### Framework

#### Ethics must first start by defining good and bad because ethical answers rely on a correct interpretation of what they’re representing. Thus, a moral interpretation of [intellectual property protections] based on inherent characteristics is the only way to escape the problem of the naturalistic fallacy. One cannot substitute words in the place of good as for any property we identify with “goodness,” agents can ask “Is that property itself good?” One can claim that pleasure is the highest intrinsic good, but the question can be asked, “But, is pleasure itself good” The fact that this question makes sense shows that “pleasure” and “goodness” are not identical. Thus, there is a distinction between natural and non-natural moral terms. Natural terms are externally encountered whereas the non-natural fails the test of physical cognition. Non-naturalism posits that moral properties like goodness are coherent but cannot be explained by natural terms. Therefore, the meta-ethic is moral non-naturalism.

**Hume**, David. *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (**1772**). Hackett Publ Co. 1993; Chapter on Cause and Effect. //Massa

That there are no demonstrative arguments in the case seems evident; since it implies no contradiction that **the course of nature may change, and** that **an object,** **seemingly like those which we have experienced**, **may be attended with different** or contrary **effects**. May I not clearly and distinctly conceive that a body, falling from the clouds, and which, in all other respects, resembles snow, has yet [has] the taste of salt or feeling of fire? Is there any more intelligible proposition than to affirm, that all the trees will flourish in December and January, and decay in May and June? Now whatever is intelligible, and can be distinctly conceived, implies no contradiction, and can never be proved false by any demonstrative argument or abstract reasoning a priori.If we be, therefore, engaged by arguments [**that] to put trust in past experience, and make it the standard of our future judgment,[can] these arguments must be probable** only, or such as regard matter of fact and real existence according to the division above mentioned. But that there is no argument of this kind, must appear, if our explication of that species of reasoning [can] be admitted as solid and satisfactory. We have said that all [these] **arguments [that trust in past experience]** concerning existence **are founded on the [assumption that]** relation of cause and effect; that our knowledge of that relation is derived entirely from experience; and that all our experimental conclusions proceed upon the supposition that **the future will be conformable to** **the past**. To endeavour, therefore, **the proof of this last supposition by probable arguments**, or arguments regarding existence, **must be evidently going in a circle**, and taking that for granted, which is the very point in question.

#### Additionally, correlation does not disprove non-naturalism because it does not contend that there is no relationship between moral terms and natural terms. Instead terms such as member nations and property cannot be reduced to a set of nonmoral features and interpreted as identical. Warranting a relationship further justifies the constraint since that intrinsically warrants a lack of identity. However, non-moral facts cannot conclude in moral reasons because of the gap between is and ought. We might observe that arsenic is poisonous, but then conclude that we ought not consume it, but the fact that these two premises are unrelated proves the ethical problem. Instead, a different mechanism is required to answer the question that lies outside the scope of the natural statement itself and furthers the gap by adding another moral premise.

#### And, since moral properties cannot be defined by natural properties, it becomes impossible to externally distinguish good and bad. Non-naturalism, however, does not deny the ability to internally recognize the good just like distinguishing between natural observations.

#### That means non-naturalism prima facie justifies intuitionism as the only ethical theory that can guide action. The fallacy of Loki’s Wager is true because we know certain things are observationally relevant despite a clear articulation of what they are, just like I know the difference between red and blue.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with a priori moral intuitions.

**McMahan**, Jeff [<http://www.philosophy.rutgers.edu/joomlatools-files/docman-files/Moral%20Intuition%202nd%20edition.pdf>] //Massa

As I will understand the term, **a moral intuition is a moral judgment** – typically about a particular problem, a particular act, or a particular agent, though possibly also about a moral rule or principle – **that is not the result of inferential reasoning**. It is not inferred from one’s other beliefs but arises on its own. **If I consider the act of torturing the cat, I judge immediately that,** in the circumstances, **this would be wrong. I do not need to consult my other beliefs in order to arrive at this judgment**. This is not to say that a moral intuition is necessarily elicited instantaneously, the way a sense perception is.

#### This means adopting beliefs about the world are insufficient to make decisions consistent with them. Every system is inevitably hijacked or guided by intuitions which makes their faculty fundamentally inescapable.

#### Prefer the standard additionally:

#### First, rule following fails a) We can infinitely question why to follow that rule, as all rules will terminate at the assertion of some principle with no further justification b) Rule are arbitrary since the agent has the ability to formulate a unique understanding of them. It becomes impossible to say someone is violating a rule, since they can always perceive their actions as a non-violation. Intuitions solve since they don’t rely on external normative force.

#### Second, if we have the ability to not follow our intuitions, then that means that morality is non-motivational, and can’t guide action. Intuition is our internal motivation, so if morality can’t guide action then correctness and incorrectness don’t exist.

#### Third, not following intuitions produces poor ontological understandings of the self, as we have ontological obligations to remain consistent with our way of being. Therefore, we a priori derive ontic obligations to reject moral standards that are devoid of our intuitions.

#### Impact Calc:

#### First, frameworks all share equal value. Weighing between them becomes infinitely regressive as it presupposes there is a higher metric to determine who has the better justifications. That means contestation is vacuous which means a locus of moral duty is sufficient since it has an uncontested obligatory power.

### Contention

#### Altruism and fairness are a priori intuitive - brain and psychological studies across age ranges prove.

**Lucas**, Margery. “FAIR GAME: THE INTUITIVE ECONOMICS OF RESOURCE EXCHANGE IN FOUR-YEAR OLDS.” Journal of Social, Evolutionary, and Behavioral Psychology, **2008**, citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.470.8506&rep=rep1&type=pdf. //Massa

There has been a great deal of interest in the study of intuitive knowledge in young children but not much is known about the development of **intuitive** economics - the concepts and abilities that comprise the representations and mechanisms underlying core knowledge of economic value and exchange. Although the acquisition of economic knowledge is usually associated with complex cultural learning, the **ability to engage in fair and reciprocal transactions** involving food and other resources has probably been important throughout human evolutionary history (Dunbar, 1996; Winterhalder, 2001) **suggesting that** fairness, reciprocity, and **altruism in humans may have a biological basis**. If so, these behaviors may be observable even in young children. The field of behavioral economics provides a set of tools for studying adult preferences in resource exchange. **In ultimatum games**, there are two players, a proposer and a responder. **The proposer can offer any amount** of a given stake to the responder. If the amount is accepted, both players receive the amount proposed. If the amount is rejected, neither player receives anything. In the dictator game, the protocol is similar except that responders must accept whatever amount the proposer offers. **The literature on these games reports consistent findings across samples from western cultures** (Camerer, 2003): Proposers in ultimatum games offer, on average, 40% of the stake and responders reject offers of 20% or less about half the time. In college-age populations, the offers are, on average, higher at 40-45% (Henrich et al., 2005). In dictator games, proposers offer 20%, on average, even though they could offer nothing and still keep their stake. These results are problematic for the canonical economic model of rational self-interest according to which proposers should offer the smallest amount possible and responders should accept anything that is offered. Instead, **participants offer more than is necessary and reject offers perceived to be unfair. These** choices **indicate preferences for fairness and altruism** as well as an understanding of the importance of reciprocity. **Failure to meet** social **expectations** regarding reciprocity and fairness have been shown to **elicit strong negative emotions** and punishment in exchange partners (Fehr & Gachter, 2002; de Quervain et al., 2004).

#### That affirms – intrinsically reducing patents legally allows medicines to be developed by other countries and allows others to access it which links to altruism.

#### Now, the neg must not contest the aff contention a) forces a more in-depth phil debate which is constitutive of LD which means it o/w b) some frameworks descriptively flow one way which means it’s harder to access offense – framework debate makes it a 1:1 burden.

#### Intuitions flow innovation – medical tech can’t be privately owned. Agents recreating, redistributing, and remodeling is an intuitive transferal of ownership – brain studies prove.

**APS**. (**2010**, August 17). *An intuitive sense of property*. Association for Psychological Science - APS. <https://www.psychologicalscience.org/news/were-only-human/an-intuitive-sense-of-property.html> //Massa

Americans like to own their homes, and the rules and conventions for ownership are generally well understood. So it’s easy to forget that in many corners of the globe the rules are more ambiguous–and more open to challenge. Indeed, there are an estimated one billion squatters in the world today–people who, mostly out of necessity, are living on property they do not own and cannot afford.

Squatters rarely have a voice, but in a few industrialized cities where they do, their claims are usually founded on the idea of improvement. If an owner abandons or neglects a property, shouldn’t another human being be allowed to take shelter, invest sweat equity in making it a home, and lay some claim to it? In other words, does hard work improving a property convey some right to occupancy, even ownership?

**New research suggests that our moral judgments about property ownership may be an intuitive process**–**one more fundamental than society’s laws and regulations**. **Psychological scientist** Patricia Kanngiesser and colleagues **at the University of Bristol**, UK, **studied** three and four-year-old **children** (as well as adults) **to see how children think about private property before they come under the influence of adult rules.** Previous research had shown that very young children tend to honor the rights of the first owner as a default position–as long as they are given no compelling reason to think differently. But the **scientists wanted to see if** creative labor is such a compelling reason–that is, if **improving property trumps the original ownership rights.**

To test this idea in the lab, **they used a form of property that children might realistically “own”–clay animals.** Both the experimenter and the subjects were given title to a set of clay cookie-cutter animals, each set different: blue ducks, for example, or red butterflies. Then each of them “borrowed” and worked on one of the other’s animals, using cookie cutters to transform the clay into something new–an elephant, for example. Or, alternatively, they simply held the animal for a bit, or snipped off a small piece of clay with a knife. The idea was to compare mere possession with two levels of creative labor, to see if any of these affected views of ownership.

And they did, in some interesting ways.[**As reported on-line this week in the journal Psychological Science**](http://pss.sagepub.com/content/early/2010/08/09/0956797610380701.abstract)**, all of the subjects–children and adults–were much more likely to transfer ownership of the property to a second person if that person showed some industry in changing the property.** And the more work, the greater the entitlement: That is, transforming the animal into a new animal was more significant than just snipping off some clay, which was more significant than merely holding the animal. **Even if they transformed a duck into a different kind of duck, that was sufficient for entitlement, though changing a duck into an elephant conveyed somewhat more in the way of ownership rights.** In other words, it was work that mattered most; creativity was important but secondary.

But here’s the really interesting part: **These views of ownership** and labor **were much more common in the preschool children than in the adults.** Adults were much more likely to give priority to the original owner–and much less likely to value labor and creativity. In that sense, **adults appear to have outgrown their intuitive belief** in squatters’ rights, replacing this sensibility **with formal laws and regulations**

### Underview

#### [1] Aff gets 1ar theory since the neg can be infinitely abusive, drop the debater, no rvi, competing interps (a) the 1ar is too short to win both theory and substance (b) deters people from making the mistake again (c) competing interps means the 2n can’t dump on a reasonability bright-line that excludes only what they did wrong (d) you shouldn’t win for being fair, otherwise you can’t resolve rounds when no one reads theory (e) good theory debaters will be as abusive as possible and auto-win.

#### [2] Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all constructive positions on open source with highlighting on the 2021-2022 NDCA LD wiki after the round in which they read them.

#### Violation – they don’t – ss proves missing last round

A screenshot of a computer

Description automatically generated

#### 1] Debate resource inequities— the only way to truly level the playing field for novices in under-privileged programs who can’t bypass paywalled articles.

#### 2] Evidence ethics – open source is the only way to verify pre-round that cards aren’t miscut or highlighted or bracketed unethically. That’s a voter – maintaining ethical ev practices is key to being good academics and we should be able to verify you didn’t cheat