# 1AC

### Framing

#### The meta ethic is procedural moral realism or the idea that ethics are derived in the noumenal world absent accounting for human experiences.

#### [1] Uncertainty – experiences are locked within our own subjectivity and are inaccessible to others, however a priori principles are created in the noumenal world and are universally applied to all agents. Outweighs since founding ethics in the phenomenal world allows people to justify atrocities by saying they don’t experience the same.

#### [2] Is/Ought Gap – experience in the phenomenal world only tells us what is since we can only perceive what is, not what ought to be. But it’s impossible to derive an ought from descriptive premises, so there needs to be additional a priori premises within the noumenal world to make a moral theory.

#### The existence of extrinsic goodness requires unconditional human worth—that means we must treat others as ends in themselves.

Korsgaard ’83 (Christine M., “Two Distinctions in Goodness,” The Philosophical Review Vol. 92, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), pp. 169-195, JSTOR) OS/Recut Lex AKu \*brackets for gendered language

The argument shows how Kant's idea of justification works. It can be read as a kind of regress upon the conditions, starting from an important assumption. The assumption is that when a rational being makes a choice or undertakes an action,[they] he or she supposes the object to be good, and its pursuit to be justified. At least, if there is a categorical imperative there must be objectively good ends, for then there are necessary actions and so necessary ends (G 45-46/427-428 and Doctrine of Virtue 43-44/384-385). In order for there to be any objectively good ends, however, there must be something that is unconditionally good and so can serve as a sufficient condition of their goodness. Kant considers what this might be: it cannot be an object of inclination, for those have only a conditional worth, "for if the inclinations and the needs founded on them did not exist, their object would be without worth" (G 46/428). It cannot be the inclinations themselves because a rational being would rather be free from them. Nor can it be external things, which serve only as means. So, Kant asserts, the unconditionally valuable thing must be "humanity" or "rational nature," which he defines as "the power set to an end" (G 56/437 and DV 51/392). Kant explains that regarding your existence as a rational being as an end in itself is a "subjective principle of human action." By this I understand him to mean that we must regard ourselves as capable of conferring value upon the objects of our choice, the ends that we set, because we must regard our ends as good. But since "every other rational being thinks of his existence by the same rational ground which holds also for myself' (G 47/429), we must regard others as capable of conferring value by reason of their rational choices and so also as ends in themselves. Treating another as an end in itself thus involves making that person's ends as far as possible your own (G 49/430). The ends that are chosen by any rational being, possessed of the humanity or rational nature that is fully realized in a good will, take on the status of objective goods. They are not intrinsically valuable, but they are objectively valuable in the sense that every rational being has a reason to promote or realize them. For this reason it is our duty to promote the happiness of others-the ends that they choose-and, in general, to make the highest good our end.

#### Practical reason is inescapable - Any moral rule faces the problem of regress – I can keep asking “why should I follow this.” Regress collapses to skep since no one can generate obligations absent grounds for accepting them. Only reason solves since asking “why reason?” requires reason to do in the first place which concedes its authority.

#### Reason means we must be able to universally will maxims— [A] our judgements are authoritative and can’t only apply to ourselves any more than 2+2=4 can be true only for me. [B] That allows others to impede on my ends

#### This the standard is consistency with the categorical imperative.

#### Other frameworks collapse—they contain conditional obligations which derive their authority from the categorical imperative.

Korsgaard 98 [CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, greatest philosopher alive, 1998, “Introduction”, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals] AG // Recut Lex AKu

This is the sort of thing that makes even practiced readers of Kant gnash their teeth. A rough translation might go like this: the categorical imperative is a law, to which our maxims must conform. But the reason they must do so cannot be that there is some further condition they must meet, or some other law to which they must conform. For instance, suppose someone proposed that one must keep one's promises because it is the will of God that one should do so - the law would then "contain the condition" that our maxims should conform to the will of God. This would yield only a conditional requirement to keep one's promises — if you would obey the will of God, then you must keep your promises - whereas the categorical imperative must give us an unconditional requirement. Since there can be no such condition, all that remains is that the categorical imperative should tell us that our maxims themselves must be laws - that is, that they must be universal, that being the characteristic of laws. There is a simpler way to make this point. What could make it true that we must keep our promises because it is the will of God? That would be true only if it were true that we must indeed obey the will of God, that is, if "obey the will of God" were itself a categorical imperative. Conditional requirements give rise to a regress; if there are unconditional requirements, we must at some point arrive at principles on which we are required to act, not because we are commanded to do so by some yet higher law, but because they are laws in themselves. The categorical imperative, in the most general sense, tells us to act on those principles, principles which are themselves laws. Kant continues:

### Contention

#### Resolved: The member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines.

#### 1] IP rights prevent certain people from receiving the fruits of their mental labor.

Lindsey and Teles 17 [Ricketts, M. (2018). The Captured Economy: How the Powerful Enrich Themselves, Slow Down Growth, and Increase Inequality by Brink Lindsey and Steven M. Teles. Oxford University Press (2017), 221 pp. ISBN: 978-0190627768 (hb, £16.99). Economic Affairs, 38(2), 297–300. doi:10.1111/ecaf.12299]//Lex AKu recut Lex VM

In our opinion, the biggest problem with the moral case for patents and copyright laws is that those laws as currently constituted regularly violate the principle on which they are supposedly grounded—namely, entitlement to the fruits of one’s mental labor. The exclusive rights granted to copyright and patent holders aren’t just an additional premium layer of protection on top of the basic rights that all enjoy. Rather, copyright and patent laws extend premium rights to some in a way that frequently restricts the basic rights of others. Perversely, copyright and patent laws are regularly used to stop people from producing or selling their own original works. This was not always the case with copyright. Originally, US law prohibited only simple copying of full works as originally published. Thus, translations and even abridgments were not considered infringing. Gradually, the concept of infringement expanded to cover so-called derivative works—for example, a play based on a book, or a book that contains characters created by another author. This expansion was checked, to a limited and uncertain extent, by the concurrent rise of the doctrine of “fair use.” According to this doctrine, some derivative works—parodies, for example, and books that include brief quoted passages from other works—are not considered infringing. For everything else, including adaptations of an artistic work to a new format, new works using existing literary characters or settings, remixes or mashups of musical works, and so forth, the restrictions and penalties of copyright apply. In all these cases, artists can expend mental effort to create something new and original, but they are not allowed to publish or sell it.33 They are thus deprived of their basic rights to the fruits of their own mental labor. In the case of patent law, independent invention has never been a defense against claims of infringement. As a result, inventors who come in second in a patent race have no right at all to make use of and profit from their ideas. This is by no means an unusual occurrence, for nearly simultaneous and completely independent discovery of new technologies occurs with astonishing frequency.34 Indeed, patent infringement lawsuits only rarely involve intentional copying of someone else’s invention; in the clear majority of lawsuits, the alleged infringers developed their products on their own and weren’t even aware of the patent in question. In summary, the moral case for patents and copyright is supposedly based on the entitlement to enjoy the fruits of one’s mental labor. Yet under current law, the most basic and universal form that this entitlement can take, one whose general propriety is completely uncontroversial, is regularly traduced. We therefore find unconvincing the claim that copyright and patent holders are rightful property owners who are only receiving their just due. Yes, we can imagine intellectual property laws in which the moral claims for exclusive rights are much stronger. If copyright were limited to its original concern of preventing sales of full reproductions, and if patents were awarded to all independent co-inventors (or at least independent invention were a complete defense in any infringement action), then intellectual property rights would indeed provide additional protections for artists and inventors without impinging on the basic rights of other artists and inventors. But that is not the intellectual property law we have today, and to get there would require major statutory changes. The copyright and patent laws we have today therefore look more like intellectual monopoly than intellectual property. They do not simply give people their rightful due; on the contrary, they regularly deprive people of their rightful due. If there is a case to be made for the special privileges granted under these laws, it must be based on utilitarian grounds. As we have already seen, that case is surprisingly weak, and utterly incapable of justifying the radical expansion in IP protection that has occurred in recent years. Therefore, it is entirely appropriate to strip IP protection of its sheep’s clothing and to see it for the wolf it is, a major source of economic stagnation and a tool for unjust enrichment.

#### 2] IP Rights hand partial control of others property to IP Creators.

Kinsella 13 [Kinsella S. (2013) The Case Against Intellectual Property. In: Luetge C. (eds) Handbook of the Philosophical Foundations of Business Ethics. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1494-6\_99]//Lex AKu recut Lex VM \*\*\*Brackets for Gendered Language\*\*\*

Let us recall that IP rights give to pattern-creators partial rights of control – ownership – over the material property of everyone else. The pattern-creator has partial ownership of others’ property, by virtue of his [their] IP right, because he [they] can prohibit them from performing certain actions with their own property. Author X, for example, can prohibit a third party, Y, from inscribing a certain pattern of words on Y’s own blank pages with Y’s own ink. That is, by merely authoring an original expression of ideas, by merely thinking of and recording some original pattern of information, or by finding a new way to use his own property (recipe), the IP creator instantly, magically becomes a partial owner of others’ property. He [They] has some say over how third parties can use their property. He is granted, in effect, a type of “negative servitude” in others’ already owned property” (See [32]). IP rights change the status quo by redistributing property from individuals of one class (material-property owners) to individuals of another (authors and inventors). Prima facie, therefore, IP law trespasses against or “takes” the property of material-property owners, by transferring partial ownership to authors and inventors. It is this invasion and redistribution of property that must be justified in order for IP rights to be valid. We see, then, that utilitarian defenses do not do the trick. Further problems with natural-rights defenses are explored below.

#### 3] Justifying ownership based on creation is unjust.

Kinsella 13 [Kinsella S. (2013) The Case Against Intellectual Property. In: Luetge C. (eds) Handbook of the Philosophical Foundations of Business Ethics. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1494-6\_99]//Lex AKu recut Lex VM

One problem with the creation-based approach is that it almost invariably protects only certain types of creations – unless, i.e., every single useful idea one comes up with is subject to ownership (more on this below). But the distinction between the protectable and the unprotectable is necessarily arbitrary. For example, philosophical or mathematical or scientific truths cannot be protected under current law on the grounds that commerce and social intercourse would grind to a halt were every new phrase, philosophical truth, and the like considered the exclusive property of its creator. For this reason, patents can be obtained only for so-called practical applications of ideas, but not for more abstract or theoretical ideas. Rand agrees with this disparate treatment, in attempting to distinguish between an unpatentable discovery and a patentable invention. She argues that a “scientific or philosophical discovery, which identifies a law of nature, a principle, or a fact of reality not previously known” is not created by the discoverer. But the distinction between creation and discovery is not clear-cut or rigorous.31 Nor is it clear why such a distinction, even if clear, is ethically relevant in defining property rights. No one creates matter; they just manipulate and grapple with it according to physical laws. In this sense, no one really creates anything. They merely rearrange matter into new arrangements and patterns. An engineer who invents a new mousetrap has rearranged existing parts to provide a function not previously performed [90]. Others who learn of this new arrangement can now also make an improved mousetrap. Yet the mousetrap merely follows laws of nature. The inventor did not invent the matter out of which the mousetrap is made, nor the facts and laws exploited to make it work. Similarly, Einstein’s “discovery” of the relation E = mc2 , once known by others, allows them to manipulate matter in a more efficient way. Without Einstein’s, or the inventor’s, efforts, others would have been ignorant of certain causal laws, of ways matter can be manipulated and utilized. Both the inventor and the theoretical scientist engage in creative mental effort to produce useful, new ideas. Yet one is rewarded, and the other is not. In one recent case, the inventor of a new way to calculate a number representing the shortest path between two points – an extremely useful technique – was not given patent protection because this was “merely” a mathematical algorithm.32 But it is arbitrary and unfair to reward more practical inventors and entertainment providers, such as the engineer and songwriter, and to leave more theoretical science and math researchers and philosophers unrewarded. The distinction is inherently vague, arbitrary, and unjust.

#### 4] Property rights for IP are unnecessary.

Lindsey and Takash 19 [Niskanen Center, “Why ‘Intellectual Property’ is a Misnomer”, September 2019, Brink Lindsey Vice President for Policy Niskanen Center, Daniel Takash Regulatory Policy Fellow Niskanen Center, https://www.niskanencenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/LT\_IPMisnomer-2-1.pdf]//Lex AKu recut Lex VM

Because ideal goods are nonrivalrous, they are not scarce in the way that physical objects are. In other words, there is no either/or decision that has to be made about who gets to use and control them — that is, about who owns them. An infinite number of people can sing the same song, tell the same story, or use the same design for a widget without interfering with the ability of anyone else to do the same.7 But if one person eats a steak, nobody else can and it’s gone; if one person is shooting a basketball, nobody else can shoot that ball at the same time; if a developer wants to build a shopping center on a piece of land but the neighbors want to leave it as a park, they can’t both get their way. The inherent scarcity of rivalrous physical goods means that there is an everpresent potential for conflict over who gets what. It’s either/or, zero-sum: For every disputed object there’s one winner and a world of losers. In Hobbes’ grim vision of a state of nature without government, and thus without legally enforceable ownership claims, the “war of all against all” is ultimately a contest over who can use and control scarce valuable resources.

### Theory

#### Interpretation: All debater’s theory shells must operate through NCM, or the norm-setting model, not the abuse model. To clarify, an interpretation under NCM necessitates that a proposed interpretation would produce better norms for debate than the mutually exclusive counter-interp. A violation says the rule is not a set norm in the debate community. This is done by showing the opposing debater is in violation of the norm. But, showing the opponent’s action is in violation of the rule is unnecessary if the proposed rule is not a set norm in debate.

#### Violation – It’s preemptive –

#### And, people’s theory shells currently do not operate under NCM – which is proven by judge paradigms that say theory is only legit if it applies in-round.

#### 1] Norming – NCM means endorsement of the debater who promotes the best competitive norm, but punishment models of theory do not necessitate comparative models that are evaluated equally as initial interpretations. NCM forces debaters to commit to their theory norm which increases the quality of norms because no one would defend a norm that would get crushed and warrant a loss. Weighing between standards becomes regressive it presupposes there is a higher metric to determine who has the better justifications which means. Norming is a voter All voters beg the question of what norms or interpretations are consistent with their impacts. For example, fairness and education are nonsensical without a norm that constitutes it.

#### Voters – If you win that my model of debate is bad, the counter-interpretation would not be an RVI. Abuse models imply that you vote for a debater who broke a rule. Proving that you may engage in some practice is insufficient under that model as there is no proactive violation to a rule sufficient to warrant a ballot. Reasonability is also our violation because it does not necessitate comparative norms. Dropping the debater is implied by our interp because you would vote us up for endorsing the better model of debate.

#### Presumption and permissibility affirm –

#### 1. Statements are true before false since if I told you my name, you’d believe me. 2. Epistemics – we wouldn’t be able to start a strand of reasoning since we’d have to question that reason. 3. Illogical – presuming statements false is illogical since you can’t say things like P and ~P are both wrong. 4. Presuming obligations is logically safer since we move away from squo harms 5. Presuming statements false is impossible since we can’t operate in a world where we don’t trust anything. 6. To negate means to deny the truth of, which means if there isn’t offense to deny the truth of you should affirm. 7. Otherwise we’d have to have a proactive justification to do things like drink water. 8. If anything is permissible, then definitionally so is the aff since there is nothing that prevents us from doing it.