### 1

#### The desire to fill the insatiable lack creates experiences of impairment that structures the disability drive – cementing an order of signification that relies upon ableist value systems.

Mollow 15 [The Disability Drive by Anna Mollow A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in English in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Kent Puckett, Chair Professor Celeste G. Langan Professor Melinda Y. Chen Spring 2015. Anna Mollow received her Ph.D. in 2015 from the University of California, Berkeley, where she was an Andrew Vincent White and Florence Wales White Scholar and a UC Dissertation-Year Fellow. She is the coeditor, with Robert McRuer, of Sex and Disability (Duke UP, 2012) and the coeditor, with Merri Lisa Johnson, of DSM-CRIP (Social Text Online, 2013). Anna has published numerous articles on disability, queerness, feminism, race, and fatness. Her essays have appeared, or are forthcoming, in African American Review, Body Politics: Zeitschrift für Körpergeschichte, Hypatia: Journal of Feminist Philosophy, The Journal of Literary and Cultural Disability Studies, WSQ: Women’s Studies Quarterly, MELUS: Multi-Ethnic Literature of the United States, The Disability Studies Reader, Michigan Quarterly Review, the Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Critical and Cultural Theory, Disability Studies Quarterly, Bitch: Feminist Response to Pop Culture, Autostraddle, Everyday Feminism, and Huffington Post. // WHSRS and Lex VM]

Tropes of disability are also present in what Edelman reads as Jean Baudrillard‟s “panicky offensive against reproduction without heterogenital copulation,” in which sex is described as devolving into a “useless function” and humans are distinguished (unsuccessfully, Edelman argues) from “the order of the virus” (qtd. in Edelman 64, 62).111 Edelman‟s apt reading of these remarks by Baudrillard in relation to what was once called “the gay plague,” as well as his own plays on the word “bent,” suggest that it can be difficult, in homophobic and ableist culture, to distinguish between queerness and disability (62, 90).112 Anti-queer religious leaders, Edelman notes, characterize queer sexualities as “unhealthy” and “ugly,” and “ministries of hope” offer cures to those who have “grown sick-to-death of being queer” (91, 47). 113 Against the “pathology” or “social disease” as which queerness is diagnosed, queer-baiting of children, Edelman argues, functions as a form of “antigay immunization,” while the narrative of A Christmas Carol serves as an annual “booster shot” (143, 19, 49). These repetitive references to disability suggest that not only queerness but also disability might be a fitting name for what Edelman, alluding to the death drive, calls “the remainder of the Real internal to the Symbolic order” (25). Indeed, disability metaphors are often the closest approximations that Edelman can find for the “unnameable” death drive (25). The terms that Edelman uses to describe the death drive include “wound,” “fracture,” “stupid enjoyment,” “mindless violence,” “lifeless machinery,” “senseless compulsion,” “disfiguration,” and a “shutdown of life‟s vital machinery” (No Future 22; “Kid” 28; No Future 38, 23, 27, 38, 37, 44). Although these signifiers do not directly refer to specific impairments, they do, taken together, evoke the physical and mental injury and dysfunction as which disability is commonly understood. And then there is Edelman‟s term “sinthomosexuality,” a neologism formed by “grafting, at an awkward join,” the word “sexuality” onto Lacan‟s term “sinthome.” With its “awkward” “grafting,” the word “sinthomosexuality” embodies disability at the level of the letter.114 Etymologically, too, Edelman‟s term harkens back to disability: “sinthome” is an archaic way of spelling the French word for “symptom” (qtd. in Edelman 33). The root meaning of “sinthomosexuality,” then, is something like “symptom-sexuality.” However, Lacan‟s “sinthome” means more than simply “symptom”: it refers, Edelman explains, to “the particular way each subject manages to knot together the orders of the Symbolic, the Imaginary, and the Real” (35). The sinthome is the only means by which the subject can access the Symbolic order of meaning production; but paradoxically, because each subject‟s sinthome is arbitrary and meaningless (as individual as a fingerprint), the sinthome also threatens the Symbolic order to which it provides access (36). Both this access and this threat are figured as disability. In order to be constituted as a subject and to take one‟s place within the Symbolic order, one must be metaphorically blind: the cost of subjectivity is “blindness to this determination by the sinthome,” “blindness to the arbitrary fixation of enjoyment responsible for [the subject‟s] consistency,” “blindness” to the functioning of the sinthome (Edelman 36, 38). The alternative to subjectivity as disability would be, according to remarks that Edelman attributes to Lacan, “radical psychotic autism” (qtd. in Edelman 37).115 That is, whatever might alleviate our constitutive “blindness” by exposing “the sinthome as meaningless knot” must effect a “disfiguration” (Edelman 38), the consequences of which would be “pure autism” (Žižek 81, qtd. in Edelman 38). On the one side, blindness; on the other, disfiguration, psychosis, autism: when it comes to recognizing the senselessness of one‟s sinthome, it seems we‟re disabled if we do, disabled if we don‟t. This is why I have proposed that the “death drive”—a force that has less to do with literal death than with a strange persistence of life in death, or of death in life (perhaps like the “life not worth living” of which disability is often supposed to consist)—would more accurately be termed the “disability drive.” Writing of the contingency of disability as an identity category, Michael Bérubé observes: Any of us who identify as “nondisabled” must know that our self-designation is inevitably temporary, and that a car crash, a virus, a degenerative genetic disease, or a precedent-setting legal decision could change our status in ways over which we have no control whatsoever. If it is obvious why most nondisabled people resist this line of thinking, it should be equally obvious why that resistance must somehow be overcome. (viii) Could part of this resistance be attributable to a fear that, in the car crash or other identity- shattering event, it might be the driver‟s own hand that makes that disabling turn, that is, that the driver might be driven by an impulse, unwanted and unconscious, toward something beyond the principles of pleasure and health? Applying the name “the disability drive” to this “beyond” affords insight into the reasons that images of disability so powerfully excite and repel, becoming, as Tobin Siebers writes, “sources of fear and fascination for able-bodied people, who cannot bear to look at the unruly sight before them but also cannot bear not to look” (178). Later in this chapter, I will define the affect that Siebers references here as “primary pity.” For now, though, I simply want to point out that Siebers‟s important observation can be extended by noting that it is not only nondisabled people who react to images of disability with a mixture of aversion and attraction. Disabled people may also respond in this way, especially when contemplating impairments other than those that currently disable us.116 Building on Douglas Baynton‟s famous assertion that “disability is everywhere,...once you begin looking for it,” I suggest that the same may be true in regard to the disability drive: this ego-undoing psychic force shapes the subjectivities of disabled and nondisabled subjects alike (52). Manifestations of the disability drive may be present in Edelman‟s discussion of Tiny Tim. Take, for example, Edelman‟s contention that “the pleasurable fantasy of survival” in Dickens‟s story requires the survival of the fantasy that Tiny Tim “does not excite an ardent fear (or is it a fearful ardor?) to see him . . . at last cash in his chips” (45). It‟s a familiar cultural fantasy: cure ‟em (as Dickens might hope) or kill ‟em (as Edelman suggests readers must secretly wish).117 But in this unacknowledged wish, there may be more at stake than either killing or curing. In the chapter that follows his reading of A Christmas Carol, Edelman adduces Lacan‟s discussion of the legend of Saint Martin, who was said to have cut his own cloak in two in order to give half of it to a beggar. “Perhaps,” Lacan suggests, “over and above that need to be clothed, [the beggar] was begging for something else, namely that Saint Martin either kill him or fuck him” (qtd. in Edelman 83). Drawing upon this passage in his analysis of North by 72 Northwest, Edelman proposes that as Leonard attempts to push Roger Thornhill to his death from atop Mount Rushmore, he “enacts . . . the one [killing] as displacement of the other [fucking]” (85). Killing as displacement of fucking: might a similar displacement be at work in Edelman‟s attribution, to Dickens‟s readers, of a “fearful ardor” to see Tiny Tim “at last cash in his chips” (45)? As evidence for this suggestion, take the mode by which Edelman introduces his discussion of A Christmas Carol: “Take Tiny Tim, please!,” “with a nod to the spirit of the late Henny Youngman” renders Tiny Tim wifelike—clearly undesirable in this context, but not wholly uneroticized (41). And then there is the word “take,” which, particularly when followed by the word “please,” has a meaning other than the ones Edelman seems deliberately to invoke: “take” means “fuck,” and so Edelman‟s directive to “take Tiny Tim, please!,” which echoes his earlier injunction to “fuck Annie; fuck the waif from Les Mis; fuck the poor, innocent kid on the Net,” seems to authorize an additional imperative: fuck Tiny Tim. “Fuck” here means, of course, “remove” or “the hell with,” but it also means fuck.118 Arguably, these two ways in which No Future says “fuck Tiny Tim” coincide with what disability studies most ardently desires. “Fuck Tiny Tim, please!” disability scholars beg: rid us, please, of this most reviled textual creation. And also: if it is our cultural mandate to embody this pitiable, platitude-issuing, infantilized, and irritating figure—well, then fuck us, every one. Fuck us because figuratively, we are already “so fucked” by our culture‟s insistence, through this figure, that the disabled are not fuckable. This insistence must be understood as a form of reactive reinforcement: propelling every cultural representation of disability as undesirable, there may be a “fearful ardor,” an unacknowledged drive. Such representations include Edelman‟s abjection of Tiny Tim. And, I will argue, they also pertain to a similar abjection of Tiny Tim in the field of disability studies. As we shall soon see, the drive that infuses affective reactions to disability with ardor is often expressed through the emotion of pity. In taking account of the various forms that pity can take, we will be led to pose a question to disability studies and to queer antisocial theory together: are we sure that we want to take Tiny Tim out of the cultural text? A Tale of Two Pities “Piss on pity,” declares a well-known disability activist bumper sticker. A more polite companion to this tag, the slogan “No pity” is a rallying cry of the disability rights movement.119 For disability studies, a field that since its inception has vigorously resisted the imposition of pity upon disabled people, Tiny Tim is anathema. Understandably so: every year, the image of Tiny Tim is used to drum up pity for disabled people; the widespread circulation of this affect, disability scholars have compellingly argued, does not alleviate the social barriers that we face but instead reinforces our oppression. Indispensable as this disability studies analysis is, it leaves some important questions about pity unanswered. For example: if, as is commonly said, “No one wants to be pitied,” then why is this so? And also, if nobody wants to be pitied, who, if anyone, wants to feel pity? At first glance, the answer to the latter question might seem to be “everyone.” Certainly, multitudes of moviegoers appear to enjoy our culture‟s annual recitations of Tiny Tim‟s pity inducing tale. If it can be fun to perform pity, perhaps this is because pity gives a boost to the ego of the pitying person. “You are broken, and I am whole,” the pitier says to the one who is pitied. “I look down on you because you suffer.” Naturally, disabled people resist performing this service for the nondisabled. “Spare us your pity,” we say, because pity is felt to be demeaning. 73 Yet an incoherence structures this familiar account of pity: if pity fortifies the ego of the subject who feels it, then why do people so often resist feeling pity? Some folks get pissed when they are prodded to pity. “Your appeals to pity won‟t work,” they say. “I have no pity for you.” This is the attitude that Scrooge takes toward Tiny Tim. It‟s also the stance that Edelman invites queers to take in relation to the Child—and not only to the Child per se, but also to anyone who calls for a performance of pity. Edelman argues that compassion (which, of course, is a close relative of pity) is fundamentally narcissistic (73). When we call ourselves compassionate, we think we‟re feeling for the other; but, Edelman contends, we‟re really only feeling for ourselves (83). That is, compassion involves projecting one‟s own ego onto the object of one‟s compassion. In this schema, the pitied person is used as a vehicle for the pitier to feel sorry for his or her own self.

#### There is a two-tiered affective reaction when confronted with disability – primary pity damages the egos’ ability status, which invokes secondary pity to overcorrect for the threat.

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A great deal of the pain and pleasure of primary pity center on questions about what, or who, this fallen self is. When most people think about pity, we refer to an affect in which, to adopt Edelman‟s phrase, we purport to “feel for the other.” But as with primary narcissism, in which the self has not yet been constituted, and therefore cannot be said to enter into intersubjective relations with an “other,” primary pity entails a mixing up of self and other such that the ego, in becoming permeable to pain that may properly belong to “someone else,” is profoundly threatened in its integrity. Primary pity is that intense pain-pleasure complex that is provoked by the image of a suffering other who, it seems momentarily, both is and is not one‟s self. This affective response can feel unbearable, as seen in Siebers‟s formulation: one “cannot bear to look…but also cannot bear not to look.” Primary pity is difficult to bear because it involves a drive toward disability (one cannot bear not to look), which menaces the ego‟s investments in health, pleasure, and control—because to contemplate another person‟s suffering is to confront the question, “Could this happen to me?” Such a prospect, although frightening, may also be compelling; in this way, primary pity replicates the self-rupturing aspects of sexuality. Indeed, the unbearability of primary pity reflects its coextensiveness with sexuality. Sex, or the Unbearable, a book coauthored by Edelman and by Lauren Berlant, argues that sex “unleashes unbearable contradictions that we nonetheless struggle to bear” (back cover). This claim accords with Freud‟s account of sexuality as a “pleasurable” “unpleasure” that the ego can never fully master or control (Three 49,75). As Leo Bersani puts it in his reading of Freud, “the pleasurable unpleasurable tension of sexual enjoyment occurs when the body‟s „normal‟ range of sensation is exceeded, and when the organization of the self is momentarily disturbed”; thus, “sexuality would be that which is intolerable to the structured self” (Freudian 38). Primary pity is also intolerable to the structured self, because it entails a fascination with the fantasy of a self in a state of disintegration or disablement. Secondary pity is something else, although it cannot wholly be differentiated from primary pity. Secondary pity attempts to heal primary pity‟s self-rupturing effects by converting primary pity into a feeling that is bearable. As with secondary narcissism, secondary pity involves both an attempt to get back to that ego-shattering state of painfully pleasurable primary pity, and at the same time to defend against that threat to the ego by aggrandizing oneself at someone else‟s expense. Secondary pity refers to all those ego-bolstering behaviors that most people think of when they talk about pity. Disabled people are all too familiar with these behaviors: the saccharin sympathy, the telethon rituals of “conspicuous contribution,” the insistence that “they” (i.e., nondisabled people) could never endure such suffering. More commonly known in our culture simply as “pity,” secondary pity encompasses our culture‟s most clichéd reactions to disability: charity, tears, and calls for a cure. Correlatives of these commonplace manifestations of secondary pity are the obligatory claims that disabled people‟s suffering is “inspiring.” Indeed, the speed with which conventional cultural representations of disability segue from overt expressions of pity to celebrations of “the triumph of the human spirit” highlights the ways in which secondary pity, as a defense against primary pity‟s incursions, reinforces the ego‟s fantasy of sovereignty. Secondary pity, in other words, can be seen as a variation of secondary narcissism: these affects enlarge the ego of the pitier or the narcissist at the expense of someone else. But primary pity is not the same as either primary narcissism, secondary narcissism, or secondary pity. Unlike primary narcissism, a feeling that emerges out of a relation to the world in which notions of “self” and “other” do not obtain, primary pity does depend upon the constructs of self and other, although these constructions are unstable and are continually threatening to come undone. Primary pity can thus be envisioned as a threshold category occupying a liminal position between the total denial of the other that is inherent to primary narcissism and the rigid structure of (superior) self and (inferior) other that constitutes secondary narcissism and secondary pity. My concept of primary versus secondary pity also differs from Freud‟s primary secondary narcissism distinction at the level of genealogy. Like Freud‟s account of primary and secondary narcissisms, my model of primary and secondary pities involves a temporal transition; but whereas Freud imagines the movement from primary to secondary narcissism as a passage from an earlier to a later stage of an individual‟s development, the temporal shift from primary to secondary pity happens much more quickly than this. It happens in an instant: that moment in which we feel primary pity and then, almost before we can blink, deny that we feel or have felt it. The denial is understandable: who wants to admit that one gets pleasure from the sight of another person‟s suffering—or, to make matters worse, that this pleasure derives in part from the specter of disability‟s transferability, the possibility that this suffering could be—and, fantasmatically, perhaps already is—an image of one‟s own self undone?

#### The 1ACs belief of a better future is tied to rehabilitation where the signifier of the Child is placed forward to demean disabled people.

Mollow 3 [The Disability Drive by Anna Mollow A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in English in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Kent Puckett, Chair Professor Celeste G. Langan Professor Melinda Y. Chen Spring 2015. Anna Mollow received her Ph.D. in 2015 from the University of California, Berkeley, where she was an Andrew Vincent White and Florence Wales White Scholar and a UC Dissertation-Year Fellow. She is the coeditor, with Robert McRuer, of Sex and Disability (Duke UP, 2012) and the coeditor, with Merri Lisa Johnson, of DSM-CRIP (Social Text Online, 2013). Anna has published numerous articles on disability, queerness, feminism, race, and fatness. Her essays have appeared, or are forthcoming, in African American Review, Body Politics: Zeitschrift für Körpergeschichte, Hypatia: Journal of Feminist Philosophy, The Journal of Literary and Cultural Disability Studies, WSQ: Women’s Studies Quarterly, MELUS: Multi-Ethnic Literature of the United States, The Disability Studies Reader, Michigan Quarterly Review, the Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Critical and Cultural Theory, Disability Studies Quarterly, Bitch: Feminist Response to Pop Culture, Autostraddle, Everyday Feminism, and Huffington Post. // WHSRS and Lex VM]

Elsewhere, I have argued that No Future‟s impassioned polemic is one that disability studies might take to heart. Indeed, the figure that Edelman calls “the disciplinary image of the ‘innocent’ Child” is inextricable not only from queerness but also from disability (19). For example, the Child is the centerpiece of the telethon, a ritual display of pity that demeans disabled people. When Jerry Lewis counters disability activists‟ objections to his assertion that a disabled person is “half a person,” he insists that he is only fighting for the Children: “Please, I’m begging for survival. I want my kids alive,” he implores (in Johnson, Too Late 53, 58). If the Child makes an excellent alibi for ableism, perhaps this is because, as Edelman points out, the idea of not fighting for this figure is unthinkable. Thus, when Harriet McBryde Johnson hands out leaflets protesting the Muscular Dystrophy Association, a confused passerby cannot make sense of what her protest is about. “You‟re against Jerry Lewis!” he exclaims (61). The passerby’s surprise is likely informed by a logic similar to that which, in Edelman‟s analysis, undergirds the use of the word “choice” by advocates of legal abortion: “Who would, after all, come out for abortion or stand against reproduction, against futurity, and so against life?” (16). Similarly, why would anyone come out for disability, and so against the Child who, without a cure, might never walk, might never lead a normal life, might not even have a future at all? The logic of the telethon, in other words, relies on an ideology that might be defined as “rehabilitative futurism,” a term that I coin to overlap and intersect with Edelman‟s notion of “reproductive futurism.” If, as Edelman maintains, the future is envisaged in terms of a fantasmatic “Child,” then the survival of this future-figured-as-Child is threatened by both queerness and disability. Futurity is habitually imagined in terms that fantasize the eradication of disability: a recovery of a “crippled” or “hobbled” economy, a cure for society’s ills, an end to suffering and disease. Eugenic ideologies are also grounded in both reproductive and rehabilitative futurism: procreation by the fit and elimination of the disabled, eugenicists promised, would bring forth a better future.” (68-69)

#### The alternative is to analyze the disability drive — it comes to terms with the existence of the drive and shatters the fantasy of the ego. Anything else only displaces the lack onto other oppressed groups. The ROTB is to question ideological optimism in the classroom.

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Questions about activism press us further, too. In using the lenses of psychoanalysis and literary theory to delineate aspects of the cultural politics of disability, I have not laid out a guideline or program for resisting ableist social structures. I have sought instead to show how developing an understanding of the disability drive—and, in particular, attending to the violences that result from individuals‟ and cultures‟ misrecognitions of the drive—may facilitate transformations in how we conceive of our subjectivities. Such transformations, deeply indebted to the feminist maxim that the personal is political, are not individual solutions akin to the overcoming narrative. Rather, by changing how we understand our “insides,” we may contribute to changing the ways that, “outside,” on the level of the social, we relate to each other. As we saw in Chapter 4, something as seemingly personal as an individual‟s “relationship to food” can raise vexing questions that, when we deny that within ourselves that drives these questions, become the basis of damaging social structures of fatphobia, racism, classism, misogyny, and anti-queer prejudice. If the drive won‟t stop doing us, is it possible that we can allow it to do us differently? In the last paragraph of this dissertation, on the day that it is due, I feel as if I should leave you with a message to take home: perhaps a user‟s guide to the drive, a method for learning to love this thing that won‟t leave us. If I were a queer antisocial theorist, I might propose that we shout out, loud and proud, something like this: “We‟re here! We‟re queer! We are the drive! And you‟ll never get used to us!” But such a call, we saw in Chapter 1, performs a fantasy of overcoming the drive by identifying with it (if you can‟t beat it, join it); and the drive is not a force that can be overcome. Were I to articulate my own version of a saying evoking the feeling of the drive, it would go more like this: “Come on; we‟re late; let‟s go—oh no, where are my keys!?” To be clear, I am the last person who should offer advice about handling the loss of one‟s keys. I know the recommendations—stay calm; breathe; retrace your steps—but rarely do I heed them. For me, it‟s closer to: Panic! Berate self! Look for someone to blame! I have no guide for getting over this set of reactions, but I do want to say this: “The Disability Drive” has been an invitation to think collectively about the ways that, when we feel we cannot bear the psychic or social equivalents of losing our keys (keys potentially serving as metaphors for other objects, the loss of which might be more devastating), the impetus to blame someone else can harden into a fixed idea, a truth that one refuses to relinquish. We have analyzed multiple examples of this process: fat people stigmatized as “compulsive eaters,” feminists caricatured as anti-sex identitarians, and chronically ill people dismissed as “hysterical.” If this dissertation has a moral, it is this: the intolerable feeling that arises when we lose keys, control, or other objects that we think we need in order to believe in our selves, originates not from outside us but from within. This is the drive: it always has its keys in hand. We are not done with the drive.

#### Disability is the master trope for all forms of oppression on the basis of inferiority – involuntary aesthetics disqualify humans based on their ability.

Siebers 10 [Tobin Siebers, Department of English Language and Literature at the University of Michigan; “The Aesthetics of Human Disqualification”; University of Michigan Press; 10/28/2010; accessed 07/30/19 // WHSRS]

**Disqualification as a symbolic process removes individuals from the ranks of quality human beings, putting them at risk of unequal treatment, bodily harm, and death**. That people may be subjected to violence if they do not achieve a prescribed level of quality is an injustice rarely questioned. In fact, even though we may redefine what we mean by quality people, for example as historical minorities are allowed to move into their ranks, we have not yet ceased to believe that nonquality human beings do exist and that they should be treated differently from people of quality. Harriet McBryde Johnson’s debate with Peter Singer provides a recent example of the widespread belief in the existence of nonquality human beings (Johnson). Johnson, a disability activist, argues that all disabled people qualify as persons who have the same rights as everyone else. Singer, a moral philosopher at Princeton University, claims to the contrary that people with certain disabilities should be euthanized, especially if they are thought to be in pain, because they do not qualify as persons. Similarly, Martha Nussbaum, the University of Chicago moral philosopher, establishes a threshold below which “a fully human life, a life worthy of human dignity,” is not possible (181). In particular, she notes that **the onset of certain disabilities may reduce a person to the status of former human being**: “we may say of some conditions of a being, let us say a permanent vegetative state of a (former) human being, that this just is not a human life at all” (181). Surprisingly **little thought and energy have been given to disputing the belief that nonquality human beings do exist**. This belief is so robust that it supports the most serious and characteristic injustices of our day. **Disqualification at this moment in time justifies discrimination, servitude, imprisonment, involuntary institutionalization, euthanasia, human and civil rights violations, military intervention, compulsory sterilization, police actions, assisted suicide, capital punishment, and murder**. It is my contention that disqualification finds support in the way that bodies appear and in their specific appearances—that is, **disqualification is justified through the accusation of mental or physical inferiority based on aesthetic principles**. Disqualification is produced by naturalizing inferiority as the justification for unequal treatment, violence, and oppression. According to Snyder and Mitchell, **disability serves in the modern period as “the master trope of human disqualification**.” They argue that disability represents a marker of otherness that establishes differences between human beings not as acceptable or valuable variations but as dangerous deviations. Douglas Baynton provides compelling examples from the modern era, explaining that during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the United States disability identity disqualified other identities defined by gender, race, class, and nationality. **Women were deemed inferior because they were said to have mental and physical disabilities. People of color had fewer rights than other persons based on accusations of biological inferiority. Immigrants were excluded from entry into the United States when they were poor, sick, or failed standardized tests**, even though the populations already living there were poor, sick, and failed standardized tests. In every case, **disability identity served to justify oppression by amplifying ideas about inferiority already attached to other minority identities. Disability is the trope by which the assumed inferiority of these other minority identities achieved expression**. The appearance of lesser mental and physical abilities disqualifies people as inferior and justifies their oppression. It is now possible to recognize disability as a trope used to posit the inferiority of certain minority populations, but it remains extremely difficult to understand that mental and physical markers of inferiority are also tropes placed in the service of disability oppression. Before disability can be used as a disqualifier, disability, too, has to be disqualified. Beneath the troping of blackness as inbuilt inferiority, for example, lies the troping of disability as inferior. Beneath the troping of femininity as biological deficiency lies the troping of disability as deficiency. **The mental and physical properties of bodies become the natural symbols of inferiority via a process of disqualification that seems biological, not cultural—which is why disability discrimination seems to be a medical rather than a social problem.** If we consider how difficult it is at this moment to disqualify people as inferior on the basis of their racial, sexual, gender, or class characteristics, we may come to recognize the ground that we must cover in the future before we experience the same difficulty disqualifying people as inferior on the basis of disability. We might also recognize the work that disability performs at present in situations where race, sexuality, gender, and class are used to disqualify people as physically or mentally inferior. **Aesthetics studies the way that some bodies make other bodies feel. Bodies, minimally defined, are what appear in the world. They involve manifestations of physical appearance,** whether this appearance is defined as the physical manifestation itself or as the particular appearance of a given physical manifestation. Bodies include in my definition human bodies, paintings, sculpture, buildings, the entire range of human artifacts as well as animals and objects in the natural world. Aesthetics, moreover, has always stressed that **feelings produced in bodies by other bodies are involuntary, as if they represented a form of unconscious communication between bodies**, a contagious possession of one body by another. Aesthetics is the domain in which the sensation of otherness is felt at its most powerful, strange, and frightening. Whether the effect is beauty and pleasure, ugliness and pain, or sublimity and terror, the emotional impact of one body on another is experienced as an assault on autonomy and a testament to the power of otherness. Aesthetics is the human science most concerned with invitations to think and feel otherwise about our own influence, interests, and imagination. Of course, **when bodies produce feelings of pleasure or pain, they also invite judgments about whether they should be accepted or rejected in the human community.** People thought to experience more pleasure or pain than others or to produce unusual levels of pleasure and pain in other bodies are among the bodies most discriminated against, actively excluded, and violated on the current scene, be they disabled, sexed, gendered, or racialized bodies. **Disabled people, but also sex workers, gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered people, and people of color, are tortured and killed because of beliefs about their relationship to pain and pleasure** (Siebers 2009). This is why **aesthetic disqualification is not merely a matter for art critics or museum directors but a political process of concern to us all.** An understanding of **aesthetics** is crucial because it **reveals the operative principles of disqualification used in minority oppression**. Oppression is the systematic victimization of one group by another. It is a form of intergroup violence. That oppression involves “groups,” and not “individuals,” means that it concerns identities, and this means, furthermore, that oppression always focuses on how the body appears, both on how it appears as a public and physical presence and on its specific and various appearances. Oppression is justified most often by the attribution of natural inferiority—what some call “in-built” or “biological” inferiority. Natural inferiority is always somatic, focusing on the mental and physical features of the group, and it figures as disability. **The prototype of biological inferiority is disability. The representation of inferiority always comes back to the appearance of the body and the way the body makes other bodies feel**. This is why the study of **oppression requires an understanding of aesthetics—not only because oppression uses aesthetic judgments for its violence but also because the signposts of how oppression works** are visible in the history of art, where aesthetic judgments about the creation and appreciation of bodies are openly discussed. One additional thought must be noted before I treat some analytic examples from the historical record. First, despite my statement that disability now serves as the master trope of human disqualification, **it is not a matter of reducing other minority identities to disability identity. Rather, it is a matter of understanding the work done by disability in oppressive systems.** In disability oppression, **the physical and mental properties of the body are socially constructed as disqualifying defects, but this specific type of social construction happens to be integral at the present moment to the symbolic requirements of oppression in general**. In every oppressive system of our day, I want to claim, the oppressed identity is represented in some way as disabled, and although it is hard to understand, the same process obtains when disability is the oppressed identity. “**Racism” disqualifies on the basis of race, providing justification for the inferiority of certain skin colors**, bloodlines, and physical features. “**Sexism” disqualifies on the basis of** sex/gender as a direct representation of **mental and physical inferiority.** “**Classism” disqualifies on the basis of family lineage** and socioeconomic power **as proof of inferior genealogical status. “Ableism” disqualifies on the basis of mental and physical differences, first selecting and then stigmatizing them as disabilities**. The oppressive system occults in each case the fact that the disqualified identity is socially constructed, a mere convention, representing signs of incompetence, weakness, or inferiority as undeniable facts of nature. As racism, sexism, and classism fall away slowly as justifications for human inferiority—and the critiques of these prejudices prove powerful examples of how to fight oppression—the prejudice against disability remains in full force, providing seemingly credible reasons for the belief in human inferiority and the oppressive systems built upon it. This usage will continue, I expect, until we reach a historical moment when we know as much about the social construction of disability as we now know about the social construction of race, class, gender, and sexuality. **Disability represents at this moment in time the final frontier of justifiable human inferiority.**

### Case

#### theorizing disability through gradations of debility moves away from a stable conception of disability and allows us to explicitly critique U.S. imperialism while maintaining a larger theory of how power operates. Puar 17

“The Right to Maim: Debility, Capacity, Disability” 2017 // UTDD

”Phenomenological elaborations of **the multiplicity of material embodiment of bodies with disabilities** and the political stakes in the liberatory facets of bodily difference notwithstanding, I join a growing chorus of scholars and activists who urge greater attention not only to how disabled bodies are maintained in difference and hierarchy but also to how disabled bodies are solicited and manufactured. This is a crucial facet of disability that **complicates** the **exceptionalism** of certain kinds of disabilities and disabled bod- ies **with attention to debilitation as a primary activity of capitalist global expansion. Theorizing** these two together—**the biopolitics of disability and** the biopolitics of **debilitation—demands nothing less than the crafting of a scholarly platform that seeks to address and attempts to eliminate the local and global conditions of inequality that give rise to** the incidence of much—if not most—of **the world’s disability**. A disability justice approach, as many have argued, **is** unequivocally antiwar, pro-labor, antiracist, prison abolitionist, and **anti-imperialist.** This approach is **resolutely vigilant about critiquing U.S. imperialism both within the United States—as a settler colonial state—and internationally, as the director of the war on terror**, an occupier of Afghanistan and Iraq, and as the main entity legitimating and funding Israel’s settler colonial occupation of Palestine. There cannot be a focus on growing disability culture alone, for indeed this growth happens within the context of these imperial projects, is informed by them, and cannot be separated from them.11 Any flourishing of cultures of disability and disability pride must be evaluated in the context of these fissures in order to ask who is able to participate in empowerment discourses and practices and why.” (67)

#### Focusing on the jurisdiction of the settler state replicates a “logic of recognition”— this shifts from a focus on territory to a focus on the body, defining citizens through their descent alone. Instead, we should focus on relationality with non-indigenous populations in shared and overlapping territories—this is about a sensorial connection between bodies and territories. Powell 15

“The rainbow is our sovereignty: Rethinking the politics of energy on the Navajo Nation” Dana E. Powell 2015 // LHPDD

“Recent moves in political ecology, anthropology, and critical Native American/Indigenous studies (NAIS) are instructive here and deserve to be brought into orbit with one another. Some seek to rethink sovereignty in ways that challenge state-centric analyses, through support to global peasant and food sovereignty movements that challenge official discourses of food 'security' (Desmarais 2007); others consider 'graduated sovereignty' among Asian states (Ong 2006) and the insidious reincorporation of 'indigenous knowledge' by states involved in mapping and other territorial projects. These advance state authority (McCreary and Lamb 2014). Nonetheless, **the primary emphasis in most approaches to natural resource and environmental governance is the jurisdiction of the (settler) state. Often, this "cunning of recognition"** (Povenelli 2002) in fact **reflects** what Jean Dennison describes as **a settler colonial "logic of recognition"** (Dennison 2014). In her work on her own Osage Nation's shifting citizenship policies, Dennison details ethnographically how **this problematic logic dangerously shifts discourses of belonging and self- identification away from territory** (quite literally, the very ground on which the future is to be built), **favoring instead discourses of the body. With this shift, struggles to define citizen-selves through race, blood, and descent alone work to undermine indigenous nations' precarious relations with non-indigenous populations in shared or overlapping territories, and ultimately, Native nations' authority over their own land** (Dennison 2014). I argue, with Dennison, that **the politics of abandoning territorial notions of citizenship/sovereignty is part and parcel of settler colonial logics, creating the conditions for further erosion of indigenous authority over landscapes.** And yet, as I have found over the course of several years of research with and among Diné people, **there is a felt, lived, sensorial connection forged through practice between bodies and territories** on the Navajo Nation – so much so, that I emphasize here the lived dimension of territorial sovereignty. The embodiment is closer to Tim Ingold's discussion of dwelling and enskillment as part of belonging to a territory (Ingold 2011), **a phenomenological departure from** what Dennison critiques as **the more commodified, and ultimately divisive, identifiers of race, blood, and descent.**” (55)

**Extinction first**

#### 1 – Forecloses future improvement – we can never improve society because our impact is irreversible

#### 2 – Turns suffering – mass death causes suffering because people can’t get access to resources and basic necessities

#### 3 – Moral obligation – allowing people to die is unethical and should be prevented because it creates ethics towards other people

#### 4 – Objectivity – body count is the most objective way to calculate impacts because comparing suffering is unethical

#### 5 – Moral uncertainty – if we’re unsure about which interpretation of the world is true – we ought to preserve the world to keep debating about it

#### Space colonization solves extinction

Filling Space 19, 4-19, "Deflecting Existential Risk with Space Colonization," Filling Space, https://filling-space.com/2019/04/19/deflecting-existential-risk-with-space-colonization/

The first living organism on Earth emerged approximately three and a half billion years ago. Since then, life has evolved into countless forms and colonized the planet. But the story of life is not a rosy one. At least five mass extinctions have occurred, and nearly all species that have ever existed on our planet are now dead. One of the most well-understood mass extinctions occurred when the Alvarez asteroid impacted Earth and, likely combined with other factors, killed many dinosaurs and other species. Life then had no tools to detect the coming asteroid or to be able to plan proactively to ensure its survival. In order to avoid sharing the same fate as the dinosaurs, scholars argue that humans should become a multi-planetary species. We spoke with Professor Gonzalo Munevar, Emeritus Professor at Lawrence Technical University, to hear his thoughts on the existential risks we face and how colonization of the cosmos can help us address them. He has written extensively about the philosophy of space exploration and human consciousness. Why do you argue that “failure to move into the cosmos would condemn us to oblivion”? By having a significant presence in the solar system in the next few thousands of years and beyond, we will be in a better position to deflect asteroids and comets that might bring the end of humanity, and much other Earth life, in a horrible collision. And if perchance one such catastrophe proves inevitable (e.g. a rogue planet passing through the solar system), humanity would still survive by having colonized Mars and other bodies, as well as by having built artificial space colonies of the type advocated by Gerard O’Neill. Once the sun begins to turn into a red giant in a few billion years, we must have long moved into the outer solar system. In the very long run, we have to move into other solar systems. Relativistic-speed starships would be nice, but they are not necessary for the task of moving humanity to the stars. We can reach them, slowly but surely, by propelling some of our space colonies away from the sun, carrying perhaps millions of human beings. They would take advantage of the many resources to be found in the Oort Cloud, and then of equivalent clouds in other solar systems. Even interstellar space has resources to offer. Nuclear energy, probably fusion, would likely be required. It may take us tens of thousands of years, but in the cosmic time scale, that is but a blink in the eye. What are these catastrophic threats? Are there any records of catastrophic events happening before humans appeared on Earth? I have already mentioned collisions with asteroids and comets. Although the active geology of our planet tends to erase the record of many collisions, we can find a well-preserved record on the Moon and Venus, the two closest bodies to Earth. On the 600-million-years-old Venusian surface, the spacecraft Magellan discovered about one thousand impact craters at least twice the diameter of meteor craters on Earth. This impact record makes it reasonable to estimate a catastrophic impact on Earth every half a million years or so. Collisions with bodies of 5 km across would happen, on the average, every 20 million years. Apart from the Alvarez asteroid (crater near Yucatan) that led to the extinction of the dinosaurs and the majority of species on Earth 65 million years ago, there have been at least two more impacts by asteroids 10 km or larger in the last 300 million years. How could human colonization of outer space save other terrestrial life? On both O’Neill types of colonies as well as on colonies on other planets, and particularly on terraformed planets, we would need all sorts of organisms like bacteria and plants for food, medicine, and ornamentation, as well as many animals for food and other purposes. We cannot have a proper colony without an Earthly environment to surround and nourish us. So, we have to take much other terrestrial life with us in order to survive and flourish. And given the value of biodiversity we would make it a point to take a great variety of organisms that contribute to our biosphere. Of course, we should heed Mark Twain and be sure not to include mosquitoes in our future space arks. I myself would keep out tarantulas and some other obnoxious viruses, bacteria, plants, and animals.

#### Earth won’t be inhabitable forever – colonization is essential to preventing extinction

Newitz 13 [(Annalee, is the author, most recently, of the science fiction novel The Future of Another Timeline, a contributing opinion writer at the New York Times, and co-host of the podcast Our Opinions Are Correct.), “Escape Plans,” Slate, 5/15/13, https://slate.com/technology/2013/05/surviving-the-next-mass-extinction-humans-will-need-to-leave-earth-for-space-colonies.html] MN

When the Russian asteroid became a fireball in the air over Chelyabinsk, destroying buildings and injuring hundreds, we were lucky it wasn’t worse. What about when the next one hits? Just for fun, let’s say a 10-kilometer-diameter asteroid—much larger than the one over Chelyabinsk but close to the size of one that hit the planet 65 million years ago—smashed into central California. It wouldn’t just destroy Hollywood and Silicon Valley. It would punch a hole in the atmosphere. That’s what surprises people the most. Every disaster-from-space movie we’ve ever seen prepares us for fire and explosive destruction. Instead, blowback from the strike would be so powerful that it would hurl millions of tons of debris back into space. A thick, toxic cloud layer would settle over our upper atmosphere, wrapping itself around the world within hours after the impact, cutting off the sun. We’re not talking about an ordinary cloud, either. Packed with carbon, dust, and sulfur particles, it would reflect a lot more sunlight than a normal cloud would. Our satellites would record images of a once-blue planet gone brilliant white, like a pool ball. On Earth, it would be twilight for months. Temperatures would plummet. Crops would die, and then the forests. There would be fires the whole time, of course, especially around the impact site. Plus earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. But most of the 5 billion people who are likely to be killed by an asteroid strike like this would die of famine. In many parts of the world, permanent dusk would mean nothing to feed our animals, let alone our families. Food supplies would dwindle. And that’s when the riots would start. This is an all-too-plausible scenario for the near future if we suffered an asteroid strike comparable to the one that killed most of the dinosaurs 65 million years ago. It wasn’t a giant explosion that exterminated Tyrannosaurus rex, Triceratops, and their kin. In reality, most of those giants died out over thousands of years, their numbers winnowed down to nothing as their food-rich, tropical environments grew barren and cold. Today, we have solid evidence that confirms environmental changes like these can be blamed directly or indirectly for most mass extinctions that have scourged the Earth. And that’s why our space program isn’t just something educational we’re doing to learn more about the universe. It’s vital to our survival as a species, because the Earth isn’t going to be a safe place for us in the long term. I learned about the many pathways to mass death while researching my book published this week: Scatter, Adapt and Remember: How Humans Will Survive a Mass Extinction. There is a pattern to how mass extinctions happen. A calamity like an asteroid strike or an enormous volcanic eruption causes an initial disaster that kills a lot animals and plants at once. And this leads to climate changes that eventually kill more than 75 percent of all species on the planet, usually in less than a million years—the blink of an eye in geological time. There is a pattern to survival, too. Every mass extinction has its survivors. A group of furry, mouselike mammals took over the planet after the dinosaurs’ heyday and eventually evolved into us. What these survivors have in common are three abilities encapsulated by the title of my book: They are able to scatter to many places in the world, adapt to them, and remember how to avoid danger. Humans are exceptionally good at all three, but perhaps our greatest strength is an ability to reconstruct the deep history of our planet—and to plan for the future. Because we know Earth is inherently dangerous, any long-term plan for humanity has to involve building communities on other worlds, or maybe in vast, artificial environments in space. But the process of doing so will take a lot longer, and be a lot weirder, than what you see in most science fiction stories. It’s likely we won’t have bustling cities the size of San Francisco on Mars or Titan in the next hundred years, so in the meantime we need to come up with a plan to deal with threats to Earth from space. Already, the U.N. Office for Outer Space Affairs and space agencies like NASA monitor the skies for potentially deadly asteroids in our neighborhood, called near-Earth objects (NEOs). These groups have already proposed simple solutions to the asteroid problem, all of which are within our technological grasp.

#### Colonization of outer space is essential to humanity – 5 warrants (good, diverse non just extinction impacts)

Orwig 15 [(Jessica, a senior editor at Insider. She has a Master of Science in science and technology journalism from Texas A&M University and a Bachelor of Science in astronomy and physics from The Ohio State University. Before NY she spent time as an intern at: American Physical Society in MD International Center for Theoretical Physics in Italy Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory in IL American Geophysical Union in DC), “5 undeniable reasons humans need to colonize Mars — even though it's going to cost billions,” Slate, 4/21/2015, https://www.businessinsider.com/5-undeniable-reasons-why-humans-should-go-to-mars-2015-4] MN

Establishing a permanent colony of humans on Mars is not an option. It's a necessity. At least, that's what some of the most innovative, intelligent minds of our age — Buzz Aldrin, Stephen Hawking, Elon Musk, Bill Nye, and Neil deGrasse Tyson — are saying. Of course, it's extremely difficult to foresee how manned missions to Mars that would cost hundreds of billions of dollars each, could benefit mankind. It's easier to imagine how that kind of money could immediately help in the fight against cancer or world hunger. That's because humans tend to be short-sighted. We're focused on what's happening tomorrow instead of 100 years from now. "If the human race is to continue for another million years, we will have to boldly go where no one has gone before," Hawking said in 2008 at a lecture series for NASA's 50th anniversary. That brings us to the first reason humans must colonize Mars: 1. Ensuring the survival of our species The only home humans have ever known is Earth. But history shows that surviving as a species on this tiny blue dot in the vacuum of space is tough and by no means guaranteed. The dinosaurs are a classic example: They roamed the planet for 165 million years, but the only trace of them today are their fossilized remains. A colossal asteroid wiped them out. Putting humans on more than one planet would better ensure our existence thousands if not millions of years from now. "Humans need to be a multiplanet species," Musk recently told astronomer and Slate science blogger Phil Plait. Musk founded the space transport company SpaceX to help make this happen. Mars is an ideal target because it has a day about the same length as Earth's and water ice on its surface. Moreover, it's the best available option: Venus and Mercury are too hot, and the Moon has no atmosphere to protect residents from destructive meteor impacts. 2. Discovering life on Mars Nye, the CEO of The Planetary Society, said during an episode of StarTalk Radio in March that humanity should focus on sending humans instead of robots to Mars because humans could make discoveries 10,000 times as fast as the best spacecraft explorers we have today. Though he was hesitant to say humans should live on Mars, he agreed there were many more discoveries to be made there. One monumental discovery scientists could make is determining whether life currently exists on Mars. If we're going to do that, we'll most likely have to dig much deeper than NASA's rovers can. The theory there is that life was spawned not from the swamps on adolescent Earth, but from watery chasms on Mars. The Mars life theory suggests that rocks rich with microorganisms could have been ejected off the planet's surface from a powerful impact, eventually making their way through space to Earth. It's not a stretch to imagine, because Martian rocks can be found on Earth. None of those, however, have shown signs of life. "You cannot rule out the fact that a Mars rock with life in it landing on the Earth kicked off terrestrial life, and you can only really test that by finding life on Mars," Christopher Impey, a British astronomer and author of over a dozen books in astronomy and popular science, told Business Insider. 3. Improving the quality of life on Earth "Only by pushing mankind to its limits, to the bottoms of the ocean and into space, will we make discoveries in science and technology that can be adapted to improve life on Earth." British doctor Alexander Kumar wrote that in a 2012 article for BBC News where he explored the pros and cons of sending humans to Mars. At the time, Kumar was living in the most Mars-like place on Earth, Antarctica, to test how he adapted to the extreme conditions both physiologically and psychologically. To better understand his poignant remark, let's look at an example: During its first three years in space, NASA's prized Hubble Space Telescope snapped blurry pictures because of a flaw in its engineering. The problem was fixed in 1993, but to try to make use of the blurry images during those initial years, astronomers developed a computer algorithm to better extract information from the images. It turns out the algorithm was eventually shared with a medical doctor who applied it to the X-ray images he was taking to detect breast cancer. The algorithm did a better job at detecting early stages of breast cancer than the conventional method, which at the time was the naked eye. "You can't script that. That happens all the time — this cross pollination of fields, innovation in one, stimulating revolutionary changes in another," Tyson, the StarTalk radio host, explained during an interview with Fareed Zakaria in 2012. It's impossible to predict how cutting-edge technologies used to develop manned missions to Mars and habitats on Mars will benefit other fields like medicine or agriculture. But we'll figure that out only by "pushing humankind to its limits" and boldy going where we've never been before. 4. Growing as a species Another reason we should go to Mars, according to Tyson, is to inspire the next generation of space explorers. When asked in 2013 whether we should go to Mars, he answered: "Yes, if it galvanizes an entire generation of students in the educational pipeline to want to become scientists, engineers, technologists, and mathematicians," he said. "The next generation of astronauts to land on Mars are in middle school now." Humanity's aspirations to explore space are what drive us toward more advanced technological innovations that will undoubtedly benefit mankind in one way or another. "Space is like a proxy for a lot of what else goes on in society, including your urge to innovate," Tyson said during his interview with Zakaria. He added: "There's nothing that drives ambitions the way NASA does." 5. Demonstrating political and economic leadership At a February 24 hearing, Aldrin told the US Senate's Subcommittee on Space, Science and Competitiveness that getting to Mars was a necessity not only for science, but also for policy. "In my opinion, there is no more convincing way to demonstrate American leadership for the remainder of this century than to commit to a permanent presence on Mars," he said. If Americans do not go to Mars, someone else will. And that spells political and economic benefit for whoever succeeds. "If you lose your space edge," Tyson said during his interview with Zakaria, "my deep concern is that you lose everything else about society that enables you to compete economically."

#### Colonies on the moon are key to preventing extinction

Alexander 19 [(Donovan, After 5 years in the start-up world collaborating with companies like Google and Škoda Auto, the award-winning marketer Donovan Alexander restarted his career. He has combined his passion for artificial intelligence, fashion, design, and technology to begin a new journey as an aspiring multidisciplinary designer and technology writer. Throughout his career, he has authored over 300 articles, worked on 34 advertising campaigns for international brands, and curated 4 major art projects. Donovan is fascinated with how emerging technologies like artificial intelligence and 3D printing are changing the way we design and engineer our everyday products. With a creative studio based in the heart of Europe, Donovan loves sharing the stories of the people and organizations engineering change around the world.), “Colonizing the Moon Could Be the Key to Saving the Earth, Says Jeff Bezos,” Interesting Engineering, 6/9/2019, https://interestingengineering.com/colonizing-the-moon-could-be-the-key-to-saving-the-earth-says-jeff-bezos] MN

The space race towards colonizing Mars is very much underway. Private companies have made it their personal mission to reach the big red planet in the near future. Nevertheless, not only is the trip to Mars a long and strenuous one, colonizing Mars is not an easy feat. You hear all about colonizing Mars, but what about the Moon? Some have argued that colonizing the moon should be our first big priority before heading to the big red planet. Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos has made moon colonization one of his top priorities at his aerospace company Blue Origin, something that should also be a top priority for humanity, according to him. Saving the Earth According to Bezos, there is a very simple reason why we need to colonize the moon, he believes that “Humanity's very survival relies on colonizing space, starting with the moon”. Just this past month, Bezos and his Blue Origin team unveiled a lunar-lander vehicle, called Blue Moon, designed to deliver a variety of payloads to the moon. Eventually, the ultimate goal is to help humans establish, “sustained human presence” on Earth’s moon. In a presentation at Amazon’s Re:Mars tech conference, Bezos stated: "The reason we've got to go to space, in my view, is to save the Earth. If we're going to continue to grow this civilization, we need to move – and I'm talking about something our grandchildren will work on and their grandchildren and so on. This isn't something just this generation is going to accomplish." Bezos believes the moon is the perfect landing spot. The moon itself is only a three-day ride, has access to solar energy, has lighter gravity, and even has water in the form of ice. Why the Moon? According to Philip Metzger, a physicist at NASA Kennedy Space Center, the moon could also offer even more in the great history of human space travel, eventually becoming a base and stomping ground for longer trips. “The Moon is a natural first step. It’s nearby. We can practice living, working and doing science there before taking longer and riskier trips to Mars.” What do you think about the future of colonization? And do you think the moon should be humanity’s first stop?

#### Space exploration key to scientific innovation

Keusen 21 Tanya, "Space Exploration and Innovation," United Nations Office for Outer Affairs, https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/topics/space-exploration-and-innovation.html

Since the beginning of time, exploring the Universe has been a dream of humankind. Human curiosity has fuelled interest in exploring and discovering new worlds, pushing the boundaries of the known, and expanding scientific and technical knowledge. States and [space agencies](https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/space-agencies-OLD.html) have been engaging in space exploration since the first space launch. The first space launch led to the first human space flight, which led to the first moonwalk. Nowadays focus has shifted to joint human and robotic missions, near-Earth asteroids, Mars and destinations beyond our own solar system. Space exploration and the innovation it entails are essential drivers for opening up new domains in space science and technology. They trigger new partnerships and develop capabilities that create new opportunities for addressing global challenges. Space exploration also motivates young people to pursue education and careers in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (the STEM disciplines). Though the precise nature of future benefits from space exploration is not easily predefined, current trends suggest that significant advantage may be found in areas such as new materials, health and medicine, transportation and computer technology. As the benefits of space exploration and innovation become better known, increasingly more countries and non-governmental entities are interested in engaging in exploration and innovation. Recent COPUOS and UNOOSA Efforts In 2016, seven thematic priorities were endorsed by the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in the context of preparations for the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (UNISPACE+50), the first of which was global partnership in space exploration and innovation. The Committee established an action team as the mechanism to drive the topic. Twenty-two States and seven permanent observer organizations joined the [Action Team on Exploration and Innovation](https://www.unoosa.org/res/oosadoc/data/documents/2018/aac_105c_12018crp/aac_105c_12018crp_3_0_html/AC105_C1_2018_CRP03E.pdf), producing a report including a series of recommendations ( [A/AC.105/1168)](https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/oosadoc/data/documents/2018/aac.105/aac.1051168_0.html). The Action Team Co-Chairs underscored the significance of the report, "which represented the first time the United Nations had examined, in a comprehensive way, human and robotic exploration beyond low-Earth orbit, and provided a basis for further consideration of how the United Nations system may contribute to a new era in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space". In 2018, on the basis of the Action Team recommendation, the Committee added "Space exploration and innovation" as an item on its agenda ( [A/73/20](https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/oosadoc/data/documents/2018/a/a7320_0.html), para. 364). Under this agenda item, first considered at the Committee session in 2019, States share information on, among other things: research and development activities; astronaut programmes; a space exploration innovation hub centre; the planned establishment of a Mars scientific city; activities in connection with the International Space Station and the China Space Station; the use of a satellite as a multi-wavelength observatory; various missions to the Moon, Mars, Venus, Jupiter and asteroids; the planned Lunar Orbital Platform-Gateway; a new spacecraft that has the potential to be utilized as a deep-space logistics carrier to the cis-lunar region; a dedicated solar mission with a focus on studying the inner solar corona; a tracker of electromagnetic counterparts of binary neutron star merger events; a mission to examine the atmospheric composition of exoplanets; and satellites launched for the purpose of deep space exploration. Much of this information is available in [technical presentations](https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/technical-presentations.html).

#### Space col key to innovation, space tourism, and heg

West 20 Darrell M. West, 8-18-2020, "Five reasons to explore Mars," Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2020/08/18/five-reasons-to-explore-mars/> TDI

The recent launch of the Mars rover Perseverance is the latest U.S. space mission seeking to understand our solar system. Its [expected arrival at the Red Planet in mid-February](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/30/science/nasa-mars-launch.html) 2021 has a number of objectives linked to science and innovation. The rover is equipped with sophisticated instruments designed to search for the remains of ancient microbial life, take pictures and videos of rocks, drill for soil and rock samples, and use a small helicopter to fly around the [Jezero Crater landing spot](https://mars.nasa.gov/resources/22474/jezero-crater-mars-2020s-landing-site/). Mars is a valuable place for exploration because it can be reached in 6 ½ months, is a major opportunity for scientific exploration, and has been mapped and studied for several decades. The mission represents the first step in a long-term effort to bring Martian samples back to Earth, where they can be analyzed for residues of microbial life. Beyond the study of life itself, there are a number of different benefits of Mars exploration. UNDERSTAND THE ORIGINS AND UBIQUITY OF LIFE The site where Perseverance is expected to land is the place where experts believe 3.5 billion years ago held a lake filled with water and flowing rivers. It is an ideal place to search for the residues of microbial life, test new technologies, and lay the groundwork for human exploration down the road. The mission plans to investigate whether microbial life existed on Mars billions of years ago and therefore that life is not unique to Planet Earth. As noted by Chris McKay, a research scientist at NASA’s Ames Research Science Center, that would be an extraordinary discovery. “Right here in our solar system, [if life started twice](https://www.space.com/9329-earth-unique-life-common-universe.html), that tells us some amazing things about our universe,” he pointed out. “It means the universe is full of life. Life becomes a natural feature of the universe, not just a quirk of this odd little planet around this star.” The question of the origins of life and its ubiquity around the universe is central to science, religion, and philosophy. For much of our existence, humans have assumed that even primitive life was unique to Planet Earth and not present in the rest of the solar system, let alone the universe. We have constructed elaborate religious and philosophical narratives around this assumption and built our identity along the notion that life is unique to Earth. If, as many scientists expect, future space missions cast doubt on that assumption or outright disprove it by finding remnants of microbial life on other planets, it will be both invigorating and illusion-shattering. It will force humans to confront their own myths and consider alternative narratives about the universe and the place of Earth in the overall scheme of things. As noted in my Brookings book, [Megachange](https://www.brookings.edu/book/megachange-economic-disruption-political-upheaval-and-social-strife-in-the-21st-century/), given the centrality of these issues for fundamental questions about human existence and the meaning of life, it would represent a far-reaching shift in existing human paradigms. As argued by scientist McKay, discovering evidence of ancient microbial life on Mars would lead experts to conclude that life likely is ubiquitous around the universe and not limited to Planet Earth. Humans would have to construct new theories about ourselves and our place in the universe. DEVELOP NEW TECHNOLOGIES The U.S. space program has been an extraordinary [catalyst for technology innovation](https://www.jpl.nasa.gov/infographics/infographic.view.php?id=11358). Everything from Global Positioning Systems and medical diagnostic tools to wireless technology and camera phones owe at least part of their creation to the space program. Space exploration required the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to learn how to communicate across wide distances, develop precise navigational tools, store, transmit, and process large amounts of data, deal with health issues through digital imaging and telemedicine, and develop collaborative tools that link scientists around the world. The space program has pioneered the miniaturization of scientific equipment and helped engineers figure out how to land and maneuver a rover from millions of miles away. Going to Mars requires similar inventiveness. Scientists have had to figure out how to search for life in ancient rocks, drill for rock samples, take high resolution videos, develop flying machines in a place with gravity that is 40 percent lower than on Earth, send detailed information back to Earth in a timely manner, and take off from another planet. In the future, we should expect large payoffs in commercial developments from Mars exploration and advances that bring new conveniences and inventions to people. ENCOURAGE SPACE TOURISM In the not too distant future, wealthy tourists likely will take trips around the Earth, visit space stations, orbit the Moon, and perhaps even take trips around Mars. For a substantial fee, they can experience weightlessness, take in the views of the entire planet, see the stars from outside the Earth’s atmosphere, and witness the wonders of other celestial bodies. The Mars program will help with space tourism by improving engineering expertise with space docking, launches, and reentry and providing additional experience about the impact of space travel on the human body. Figuring out how weightlessness and low gravity situations alter human performance and how space radiation affects people represent just a couple areas where there are likely to be positive by-products for future travel. The advent of space tourism will [broaden human horizons](https://unitedearth.us/religion-and-spirituality/does-seeing-earth-from-space-alter-your-perspective/) in the same way international travel has exposed people to other lands and perspectives. It will show them that the Earth has a delicate ecosystem that deserves protecting and why it is important for people of differing countries to work together to solve global problems. Astronauts who have had this experience say it has altered their viewpoints and had a profound impact on their way of thinking. FACILITATE SPACE MINING Many objects around the solar system are made of similar minerals and chemical compounds that exist on Earth. That means that some asteroids, moons, and planets could be rich in minerals and rare elements. Figuring out how to [harvest those materials](https://www.sciencefocus.com/space/space-mining-the-new-goldrush/) in a safe and responsible manner and bring them back to Earth represents a possible benefit of space exploration. Elements that are rare on Earth may exist elsewhere, and that could open new avenues for manufacturing, product design, and resource distribution. This mission could help resource utilization through advances gained with its Mars Oxygen Experiment (MOXIE) equipment that converts Martian carbon dioxide into oxygen. If MOXIE works as intended, it would help humans live and work on the Red Planet. ADVANCE SCIENCE One of the most crucial features of humanity is our curiosity about the life, the universe, and how things operate. Exploring space provides a means to satisfy our thirst for knowledge and improve our understanding of ourselves and our place in the universe. Space travel already has exploded centuries-old myths and promises to continue to confront our long-held assumptions about who we are and where we come from. The next decade promises to be an exciting period as scientists mine new data from space telescopes, space travel, and robotic exploration. Ten or twenty years from now, we may have [answers to basic questions](https://www.brookings.edu/book/turning-point/) that have eluded humans for centuries, such as how ubiquitous life is outside of Earth, whether it is possible for humans to survive on other planets, and how planets evolve over time.

#### Space innovation solves extinction – generates ecological survival mechanisms.

Sadedin 17 (Suzanne, PhD in Evolutionary Biology, 10-9, "Will Human Innovation Save Us From Future Extinction?," Forbes, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2017/10/09/will-human-innovation-save-us-from-future-extinction/?sh=773a4f276c65>) TDI

Does the human ability to innovate suggest an immunity to total extinction? Yes and no. Currently, innovation reduces our chance of extinction in some ways, and increases it in others. But if we innovate cleverly, we could become just about immune to extinction. The species that survive mass extinctions tend to share three characteristics. They're widespread. This means local disasters don't wipe out the entire species, and some small areas, called refugia, tend to be unaffected by global disasters. If you're widespread, it's more likely that you have a population that happens to live in a refugium. They're ecological generalists. They can cope with widely varying physical conditions, and they're not fussy about food. They're r-selected. This means that they breed fast and have short generation times, which allows them to rapidly grow their populations and adapt genetically to new conditions. Innovation gives humans the ability to be widespread ecological generalists. With technology, we can live in more diverse conditions and places than any other species. And while we can't (currently) grow our populations rapidly like an r-selected species, innovation does allow us to adapt quickly at the cultural level. Technology also increases our connections to one another and connectivity is a two-edged sword. Many species consist of a network of small, local populations, each of which is somewhat isolated from the others. We call this a metapopulation. The local populations often go extinct, but they are later re-seeded by others, so the metapopulation as a whole survives. Humans used to be a metapopulation, but thanks to innovation, we're now globally connected. Archaeologists believe that many past civilizations, such as the Easter Islanders, fell because of unsustainable ecological and cultural innovations. The impact of these disasters was limited because these civilizations were small and disconnected from other such civilizations. These days, a useful innovation can spread around the world in weeks. So can a lethal one. With many of the technologies and chemicals we're currently inventing, we can't be certain about their long-term effects; human biology is complex enough that we often can't be absolutely certain something won't kill us in a decade until we've waited a decade to see. We try to be careful and test things before they're released, and the probability that any particular invention could kill us all is tiny, but since we're constantly innovating, it's a real possibility. Pandemics pose the same problem for a well-connected species. There are certain possibilities where species extinction is really hard to avoid; fortunately, they're also very unlikely, but we are definitely not immune from this. The most likely cause of our extinction, in my opinion, is innovation in machine learning/AI. This could destroy the planet, but even if it doesn't, humans will be ultimately redundant to the dominant systems. They might keep us alive in a zoo somewhere, but I doubt it. A happier scenario (to me at least) is transhumanism, where humans become extinct in a sense because we've managed to liberate ourselves from biology. So how could innovation prevent our extinction? We seed the galaxy with independently evolving human populations to create a new metapopulation. These local populations would hopefully be sufficiently isolated that some would survive an innovation or disaster that wipes out the rest. They would, of course, evolve in response to local conditions, perhaps creating several new species. So you could say this is still extinction, but it's as close as we'll come to persistence in our ever-changing universe.