# 1NC

## OFFs

### 1

#### Presumption and permissibility negates – a) statements are more often false than true since I can prove something false in infinite ways b) real world policies require positive justification before being adopted c) the aff has to prove an obligation which means lack of that obligation negates d) resolved in the resolution indicates they proactively did something, to negate that means that they aren’t resolved.

#### Every moral theory begins with modus ponens – when we make claims about the natural world and how we ought to exist within it, it is necessary to be correct about assumptions. If we made the claim that the Bald King of France ought to bake a cake, that statement is a contingent truth predicated on if the King is bald and is actually a King. That means it is necessary to justify outside assumptions on logic because we can’t universally apply an illogical belief.

#### 1. Moral questions take time to answer – ethics have been disputed for thousands of years yet we haven’t figured it out. Start from the bottom and questioning everything we already know about ethics as a precondition since we’re obviously wrong about something.

#### 2. Theory – there are infinite ways something can be false, which pushes you to the limit of logical ones. Defending theories with illogical assumptions guts predictability since any possible wrong thing can emerge that we aren’t prepared to contest.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with epistemic and experiential authenticity. Negates under worlds framing – if we win we can create obligations then we’re a better world and you can’t create any to prescribe action.

#### Every reason is equally as violent in its creation.

**Derrida,** Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority” //Massa But **justice,** however unpresentable it may be, doesn't wait.· It **is that which must not wait.** To be direct, simple and brief, let us say this: **a just decision is always required immediately, "right away." It cannot furnish itself with** infinite information and the **unlimited knowledge of conditions,** rules or hypothetical imperatives **that could justify it.** And **even if it did** have all that at its disposal, even if it did give itself the time, all the time and all the necessary facts about the matter, **the moment of decision,** as such, **always remains a finite moment of urgency** and precipitation, since it must not be the consequence or the effectof this theoretical or historical knowledge, of this reflection or this deliberation, **since it always marks the interruption of the** juridico- or ethico- or politico-**cognitive deliberation that precedes it,** that must precede it. The instant of decision is a madness, says Kierkegaard. This is particularly true of the instant of the just decision that must rend time and defy dialectics. It is a madness. **Even if time** and prudence,the patience of knowledge and the mastery of conditions **were** hypothetically **unlimited, the decision would be structurally finite,** however late it came, decision of urgency and precipitation, **acting in** the night of **non-knowledge and non-rule**

#### And, either it’s the case we can predict the outcome of a situation, or we cannot. We cannot, insofar as no situation is ever replicated exactly, and even if it can, there’s no guarantee the outcome will be the same. If we can predict situations, that means everyone can, which means we will always predict each other, making a paradox of action insofar as we always attempt to predict the outcomes of each other’s actions, and will cancel out the obligations.

#### External world skep is true.

**Neta**, Ram. “External World Skepticism.” The Problem of The External World, **2014**, philosophy.unc.edu/files/2014/06/The-Problem-of-the-External-World.pdf. //Massa You take yourself to know that you have hands. But notice that, **if you do have hands, then you are not merely a brain floating in a vat of nutrient fluid and being electrochemically stimulated to have the sensory experiences** that you have now: such a brain does not have hands, but you do. So if you know that you do have hands, then you must also be in a position to know that you are not such a brain. **But how could you know that you are not such a brain? If you were such a brain, everything would seem exactly as it does now**; **you would** (by hypothesis) **have all the same sensory experiences that you’re having right now.** Since your **empirical knowledge of the world** around you **must somehow be based upon your sensory experiences, how could these experiences**—the very same experiences that you would have if you were a brain in a vat—**furnish you with knowledge that you’re not such a brain? And if you don’t know that you’re not such a brain, then you cannot know that you have hands.**

#### And, in order to discover something, it must not be known, but in order to know to discover something, it must already be known – this makes the quest for knowledge incomprehensible and thus impossible

#### And, any account of morality is regressive since it predicates one universal rule on the existence of another moral rule. Since every human chain of reasoning must be finite according to our finite nature, such a reasoning process must terminate in a rule for which no reason can be given.

### 2

#### The role of the ballot is to determine whether the resolution is a true or false statement – anything else moots 7 minutes of the nc and exacerbates the fact that they get infinite pre-round prep since I should be able to compensate by choosing – their framing collapses since you must say it is true that a world is better than another before you adopt it.

#### They justify substantive skews since there will always be a more correct side of the issue but we compensate for flaws in the lit.

#### Most educational since otherwise we wouldn’t use math or logic to approach topics. Scalar methods like comparison increases intervention – the persuasion of certain DA or advantages sway decisions – T/F binary is descriptive and technical.

#### a priori’s 1st – even worlds framing requires ethics that begin from a priori principles like reason or pleasure so we control the internal link to functional debates.

#### The ballot says vote aff or neg based on a topic – five dictionaries[[1]](#footnote-1) define to negate as to deny the truth of and affirm[[2]](#footnote-2) as to prove true which means it’s constitutive and jurisdictional. I denied the truth of the resolution by disagreeing with the aff which means I’ve met my burden.

### 3

#### 1. Split Brains: If I were to take a test and then swap bodies with a classmate, we aren’t inclined to believe I’d choose the same answers. This means my decisions are keen to brain chemistry.

#### 2. States of Affairs: states of affairs are only relevant due to the infinite amount of personal identities which would warrant why either a) every action is determined by the nature of our being rather than persons b) infinite amount of actions taken by individuals always invalidate the goals of states of affairs.

#### That Negates:

#### 1. If Determinism is true, then an ethical calculus is incoherent since actions will happen inevitably if nature dictates.

#### 2. Proactive actions are unjustifiable since everything would just revolve around the unpredictability of an end which means polarization.

#### 3. The resolution necessitates a right, but consequentialism only cares about end states which means that consequentialism means you vote neg since otherwise it would rely on it’s own principle for it’s justification.

### 4

#### 1. Infinite chain of action. There are infinite end states to each action that I may take meaning we can never know if it is a good or bad action as per util because it could possibly result in many ways. For example, util would tell me to save 2 babies rather than one but there’s a chance that baby turns out to be Hitler in which case util would condemn my actions. This means any action is permissible because of the unpredictability of our end states.

#### 2. Util evaluates end states, not the way to achieve those ends states. But if the way we obtain an end is through an action and util ignores the action taken, it ignores the actions taken and cares only about the end states so technically any action is permissible under util because it wouldn’t condemn the action it would condemn the end that the action entails.

#### Proves util triggers permissibility –

### 5

#### Negate –

#### 1] just[[3]](#footnote-3) means “very recently; in the immediate past” so the rez has already passed.

#### 2] of[[4]](#footnote-4) is to “expressing an age” but the rez doesn’t delineate a length of time.

#### 3] recognize[[5]](#footnote-5) is to “Officially regard (a qualification) as valid or proper” but a right isn’t a qualification.

#### 4] to[[6]](#footnote-6) is to “expressing motion in the direction of (a particular location)” but the rez doesn’t have a location.

#### 5] right[[7]](#footnote-7) is to “conforming to facts or truth” rez doesn’t specify what workers are right about.

**6] Strike[[8]](#footnote-8) is defined as** to delete something rez doesn’t spec what to delete.

#### 7] Workers[[9]](#footnote-9) is defined as a “any of the sexually underdeveloped and usually sterile members of a colony of social ants, bees, wasps, or termites that perform most of the labor and protective duties of the colony” you can’t give a right to insects nor can we know if they are correct.

### 6

#### No 1ar theory – a)7-6, 2-1 skew proves its always skewed to the aff, b) resolvability double bind – either the judge has to intervene to decide whether the 2ar’s answers to the 2nr’s Counter interp are sufficient or they auto accept every answer and you auto win. Intervention ow since it takes the round out of the debaters hands. That also means reasonability on 1ar theory since some level of intervention is inevitable so it’s net better to focus on things like substance education, Drop the argument on 1ar theory – they can initiate offensive drop the debater theory in the aff and in the 1ar while no judge would vote on 2n theory on severance.

### 7

#### No new 1ar ROTBs - (a) restarting the ROB debate in the 1ar puts you at a 7-6 advantage on the framing debate since I have to propose one in the 1N since 2N arguments are new – putting it in the aff makes it 13-13 (b) you have one more speech to contest my ROB and weigh, I can only possibly answer your ROB in the 2n but you can do comparative weighing in the 2ar (c) I can only read a ROB in the 1N so you should read it in your first speech as well – that’s definitionally an equal burden.

### 8

#### A. Interpretation: The Aff must defend theory interpretations and arguments unconditionally as presented in the 1ac. In other words, the aff may not run cx checks.

#### B. Violation:

#### 1. Theory recourse – CX checks (a) causes sidestepping, encouraging you to have hidden abusive args since I either call you out on it in cx and you kick it or I concede it and you win, which makes debates innocuous and is empirically confirmed with Jake Steirn, (b) causes ambiguity – what constitutes a sufficient “check” is unclear. Even if we isolate the abusive practice in CX, the aff can still go for the arg and establish new parameters for checking, and (c) prep skew – even if you don’t kick the abuse, you get extra time to prep my interp since you know what I’ll indict. That gives you nearly double the time to prep and creates irreciprocal burdens. Theory recourse is key to any voter since it ensures I can check back abusive strategies.

#### 2. Strat Skew – This skews my strategy because a) I have to waste valuable cross-x time clarifying abusive argument of asking questions that set up a coherent strategy in the NC, b) I am not allowed to run theory if I think of a potentially abusive thing in the AC during my speech. This also link turns all other theory arguments since theoretical benefits are predicated on the ability to run theory in the first place.

#### D] Voter:

#### Fairness and education are voters – debate’s a game that needs rules to evaluate it and education gives us portable skills for life like research and thinking.

#### Drop the debater – a) they have a 7-6 rebuttal advantage and the 2ar to make args I can’t respond to, b) it deters future abuse and sets a positive norm.

#### Use competing interps – a) reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention since we don’t know your bs meter, b) collapses to competing interps – we justify 2 brightlines under an offense defense paradigm just like 2 interps.

#### No RVIs – a) illogical – you shouldn’t win for being fair – it’s a litmus test for engaging in substance, b) norming – I can’t concede the counterinterp if I realize I’m wrong which forces me to argue for bad norms, c) chilling effect – forces you to split your 2AR so you can’t collapse and misconstrue the 2NR, d) topic ed – prevents 1AR blipstorm scripts and allows us to get back to substance after resolving theory

### Case

#### Democracy is net-worse for peace

Ghatak 17 (Sam, Lecturer in Political Science at the University of Tennessee Knoxville; Aaron Gold, PhD Student in Political Science at UT Knoxville; Brandon C. Prins, Professor and Director of Graduate Studies of Political Science at UT Knoxville; “External threat and the limits of democratic pacifism,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 34, No. 2, p. 141-159)

It has become a stylized fact that dyadic democracy lowers the hazard of armed conflict. While the Democratic Peace has faced many challenges, we believe the most significant challenge has come from the argument that the pacifying effect of democracy is epiphenomenal to territorial issues, specifically the external threats that they pose. This argument sees the lower hazards of armed conflict among democracies not as a product of shared norms or institutional structures, but as a result of settled borders. Territory, though, remains only one geo-political context generating threat, insecurity, and a higher likelihood of armed conflict. Strategic rivalry also serves as an environment associated with fear, a lack of trust, and an expectation of future conflict. Efforts to assess democratic pacifism have largely ignored rivalry as a context conditioning the behavior of democratic leaders. To be sure, research demonstrates rivals to have higher probabilities of armed conflict and democracies rarely to be rivals. But fundamental to the Democratic Peace is the notion that even in the face of difficult security challenges and salient issues, dyadic democracy will associate with a lower likelihood of militarized aggression. But the presence of an external threat, be that threat disputed territory or strategic rivalry, may be the key mechanism by which democratic leaders, owing to audience costs, resolve and electoral pressures, fail to resolve problems nonviolently.

This study has sought a ‘‘hard test’’ of the Democratic Peace by testing the conditional effects of joint democracy on armed conflict when external threat is present. We test three measures of threat: territorial contention, strategic rivalry, and a threat index that sums the first two measures. For robustness checks, we use two additional measures of our dependent variable: fatal MID onset, and event data from the Armed Conflict Database, which can be found in our Online Appendix. As most studies report, democratic dyads are associated with less armed conflict than mixed-regime and autocratic dyads. In every one of our models, when we control for each measure of external threat, joint democracy is strongly negative and significant and each measure of threat is strongly positive and significant. Here, liberal institutions maintain their pacific ability and external threats clearly increase conflict propensities. However, when we test the interactive relationship between democracy and our measures of external threat, the pacifying effect of democracy is less visible. Park and James (2015) find some evidence that when faced with an external threat in the form of territorial contention, the pacifying effect of joint democracy holds up. This study does not fully support the claims of Park and James (2015). Using a longer timeframe, we find more consistent evidence that when faced with an external threat, be it territorial contention, strategic rivalry, or a combination, democratic pacifism does not survive. What are the implications of our study? First, while it is clear that we do not observe a large amount of armed conflict among democratic states, if we organize interstate relationships along a continuum from highly hostile to highly friendly, we are probably observing what Goertz et al. (2016) and Owsiak et al. (2016) refer to as ‘‘lesser rivalries’’ in which ‘‘both the frequency and severity of violent interaction decline. Yet, the sentiments of threat, enmity, and competition that remain—along with the persistence of unresolved issues—mean that lesser rivalries still experience isolated violent episodes (e.g., militarized interstate disputes), diplomatic hostility, and non-violent crises’’ (Owsiak et al., 2016). Second, our findings show that the pacific benefits of liberal institutions or externalized norms are not always able to lower the likelihood of armed conflict when faced with external threats, whether those hazards are disputed territory, strategic rivalry, or a combination of the two. The structural environment clearly influences democratic leaders in their foreign policy actions more than has heretofore been appreciated. Audience costs, resolve, and electoral pressures, produced from external threats, are powerful forces that are present even in jointly democratic relationships. These forces make it difficult for leaders to trust one another, which inhibits conflict resolution and facilitates persistent hostility. It does appear, then, that there is a limit to the Democratic Peace.

1. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate>, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate>, <http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. *Dictionary.com – maintain as true, Merriam Webster – to say that something is true, Vocabulary.com – to affirm something is to confirm that it is true, Oxford dictionaries – accept the validity of, Thefreedictionary – assert to be true* [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. <https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/just> //Lex VM [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. <https://www.google.com/search?q=of+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS877US877&oq=of+definition&aqs=chrome.0.69i59j69i61l3.1473j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8> //Lex VM [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. <https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/recognize> //Lex VM [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. <https://www.google.com/search?q=to+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS877US877&oq=to+definition&aqs=chrome..69i57j69i60l3.1415j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8> //Lex VM [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/right> //Lex VM

   [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/strike> //Lex VM [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/worker> //Lex VM [↑](#footnote-ref-9)