# GBX Dubs

### 1

#### Interpretation: the affirmative must defend that only just governments ought to recognize the right to strike

#### Just governments respect liberties

Dorn 12 James A. Dorn, Cato Journal, "The Scope of Government in a Free Society", Fall 2012, https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/2012/12/v32n3-10.pdf

If laws are just, liberty and property are secure. The most certain test of justice is negative—that is, justice occurs when injustice (the violation of natural rights to life, liberty, and property) is prevented. The emphasis here is on what Hayek (1967) called “just rules of conduct,” not on the fairness of outcomes. No one has stated the negative concept of justice better than the 19th century French classical liberal Frederic Bastiat ([1850] 1964: 65): When law and force confine a man within the bounds of justice, they do not impose anything on him but a mere negation. They impose on him only the obligation to refrain from injuring others. They do not infringe on his personality, or his liberty or his property. They merely safeguard the personality, the liberty, and the property of others. They stand on the defensive; they defend the equal rights of all. They fulfill a mission whose harmlessness is evident, whose utility is palpable, and whose legitimacy is uncontested. In short, the purpose of a just government is not to do good with other people’s money, but to prevent injustice by protecting property and securing liberty.

#### Violation—the US and specifically courts are not just.

Nellis, Ph.D., 18, Report to the United Nations on Racial Disparities in the U.S. Criminal Justice System, https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/un-report-on-racial-disparities/, Sentencing Project,

The United States criminal justice system is the largest in the world. At yearend 2015, over 6.7 million individuals1) were under some form of correctional control in the United States, including 2.2 million incarcerated in federal, state, or local prisons and jails.2) The U.S. is a world leader in its rate of incarceration, dwarfing the rate of nearly every other nation.3) Such broad statistics mask the racial disparity that pervades the U.S. criminal justice system, and for African Americans in particular. African Americans are more likely than white Americans to be arrested; once arrested, they are more likely to be convicted; and once convicted, and they are more likely to experience lengthy prison sentences. African-American adults are 5.9 times as likely to be incarcerated than whites and Hispanics are 3.1 times as likely.4) As of 2001, one of every three black boys born in that year could expect to go to prison in his lifetime, as could one of every six Latinos—compared to one of every seventeen white boys.5) Racial and ethnic disparities among women are less substantial than among men but remain prevalent.6) The source of such disparities is deeper and more systemic than explicit racial discrimination. The United States in effect operates two distinct criminal justice systems: one for wealthy people and another for poor people and people of color. The wealthy can access a vigorous adversary system replete with constitutional protections for defendants. Yet the experiences of poor and minority defendants within the criminal justice system often differ substantially from that model due to a number of factors, each of which contributes to the overrepresentation of such individuals in the system. As former Georgetown Law Professor David Cole states in his book No Equal Justice,

#### Prefer –

#### 1] Precision — anything else justifies the aff arbitrarily jettisoning words in the resolution at their whim which decks negative ground and preparation because the aff is no longer bounded by the resolution – they try to justify the US as just which is exclusionary towards minorities and people of color who feel this violence everyday. This is supercharged by their reps and performance – they literally try to hide violence in spite of this systematic oppression. Hold the line – accessibility is an antecedent question to any other judge obligation because it’s a prereq to debate and a jurisdictional obligation of educators.

#### 2] Limits – there are 200 governments in the world – letting them pick an unjust ones explodes limits via infinite permutations of governments

#### 3] Phil ed – 1AR will claim no government is just but that just means that we defend ideal theory. That’s good –

#### forces philosophical contestation which can uniquely happen in LD debate whereas you can util debate on any topic

#### 4] TVA – read the aff as a whole res aff, same advantage area

#### Fairness and education are voters – debate’s a game that needs rules to evaluate it and education gives us portable skills for life like research and thinking.

### 2

#### The role of the ballot is to determine whether the resolution is a true or false statement – anything else moots 7 minutes of the nc and exacerbates the fact that they get infinite pre-round prep since I should be able to compensate by choosing – their framing collapses since you must say it is true that a world is better than another before you adopt it.

#### They justify substantive skews since there will always be a more correct side of the issue but we compensate for flaws in the lit.

#### Most educational since otherwise we wouldn’t use math or logic to approach topics. Scalar methods like comparison increases intervention – the persuasion of certain DA or advantages sway decisions – T/F binary is descriptive and technical.

#### The ballot says vote aff or neg based on a topic – five dictionaries[[1]](#footnote-1) define to negate as to deny the truth of and affirm[[2]](#footnote-2) as to prove true which means it’s constitutive and jurisdictional. I denied the truth of the resolution by disagreeing with the aff which means I’ve met my burden.

### 3

#### Presumption and permissibility negates – a) statements are more often false than true since I can prove something false in infinite ways o/w on probability b) real world policies require positive justification before being adopted c) the aff has to prove an obligation which means lack of that obligation negates.

#### I negate: A just government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike.

#### The resolution specifies that the right to strike must be unconditional—this means it cannot be contingent on any authority or have any exceptions.

Magnell 11 [Thomas Magnell, Quals: Philosopher, Department of Philosophy, Drew University, Madison, NJ, The Correlativity of Rights and Duties, J Value Inquiry (2011) 45:1–12]//BA PB

Unconditional rights may be either absolutely unconditional or relatively unconditional. An absolutely unconditional right is a right which every right-holder enjoys as something capable of having rights. These are the most fundamental of all rights. As rights which all right-holders have simply as right-holders, they are common to all people, institutions, corporations, societies, and at least some nonhuman animals. They do not need to be acquired. Because they are held unconditionally, they cannot be overruled. For the same reason, they are as minimal as can be. To draw anything more than the most minimal rights from right-holders as such is almost surely a mistake. The flights of fancy of natural rights theorists led Bentham to shout: ‘‘Natural Rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense,—nonsense upon stilts.’’12 Still, notwithstanding Bentham’s finest flourish of phrasing, there may be some, for example, the right of a right-holder not to be subject to a wanton disregard of its interests. This would seem to be a right that at least some animals have as well as people taken individually or in groups. It is not a particularly robust right. An awful lot of harm can be inflicted upon a right-holder without showing a wanton disregard for the right holder’s interests. Even so, as minimal as it is, it is not a right that is always respected, as National Socialists and International Socialists showed in concentration camps and the Gulag. A relatively unconditional right is a right which all right-holders of a certain kind enjoy without qualification. This gives a clear sense to the much abused term ‘‘human rights,’’ though there may be others. In the strictest sense, human rights are relatively unconditional rights. They are rights which human beings have simply as human beings, or perhaps more precisely as persons, if not all human beings are accounted persons, whatever their role or situation within or apart from a society. A better term for them would be ‘‘person rights,’’ but here the common term is unlikely to be allowed to give way. Human rights are not acquired, though if personhood is a characteristic that human beings can come to have and come to lose, human rights may be gained or lost along with it. Some other right-holders may have the same rights unconditionally, but not all. Narrower on the one hand than absolutely unconditional rights, broader on the other than conditional rights, human rights cannot be conferred by declarations or political manifestos on non-human animals or people: not on non-human animals because non-human animals cannot have them, and not on people because people already have them. In the strictest sense, many of the rights that have come to be labeled as human rights in the fairly recent past, such as the supposed rights to a certain level of income or to a certain level of education are not human rights at all, however politically popular it may be to say that they are. If they are rights in any sense, they are civil rights, acquired rights that are conferred by some civil authority. Human rights in the strictest sense have a more philosophical tone. One notable human right is that of entering into obligations, the right, odd as it sounds, to bear duties. Another is the human right to freedom, the relatively unconditional right that people who are capable of acting autonomously have as such beings. We have a right to liberty without the need for the right to be conferred, while other beings, such as non-human animals that may have the broader absolutely unconditional rights, lack this relatively unconditional right. This is why liberty is intimately tied with human dignity, even as it is demonstrably allied with human prosperity. All other rights that have correlative duties are conditional rights, rights of only some right-holders. They are acquired rights. Their acquisition is conditional on meeting certain qualifications. Someone has a right to have a promise kept only if he meets the qualifications of being the promisee. Someone has a right to receive charity only if he meets the qualification of being in need. From this it should be evident that conditional rights may be either conditioned-rights or unconditionedrights. What makes a right conditioned is a condition of the right itself, that of the correlative duty, an imperfect duty, not being conferred on other qualified rightholders. What makes a right conditional is a condition for acquiring the right in the first place.

#### The right to strike is a conditional right, so viewing it as unconditional is impossible. Fiat doesn’t solve because its intrinsic to the nature of the principle and the aff is a binding policy, not just view X as Y.

#### [1] The right to strike is conditional on the government existing and enforcing it: A] The Sqou proves that without the state, the right doesn’t exist, which means turning the NC non-uniques the aff B] State of nature would just mean people could take the action, not that they have a guaranteed right to do so.

#### [2] The right is conditional on the existence of certain social institutions: IE a workplace and employer to strike against, and a job to stop doing. This doesn’t apply to unconditional rights like freedom or life, since they are intrinsic to human nature not social constructs.

#### [3] Unconditional rights cannot conflict with each other, as otherwise neither would be absolute, but the right to strike conflicts with 1] The right to life of those deprived of stuff like medicine, which is fundamental to every human action.

### 4

#### Negate –

#### 1] just[[3]](#footnote-3) means “very recently; in the immediate past” so the rez has already passed.

#### 2] of[[4]](#footnote-4) is to “expressing an age” but the rez doesn’t delineate a length of time.

#### 3] recognize[[5]](#footnote-5) is to “Officially regard (a qualification) as valid or proper” but a right isn’t a qualification.

#### 4] to[[6]](#footnote-6) is to “expressing motion in the direction of (a particular location)” but the rez doesn’t have a location.

#### 5] right[[7]](#footnote-7) is to “conforming to facts or truth” rez doesn’t specify what workers are right about.

**6] Strike[[8]](#footnote-8) is defined as** to delete something rez doesn’t spec what to delete.

#### 7] Workers[[9]](#footnote-9) is defined as a “any of the sexually underdeveloped and usually sterile members of a colony of social ants, bees, wasps, or termites that perform most of the labor and protective duties of the colony” you can’t give a right to insects nor can we know if they are correct.

### 5

#### Reject 1AR Theory arguments – a) double bind – either you can put minor ink next to answer of my responses and extend your arguments to auto-win or the judge has to intervene to see if the 2ar answers to the 2n are good enough. b) they have 2 speeches on theory while I have 1 which means they can structurally preempt my answers and respond to them and I can’t do either c) infinite abuse in the context of aff abuse doesn’t make sense since you can read 1ac theory and uplayer with other 1ar offs like Ks d) they have 1 more minute on the theory debate due to a 7-6 skew which o/w since theory is mainly about substance g) If they get 1ar theory, we get 2nr theory to check back against infinite 1ar abuse and k2 reciprocity both get two speeches to read theory h) they can blow up dropped arguments in the next speech and I don’t have the chance to frame them out but they can which means only dropped arguments for them are game over.

### Framing

#### Util is true and justifies death good:

#### 1] Death is a net better state of existence since existers suffer pain and pleasure, but the non-existent don’t feel either. Thus, it follows that non-existence is a net better state since the absence of pain is morally good even if it isn’t experience by anyone while the absence of pleasure is neither good or bad. Even if live can be pleasurable, you still negate since non existence is always good while pleasure in life is variable.

#### 2] An obligation to maximize happiness causes infinite pain since no matter how much happiness one has, there is always a moral obligation to acquire more which A] Prevents that pleasure from being utilized and B] is cruelly optimistic because you are chasing an insatiable desire. Only death offers a final escape.

#### 3] Reject aff answers, they are contaminated by psychological bias.

David Benatar, Professor of Phil at University of Cape Town, Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence, pub Oxford University Press, USA, Year: 2006, ISBN: 0199296421 ///AHS PB

Most people deny that their lives, all things considered, are bad (and they certainly deny that their lives are so bad as to make never existing preferable). Indeed, most people think that their lives go quite well. Such widespread blithe self-assessments of well-being, it is often thought, constitute a refutation of the view that life is bad. How, it is asked, can life be bad if most of those who live it deny that it is? How can it be a harm to come into existence if most of those who have come into existence are pleased that they did? In fact, however, there is very good reason to doubt that these self-assessments are a reliable indicator of a life’s quality. There are a number of well-known features of human psychology that can account for the favourable assessment people usually make of their own life’s quality. It is these psychological phenomena rather than the actual quality of a life that explain (the extent of) the positive assessment. The first, most general and most influential of these psychological phenomena is what some have called the Pollyanna Principle,⁷ a tendency towards optimism.⁸ This manifests in many ways. First, there is an inclination to recall positive rather than negative experiences. For example, when asked to recall events from throughout their lives, subjects in a number of studies listed a much greater number of positive than negative experiences.⁹ This selective recall distorts our judgement of how well our lives have gone so far. It is not only assessments of our past that are biased, but also our projections or expectations about the future. We tend to have an exaggerated view of how good things will be.¹⁰ The Pollyannaism typical of recall and projection is also characteristic of subjective judgements about current and overall well-being. Many studies have consistently shown that self-assessments of well-being are markedly skewed toward the positive end of the spectrum.¹¹ For instance, very few people describe themselves as ‘not too happy’. Instead, the overwhelming majority claims to be either ‘pretty happy’ or ‘very happy’.¹² Indeed, most people believe that they are better off than most others or than the average person.¹³ Most of the factors that plausibly improve the quality of a person’s life do not commensurately influence self-assessments of that quality (where they influence them at all). For example, although there is a correlation between people’s own rankings of their health and their subjective assessments of well-being, objective assessments of people’s health, judging by physical symptoms, are not as good a predictor of peoples’ subjective evaluations of their well-being.¹⁴ Even among those whose dissatisfaction with their health does lead to lower self-reported well-being, most report levels of satisfaction toward the positive end of the spectrum.¹⁵ Within any given country,¹⁶ the poor are nearly (but not quite) as happy as the rich are. Nor do education and occupation make much (even though they do make some) difference.¹⁷ Although there is some disagreement about how much each of the above and other factors affect subjective assessments of well-being, it is clear that even the sorts of events that one would have thought would make people ‘very unhappy’ have this effect on only a very small proportion of people.¹⁸

#### 4] Even if killing people is bad, death good outweighs since the pain caused by 8 billion deaths is less than infinite future lives. Additionally, extinction is inevitable, so extinction first doesn’t matter since this debate is just a question of whether or not we should go extinct sooner or later.

#### 5] Reps voters against the NC are a reason to drop the aff since 1] If the NC is violent, I only read it since you read the aff so its your fault and 2] my argument is conditional on util being true, so if death good is morally repugnant that’s a reason since why you should lose since your arguments justify it.

### Case

#### ILO is nonbinding and gets rolled back.

1AC Seifert 21 [Achim; 2021; Full Professor of Private Law, German and European Labor Law and Comparative Law at the University of Jena (since 2011). He holds both German State Exams in Law and a PhD of the Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-University of Frankfurt (1998). After his Habilitation [Post-Doc] in 2006 at the University of Frankfurt and several short-term Replacements at the Universities of Frankfurt and Trier (2006-2008), he became an Associate Professor of European and International Labor Law at the University of Luxembourg (2008). His main fields of interest are the Labor Law of the European Union and Comparative Labor Law, including the methodology of Comparative Law. Achim SEIFERT serves as co-editor of the Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal (CLLPJ) and is a member of the editorial board of the European Labour Law Journal (ELLJ) as well as of the Revue de droit comparé du travail et de la sécurité sociale (RDCTSS). He is an associated member of the International Academy of Comparative Law (since 2013) and fellow of the European Law Institute (ELI) (since 2014); furthermore he has been member of the Jean-Monnet-Centre of Excellence at the University of Jena (2013-2016). He has been visiting Professor at the Universities of Bordeaux, Nantes, Paris 1 (Panthéon-Sorbonne), Luigi Bocconi/Milan and Leuven (Global Law Programme) and has taught as adjunct professor at the University of Luxembourg between 2011 and 2016; “Book Review,” European Labour Law Journal, <https://sci-hub.se/https://doi.org/10.1177/2031952521994412>] Justin//Recut Aanya

In accomplishing their functions, CFA and CEACR necessarily have to interpret the Conventions and Recommendations of the ILO whose application in the Member States they shall control. In so doing, they need to concretize the principle of freedom of association that is only in general terms guaranteed by the ILO Conventions and Recommendations on freedom of association. But as supervisory bodies, which the Governing Body has established and which are not foreseen in the ILO Constitution, both probably do not have the power to interpret ILO law with binding effect8 . This is also the opinion that the CEACR expresses itself in its yearly reports to the ILC when explaining that, “its opinions and recommendations are non-binding” 9 . As a matter of fact, the Governing Body, when establishing both Committees, could not delegate to them a power that it has never possessed itself: nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse haberet 10. According to Article 37(1) of the ILO Constitution, it is within the competence of the International Court of Justice to decide upon “any question or dispute relating to the interpretation of this Constitution or of any subsequent Convention concluded by the Members in pursuance of the provisions of this Constitution.” Furthermore, the ILC has not established yet under Article 37(2) of the ILO Constitution an ILO Tribunal, competent for an authentic interpretation of Conventions11.

**Plan causes private sector lashout which decks ILO legitimacy—turns case. Frey 17** Frey, Diane, Lecturer in Labor and Employment Studies at San Francisco State University and Harvard University Extension School in Negotiation and Organizational Conflict Resolution

(2017). Conflict over Conflict: The Right to Strike in International Law. Global Labour Journal. 8. 10.15173/glj.v8i1.2649.

The ILO has been in increasing turmoil since 1989 when the employer group, the International Organisation of Employers (IOE), began systematically claiming there is no right to strike under ILO Conventions (La Hovary, 2013: 361). Although the specific arguments have evolved, the employer group’s overall claim has been that there is no international right to strike. They base their position on the absence of an explicit provision enumerating the right to strike in Convention No. 87. The Convention provides workers with freedom to join organisations of their own choosing and bestows upon those organisations the right to organise their activities and programmes. It does not, however, explicitly name the right to strike in the text (ILO, Undated b; Convention No. 87: articles 2, 3, 8 and 10; Bellace, 2014a: 30). Further, the employer group argues that one of the ILO’s supervisory bodies, the Committee of Experts, lacks authority to imply the right to strike in Convention No. 87 because “only the International Court of Justice can give authoritative interpretations of ILO Conventions” (IOE, 2013: 7). Worker representatives have responded that the right to strike has rightfully been considered as part of ILO Conventions on Freedom of Association without interruption since 1948, including by employer members who have served on the tripartite Committee on Freedom of Association (ITUC, 2014b: 17). According to worker representatives, the attack on the right to strike is part of a larger effort to undermine the authority of the ILO to monitor and enforce labour standards and to turn hard labour standards law into soft law (Hofmann, 2014: 1; ITUC, 2014b: 8). The origins of the employer group’s opposition to recognition of the right to strike have been attributed to several related factors such as the end of the Cold War, the ascendency of employer power relative to labour, and the increasing influence of ILO non-binding pronouncements in domestic policy, as well as regional and domestic court decisions (La Hovary, 2013: 365). Indeed, ILO standards on the right to strike have influenced soft laws such as the OECD guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights (Van de Heijden, 2013: 3; Bellace, 2014a: 59). ILO standards have also influenced court decisions including the recent Supreme Court decision in Canada reaffirming the right to strike (Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v Saskatchewan, 2015, SCC 4: ¶67). The employer group therefore, directly challenges the ILO’s legitimacy and influence.

#### Court decisions are subject to extreme Congressional scrutiny – ensures backlash

**Miller 09** [Mark - Professor of Political Science, Adjunct Professor of History, Director of Law and Society Program, at Clark University, ‘Constitutionalism and Democracy : View of the Courts from the Hill : Interactions Between Congress and the Federal Judiciary.” University of Virginia Press, 2009, proquest] Bschulz 12

Pickerill has found that Congress pays a great deal of attention to constitutionally based judicial decisions, at least those from the Supreme Court. Congress may not devote much time to constitutional issues in its initial debates on legislation (Pickerill 2004, 67), but it does respond when the courts declare congressional actions to be unconstitutional. As Pickerill notes, “Congress is highly responsive to Supreme Court decisions striking federal statutes; that is, Congress usually responds formally to the Supreme Court by repassing the statute in modified form, amending the Constitution, or taking other official action” (2004, 7). “When it comes to constitutional issues,” he concludes, “Congress is often a reactive body” (2004, 145). Congress is certainly aware of the voice of the courts in the inter-institutional constitutional debate, although the legislative branch may not always yield to the dictates of the judicial branch.

The more routine interactions between Congress and the federal courts illustrate that the two institutions have very different perspectives and wills. At times, these regular interactions inevitably produce friction and tension between the two institutions. At times, Congress has attempted to use its institutional powers in the judicial confirmation process and in the budgetary process, among others, to help shape the direction of judicial decisions. At other times, Congress has been more direct in its attempts to guide or alter the scope of judicial decisions. Since constitutional interpretation is a continuous dialogue among the political actors in American society, these interactions between Congress and the courts will probably continue well into the future. Congress will always attempt to influence the decision making of federal judges, including the justices who sit on the U.S. Supreme Court. While this continuous conversation among the branches of government is certainly healthy, there are limits as to how far Congress should go in its attempts to influence judicial decisions. When Congress goes too far, the majority in Congress may get what they want in the short term, but at the expense of the fundamental principle of judicial independence. Independent federal courts must remain key participants in the ongoing inter-institutional constitutional conversation.

#### Doesn’t matter if it isn’t a thing – justices believe it is and act accordingly.

Yoo 4 (John C., Professor of Law, University of Texas, Texas LR, November, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1)

n443. This last point is quite controversial. Jesse Choper has argued, for example, that "the people's reverence and tolerance is not infinite and the Court's public prestige and institutional capital is exhaustible." The judiciary's ability to strike down laws without incurring severe institutional costs, therefore, "is determined by the number and frequency of its attempts to do so, the felt importance of the policies it disapproves, and the perceived substantive correctness of its decisions." Choper, supra note 35, at 139. Others, by contrast, have asserted that the Court may - at least in some circumstances - actually enhance its legitimacy by actively confronting the political branches. See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, Rights, Remedies and Restraint, [64 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 531, 546 (1988)](http://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=11cba94a2e0463ed82e517fc38fdbd65&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b83%20Tex.%20L.%20Rev.%201%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_butNum=1258&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b64%20Chi.-Kent.%20L.%20Rev.%20531%2cat%20546%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=68&_startdoc=51&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAl&_md5=0f60d59f3a3132dcd480986426f03eed) (suggesting that, in some cases, the Court may enhance its legitimacy through opposing the political branches). It would be exceptionally difficult to verify either proposition empirically; about all that can be said with confidence is that the Court sometimes seems to behave as if it thinks its "institutional capital" is limited in this way, and the notion may at least constrain judicial behavior in this sense. See Young, State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 92, at 58-60.

1. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate>, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate>, <http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. *Dictionary.com – maintain as true, Merriam Webster – to say that something is true, Vocabulary.com – to affirm something is to confirm that it is true, Oxford dictionaries – accept the validity of, Thefreedictionary – assert to be true* [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. <https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/just> //Lex VM [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. <https://www.google.com/search?q=of+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS877US877&oq=of+definition&aqs=chrome.0.69i59j69i61l3.1473j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8> //Lex VM [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. <https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/recognize> //Lex VM [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. <https://www.google.com/search?q=to+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS877US877&oq=to+definition&aqs=chrome..69i57j69i60l3.1415j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8> //Lex VM [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/right> //Lex VM

   [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/strike> //Lex VM [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/worker> //Lex VM [↑](#footnote-ref-9)