### 1

#### The role of the ballot is to determine whether the resolution is a true or false statement – anything else moots 7 minutes of the nc and exacerbates the fact that they get infinite pre-round prep since I should be able to compensate by choosing – their framing collapses since you must say it is true that a world is better than another before you adopt it.

#### They justify substantive skews since there will always be a more correct side of the issue but we compensate for flaws in the lit.

#### Most educational since otherwise we wouldn’t use math or logic to approach topics. Scalar methods like comparison increases intervention – the persuasion of certain DA or advantages sway decisions – T/F binary is descriptive and technical.

#### a priori’s 1st – even worlds framing requires ethics that begin from a priori principles like reason or pleasure so we control the internal link to functional debates.

#### The ballot says vote aff or neg based on a topic – five dictionaries[[1]](#footnote-1) define to negate as to deny the truth of and affirm[[2]](#footnote-2) as to prove true which means it’s constitutive and jurisdictional. I denied the truth of the resolution by disagreeing with the aff which means I’ve met my burden.

### 2

#### Negate –

#### 1] just[[3]](#footnote-3) means “very recently; in the immediate past” so the rez has already passed.

#### 2] of[[4]](#footnote-4) is to “expressing an age” but the rez doesn’t delineate a length of time.

#### 3] recognize[[5]](#footnote-5) is to “Officially regard (a qualification) as valid or proper” but a right isn’t a qualification.

#### 4] to[[6]](#footnote-6) is to “expressing motion in the direction of (a particular location)” but the rez doesn’t have a location.

#### 5] right[[7]](#footnote-7) is to “conforming to facts or truth” rez doesn’t specify what workers are right about.

**6] Strike[[8]](#footnote-8) is defined as** to delete something rez doesn’t spec what to delete.

#### 7] Workers[[9]](#footnote-9) is defined as a “any of the sexually underdeveloped and usually sterile members of a colony of social ants, bees, wasps, or termites that perform most of the labor and protective duties of the colony” you can’t give a right to insects nor can we know if they are correct.

### 3

#### Presumption and permissibility negates – a) statements are more often false than true since I can prove something false in infinite ways b) real world policies require positive justification before being adopted c) the aff has to prove an obligation which means lack of that obligation negates d) resolved in the resolution indicates they proactively did something, to negate that means that they aren’t resolved

#### The meta-ethic is procedural moral realism - substantive realism holds that moral truths exist independently of that in the empirical world. Prefer procedural realism –

#### [1] Uncertainty – our experiences are inaccessible to others which allows people to say they don’t experience the same, however a priori principles are universally applied to all agents.

#### [2] Naturalistic fallacy – experience only tells us what is since we can only perceive what is, not what ought to be, this means experience may be generally useful but should not be the basis for ethical action.

#### Practical Reason is that procedure. To ask for why we should be reasoners concedes its authority since it uses reason – anything else is nonbinding.

#### Moral law must be universal—any non-universalizable norm justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with liberty.

#### Prefer –

#### 1] freedom is the key to the process of justification of arguments. Willing that we should abide by their ethical theory presupposes that we own ourselves in the first place.

#### I contend that recognizing a right to strike violates liberty

#### –

#### The 1AC’s offense is bogus – it conflates “right to strike” with “right to quit” – striking is not a legitimate right and is fundamentally unfair.

**Gourevitch, 16** **(Alex Gourevitch, associate professor of political science at Brown University, 6-13-2016, accessed on 10-12-2021, *Perspectives on Politics*, "Quitting Work but Not the Job: Liberty and the Right to Strike",** [**https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/S1537592716000049**](https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/S1537592716000049)**) \*brackets in original //D.Ying**

The right to strike is peculiar. It is not a right to quit. The right to quit is part of freedom of contract and the mirror of employment-at-will. Workers may quit when they no longer wish to work for an employer; employers may fire their employees when they no longer want to employ them. Either of those acts severs the contractual relationship and the two parties are no longer assumed to be in any relationship at all. The right to strike, however, assumes the continuity of the very relationship that is suspended. Workers on strike refuse to work but do not claim to have left the job. After all, the whole point of a strike is that it is a collective work stoppage, not a collective quitting of the job. This is the feature of the strike that has marked it out from other forms of social action. If a right to strike is not a right to quit, what is it? It is the right that workers claim to refuse to perform work they have agreed to do while retaining a right to the job. Most of what is peculiar, not to mention fraught, about a strike is contained in that latter clause. Yet, surprisingly, few commentators recognize just how central and yet peculiar this claim is. 16 Opponents of the right to strike are sometimes more alive to its distinctive features than defenders. One critic, for instance, makes the distinction between quitting and striking the basis of his entire argument: the unqualified right to withdraw labour, which is a clear right of free men, does not describe the behaviour of strikers.… Strikers … withdraw from the performance of their jobs, but in the only relevant sense they do not withdraw their labour. The jobs from which they have withdrawn performance belong to them, they maintain. 17 On what possible grounds may workers claim a right to a job they refuse to perform? While many say that every able-bodied person should have a right to work, and they might say that the state therefore has an obligation to provide everyone with a job, the argument for full employment never amounts to saying that workers have rights to specific jobs from specific private employers. For instance, in 1945, at the height of the push for federally-guaranteed full employment, the Senate committee considering the issue took care to argue that “the right to work has occasionally been misinterpreted as a right to specific jobs of some specific type and status.” After labeling this a “misinterpretation,” the committee’s report cited the following words from one of the bill’s leading advocates: “It is not the aim of the bill to provide specific jobs for specific individuals. Our economic system of free enterprise must have free opportunities for jobs for all who are able and want to work. Our American system owes no man a living, but it does owe every man an opportunity to make a living.” 18 These sentences remind us how puzzling, even alarming, the right to specific jobs can sound. In fact, in a liberal society the whole point is that claims on specific jobs are a relic of feudal thinking. In status-based societies, specific groups had rights to specific jobs in the name of corporate privilege. Occupations were tied to birth or guild membership, but not available to all equally. Liberal society, based on freedom of contract, was designed to destroy just that kind of unfair and oppressive status-based hierarchy. A common argument against striking workers is that they are latter-day guilds, protecting their sectional interests by refusing to let anyone else perform “their jobs.” 19 As one critic puts it, the strikers’ demand for an inalienable right to, and property in, a particular job cannot be made conformable to the principles of liberty under law for all … the endowment of the employee with some kind of property right in a job, [is a] prime example of this reversion to the governance of status. 20

#### The right to strike implies a right to coercion which is a contradiction in conception.

**Gourevitch, 16** **(Alex Gourevitch, associate professor of political science at Brown University, 6-13-2016, accessed on 10-12-2021, *Perspectives on Politics*, "Quitting Work but Not the Job: Liberty and the Right to Strike", https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/S1537592716000049) //D.Ying**

A second problem follows on the first. If workers have rights to the jobs they are striking then they must have some powers to enforce those rights. Such powers might include mass picketing, secondary boycotts, sympathy strikes, coercion and intimidation of replacement workers, even destruction or immobilization of property—the familiar panoply of strike actions. While workers have sometimes defended such actions without using the specifically juridical language of “rights,” in many cases they have used that kind of appeal. 21 Even when they have not employed rights discourse, they have invoked some related notion of demanding fair terms to their job. 22 Each and any of the above listed activities of a strike—pickets, boycotts, sympathy actions—are part of the way workers not only press their demands but claim their right to the job. Strikers regularly implore other workers not to cross picket lines and take struck jobs. These are more than speech acts. At the outer edges, they amount to intimidation and coercion. Or at least, workers claim the right to intimidate and coerce if the state will not itself enforce this aspect of their right to strike. Liberal societies rarely permit a group of individuals powers that come close and even cross over into rights of private coercion. It is no surprise that regulation and repression of these strike activities have been the source of some of the most serious episodes of labor-related violence in U.S. and European history. 23 So, alongside the unclear basis for the strikers’ rights to their jobs, the problem for a liberal society is that this right seems to include private rights of coercion or at least troubling forms of social pressure.

#### Strikes violate fundamental rights.

**Gourevitch, 16** **(Alex Gourevitch, associate professor of political science at Brown University, 6-13-2016, accessed on 10-12-2021, *Perspectives on Politics*, "Quitting Work but Not the Job: Liberty and the Right to Strike", https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/S1537592716000049) //D.Ying**

Yet there is more. The standard strike potentially threatens the fundamental freedoms of three specific groups. • Freedom of contract. It conflicts with the freedom of contract of those replacement workers who would be willing to take the job on terms that strikers will not. Note that this is not a possible conflict but a necessary one. Strikers claim the job is theirs, which means replacements have no right to it. But replacements claim everyone should have the equal freedom to contract with an employer for a job. • Property rights. A strike seriously interferes with the employer’s property rights. The point of a strike is to stop production. But the point of a property right is that, at least in the owner’s core area of activity, nobody else has the right to interfere with his use of that property. The strikers, by claiming that the employer has no right to hire replacements and thus no way of employing his property profitably, effectively render the employer unfree to use his property as he sees fit. To be clear, strikers claim the right not just to block replacement workers, but to prevent the employer from putting his property to work without their permission. For instance, New Deal “sit-down” strikes made it impossible to operate factories, which was one reason why the courts claimed it violated employer property rights. 24 Similarly, during the Seattle general strike in 1919, the General Strike Committee forced owners to ask permission to engage in certain productive activities—permission it often denied. 25 • Freedom of association. Though the conceptual issues here are complicated, a strike can seriously constrain a worker’s freedom of association. It does so most seriously when the strike is a group right, in which only authorized representatives of the union may call a strike. In this case, the right to strike is not the individual’s right in the same way that, say, the freedom to join a church or volunteer organization is. Moreover, the strike can be coercively imposed even on dissenting members, especially when the dissenters work in closed or union shops. That is because refusal to follow the strike leads to dismissal from the union, which would mean loss of the job in union or closed shops. The threat of losing a job is usually considered a coercive threat. So not only might workers be forced to join unions—depending on the law—but also they might be forced to go along with one of the union’s riskiest collective actions. Note that each one of these concerns follows directly from the nature of the right to strike itself. Interference with freedom of contract, property rights, and the freedom of association are all part and parcel of defending the right that striking workers claim to “their” jobs. These are difficult forms of coercive interference to justify on their own terms and they appear to rest on a claim without foundation. Just what right do workers have to jobs that they refuse to perform?

#### Prohibiting coercion doesn’t solve:

#### 1] It makes the right to strike conditional.

#### 2] Promise breaking – employees sign a contract with their employer and promise to work – striking is a unilateral violation of that.

### 4

#### Reject 1AR Theory arguments – a) double bind – either you can put minor ink next to answer of my responses and extend your arguments to auto-win or the judge has to intervene to see if the 2ar answers to the 2n are good enough. That also means reasonability on 1ar theory since some level of intervention is inevitable so it’s net better to focus on things like substance education. b) they have 2 speeches on theory while I have 1 which means they can structurally preempt my answers and respond to them and I can’t do either c) infinite abuse in the context of aff abuse doesn’t make sense since you can read 1ac theory and uplayer with other 1ar offs like Ks d) they have 1 more minute on the theory debate due to a 7-6 skew which o/w since theory is mainly about substance e) evaluate 2n paradigm issues and framing since they have 2 speeches to answer and weigh against 1 argument and I need another speech to compensate f) some judges evaluate 2ar theory arguments when a 2n kicks out of an uncondo CP which means they can generate 3 speeches of theory offense g) If they get 1ar theory, we get 2nr theory to check back against infinite 1ar abuse and k2 reciprocity both get two speeches to read theory h) they can blow up dropped arguments in the next speech and I don’t have the chance to frame them out but they can which means only dropped arguments for them are game over. Also eval every layer in every speech leads to a 2-1 speech skew which is irreciprocal and leads to infinite abuse since the 2nr cant respond.

### Framing

1. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate>, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate>, <http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. *Dictionary.com – maintain as true, Merriam Webster – to say that something is true, Vocabulary.com – to affirm something is to confirm that it is true, Oxford dictionaries – accept the validity of, Thefreedictionary – assert to be true* [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. <https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/just> //Lex VM [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. <https://www.google.com/search?q=of+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS877US877&oq=of+definition&aqs=chrome.0.69i59j69i61l3.1473j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8> //Lex VM [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. <https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/recognize> //Lex VM [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. <https://www.google.com/search?q=to+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS877US877&oq=to+definition&aqs=chrome..69i57j69i60l3.1415j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8> //Lex VM [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/right> //Lex VM

   [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/strike> //Lex VM [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/worker> //Lex VM [↑](#footnote-ref-9)