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#### The desire to fill the insatiable lack creates experiences of impairment that structures the disability drive – cementing an order of signification that relies upon ableist value systems.

Mollow 15 [The Disability Drive by Anna Mollow A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in English in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Kent Puckett, Chair Professor Celeste G. Langan Professor Melinda Y. Chen Spring 2015. Anna Mollow received her Ph.D. in 2015 from the University of California, Berkeley, where she was an Andrew Vincent White and Florence Wales White Scholar and a UC Dissertation-Year Fellow. She is the coeditor, with Robert McRuer, of Sex and Disability (Duke UP, 2012) and the coeditor, with Merri Lisa Johnson, of DSM-CRIP (Social Text Online, 2013). Anna has published numerous articles on disability, queerness, feminism, race, and fatness. Her essays have appeared, or are forthcoming, in African American Review, Body Politics: Zeitschrift für Körpergeschichte, Hypatia: Journal of Feminist Philosophy, The Journal of Literary and Cultural Disability Studies, WSQ: Women’s Studies Quarterly, MELUS: Multi-Ethnic Literature of the United States, The Disability Studies Reader, Michigan Quarterly Review, the Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Critical and Cultural Theory, Disability Studies Quarterly, Bitch: Feminist Response to Pop Culture, Autostraddle, Everyday Feminism, and Huffington Post. // WHSRS and Lex VM]

Tropes of disability are also present in what Edelman reads as Jean Baudrillard‟s “panicky offensive against reproduction without heterogenital copulation,” in which sex is described as devolving into a “useless function” and humans are distinguished (unsuccessfully, Edelman argues) from “the order of the virus” (qtd. in Edelman 64, 62).111 Edelman‟s apt reading of these remarks by Baudrillard in relation to what was once called “the gay plague,” as well as his own plays on the word “bent,” suggest that it can be difficult, in homophobic and ableist culture, to distinguish between queerness and disability (62, 90).112 Anti-queer religious leaders, Edelman notes, characterize queer sexualities as “unhealthy” and “ugly,” and “ministries of hope” offer cures to those who have “grown sick-to-death of being queer” (91, 47). 113 Against the “pathology” or “social disease” as which queerness is diagnosed, queer-baiting of children, Edelman argues, functions as a form of “antigay immunization,” while the narrative of A Christmas Carol serves as an annual “booster shot” (143, 19, 49). These repetitive references to disability suggest that not only queerness but also disability might be a fitting name for what Edelman, alluding to the death drive, calls “the remainder of the Real internal to the Symbolic order” (25). Indeed, disability metaphors are often the closest approximations that Edelman can find for the “unnameable” death drive (25). The terms that Edelman uses to describe the death drive include “wound,” “fracture,” “stupid enjoyment,” “mindless violence,” “lifeless machinery,” “senseless compulsion,” “disfiguration,” and a “shutdown of life‟s vital machinery” (No Future 22; “Kid” 28; No Future 38, 23, 27, 38, 37, 44). Although these signifiers do not directly refer to specific impairments, they do, taken together, evoke the physical and mental injury and dysfunction as which disability is commonly understood. And then there is Edelman‟s term “sinthomosexuality,” a neologism formed by “grafting, at an awkward join,” the word “sexuality” onto Lacan‟s term “sinthome.” With its “awkward” “grafting,” the word “sinthomosexuality” embodies disability at the level of the letter.114 Etymologically, too, Edelman‟s term harkens back to disability: “sinthome” is an archaic way of spelling the French word for “symptom” (qtd. in Edelman 33). The root meaning of “sinthomosexuality,” then, is something like “symptom-sexuality.” However, Lacan‟s “sinthome” means more than simply “symptom”: it refers, Edelman explains, to “the particular way each subject manages to knot together the orders of the Symbolic, the Imaginary, and the Real” (35). The sinthome is the only means by which the subject can access the Symbolic order of meaning production; but paradoxically, because each subject‟s sinthome is arbitrary and meaningless (as individual as a fingerprint), the sinthome also threatens the Symbolic order to which it provides access (36). Both this access and this threat are figured as disability. In order to be constituted as a subject and to take one‟s place within the Symbolic order, one must be metaphorically blind: the cost of subjectivity is “blindness to this determination by the sinthome,” “blindness to the arbitrary fixation of enjoyment responsible for [the subject‟s] consistency,” “blindness” to the functioning of the sinthome (Edelman 36, 38). The alternative to subjectivity as disability would be, according to remarks that Edelman attributes to Lacan, “radical psychotic autism” (qtd. in Edelman 37).115 That is, whatever might alleviate our constitutive “blindness” by exposing “the sinthome as meaningless knot” must effect a “disfiguration” (Edelman 38), the consequences of which would be “pure autism” (Žižek 81, qtd. in Edelman 38). On the one side, blindness; on the other, disfiguration, psychosis, autism: when it comes to recognizing the senselessness of one‟s sinthome, it seems we‟re disabled if we do, disabled if we don‟t. This is why I have proposed that the “death drive”—a force that has less to do with literal death than with a strange persistence of life in death, or of death in life (perhaps like the “life not worth living” of which disability is often supposed to consist)—would more accurately be termed the “disability drive.” Writing of the contingency of disability as an identity category, Michael Bérubé observes: Any of us who identify as “nondisabled” must know that our self-designation is inevitably temporary, and that a car crash, a virus, a degenerative genetic disease, or a precedent-setting legal decision could change our status in ways over which we have no control whatsoever. If it is obvious why most nondisabled people resist this line of thinking, it should be equally obvious why that resistance must somehow be overcome. (viii) Could part of this resistance be attributable to a fear that, in the car crash or other identity- shattering event, it might be the driver‟s own hand that makes that disabling turn, that is, that the driver might be driven by an impulse, unwanted and unconscious, toward something beyond the principles of pleasure and health? Applying the name “the disability drive” to this “beyond” affords insight into the reasons that images of disability so powerfully excite and repel, becoming, as Tobin Siebers writes, “sources of fear and fascination for able-bodied people, who cannot bear to look at the unruly sight before them but also cannot bear not to look” (178). Later in this chapter, I will define the affect that Siebers references here as “primary pity.” For now, though, I simply want to point out that Siebers‟s important observation can be extended by noting that it is not only nondisabled people who react to images of disability with a mixture of aversion and attraction. Disabled people may also respond in this way, especially when contemplating impairments other than those that currently disable us.116 Building on Douglas Baynton‟s famous assertion that “disability is everywhere,...once you begin looking for it,” I suggest that the same may be true in regard to the disability drive: this ego-undoing psychic force shapes the subjectivities of disabled and nondisabled subjects alike (52). Manifestations of the disability drive may be present in Edelman‟s discussion of Tiny Tim. Take, for example, Edelman‟s contention that “the pleasurable fantasy of survival” in Dickens‟s story requires the survival of the fantasy that Tiny Tim “does not excite an ardent fear (or is it a fearful ardor?) to see him . . . at last cash in his chips” (45). It‟s a familiar cultural fantasy: cure ‟em (as Dickens might hope) or kill ‟em (as Edelman suggests readers must secretly wish).117 But in this unacknowledged wish, there may be more at stake than either killing or curing. In the chapter that follows his reading of A Christmas Carol, Edelman adduces Lacan‟s discussion of the legend of Saint Martin, who was said to have cut his own cloak in two in order to give half of it to a beggar. “Perhaps,” Lacan suggests, “over and above that need to be clothed, [the beggar] was begging for something else, namely that Saint Martin either kill him or fuck him” (qtd. in Edelman 83). Drawing upon this passage in his analysis of North by 72 Northwest, Edelman proposes that as Leonard attempts to push Roger Thornhill to his death from atop Mount Rushmore, he “enacts . . . the one [killing] as displacement of the other [fucking]” (85). Killing as displacement of fucking: might a similar displacement be at work in Edelman‟s attribution, to Dickens‟s readers, of a “fearful ardor” to see Tiny Tim “at last cash in his chips” (45)? As evidence for this suggestion, take the mode by which Edelman introduces his discussion of A Christmas Carol: “Take Tiny Tim, please!,” “with a nod to the spirit of the late Henny Youngman” renders Tiny Tim wifelike—clearly undesirable in this context, but not wholly uneroticized (41). And then there is the word “take,” which, particularly when followed by the word “please,” has a meaning other than the ones Edelman seems deliberately to invoke: “take” means “fuck,” and so Edelman‟s directive to “take Tiny Tim, please!,” which echoes his earlier injunction to “fuck Annie; fuck the waif from Les Mis; fuck the poor, innocent kid on the Net,” seems to authorize an additional imperative: fuck Tiny Tim. “Fuck” here means, of course, “remove” or “the hell with,” but it also means fuck.118 Arguably, these two ways in which No Future says “fuck Tiny Tim” coincide with what disability studies most ardently desires. “Fuck Tiny Tim, please!” disability scholars beg: rid us, please, of this most reviled textual creation. And also: if it is our cultural mandate to embody this pitiable, platitude-issuing, infantilized, and irritating figure—well, then fuck us, every one. Fuck us because figuratively, we are already “so fucked” by our culture‟s insistence, through this figure, that the disabled are not fuckable. This insistence must be understood as a form of reactive reinforcement: propelling every cultural representation of disability as undesirable, there may be a “fearful ardor,” an unacknowledged drive. Such representations include Edelman‟s abjection of Tiny Tim. And, I will argue, they also pertain to a similar abjection of Tiny Tim in the field of disability studies. As we shall soon see, the drive that infuses affective reactions to disability with ardor is often expressed through the emotion of pity. In taking account of the various forms that pity can take, we will be led to pose a question to disability studies and to queer antisocial theory together: are we sure that we want to take Tiny Tim out of the cultural text? A Tale of Two Pities “Piss on pity,” declares a well-known disability activist bumper sticker. A more polite companion to this tag, the slogan “No pity” is a rallying cry of the disability rights movement.119 For disability studies, a field that since its inception has vigorously resisted the imposition of pity upon disabled people, Tiny Tim is anathema. Understandably so: every year, the image of Tiny Tim is used to drum up pity for disabled people; the widespread circulation of this affect, disability scholars have compellingly argued, does not alleviate the social barriers that we face but instead reinforces our oppression. Indispensable as this disability studies analysis is, it leaves some important questions about pity unanswered. For example: if, as is commonly said, “No one wants to be pitied,” then why is this so? And also, if nobody wants to be pitied, who, if anyone, wants to feel pity? At first glance, the answer to the latter question might seem to be “everyone.” Certainly, multitudes of moviegoers appear to enjoy our culture‟s annual recitations of Tiny Tim‟s pity inducing tale. If it can be fun to perform pity, perhaps this is because pity gives a boost to the ego of the pitying person. “You are broken, and I am whole,” the pitier says to the one who is pitied. “I look down on you because you suffer.” Naturally, disabled people resist performing this service for the nondisabled. “Spare us your pity,” we say, because pity is felt to be demeaning. 73 Yet an incoherence structures this familiar account of pity: if pity fortifies the ego of the subject who feels it, then why do people so often resist feeling pity? Some folks get pissed when they are prodded to pity. “Your appeals to pity won‟t work,” they say. “I have no pity for you.” This is the attitude that Scrooge takes toward Tiny Tim. It‟s also the stance that Edelman invites queers to take in relation to the Child—and not only to the Child per se, but also to anyone who calls for a performance of pity. Edelman argues that compassion (which, of course, is a close relative of pity) is fundamentally narcissistic (73). When we call ourselves compassionate, we think we‟re feeling for the other; but, Edelman contends, we‟re really only feeling for ourselves (83). That is, compassion involves projecting one‟s own ego onto the object of one‟s compassion. In this schema, the pitied person is used as a vehicle for the pitier to feel sorry for his or her own self.

#### There is a two-tiered affective reaction when confronted with disability – primary pity damages the egos’ ability status, which invokes secondary pity to overcorrect for the threat.

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A great deal of the pain and pleasure of primary pity center on questions about what, or who, this fallen self is. When most people think about pity, we refer to an affect in which, to adopt Edelman‟s phrase, we purport to “feel for the other.” But as with primary narcissism, in which the self has not yet been constituted, and therefore cannot be said to enter into intersubjective relations with an “other,” primary pity entails a mixing up of self and other such that the ego, in becoming permeable to pain that may properly belong to “someone else,” is profoundly threatened in its integrity. Primary pity is that intense pain-pleasure complex that is provoked by the image of a suffering other who, it seems momentarily, both is and is not one‟s self. This affective response can feel unbearable, as seen in Siebers‟s formulation: one “cannot bear to look…but also cannot bear not to look.” Primary pity is difficult to bear because it involves a drive toward disability (one cannot bear not to look), which menaces the ego‟s investments in health, pleasure, and control—because to contemplate another person‟s suffering is to confront the question, “Could this happen to me?” Such a prospect, although frightening, may also be compelling; in this way, primary pity replicates the self-rupturing aspects of sexuality. Indeed, the unbearability of primary pity reflects its coextensiveness with sexuality. Sex, or the Unbearable, a book coauthored by Edelman and by Lauren Berlant, argues that sex “unleashes unbearable contradictions that we nonetheless struggle to bear” (back cover). This claim accords with Freud‟s account of sexuality as a “pleasurable” “unpleasure” that the ego can never fully master or control (Three 49,75). As Leo Bersani puts it in his reading of Freud, “the pleasurable unpleasurable tension of sexual enjoyment occurs when the body‟s „normal‟ range of sensation is exceeded, and when the organization of the self is momentarily disturbed”; thus, “sexuality would be that which is intolerable to the structured self” (Freudian 38). Primary pity is also intolerable to the structured self, because it entails a fascination with the fantasy of a self in a state of disintegration or disablement. Secondary pity is something else, although it cannot wholly be differentiated from primary pity. Secondary pity attempts to heal primary pity‟s self-rupturing effects by converting primary pity into a feeling that is bearable. As with secondary narcissism, secondary pity involves both an attempt to get back to that ego-shattering state of painfully pleasurable primary pity, and at the same time to defend against that threat to the ego by aggrandizing oneself at someone else‟s expense. Secondary pity refers to all those ego-bolstering behaviors that most people think of when they talk about pity. Disabled people are all too familiar with these behaviors: the saccharin sympathy, the telethon rituals of “conspicuous contribution,” the insistence that “they” (i.e., nondisabled people) could never endure such suffering. More commonly known in our culture simply as “pity,” secondary pity encompasses our culture‟s most clichéd reactions to disability: charity, tears, and calls for a cure. Correlatives of these commonplace manifestations of secondary pity are the obligatory claims that disabled people‟s suffering is “inspiring.” Indeed, the speed with which conventional cultural representations of disability segue from overt expressions of pity to celebrations of “the triumph of the human spirit” highlights the ways in which secondary pity, as a defense against primary pity‟s incursions, reinforces the ego‟s fantasy of sovereignty. Secondary pity, in other words, can be seen as a variation of secondary narcissism: these affects enlarge the ego of the pitier or the narcissist at the expense of someone else. But primary pity is not the same as either primary narcissism, secondary narcissism, or secondary pity. Unlike primary narcissism, a feeling that emerges out of a relation to the world in which notions of “self” and “other” do not obtain, primary pity does depend upon the constructs of self and other, although these constructions are unstable and are continually threatening to come undone. Primary pity can thus be envisioned as a threshold category occupying a liminal position between the total denial of the other that is inherent to primary narcissism and the rigid structure of (superior) self and (inferior) other that constitutes secondary narcissism and secondary pity. My concept of primary versus secondary pity also differs from Freud‟s primary secondary narcissism distinction at the level of genealogy. Like Freud‟s account of primary and secondary narcissisms, my model of primary and secondary pities involves a temporal transition; but whereas Freud imagines the movement from primary to secondary narcissism as a passage from an earlier to a later stage of an individual‟s development, the temporal shift from primary to secondary pity happens much more quickly than this. It happens in an instant: that moment in which we feel primary pity and then, almost before we can blink, deny that we feel or have felt it. The denial is understandable: who wants to admit that one gets pleasure from the sight of another person‟s suffering—or, to make matters worse, that this pleasure derives in part from the specter of disability‟s transferability, the possibility that this suffering could be—and, fantasmatically, perhaps already is—an image of one‟s own self undone?

#### The 1ACs belief of a better future is tied to rehabilitation where the signifier of the Child is placed forward to demean disabled people.

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Elsewhere, I have argued that No Future‟s impassioned polemic is one that disability studies might take to heart. Indeed, the figure that Edelman calls “the disciplinary image of the ‘innocent’ Child” is inextricable not only from queerness but also from disability (19). For example, the Child is the centerpiece of the telethon, a ritual display of pity that demeans disabled people. When Jerry Lewis counters disability activists‟ objections to his assertion that a disabled person is “half a person,” he insists that he is only fighting for the Children: “Please, I’m begging for survival. I want my kids alive,” he implores (in Johnson, Too Late 53, 58). If the Child makes an excellent alibi for ableism, perhaps this is because, as Edelman points out, the idea of not fighting for this figure is unthinkable. Thus, when Harriet McBryde Johnson hands out leaflets protesting the Muscular Dystrophy Association, a confused passerby cannot make sense of what her protest is about. “You‟re against Jerry Lewis!” he exclaims (61). The passerby’s surprise is likely informed by a logic similar to that which, in Edelman‟s analysis, undergirds the use of the word “choice” by advocates of legal abortion: “Who would, after all, come out for abortion or stand against reproduction, against futurity, and so against life?” (16). Similarly, why would anyone come out for disability, and so against the Child who, without a cure, might never walk, might never lead a normal life, might not even have a future at all? The logic of the telethon, in other words, relies on an ideology that might be defined as “rehabilitative futurism,” a term that I coin to overlap and intersect with Edelman‟s notion of “reproductive futurism.” If, as Edelman maintains, the future is envisaged in terms of a fantasmatic “Child,” then the survival of this future-figured-as-Child is threatened by both queerness and disability. Futurity is habitually imagined in terms that fantasize the eradication of disability: a recovery of a “crippled” or “hobbled” economy, a cure for society’s ills, an end to suffering and disease. Eugenic ideologies are also grounded in both reproductive and rehabilitative futurism: procreation by the fit and elimination of the disabled, eugenicists promised, would bring forth a better future.” (68-69)

#### The 1AC is a form of recognition politics that reinforces a social model of suffering that demands to be addressed by an RTS within debate.

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The line of thinking that I have been pursuing runs counter to a major argumentative thread in disability studies. For the past several decades, disability scholars have sought to detach social constructions of disability from the notion of suffering.13 Working within the paradigms of the “social model of disability” and the related “critique of the medical model,” these thinkers and cultural workers have argued that a widespread cultural equation of disability with suffering is a crucial contributor to ableism, the social process by which disabled people are oppressed. “The Disability Drive” is deeply indebted to the social model and to the disability rights movement that this model inspired. The groundbreaking ideas that disabled people constitute a politically oppressed group, and that this oppression can and should be remedied, are conditions of possibility for my project. However, as numerous disability scholars have observed, the social model may inadvertently reinforce the oppression of some disabled people, especially those who define suffering as important aspects of our lived experiences.14 For this reason, my efforts to repay my debts to the social model will proceed perversely: I will work from the premise that disability often does involve suffering, and I will put forth, as an alternative to the social model, a new interpretative frame, which I term “the sexual model of disability.” Rather than distancing disability from physical and mental distress, as the social model often does, the sexual model foregrounds points of contact among disability, sexuality, and suffering, thus making room for the theorization of suffering as a central experiential aspect of disability. I suggest that the social model‟s disclaiming of suffering is a shortcut, which leaves unanswered this pressing question: why is suffering so heavily stigmatized in our culture? The sexual model approaches this question by way of a set of related inquiries, all of which are closely connected to the concept of the disability drive. How and why are disability and suffering sexualized? When is this sexualization disavowed, punished, or attributed to “someone else”? Conversely, in what ways is sexuality rendered as disability and suffering? And when are renditions of sexuality as disabling suffering abjected onto stigmatized cultural minorities? In posing these questions, I hope to facilitate a more in-depth understanding of disability oppression than the social model has enabled. Importantly, the social model defines disability as a system of oppression that isolates and excludes disabled people.15 The sexual model of disability builds upon this transformative intervention by undertaking an in-depth exploration of the reasons for disabled people‟s isolation and exclusion. If, as many disability scholars have pointed out, ableist culture often seems torn between an urge to witness disability (for example, by staring at disabled people) and an impulse to hide disability (for example, by confining disabled people to institutions), this ambivalence may be attributable to the nature of the disability drive itself specifically, to the intolerability of the erotic excitement that images of disability can generate.16 Getting excited about disability, in all the capacious ways that “excited” and “disability” can signify, is distressing. What does it mean to be turned on by disability, especially when disability is imaged as suffering? Such a possibility, could it be acknowledged, would pose a profound threat to the ego‟s investments in security, pleasure, and health. If there is a disability drive, this implusion toward disability must endanger our senses of our selves as able: as coherent, rational, and capable subjects who know “what‟s good for us” and know how to act on that knowledge. If witnessing disability provokes sexual pleasure, then, two things may happen at once: first, that pleasure (or the sexual component of that pleasure) is denied or repressed; and second, disabled people are blamed for eliciting these intolerable sensations. Ambivalent encounters with disability point to a possibility that is at the heart of psychoanalytic theory: our psyches may be set up in ways that make us innately disabled. Freud‟s theory of the death drive suggests that we are driven by a force that threatens our socially recognizable selves, but are at the same time prevented from fully perceiving this drivenness in ourselves. Always, it will be easier to allow that “someone else” may be under the sway of a self-undoing compulsion toward disability than to imagine ourselves as similarly driven. Yet our unwillingness indeed, perhaps, our structural inability to see ourselves as governed by the disability drive presents a major problem. A central argument of this dissertation will be that when individuals and social movements imagine themselves as not subject to the disability drive, their projects almost invariably have the effect of stigmatizing other abjected subjects, who come to be read as emblems of this disavowed and disabling compulsion. This thesis attempts to upset the impulse to overcome the disability drive. Rather than “putting the „ability‟ back in „disability,‟” the sexual model of disability underscores the disability that may inhere in subjectivity itself, regardless of whether a given individual or political movement identifies as “disabled” or “nondisabled.”17

#### The alternative is to find the middle ground between the utopian/anti-relational binary and weaponize disability against the figure of “human”.

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But here a problem emerges: as we have seen, the writing by Bersani and Edelman that I have examined forwards powerful arguments against the project of becoming human. Urging queers to embrace the “inhumanity of the sinthomosexual,” Edelman observes that the liberal goal of expanding the category of “human” to encompass those presently excluded from it will not “stop the cultural production of figures” made to embody the inhumanity of the death drive (No Future 107). What would it mean for disability theory to embrace disabled people’s figuration as inhuman? As we contemplate this possibility, a moment from How I Became a Human Being may give us pause. After a presentation by the physicist Stephen Hawking at the U.C. Berkeley campus, O’Brien posed the following question: “Doctor Hawking, what can you say to all the disabled people who are stuck in nursing homes or living with their parents or in some other untenable situation and who feel that their life is over, that they have no future?” (Human Being 230). A response that might be derived from Edelman’s book—that there is, and can be, no future, since the future, by definition, can only ever be a fantasy (“always / A day / Away,” in Annie’s paean to “Tomorrow”)—hardly seems more adequate than Hawking’s reply: “All I can say is that one must do the best one can in the situation in which one finds oneself ” (No Future 30; Human Being 231). In light of O’Brien’s question, Edelman’s embrace of the death drive, or Bersani’s celebration of what he calls “the breakdown of the human itself in sexual intensities,” can easily appear as irresponsible theoretical indulgences (“Rectum” 29). Indeed, the word “irresponsible” is one that Bersani himself uses when he reflects, at a distance of thirteen years, on “Is the Rectum a Grave?”: “Much of this now seems to me a rather facile, even irresponsible celebration of ‘self- defeat.’ Masochism is not a viable alternative to mastery, either practically or theoretically” (“Sociality” 110). This remark highlights important shifts and ambivalences in Bersani’s thinking over the course of his career, which may serve as an entry into the question of the status of the human in disability theory. Bersani and Edelman are often cited, as if in the same breath, as proponents of an “antisocial” or “antirelational” “thesis” in queer theory, in opposition to which some critics of their work, such as Muñoz, have defined their own projects as “utopian.”17 But Bersani’s work, rather than conforming to either side of a utopian/antirelational binary, often reveals an interest in thinking in both of these ways at once. For example, writing of passages in his book, Homos (published in 1995) that are frequently cited as the origin of the “antirelational thesis,” Bersani describes the “performance of antirelationality” that he celebrates in Jean Genet’s Funeral Rites as a “utopic form of revolt” (“Sociality” 103; emphasis added). This joining of the utopian and the antirelational corresponds to what Bersani describes, in an essay published in 2004, as a central concern throughout his career: “a dialogue (both conciliatory and antagonistic) between” Foucault and Freud (“Fr- oucault” 133). In this essay and other recent writings, Bersani moves away from the “Freudian” and toward the “Foucauldian.” Worrying that the psychoanalytic (or antirelational) side of this paradigm may be politically irresponsible (insofar as its insistence on the intractability of the death drive seems “resistant to any social transformations whatsoever”), Bersani has become increasingly interested in the creation of what, invoking a phrase of Foucault’s, he calls “new relational modes” (“Fr- oucault” 134). Interestingly, this “admittedly utopic” project often employs a rhetoric of futurism, both reproductive and rehabilitative (Bersani, “Fr- oucault” 134). For example, in a reading of Plato’s Symposium, Bersani approvingly observes that “the goal of a love relation with Socrates” is “the bringing to term of the other’s pregnancy of soul” (“Sociality” 110; 117).18 Not only a pregnancy but perhaps also a rehabilitation of the soul is at stake at moments in which a utopian impulse is evident in Bersani’s work—as when, for example, he speaks of effecting “a curative collapse of social difference,” or of enabling a future enjoyment of “as yet unarticulated pleasures” that have thus far been “suppressed and crippled” (Homos 177; “Fr- oucault” 137; emphasis added). If, as these examples suggest, Edelman is correct in asserting that we cannot think of the future without reference to the Child—and if I am right in suggesting that the overlapping ideology of rehabilitative futurism is equally pervasive and insidious—then how should disability theory answer O’Brien’s question? The disability rights movement, of course, has already provided compelling responses: protestations against the injustice of institutionalization, critiques of the nursing home lobby, and advocacy for attendant programs. Theoretically, it could be said that the goal of de- institutionalization is merely a liberal one, as it aims only to include disabled people within the social fabric. Yet in this instance (and many similar ones), an imperfect politics clearly seems better than no politics at all. But what is the role of disability theory in relation to this politics? Is it, as Paul Longmore described disability studies in 2003, to serve as the “academic counterpart to disability rights advocacy” (Burned 2)? Or should disability theory conceive of itself as sometimes in tension with this movement (as queer theory often is in relation to the mainstream lGbt movement)? Insofar as it has acted as a “counterpart” to the disability rights movement, disability studies has made crucial contributions to what might be called a humanizing enterprise. It has offered, for example, myriad analyses of the reasons for our society’s willingness—its desperation, even—to dehumanize and exclude disabled people, even to the point of locking them up. But when sex enters the picture, things get complicated. Consider, for example, the following remark, made by a doctor to a group of patients at one of O’Brien’s rehabilitation hospitals: “You may think you’ll never have sex again, but remember . . . some people do become people again” (Human Being 80). The doctor’s comment points to a paradox that inheres in any conversation about sex and disability: disabled people, it is implied here, are less than fully human because they are presumed not to “have sex”—but sex, psychoanalysis shows us, is radically dehumanizing, effecting a “shattering” of “the structured self ” rather than its entrenchment in personhood or identity. This paradox is at the root of the double bind I discussed in the introduction to this chapter, in which disability simultaneously figures sexual excess and sexual lack: disabled people are regarded as sexually deficient and therefore not fully human, but at the same time, disabled people register as less than human because disability is the ubiquitous figure for a dehumanizing, identity- disintegrating force that resembles sex. If, as the second half of this paradoxical construction suggests, assertions of humanity are in necessary conflict with expressions of sexuality, then perhaps disability theory should, rather than seeking to humanize the disabled (insisting that disabled people be treated “as human beings”), instead ask how disability might threaten to undo, or disable, the category of the human. It might do so in part by attending to the insights Bersani’s and Edelman’s readings of psychoanalytic theory yield, according to which sex, far from enabling us to “become people,” ruptures the self and dehumanizes us all. But what, then, would become of disability politics? Critics of No Future— despite Edelman’s insistence that its argument pertains to “figurality,” not to “being or becoming” the death drive—tend to read the book as advocating, on a literal level, the abandonment of hope and political goals (No Future 17; 25).19 As noted earlier, however, it is “politics as we know it” that Edelman refuses, and even this refusal does not mean that queers should stop insisting on “our equal right to the social order’s prerogatives” (No Future 3; 29; emphasis added). Edelman further clarifies this point in his essay “Ever After”: “Without for a moment denying the importance that distinguishes many [political] projects, I want to insist on the need for an ongoing counterproject as well: a project that’s willing to forgo the privilege of social recognition” (473; emphasis added). Such a counterproject—one that can be read as possibly opposing the humanizing impulse behind O’Brien’s narration of How I Became a Human Being—may take shape in some of O’Brien’s own poetry. While the title of his autobiography speaks of becoming human, his unpublished poem “Femininity” disrupts this trajectory. O’Brien writes of lying: Naked on the gurney in the hospital corridor, surrounded by nurses, tall, young, proud of their beauty, admiring my skinny cripple body. “You’re so thin, you should’ve been a girl.” “I wish my eyelashes were as long as yours.” “Such pretty eyes.” I thought or think I thought or wish I’d said, “But your bodies work. Get scissors, cut my cock and balls off. Make me a girl, without anaesthesia, make me a girl, make me a girl.”20 Much of the unnerving intensity of these lines derives from what, invoking Bersani, we might refer to as their embrace of “the suicidal ecstasy of being a woman” (or a girl, or queer, or disabled); from their rejection, that is, of the ideology of rehabilitative futurism, and from their refusal to engage in a “redemptive reinvention” of sex or disability. O’Brien’s speaker does not plead with the nurses who admire his “skinny cripple body” to “cure me” or “make me walk again.” Nor does he attempt to redefine his body (which does not “work”) as merely a manifestation of human variation. Suffering and lack, rather than being dissociated from disability, are amplified and eroticized: “cut my cock and balls off . . . without anaesthesia,” the speaker implores, the repetition of his plea (“make me a girl, / make me a girl”) evoking the repetitiveness of a drive. “Femininity” can indeed be read as an instantiation of the disability drive: disability in this poem, like “the rectum” in Bersani’s essay, “is the grave in which the masculine [and nondisabled] ideal of proud subjectivity is buried.” It will of course be tempting to evade this “nightmare of ontological obscenity” (“Rectum” 29), this fantasy of un- becoming human.21 But the dehumanizing double binds that so persistently structure cultural representations of sex and disability suggest that such evasions may be futile. Intrinsically obscene, yet inherently asexual: rather than attempting to assume a different position within this impossible paradigm, disability theory should perhaps underscore its pervasiveness as evidence of a disability drive; as a sign, that is, that our culture’s desexualization of disabled people functions to defend against a deeply rooted but seldom acknowledged awareness that all sex is incurably, and perhaps desirably, disabled.

#### Our interpretation of debate is to question ideological optimism in the classroom. Communicative spheres zone out disability or are cruelly optimistic – breaking down notions of progress is necessary in the face of social death.

Selck 16 [Selck, Michael L. "Crip Pessimism: The Language of Dis/ability and the Culture that Isn't." (Jan 2016) // WHSRS and Lex VM]

Despite the fact that a large basis of American culture is founded on ability, dis/ability rarely enters the dominant public communication sphere. The unpleasant and visceral questions that accompany communication about dis/ability have been strategically re-zoned and relocated like so many dis/abled patients, veterans, and transients. Yet, when conversation about dis/ability does seem to permeate the ideological walls of ability the messages are inspirationally distorted and optimistic. My time researching dis/ability in academia found that the conversation there mimicked the exploitive inspirational humaninterest trope found in cinema and journalism. To break the optimistic silence I set out with a performance art piece titled Under The Mantle to advance a theme of crip-pessimism, which intended to raise the stakes of contemporary dis/ability research. The beginning of this essay takes the time to detail the vast theoretical backgrounds of critical disability theory and philosophical pessimism. In the following section I reviewed intercultural communication literature for dis/ability because much of the theory literature I drew from existed outside the communication studies discipline. The evidenced lack of intercultural dis/ability artifacts up against a dis/ability centric performance art project necessitated an interdisciplinary multi-method framework. In that framework I demonstrate how autoethnography is significant to dis/ability studies because it illuminates even the most mundane able-bodied norms. In the final sections I offer a textual description of the performance and hone in on three explicit arguments that augment traditional thinking about dis/ability and communication. The trouble I encountered with dis/ability research in communication studies has to do with the way American culture understands offensive communication. Political correctness as a disciplining communication concept dictates what terms are socially acceptable at a given time. Political correctness underscores how many communication studies programs operate within the rubric of conflict (Wilderson, 2010). The thinking that suggests simply avoiding offensive terms will diminish oppression is within the rubric of conflict because it understands the oppression as materially reconcilable. What crippessimism does, and what UTM performed, is skepticism that speaking inspirationally and avoiding speaking offensively about dis/ability would end disablism. Instead I argued that what dis/ability represents is an antagonism, it is an oppression so much more foundational to the core of American values that linguistic reforms would not even scratch the surface. The significance of antagonism is that it raises the stakes of dis/ability research. The end goal of research should not be to service the meta-theoretical assumptions of the paradigm (Kuhn, 1962), because consequently the researcher never stops to ask if the assumptions of the paradigm are ethical, valid, or effective. Crippessimism is a call for some demolition and redistribution of communicative identity paradigms. If the radical promise of our theories is nothing more than a call for social stability then they are complicit in the neoliberal eugenic project. We need to theorize so that there is nothing already ‘given’ or taken for granted. Often in those moments, like the moments of so many textbooks, the underlying optimism goes completely unquestioned. Crip-pessimism as a theme is characterized by negotiating debates surrounding the efficacy of identity politics. Arguments that fit within the theme ask why the disabled should abandon their bodies in the political sphere. Social death has already occurred, the dis/abled are being rendered culturally unintelligible and physically fungible. So what we need when we are having discussions about how to progress is a theory that breaks down the notion of progress. The recognition and need for a theory like this comes about when we ask central dis/ability questions like: ‘when did eugenics end?’ and ‘where is disability in U.S. society before and after the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act?’ and ‘globally has the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities reconciled the antagonism of disablism?’. These are the questions that I want to end on and encourage communication and dis/ability scholars alike to take up. As scholars and mass media engines continue to project dis/ability within the rubric of conflict our collective reliance on capitalism and neoliberalism grow deeper. It is my hope at the end of this project that my voice both in performing and in writing encourages more scholarship detailing the omnipresence of disablism in American culture. Under The Mantle is a reminder to me that all representations of dis/ability have consequences and in many cases all we need to witness those consequences is a slight perspectival shift.

### AT Underview

#### 1AR Theory is not a voter –

#### [A] Theory avoids engagement with proves the Selck evidence of how debate zones out discussion about disability.

#### [B] The only voter for theory that matters in this round is ableism.

#### [C] Exploits disabilities – since those with ADHD or ADD lose focus and forget to meet certain interps, other mental disabilities hinder the ability to understand communal norms like disclosure

#### [D] New 2nr responses to 1AC tricks and spikes – 1. Inclusion – kids with adhd might miss some arguments that are hidden 2. Spikes aren’t complete arguments, nor do we know the implication till the 1AR.

### Framework

#### Util is a link – focus on pleasure is what disability harms thats the pity warrant up top.

#### Epistemic uncertainty flows neg — their analysis ignores the ways in which uncertainty, confusion, and the overall drive determine us.

Mollow 5 [The Disability Drive by Anna Mollow A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in English in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Kent Puckett, Chair Professor Celeste G. Langan Professor Melinda Y. Chen Spring 2015 // WHSRS and Lex VM]

“How, then, might we begin to acknowledge our own determination by the drive? Any knowing of the drive that we might hope to achieve must, on account of the structural barriers that render the drive unthinkable, be an effort characterized by failure and incompletion—that is, we might say, by epistemological disablement. The term “epistemological disablement” will appear frequently in this dissertation, as I will argue that coming into close proximity with the disability drive produces states of cognitive and affective uncertainty, confusion, and incapacity that are akin to disability. In the works that I shall analyze, epistemological disablement will often be performed on a textual level, as theorists and narrators seem to lose control of what they want to say about disability. These moments of epistemological disablement are often disavowed by theorists and narrators and are instead projected onto disabled people. When this happens, disabled people’s impairments are depicted as the result of an insufficiency of self-knowledge that is assumed not to determine nondisabled subjects. I will challenge these characterizations of disabled people not only by arguing for the value of “cripistemologies” (that is, ways of knowing that arise from disabled people‟s lived experiences) but also by using drive theory to undermine belief in the possibility of a transparent and wholly knowable self, whether disabled or nondisabled.18 My two-pronged approach to the issue of epistemological disablement may seem to present a paradox: on the one hand, I am asserting that disabled people’s lived experiences generate important knowledge about disability; yet at the same time I am seeking to destabilize the very notion of self-knowledge. Let me be clear, then, that in undertaking this double endeavor I do not forward all-or-nothing claims either “for” or “against” the possibilities of self- knowledge. I will not assert that people cannot ever know anything reliable about themselves, but I will also not suggest that truth claims derived from personal knowledge about disability are infallible. Instead, this dissertation highlights the limits of complete self-knowledge for nondisabled and disabled subjects alike, while at the same time interrogating the social dynamics that give rise to imbalances in the distribution of epistemological authority to particular subjects on the basis of their perceived status as disabled or nondisabled.” (4)

#### There remains a fundamental gap between the imaginary body and the real body. The affirmative is fundamentally a failed project.

**Breu 16** [Christopher Breu, “Identity vs. Embodiment: A Materialist Rethinking of Intersex and Queerness” symplokē, Vol. 24, No. 1-2, Materialisms (2016), pp. 65-79 Published by: University of Nebraska Press] // UTDD

“To add to this list, I think we need to focus on embodiment as distinct not only from identity, but from all of these other dynamics as well. While it intersects with each of these dynamics it is important to emphasize embodiment in its resistance, intransigence, malleability, and agency. The advent of the material turn enables us to theorize this more fully, by refusing to merely see the body as a discursive production or as what Butler in 1994 called a process of materialization. In the conception of the body I want to argue for, materiality isn’t just a passive site of inscription or construction, culture’s and language’s plaything, but also something that actively intervenes, insists, resists, and exerts agency. One way of theorizing this form of embodiment, one I employed in Insistence of the Material, is to use the developmentalist account of the real and the imaginary in Lacan. The imaginary body, for Lacan, is one that is produced by the phantasmatic mapping of the body that takes place during the mirror stage. This imaginary body, or what Freud terms the body ego, is a phantasmatic construction, one that both differs from the material body as it also becomes the way in which the material body is lived. Thus, the imaginary body can exist in contradiction with the material body, even as it provides the subject’s apprehension of the material body.18 The real body in Lacan functions as uncoded materiality. It is those aspects of the material body that elude or exist in tension with symbolization and imaginary mapping.

#### Try or die flips neg – the aff’s discourse makes war inevitable through the disability drive – only we solve

Mollow 6 [The Disability Drive by Anna Mollow A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in English in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Kent Puckett, Chair Professor Celeste G. Langan Professor Melinda Y. Chen Spring 2015] // Lex VM

As a means of exploring connections between sexuality and disability, this project theorizes a psychoanalytic concept to which I have given the name “the disability drive.”6 I define the disability drive as an eroticized compulsion toward disability, and I argue that this compulsion may be an intrinsic element of most subjects‟ psychic lives. My term “the disability drive” is intended to inaugurate a renaming and a rethinking of Freud‟s influential notion of a “death drive”—an idea that, as we shall see, has as much to do with disability as with death. Freud‟s theory of the death drive emerged in part from his efforts to understand why humans act in ways that make us unhappy. Why do we murder, commit suicide, fight wars, fall in love with people who we know will disappoint us, and return in our dreams to traumatizing scenarios? The answers to these questions, Freud suggested, lie in the structure of the psyche. Freud posited a subjectivity intrinsically divided against itself, the ego‟s instincts for pleasure and self-preservation competing with a puzzling component of mental life that continually pulls subjects away from what would seem to be rational self-interest and the desire for pleasure. To this aspect of the psychic structure, Freud gave the name “the death drive.” But the death drive does not primarily refer to biological death. Instead, the drive entails the death of the subject‟s ego, or socially legible self. Whereas the term “ego” stands for the parts of one‟s self that one can recognize and represent, the phrase “the death drive” signifies those parts of the subject that cannot be represented.7 The destruction of the ego toward which 2 the death drive tends does not involve the death of the subject per se, since a corollary of Freud‟s theory of the drive is that the ego is only one part of the self. The desires that a subject is able to recognize as belonging to itself take shape within the realm of the ego, but subjects are also compelled in ways that may be felt as hostile or threatening to the ego. “The death drive” is Freud‟s name for that force that goes “beyond” the ego, undercutting its self-interest and interfering with its efforts to secure pleasure. In undermining what our egos think they want, the death drive brings about not biological death but instead experiences that are closely related to disability.

#### Scenario planning requires crip death and causes internalized ableism.

Campbell 08 (Dr Fiona Kumari Campbellis a Senior Lecturer in the School of Health and Wellbeing at the University of South Queensland http://www98.griffith.edu.au/dspace/bitstream/handle/10072/21024/50540\_1.pdf “Exploring Internalized Ableism using Critical Race Theory” Disability and Society, Vol. 23 (2), p. 151-162) //Lex VM

Internalized oppression is not the cause of our mistreatment; it is the result of our mistreatment. It would not exist without the real external oppression that forms the social climate in which we exist. Once oppression has been internalized, little force is needed to keep us submissive. We harbour inside ourselves the pain and the memories, the fears and the confusions, the negative self-images and the low expectations, turning them into weapons with which to re-injure ourselves, every day of our lives. (Mason, as cited Marks, 1999, p.25). Internalised ableism means that to assimilate into the norm the referentially disabled individual is required to embrace, indeed to assume an ‘identity’ other than one’s own – and this subject is repeatedly reminded by epistemological formations and individuals with hegemonic subjectifications of their provisional and (real) identity. I am not implying that subjects have a true or real essence. Indeed the subjects' formation is in a constant state of fluidity, multiplicity and (re)formation. However, disabled people often feel compelled to fabricate ‘who’ they are – to adopt postures and comportments that are additional to self. The formation of internalised ableism cannot be simply deduced by assessing the responses of individuals to Althusser’s famous interpolative hailing “Hey you, there” (Althusser & Balibar, 1979). Whilst a subject may respond to “Hey you there, crip!” – it is naïve to assume that an affirmative response to this hailing repressively inaugurates negative disabled subjectification. In fact the adoption of more positive or oppositional ontologies of disability by the subject in question may be unexpectedly enabling. As Susan Park (2000: 91) argues “what is at stake here is not so much the accuracy behind the hailing privilege, but the power of the hailing itself to instantly determine (or elide) that thing it is naming”. Nonetheless, censure and the cancellation of the legitimacy of oppositional subjectivities remains common place as Cherney reminds us with respect to Deaf culture: “If abnormal [sic] bodies must be fixed to fit within dominant cultural views of appropriateness then the Deaf celebration of their differences must be read as an illegitimate model of advocacy”. (Cherney, 1999, p. 33). Foucault’s (1976; 1980) theorisation of power as productive may provide some offerings from which to build a conversation about internalised ableism. I am not so much interested in the ‘external’ effects of that power, but for the moment wish to concentrate on what Judith Butler aptly refers to as the ‘psychic life’ of power. She describes this dimension: … an account of subjection, it seems, must be traced in the turns of psychic life. More specifically, it must be traced in the peculiar turning of a subject against itself that takes place in acts of self-reproach, conscience, and melancholia that work in tandem with processes of social regulation (Butler, 1997b, p.19). In other words, the processes of subject formation cannot be separated from the subject him/herself who is brought into being though those very subjectifying processes. The consequences of taking into oneself negative subjectivities not only regulate and continually form identity (the disabled citizen) but can transcend and surpass the strictures of ableist authorizations. Judith Butler describes this process of the “carrying of a mnemic trace”: One need only consider the way in which the history of having been called an injurious name is embodied, how the words enter the limbs, craft the gesture, bend the spine …how these slurs accumulate over time, dissimulating their history, taking on the semblance of the natural, configuring and restricting the doxa that counts as “reality”. (Butler, 1997b, p. 159) The work of Williams and Williams-Morris (2000) links racism experienced by African Americans to the effects of hurtful words and negative cultural symbols on mental health, especially when marginalized groups embrace negative societal beliefs about themselves. They cite an international study by Fischer et al (1996) which inter alia links poor academic performance with poor social status. Although using different disciplinary language Wolfensberger (1972) in his seven core themes of SRV, identified role circularity as a significant obstacle to be overcome by disabled people wanting socially valued roles. Philosopher Linda Purdy contends it is important to resist conflating disability with the disabled person. She writes My disability is not me, no matter how much it may affect my choices. With this point firmly in mind, it should be possible mentally to separate my existences from the existence of my disability. (Purdy, 1996, p. 68). The problem with Purdy’s conclusion is that it is psychically untenable, not only because it is posited around a type of Cartesian dualism that simply separates being-ness from embodiment, but also because this kind of reasoning disregards the dynamics of subjectivity formation to which Butler (1997a; 1997b) has referred. Whilst the ‘outputs’ of subjectivity are variable the experience of impairment within an ableist context can and does effect formation of self – in other words ‘disability is me’, but that ‘me’ does not need to be enfleshed with negative ontologies of subjectivity. Purdy’s bodily detachment appears locked into a loop that is filled with internalised ableism, a state with negative views of impairment, from which the only escape is disembodiment; the penalty of denial is a flight from her body. This finds agreement in the reasoning of Jean Baudrillard (1983) who posits that it is the simulation, the appearance (representation) that matters. The subject simulates what it is to be ‘disabled’ and by inference ‘abled’ and whilst morphing ableist imperatives, in effect performs a new hyper reality of be-ing disabled. By unwittingly performing ableism disabled people become complicit in their own demise – reinforcing impairment as an outlaw ontology.

### Case

#### Topic says to only do the aff if the gov is Just but China is not.

#### CCP legitimacy leads to atrocities – already committing in the status quo

Kenneth Roth 19, [Kenneth Roth- executive director for human rights watch and federal prosecutor in New York and for the Iran-Contra investigation in Washington, DC. A graduate of Yale Law School and Brown University, Roth has conducted numerous human rights investigations and missions around the world, "World Report 2019: Rights Trends in China", Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/china-and-tibet] Zhukovsky

Authorities dramatically stepped up repression and systematic abuses against the 13 million Turkic Muslims, including Uyghurs and ethnic Kazakhs, in China’s northwestern Xinjiang region. Authorities have carried out mass arbitrary detention, torture, and mistreatment of some of them in various detention facilities, and increasingly imposed pervasive controls on daily life. New regulations in Tibet now criminalize even traditional forms of social action, including community mediation by religious figures. In Hong Kong, a region promised “a high degree of autonomy” under the Sino-British Joint Declaration, the Chinese and Hong Kong governments hastened their efforts in 2018 to undermine people’s rights to free speech and political participation. Human rights defenders continue to endure arbitrary detention, imprisonment, and enforced disappearance. The government maintains tight control over the internet, mass media, and academia. Authorities stepped up their persecution of religious communities, including prohibitions on Islam in Xinjiang, suppression of Christians in Henan province, and increasing scrutiny of Hui Muslims in Ningxia. Authorities increasingly deploy mass surveillance systems to tighten control over society. In 2018, the government continued to collect, on a mass scale, biometrics including DNA and voice samples; use such biometrics for automated surveillance purposes; develop a nationwide reward and punishment system known as the “social credit system”; and develop and apply “big data” policing programs aimed at preventing dissent. All of these systems are being deployed without effective privacy protections in law or in practice, and often people are unaware that their data is being gathered, or how it is used or stored. In 2018, animated by the global #MeToo movement, a number of Chinese women stepped forward exposing people who they said had sexually harassed them. Government censorship dampened subsequent public outrage.

### More Links

#### 1] The 1AC’s static concepts of strikes naturalize a universal able-bodied subject that excludes disabled bodies and causes political rollback.

Desai 17 [Desai, Saima is an activist and an Editor at Briarpatch Magazine https://www.mcgilldaily.com/2017/02/organizing-our-way-through-mental-illness/ “Organizing our way through mental illness: Lots of activists live with mental illness – so why is social justice organizing still so ableist?” “” indicates paragraphs] //Lex VM

Our worth as activists is measured by our ability to throw down in the street, to stand at vigils or strikes for hours in the cold without food, our willingness to risk being arrested or pepper sprayed or kettled. We’re expected to be constantly active on social media, constantly debating and educating our less-political friends and family, constantly up to date on the news, constantly offering emotional support to affected communities. Physical, emotional, and mental exertion are used as yardsticks of commitment to the cause – without taking into account our differing abilities and skills. It ends up replicating structures of capitalism, where our bodies are juiced for labour and then disposed of when they can no longer work – the workers become what Marx, in Capital, calls the “conscious organs of the automaton.” “There’s a hierarchy in mental illness, where the people who are the most productive are at the top, and the people who are the least productive are at the bottom, which is ingrained in us by capitalism,” said Sonia. As a result of all of this, a lot of the discussion around activism and organizing is incredibly ableist. It’s coming from seasoned organizers as well as the recent influx of new activists that perhaps haven’t done the work to interrogate their ableism. The rhetoric of “bodies in the streets” activism most strongly excludes people with physical disabilities and mobility restrictions, as well as many undocumented, racialized, and trans folks who simply cannot risk arrest in the way a white dude can. But ableist activism also affects those of us with mental illness. People with anxiety are excluded from protests. People with PTSD are side-eyed for not shutting down a sexist comment at a dinner party. People with bipolar disorder are judged for not showing up for the vigil, when in reality they couldn’t get out of bed that day. Our bodies are juiced for labour and then disposed of when they can no longer work. “I feel like there’s no room for people who can’t make those protests for various reasons. And even if people say that they don’t have that mentality, I think it’s very ingrained,” Maddie told me. It’s the mentality that creates the idea of the Platonic form of the activist: a young white man who’s necessarily able-bodied and infinitely resilient, who can scream at the cops without risking being beaten or deported. “That’s definitely internalized in many activist communities: that you need to put your body on the street, you need to be out there, and be ready to face violence,” Maddie continued. For those who organize in communities or alongside friends, withdrawing from high-intensity work means not only feeling like a bad activist, but a bad person overall. “We have to keep loving people when they’re not able to organize, and not able to do as much,” CJ told me. “And I think that’s hard because I definitely idolize or deeply respect and admire people who spend their life organizing, and really do a lot – but that’s also just not possible for so many people, for so many reasons.” Part of this ableist rhetoric of activism is the idea of “slacktivism”: posting, sharing, liking, or donating via social media, which is considered ‘lazy’ or ‘shallow’ activism. But creating a hierarchy of activism, where violent protest is at the top, not only excludes those who cannot attend protests or smash windows, but also underestimates social media’s value as a tool for organizing and community-building. “We have to keep loving people when they’re not able to organize.” “During high school I isolated a lot from my physical community because of my depression, but I did a lot of online community stuff; I had this screen and I felt more comfortable behind it, and I didn’t have to move out of my bed, also,” Maddie told me. “I created a community through Twitter and Tumblr – that was my initial introduction into social justice spaces.” Protests and vigils are wonderful and necessary forms of political action. But we also need to value other forms of resistance, and make space for people to resist in whatever ways their bodies and brains allow – lest our work become anti-oppressive in name alone. This has never been more important to understand than now, when mass protests are erupting in Montreal twice a week, when we’re inundated with calls to “step up,” and “show up,” when tapping out of visible, high-intensity, or physical activism is seen as inexcusable. When Trump has a history of mocking disabled reporters, his possible repeal of the Affordable Care Act will strip many disabled people of healthcare, and his federal hiring freeze is going to make it even harder to appeal for Social Security Disability Insurance, activists need to make sure that we’re not excluding the very people whose rights we should be fighting for. Staying sane in the time of Trump I have a lot of friends who have never been politically engaged before who are coming to me and asking how to attend a protest for the first time, or which grassroots organizations to volunteer with. I’m really excited about this wave of popular resistance, but I also know that this intensity of fear and rage amongst activists is not sustainable. I know that this work erodes your sanity. If we don’t start talking about mental illness in activism – and not just as a throwaway acknowledgement, not just as an afterthought – then we’re facing mass burnout in the near future. This chunk of writing is how I’m staying sane in harrowing times. I’m writing to try and open a more honest conversation about mental illness amongst activists, but I’m also writing to help myself untangle my complicated relationship with the politics of mental illness. I’m writing because I feel helpless and sad, and journalism is my activism and my catharsis. This is my act of resistance – against Trump, against ableism, against burnout and desensitization, against my own creeping depression. CJ told me, “it would be good for me to prioritize my own mental and physical health. I should do that for my own sake. But also to actually do the most good, my organizing has to be sustainable, and I have to find ways that it doesn’t kill me.” Four years is a long time to keep up a fight, and it’s imperative that our work survives – but to do so, the activists have to survive too.

#### 2] Focus on economic growth retches human bio capital which always structures disability at the bottom of civil society

Fritsch 15 [Fritsch, Kelly Michelle. "The Neoliberal Biopolitics of Disability: Towards Emergent Intracorporeal Practices." Diss. York U, Toronto, 2015. YorkSpace Institutional Repository. York University, 16 Dec. 2015. Web.] //Lex AKo

**Biocapitalism and the economization** of life marks a way of talking about more and **less valuable lives in economic terms** rather than solely in biological terms. The economic **viability of disability in Landrigan** and Grandjean’s studes are **comprehensible precisely because of the ways by which disability** has been entrenched in neoliberal biocapitalism. Neoliberalism as a social and economic reorganization of **capitalism and governance intervenes extensively** and invasively in every area of social life, including life itself. Michelle Murphy (2011) calls this “the economization of life,” that centers on the profitability of future-oriented human biocapital. **Neoliberalism is the economization** of life such that the future of life is intimately **tied to profitability and productivity**. Life is made to live—have a future—if it is profitable, while **unprofitable life has no future** and is made to wither. Neoliberal **biocapital, in its orientation towards multiplicity** and differentiation, seizes on the **economization of life to govern all forms of living being** “for the sake of fostering economic development and enhancing national GDP” (Murphy 2011, 29). As such, capitalism becomes **neoliberal biocapitalism, which has particular consequences for** how we critically pair **disability and toxicity together**. 132 Murphy (2013) argues that **neoliberal notions of “human capital” depend upon “the embodied capacities** of a person that can produce future economic benefits for that person, her employer, and even her national economy.” Murphy’s work on the economization of life argues that as neoliberalism developed throughout the mid-to-late 20th century, it became increasingly common to render and govern lives in purely economic terms (for example, as more or less valuable). In the economization of life, normal and abnormal **biology are less important than how different forms of life** can be made profitable. Murphy (2011), drawing on Foucault’s formula of the racial state, notes that practices of population control have been tied to GDP and GDP per capita, resulting in a “eugenic necropolitics” that “declared that some must die so that others may live more healthfully… some must not be born so that future others might live more abundantly…” (2011, 30). While embodying “human capital” means mitigating any risks to our embodied **capacities as a population**, neoliberalism is a system of individualization that “‘**privatizes’ the risks** and capacities of populations onto individuals, encouraging them to take charge of their own exposure to risk or opportunity in relative isolation or independence” (Hengehold 2007, 16). As Laura Hengehold remarks (2007, 274): The privatization or individualization of risk **was a change in governmental technique**, implemented by cutting back on many of the social insurance programs and legal protection programs of the welfare state