### Overview

#### [1] The AFF will defend NEG preferences on specificity insofar as it doesn't require me to abandon my maxim. If there is a problem with the paradigmatic issues set, it would justify dropping them rather than the AFF in its entirety since they are logically a prerequisite to the round.

#### [2] Reject new paradigm issues or/and new theory interpretations in the 2nr (a) judge intervention – judges have to insert intervention to see if the 2NR shells are true enough to o/w the 2ar CI (b) 6 min 2nr collapse can check back against 1ar abuse since we have to extend offense twice (c) they get 2nr theory, we get 2ar theory to check back against infinite 2nr abuse, also means new 2nr responses leads to a 13-6 skew on offense and moot 4 mins of 1ar offense since its based on 1nc concessions. (d) you can read 6 minutes of 2nr interps and the 3-minute 2ar becomes impossible.

#### [3] Aff gets 1ar theory since the neg can be infinitely abusive, drop the debater, no rvi, competing interps, aff theory first (a) the 1ar is too short to win both theory and substance (b) deters people from making the mistake again (c) competing interps means the 2n can’t dump on a reasonability bright-line that excludes only what they did wrong (d) you shouldn’t win for being fair, otherwise you can’t resolve rounds when no one reads theory (e) good theory debaters will be as abusive as possible and auto-win. (f) it’s a much larger strategic loss because 1min is ¼ of the 1AR vs 1/7 of the 1NC which means there’s more abuse if I’m devoting a larger fraction of time, (g) the 2N has time to beat back my shell and win theirs, but it’s impossible for the 2AR to win 2 shells.

#### [4] if the 1nc decides to read tricks - neg a priori’s affirm – denying the assumptions of a statement proves it valid – the aff is a set of conditionals since the offense being true relies on the framework.

### Framework

#### Ethics must first start by defining good and bad because ethical answers rely on a correct interpretation of what they’re representing. Thus, a moral interpretation of [a right to strike] based on inherent characteristics is the only way to escape the problem of the naturalistic fallacy. One cannot substitute words in the place of good as for any property we identify with “goodness,” agents can ask “Is that property itself good?” One can claim that pleasure is the highest intrinsic good, but the question can be asked, “But, is pleasure itself good” The fact that this question makes sense shows that “pleasure” and “goodness” are not identical. Thus, there is a distinction between natural and non-natural moral terms. Natural terms are externally encountered whereas the non-natural fails the test of physical cognition. Non-naturalism posits that moral properties like goodness are coherent but cannot be explained by natural terms. Therefore, the meta-ethic is moral non-naturalism.

**Hume**, David. *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (**1772**). Hackett Publ Co. 1993; Chapter on Cause and Effect. //Massa

That there are no demonstrative arguments in the case seems evident; since it implies no contradiction that **the course of nature may change, and** that **an object,** **seemingly like those which we have experienced**, **may be attended with different** or contrary **effects**. May I not clearly and distinctly conceive that a body, falling from the clouds, and which, in all other respects, resembles snow, has yet [has] the taste of salt or feeling of fire? Is there any more intelligible proposition than to affirm, that all the trees will flourish in December and January, and decay in May and June? Now whatever is intelligible, and can be distinctly conceived, implies no contradiction, and can never be proved false by any demonstrative argument or abstract reasoning a priori.If we be, therefore, engaged by arguments [**that] to put trust in past experience, and make it the standard of our future judgment,[can] these arguments must be probable** only, or such as regard matter of fact and real existence according to the division above mentioned. But that there is no argument of this kind, must appear, if our explication of that species of reasoning [can] be admitted as solid and satisfactory. We have said that all [these] **arguments [that trust in past experience]** concerning existence **are founded on the [assumption that]** relation of cause and effect; that our knowledge of that relation is derived entirely from experience; and that all our experimental conclusions proceed upon the supposition that **the future will be conformable to** **the past**. To endeavour, therefore, **the proof of this last supposition by probable arguments**, or arguments regarding existence, **must be evidently going in a circle**, and taking that for granted, which is the very point in question.

#### Additionally, correlation does not disprove non-naturalism because it does not contend that there is no relationship between moral terms and natural terms. Instead terms such as rights and government cannot be reduced to a set of nonmoral features and interpreted as identical. Warranting a relationship further justifies the constraint since that intrinsically warrants a lack of identity and no neg combo shells since they destroy substantive debate because no matter how fair I am you can always find a violation and avoid clash.

#### However, non-moral facts cannot conclude in moral reasons because of the gap between is and ought. We might observe that arsenic is poisonous, but then conclude that we ought not consume it, but the fact that these two premises are unrelated proves the ethical problem. Intuitively to weigh between RTPs would become regressive as it presupposes there is a higher metric to determine who has the better justifications means moral duty is sufficient to vote on our intuitions. Instead, a different mechanism is required to answer the question that lies outside the scope of the natural statement itself and furthers the gap by adding another moral premise.

#### And, since moral properties cannot be defined by natural properties, it becomes impossible to externally distinguish good and bad and eval the debate after the 1ac since it prevents the neg from reading abusive args. Non-naturalism, however, does not deny the ability to internally recognize the good just like distinguishing between natural observations. When determining the differences between colors, we can look at one and identify it in the same way we look at goodness. There is no defining feature of morality like the color spectrum, rather we can identify it absent explanation through intuitions.

#### That means non-naturalism prima facie justifies intuitionism as the only ethical theory that can guide action. The fallacy of Loki’s Wager is true because we know certain things are observationally relevant despite a clear articulation of what they are, just like I know the difference between red and blue. Thus, the standard is consistency with a priori moral intuitions.

**McMahan**, Jeff [<http://www.philosophy.rutgers.edu/joomlatools-files/docman-files/Moral%20Intuition%202nd%20edition.pdf>] //Massa

As I will understand the term, **a moral intuition is a moral judgment** – typically about a particular problem, a particular act, or a particular agent, though possibly also about a moral rule or principle – **that is not the result of inferential reasoning**. It is not inferred from one’s other beliefs but arises on its own. **If I consider the act of torturing the cat, I judge immediately that,** in the circumstances, **this would be wrong. I do not need to consult my other beliefs in order to arrive at this judgment**. This is not to say that a moral intuition is necessarily elicited instantaneously, the way a sense perception is.

#### This means adopting beliefs about the world are insufficient to make decisions consistent with them. Every system is inevitably hijacked or guided by intuitions which makes their faculty fundamentally inescapable.

#### Prefer the standard additionally:

#### First, rule following fails a) We can infinitely question why to follow that rule, as all rules will terminate at the assertion of some principle with no further justification b) Rule are arbitrary since the agent has the ability to formulate a unique understanding of them. It becomes impossible to say someone is violating a rule, since they can always perceive their actions as a non-violation. Intuitions solve since they don’t rely on external normative force. Also, we can weight the case anything else moots 6 mins of aff offense.

#### Second, if we have the ability to not follow our intuitions, then that means that morality is non-motivational, and can’t guide action. Intuition is our internal motivation, so if morality can’t guide action then correctness and incorrectness don’t exist.

#### Third, not following intuitions produces poor ontological understandings of the self, as we have ontological obligations to remain consistent with our way of being. Therefore, we a priori derive ontic obligations to reject moral standards that are devoid of our intuitions.

#### Impact Calc:

#### Moral intuitions can be rationally unsound. For example: Intuitions could justify the aff, but also justify util, which negates. In the case of contradictory maxims, err on specificity to the resolution. No general maxim is perfectly intuitive so only direct intuitions to the resolution explain a statement’s properties. Also, this merely proves the aff is a meta-ethical principle to the NC framework which means its offense functions as a hijack because the meta-ethic comes sequentially prior.

### Contention

#### I affirm: Resolved: A just government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike. Presumption & Permissibility affirms a) statements are more often true until proven false i.e. if I tell you my name is Vik you’ll believe that unless proven otherwise b) we couldn’t function or do anything in a world where everything was presumed false c) any action has to be permissible until prohibited.

#### 1] Intuitively working is a choice – no right to strike would hinder that intuition through slavery.

**Croucher et al., 12** (Richard Croucher, Mark G. E. Kelly, and Lilian Miles, \*Professor of Comparative Employment Relations and Director of Research at Middlesex University Business School, \*\*Associate Professor and ARC Future Fellow in the School of Humanities and Communication Arts at Western Sydney University in Australia, \*\*\*Senior Fellow of the Higher Education Academy at University of Westminster, January 2012, accessed on 10-11-2021, Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal, "A Rawlsian basis for core labor rights", https://www.researchgate.net/publication/236873894\_A\_Rawlsian\_basis\_for\_core\_labor\_rights) //D.Ying

The right to strike appears as a special and controversial case, then, but we argue that from a rights perspective it is a simple, fundamental freedom. The right to conduct industrial action is in effect that to withdraw their labour in some way (quitting, striking, going slow) unless collective demands are met. As individuals, every worker, if they are not a slave (and slavery is explicitly not permitted under Rawls’s first principle) has a right to withdraw their own labour, and might of course threaten this in individual negotiations with their employer. Effectively, what occurs in industrial action is a pooling of individual rights into collective rights, via the individual freedom to associate with our peers, and in this respect we may still discuss these collective rights qua individual rights under Rawls’s first principle of justice. That is, individuals may be said to have an individual right to join in collective industrial action to improve their conditions. Of course, it will be argued that there is no right to strike if it involves a breach of contract. However, no contract can literally force labour – if it did that, it would breach the right to freedom from slavery. Rather, it can only schedule penalties, typically financial, where labour is not performed. In effect, as long as the freedom to contract is limited by the right to freedom from slavery, there is an implied freedom to strike. Thus, it is because of the very lack of complete freedom to make contracts that prevents us having a primary right to bargain that we do have a primary freedom to strike. We cannot, according to Rawls, sign away our basic freedom to refuse to do any particular job.40

#### 2] It’s a priori intuitive – workers intuition is to avoid working at places that harm them or go against their needs – forcing them to work would run contrary to that.

#### 3] Its unintuitive to have rights to freedom and bodily autonomy BUT prevent the autonomy to not work which is a contradiction and thus not a priori intuitive to force work

#### 4] The offense can’t be turned – strikes are an omission of action

**Benjamin 78** [Walter Benjamin, On Violence, Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings [Walter Bendix Schönflies Benjamin was a German Jewish philosopher, cultural critic and essayist]

This is above all the case in the class struggle, in the form of the workers' guaranteed right to strike. Organized labor is, apart from the state, probably today the only legal subject en­titled to exercise violence. Against this view there is certainly the objection that an omission of actions, a nonaction, which a strike really is, cannot be described as violence. Such a consideration doubtless made it easier for a state power to conceive the right to strike, once this was no longer avoidable. But its truth is not unconditional, and therefore not unrestricted. It is true that the omission of an action, or service, where it amounts simply to a "severing of relations," can be an entirely nonviolent, pure means. And as in the view of the state, or the law, the right to strike conceded to labor is certainly not a right to exercise violence but, rather, to escape from a violence indirectly exercised by the employer, strikes conforming to this may undoubtedly occur from time to time and involve only a "withdrawal" or "estrangement" from the employer. The mo­ment of violence, however, is necessarily introduced, in the form of extortion, into such an omission, if it takes place in the context of a conscious readiness to resume the suspended action under certain circumstances that either have nothing whatever to do with this action or only superficially modify it. Understood in this way, the right to strike constitutes in the view of labor, which is opposed to that of the state, the right to use force in attaining certain ends. The antithesis between the two conceptions emerges in all its bitterness in face of a revolu­tionary general strike. In this, labor will always appeal to its right to strike, and the state will call this appeal an abuse, since the right to strike was not "so intended," and take emer­gency measures.