeed, under the administration of George W. Bush, the U.S. talking points centered on the mantra “there is no arms race in outer space,” so there is no need for diplomat instruments to constrain one. Now, a decade later, the U.S. military – backed by the Intelligence Community which operates the nation’s spy satellites – seems to be shouting to the rooftops that the United States is in danger of losing the space arms race already begun by its potential adversaries. The underlying assumption — a convenient one for advocates of more military spending — is that now there is nothing that diplomacy can do.

However, it must be remembered that most space-related technologies – with the exception of ballistic missiles and dedicated jammers – have both military and civil/commercial uses; both benign — indeed, helpful — and nefarious uses. For example, giving satellites the ability to maneuver on orbit can allow useful inspections of ailing satellites and possibly even repairs.

Further, the United States is not unable to protect its satellites, as repeated during the CNN broadcast by various interviewees and the host. Many U.S. government-owned satellites, including precious spy satellites, have capabilities to maneuver. Many are hardened against electro-magnetic pulse, sport “shutters” to protect optical “eyes” from solar flares and lasers, and use radio frequency hopping to resist jamming.

Offensive weapons, deployed on the ground to attack satellites, or in space, are not a silver bullet. To the contrary, U.S. deployment of such weapons may actually be detrimental to U.S. and international security in space (as we argued in a recent Atlantic Council publication, Towards a New National Security Space Strategy). Further, there are benefits to efforts started by the Obama Administration to find diplomatic tools to restrain and constrain dangerous military activities in space.

These diplomatic efforts, however, would be undercut by a full-out U.S. pursuit of “space dominance.” This includes dialogue with China, the lack of which Gen. William Shelton, retired commander of Air Force Space Command, lamented in the CNN report.

Given CNN’s “cast,” the spin was not surprising. Starting with Ghost Fleet author Peter Singer set the sensationalist tone, which never altered. The apocalyptic opening, inspired by Ghost Fleet, posited a scenario where all U.S. satellites are taken off-line in nearly one fell swoop. Unless we are talking about an alien invasion, that scenario is nigh on impossible. No potential adversary has such capabilities, nor will they ever likely do so. There is just too much redundancy in the system.

### 1NC---Sino-Russia Alliance Good

#### China-Russia coop solves nuclear war

Artyom Lukin 20 {Artyom Lukin is Deputy Director for Research at the School of Regional and International Studies, Far Eastern Federal University. He is also Associate Professor at the Department of International Relations. 6-13-2020. “The Russia–China entente and its future.” https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00251-7}//JM

China and Russia are the two largest—and neighboring—powers of continental Eurasia. Can two tigers share the same mountain, especially when one great power is rapidly gaining strength and the other is in relative decline? And there seems to be a pattern in the history of international relations that two ambitious major powers that share a land border are less likely to make an alliance, while they are more likely to engage in territorial disputes with one another as well as rivalry over primacy in their common neighborhood. There are at least three major parts of Eurasia—East Asia, the post-Soviet space (mainly Central Asia), and the Arctic—where China’s and Russia’s geopolitical interests intersect, creating potential for competition and conflict. But, on the other hand, if managed wisely, overlapping interests and stakes can also generate opportunities for collaboration. The following sections examine how Russia and China are managing to keep their differences in key Eurasian zones under control while displaying a significant degree of mutual cooperation.

East Asia This is China’s ‘home region’, but also one where Russia, by virtue of possessing the Far Eastern territories, is a resident power. Moscow, which has traditionally been concerned with keeping sovereignty over its vulnerable Far East, does not at present see China as a major security risk on Russia’s eastern borders. All border delimitation issues between Moscow and Beijing were resolved in the 1990s and 2000s, while the 2001 Sino-Russian Treaty explicitly states that the two countries have no territorial claims to each other. Furthermore, Moscow is well aware that Chinese military preparations are directed primarily toward Taiwan, the Western Pacific and the South China Sea, not against the Russian Far East. There is the cliché, persistent among the Western media and commentariat, of a Chinese demographic invasion of the Russian Far East. For example, a Wall Street Journal article claimed recently that ‘about 300,000 Chinese, some unregistered, could now be settled in Russia’s Far East’ (Simmons 2019). In reality, the actual number of the Chinese who live more or less permanently in the Russian Far East is far lower, and there are very few cases of illegal Chinese migration. There is no imminent risk of the Russian Far East falling under Chinese control demographically or otherwise.

Not sensing any major Chinese menace to the Russian Far East, Russia has refused to engage in rivalry with China in East Asia. On the most important issues of contemporary East Asian geopolitics Moscow has tended to support Beijing or displayed friendly neutrality. On the Korean Peninsula, Moscow has largely played second fiddle to Beijing. On the South China Sea disputes, although Russia’s official stance is strict neutrality, some Russian moves may be seen as favoring Beijing. For example, following the July 2016 Hague tribunal ruling that rejected China’s claims to sovereignty over the South China Sea, Putin expressed solidarity with China, calling the international court’s decision ‘counterproductive’ (Reuters 2016).

Russia shares with China the objective of reducing American influence in East Asia and undermining the US-centric alliances in the region. Russian weapon sales are helping China alter the military balance in the Western Pacific to the detriment of the USA and its allies. Russia’s decision to assist China with getting its own missile attack early warning system may have also been partly motivated by the desire to strengthen China vis-à-vis the USA in their rivalry for primacy in East Asia. The Russian ambassador to the US Anatoly Antonov hinted as much by saying that this strategic system will ‘cardinally increase stability and security in East Asia’ (TASS 2019c).

Russian deference to China on East Asian issues, albeit somewhat hurting Moscow’s great-power pride, makes geopolitical sense. The Kremlin treats Pacific affairs as an area of lower concern than Europe, the Middle East, or Central Asia. Mongolia, which constitutes Siberia’s underbelly, is the only East Asian nation that can count on Russian security protection in case it finds itself in danger of external aggression, at any rate a purely theoretical possibility so far.

It would be incorrect to say that Russia has completely withdrawn from East Asian geopolitics. In some cases, Russia does act against Chinese wishes in the Asia–Pacific. One recent example is Russia’s quiet determination to keep drilling in the areas of the South China Sea on the Vietnamese continental shelf over which China lays sovereignty claims. The Russian state-owned energy company Rosneft operates on Vietnam’s shelf, despite Beijing’s displeasure and periodic harassment by Chinese ships (Zhou 2019). Apart from the desire to make profits from the South China Sea’s hydrocarbons, Russia may be seeking to support its old-time friend Vietnam—to whom it also sells weapons—as well as demonstrate that it is still an independent actor in East Asia. Through such behavior on China’s Southeast Asian periphery, the Kremlin could also be sending the signal to Beijing that, if China gets too closely involved in Russia’s backyard, such as Central Asia or the Caucasus, Russia can do similar things in China’s. Albeit a friction point between Beijing and Moscow, the activities by Russian energy firms in the South China Sea are unlikely to destabilize the Sino-Russian entente, since Moscow and Beijing need each other on much bigger issues.

The post-Soviet space Russia has vital stakes in the geopolitical space formerly occupied by the Soviet Union and is willing to go to great lengths to defend those interests. It was, after all, a perceived brazen attempt by Brussels and Washington to draw Ukraine into the EU’s and NATO’s orbit that induced Moscow to take drastic action in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, causing a rupture with the West.

When it comes to Moscow–Beijing politics over the post-Soviet space, the most problematic question is certainly about Central Asia, a region composed of five former Soviet republics which shares borders with both Russia and China. Since the nineteenth century, Russia has traditionally considered Central Asia as its sphere of influence. However, in the 2000s China began its economic expansion in the region. It is now by far the biggest trade partner for Central Asian states (Bhutia 2019) as well as its largest source of investments. China also set up a small military presence inside Tajikistan, apparently to secure a sensitive area which borders China’s Xinjiang region and Afghanistan (Lo 2019).

### 1NC---AT: ASAT

#### Zero risk of escalation from ASATs

**Pavur and Martinovic 19** [James Pavur and Ivan Martinovic, May 2019, "The Cyber-ASAT: On the Impact of Cyber Weapons in Outer Space," ResearchGate, 11th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Silent Battle [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334422193\_The\_Cyber-ASAT\_On\_the\_Impact\_of\_Cyber\_Weapons\_in\_Outer\_Space accessed 12/10/21](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334422193_The_Cyber-ASAT_On_the_Impact_of_Cyber_Weapons_in_Outer_Space%20accessed%2012/10/21)]Adam

A. Limited Accessibility

Space is difficult. Over 60 years have passed since the first Sputnik launch and only nine countries (ten including the EU) have orbital launch capabilities. Moreover, a launch programme alone does not guarantee the resources and precision required to operate a meaningful ASAT capability. Given this, one possible reason why space wars have not broken out is simply because only the US has ever had the ability to fight one [21, p. 402], [22, pp. 419–420].

Although launch technology may become cheaper and easier, it is unclear to what extent these advances will be distributed among presently non-spacefaring nations. Limited access to orbit necessarily reduces the scenarios which could plausibly escalate to ASAT usage. Only major conflicts between the handful of states with ‘space club’ membership could be considered possible flashpoints. Even then, the fragility of an attacker’s own space assets creates de-escalatory pressures due to the deterrent effect of retaliation. Since the earliest days of the space race, dominant powers have recognized this dynamic and demonstrated an inclination towards de-escalatory space strategies [23].

B. Attributable Norms

There also exists a long-standing normative framework favouring the peaceful use of space. The effectiveness of this regime, centred around the Outer Space Treaty (OST), is highly contentious and many have pointed out its serious legal and political shortcomings [24]–[26]. Nevertheless, this status quo framework has somehow supported over six decades of relative peace in orbit.

Over these six decades, norms have become deeply ingrained into the way states describe and perceive space weaponization. This de facto codification was dramatically demonstrated in 2005 when the US found itself on the short end of a 160-1 UN vote after opposing a non-binding resolution on space weaponization. Although states have occasionally pushed the boundaries of these norms, this has typically occurred through incremental legal re-interpretation rather than outright opposition [27]. Even the most notable incidents, such as the 2007-2008 US and Chinese ASAT demonstrations, were couched in rhetoric from both the norm violators and defenders, depicting space as a peaceful global commons [27, p. 56]. Altogether, this suggests that states perceive real costs to breaking this normative tradition and may even moderate their behaviours accordingly.

One further factor supporting this norms regime is the high degree of attributability surrounding ASAT weapons. For kinetic ASAT technology, plausible deniability and stealth are essentially impossible. The literally explosive act of launching a rocket cannot evade detection and, if used offensively, retaliation. This imposes high diplomatic costs on ASAT usage and testing, particularly during peacetime.

C. Environmental Interdependence

A third stabilizing force relates to the orbital debris consequences of ASATs. China’s 2007 ASAT demonstration was the largest debris-generating event in history, as the targeted satellite dissipated into thousands of dangerous debris particles [28, p. 4]. Since debris particles are indiscriminate and unpredictable, they often threaten the attacker’s own space assets [22, p. 420]. This is compounded by Kessler syndrome, a phenomenon whereby orbital debris ‘breeds’ as large pieces of debris collide and disintegrate. As space debris remains in orbit for hundreds of years, the cascade effect of an ASAT attack can constrain the attacker’s long-term use of space [29, pp. 295– 296]. Any state with kinetic ASAT capabilities will likely also operate satellites of its own, and they are necessarily exposed to this collateral damage threat. Space de

# Acessiable formating

### 1

#### The desire to fill the insatiable lack creates experiences of impairment that structures the disability drive. The drive is tied up with primary pity which reflects disability upon the ego threatening its ability status – which invokes secondary pity to overcorrect for the shattered-ego necessitating disabled death.

Mollow 15 [The Disability Drive by Anna Mollow A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in English in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Kent Puckett, Chair Professor Celeste G. Langan Professor Melinda Y. Chen Spring 2015 // WHSRS and Lex VM]

primary pity entails a mixing up of self and other such that the ego belong to “someone else,” This affective response can feel unbearable because it involves a drive toward disability which menaces the ego‟s investments in health, and control to contemplate another person‟s suffering is to question, “Could this happen to me?” Secondary pity attempts to heal primary pity and defend the ego at someone else‟s expense. secondary pity encompasses charity, tears, and calls for a cure. these affects enlarge the ego of the pitier primary pity is so unsettling that We have been driven to lock people in institutions, to stare, to punish, and sentimentalize in not acknowledging that pity Because primary pity is tied up with the disability drive it must be unrepresentable

#### The 1ACs belief of a better future is tied to rehabilitation where the signifier of the Child is placed forward which deems the disabled child a threat to society and is thus eradicated from the political.

Mollow 2 [

the image of the Child” is inextricable from disability the Child is a ritual display of pity that demeans disabled people. the Child makes an excellent alibi for ableism because the idea of not fighting is unthinkable. Who would stand against futurity, and life why would anyone come out against the Child who, without a cure, might never have a future The logic relies on “rehabilitative futurism,” is envisaged in terms of a fantasmatic “Child,” that eradication of disability: a recovery of a “hobbled” economy

#### Nationalist strategies of hegemony and economics are prefigured by ableist epistemological reduction of the rest of the world.

Soldatic & Biyanwila 06 [Karen and Janaka Graduate School of Education; Organizational and Labour Studies; University of Western Australia, disability and Development: A Critical Southern Standpointon Able-Bodied Masculinity, T ASA Conference 2006, University of Western Australia & Murdoch University, 4-7 December 2006 TASA 2006 Conference Proceedings] //Lex AKo

**state’s attempts to gain legitimacy** **on** **nationalist strategies**. I **discourse** **committed to market** **politics** **grounded in able-bodied** **constructions of nationhood** **as masculine** **emphasis on ability relates** **economic activities** **nationalist projects are able-bodied masculinity** evading frailty of **social beings**( bodily performance de-valuation of the disabled **nationalist projects overlaps with fascist tendencies** **wom[x]n with disabilities** **regarded as unfit to reproduce** **humanity’ of the imperial able-bodied** **separate** **inhumanity of** **that continue to reproduce disabling structures**

#### The alternative is to analyze the disability drive — it comes to terms with the existence of the drive and shatters the fantasy of the ego. Anything else only displaces the lack onto other oppressed groups. The ROTB is to question ideological optimism in the classroom.

Mollow 3 [

I have laid out a program for developing an understanding of the drive and violences from misrecognitions facilitate how we conceive subjectivities changing our “insides,” chang ways that, “outside,” relate We are the drive! performs a fantasy of overcoming the drive it would go like where are my keys!?” Look for someone to blame! no getting over this but think the psychic equivalent of losing keys the impetus to blame someone else ill people dismissed as “hysterical the intolerable feeling that arises when we lose keys originates from within the drive always has its keys in hand

### Case

#### Now do not let them weigh case – 3 answers –

#### [1] Perm solves – comparative worlds can be true in OTHER instances but if we prove their rhetoric is invested in ableist communicative manners you should bracket out substance.

#### [2] Link turns and de-links DEFINITELY solve because you can gain offense against the K off the link debate or you can de-link and collapse to the aff leaving the K with a floating alternative

#### [3] Dialogue turn – there’s infinite consequences based upon plan as a cause can have endless effects, their will to set neg ground based on hypotheticals is an attempt at negotiation the least change since it centers stasis upon WHAT debate is rather than should be – disabled liberation is a continuous project – the name of good intentions cements abled complacency.

#### [1] Self-sacrificing Actions Objection – Util necessitates self sacrifices because util judges that it is impermissible to devote a more than minimal time to oneself killing your happiness. This guts happiness providing no binding reason for action.

#### [2] Manipulation Objection – Util treats people on their capacity for happiness. People with Anhedonia cannot feel physical happiness which means they are exploitable and executed under util to increase total aggregated pleasure.

#### [3] Naturalistic Fallacy –util is morally incoherent – they have no definition of what constitutes a “good” or “bad” besides pain or pleasure BUT then says pleasure is what constitutes goodness which is tautological. Proves it is unwarranted.

#### [4] Subjective Value Objection - States don’t know what citizens “interests” really are. Citizens have different pleasures based on their own experiences – means states can’t guide action

### AT: Sinhababu/Phenomenal Introspection

#### [1] Not normative: Introspection just points out that I feel X and other could too, not that I have an obligation to do it.

#### [2] Phenomenal introspection is unreliable: We can never view ourselves outside of ourselves, so all conclusions are influenced by subjective biased.

#### [3] Doesn’t prove util: Different people like masochists derive pleasure and pain from different sensations, this proves that it’s impossible to find one particular definition of the good to aggregate.

#### [4] Its impossible for us to verify if other’s feel pain as well and if they do how much they feel, this makes trying to calculate under introspection impossible.

#### [5] Reading Sinhababu evidence is a voting issue he is a sexual harasser and taking a stance with the ballot shows that endorsing his work is not acceptable in philosophy or our community.

**Clark-Younger 18.** Hannah Clark-Younger, “Neil Sinhababu,” philosophicalmisconduct, January 22nd, 2018, <https://philosophicalmisconduct.wordpress.com/2018/01/22/neil-sinhababu/>. NK.

To be honest, **Neil, I am quite sick of seeing your moralistic facebook posts about this issue**, given that **you sexually harassed me and are one of the well-known creeps at philosophy events. When I tell my story** to people who know you, **the response is** usually “**oh I’m not surprised, he’s a creep**”, which leads me to believe **I’m not the only one with a story like this. Many** of them report, **and I have overheard, you saying that** one of **your favourite things about philosophy conferences is flirting with** the **female** graduate **students**. At the 2011 AAP, **when I was a** PhD **student, you groped my breasts** one night when we were out with a bunch of philosophers, **then continued** to do so at least two more times **after I extracted myself** and moved away. When I went to leave the bar, you got up to leave right away, so a friend walked me home because we both felt **you were a threat**. If I gave you the wrong idea, I’m not sure how, as we had met for the first time the night before, and we had discussed how I was going to find out whether the woman I liked was interested in women (and me).

#### [1] That’s a Link – their focus on pleasure is in reality a momentary investment into the jouissance of the drive to understand the real which translates itself into the disability drive as the subject rejects itself in asylum without being able to make any change

#### [2] Independently drop them for reading utilitarianism it is an unsafe philosophy that normalizes repugnant conclusions. Safety is prima facie because we concede to the validity of safety when not we are scared of our bodily security to debate in this round.

#### [A] Util dehumanizes disability and the curing of secondary pity to increase the disabled’s “welfare”

Stein 01

**If** **disabled have** **less welfare** it seems the disabled benefit less from life **Utili** **would** **place** **lower value on disabled life** **proportional to the** **preference in** **distribution of resources** to cure a disabled person, increasing welfare

#### [B] Util excludes people who can’t feel happiness, which results in their manipulation.

**Peter** 07 “Utilitarianism Is Unjust.” On Philosophy, N.P, 8 Sept. 2007, onphilosophy.wordpress.com/2007/09/08/utilitarianism-is-unjust/. //Massa

utilitarianism treats people on capacity for happiness those who have no capacity wouldn’t count; we would be free to exploit them, treated unfairly are who are in permanent unhappiness. util system would execute them since eliminating would increase happiness

#### [1] [subpoint] and extinction – this is totally irrelevant because we read a fiat K which means you can’t weigh hypotheticals BUT even if you intervene and let them.

#### [2] VTL is non unique for disabled folk who are antagonism to civil society that produce able-bodiness. ONLY this leap in the name of preventing future eradication can risk clearing the grounds for future generations of disabled life their project is parasitic because it furthers the occupation of abled bodies at the expense of disabled folk – that’s Mollow.

#### [2] Justifying extinction first is an independent voter –

* It justifies atrocities since it allows us to harm some for the benefit of others
* Reject ethics based in preservation–it creates a survival-at-all-costs mentality that justifies violence and makes debate unsafe–comes first since safety is a prior question to people being in debate.

Callahan 73 Daniel Callahan, Fellow at the Institute of Society and Ethics, 1973 The Tyranny of Survival, Pages 91-93) SJCP//JG

In

name of survival

evils have been committed

including

right to life.

can justify acts

unjustifiable

survival of the Aryan race was

Nazism

South Africa imposed

apartheid

survival requires

we overthrow

ethical

system

#### Extinction outweighs sets the bar too low and relate to lenient attitudes toward moral transgressions

**Kahane et al 15**

sacrificial dilemmas are merely one context in which util conflict with moral views studies tested this by investigating the relation between util and genuine concern for the greater good tendency to endorse the sacrifice of one to save a greater number was not (or negatively) associated concern responses designated as ‘utilitarian’ were strongly associated with egoism and lenient attitude toward moral transgressions opposed to the heart of util

### AT: Actor Spec

#### [1] Is ought fallacy – just because policies use it doesn’t mean they should – it’s not unfeasible to K politics one can demand radical change through infiltrating politics.

#### [2] That’s a link –

### TJFs – O/V

#### [1] TJFs are a voting issue – they kill all phil education because people don’t have to explain why your fwk is good. Phil ed o/w since its unique to LD and most specific to the context of us as LD debaters.

#### [2] Jurisdiction – if we prove your framework is incoherent its illogical for the judges to vote on it.

#### Maintaining US hegemony makes war with China inevitable – rising military and economic capabilities, regional rivalries, alliances, will escalate to great power war – Multipolarity from US hege decline preserves some influence while allowing cooperation with China over mutual interest such as economic growth, international security and non-proliferation that ensure peace

Keay 18

China is America’s chief competitor the growth of a rising power’s capabilities relative to those of a ruling power greatly increases the probability of war Trump engage in “a geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order alliance commitments further intensify its rivalry with Beijing America appears to be suffering from ruling power syndrome Rigid alliance structures also magnify the risks of great power conflict The US must cease to aspire to global hegemony Washington should ultimately be prepared to cede ascendancy in East Asia to Beijing Not only would the US avoid war with China, it would be better placed to secure Beijing’s cooperation over numerous issues of mutual interest, chiefly economic growth, international security and nuclear non-proliferation

#### Unipolarity is responsible for global terrorism – those continuted assymmetric responses make hegemony unsustainalbe

**Ibrahimi 18** a researcher and instructor of political science. Ibrahimi received his PhD from Carleton University. His research interests include international relations, international security, terrorism, conflict Analysis, political development in the Middles East and South Asia, and Afghanistan. His articles have appeared in Small Wars and Insurgencies, Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, and elsewhere. (2/19/18; S. Yaqub Ibrahimi; “Unipolar politics and global peace: a structural explanation of the globalizing jihad”; taylor and francis https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17467586.2018.1428763?needAccess=true)

. Unipolarity

has generated conflict-producing mechanisms

unipolarity transformed Islamist-oriented terrorism from domestic to global

the U

S

unipolar policies in Muslim regions transformed the traditional near-enemy-centric narrative of jihad into a far-enemy-centric ideology

US interventionism, due to the absence of a challenging great power

would engage the US in asymmetric warfare with nonstate actors that

disrupt

hegemony through insurgency, terrorism, and other forms of violence

#### Attempting to sustain unipolarity in an already-multipolar world causes great power war.

Pillar ’18 (

maintenance of

superiority

disregard

how other

respond assertively

the security dilemma, in which

one

perceives as offensive

and

respond

This

is

applicable to

hard power

Security dilemmas

arise

vis-à-vis Russia and China

Putin’s show-and-tell was

developing

advanced

weapons

leaders are less

likely to back down

Russia saw

a threat

disregard for

the world’s responses

keep adversaries adversarial

### 1NC---AT: Sino-Russian Alliance

#### No war – it’s hype and systems are redundant

Johnson-Freese and Hitchens 16 [Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese is a member of the Breaking Defense Board of Contributors, a Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College and author of Space Warfare in the 21st Century: Arming the Heavens. Views expressed are those of the author alone. Theresa Hitchens is a Senior Research Scholar at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), and the former Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in Geneva, Switzerland. Stop The Fearmongering Over War In Space: The Sky’s Not Falling, Part 1. December 27, 2016. https://breakingdefense.com/2016/12/stop-the-fearmongering-over-war-in-space-the-skys-not-falling-part-1/]

In the last two years, we’ve seen rising hysteria over a future war in space. Fanning the flames are not only dire assessments from the US military, but also breathless coverage from a cooperative and credulous press. This reporting doesn’t only muddy public debate over whether we really need expensive systems. It could also become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The irony is that nothing makes the currently slim possibility of war in space more likely than fearmongering over the threat of war in space.

Two television programs in the past two years show how egregious this fearmongering can get. In April 2015, the CBS show 60 Minutes ran a segment called “The Battle Above.” In an interview with General John Hyten, the then-chief of U.S. Air Force Space Command, it came across loud and clear that the United States was being forced to prepare for a battle in space — specifically against China — that it really didn’t want.

It was explained by Hyten and other guests that China is building a considerable amount of hardware and accumulating significant know-how regarding space, all threatening to space assets Americans depend on every day. If viewers weren’t frightened after watching the segment, it wasn’t for lack of trying on the part of CBS.

Using terms like “offensive counterspace” as a 1984 NewSpeak euphemism for “weapons,” it was made clear that the United States had no choice but to spend billions of dollars on offensive counterspace technology to not just thwart the Chinese threat, but control and dominate space. While it didn’t actually distort facts — just omit facts about current U.S. space capabilities — the segment was basically a cost-free commercial for the military-industrial complex.

In retrospect though, “The Battle Above” was pretty good compared to CNN’s recent special, War in Space: The Next Battlefield. The latter might as well have been called Sharknado in Space – because the only far-out weapons technology our potential adversaries don’t have, according to the broadcast, seems to be “sharks with frickin’ laser beams attached to their heads!”

First, CNN needs to hire some fact checkers. Saying “unlike its adversaries, the U.S. has not yet weaponized space” is deeply misleading, like saying “unlike his political opponents, President-Elect Donald Trump has not sprouted wings and flown away”: A few (admittedly alarming) weapons tests aside, no country in the world has yet weaponized space. Contrary to CNN, stock market transactions are not timed nor synchronized through GPS, but a closed system. Cruise missiles can find their targets even without GPS, because they have both GPS and precision inertial measurement units onboard, and IMUs don’t rely on satellite data. Oh, and the British rock group Pink Floyd holds the only claim to the Dark Side of the Moon: There is a “far side” of the Moon — the side always turned away from the Earth — but not a “dark side” — which would be a side always turned away from the Sun.

More nefariously, the segment sensationalized nuggets of truth within a barrage of half-truths, backed by a heavy bass, dramatic soundtrack (and gravelly-voiced reporter Jim Sciutto) and accompanied by sexy and scary visuals.

Make no mistake there are dangers in space, and the United States has the most to lose if space assets are lost. The question is how best to protect them. Here are a few facts CNN omitted.

The Reality

The U.S. has all of the technologies described on the CNN segment and deemed potentially offensive: maneuverable satellites, nano-satellites, lasers, jamming capabilities, robotic arms, ballistic missiles that can be used as anti-satellite weapons, etc. In fact, the United States is more technologically advanced than other countries in both military and commercial space.

That technological superiority scares other countries; just as the U.S. military space community is scared of other countries obtaining those technologies in the future. The U.S. military space budget is more than 10 times greater than that of all the countries in the world combined. That also causes other countries concern.

More unsettling still, the United States has long been leery of treaty-based efforts to constrain a potential arms race in outer space, as supported by nearly every other country in the world for decades. Indeed, under the administration of George W. Bush, the U.S. talking points centered on the mantra “there is no arms race in outer space,” so there is no need for diplomat instruments to constrain one. Now, a decade later, the U.S. military – backed by the Intelligence Community which operates the nation’s spy satellites – seems to be shouting to the rooftops that the United States is in danger of losing the space arms race already begun by its potential adversaries. The underlying assumption — a convenient one for advocates of more military spending — is that now there is nothing that diplomacy can do.

However, it must be remembered that most space-related technologies – with the exception of ballistic missiles and dedicated jammers – have both military and civil/commercial uses; both benign — indeed, helpful — and nefarious uses. For example, giving satellites the ability to maneuver on orbit can allow useful inspections of ailing satellites and possibly even repairs.

Further, the United States is not unable to protect its satellites, as repeated during the CNN broadcast by various interviewees and the host. Many U.S. government-owned satellites, including precious spy satellites, have capabilities to maneuver. Many are hardened against electro-magnetic pulse, sport “shutters” to protect optical “eyes” from solar flares and lasers, and use radio frequency hopping to resist jamming.

Offensive weapons, deployed on the ground to attack satellites, or in space, are not a silver bullet. To the contrary, U.S. deployment of such weapons may actually be detrimental to U.S. and international security in space (as we argued in a recent Atlantic Council publication, Towards a New National Security Space Strategy). Further, there are benefits to efforts started by the Obama Administration to find diplomatic tools to restrain and constrain dangerous military activities in space.

These diplomatic efforts, however, would be undercut by a full-out U.S. pursuit of “space dominance.” This includes dialogue with China, the lack of which Gen. William Shelton, retired commander of Air Force Space Command, lamented in the CNN report.

Given CNN’s “cast,” the spin was not surprising. Starting with Ghost Fleet author Peter Singer set the sensationalist tone, which never altered. The apocalyptic opening, inspired by Ghost Fleet, posited a scenario where all U.S. satellites are taken off-line in nearly one fell swoop. Unless we are talking about an alien invasion, that scenario is nigh on impossible. No potential adversary has such capabilities, nor will they ever likely do so. There is just too much redundancy in the system.

### 1NC---Sino-Russia Alliance Good

#### China-Russia coop solves nuclear war

Artyom Lukin 20 {Artyom Lukin is Deputy Director for Research at the School of Regional and International Studies, Far Eastern Federal University. He is also Associate Professor at the Department of International Relations. 6-13-2020. “The Russia–China entente and its future.” https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00251-7}//JM

China and Russia are the two largest—and neighboring—powers of continental Eurasia. Can two tigers share the same mountain, especially when one great power is rapidly gaining strength and the other is in relative decline? And there seems to be a pattern in the history of international relations that two ambitious major powers that share a land border are less likely to make an alliance, while they are more likely to engage in territorial disputes with one another as well as rivalry over primacy in their common neighborhood. There are at least three major parts of Eurasia—East Asia, the post-Soviet space (mainly Central Asia), and the Arctic—where China’s and Russia’s geopolitical interests intersect, creating potential for competition and conflict. But, on the other hand, if managed wisely, overlapping interests and stakes can also generate opportunities for collaboration. The following sections examine how Russia and China are managing to keep their differences in key Eurasian zones under control while displaying a significant degree of mutual cooperation.

East Asia This is China’s ‘home region’, but also one where Russia, by virtue of possessing the Far Eastern territories, is a resident power. Moscow, which has traditionally been concerned with keeping sovereignty over its vulnerable Far East, does not at present see China as a major security risk on Russia’s eastern borders. All border delimitation issues between Moscow and Beijing were resolved in the 1990s and 2000s, while the 2001 Sino-Russian Treaty explicitly states that the two countries have no territorial claims to each other. Furthermore, Moscow is well aware that Chinese military preparations are directed primarily toward Taiwan, the Western Pacific and the South China Sea, not against the Russian Far East. There is the cliché, persistent among the Western media and commentariat, of a Chinese demographic invasion of the Russian Far East. For example, a Wall Street Journal article claimed recently that ‘about 300,000 Chinese, some unregistered, could now be settled in Russia’s Far East’ (Simmons 2019). In reality, the actual number of the Chinese who live more or less permanently in the Russian Far East is far lower, and there are very few cases of illegal Chinese migration. There is no imminent risk of the Russian Far East falling under Chinese control demographically or otherwise.

Not sensing any major Chinese menace to the Russian Far East, Russia has refused to engage in rivalry with China in East Asia. On the most important issues of contemporary East Asian geopolitics Moscow has tended to support Beijing or displayed friendly neutrality. On the Korean Peninsula, Moscow has largely played second fiddle to Beijing. On the South China Sea disputes, although Russia’s official stance is strict neutrality, some Russian moves may be seen as favoring Beijing. For example, following the July 2016 Hague tribunal ruling that rejected China’s claims to sovereignty over the South China Sea, Putin expressed solidarity with China, calling the international court’s decision ‘counterproductive’ (Reuters 2016).

Russia shares with China the objective of reducing American influence in East Asia and undermining the US-centric alliances in the region. Russian weapon sales are helping China alter the military balance in the Western Pacific to the detriment of the USA and its allies. Russia’s decision to assist China with getting its own missile attack early warning system may have also been partly motivated by the desire to strengthen China vis-à-vis the USA in their rivalry for primacy in East Asia. The Russian ambassador to the US Anatoly Antonov hinted as much by saying that this strategic system will ‘cardinally increase stability and security in East Asia’ (TASS 2019c).

Russian deference to China on East Asian issues, albeit somewhat hurting Moscow’s great-power pride, makes geopolitical sense. The Kremlin treats Pacific affairs as an area of lower concern than Europe, the Middle East, or Central Asia. Mongolia, which constitutes Siberia’s underbelly, is the only East Asian nation that can count on Russian security protection in case it finds itself in danger of external aggression, at any rate a purely theoretical possibility so far.

It would be incorrect to say that Russia has completely withdrawn from East Asian geopolitics. In some cases, Russia does act against Chinese wishes in the Asia–Pacific. One recent example is Russia’s quiet determination to keep drilling in the areas of the South China Sea on the Vietnamese continental shelf over which China lays sovereignty claims. The Russian state-owned energy company Rosneft operates on Vietnam’s shelf, despite Beijing’s displeasure and periodic harassment by Chinese ships (Zhou 2019). Apart from the desire to make profits from the South China Sea’s hydrocarbons, Russia may be seeking to support its old-time friend Vietnam—to whom it also sells weapons—as well as demonstrate that it is still an independent actor in East Asia. Through such behavior on China’s Southeast Asian periphery, the Kremlin could also be sending the signal to Beijing that, if China gets too closely involved in Russia’s backyard, such as Central Asia or the Caucasus, Russia can do similar things in China’s. Albeit a friction point between Beijing and Moscow, the activities by Russian energy firms in the South China Sea are unlikely to destabilize the Sino-Russian entente, since Moscow and Beijing need each other on much bigger issues.

The post-Soviet space Russia has vital stakes in the geopolitical space formerly occupied by the Soviet Union and is willing to go to great lengths to defend those interests. It was, after all, a perceived brazen attempt by Brussels and Washington to draw Ukraine into the EU’s and NATO’s orbit that induced Moscow to take drastic action in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, causing a rupture with the West.

When it comes to Moscow–Beijing politics over the post-Soviet space, the most problematic question is certainly about Central Asia, a region composed of five former Soviet republics which shares borders with both Russia and China. Since the nineteenth century, Russia has traditionally considered Central Asia as its sphere of influence. However, in the 2000s China began its economic expansion in the region. It is now by far the biggest trade partner for Central Asian states (Bhutia 2019) as well as its largest source of investments. China also set up a small military presence inside Tajikistan, apparently to secure a sensitive area which borders China’s Xinjiang region and Afghanistan (Lo 2019).

### 1NC---AT: ASAT

#### Zero risk of escalation from ASATs

**Pavur and Martinovic 19** [James Pavur and Ivan Martinovic, May 2019, "The Cyber-ASAT: On the Impact of Cyber Weapons in Outer Space," ResearchGate, 11th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Silent Battle [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334422193\_The\_Cyber-ASAT\_On\_the\_Impact\_of\_Cyber\_Weapons\_in\_Outer\_Space accessed 12/10/21](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334422193_The_Cyber-ASAT_On_the_Impact_of_Cyber_Weapons_in_Outer_Space%20accessed%2012/10/21)]Adam

A. Limited Accessibility

Space is difficult. Over 60 years have passed since the first Sputnik launch and only nine countries (ten including the EU) have orbital launch capabilities. Moreover, a launch programme alone does not guarantee the resources and precision required to operate a meaningful ASAT capability. Given this, one possible reason why space wars have not broken out is simply because only the US has ever had the ability to fight one [21, p. 402], [22, pp. 419–420].

Although launch technology may become cheaper and easier, it is unclear to what extent these advances will be distributed among presently non-spacefaring nations. Limited access to orbit necessarily reduces the scenarios which could plausibly escalate to ASAT usage. Only major conflicts between the handful of states with ‘space club’ membership could be considered possible flashpoints. Even then, the fragility of an attacker’s own space assets creates de-escalatory pressures due to the deterrent effect of retaliation. Since the earliest days of the space race, dominant powers have recognized this dynamic and demonstrated an inclination towards de-escalatory space strategies [23].

B. Attributable Norms

There also exists a long-standing normative framework favouring the peaceful use of space. The effectiveness of this regime, centred around the Outer Space Treaty (OST), is highly contentious and many have pointed out its serious legal and political shortcomings [24]–[26]. Nevertheless, this status quo framework has somehow supported over six decades of relative peace in orbit.

Over these six decades, norms have become deeply ingrained into the way states describe and perceive space weaponization. This de facto codification was dramatically demonstrated in 2005 when the US found itself on the short end of a 160-1 UN vote after opposing a non-binding resolution on space weaponization. Although states have occasionally pushed the boundaries of these norms, this has typically occurred through incremental legal re-interpretation rather than outright opposition [27]. Even the most notable incidents, such as the 2007-2008 US and Chinese ASAT demonstrations, were couched in rhetoric from both the norm violators and defenders, depicting space as a peaceful global commons [27, p. 56]. Altogether, this suggests that states perceive real costs to breaking this normative tradition and may even moderate their behaviours accordingly.

One further factor supporting this norms regime is the high degree of attributability surrounding ASAT weapons. For kinetic ASAT technology, plausible deniability and stealth are essentially impossible. The literally explosive act of launching a rocket cannot evade detection and, if used offensively, retaliation. This imposes high diplomatic costs on ASAT usage and testing, particularly during peacetime.

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A third stabilizing force relates to the orbital debris consequences of ASATs. China’s 2007 ASAT demonstration was the largest debris-generating event in history, as the targeted satellite dissipated into thousands of dangerous debris particles [28, p. 4]. Since debris particles are indiscriminate and unpredictable, they often threaten the attacker’s own space assets [22, p. 420]. This is compounded by Kessler syndrome, a phenomenon whereby orbital debris ‘breeds’ as large pieces of debris collide and disintegrate. As space debris remains in orbit for hundreds of years, the cascade effect of an ASAT attack can constrain the attacker’s long-term use of space [29, pp. 295– 296]. Any state with kinetic ASAT capabilities will likely also operate satellites of its own, and they are necessarily exposed to this collateral damage threat. Space de