# Carded formatting

## Framework

## Framework

#### Subject formation relies on an autonomous separation of the body and the individual that excludes crips – within civil society, they can never express themselves as autonomous subjects able to move beyond their bodies – the only ethical demand is the end of subjectivity and to affirm crip subjectivity

**Braswell 11 (Harold Braswell, “Can there be a Disability Studies Theory of "End-of-Life Autonomy"?”,** [**http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/1704/1754)**](http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/1704/1754))

**While there are many competing conceptions of "autonomy" (Christman, 1998), there is common ground among philosophers in understanding "autonomy" to be a conception of subjectivity that defines the individual as a self-governing being(Buss, 2008). In this view, individuals are coherent, self-knowing entities with the capacity to understand and, ideally, to act on their own desires. These desires are, in turn, what is best for the individual: In other words, the individual him or herself is best able to determine his or her own conception of the "good life" (Emanuel, 1991, p. 81). This conception is considered independent of and, conceivably, even in opposition to society. The individual is thus prior to society, and while society can provide the means of realizing the individual's desires, it does not constitute them. The individual is master and creator of himself. As a conception of subjectivity, "autonomy" determines the organization and function of the state. In liberal democracy, the state adopts an attitude of "neutrality" with regard to its citizens (Emanuel 1991, p. 36). The state does not postulate a unified vision of the "good life," to which its citizens universally ascribe. Rather, by abstaining from proposing such a unifying public conception, the state allows its citizens, in the private sphere, to determine their own vision of the "good life" (Fineman, 2004, p. 19; Emanuel 1991, p. 36). The state is thus organized to avoid paternalism, which is "the interference of a state or an individual with another person, against their will, and defended or motivated by a claim that the person interfered with will be better off or protected from harm" (Dworkin, 2010). Consequently, the liberal state fosters the "autonomy" of its citizens by abstaining from contact with them. This view is consistent with and dependent on the autonomous individual's originary asociality. Less commented on—but no less important—is the manner in which "autonomy" conceives of the individual's relation to his or her body. The autonomous individual is master of ~~his or her~~ (their) own body, but ~~his~~ (their) body is not synonymous with the self. Rather, the self owns the body like a piece of property(Andrews, 1986; Rao, 2000). He or she instrumentalizes it, using it as he sees fit, in accord with ~~his~~ (their) particular vision of the good life. The autonomous subject exerts mastery over his or her body; such mastery is, in fact, the mark of ~~his~~ (their) freedom—and any attempt to manipulate the individual's body against ~~his~~ (their) will would be the ultimate example of paternalistic domination. "Autonomy" thus reifies a Cartesian division between subjectivity and corporeality, postulating the individual as prior to ~~his or her~~ (their) body in a manner that parallels ~~his~~ (their) relation to society. Thus, just as society can impinge itself on the individual's autonomy, so too can the individual's body, if it resists ~~his~~ (their) commands. This presumptive conflict between subjectivity and corporeality is what makes the very concept of "end-of-life autonomy" possible. The Intersection of Political "Autonomy" and "End-of-Life Autonomy" How does the conception of end-of-life autonomy in bioethics relate to this broader definition of "autonomy" as a form of political subjectivity? Just as "autonomy" connotes the individual's self-realization in the absence of external political impairments, so "end-of-life autonomy" marks a space in the private sphere where the individual can make decisions about his own life without imposition from political authority. The state recognizes individual "autonomy," but, due to its neutrality, it is not understood to affect "autonomy" itself. Similarly, the relevant medical information tendered in "informed consent" is a precondition for patient autonomy, but does not compromise this autonomy in any way. Like the state, this information is considered to be of a neutral character. In this sense, "end-of-life autonomy" extends political neutrality to medical authority: The nullification of the doctor's own perspective of the "good life" and the presumed neutrality of medical data is parallel to the liberal state's coupling of a lack of a conception of a public good with its own neutral political structures. The "neutrality" of medical and political spheres is, in turn, only possible because "autonomy" conceives the individual to be primarily acorporeal and asocial. Thus, in a seeming paradox, the medical and political aspects of "autonomy" represent the individual as fundamentally independent of both medicine and politics. The autonomous individual's independence from body and society is reflected in the construction of the bioethical encounter, as well as that of social action more generally. Consequently, one cannot discuss "end-of-life autonomy" without implicitly commenting on the political organization of life in liberal democracy. My treatment of the disability studies rethinking of "autonomy" will move between these micro- and macro- levels, in recognition that any reformulation of "end-of-life autonomy" will necessarily also reformulate the relationship between individual, society, and the state. Rethinking Autonomy The first claim in a disability studies reformulation of autonomy is that "autonomy" is itself, prior to any application to persons with disabilities, saturated with ableist norms. Rosemarie Garland-Thomson has argued that the rise of liberal individualism—which, as Paul Root Wolpe notes, is synonymous with autonomy (Wolpe, 1998, p. 43)—was predicated on ideals of self-government that were prejudicial against the disabled (Garland-Thomson, 1997, p. 43). The deviant corporeality of the disabled body refused the dictates of the autonomous individual. Similarly, the visible dependence of persons with disabilities on social relations—whether incarnated in caretaking bonds or technological prostheses—was the denigrated opposite of the autonomous self's constitutive independence. As a reminder of the individual's dependence on both body and society, disability represented the destruction of the autonomy (p.44). Historically, then, the rise of the autonomous subject created disability as a pathology. For Garland-Thomson, the primordial asociality of the autonomous individual obscures the relational core of individual identity. A disability studies rethinking of autonomy, in contrast, highlights the role of relationships in the constitution of individual identity. Various sources exist for such an argument: Most recently, feminist physicist Karen Barad (2006) has analyzed the experiments of Niehls Bohr to argue that discrete relata do not preexist the relationships that bind them, but rather are a product of these relationships (p. 140). Barad's claims accord with Foucauldian accounts of the discursive production of the modern individual (Foucault, 1971, 1978). A clinical basis for such arguments can be found in the work of developmental psychologist Phillipe Rochat whose work Others in Mind postulates the primacy of culturally-formed caretaking relationships in the development of self-consciousness (Rochat, 2009). This theoretical, historical, and clinical literature demonstrates that the self is always already interpenetrated with the other. "Autonomy's" insistence on the necessarily coercive or instrumental character of relationships is thus untenable. But disability studies also raises questions about relational theories of subjectivity. Such theories cannot account for the possibility of "internalized discrimination"—a concept fundamental to disability critique (Campbell, 2009, p. 16; Charlton, 2000, p. 27). The problem of "internalized discrimination" supersedes debates about whether the self is primarily isolated or relational. Both phenomenologically oriented and intersubjective developmental psychologists, while disagreeing on the primacy of the "first-person perspective" (Zahavi, 2005), share a view of the subject as a coherent entity. This coherence may be relational or not, but, in either case, it eliminates the possibility that a person could, in some sense, be turned against him or herself. This view of the self as a coherent entity is fundamental to the autonomous subject. The hegemony of "autonomy" in bioethics explains why the field not only considers internalized discrimination to be irrelevant to determining autonomy, but in fact cannot conceive of it as a possibility. Disability studies must propose an alternative conception of subjectivity, one based not in coherence, but rather in conflict. Grounding the subject in conflict makes it possible to conceive of how persons with disabilities, because of the conflictive nature of life in an ableist society, can persistently devalue their own existence. At the same time, a conflict-based theory of subjectivity highlights that such internalized ableism is never total—and that it always possible for individuals to oppose it. Grounding the subject of disability studies in conflict thus makes it possible to conceive of not only internalized ableism, but also a world without it. The inability of the liberal conception of autonomy to imagine internalized discrimination relates to its model of civil society and the state. The liberal state provides the grounds for individual autonomy through the negative freedom of not interfering in the social order. This perspective naturalizes the social order as an entity that allows for the equal self-realization of its members. It cannot conceive of society as privileging some individuals over others (Felski, 1989, p. 168, cited in Slaughter, 2007, p. 146). As a result, this view is unable to conceive of ableism or, for that matter, or any form of power relations. In contrast, a disability studies rethinking of autonomy understands society to be defined, like the individual, by conflict—particularly (though not exclusively) the conflict between the able and disabled. This conflict manifests itself in and is mediated by individual psychology, just as individual psychology mediates social organization. Both must be considered, as both are fundamentally intertwined. This critique of the presumed neutrality of the liberal state applies as well to the procedures designed to determine whether a particular individual is acting "autonomously" or not. "Autonomy" presumes a radical separation between the individual and the procedural measures taken to ensure the autonomy of his decision. The framing of the choices presented to the individual, as well as the procedures that ensure that he is of "sound mind" (Werth, 1998, p. 5) are not considered to limit him, but rather to provide neutral vehicles for the realization of ~~his~~ (their) freedom. Thus, as I discussed earlier, "informed consent" is considered to be an essential precursor of autonomy because the medical information it supplies is considered to give the individual the possibility of choice, without determining which choice he or she would make. But, as Karen Barad (2006) has argued, Bohr's experiments rendered the presumed neutrality of the measuring apparatus highly suspect. Just as relata are a product of relationships, so too the scientific measure produces the very entities whose existence it presumes to catalog (p. 140). As a result, in Barad's view, the goal of science should not be to claim the neutrality of its measures but instead to scrutinize the seemingly discrete identities that its measures create (p. 393). A disability studies critique of "autonomy" would thus draw attention to how "autonomy's" neutral procedures produce the very autonomous subjectivity they claim to discover, and how the resulting "autonomous" subject is structured according to ableist norms. For example, Paul Root Wolpe (1998) has highlighted that the legal model for end-of-life autonomy is the private contract (p. 51). But, as Martha Albertson Fineman (2004) has pointed out, the private contract obscures the public nature of the private sphere (p. 226). This false division skews decision-making in bioethics and liberal politics more generally. While the negative freedom of autonomy leaves individuals presumably free from public forces, it does not enable them to make demands on the state and society. Thus physician-assisted suicide is legitimized as an "autonomous" choice due to its private nature, but an individual demand for healthcare would not be protected as an exercise in "autonomy" (Wolpe, 1998, p. 53). Similarly, the presumably neutral category of the "removal of life-sustaining treatment" creates an articulation of subjectivity in which individuals exist separate from and prior to technological prostheses. An alternative, as illustrated by Fiona Kumari Campbell as well as Barad, would be to adopt the view that technology—including end-of-life technology—is expressive of and constitutive of individual character (Campbell, 2009, p. 53; Barad, 2006, p. 158-9). The seemingly "neutral" measure of the individual's desire to remove treatment is what enacts their separation, producing the asocial autonomous subject it claims to discover. The same is true of the conception of causation underpinning "autonomy." Here, the individual's desire to die must be traced to a discrete medical cause. Were it shown that this desire were due to social or psychological factors—such as poverty or, for example, a desire to enact vengeance on a father figure—then its "autonomy" would be nullified. But this very understanding of causation presumes that medical data are discrete entities readily isolable from social, economic, and psychological forces. In fact, the central concern of the disability rights movement has been to show the social valorizations implicit in purportedly neutral medical measures (Charlton, 2000, p. 23-36). By treating medical data as neutral facts, "informed consent" separates both them and the deciding individual from any mediation by society. The result is a conception of not only medicine, but also individual subjectivity as atomized entities. Autonomy's criterion of "consistency of character" is especially problematic. In an ableist society, individuals will, by default, tend to be consistently ableist. They will frequently have derogatory perceptions about life with disability, and will be particularly fearful of living with the open acknowledgement of their dependence on others. The achievement of such acknowledgement would not be a form of "consistency of character;" rather, it would be an active development of one's character towards a heightened understanding and experience of life as a social being. But the criterion of "consistency of character" will, in an ableist society, always be prejudiced against such realizations—considering them deformations of the individual's "consistent" self. Its seeming neutrality enforces ableism. Finally, "autonomy" enacts a split between the individual and his or her body. The autonomous individual's consideration of his body as property precludes a consideration of the body's role in constituting subjectivity. This self/body split is inherently prejudiced against individuals who, while living, cannot express themselves in terms that render them legible as autonomous subjects. Thus, persons in persistent vegetative states cannot be recognized as autonomous beings; rather, their autonomous decision must be determined by the information on their advanced directives, which refers to a time when they were "autonomous" (Olick, 2004, p. xviii). As "vegetative" bodies, they do not figure as legal or medical subjects. This obfuscation of the living body is a product of autonomy's acoporeal construction of the self. Thus, rather than neutral, the very measuring apparatus of "autonomy" produces a conception of the individual that, in its self-coherence and independence from both technological and biological processes, is constituted by ableist norms. This conception of the individual is buoyed by an understanding of medical data as asocial markers of objective truth, and an understanding of society as a coherent and power-free sphere that gives all its members equal opportunity for self-realization. Such a conception of subjectivity is, I have argued, inherently ableist, and it should be abandoned by disability studies. Nevertheless, though I think that we should abandon this liberal conception of "autonomy," I do not think that we can give up on "autonomy" itself. In the following section, I argue that disability studies scholars must appropriate "autonomy" for our own ends, and explain how we can do so.**

**Society views those who don’t fit perfect mold as lesser human being. Thus the only way to truly understand Societal Oppression is through Disability.**

**Siebers 10 [Tobin Siebers, Department of English Language and Literature at the University of Michigan; “The Aesthetics of Human Disqualification”; University of Michigan Press; 10/28/2010; accessed 07/30/19 // WHSRS]**

**Disqualification as a symbolic process removes individuals from the ranks of quality human beings, putting them at risk of unequal treatment, bodily harm, and death. That people may be subjected to violence if they do not achieve a prescribed level of quality is an injustice rarely questioned. In fact, even though we may redefine what we mean by quality people, for example as historical minorities are allowed to move into their ranks, we have not yet ceased to believe that nonquality human beings do exist and that they should be treated differently from people of quality. Harriet McBryde Johnson’s debate with Peter Singer provides a recent example of the widespread belief in the existence of nonquality human beings (Johnson). Johnson, a disability activist, argues that all disabled people qualify as persons who have the same rights as everyone else. Singer, a moral philosopher at Princeton University, claims to the contrary that people with certain disabilities should be euthanized, especially if they are thought to be in pain, because they do not qualify as persons. Similarly, Martha Nussbaum, the University of Chicago moral philosopher, establishes a threshold below which “a fully human life, a life worthy of human dignity,” is not possible (181). In particular, she notes that the onset of certain disabilities may reduce a person to the status of former human being: “we may say of some conditions of a being, let us say a permanent vegetative state of a (former) human being, that this just is not a human life at all” (181). Surprisingly little thought and energy have been given to disputing the belief that nonquality human beings do exist. This belief is so robust that it supports the most serious and characteristic injustices of our day. Disqualification at this moment in time justifies discrimination, servitude, imprisonment, involuntary institutionalization, euthanasia, human and civil rights violations, military intervention, compulsory sterilization, police actions, assisted suicide, capital punishment, and murder. It is my contention that disqualification finds support in the way that bodies appear and in their specific appearances—that is, disqualification is justified through the accusation of mental or physical inferiority based on aesthetic principles. Disqualification is produced by naturalizing inferiority as the justification for unequal treatment, violence, and oppression. According to Snyder and Mitchell, disability serves in the modern period as “the master trope of human disqualification.” They argue that disability represents a marker of otherness that establishes differences between human beings not as acceptable or valuable variations but as dangerous deviations. Douglas Baynton provides compelling examples from the modern era, explaining that during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the United States disability identity disqualified other identities defined by gender, race, class, and nationality. Women were deemed inferior because they were said to have mental and physical disabilities. People of color had fewer rights than other persons based on accusations of biological inferiority. Immigrants were excluded from entry into the United States when they were poor, sick, or failed standardized tests, even though the populations already living there were poor, sick, and failed standardized tests. In every case, disability identity served to justify oppression by amplifying ideas about inferiority already attached to other minority identities. Disability is the trope by which the assumed inferiority of these other minority identities achieved expression. The appearance of lesser mental and physical abilities disqualifies people as inferior and justifies their oppression. It is now possible to recognize disability as a trope used to posit the inferiority of certain minority populations, but it remains extremely difficult to understand that mental and physical markers of inferiority are also tropes placed in the service of disability oppression. Before disability can be used as a disqualifier, disability, too, has to be disqualified. Beneath the troping of blackness as inbuilt inferiority, for example, lies the troping of disability as inferior. Beneath the troping of femininity as biological deficiency lies the troping of disability as deficiency. The mental and physical properties of bodies become the natural symbols of inferiority via a process of disqualification that seems biological, not cultural—which is why disability discrimination seems to be a medical rather than a social problem. If we consider how difficult it is at this moment to disqualify people as inferior on the basis of their racial, sexual, gender, or class characteristics, we may come to recognize the ground that we must cover in the future before we experience the same difficulty disqualifying people as inferior on the basis of disability. We might also recognize the work that disability performs at present in situations where race, sexuality, gender, and class are disqualify people as physically or mentally inferior. Aesthetics studies the way that some bodies make other bodies feel. Bodies, minimally defined, are what appear in the world. They involve manifestations of physical appearance, whether this appearance is defined as the physical manifestation itself or as the particular appearance of a given physical manifestation. Bodies include in my definition human bodies, paintings, sculpture, buildings, the entire range of human artifacts as well as animals and objects in the natural world. Aesthetics, moreover, has always stressed that feelings produced in bodies by other bodies are involuntary, as if they represented a form of unconscious communication between bodies, a contagious possession of one body by another. Aesthetics is the domain in which the sensation of otherness is felt at its most powerful, strange, and frightening. Whether the effect is beauty and pleasure, ugliness and pain, or sublimity and terror, the emotional impact of one body on another is experienced as an assault on autonomy and a testament to the power of otherness. Aesthetics is the human science most concerned with invitations to think and feel otherwise about our own influence, interests, and imagination. Of course, when bodies produce feelings of pleasure or pain, they also invite judgments about whether they should be accepted or rejected in the human community. People thought to experience more pleasure or pain than others or to produce unusual levels of pleasure and pain in other bodies are among the bodies most discriminated against, actively excluded, and violated on the current scene, be they disabled, sexed, gendered, or racialized bodies. Disabled people, but also sex workers, gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered people, and people of color, are tortured and killed because of beliefs about their relationship to pain and pleasure (Siebers 2009). This is why aesthetic disqualification is not merely a matter for art critics or museum directors but a political process of concern to us all. An understanding of aesthetics is crucial because it reveals the operative principles of disqualification used in minority oppression. Oppression is the systematic victimization of one group by another. It is a form of intergroup violence. That oppression involves “groups,” and not “individuals,” means that it concerns identities, and this means, furthermore, that oppression always focuses on how the body appears, both on how it appears as a public and physical presence and on its specific and various appearances. Oppression is justified most often by the attribution of natural inferiority—what some call “in-built” or “biological” inferiority. Natural inferiority is always somatic, focusing on the mental and physical features of the group, and it figures as disability. The prototype of biological inferiority is disability. The representation of inferiority always comes back to the appearance of the body and the way the body makes other bodies feel. This is why the study of oppression requires an understanding of aesthetics—not only because oppression uses aesthetic judgments for its violence but also because the signposts of how oppression works are visible in the history of art, where aesthetic judgments about the creation and appreciation of bodies are openly discussed. One additional thought must be noted before I treat some analytic examples from the historical record. First, despite my statement that disability now serves as the master trope of human disqualification, it is not a matter of reducing other minority identities to disability identity. Rather, it is a matter of understanding the work done by disability in oppressive systems. In disability oppression, the physical and mental properties of the body are socially constructed as disqualifying defects, but this specific type of social construction happens to be integral at the present moment to the symbolic requirements of oppression in general. In every oppressive system of our day, I want to claim, the oppressed identity is represented in some way as disabled, and although it is hard to understand, the same process obtains when disability is the oppressed identity. “Racism” disqualifies on the basis of race, providing justification for the inferiority of certain skin colors, bloodlines, and physical features. “Sexism” disqualifies on the basis of sex/gender as a direct representation of mental and physical inferiority. “Classism” disqualifies on the basis of family lineage and socioeconomic power as proof of inferior genealogical status. “Ableism” disqualifies on the basis of mental and physical differences, first selecting and then stigmatizing them as disabilities. The oppressive system occults in each case the fact that the disqualified identity is socially constructed, a mere convention, representing signs of incompetence, weakness, or inferiority as undeniable facts of nature. As racism, sexism, and classism fall away slowly as justifications for human inferiority—and the critiques of these prejudices prove powerful examples of how to fight oppression—the prejudice against disability remains in full force, providing seemingly credible reasons for the belief in human inferiority and the oppressive systems built upon it. This usage will continue, I expect, until we reach a historical moment when we know as much about the social construction of disability as we now know about the social construction of race, class, gender, and sexuality. Disability represents at this moment in time the final frontier of justifiable human inferiority.**

**Thus ROB is to vote for the debater who best challenges ableism**

**Prefer –**

1. **Assumptions of ableism are inherent in systems of knowledge production thus ableism is an a priori question \*A Campbell 13\*C**

**Campbell 13 (Fiona Kumari Campbell, Adjunct Professor in the Department of Disability Studies at Griffith University. Wednesday 27 November 2013. Problematizing Vulnerability: Engaging Studies in Ableism and Disability Jurisprudence. Keynote speech at Disability at the Margins: Vulnerability, Empowerment and the Criminal Law)**

What is meant by the concept of ableism? The literature suggests that the term is often used fluidly with limited definitional or conceptual specificity. The work of Carlson (2001)5 and Campbell (2001) represented a turning point in bringing attention to this new site of subordination not just in terms of disablement but also ableism’s application to other devalued groups. **Ableism is** deeply **seeded at the level of knowledge systems** of life, personhood and liveability. **Ableism is not just** a matter of ignorance or **negative attitudes** towards disabled people; **it is a schema of perfection**, **a** deep **way of thinking about bodies**, wholeness and permeability.6 As such integrating ableism into social research and advocacy strategies represents a significant challenge to practice as ableism moves beyond the more familiar territory of social inclusion and usual indices of exclusion to the very divisions of life. Bringing together the study of existence and knowledge systems, ableism is difficult to pin down. Ableism is a set of processes and practices that arise and decline through sequences of causal convergences influenced by the elements of time, space, bodily inflections and circumstance. Ability and the corresponding notion of ableism are intertwined. **Compulsory ablebodiedness is implicated in the** very **foundations of social theory**, therapeutic jurisprudence, advocacy, medicine and law; or in the mappings of human anatomy. Summarised by Campbell (2001, 44) Ableism refers to; …A network of beliefs processes and practices that produces a particular kind of self and body (the bodily standard) that is projected as the perfect, speciestypical and therefore essential and fully human. Disability then is cast as a diminished state of being human. Writing today (2013) I add an addition to this definition: ‘The ableist bodily configuration is immutable, permanent and laden with qualities of perfectionism or the enhancement imperative orientated towards a self-contained improvability’. Sentiency applies to not just the human but the ‘animal’ world. As a category to differentiate the normal from the pathological, the concept of **abledness is predicated on** some **preexisting notion about the nature of typical** species **functioning** that is beyond culture and historical context. **Ableism** does not just stop at propagating what is typical for each species. An ableist imaginary **tells us what** a healthy body means – a normal mind, the pace, the tenor of **thinking and** the kinds of **emotions** and affect that **are suitable to express**. Of course these ‘fictional’ characteristics then are promoted as a natural ideal. This abled imaginary relies upon the existence of an unacknowledged imagined shared community of able-bodied/minded people held together by a common ableist world view that asserts the preferability and compulsoriness of the norms of ableism. Such ableist schemas erase differences in the ways humans express our emotions, use our thinking and bodies in different cultures and in different situations. This in turn enacts bodily Otherness rendered sometimes as the ‘disabled’, ‘perverted’ or ‘abnormal body’, clearly demarcating the boundaries of normal and pathological. A critical feature of an ableist orientation is a belief that impairment or disability is inherently negative and at its essence is a form of harm in need of improvement, cure or indeed eradication. Studies in Ableism (SiA) inverts traditional approaches, by shifting our concentration to what the study of disability tells us about the production, operation and maintenance of ableism. In not looking solely at disability, we can focus on how the abled able-bodied, non-disabled identity is maintained and privileged. Disability does not even need to be in the picture. SiA’s interest in abledness means that the theoretical foundations are readily [is]applicable to the study of difference and the dividing practices of race, gender, location and sexual orientation. **Reframing our focus** from disability to ableism prompts different preoccupations: • What does the study of the politics of ‘vulnerability’ tells us about what it me ty ans to be ‘non-vulnerable’? • Indeed how is the very conceptualisation of ‘autonomy’ framed in the light of discourses of ‘vulnerability’? • In representing vulnerabilias universal does this detract from the specificity of disability experiences? SiA examines the ways that concepts of wellbeing, vulnerability and deficiency circulate throughout society and impact upon economic, social, legal and ethical choices. Principally SiA focuses on the limits of tolerance and possessive individualism. Extending the theorization of disability, studies in ableism **can enrich our understanding of the** production of vulnerability and the **terms of engagement in** civic **life** and the possibilities of social inclusion. I now turn to unpacking the nuances and structure of a theory of ableism.

1. **Sociological subjectivity –** 
   1. **Only implications of social norms can determine how we ought to follow moral principles since there is nothing inherent about rules that definitionally tell you how to follow them.**
   2. **Hijacks their FW- If a subject is socially only excluded only looking at the mechanism that produceds those conditions allows for solvency**
2. **Ideal Theory fails -**
   1. **Every inclusive framework leaves someone out but our framework starts with the starting point of exclusion which means collapses to the aff framework and changing the framework moots 6 mins of offense and skews my time 7-13**

#### Infinitely Regressive: an ideal theory requires another ideal theory and so on and on to justify itself – only non-ideal theory can have a grounded stasis point – empirical reality

#### Prioritize structural violence against the disabled – their impact claims only gain coherence through the conception of an ablebodied liberal subject who has value that can be lost in the first place

Colebrook 17 [Claire Colebrook, 2017, acclaimed Australian cultural theorist, currently appointed Edwin Erle Sparks Professor of English at Pennsylvania State University, “Lives Worth Living: Extinction, Persons, Disability,” <https://www.academia.edu/19843360/Lives_Worth_Living> /accessed 1-17-19]//Juice

What is the relationship between extinction and disability? One of the ways in which we might think about disability and disability studies is as requiring an expansion of conditions of justice; this is how Martha Nussbaum has criticized the liberal tradition of fairness and personhood. We should, she argues, extend considerations of fairness to include those who care for others. If we think about a world that enables human capacities and ﬂourishing, then we need to look beyond autonomous and self-deﬁning individuals. Disability considerations would both enhance and extend the range of political compassion, enabling a notion of persons that is not merely that of the abstract political subject, but a being with capacities and dignity; capacities are richer and more varied than our narrow notion of person currently allows (2006). For Nussbaum we will live in a better world if we expand our notion of capacity and what counts as a ﬂourishing human life. In what follows I want to reverse this relation, and rather than expand capacities and justice to allow for disability (with disability being the secondary consideration), I want to see disability as the primary or transcendental condition from which the supposedly “normal” person derives, and further to see the long history of the “normal” subject as directly intertwined with the accelerated extinction of humans and non-humans. If one considers the subject of capacities from which Nussbaum begins her critique – the liberal person, blessed with reason, autonomy, “favorable” social conditions and an enlightened milieu of political deliberation – one would needs to recognize the long history of enslavement (of humans and non-humans), exploitation, appropriation and colonization that made even the thought of the just society possible. Disability is not an added on concern but is precisely what orients, if silently, the problem of extinction. One might say, that “human” existence is constitutively disabled (or, to follow Bernard Stiegler, that its default condition is dependence upon a broad network of technologies and archives that have never been equally distributed (Stiegler 1998, 122). Further, the capacities that enable the “able” person have cost, and continue to cost, the earth. Those lives that are (to borrow from Nick Bostrom [2013]) “technologically immature”, may perhaps not be lamentable and to be avoided at all costs, but perhaps oﬀer a trajectory for life that is not necessarily that of extinction. Even though the speciﬁc concepts of extinction and disability are rarely explicitly linked the two concepts are inextricably intertwined in discussions of what counts as a life worth living. Indeed, the grand Socratic notion that the unexamined life is not worth living, is not only normative (which is almost unavoidable) but normalizing : to privilege the life of examination is to open up a history that will generate the individual, reﬂective, deliberative and rational subject, but to make a claim about a life not worth living is to hint at the long history that will extinguish, eliminate, harness and evaluate unworthy lives, and will do so precisely by way of capacity. Outside explicit work on extinction and outside the rich ﬁeld of disability studies it is possible to ﬁnd constant and complex linkages between the question of the worth of life (its capacity or ability) and whether such a life ought to exist. Many such arguments are utilitarian; and while utilitarianism might seem to be but one branch of (analytic) philosophy, part of my argument will be that as a conception of the liberal subject of capacity gains ascendency and takes on increasing value in neo-liberal arguments for autonomy, and as the planet faces accelerated and mass extinction, a utilitarian logic becomes increasingly dominant. Utilitarianism is a motif that will necessarily haunt questions of extinction and capacity: as resources and the capacity to survive become threatened decisions will need to be made regarding the worth of life. Precisely in this respect it is utilitarianism that has also articulated the most oﬀensive position on disability. By oﬀensive, here, I am not referring to an aﬀect or emotion, but rather – as in the manner of a military oﬀensive – a direct and forthright targeting of what has been set aside as “ disabled. Here, it might seem that a utilitarian approach is partial, and that there are other ethical paradigms, which of course there are; but I want to argue that the extreme positions that utilitarianism has yielded, bring to the fore what is implicit in a broader history of ethics focused on personhood and a life worth living. One of the objections to calculations of utility would be by way of a deeper or inviolable conception of the person, but this too relies upon distinguishing between what counts as “utility” and what would warrant a mode of “dignity” beyond calculation. For Nussbaum, the key stakes of justice lie in considering what counts as a digniﬁed life, where dignity includes capacities that extend beyond social utility and mutual advantage. Her claim is that dignity should be the basis for social entitlements, and that we attribute dignity not for rational and active powers, but for “our” animal fragility: “bodily need, including the need for care, is a feature of our rationality and our sociability; it is one aspect of our dignity, then, rather than something to be contrasted with it” (2006, 160). This is perhaps why Nussbaum’s title refers to “species membership,” as though feeling and caring for one’s kind (which would, in part, include non-human animals) is not only a recognition of dignity, but digniﬁes one’s own life. To suﬀer, to be fragile is to possess a life worth living. Here, Nussbaumrefers to the value and enhancement (beyond strict utility) of caring for others, and of having social relationships with those whose capacities are not those of the classic rational individual; her approach on capacities “includes the advantage of respecting the dignity of people with mental disabilities and developing their human potential, whether or not this potential is socially “useful” in the narrower sense. It includes, as well, the advantage of understanding humanity and its diversity that comes from associating with mentally disabled people on terms of mutual respect and reciprocity” (2006,147). Nussbaum presents her account as a broadening of theories of human justice by way of a more classical conception of the life worth living, one not reduced to narrow notions of mutual advantage. Even though her discourse and disciplinary terrain might appear to be strictly philosophical, the very mode of posing the question of what we owe to a life is really (ultimately) the question that presses itself upon human civilization now, and always. As “we” look to the future and the sixth great extinction event the question of who and what survives will be imposed upon us. Utilitarian approaches to this question are, as I have already suggested, oﬀensive, but they are because they disclose something oﬀensive – or combative, violent, conquering – in the philosophical tradition of digniﬁed humanity and the life worth living. In this respect, disability is neither a recent nor a local concern: the very formation of the Greek polity is based on the exclusion of those with lesser capacities. Even though, as Lennard Davis (2013) has argued, the notion of the “normal” body is very recent and is quite diﬀerent from earlier cultures’ conception of an ideal body that no actual member of the species achieves, the exclusion of those who do not possess the proper potentiality of political humanity has been at the basis of the history of the Western polity. When Nussbaum argues for an expanded sense of capacities she nevertheless, and necessarily, maintains the question of the life worth living. This classic philosophical question always and necessarily invokes ability, or, more accurately, disability, and this in two respects. Not only are subjects deﬁned by way of powers (of reason, deliberation and empathy), those capacities in turn are enabled by a history of technologies and archives upon which “able” subjects are increasingly dependent. At the very least, deﬁnitions of proper political persons rely upon quite speciﬁc capacities that, even in expanded scenarios are not all-inclusive. More importantly, the quite speciﬁc concept of the liberal, deliberative, rational and empathetic subject depends upon a history of “enlightenment” that disabled many lives, either by way of exclusion, colonialism, resource depletion, or expropriation. In a world where not all lives matter to the same extent, the concept of disability is precisely what enables political inclusion, privilege and personhood. When Peter Singer argues, in a manner that appears to be exceptional, and exceptionally oﬀensive that rationality and autonomy (and not species membership) are the capacities that would preclude us from being right in killing another human being, he is taking part in a far broader oﬀensive that is deﬁnitive of the philosophical epoch oriented around the question of the life worth living. Not only is the question of the life worth living oﬀensive (in its implicit generation of an unworthy life), the life worth living is a life of dependence and incapacity, generated through a history of enlightenment that is a history of appropriation, plundering, brigandry, excessive consumption and energy proﬂigacy. Could we have the able political subject of deliberation and reason without the planet-destructive history of industrialism and globalism that at once enables and disables what has come to be known as humanity? Could there have been a tradition of “the life worth living” without a global industry that generated unworthy and dis-abled lives? And is not the question of the life worth living, the capable life, intertwined essentially with dependence and incapacity? What I want to question here is whether such a question can have any coherence at all in an epoch of extinction: to ask about lives worth living is necessarily to be oﬀensive, asserting some lives over others, and thereby waging violence (however slow) against some forms of life. If, as I would also argue, any epoch of thriving and fecundity takes place at the expense of some lives, then all ages are ages of extinction. What makes our time – the sixth mass extinction – more intense is that questions that have always haunted political personhood are now becoming more explicit. The interrelated problem of capacity and extinction has not only determined the human lives that are deemed to be worth living, but has also generated the liberal political person whose autonomy, productivity, super-intelligence and heightened capacity for urbanity is the “Anthropos” of the Anthropocene, the “man” whose cost to the planet is too exorbitant to reckon (Luke 2015). When (today) utilitarian arguments are explicitly oﬀensive, or make the claim that some lives ought not be lived, they reveal the oﬀensive (combative, polemical, violent, barbaric, sacriﬁcial) nature of what has called itself civilization. If this civilization, today, is facing extinction and therefore pressed – more than ever – to consider ways of “weighing lives,” it may either continue with ever more nuanced and expanded conceptions of the worth of life, or it may regard this question itself as an indictment of the very rationality it seeks to save. Phrased diﬀerently, we might say that the problem of disability runs to the very heart of the extinction-logic that enables the political tradition of the person. Both those who assume that the human species – because of certain capacities – has a prima facie right to survive, and those who calculate that human life as such is not worth living (for all their seeming extremity) are expressions of a broader logic of the proper potentiality of a highly normative conception of human ﬂourishing. As an example of the prima facie “right to humanity,” I would cite Rebecca Newberger Goldstein’s defense of Sellars and philosophical progress. The rational image we have of ourselves, even when at odds with scientiﬁc evidence about the irrational causes of our behavior, will generate on ongoing history of coherence and inclusion, where the rational “we” extends itself to value others: Gregarious creatures that we are, our framework of making ourselves coherent to ourselves commits us to making ourselves coherent to others. Having reasons means being prepared to share them—though not necessarily with everyone. The progress in our moral reasoning has worked to widen both the kinds of reasons we oﬀer and the group to whom we oﬀer them. There can’t be a widening of the reasons we give in justifying our actions without a corresponding widening of the audience to which we’re prepared to give our reasons. Plato gave arguments for why Greeks, under the pressures of war, couldn’t treat other Greeks in abominable ways, pillaging and razing their cities and taking the vanquished as slaves. But his reasons didn’t, in principle, generalize to non-Greeks, which is tantamount to denying that non-Greeks were owed any reasons. Every increase in our moral coherence—recognizing the rights of the enslaved, the colonialized, the impoverished, the imprisoned, women, children, LGBTs, the handicapped ...—is simultaneously an expansion of those to whom we are prepared to oﬀer reasons accounting for our behavior. The reasons by which we make our behavior coherent to ourselves changes together with our view of who has reasons coming to them.And this is progress, progress in increasing our coherence, which is philosophy’s special domain. In the case of manumission, women’s rights, children’s rights, gay rights, criminals’ rights, animal rights, the abolition of cruel and unusual punishment, the conduct of war—in fact, almost every progressive movement one can name—it was reasoned argument that ﬁrst laid out the incoherence, demonstrating that the same logic underlying reasons to which we were already committed applied in a wider context. The project of rendering ourselves less inconsistent, initiated by the ancient Greeks, has left those ancient Greeks, even the best and brightest of them, far behind, just as our science has left their scientists far behind. This kind of progress, unlike scientiﬁc progress, tends to erase its own tracks as it is integrated into our manifest image and so becomes subsumed in the framework by which we conceive of ourselves (Newberger Goldstein 2014). For all its manifest worthiness the notion of a progressive “self-image” that gains in progressive global coherence, alongside scientiﬁc progress, sees its path of self-correction as improving with more and more human life taking part in the journey of development. One could make the rather obvious point that such a notion of “progress” by way of inclusion and ongoing “self-image” precludes other ways of thinking about human and non-human life that do not involve self-image (or some shared normative conception of “the human”); but in addition to the colonialist mentality of self-justiﬁcation, one might ask about the price paid for such a history of philosophical progress. Would not other modes of life – such as those without an over-investment in “self-image” or “the” human – have generated a quite diﬀerent history of the planet? Such a question cannot be asked if a certain mode of human reason is an unquestioned good. But just as the inﬂation of human personhood precludes asking the question of the loss and extinction of other lives with other capacities, certain arguments for the extinction and annihilation of part or all of humanity also assume the value of the person – a single life with its speciﬁc coherence, value and meaning. (Not only is such a notion historically and culturally speciﬁc, and tied to a highly normative conception of human self-awareness; it is also this self with an unquestioned right to the “good life” of reﬂection, reason and self-determination that has generated the Anthropocene.)

### advocacy

#### I affirm Resolved: The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust. Spec and definitions in doc

The – “used to point forward to a following qualifying or defining clause or phrase”. Google. <https://www.google.com/search?q=the+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS877US877&oq=the+definition&aqs=chrome.0.69i59j69i64j69i61j69i60l2.2103j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8>

Appropriation – “an act or instance of appropriating something”. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/appropriation>

Of – “indicating an association between two entities, typically one of belonging”. <https://www.google.com/search?q=of+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS877US877&oq=of+definition&aqs=chrome..69i57j69i60.1494j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8>

Outer Space – “the physical universe beyond the earth's atmosphere”. <https://www.google.com/search?q=outer+space+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS877US877&oq=outer+space+definition&aqs=chrome..69i57j69i60.2363j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8>

By – “identifying the agent performing an action.”. <https://www.google.com/search?q=by+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS877US877&oq=by+definition&aqs=chrome.0.69i59.1433j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8>

Private Entity – “(A) In general Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the term “private entity” means any person or private group, organization, proprietorship, partnership, trust, cooperative, corporation, or other commercial or nonprofit entity, including an officer, employee, or agent thereof.”. <https://www.law.cornell.edu/definitions/uscode.php?width=840&height=800&iframe=true&def_id=6-USC-625312480-168358316&term_occur=999&term_src=title:6:chapter:6:subchapter:I:section:1501>

Unjust – “not morally right; not fair”. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/unjust>

#### The aff identifies appropriation as unjust

Webster ND Definition of IS," Merriam Webster, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/is> IS

is Definition of is (Entry 1 of 4) present tense third-person singular of BE dialectal present tense first-person and third-person singular of BE dialectal present tense plural of BE

#### Dialectical present tense means logical coherence which implies no implementation

Your Dictionary ND, , "Dialectical Meaning," No Publication, <https://www.yourdictionary.com/dialectical> Cho

The definition of dialectical is a discussion that includes logical reasoning and dialogue, or something having the sounds, vocabulary and grammar of a specific way of speaking. An example of something dialectical is a Lincoln Douglass style of debate, where both parties argue a point in a logical order. Of, or pertaining to dialectic; logically reasoned through the exchange of opposing ideas.

#### “BE” is a linking verb, not an action verb so implementation is incoherent

Grammar Monster ND "Linking Verbs," Grammar Monster, <https://www.grammar-monster.com/glossary/linking_verbs.htm> CHO

What Are Linking Verbs? (with Examples) A linking verb is used to re-identify or to describe its subject. A linking verb is called a linking verb because it links the subject to a subject complement (see graphic below). Infographic Explaining Linking Verb A linking verb tells us what the subject is, not what the subject is doing. Easy Examples of Linking Verbs In each example, the linking verb is highlighted and the subject is bold. Alan is a vampire. (Here, the subject is re-identified as a vampire.) Alan is thirsty. (Here, the subject is described as thirsty.)

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### Offense

#### 1) Traditional understandings of the space faring astronaut are dominated by transhumanist notions of overcoming human limitations and producing better human subjects. Rejecting narratives of overcoming is key to resist narratives that are seeped in eugenic

Boucher 18(Martin [PhD Candidate in Human Studies at Laurentian University. His work is primarily situated in disability studies and posthumanism, but he maintains an interest in the philosophy of social science and the history of ideas.] “Prostheticity, Disability, and Spaceflight”)/Jwala

Posthumanist theory is beginning to make a considerable impact on the theoretical foundations of Critical Disability Studies. To a certain extent there has been engagement with cyborg theory in this field for over a decade;1 however, more recently, work influenced by Rosi Braidotti’s The Posthuman has been gaining momentum.2 Given that the goal of this issue of Con Texte is to provide short reflections on posthuman topics, I will not summarize or explore these literatures in great detail. Instead, I will reflect on a question that came to me recently while watching the launch of Falcon Heavy, and will do it from the perspective of this latter stream of posthumanism in disability studies. The question I asked myself was: within the eventual goal—spearheaded by SpaceX and its CEO Elon Musk—of colonizing Mars, how do we interpret the astronaut from a posthuman critical disability perspective? What can we learn from disability about this futurist superhuman event and vice versa?

It seems to be the consensus in the space technology field that future Mars astronauts (or colonists) are already born. As I write this, the Austrian Space Forum (OeWF) is conducting an isolated Mars analogue mission on the Arabian Peninsula (Austrian Space Forum). At least for optimists, interplanetary travel is crossing from science fiction to science proper. Of the plethora of questions this raises, I will limit myself quite narrowly to a reflection on how we might modify our framework of understanding to capture the interaction with technology from both the perspective of the individual with a disability and that of the interplanetary astronaut.

In a sense, this paper has nothing to do with space travel. It is interested in the way we interpret the protagonist of such an adventure. For the transhumanist, technological advancement has endowed the human with the means to surpass himself towards a new and unrecognizable future—epitomized in the cosmo-colonist. The question of disability seems to be at the other extreme of the spectrum. Technology is not enhancement but correction towards the normal range of human limitations. In both cases, the difference is contingent on the acceptance of a foundational humanness with concrete limits. Critical posthumanism and critical posthuman disability studies challenges this foundation. As result, I will conclude that both the astronaut and the individual with a disability are congruent posthuman subjects insofar as a) their differentiation is contingent on a shaky natural-able human category, and b) they share the same originary and reflexive relationship with technology. Exploring this relationship can tell us something about how posthuman subjects may be understood more generally. However, within the limits of this special issue, this paper can only point us in the direction of a complete analysis. I will therefore focus primarily on a few works by Tamar Sharon and Dan Goodley and on the narrow questions of the congruency of the subjects mentioned above and the model of technology that can make sense of this relationship. However, it is important to recognize that exhausting the question posed here would require a much more detailed engagement with the work of these two authors among others.

One undeniable fact is that the astronaut’s survival and success is contingent on their relationship to a whole array of highly sophisticated technological machinery. Furthermore, the interplanetary astronaut depends on a large network of support staff, training infrastructure, political and social human investment, and tremendous economic wealth in order to eventually carry out their mission. The complex technological and human networks that exist to support one individual, on an International Space Station (ISS) spacewalk for example, lead us to think of these individuals as somehow surpassing the natural limits of the human animal. It is this idea of surpassing itself (i.e. going beyond nature) and the what that we are surpassing (i.e. natural human limits) that is at issue. The paradigm of critical posthumanism recognizes that (a) there is no fixed natural ‘human’ and so no natural limits to be surpassed, (b) all beings are interconnected and depend on networks of human, non-human, and inorganic entities—they are never stand alone agents, and (c) the novelty of survival in space, for example, is not a change in kind from other achievements, but a continued expression of the possibilities of life. This does give rise to new subjectivities, but not contradictory ones. Outside of such a posthumanism, the ‘disabled body’ is interpreted as the antithesis of the highly techno-enhanced interplanetary astronaut. They are both new and protean posthuman subjects, but one does not represent the overcoming of the other.

The prevailing idea of the natural human and its fixed limits and abilities has been intrinsically challenged from the critical disability perspective, because that subject—the individual with a disability—was not considered truly ‘human’ to begin with. This population has been subject to dehumanization through a collection of historical events such as freak shows, institutionalization, segregation in education, medical experimentations etc., because they represent the ‘other’ of the able-human and embody a problem to be solved. Prosthetics, surgical/pharmaceutical treatments, rehabilitation programs, service animals, social support workers, and community organizations are examples of technologies and networks that allows individuals living with a disability to attain the theoretical ‘natural ability’ of the human being. Although Critical Disability Studies challenges this latter idea of natural ability, it remains the prevailing interpretation outside of it. Alternatively, “disability has always demanded to be recognized not as lack but possibility”; moreover, we should “be careful not to be seduced by shiny technology when, on a more mundane level, we are already potentially enhancing our humanity through a myriad of inter-relationships” (Goodley, Lawthom, and Runswick-Cole 352). A critical understanding means a re-evaluation of how we interpret those technologies and relationships mentioned above.

We want to avoid a simplistic interpretation where individuals with disabilities are seen as lacking something and must be brought back to some kind of normalcy, and where the astronaut is someone who attained this normalcy and becomes exceptional by surpassing him or herself while leaving normalcy in their wake. From the perspective of lack (or suffering), the cold world of ableism is as frigid as the emptiness of space, and technology allows for the overcoming of these limiting factors. Alternatively, a positive view of disability sees these new ways of being as transgressing those limits with transformative results. We consider neither as lacking or exceptional—they are both typical posthuman subjects. Critical Posthumanism centres on the productive ambiguity that we ‘do not yet know what bodies can do.’3 Technology and new ways of interacting with each other lead to an expansion of possibilities and a substantive change in how people experience and relate to the world. This is equally true for the individual living with a disability and the astronaut depending on complex equipment to survive in space. Generally speaking, these insights emerge out of what Tamar Sharon calls Radical Posthumanism. Though there are many models of posthumanism, we will be relying on Sharon’s analysis here because it will allow us—within the parameters of this short work—to discuss three important orienting concepts: reflexivity, mediation, and prostheticity.

#### 1] The appropriation of space by private entities isn’t value neutral but is sutured in a discourse of the cosmic elite and unequal IR.

Stockwell 20 [Samuel Stockwell (Research Project Manager, the Annenberg Institute at Brown University). “Legal ‘Black Holes’ in Outer Space: The Regulation of Private Space Companies”. E-International Relations. Jul 20 2020. Accessed 12/7/21. <https://www.e-ir.info/2020/07/20/legal-black-holes-in-outer-space-the-regulation-of-private-space-companies/> //Xu]

#### The US government’s support for private space companies is also likely to lead to the reinforcement of Earth-bound wealth inequalities in space. Many NewSpace actors frame their long-term ambitions in space with strong anthropogenic undertones, by offering the salvation of the human race from impending extinction through off-world colonial developments (Kearnes & Dooren: 2017: 182). Yet, this type of discourse disguises the highly exclusive nature of these missions. Whilst they seem to suggest that there is a stake for ordinary citizens in the vast space frontier, the reality is that these self-described space pioneers are a member of a narrow ‘cosmic elite’ – “founders of Amazon.com, Microsoft, Pay Pal… and a smattering of games designers and hotel magnates” (Parker, 2009: 91). Indeed, private space enterprises have themselves suggested that they have no obligation to share mineral resources extracted in space with the global community (Klinger, 2017: 208). This is reflected in the speeches of individuals such as Nathan Ingraham, a senior editor at the tech site EngadAsteroid mining, who claimed that asteroid mining was “how [America is] going to move into space and develop the next Vegas Strip” (Shaer, 2016: 50). Such comments highlight a form of what Beery (2016) defines as ‘scalar politics’. In similar ways to the ‘scaling’ of unequal international relations that has constituted our relationship with outer space under the guise of the ‘global commons’ (Beery, 2016: 99), private companies – through their anthropogenic discourse – are scaling existing Earth-bound wealth inequalities and social relations into space by siphoning off extra-terrestrial

1. **Affirm as method of accomplishment**

**Calm Clinic 15** (Calm Clinic is an informational blog designed to educate the public on anxiety and assist those with anxiety. *Calm Clinic:* “Common Anxiety Triggers for Anxiety and Panic” copyright 2009-2015. Accessed July 24th, 2015.<http://www.calmclinic.com/anxiety/causes/triggers>) TheFedora

Lack of Goal Setting The mind and body often need certain emotions to stay sane. **Accomplishment and the idea that you're working towards something are actually a valuable tool** for keeping your anxiety at bay. If you're not goal setting and letting each day pass without a plan, you may find that you stop thinking about the future, and that can put you too much in the present.

### UDV

**1.Presumption and permissibility affirm –**

**a. Statements are true before false since if I told you my name, you’d believe me.**

**b. Epistemics – we wouldn’t be able to start a strand of reasoning since we’d have to question that reason.**

**c. Illogical – presuming statements false is illogical since you can’t say things like P and ~P are both wrong.**

#### 2.Reject new paradigm issues or/and new theory interpretations in the 2nr

#### (a) judge intervention – judges have to insert intervention to see if the 2NR shells are true enough to o/w the 2ar CI

#### (b) you can read 6 minutes of 2nr interps and the 3-minute 2ar becomes impossible.

# Acessiable formating1ac

### Framework

#### Subject formation relies on an autonomous separation of the body and the individual that excludes crips – within civil society, they can never express themselves as autonomous subjects able to move beyond their bodies – the only ethical demand is the end of subjectivity and to affirm crip subjectivity Braswell 11

**subjectivity defines the individual as a self-governing being The autonomous is master of (their) own body, (their) body is not synonymous with the self. "autonomy" is, prior to any application to persons with disabilities, saturated with ableist norms. deviant corporeality of the disabled body refused the dictates of the autonomous individual. visible dependence of persons with disabilities on social relations was opposite of the autonomous self's constitutive independence. disability represented destruction of autonomy Disability studies must propose an alternative conception of subjectivity, one based not in coherence, but rather in conflict. persons with disabilities, because of the conflictive nature of life in an ableist society, persistently devalue their own existence. neutral procedures produce the "autonomous" subject according to ableist norms. creates an articulation of subjectivity in which individuals exist separate and prior to prostheses. This self/body split is prejudiced against individuals who, cannot express themselves in terms that render them legible as autonomous subjects.**

**Society views those who don’t fit perfect mold as lesser human being. Thus the only way to truly understand Societal Oppression is through Disability.**

**Siebers 10**

**disabilities reduce person to former being: as “the master trope of disqualification to justify oppression by amplifying inferiority to minority identities. Aesthetics studies that, when bodies produce feelings they invite judgments in the community.. Disabled people, are killed because of beliefs aesthetics reveals disqualification in oppression prototype of inferiority is disability “Ableism” disqualifies differences, stigmatizing them as disabilities. in the frontier of inferiority**

**Thus  ROB is to vote for the debater who best challenges ableism**

**Prefer –**

1. **Assumptions of ableism are inherent in systems of knowledge production thus ableism is an a priori question \*A Campbell 13\*C**

**Ableism is** **seeded at the level of knowledge systems** **Ableism is not just** **negative attitudes it is a schema of perfection**, **a** **way of thinking about bodies**, **Compulsory ablebodiedness is implicated in the** **foundations of social theory**, **abledness is predicated on** **preexisting notion about the nature of typical** **functioning** **Ableism** **tells us what** **thinking and** **emotions are suitable to express**. **Reframing our focus** **can enrich our understanding of the terms of engagement in** **life**

1. **Sociological subjectivity –**
   1. **Only implications of social norms can determine how we ought to follow moral principles since there is nothing inherent about rules that definitionally tell you how to follow them.**
   2. **Hijacks their FW- If a subject is socially only excluded only looking at the mechanism that produceds those conditions allows for solvency**
2. **Topic ED- This specifies just and a just society would include people with disabilities.**
3. **Ideal Theory fails -**
   1. **Every inclusive framework leaves someone out but our framework starts with the starting point of exclusion**
   2. **Infinitely Regressive: an ideal theory requires another ideal theory and so on and on to justify itself – only non-ideal theory can have a grounded stasis point – empirical reality**

#### Prioritize structural violence against the disabled – their impact claims only gain coherence through the conception of an ablebodied liberal subject who has value that can be lost in the first place

Colebrook 17

see disability as the primary history of the “normal” subject as directly intertwined with the accelerated extinction of humans and non-humans one needs to recognize the history of exploitation that made even the thought of society possible. Disability is not an added on concern but is precisely what orients the problem of extinction the speciﬁc concepts of extinction and disability are intertwined in discussions of what counts as a life worth living as a conception of the liberal subject of capacity gains ascendency takes on increasing value in neo-liberal arguments for autonomy a utilitarian logic becomes increasingly dominant utilitarian arguments are explicitly oﬀensive they reveal the oﬀensive nature of “weighing lives we might say that the problem of disability runs to the very heart of the extinction-logic that enables the political tradition of the person such a notion of “progress” by way of inclusion and ongoing “self-image” precludes other ways of thinking about human and non-human life that do not involve self-image

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Your Dictionary ND,

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Boucher 18

#### ,how do we interpret the astronaut from a posthuman critical disability perspective? For transhumanist, technological advancement has endowed the human with the means to surpass towards a new future the difference is contingent on acceptance of a foundational humanness with concrete limits. Critical posthumanism challenges this foundation the astronaut’s survival and success is contingent on their relationship to highly sophisticated technological machinery The paradigm of critical posthumanism recognizes that there is no fixed natural ‘human’ and so no natural limits to be surpassed all beings are interconnected and they are never stand alone agents, and the novelty of survival in space , is not a change in kind from other achievements, but a continued expression of the possibilities of life. The prevailing idea of the natural human and its fixed limits and abilities has been challenged from the critical disability perspective, because that subject was not considered truly ‘human’ to begin with the cold world of ableism is as frigid as the emptiness of space, and technology allows for the overcoming of these limiting factors. a positive view of disability sees these new ways of being as transgressing those limits with transformative results.

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Stockwell 20

private space companies reinforce inequalities in space discourse disguises exclusive nature self-described space pioneers are a narrow ‘cosmic elite’ private enterprises suggest they have no obligation to share resources with the global community the ‘scaling’ of unequal international relations constituted relationship with outer space under guise of the ‘global commons’ scaling existing inequalities by siphoning off

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**Calm Clinic 15**

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