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**To be is to signify – the failure of linguistic signifiers to describe the Real produces repetitive drives to fill the resulting lack that is the root cause of violence and destroys politics, ethics, and the value to life. Thus, the roll of the ballot is to analyze the libidinal investments of the 1AC’s politics and presentation.**

**Ruti 14** [Mari, English, Toronto, Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society (2014) 19, 297–314]

**Lauren Berlant characterizes this predicament as one of “cruel optimism”: the stubborn, irrational belief that social arrangements and ways of life that hurt us will eventually pay off and make us happy. B**erlant specifies that “a relation of cruel optimism” exists when something we desire is in reality an obstacle to our flourishing (2011, p. 1). That is, cruel optimism entails the fantasy that our relentless efforts (say, our good performance) will bring us the love, intimacy, success, security, harmony, financial reward, or the so-called “good life” we crave even when they are extremely unlikely to do so. Berlant explains, for instance, that the economically disadvantaged may at times form optimistic attachments to the very power structures that oppress them, so that a poor person might support a conservative political agenda even when it is clear that this agenda will never help him or her overcome poverty. Or the daughter of working-class parents who has watched her parents toil without reward for two decades might still place a great deal of faith in the ideals of hard work and social mobility, hoping against hope that the American dream will one day rescue her even if it did not rescue her parents. As Butler has also suggested, such an optimistic attachment to potentially wounding modalities of life tends to arise from the desire to feel normal: we want to feel like we are a part of something familiar, like we “belong” to – and are recognized by – the world in which we live, with the result that we go along with the expectations that render this world comprehensible to us. **In Berlant’s terms, our investment in the notion “a dependable life,” “a life that does not have to keep being reinvented” (p. 170), can be so strong that we remain wedded to specific fantasies of satisfaction even after they have repeatedly disappointed us**. **We, in short, endorse forms of life that are not in the least bit good for us, coming, as it were, “to misrecognize the bad life as a good one” (p. 174).** Sara Ahmed makes a parallel point about our culture’s dominant “happiness scripts,” which, like Berlant’s cruel optimism, can render us overly patient with our plight. Because they present a specific version of happiness as the goal, or telos, of life, they induce us to chase this version even though we might be very unlikely to ever attain it (or even though it might not actually make us happy in the end). As Ahmed maintains, the ideal of happiness “might be how waiting for something can acquire a sense of meaning or purpose and can thus be endured, as it points toward something. The failure to achieve happiness in the present can even extend one’s investment in a certain path of action: if the more one waits, the more one gives up, then the more one waits, the harder it is to give up. **The more one persists unhappily on a path of happiness, the harder it is to give up on that path.** Unhappiness can thus be what makes happiness harder to give up” (2010, p. 236). Indeed, our commitment to dominant happiness scripts can be so strong that when a given script does not deliver what it promises, when it makes us unhappy rather than happy, we do not think of questioning the script itself but instead assume that somehow we have failed to live it out correctly. In other words, when we have been invested in the notion that a certain kind of life is the happy life, it can be very difficult for us to admit that this life has not made us happy, that it might have actually led us astray. As Ahmed concludes, “It is hard labor just to recognize sadness and disappointment, when you are living a life that is meant to be happy but just isn’t, which is meant to be full, but feels empty. It is difficult to give up an idea of one’s life, when one has lived a life according to that idea. To recognize loss can mean to be willing to experience an intensification of the sadness that hopefulness postpones” (p. 75). Marcuse’s argument about the performance principle is similar in the sense that he recognizes that workers often come to desire this principle even though it is predicated on a severe repression of their libidinal impulses: “The restrictions imposed upon the libido appear as the more rational, the more universal they become, the more they permeate the whole of society. They operate on the individual as external objective laws and as an internalized force: the societal authority is absorbed into the ‘conscience’ and into the unconscious of the individual and works as his own desire, morality, and fulfillment. In the ‘normal’ development, the individual lives his repression ‘freely’ as his own life: he desires what he is supposed to desire” (p. 46). Most important for our purposes, Marcuse emphasizes that the repression demanded by the performance principle far exceeds the parameters of the kind of repression that Freud saw as the foundation of civilization. While social existence always requires a degree of libidinal repression, what we are witnessing in modern Western society is what Marcuse calls “surplus-repression”: the kind of repression that meets the demands of a society organized by the unequal distribution of resources. “Within the total structure of the repressed personality,” Marcuse explains, “surplus-repression is that portion which is the result of specific societal conditions sustained in the specific interest of domination.... The distinction is equivalent to that between the biological and the historical sources of human suffering” (pp. 87–88). Surplus-repression is thus a historically specific form of suffering that is added, for the benefit of those who hold power, to the mutilation of the drives demanded by social life as such. And because our desires have become so neatly aligned with what Lacan calls the “order of powers” (or the “service of goods”), we willingly participate in this arrangement, earnestly believing that it serves our most fundamental needs. Lacan understood all of this perfectly well, which makes it all the more noteworthy that he conceptualized ethics in terms of the subject’s unwillingness to give ground on its desire. Lacan knew that it is extremely difficult to differentiate the subject’s desire from the desire of the big Other, yet his ethics demands precisely the capacity to do so. This is why Lacanian ethics offers such a powerful point of contrast to Butler’s conviction that there is no way to shatter the subject’s psychic attachment to hegemonic power. Lacan admits that such a rupture is hard to accomplish, but he insists that it is the task of psychoanalysis as a clinical practice – as a practice of ethics specifically – to produce the kind of subject who might be able to carry out such a feat of defiance. The ethical act that I have discussed is a radical example of this capacity, but we should not underestimate the importance of the moment when the analysand, perhaps after years of analysis, finally manages to say “Enough!” to whomever or whatever is causing her to suffer. **If the goal of Lacanian analysis is to enable the analysand to dissociate herself from the desire of the big Other, or from the desire of those who, in her life, embody this desire, it is because this is the only way for her to destroy her (cruelly) optimistic allegiance to power structures that oppress her**. There may still be an enormous distance between such tiny acts of individual defiance and revolutionary politics, yet there is arguably also a conceptual link between the analysand who is able to utter her “Enough!” with a degree of conviction and the politicized subject who utters the same “Enough!” in the context of collective social mobilization. That is, collective social mobilization relies on subjects who have the ability to stick to their desire in the face of the demand that they capitulate to the desire of the big Other. I will return to this connection between individual and collective acts of defiance toward the end of this essay. But first I want to explore in greater detail how, from a Lacanian perspective, it might be possible to talk about desire as something that can be dissociated from the master’s morality. Let me restate the problematic I outlined above in the form of a question: if subjectivity is a function of being interpellated into the symbolic order, then how can we even begin to conceptualize forms of desire that have not been completely overrun by the desire of the big Other? This is where I find Marcuse helpful, for his analysis of surplusrepression implies that if we were able to somehow peel off this excess of repression, we would be left with what Lacan calls the truth of desire: the kind of desire that has certainly come into existence as a result of repression, but not as a result of the expectations of the performance principle. Indeed, though Lacan does not share Marcuse’s neo-Marxist platform, he in many ways operates with a similar distinction between repression and surplus-repression: though he understands that there is no such thing as desire divorced from its social environment, he believes that there are degrees of freedom and unfreedom, that some of our desires are more primary than the desires driven by the performance principle. Such primary desires – desires that touch the subject’s fundamental fantasies – reach toward the rebellious real rather than the conformist symbolic, which is why the subject’s capacity to animate them is essential for its ability to defy the hegemonic decrees of the latter. On the one hand, Lacan – like Marcuse – believes that a degree of repression is necessary for the emergence of social subjectivity. **This is how he arrives at his well-known story about subject formation: we all start out as presymbolic creatures, dwelling in the realm of the bodily real (jouissance); our first inkling of identity takes place during the mirror stage which gives rise to both narcissistic self-regard (the grandiose ego) and self-alienation (the misrecognition of the self as more coherent and omnipotent than it actually is); finally, the signifier interpolates us into the symbolic order, thereby producing subjectivity as a site of meaning production and intersubjective capacity. According to this model, we sacrifice jouissance for the signifier, unmediated pleasure for the capacity to desire. We will henceforth experience ourselves as fundamentally lacking.** **But, in return, we gain the ability to wield the signifier, sometimes even in highly creative and rewarding ways**. And we also gain the capacity to be interested in the world around us, including the people who populate this world; we gain the ability to desire, and sometimes even love, others. **So, all in all, we come off quite well in the sense that what we gain is arguably more valuable than what we lose, and this is all the more the case given that we have not actually lost anything to begin with, that our unconscious conviction that we were once whole and completely satisfied is a misleading fantasy that in no way reflects the rather terrifying realities of jouissance.** **On the other hand, Lacan – again like Marcuse – recognizes that the symbolic order is repressive beyond the demands of subject formation, that it includes forms of violence that exceed the ubiquitous violence of the signifier**. Indeed, even the violence of the signifier is not equally distributed, so that some of us are much more vulnerable to its injurious effects than others (consider, for instance, hate speech). Lacan does not necessarily talk about the unequal distribution of resources in the manner Marcuse does, but there is no doubt that his analysis of symbolic law as the Law of the Father elucidates a historically specific, deeply heteropatriarchal and hierarchical organization of social life. In point of fact, one reason I have taken a detour through Marcuse is to illustrate the obvious ways in which Lacan’s portraiture of the symbolic mirrors that of Marcuse’s explicitly historical account: what Marcuse calls “the performance principle,” Lacan calls the “service of goods.” Both thinkers identify the underpinnings of a social order dominated by the ideal of productivity – an ideal that is, moreover, placed in direct opposition to the pleasure principle. Both emphasize that the dominant morality of this symbolic – what Lacan calls “the morality of the master” – measures the merit of lives based on largely pragmatic criteria. And both acknowledge that the model citizen of this symbolic is a subject who shows up at work reliably every morning, performs its duties with a degree of diligence, does not let its desires get the better of its productivity, and seeks satisfaction (“enjoys”) in moderate, socially sanctioned ways. “Part of the world has resolutely turned in the directions of the service of goods,” Lacan writes, “thereby rejecting everything that has to do with the relationship of man to desire” (318). This, he adds, “is what is known as the postrevolutionary perspective” (318). **In other words, the service of goods reflects the mindset of the levelheaded utilitarian subject who has deemed revolutionary change to be unrealistic**. Lacan is here referring to the kind of depoliticization that is arguably the hallmark of Western subjectivity under capitalism. **Lacan’s point is by no means, as critics such as Butler have suggested, that a different kind of symbolic is intrinsically impossible but rather that the configuration of subjectivity that Western modernity has produced – a subjectivity that has been subjected to a particular form of surplus-repression (the performance principle, the service of goods) – makes it virtually impossible for us to entertain the idea that the symbolic could be organized differently, that it could be centered around a different version of the reality principle**. As Marcuse remarks, one reason the performance principle is so powerful is that it has managed to convince us that all alternatives to it are either utopian or otherwise unpalatable. Yet, for Marcuse, the fact that this principle has been so successful also points to the possibility of transcending it. As he states, “The very progress of civilization under the performance principle has attained a level of productivity at which the social demands upon instinctual energy to be spent in alienated labor could be considerably reduced. Consequently, the continued repressive organization of the instincts seems to be necessitated less by the ‘struggle for existence’ than by the interest in prolonging this struggle – by the interest in domination” (pp. 129–130). This is to say that there is really nothing besides social power that keeps us invested in the notion that our welfare demands relentless toil. The performance principle has outlived its usefulness in the sense that our collective productivity these days surpasses what is necessary for the provision of food, clothing, housing, and other basic amenities. The fact that these amenities have not yet reached all corners of the world, or even all corners of our own society (the homeless, innercity dwellers, etc.), is a function of domination (the unequal distribution of resources) rather than of any deficiencies of productivity. As a result, in Marcuse’s view, all we would need to do to bring about a more “non-repressive civilization” (p. 134) would be to refuse the parameters of the current symbolic; even something as simple as reducing the length of the working day would immediately realign our priorities, perhaps even impacting the very organization of our psychic lives. Our standard of living might drop somewhat, but we might also learn to assess the value of our lives according to other, less performanceoriented, measurements. Psychoanalysis, particularly Lacanian analysis, does not have a normative goal; it does not seek to tell us how we should desire but merely to explore the idiosyncratic contours of our desire. But this does not change the fact that Lacan, at least as a theorist, was exasperated by people’s inability to make their way out of the maze of the master’s morality, including its performance principle; he was frustrated by individuals who were so out of touch with the truth of their desire that they were willing to sacrifice this desire for the sake of social conformity and that they were, furthermore, willing to do so to the point of self-betrayal. As he explains, “What I call ‘giving ground relative to one’s desire’ is always accompanied in the destiny of the subject by some betrayal – you will observe it in every case and should note its importance. Either the subject betrays his own way, betrays himself, and the result is significant for him, or, more simply, he tolerates the fact that someone with whom he has more or less vowed to do something betrays his hope and doesn’t do for him what their pact entailed” (p. 321). **Such a betrayal invariably results in the reassertion of the status quo, sending the subject back to the service of goods, what Lacan in this context calls “the common path” (p. 321).** **And given that desire, for Lacan, is “the metonymy of our being” (p. 321), betraying it in this way leads to the kind of psychic death that extinguishes the subject’s sense of agency**. To use Lacan’s wording, “Doing things in the name of the good, and even more in the name of the good of the other, is something that is far from protecting us not only from guilt but also from all kinds of inner catastrophes” (p. 319). It is precisely such inner catastrophes that Lacanian clinical practice was designed to counter, though it may be Julia Kristeva – rather than Lacan himself – who has most clearly developed this interpretation of analytic work. Kristeva depicts psychoanalysis as a means of restoring the subject’s psychic aliveness, as an explicit revolt against the numbing impact of what she calls “the society of the spectacle” (2002, p. 4). **This society of the spectacle – of technology, image, and speed – shares many parallels with Adorno’s “culture industry”: a flattened surface of the life world, a constriction of psychic space, a dearth of critical thought, the worship of efficiency over intellectual curiosity, and the incapacity to revolt**. Against this backdrop, psychoanalysis – along with art, writing, and some forms of religious experience – offers, for Kristeva, a gateway to revolt, a way of resurrecting “the life of the mind” (a phrase Kristeva borrows from Hannah Arendt) through ongoing questioning, interrogation, and psychic recreation. “Freud founded psychoanalysis as an invitation to anamnesis in the goal of a rebirth, that is, a psychical restructuring,” Kristeva writes: “Through a narrative of free association and in the regenerative revolt against the old law (familial taboos, superego, ideals, oedipal or narcissistic limits, etc.) comes the singular autonomy of each, as well as a renewed link with the other” (2002, p. 8). In the context of my overall argument in this essay, it is worth stressing that it is “the desire of the subject” that, in Kristeva’s view, reserves a place “for initiative, autonomy” (2002, p. 11). This is in part because the “Freudian journey into the night of desire was followed by attention to the capacity to think: never one without the other” (2010, p. 41). In other words, the exploration of desire, in psychoanalysis, is akin to the critical (or at least curious) movement of thought – the very movement that Arendt also saw as vital to the life of the mind. This is why psychoanalysis has, Kristeva asserts, “the (unique?) privilege today of accompanying the emergence of new capacities of thinking/representing/thinking, beyond the frequent and increasingly noticeable disasters of psychosomatic space – capacities that are so many new bodies and new lives” (2010, pp. 41–42). Kristeva therefore draws the same link between desire and autonomy (in this instance, the capacity for critical thought) as Lacan does. Furthermore, to translate Kristeva’s point into Marcuse’s terminology, one might say that psychoanalysis, at least the kind of analysis that refuses to uphold social adaptation as a therapeutic goal, presents the possibility of sidestepping, or at the very least diminishing, the effects of surplus-repression. This, in turn, creates space for the truth of the subject’s desire in the Lacanian sense. This does not mean that repression as such is defeated. Quite the contrary, as we will see shortly, the truth of the subject’s desire is inextricable from the primary (constitutive) repression that accompanies subject formation. But as I have already suggested, the lifting of surplus-repression renders the imprint of primary repression more clearly discernable, for when surplus-repression is removed, what remains are the always highly singular outlines of primary repression. And if Lacan – like Marcuse – sought to remove surplus-repression, it was because he understood that it was on the level of primary repression (fundamental fantasies) that one could find the most basic building blocks of the subject’s psychic destiny; primary repression was the layer of psychic life that expressed something essential about the distinctive ways in which the pleasure principle, in the subject’s life, had become bound up with the repetition compulsion. This is why Lacan states, “If analysis has a meaning, desire is nothing other than that which supports an unconscious theme, the very articulation of that which roots us in a particular destiny, and that destiny demands insistently that the debt be paid, and desire keeps coming back, keeps returning, and situates us once again in a given track, the track of something that is specifically our business” (p. 319). **According to Lacan, analysis aims to enable us to understand something about the eccentric specificity (or truth) of our most fundamental desire as well as about the track of destiny that this desire carves out for us (and that is therefore “specifically our business”). If it is indeed the case, as I have conceded, that most of us tend to be alienated from our desire, Lacanian analysis strives to undo this alienation by familiarizing us with the truth of this desire.** This process entails, among other things, recognizing that the destiny we owe to this desire can never be definitively overcome, that the debt of desire can never be fully redeemed (for how are we to compensate the signifier for having brought us into being as subjects of desire?). Our destiny – which might initially coincide quite seamlessly with our repetition compulsion – consists of recurring efforts to pay off this debt, which is why it keeps ushering us to the same track of desire, the same nexus of psychic conundrums, our unconscious hope being that if we wear out the track of our desire by incessant reiteration, one day we might be able to absolve ourselves of our debt. But since we cannot, the only thing to be done is to “own” our destiny even as we might seek to mitigate its more painful dimensions. That is, the only way to arrive at the kind of psychic rebirth Kristeva is talking about is to take full responsibility for our (unconsciously generated) destiny. In the ethical act, our impulse is to embrace this destiny wholesale regardless of consequences (this is one way to understand what it means to plunge into the jouissance of the real). In analysis, the exploration of our destiny is more gradual, more selfreflexive. **But in both cases, the point is not to obliterate our foundational destiny (or fundamental fantasies) but merely to elaborate it in more satisfying directions, away from the incapacitating effects of the repetition compulsion and toward the rewards of subjective autonomy**. And, if we are to achieve this goal, nothing is more important than staying faithful to the truth of desire that, on the most elementary level, determines our destiny.

**The aff is radical conformism—they participate in the late-capitalist project of hyper enjoyment replicating the pathological narcissism created from the demands of late capitalism. This ensures a self-destructive anxiety which prevents any dialectical addressing – turns case.**

**Donahue 2** [Brian Donahue, assistant professor of English at Gonzaga University. He has a Ph.D. from Purdue University, Gonzaga University, 2002 ["Marxism, Postmodernism, Zizek", http://pmc.iath.virginia.edu/issue.102/12.2donahue.html, 2-19-2019]

According to Zizek, theorists of postmodern society who make much of the usurpation of the Real by the simulacrum either long nostalgically for the lost distinction between them or announce the final overcoming of the "metaphysical obsession with authentic Being," or both (he mentions Paul Virilio and Gianni Vattimo, and we might add Baudrillard to the list). In either case they "miss the distinction between simulacrum and appearance": What gets lost in today's plague of simulations is not the firm, true, nonsimulated Real, but appearance itself. To put it in Lacanian terms: the simulacrum is imaginary (illusion), while appearance is symbolic (fiction); when the specific dimension of symbolic appearance starts to disintegrate, imaginary and real become more and more indistinguishable.... And, in sociopolitical terms, this domain of appearance (that is, symbolic fiction) is none other than that of politics.... The old conservative motto of keeping up appearances thus today obtains a new twist:... [it] stands for the effort to save the properly political space. ("Leftist" 995-96) Making the same argument about a slightly different version of this problem, Zizek writes that the standard reading of "outbursts of 'irrational' violence" in the postmodern "society of the spectacle" is that "our perception of reality is mediated by aestheticized media manipulations to such an extent that it is no longer possible for us to distinguish reality from its media image" (Metastases75). Violent outbursts in this context are thus seen as "desperate attempts to draw a distinction between fiction and reality... [and] to dispel the cobweb of the aestheticized pseudo-reality" (75). Again with reference to the Lacanian triad of Imaginary-Symbolic-Real, Zizek argues that this analysis is "right for the wrong reasons": What is missing from it is the crucial distinction between imaginary order and symbolic fiction. The problem of contemporary media resides not in their enticing us to confound fiction with reality but, rather, in their "hyperrealist" character by means of which they saturate the void that keeps open the space for symbolic fiction. (75) A society of proliferating, promiscuous images is thus not overly fictionalized but is, on the contrary, not "fictionalized" enough in the sense that the basis for making valid statements, the structure guaranteeing intersubjective communication, the order permitting shared narratives and, to use Jameson's term, "cognitive mapping"[[11](http://pmc.iath.virginia.edu/issue.102/12.2donahue.html" \l "foot11)]--in short, the realm of the Symbolic--is short-circuited by an incessant flow of images, which solicit not analysis and the powers of thought but rather nothing more than blank, unreflective enjoyment. The kind of subjectivity that corresponds to this hyperreal, spectacularized society without a stable Symbolic order is what Zizek calls in Looking Awry the "pathological narcissist" (102). That is, following the predominance of the "'autonomous' individual of the Protestant ethic" and the "heteronomous 'organization man'" who finds satisfaction through "the feeling of loyalty to the group"--the two models of subjectivity corresponding to previous stages of capitalist society--today's media-spectacle-consumer society is marked by the rise of the "pathological narcissist," a subjective structure that breaks with the "underlying frame of the ego-ideal common to the first two forms" (102). The first two forms involved inverted versions of each other: one either strove to remain true to oneself (that is, to a "paternal ego-ideal") or looked at oneself "through the eyes of the group," which functioned as an "externalized" ego-ideal, and sought "to merit its love and esteem" (102). With the stage of the "pathological narcissist," however, the ego-ideal itself is dissolved: Instead of the integration of a symbolic law, we have a multitude of rules to follow--rules of accommodation telling us "how to succeed." The narcissistic subject knows only the "rules of the (social) game" enabling him to manipulate others; social relations constitute for him a playing field in which he assumes "roles," not proper symbolic mandates; he stays clear of any kind of binding commitment that would imply a proper symbolic identification. He is a radicalconformist who paradoxically experiences himself as an outlaw. (102) Thus the "permissive" society of the last decades of the twentieth century, marked by the often-noted "decline of paternal authority," turns out not to be more liberating than earlier social formations after all; in fact, Zizek writes, "this disintegration of the ego-ideal entails the installation of a 'maternal' superego that does not prohibit enjoyment but, on the contrary, imposes it and punishes 'social failure' in a far more cruel and severe way, through an unbearable and self-destructive anxiety" (103). While its generalized form may be more recent, the effects of this overbearing presence of the maternal superego are already evident in Orson Welles's Citizen Kane (1941).[[12](http://pmc.iath.virginia.edu/issue.102/12.2donahue.html" \l "foot12)] The film offers viewers a fairly simple "psychological" reading of the title character's dying utterance, "Rosebud": we learn at the end of the narrative that this was the name of Kane's childhood sled; thus we surmise that Kane's saying the word as he dies indicates his nostalgic longing for his idyllic Colorado childhood. The word evokes the period before Kane was separated from his parents--at a time when he was not yet mature enough (still a "rosebud") to make decisions for himself--and was inserted into a position of wealth and power that he never sought and in which he could not, after all, find true happiness. But this reading overlooks the fact that it is Kane's mother who initiates the tragic progression of her son's future through her desire that Charles should have a "better life" than was possible in their rural home. It also overlooks the related fact that she does so over the impotent objections of Kane's ineffectual father, a man who is without power because he is without property: the deed to the mine that has become the source of the family's sudden wealth belongs to Mrs. Kane alone. Kane's acts of youthful rebellion against his despised guardian-father Thatcher, which include transgressions that get him expelled from various elite colleges, and his decision to enter adult public life as the publisher of a sensationalistic, populist, anti-big-business newspaper because running a newspaper might be "fun," as he tells Thatcher, appear at first to be attempts to break free of the restrictive "law of the father" embodied in the stern and humorless banker, who predictably disapproves of Kane's activities and decisions. But Thatcher is merely a substitute-father put in place to enact the desire of Kane's mother that Charles should grow up to be someone important, a situation that Kane never shows any awareness of in his defiance. As Kane's friend Jed Leland, thinking back on their relationship, comments about Kane, "He loved Charlie Kane, of course, very dearly; and his mother--I guess he always loved her." Kane's explicit rebellion, then, is directed against the world of sober responsibility as law-of-the-father and thus takes the form of his "enjoying himself," "having fun," and "championing the cause of the common man," behavior that he experiences as transgressive but that actually involves his acting out the paradoxical injunction to enjoy imposed by the maternal superego. As for Kane's fight for "the common man," it is ambiguous at best and seems to be motivated initially by the enjoyment that he derives from defying Thatcher and promoting causes antithetical to his interests. His "convictions" are sustained thereafter by his enjoyment of the support and adulation of friends and voters during his political campaign. Significantly, it is just when it appears inevitable, according to polls, that Kane will win the election and become governor--that is, just when he will have to make good on his attested convictions and assume the symbolic position of paternal authority as embodiment of Law--that he initiates an extramarital affair, which, when exposed, leads to his defeat on election day. This pathological pattern is continued later in the film as he begins wasting money by making wildly irrational expenditures on useless objects to fill his "fantasy palace," Xanadu, violating the paternal laws of utility and economy and evading the "reality principle": he remains trapped in a cycle of compulsive repetition on a narcissistic quest for enjoyment that can never be achieved precisely because it is demanded by the maternal superego, which determines his actions despite his properly egotistical claims that only he himself decides what he will do. On the night when he first meets his mistress and second wife Susan Alexander while on the way to a warehouse where his deceased mother's possessions are stored, Kane learns that Alexander's mother always wanted Susan to be an opera singer. As if by command, he immediately asks her to sing for him that evening and soon begins the process of training her for an opera career, fulfilling the desire of her mother regardless of Susan's own desire and thereby taking on the role that Thatcher played for Kane himself as a youth. As both Kane's and Susan's misery demonstrate, however, avoiding the law of the father by fulfilling the desire of the mother is hardly an advisable course of action.[[13](http://pmc.iath.virginia.edu/issue.102/12.2donahue.html" \l "foot13)] As Leland remarks, directly contradicting the affected ethical resolution of Kane's "declaration of principles," which Kane signs with a flourish in front of Leland and publishes in his newspaper early in the film, Kane "never believed in anything except Charlie Kane; he never had a conviction except Charlie Kane in his life"--precisely the definition of the "pathological narcissist." This subjective structure is figured near the end of the film in the famous shot of Kane walking past a mirrored mirror, producing a brief infinite regression of images of himself. Inasmuch as his "self" of infinite narcissistic images and his own private (blocked) enjoyment mark the limits of his "care," Kane has remained under the command of the maternal superego and never acceded to symbolic law. Zizek specifies this crucial opposition between symbolic law and superego explicitly in terms of the movement from permission to obligation, from possibility based on clearly defined universal prohibition to necessity based on radical contingency. Paradoxically, in the absence of prohibition, where one might expect the free flow of libidinal energy, superego intervenes to require what is already permitted: Law is the agency of prohibition which regulates the distribution of enjoyment on the basis of a common, shared renunciation (the "symbolic castration"), whereas superego marks a point at which permitted enjoyment, freedom-to-enjoy, is reversed into obligation to enjoy--which, one must add, is the most effective way to block access to enjoyment. (For They 237) It is because of this obscene, harsh, punitive quality of the superego that the subject can never settle accounts with it. There is always more that can be sacrificed, Zizek explains, which is why Lacanian psychoanalytic ethics is based explicitly on opposing the coercion of the superego, in contrast to the ordinary association of superego with "conscience" or the moral sense guiding ethical behavior: Lacan's maxim of the ethics of psychoanalysis ("not to compromise one's desire") is not to be confounded with the pressure of the superego.... Lacan takes seriously and literally the Freudian "economical paradox" of the superego--that is, the vicious cycle that characterizes the superego: the more we submit ourselves to the superego imperative, the greater its pressure, the more we feel guilty. According to Lacan, this "feeling of guilt" is not a self-deception to be dispelled in the course of the psychoanalytic cure--we really are guilty: superego draws the energy of the pressure it exerts upon the subject from the fact that the subject was not faithful to his desire, that he gave it up. Our sacrificing to the superego, our paying tribute to it, only corroborates our guilt. For that reason our debt to the superego is unredeemable: the more we pay it off, the more we owe. (Metastases 67-68) Indeed, Lacan's ethical imperative must be taken as explicitly opposed to the concept of conventional morality with its focus on maximizing the Good, which functions as the arbiter of all action, since this model ultimately leads to a psychological paralysis arising from infinite consideration of ramifications, a process that turns the subject into a perpetual Hamlet, standing behind Claudius but unable to decide whether killing him or not killing him would be the better option. The interminable process of trying to decide which course of action leads to the "greater Good" entails its own kind of choice (that is, to "compromise one's desire" by default) with its own kind of psychic consequences for the subject. Zizek explains this ethical-moral distinction through a Greimasian semiotic square based on the four possible arrangements of the positive and negative versions of these terms and the figures corresponding to the four pairings--moral, ethical (Saint); immoral, unethical (Scoundrel); immoral, ethical (Hero); and moral, unethical (superego)--and endorses the Lacanian championing of Hero over superego (Metastases 67). Zizek also anticipates the anxious objection that this Lacanian ethical attitude is too radical in its practical implications: is it reasonable to propose that everyone unrelentingly pursue his or her own desire and renounce all other considerations? Don't "ordinary" people need an "ethics of the 'common Good,'... despicable as it may appear in the eyes of the suicidal heroic ethics advocated by Lacan?" (Metastases 69). But he concludes that this concern--"What if everyone were to do the same as me?"--is simply another way of introducing the "pathological consideration of the consequences of our act in reality" and therefore functions as a way of imposing superego injunctions, restraints, and cycles of guilt through the insistence that we renounce our desire precisely because it cannot be universalized (69). From these comments on the Lacanian ethics of desire, Zizek moves, understandably, into a section on the unavoidable corollary to such an ethics, that is, the problem of evil, which has prompted the present discussion. Zizek identifies three kinds of evil, categorized according to the Freudian scheme of Ego, Superego, and Id. Ego-Evil is the most common kind: "behavior motivated by selfish calculation and greed"; Superego-Evil is the kind attributed to "fundamentalist fanatics," that is, "Evil accomplished in the name of fanatical devotion to some ideological ideal"; finally, there is Id-Evil, "structured and motivated by the most elementary imbalance in the relationship between the Ichand jouissance, by the tension between pleasure and the foreign body of jouissance at the very heart of it" (Metastases 70-71). In other words, Id-Evil involves a kind of pure, irrational enjoyment in the evil act. The skinheads who beat up foreigners because it "feels good" to do so, the white racists who killed an African-American man by dragging him from a chain tied behind their pickup truck because the mere presence of a black man "bothered" them, the adolescents who committed the shooting sprees in U.S. schools over the past several years: all of these cases involve "violence not grounded in utilitarian or ideological reasons" ("Leftist" 998) but rather raw outbreaks of the Real of jouissance: The psychotic passage à l'acte is to be conceived of as a desperate attempt of the subject to evict objet a from reality by force, and thus gain access to reality. (The psychotic "loss of reality" does not arise when something is missing in reality, but, on the contrary, when there is too much of a Thing in reality.) (Metastases 77) Of course, what is most disturbing about such instances of the psychotic passage à l'acte is the often-reported "desensitization" of the subject toward the violent acts that he performs. The reports about the Columbine High School shooting incident, for example, included witnesses' recollections of some details of the two killers' comments as they walked around shooting their classmates. It was reported that they were laughing and saying, "We've been wanting to do this for years," and commenting to each other about how "cool" it looked to see blood and pieces of victims' bodies "fly" when they shot them. This last statement precisely illustrates Zizek's diagnosis of the breakdown of the distinction between the Imaginary and the Real in a society marked by the attenuation of the Symbolic: the Real, the actual spraying of blood, is experienced as Imaginary, as a "cool" image or effect, a purely aesthetic phenomenon, while the Symbolic identity of the victim (someone with a name, a family, a "story," a network of intersubjective connections) is not considered or recognized. Violence, Evil, and Late Capitalism at the Movies Such cases of "desensitization" toward violence and desymbolization of victims' identities are widespread in contemporary film, as conservative politicians, desperate to locate in the culture industry the "causes" of violent crime (while impeding legislative efforts to curb easy access to guns), are quick to mention. But limited claims for causality (bad movies, bad parenting, bad guns) begin within a positivist framework that, as discussed above, misses the eruption of the Real in these cases of Id-Evil and that fails to account for the socioeconomic, historical context of multinational capitalism within which such eruptions take place. Even broader claims for causality based on the notion of a widespread "culture of death"--encompassing media violence, the prevalence of guns, drug abuse, as well as legalized abortion, euthanasia, and other indicators of an alleged rejection of belief in the "sanctity of human life"--fail to address the ways in which the structural demands of capitalism have contributed to the unwelcome social and cultural transformations since the "good old days" (usually meaning anytime before the 1960s). These criticisms, in both narrow and broad versions, are underwritten by the belief that with the correct combination of policy reforms to excise the diseased elements of the social body we might return to the "normal" state of society, having eliminated its anomalous, disruptive features. This belief, however, itself depends on ignoring the dialectical logic of the symptom, which Zizek, following Lacan, reminds us was "invented" by Marx: Marx's great achievement was to demonstrate how all phenomena which appear to everyday bourgeois consciousness as simple deviations, contingent deformations and degenerations of the "normal" functioning of society (economic crises, wars, and so on), and as such abolishable through amelioration of the system, are necessary products of the system itself--the points at which the "truth," the immanent antagonistic character of the system, erupts. (Sublime 128) Thus if many U.S. adolescents feel isolated and desperate, see no future for themselves that they would want to occupy, feel no symbolic identification with any entity beyond themselves (nation, community, family), resent their "well-adjusted" peers, expect little from others or themselves, and shift among affective states of manic euphoria, defensive denial, and depressive anomie, and if some of these adolescents realize their abject frustration in acts of violence, those acts are not to be understood as anomalies that might be "fixed" with appropriate reform measures but rather as symptomatic eruptions of the "truth" of the current capitalist world system. In other words, the explanation for these violent outbursts has more to do with what Zizek has assessed as the attenuation of the Symbolic order under conditions of globalizing media-technology-consumer capitalism and the concomitant rise of the "pathological narcissist" as a dominant mode of subjectivity than with any isolated individual "causes" upon which empirical studies may be (and will be) performed.

**The aff’s international approach to the patent system is the essence of the capitalist empire. It seeks to deprive local power while bolstering the influence of the global market over them, securing its position of dominance in the world. Knezevic 07,**

Intellectual Property or Intellectual Poverty? Between Colonialism and Empire in the Context of AIDS and Public Health Crises

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**The corporate-industrialized world nexus project in pushing the global IP agenda with a view to adopt a “common standard”85 or “one size fits all”86 model for patents regardless of the field of technology (in this case medicine) or socio-economic circumstances in question (AIDS epidemic in Africa) is not only hypocritical but dangerous,** and not just to immediate public health concerns. **It constitutes an attempt to sever the juridical notion of patent from its material historical source** – to deprive us of the language to articulate the un-ethics of the situation. **It seeks to monopolize the very language and thought-processes that permit us to ethically and effectively question the ‘rational’ decision-making of world leaders and corporations**. **This is what Hardt and Negri refer to (in a reading of Foucault) as a ‘biopolitics’ of control, which permeates below the level of consciousness to the bios in order to manipulate** 87 [T]he problem of the new juridical apparatus is presented to us in its most immediate figure: a global order, a justice, and a right that are still virtual but nonetheless apply to us...**our internal moral disposition...tends to be determined by the ethical, political, and juridical categories of Empire...The means of the private and individual apprehension of values are dissolved**: with the appearance of Empire, we are confronted no longer with the local 89 This latter tension represents most faithfully the precise tension between the position of developing nations and that of industrialized nations in relation to pharmaceutical patents. **It is the tension between an adaptive conception that is modified as it is historically and socio-economically contextualized or ‘locally mediated’ – and on the other hand a conception that is in juristic terms rigid and by claiming for itself ‘concrete universality’ extinguishes all contextualized conceptions**. This tendency of the very limits of what we are capable of thinking. The sentiment is echoed in the comment cited above by Spiegel regarding the ‘Cuba taboo’ – a conspicuous silence which reflects an “inclination to narrow the boundaries of what are deemed to be possible approaches”88 to public health. Out of this universalized silence, the global order of ‘Empire’ unfolds [my italics]: [T]he problem of the new juridical apparatus is presented to us in its most immediate figure: a global order, a justice, and a right that are still virtual but nonetheless apply to us...our internal moral disposition...tends to be determined by the ethical, political, and juridical categories of Empire...The means of the private and individual apprehension of values are dissolved: with the appearance of Empire, we are confronted no longer with the local mediations of the universal but with a concrete universal itself. Empire to extinguish and erase context and ‘local mediation’ is not directed merely at the Other – **the industrialized world which here is the agent of empire seeks to expunge its own context and history from the record, too, so long as the order that is universalized is the one it dominates at present**. The characteristic of Empire is that it is “formed not on the basis of force but on the basis of the capacity to present force as being in the service of right and peace.”90 **The only truly effective means to resist this process of Empire then is to deny it its ethical foundation by insisting on history**, both that of the developed and developing world, and in particular the complicity of the former in the plight of the latter, for example: Besides introducing new diseases, European colonial incursions created devastating ecological changes in Africa. Mining, plantation agriculture, irrigation schemes, and drainage ditches created good habitats for malaria- bearing mosquitoes. As Africans died from smallpox and famine, cultivated areas returned to bush, promoting the spread of tsetse flies... That, in short, is the sort of thing European ‘transfer of technology’ to Africa achieved in the 19th and early 20th century. Hunter goes on to note some further examples, among them this: it took until the 1960s to rid the Serengeti plain of the rinderpest virus brought there by the British and Italians in the 1880s, by which time most of the native domestic cattle and wild ungulates on which the Masai population depended were dead. From 1880 to 1933 the population of the Belgian Congo declined from around 40 million to 9.25 million. In another French colony it went from 20 million to 2.5 million in the space of 20 years, 1911-1931. On the heels of these ravages, “Western medicine matured at just the right time to be used as a ‘tool of empire’.”92 This configuration, it seems, persists today in what Hardt and Negri call the new ‘imperial paradigm’, which has migrated from “disciplinary society to a society of control.”93 It is the latter that operates at the level of bios, which rather than merely employing physical coercion, attempts to regulate from afar our very thought processes “to narrow the boundaries of what are deemed to be possible approaches.”94 **What is taking place here is the transition to an order wherein the agents of Empire need not instruct colonial subjects what to do or coerce them to it, but are able to ensure that goals are carried out merely by limiting the horizons of thought.** **It is clear that industrialized countries have taken every opportunity to adapt their patent systems and evolve them according to their immediate socio-economic or public health needs in different epochs**. **Developing countries should be allowed to do the same, especially given the historical complicity of developed countries in their demise and in the retardation of their development**. **The global model imposed by industrialized countries cannot serve the immediate public health needs of the developing world**. In this process and particularly in dealing with existing public health crises such as the AIDS epidemic, Cuba provides the best existing model for developing countries to learn from, given both its success and the country’s socio- economic identity with other developing countries, and there is no reason why this model could not be implemented without replicating its political environment. Over this entire complex, however, looms the hegemonic global order of Empire, with the industrialized world as agent, seeking to universalize its own conception. **In order to resist this universalizing process, developing countries should insist as a matter of right on managing their own public health networks matched by suitable patent regimes crafted to their immediate needs (i.e. compulsory licenses, import of generics) – rather than accepting the universalising imposition in return for ad hoc donations and other aid as a matter of charity or good will**. **Developing nations** should, in other words, **reject ad hoc utilitarian approaches of enforcing patents unconditionally at the service of the industrialized world designed to alleviate their suffering** but never allow them to stand on their own two feet, **leaving them always a step behind and at the mercy of corporate and international donors**. They should continue to assert their moral rights in the face of the global pharmaceutical lobby and insist on their unfettered discretion to determine the existence of health crises on their territories and design patent regimes appropriate to their immediate needs. They should implement “social and organizational priorities” shown to produce results toward the “social production of health” simultaneously investing (socially and financially) in their public health networks and in publicly financed institutions to conduct R&D programs crafted to their concerns, guided by public health needs and motives and not profit possibilities**. The attainment of public health goals is financially well within their reach merely by the implementation of appropriate policies**, as discussed above. This of course raises a number of issues relating to the willingness of African officials and governments to deal with the AIDS crisis in an effective way, and the various cultural and political 96 obstacles to this, however that this only makes the compendium of obstacles to the resolution of the AIDS crisis more complex;97 by removing the global obstacles (stringent pharmaceutical patent protection) and reducing the crisis to the level of national politics, the immediate technical responsibility is placed on the shoulders of leaders who in most cases are in one way or another politically accountable to the very populace afflicted by the epidemic, rather than on the shoulders of corporate executives thousands of miles away who answer primarily to shareholders. Thus if there is unwillingness among African politicians and elites to engage effectively with the epidemic (as some writers suggest), a more systematically ethical and less profit- oriented approach to patent enforcement by industrialized countries would be much more likely to expose this unwillingness and eliminate such politicians. **So long as industrialized countries insist on a ‘common standard’, they will remain the main scapegoat.** If they believe it to be in their interest to produce a greater confluence of norms relating to intellectual property, they should work from the opposite end to where they are now – by investing in the public health networks of developing countries with a view to making them sustainable and self-sufficient both in providing for

**Their deployment of debate is a cynical project which denies their own perverse investment in the university through an identification with their relationship to other people's relationship to the academy. This allows them to be perversely invested in the continuation of debate and the university because it allows for them to moralize about other people's investment.**

**McGowan ‘4** (Todd, Assoc. Prof. of Philosophy @ Vermont U., *The End of Dissatisfaction: Jacques Lacan and the Emerging Society of Enjoyment*, pp. 17-18)

In order to make clear the structure of the society of prohibition as it contrasts with that of the society of commanded enjoyment, it is not enough to emphasize the bond created by the sacrifice of enjoyment. Though the society of prohibition functions primarily through the dissatisfaction of its sub- jects, it also must provide some way of alleviating the sense of lack without endangering the social structure. Recognition of the social bond and of one’s own lack allows one to relate in a mediated way to other subjects. It allows one to view other subjects not just as rivals in struggle, but with some degree of lateral identification. But this is clearly not adequate compensation for the dissatisfaction that prohibition produces. Because recognizing one’s lack— one’s failure to enjoy—is not pleasant, we often avoid doing so, preferring instead to imagine that we haven’t made the initial sacrifice of enjoyment or that we are able to overcome this sacrifice and enjoy within the social order. For those who have acceded to life within the symbolic order, there remains one easy avenue of procuring enjoyment: is the imaginary. For Lacan, the imaginary is the domain of images, a register of experience that allows the subject to visualize the enjoyment it lacks. Thus, grasping the importance of the imaginary is vital for understanding what sustains the society of prohibition. Because prohibition denies the subject the ultimate enjoyment, it inevitably produces dissatisfaction and potential rebellion. The imaginary is the repository for that potential rebellion insofar as it provides an illusory enjoyment in the midst of its prohibition by the social order. One can imagine an enjoyment that the social order prohibits, and as a result, society’s con- fines do not seem absolute, even for those committed to remaining within those confines.16 For example, the spouse devoted to the ideal of marital fidelity can imagine the steamy affair that she/he would never accede to in reality. This imagined affair—this event enacted on the imaginary level— allows the subject to enjoy transgressing a prohibition without actually doing so. The imaginary thus plays a crucial supplementary role in the society of prohibition, offering an imaginary enjoyment for those who suffer from the prohibition of enjoyment in the Real. Because of our ability to imagine an enjoyment that the symbolic order prohibits, the imaginary offers us a separate register of experience, distinct from the symbolic order. In Lacan’s triadic division of experience, the symbolic order constitutes our social reality, the imaginary provides an avenue for the illusory transgression of that reality, and the Real marks the point at which the symbolic order fails—the gap that always haunts it. Though the imaginary assists prohibition by providing a safe outlet for enjoyment, it also represents a danger to the society of prohibition. The imaginary thus has an ambiguous status within the society of prohibition, and we must examine both its role in supplementing the power of prohibition and the threat that it poses.

**Vote negative to embrace the lack – this entails accepting that the gap between the Symbolic and the Real is a precondition of existence and breaks down the subject’s compulsive fantasy world.**

**Ruti** [Winnicott with Lacan: Living Creatively in a Postmodern Worldby Mari Ruti, pages 356-360]

How, then, does the Lacanian subject find meaning in its life? **Lacan’s answer is that it is only by accepting lack as a precondition of its existence—by welcoming and embracing the 358 Living Creatively in a Postmodern World primordial wound inflicted by the signifier**—that the subject can begin to weave the threads of its life into an existentially evocative tapestry. It is, in other words, only by exchanging its ego for language, its narcissistic fantasies for the meaning making capacities of the signifier, that **the subject can begin to ask constructive questions about its life**.3 For Lacan, there are of course no definitive answers to these questions. But this does not lessen the value of being able to ask them. The fact that there is no stable truth of being does not prevent the subject from actively and imaginatively participating in the production of meaning. Lacan implies that it is precisely **because the subject can never attain the truth of its being**—because it can never achieve a state of transparent wholeness—that it is driven to look for substitutes that might compensate for its sense of lack; it is motivated to invent figures of meaning that can, momentarily at least, ease and contain the discomfort of alienation. In this paradoxical sense, rather than robbing the subject of its inner richness, lack is the underpinning of everything that is potentially innovative about human life.4 Indeed, it is possible to envision the intricate productions and fabrications of the human psyche as vehicles through which the foundational lack of existence assumes a positive and tangible form. This in turn suggests that the subject’s ability to dwell within lack without seeking to close it is indispensable for its psychic vitality. As a matter of fact, such dwelling within lack could be argued to be **the greatest of human achievements**, for it transforms the terrors and midnights of the spirit into symbolic formations, imaginative undertakings, and sites of delicate beauty that make the world the absorbing and spellbinding place that it—in its most auspicious moments at least—can be. It is thus because the subject lacks that it is prompted to create, and it is through its creative activity that it manages, in an always necessarily precarious manner, to withstand its lack. In this context, it is important to specify that the translation of lack into creativity is not a matter of dialectical redemption in the sense of giving the subject the ability to turn negativity into a definitive form of positivity. The subject’s attempts to name its lack are transient at best, giving it access to no permanent meaning, no solid identity, no unitary narrative of subjective Mari Ruti 359 constitution. Any fleeting state of fullness or positivity that the subject may be able to attain must always in the end dissolve back into negativity; any endeavor to erase lack only gives rise to new instances of lack. This implies that the process of filling lack must by necessity **be continually renewed**. It cannot be brought to an end for the simple reason that the subject can never forge an object or a representation that would once and for all seal this lack. However, far from being a hindrance to existential vitality, this intrinsic impossibility—the fact that every attempt to redeem lack unavoidably falls short of its mark—is what allows us, over and again, to take up the endless process of signification. From this point of view, lack serves as a fertile kind of emptiness that keeps our subjectivities mobile. Lacan’s rendering of the subject’s relation to the signifier is therefore complex in the sense that although he consistently accentuates the subject’s relative helplessness vis-à-vis the larger systems of signification that envelop it, he at the same time suggests that it is only by virtue of its membership in the Symbolic order that the subject possesses the capacity to make meaning in the first place. **The Symbolic, in other words, is not merely (or even primarily) a hegemonic structure that coerces the subject into its law, but also—as I have endeavored to illustrate—the foundation of its creative potentialities. Lacan in fact insists that though the subject can never master the signifier—let alone the signified—it enjoys a certain degree of imaginative leeway with respect to the signifier.** He describes this imaginative leeway as the subject’s capacity to make use of the “poetic function” of language (1953, 264)—the fact that language by definition perpetuates the radical slipperiness, multiplicity, and polyvalence of meaning. In the same way that Heidegger (1971) connects creativity to the individual’s ability to dwell in the world in poetic rather than merely instrumental ways, Lacan envisions creativity in terms of the subject’s capacity to take a poetic approach to the world—an approach that is content to play with meaning without attempting to arrest it in unequivocal or transparent definitions. The fact that (the early) Lacan views the subject’s main existential task to be to come to terms with its lack explains in part why he tends to be so brutally dismissive of ego psychology. If Lacan criticizes the attempts of ego psychologists to 360 Living Creatively in a Postmodern World shore up the subject’s ego, it is because he believes that they have gotten things entirely backwards: instead of helping the subject accept lack as constitutive of subjectivity, they intensify its existential confusion by reinforcing its narcissistic fantasies. Lacan contends that such an approach is fundamentally flawed in the sense that it hastens to close prematurely the void within the subject’s being rather than to foster the psychic and creative possibilities that arise from its capacity to experience this void. It promises the end of alienation instead of teaching the subject to live resourcefully with this alienation. Such a promise, Lacan suggests, is always deceptive and hollow, in the final analysis leaving the subject worse off than before.

**2**

**Interpretation: The affirmative must not defend general principle.**

**Violation: They do – that was on the contention.**

**Standards:**

**1 – Topic Education – moots topic ed because it allows debaters to recycle generic arguments.**

**2 – Reciprocal burdens – proving a deductive argument is false only requires you win defense against one premise and proving an inductive argument is false is more difficult because of status quo bias. Our model solves because it eschews the idea that either side unilaterally carries the burden of proof, and requires both debaters to give an account of why their world is more desirable not principle.**

**3 – Ground: It gives them the ability to shift out of all CPs by saying they don’t disprove the general principle of the AFF which is bad – Good policymaking requires making comparisons between similar courses of action – saying that CPs are bad doesn’t answer this because we should have to opportunity to argue that in round. CPs teach us to find the best policy possible – debate should teach us to be better decisionmakers because it’s the only transferable skill to the rest of our lives, also controls the I/L to ground because they get infinite advocacies but I only get one.**

#### Fairness –

#### debate is a competitive activity that requires fairness for objective evaluation. Outweighs education on reversibility – we can learn in future rounds, but we need theory for a fair round now. Education is a voter – it's why schools fund debate.

#### Drop the debater –

#### A] deters future abuse

#### B] sets better norms for debate.

#### Competing interps

#### A] reasonability is arbitrary and encourages judge intervention since there's no clear norm

#### B] creates a race to the top where we create the best possible norms for debate.

#### No RVIs – a] illogical, you don't win for proving that you meet the burden of being fair, logic outweighs since it's a prerequisite for evaluating any other argument, b] RVIs incentivize baiting theory and prepping it out which leads to maximally abusive practices.

**3**

**Paradigm for 1AR shells and independent voters:**

**1 – Reasonability – 1AR theory is crazy aff-biased because the 2AR gets to line-by-line every 2NR standard with new answers that never get responded to– reasonability checks 2AR sandbagging by preventing crazy abusive 1NCs while still giving the 2N a chance.**

**2 – DTA – They can blow up a blippy 20 second shell to 3 min of the 2AR while I have to split my time and can’t preempt 2AR spin which necessitates judge intervention and means 1AR theory is irresolvable so you shouldn’t stake the round on it.**

**3 – No new 1AR theory paradigm issues – A] the 1NC has already occurred with current paradigm issues in mind so new 1ar paradigms moot any theoretical offense**

#### Paradigm for 1AR shells and independent voters:

#### 4 – No new 1AR theory paradigm issues – A] the 1NC has already occurred with current paradigm issues in mind so new 1ar paradigms moot any theoretical offense B] introducing them in the aff allows for them to be more rigorously tested which o/w’s on time frame since we can set higher quality norms.

**4**

**Interp: the aff must defend the plan in addition to a method to operationalize the plan in the 1AC in the real world that is tied to the body and voice of the speaker –the 1AC prove there’s no I-meet.**

**Instead, they’ve mirrored the political stasis that halts the notion of real change that makes debate practical.**

**Vote negative to promote knowledge production – their model of debate is a disembodied performance that detaches the self from the material – this proliferates the domination of hegemonic power structures. Knowledge production is a voting issue – it’s the only terminal impact to debating, since our performance can change the lives of those outside the community.**

**Campbell 97** – Fiona, members.tripod.com/FionaCampbell/speech\_acts\_on\_problematising\_empowerment.htm, 12-04-07

So who am I—to speak, to be listened to? And **why is it important to identify my** speaking **position**? **The ‘word’** in spoken or written form (sometimes referred to as discourse), **is the site that** both **power and knowledge meet**. Which is why **speech acts can be inherently dangerous**. Furthermore, **a person in a privileged** speaking **position**, such as myself, **has a political**/ethical **responsibility to interrogate [their] relationship to the subordinated** and disadvantaged people and declare their ‘interest.’ On this point, La Trobe University, Professor Margaret Thornton states “**assumed objectivity of knowledge** itself **camouflage not on**ly the fact **that it** always **has a standpoint, but that it** also **serves an ideological purpose**” **Refusing to declare one’s** speaking **position**, I argue constitutes not only a flagrant denial of the privileging effect of speech, but **must be considered** **as** an act of **complicity to systematically mislead**. I speak tonight from what I would term, a privileged speaking position. As someone who has been exposed to tertiary education, had an opportunity to read and reflect on many books and ideas, with a job and more particularly, as a teacher. Indeed, for some I act as a mentor—the one who ‘knows something about knowledge.’ On the other hand, I am deeply ambivalent about my ‘expertise’ to engage in the act of public speech talk. For am from the margins, the client, patient, the ‘riff raff’, flotsam and jetsam of society and might say—somewhat ‘deviant.’ It is important to come clean about my speaking position, my knowledge standpoint and declare my interests: I speak for myself as a woman who has experienced youth homelessness, childhood violence, and later ‘disability.’ **Before I speak I am required to** undertake a process of **self-examination, to scrutinize** my **representational politics, to immerse** myself **in a self-reflexive interrogation** and discern “what my representational politics authorizes and who it erases…” Do I speak for myself or others? Am I making gross generalizations about groups in the community? **Does my speech contain unacknowledged assumptions** and values? More specifically, within this process of reflection, **I am required to examine the context** and location from which I speak, in order to ascertain **whether it is “allied with structures of oppression or allied with resistance to oppression.”**

**Drop the debater – we indict their model of debate. Evaluate the T-shell through competing interpretations – you cannot be reasonably oppressive, and reasonability brightlines are arbitrary which requires judge intervention. No RVIs or impact turns – you should not win for proving you’re accessible, and their model deters debaters from indicting oppressive practices.**

**5**

#### Permissibility and Presumption negate:

#### 1 – "Ought" in the resolution mean that you need to prove an obligation to do the aff – permissibility means that AFF isn’t obligatory

#### 2 – Probability – There are infinite number of ways to prove a statement false and only one way to prove it true, so the resolution is more likely to be false.

uses the term ‘mass intellectuality’ to denote the formation of social subjectivity tied to the mass standardization of intellectual capacity in advanced industrial society.