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## NC

### Framework

#### Constitutivism must be the starting point for ethics—it is the only way for principles to be binding and all external standards collapse to constitutive ones.

Korsgaard 10 [(Christine, Philosophy Professor at Harvard) “The Normative Constitution of Agency,” keynote lecture for the Conference on Collective Intentionality VII: Perspectives on Social Ontology, August 2010, http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~korsgaar/CMK.NCA.pdf] TDI

* 1) constittivism is only way for principles to be binding

Constitutive standards are important, I claimed above, because they meet skeptical challenges with ease. But the importance of the idea is deeper than that, for I believe—and I know this is more controversial— that the only way to establish the authority of any purported normative principle is to establish that it is constitutive of something to which the person whom it governs is committed— something that she either is doing or has to do. And I think that Kant thought this too. The laws of logic govern our thoughts because if we don’t follow them we just aren’t thinking. Illogical thinking is not merely bad, it is defective, it is bad as thinking. The laws of the understanding govern our beliefs because if we don’t follow them, we just aren’t constructing a representation of an objective world (9.7.5). And as I will argue, the laws of practical reason govern our actions because if we don’t follow them we just aren’t acting, and acting is something that we must do. A constitutive principle for an inescapable activity is unconditionally binding. How could it be otherwise? Constitutive standards have unquestionable authority, while external standards give rise to further questions, and leave space for skeptical doubt. How then can we ever give authority to an external standard, except by tracing its authority back to a constitutive one? Consider again that house that blocks the neighbors’ view of the lake. Why shouldn’t the house-builder build it? For I’m supposing that we all do agree that really, after all, he shouldn’t do it, in spite of the fact that it wouldn’t therefore be a defective house. Well, perhaps he identifies himself as a good neighbor, a citizenly type, and doesn’t need to ask why he shouldn’t build a house that is a blight on the neighborhood. Or perhaps he loves his neighbors, and wouldn’t want to harm them. Or perhaps— to anticipate the success of the views we are working on here—it would be morally wrong to build a house that blocks the view of the neighbors, and so although it might be all very well as a bit of house-building, it would be defective as an action.

Prefer -

1. Is/ought gap – experience only tells us what is, not what ought to be, which raises the question why we ought to follow their framework

2. problem of relativism – inability to know each other’s experience makes it an unreliable basis for ethics. People could just say they don’t experience the same.

Moral law must be universal—our judgements can’t only apply to ourselves any more than 2+2=4 can be true only for me.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the categorical imperative

#### Prefer additionally:

#### Other frameworks collapse—all moral valuations presuppose the unconditional worth of humanity.

Korsgaard 83 [(Christine, Philosophy Professor at Harvard) “Two Distinctions in Goodness,” Duke University Press The Philosophical Review Vol. 92, No. 2, April 1983, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2184924>] TDI

The argument shows how Kant’s idea of justification works. It can be read as a kind of regress upon the conditions, starting from an important assumption. The assumption is that when a rational being makes a choice or undertakes an action, he or she supposes the object to be good, and its pursuit to be justified. At least, if there is a categorical imperative there must be objectively good ends, for then there are necessary actions and so necessary ends (G 45-46/427-28; Doctrine of Virtue 43- 44/384-85). In order for there to be any objectively good ends, however, there must be something that is unconditionally good and so can serve as a sufficient condition of their goodness. Kant considers what this might be: it cannot be an object of inclination, for those have only a conditional worth, “for if the inclinations and the needs founded on them did not exist, their object would be without worth” (G 46/428). It cannot be the inclinations themselves because a rational being would rather be free from them. Nor can it be external things, which serve only as means. So, Kant asserts, the unconditionally valuable thing must be “humanity” or “rational nature,” which he defines as the capacity to set an end (G 56/437; DV 51/392). Kant explains that regarding your existence as a rational being as an end in itself is a “subjective principle of human action.” By this I understand him to mean that we must regard ourselves as capable of conferring value upon the objects of our choice, the ends that we set, because we must regard our ends as good. But since “every other rational being thinks of his existence by the same rational ground which holds also for myself” (G 47/429), we must regard others as capable of conferring value by reason of their rational choices and so also as ends in themselves. Treating another as an end in itself thus involves making that person’s ends as far as possible your own (G 49/430). The ends that are chosen by any rational being, possessed of the humanity or rational nature that is fully realized in a good will, take on the status of objective goods. They are not intrinsically valuable, but they are objectively valuable in the sense that every rational being has a reason to promote or realize them. For this reason it is our duty to promote the happiness of others – the ends that they choose – and, in general, to make the highest good our end.

#### This requires that maxims be universal: to make an exception for yourself is to value your own humanity above the humanity of others and thus treat them as mere means.

## Offense

#### I contend that reducing IP protections for medicines impedes on manufacturers’ abilities to set and pursue ends –

#### 1] Patents protect private companies.

Na 19 [Blake Na, "Protecting Intellectual Property Rights in the Pharmaceutical Industry", Chicago-Kent | Journal of Intellectual Property, 4-19-2019, https://studentorgs.kentlaw.iit.edu/ckjip/protecting-intellectual-property-rights-in-the-pharmaceutical-industry/, accessed: 8-24-2021.] //Lex VM

Patent Rights A pharmaceutical company may apply for a patent from the PTO at any time in the development lifetime of a drug.[12] A drug is patentable if it is non-obvious, new, and useful.[13] The drug must be non-obvious when comparing the drug with another previously invented drug, i.e., it does not bring the same type of information as the other drugs. The drug must also not exist, and it must have a purpose. Intellectual property rights, especially patent rights, are the foundation of the pharmaceutical industry. The industry heavily depends on the future profits which innovation (and as a result, exclusivity) enable. Drug patents grant the originator company to market exclusivity for a fixed term of 20 years from the patent’s original filing date. By giving this 20-year patent term in which the government cannot regulate the price, market exclusivity allows pharmaceutical companies to have a monopoly over the market. To maximize their profit, pharmaceutical companies work on extending the exclusivity of a drug. For example, AbbVie extended the manufacturing exclusivity of Humira by delaying generic companies from manufacturing generic entrants until 2023. The market exclusivity can be lengthened anywhere between 180 days to 7 years. Thus, due to efforts to derive profits from patents, pharmaceutical companies’ patents contribute to roughly 70-80 percent of their overall revenues. Patents in the pharmaceutical industry are normally referred to as their product portfolio and are the most effective method for protecting innovation and creating significant returns on investments. Accordingly, as mentioned above, patents help in recouping costs related to research, development, and marketing of a drug. Patents not only help pharmaceutical companies recoup investments, they can also act as a shield against infringement claims. Strong patent protection can safeguard drugs from potential infringers. Without consent from the patentee, other competing companies cannot use, make, or distribute the invention. However, because a drug can be easily imitated by competitors, bringing an infringement suit can also protect a patentee’s rights. Recently, DUSA Pharmaceuticals, Inc.—an arm of the Indian pharmaceutical company Su Pharma and ranked among the top 50 global Pharma Companies—was recently granted injunctive relief from a U.S. court against Biofrontera Inc. in a patent infringement case[14]. The court’s order prohibited Biofrontera from making use of information, including sales data, marketing data, technical information, and unpublished clinical data, of DUSA Pharmaceuticals[15]. Although bringing an infringement suit is a valuable remedial measure for patentees, pharmaceutical companies often face difficulty with the high costs and uncertainty of litigation

#### That negates – A] Promise breaking – states promised legally binding IP protections to companies who might not have otherwise developed medicines – the aff is a unilateral violation of that contract. B] That’s a form of restricting the free economic choices of individuals.

#### 2] IP is a reflection of our will and a form of property.

Merges 11 [Merges, Robert P. "Will and Object in the World of IP." Justifying Intellectual Property, Cambridge, Harvard UP, 2011, pp. 76-78. ISBN: 0674049489,9780674049482. Found on Libgen.] //Lex VM

It is clear enough at this point that Kant thought reliable expectations about ongoing possession of objects enables something positive to take place. Stable possession permits the imprinting of some aspect of a person, what Kant called his will, onto objects so as to enable the person to more fully flourish. Though nuances abound, Kant’s basic idea regarding the will24 is simple enough: Will is that aspect of a person which decides to, and wants to, act on the world.25 It has three distinctive qualities: it is personal, autonomous, and active. It is highly individual, a function of each person’s preferences and desires; Lewis White Beck says that will is “bent upon the satisfaction of some arbitrary purpose.” It is this aspect or feature of ourselves that we imprint or stamp on the world through our choices and the resulting actions that carry out or manifest these choices. Right here, in this foundational element, we see a radically individualistic and autonomous view of humans. Although this is balanced by a universalizing, transpersonal sense of reason in other parts of his philosophy,26 a highly individual will is nonetheless central to Kant’s view of human thought and action, and thus an essential aspect of what he thought it means to be human.27 will and object in the world of ip. It is tempting to get caught up in the terminology and conceptual complexity of Kant’s ideas of persons, will, and objects. To prevent that happening, it seems wise at this point to talk about some specific examples. How exactly does Kantian autonomy work? What does it look like in the context of IP rights? After we have a better grasp of these ideas, and of how they relate to Kant’s rationale for property, we can turn to an equally important topic: the limits on individual autonomy that Kant built into his theory. Our earlier example of Michelangelo showed how stable possession is required for a creator to fully work his will on a found object— in that case, a block of marble. The same basic logic applies in all sorts of cases. Individual farmers and landowners generate and then bring to life a vision for the lands they work on;28 inventors transform off- the- shelf materials into prototypes, rough designs, and finished products; and artists work in media such as paint and canvas, paper and pen, textiles and wood, keyboard and iPad, and so on, to give life to a concept or mental image. Wherever personal skill and judgment are brought to bear on things that people inherit or find, we see evidence of the Kantian process of will imprinting itself on objects. It even happens when the objects at hand are themselves intangible. A composer working out a new instance of a traditional form— a fugue or symphony, blues song or tone poem— is working on found objects just as surely as the farmer or inventor. Even in our earlier example, some of the objects that Michelangelo works on in the course of carving his sculpture are intangible: received conventions about how to depict an emotion; traditional groupings of figures in a religious set piece, such as the Pieta; or accepted norms about how to depict athletic grace or youthful energy. He may take these pieces of the cultural tableau and refine them, or he may subtly resist or transform them. However he handles them, these conventions are just as much objects in his hands as the marble itself.29 As with found physical objects, extended possession of these objects- intransformation is required to fully apply the creator’s skill and judgment. And because of this, Kantian property rights come into play with intangible objects as well. Let me say a word about this complex, and perhaps controversial, possession of intangible objects. It has often been argued that this feature of IP, the control of copies of an intangible work, constitutes a form of “artificial scarcity,”30 that it runs counter to an ethically superior regime where information is shared freely— and is maybe even counter to the nature of information, which, some say, “wants to be free.”31 According to Kant, all property rights have this element of artifice, because they define a conceptual type of possession. Property is not just a matter of physical contact between person and object; it describes a relationship that is deeper and goes well beyond the basic acts of grasping and holding. I can hear one objection to this right away. Yes, Kant speaks of legal ownership as a special relation between a person and an object. But, the objection might run, in his writings he refers only to physical objects, for example, an apple (à la Locke). So maybe the ownership relation is limited to that sort of thing? No. I give no weight to the fact that Kant uses only examples of tangible, physical property in most of the sections of the Doctrine of Right (DOR).32 Kant describes an additional type of possession that makes it crystal clear that the idea is not in any way limited to physical things—the expectation of future performance under a contract. He posits that one could not properly be said to “possess” a right to performance under an executory contract (one that has been signed or agreed to, but not yet performed) unless “I can maintain that I would have possession . . . even if the time of the performance is yet to come.”33 With that legal relation established, however, “[t]he promise of the [promisor] accordingly belongs among my worldly goods . . . , and I can include it under what is mine.”34 The synonymous use of “possession,” “object,” “belonging,” and “mine” in the case of a tangible, physical thing such as an apple and an intangible thing such as a promise of future contractual performance is too clear to require much comment. “Object” is very abstract for Kant, and can of course therefore include IPRs.35

## 2

#### **U.S dominance over biotech now BUT Misguided policy cedes control to China.**

Gupta 6/11 [“As Washington Ties Pharma's Hands, China Is Leaping Ahead.”, Gaurav Gupta, *Opinion | America Risks Ceding Its Biotech Dominance to China | Barron's*, Barrons, 11 June 2021, www.barrons.com/articles/as-washington-ties-pharmas-hands-china-is-leaping-ahead-51623438808., *Gaurav Gupta, a physician, is the founder of the biotechnology investment firm Ascendant BioCapital.]//Lex AKu*

There should be no doubt that we are living at the dawn of a golden age of biomedical innovation. The American scientific engine that produced Covid-19 vaccines in record time was fueled by a convergence of advances in genomics, biomarkers, data science, and manufacturing years in the making. The first Food and Drug Administration approvals of a host of new product formats—oligonucleotide, bispecific, oncolytic virus, CAR-T, and lentivirus/AAV—all took place within the last decade. These represent an unprecedented expansion of the armamentarium that physicians have at their disposal to treat and cure disease. In the last few years, 47% of all new medicines were invented by U.S. biopharma companies, with homegrown startups driving the majority of innovation. The bulk of the remainder were developed by foreign companies specifically for the U.S. market.

An indirect benefit of these trends is that most novel therapeutics undergo clinical development and early commercial launch here in the U.S. The rest of the world understands that the American patient has earlier and broader access to groundbreaking therapies via these mechanisms. Indeed, the past decade is filled with examples of medical “firsts” for American patients: the first cure for Hepatitis C, the first gene therapy for blindness, the first immunotherapy for cancer. Future rewards will be greater still if we preserve our current system of incentivizing and protecting

The remarkable innovation capacity of our biopharmaceutical industry ought to be a source of national pride. Yet while “Made in America” is the global standard for medicines in development today, misguided policy risks ceding our scientific prowess to other countries in the future. This is particularly true in the case of China, where biotechnology has become a strategic pillar for the health of its people and economy. From 2016 to 2020, the market capitalization of all Chinese biopharma companies increased exponentially from $1 billion to over $200 billion. China saw over $28 billion invested in its life sciences sector in 2020, double the previous year’s amount. Returns on China’s investment are already arriving. The FDA approved a drug developed in China for the first time ever in 2019. While China’s innovation capacity currently remains behind America’s, my experiences as a biopharma professional make it clear they are doing everything they can to catch up and catch up fast. In fact, when I speak to Chinese biotechnology executives, they boast that they can run clinical trials faster than their U.S. counterparts. The danger of misguided policies that disincentivize pharmaceutical innovation in the U.S. is effectively driving that same innovation to China. If we close off the market in the U.S. at the same time that China is opening its market to innovative new products, then we will see companies choose to first launch impactful novel medicines in China, based on clinical trials conducted in China. Because the FDA rarely accepts data generated entirely outside the U.S., this relocation of research capacity will negatively affect Americans’ access to cutting-edge therapies. The biotechnology field is advancing rapidly. Promising technologies such as targeted protein degradation and gene editing are perhaps not far from being developed into impactful medicines, and the U.S. risks these technologies being mastered by Chinese companies.

#### The plan chills American biomed innovation and cedes control to China.

Paulsen 7/9 [ERIK PAULSEN: We can save the world with our vaccines — without surrendering our IP to China," Bakersfield Californian, https://www.bakersfield.com/opinion/erik-paulsen-we-can-save-the-world-with-our-vaccines-without-surrendering-our-ip-to/article\_b0b87692-df61-11eb-9a13-d7fa02eefaee.html]//Lex AKu

The Biden administration gave Beijing a gift when it endorsed a petition before the World Trade Organization to force the American developers of Covid-19 vaccines and therapeutics to relinquish their intellectual property rights to these medicines. The Chinese government seeks to take over in biotech, a sector where U.S. innovators lead. Biotech is included in its “Made in China 2025” plan, which lists 10 sectors that China aims to dominate. The government intends to force anyone doing business in China in those spheres to hand over know-how. Surrendering IP protections on biomedical technology has dire consequences. Foremost, it guts the foundation of biomedical innovation, which takes huge investments spanning many years to bear fruit. IP protections assure innovators that they can recover those investments and make a profit. Losing IP protection would have a chilling effect on investments in the sector. Equally injurious to America, the IP waiver would allow China to become a biotech powerhouse by piggybacking on American innovation. A waiver on IP for Covid-19 vaccines would accelerate the timeline for “Made in China 2025.” The mRNA technology, which undergirds the Pfizer-BioNTech and Moderna vaccines has uses beyond this pandemic. It has the potential to take on cancers and other diseases. With the waiver, China and others will be emboldened to use the once-proprietary mRNA know-how for broader research and applications. Is this in America’s interest? Mark Cohen, an expert on Chinese IP theft, recently told the Washington Post that the waiver would deliver “a competitive advantage to countries that are increasingly viewed as our adversaries, at taxpayer expense.” Beyond the damage that an mRNA giveaway will inflict on US R&D investments, the waiver sends a signal that America could agree to force American innovators to part with trade secrets every time there’s a global crisis. That attitude will arrest biopharmaceutical innovation. Small biotech firms spearhead 70 percent of the R&D pipeline, relying heavily on private investors to fund that work. If investors know that innovators may have to give away their discoveries in a global crisis, they’ll deploy their money elsewhere. That’ll make it even harder to draw the R&D investments needed to address infectious diseases, including drug-resistant infections and viruses. America is benefitting greatly from the early access to COVID-19 treatments and vaccines, saving lives and speeding economic recovery. Preserving U.S. leadership in biomedical innovation includes preserving the incentives that helped make it the world’s leader. A final downside of the waiver is the ability for American firms to find a cure for the next pandemic. Among the greatest threats is bacteria resistant to our current arsenal of antibiotics that becomes a pandemic-inducing superbug. Already, the market for new antimicrobials is broken. Only a handful of biotechs have them in development, and many have gone bankrupt trying to commercialize one. “A lot of people have rightly said we need to start thinking about preparing for the next pandemic now,” noted Craig Garthwaite, a healthcare-business professor at Northwestern University. “Suspending IP for vaccine manufacturers would send exactly the wrong signal for the future.” For the sake of patients everywhere, American IP rights must stay protected. It’s the only way to keep China at bay and American innovators at work.

#### Biotech leadership key to future military primacy.

Moore 21 [(Scott Moore is a political scientist and administrator at the University of Pennsylvania and the author of a forthcoming book, “How China Shapes the Future,” on China’s role in public goods and emerging technologies.) 8-8-2021, "In Biotech, the Industry of the Future, the U.S. Is Way Ahead of China," Lawfare, https://www.lawfareblog.com/biotech-industry-future-us-way-ahead-china]//Lex AKu

A continuing refrain from Washington in recent years has been that the United States is falling behind China in the development of critical emerging technologies. In some fields, this may be true. But not in biotechnology. To be sure, China’s biotech sector is growing at a torrid pace, and some of its firms are becoming leaders in certain areas, such as cancer treatment. Yet the U.S. retains a dominant position in research, development and commercialization, accounting for almost half of all biotech patents filed from 1999 to 2013. The triumph of its biotechnology industry during the coronavirus pandemic, producing two highly effective vaccines using an entirely new approach based on messenger RNA, and in record time, shows that the U.S.’s competitive edge in biotechnology remains largely intact. And that has important implications as Washington gears up for a sustained period of geopolitical competition with Beijing. Biotech is such a critical area for technological competition between the U.S. and China because it is transforming fields from medicine to military power. The great advances of the 19th century, like chemical fertilizers, resulted from mastering chemistry. In the 20th century, mastery of physics led to nuclear energy—and, more ominously, nuclear weapons. In the 21st century, biology offers a similar mix of peril and promise. This was illustrated dramatically by the award of the 2020 Nobel Prize for the discovery of an enzyme system known as CRISPR-Cas9, which allows an organism’s genomes to be edited with high precision. It is a transformational breakthrough. But while CRISPR shows great promise in the development of new cures for long-untreatable diseases, it could also lead to a whole new generation of deadly bioweapons. That’s a prospect that increasingly alarms U.S. intelligence officials. In 2016, then-Director of National Intelligence James Clapper warned Congress that “[r]esearch in genome editing conducted by countries with different regulatory or ethical standards than those of western countries probably increases the risk of the creation of potentially harmful biological agents or products.” Although Clapper didn’t name specific countries, it soon became clear that he was referring mainly to China. Four years later, his successor, John Ratcliffe, issued a far more pointed warning that “China has even conducted human testing on members of the People’s Liberation Army in hope of developing soldiers with biologically enhanced capabilities. There are no ethical boundaries to Beijing’s pursuit of power.” Such capabilities are almost certainly only speculative—but they underscore why biotech leadership is so important for national security as well as economic competitiveness. Beijing has long envied the United States’s dominant position in biotechnology and spent heavily to overtake it. Biotech has been a priority sector for state investment since the 1980s, and by one estimate Beijing had poured some $100 billion into the sector by 2018. Nowhere did it lavish more attention or invest more of its propaganda power than in developing a coronavirus vaccine. State media have spent months crowing that “China is working around the clock for breakthroughs in COVID-19 vaccines.” Yet despite this push, China’s vaccine program quickly took on a Potemkin air. In February 2020, barely two months after the onset of the pandemic and after a supposedly crash vaccine effort, a military doctor stood in front of a Chinese flag to receive what was billed as an experimental vaccine dose but was widely suspected to be a staged photo op. Now, having spent months talking up its two primary vaccine candidates to developing countries like Brazil and Indonesia, both of which have entered into purchase agreements with Chinese biotech firms, Chinese officials face severe mistrust among their nation’s overseas partners. For China’s leaders, the disappointing returns on their big bet on biotechnology look likely to cause them more headaches at home as well as abroad—there are already signs that affluent Chinese place more trust in foreign-developed coronavirus vaccines than the homegrown ones produced at such great expense. For U.S. officials, though, China’s relative underperformance in vaccine development presents an opportunity to reassert the United States’s leadership in biotechnology and public health and bolster the nation’s depleted soft power in the process. The Biden administration has already signaled it will reengage in multilateral bodies such as the World Health Organization. Yet the U.S. shouldn’t stop there. Washington should begin thinking now about how to emulate the success of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)—which, though imperfect, is widely regarded as one of the most successful single public health interventions in history—to address growing disparities in access to coronavirus vaccines between countries. At the moment, vaccine supplies are controlled largely by rich countries, creating the risk of moral and public health failure if the gap persists. While COVID-19, the respiratory disease caused by the novel coronavirus, differs in many respects from AIDS, PEPFAR combined research, prevention, and access to therapeutics. Developing a comparable institutional structure to close the coronavirus vaccine access gap is the right thing to do—but it would also go a long way to restoring America’s battered global reputation. At the same time, the United States can’t afford to rest on its laurels in biotechnology, or any other field. Aside from China, other nations like Singapore and Israel have also invested heavily to develop their biotechnology sectors, with Israel in particular giving rise to a thriving biotech industry. U.S. public investment in basic scientific research and development has meanwhile been on the decline for decades, and there are worrying signs that America’s once world-beating innovation ecosystem is less productive, and less entrepreneurial, than it once was. Despite strengths in translational research, moreover, the frontiers of biology increasingly sit at the intersection with other disciplines like computer science, meaning that funding agencies, universities and other organizations need to break down disciplinary silos. Boosting support for biotechnology research, while reforming how that money is used, will go a long way toward shoring up the United States’s leading position in the global biotech sector. The U.S. biotechnology sector also faces other threats, not least growing espionage and intellectual property theft by foreign actors, especially those linked to China. Several high-profile cases brought by the U.S. Department of Justice’s China Initiative have involved biotechnology researchers, and American biotech firms have been top targets for cyber theft and intrusion. Sustained outreach to researchers and research institutions is critical to preventing such theft. But efforts to clamp down on the threats posed by espionage and intellectual property theft can easily go too far and must preserve the researcher mobility and data-sharing that is essential to doing cutting-edge science. Beyond its shores, the United States should work with its partners and allies to enhance export controls on dual-use biotechnology—used for both peaceful and military gain—especially DNA templates. Many forms of genetic material and synthetic biology products are already subject to U.S. export controls, but gaps remain, and screening for genetic sequence orders relies primarily on voluntary regulation by biotech firms. Better coordinating export controls among major economies and U.S. allies can dramatically reduce the risk of sophisticated bioweapons development in the decades to come.

#### Heg solves arms races, land grabs, rogue states, and great power war.

Brands 18 [Hal, Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments." American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump." Page 129-133]

Since World War II, the United States has had a military second to none. Since the Cold War, America has committed to having overwhelming military primacy. The idea, as George W. Bush declared in 2002, that America must possess “strengths beyond challenge” has featured in every major U.S. strategy document for a quarter century; it has also been reflected in concrete terms.6

From the early 1990s, for example, the United States consistently accounted for around 35 to 45 percent of world defense spending and maintained peerless global power-projection capabilities.7 Perhaps more important, U.S. primacy was also unrivaled in key overseas strategic regions—Europe, East Asia, the Middle East. From thrashing Saddam Hussein’s million-man Iraqi military during Operation Desert Storm, to deploying—with impunity—two carrier strike groups off Taiwan during the China-Taiwan crisis of 1995– 96, Washington has been able to project military power superior to anything a regional rival could employ even on its own geopolitical doorstep.

This military dominance has constituted the hard-power backbone of an ambitious global strategy. After the Cold War, U.S. policymakers committed to averting a return to the unstable multipolarity of earlier eras, and to perpetuating the more favorable unipolar order. They committed to building on the successes of the postwar era by further advancing liberal political values and an open international economy, and to suppressing international scourges such as rogue states, nuclear proliferation, and catastrophic terrorism. And because they recognized that military force remained the ultima ratio regum, they understood the centrality of military preponderance.

Washington would need the military power necessary to underwrite worldwide alliance commitments. It would have to preserve substantial overmatch versus any potential great-power rival. It must be able to answer the sharpest challenges to the international system, such as Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 or jihadist extremism after 9/11. Finally, because prevailing global norms generally reflect hard-power realities, America would need the superiority to assure that its own values remained ascendant. It was impolitic to say that U.S. strategy and the international order required “strengths beyond challenge,” but it was not at all inaccurate.

American primacy, moreover, was eminently affordable. At the height of the Cold War, the United States spent over 12 percent of GDP on defense. Since the mid-1990s, the number has usually been between 3 and 4 percent.8 In a historically favorable international environment, Washington could enjoy primacy—and its geopolitical fruits—on the cheap.

Yet U.S. strategy also heeded, at least until recently, the fact that there was a limit to how cheaply that primacy could be had. The American military did shrink significantly during the 1990s, but U.S. officials understood that if Washington cut back too far, its primacy would erode to a point where it ceased to deliver its geopolitical benefits. Alliances would lose credibility; the stability of key regions would be eroded; rivals would be emboldened; international crises would go unaddressed. American primacy was thus like a reasonably priced insurance policy. It required nontrivial expenditures, but protected against far costlier outcomes.9 Washington paid its insurance premiums for two decades after the Cold War. But more recently American primacy and strategic solvency have been imperiled.

THE DARKENING HORIZON For most of the post–Cold War era, the international system was— by historical standards—remarkably benign. Dangers existed, and as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated, they could manifest with horrific effect. But for two decades after the Soviet collapse, the world was characterized by remarkably low levels of great-power competition, high levels of security in key theaters such as Europe and East Asia, and the comparative weakness of those “rogue” actors—Iran, Iraq, North Korea, al-Qaeda—who most aggressively challenged American power. During the 1990s, some observers even spoke of a “strategic pause,” the idea being that the end of the Cold War had afforded the United States a respite from normal levels of geopolitical danger and competition. Now, however, the strategic horizon is darkening, due to four factors.

First, great-power military competition is back. The world’s two leading authoritarian powers—China and Russia—are seeking regional hegemony, contesting global norms such as nonaggression and freedom of navigation, and developing the military punch to underwrite these ambitions. Notwithstanding severe economic and demographic problems, Russia has conducted a major military modernization emphasizing nuclear weapons, high-end conventional capabilities, and rapid-deployment and special operations forces— and utilized many of these capabilities in conflicts in Ukraine and Syria.10 China, meanwhile, has carried out a buildup of historic proportions, with constant-dollar defense outlays rising from US$26 billion in 1995 to US$226 billion in 2016.11 Ominously, these expenditures have funded development of power-projection and antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) tools necessary to threaten China’s neighbors and complicate U.S. intervention on their behalf. Washington has grown accustomed to having a generational military lead; Russian and Chinese modernization efforts are now creating a far more competitive environment.

Second, the international outlaws are no longer so weak. North Korea’s conventional forces have atrophied, but it has amassed a growing nuclear arsenal and is developing an intercontinental delivery capability that will soon allow it to threaten not just America’s regional allies but also the continental United States.12 Iran remains a nuclear threshold state, one that continues to develop ballistic missiles and A2/AD capabilities while employing sectarian and proxy forces across the Middle East. The Islamic State, for its part, is headed for defeat, but has displayed military capabilities unprecedented for any terrorist group, and shown that counterterrorism will continue to place significant operational demands on U.S. forces whether in this context or in others. Rogue actors have long preoccupied American planners, but the rogues are now more capable than at any time in decades.

Third, the democratization of technology has allowed more actors to contest American superiority in dangerous ways. The spread of antisatellite and cyberwarfare capabilities; the proliferation of man-portable air defense systems and ballistic missiles; the increasing availability of key elements of the precision-strike complex— these phenomena have had a military leveling effect by giving weaker actors capabilities which were formerly unique to technologically advanced states. As such technologies “proliferate worldwide,” Air Force Chief of Staff General David Goldfein commented in 2016, “the technology and capability gaps between America and our adversaries are closing dangerously fast.”13 Indeed, as these capabilities spread, fourth-generation systems (such as F-15s and F-16s) may provide decreasing utility against even non-great-power competitors, and far more fifth-generation capabilities may be needed to perpetuate American overmatch.

Finally, the number of challenges has multiplied. During the 1990s and early 2000s, Washington faced rogue states and jihadist extremism—but not intense great-power rivalry. America faced conflicts in the Middle East—but East Asia and Europe were comparatively secure. Now, the old threats still exist—but the more permissive conditions have vanished. The United States confronts rogue states, lethal jihadist organizations, and great-power competition; there are severe challenges in all three Eurasian theaters. “I don’t recall a time when we have been confronted with a more diverse array of threats, whether it’s the nation state threats posed by Russia and China and particularly their substantial nuclear capabilities, or non-nation states of the likes of ISIL, Al Qaida, etc.,” Director of National Intelligence James Clapper commented in 2016. Trends in the strategic landscape constituted a veritable “litany of doom.”14 The United States thus faces not just more significant, but also more numerous, challenges to its military dominance than it has for at least a quarter century.

## 3

#### Counterplan text: States ought to eliminate their nuclear arsenals

## 4

#### Counterplan text: Member nations of the WTO ought to join a Covid-19 Vaccine Investment and Trade Agreement as outlined in 5 steps below. Solves the aff better.

Brown 3/18 [Brown, Chad P. “Here's How to Get Billions of COVID-19 Vaccine Doses to the World.” *PIIE*, 26 Mar. 2021, www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/heres-how-get-billions-covid-19-vaccine-doses-world.]//Lex AKu

A COVID-19 Vaccine Investment and Trade Agreement (CVITA) is needed to create the incentives to ensure the timely and sizable scaling up of output and input investments to respond to this pandemic and future pandemic threats. Baby steps toward such an agreement are found in the Trade and Health Initiative that a small, but influential, group of World Trade Organization (WTO) members proposed in late 2020. But much more is required. First, CVITA should be aligned to leverage COVAX, the umbrella for the public and private international organizations that already have joined together for the purchase and distribution of vaccines. Linking the agreement to existing networks of regulators, such as the International Coalition of Medicines Regulatory Authorities, would also help ease concerns and create a more transparent pathway to the licensing of vaccines, instilling global confidence, reducing development costs, and expediting access in poorer markets. Second, the investment component of the agreement must create a framework to subsidize the full vaccine manufacturing supply chain and especially coordinate expansion of input production capacity, including for bioreactors, bags, cellular materials, vials, stoppers, syringes, and other ancillary supplies. Governments would pay into the investment fund on a subscription basis. Participation of the poorest countries should be heavily subsidized or free. Third, the agreement should include an enforceable commitment on the part of participating countries to not place export restrictions on supplies of vaccines and related materials destined for other countries participating in the agreement.[12] In effect, subsidized imported inputs would be exchanged for future doses of an exported vaccine. Countries should agree that imposing export restrictions on vaccine output will be swiftly met with trading partners jointly restricting their supply of inputs to the export-restricting country.[13] This potential mechanism for reciprocity, if made explicit, can be used to convince skeptical domestic audiences that hoarding—while politically tempting—will not work, because everyone will lose. Protections against export restrictions would also provide an incentive for nations to join the CVITA. Fourth, this type of international policy cooperation demands unprecedented levels of transparency. Trust can only be maintained—decreasing the likelihood of hoarding—if access to information on COVID-19 vaccines and inputs reduces uncertainty. In response to dozens of countries imposing export restrictions on staples during a perceived food crisis in 2008-2011, the G20 created the Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS) to improve transparency and coordinate policy in the event of sudden scarcity. That system generated information and trust that arguably reduced the use and duration of agricultural export bans in the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic. A similar informative monitoring system for vaccines and inputs is needed under CVITA. Fifth, CVITA needs an effective and transparent administrator who is one part general contractor and one part ombudsperson. When building a house, the general contractor is there to ensure the right inputs are available in enough supply at the right time. The electrician cannot install the wiring before the floors, beams, and rough construction are in place. On the other hand, if the sheet rock has already gone up, the plumber cannot install the pipes. Sometimes, the general contractor will move an extra plumber or electrician off one job so that a different job does not fall behind. At its best, Operation Warp Speed and the DPA were the general contractor the Americans used to help scale up investments in its entire domestic vaccine manufacturing supply chain. CVITA needs some of that facilitation at the global level. With access to information, it can help coordinate capacity investment subsidies. It can also help address the reallocation of scarce inputs when inevitable bottlenecks materialize, potentially by creating secondary markets. This is critical to ensuring the production process stays on track.[14] This facilitation mechanism can also recognize and prepare for inevitable frictions in scaling out global manufacturing. Shortages will occur. Tensions will rise. Because of scarcity problems, difficult choices will need to be made, and some may be asked to wait. Those challenges have to be resolved quickly, fairly, and transparently.

## Case

### Util

### On util

#### 1] the ac is the only way to prevent us from being egoist and just acting of our own self pleasure. A] AC devolves to the state of nature where agents aren’t afraid to violate other’s ends for their own pleasure which causes infinite violence. B] time constraints means you can’t utilize util calc in every situation and justifies the universalizability hijacks

#### 2] group their pleasure goodness args – can’t be the basis for ethics since it’s just a biological process that’s no different from our hair growing. Only reasoning allows us to confer value and purpose onto our pleasure in setting a course for action, so the aff is a prior question

### A2 Pleasure and pain

Not intrinsic pleasure

1] not an unconditional good, but rather contingent – 2 internal links A. Masochists and people in comas proves that people can opt out of pleasure as goodness. B. humans are what place value onto pain and pleasure, which prove the korsgaard 83 card

2] fallacy of origin – just because pain and pleasure are valuable doesn’t mean it’s the beginning of ethical theorizing

3] [PERMISS ]No way to aggregate pain or pleasure, we can’t weigh 5 migranes versus a punch. Person A may feel a different amount of happiness then person B when getting an iphone, so we can’t ever ascribe moral worth to any action under util.

#### A2 Extinction

#### 1] If we win our framework than we can be morally certain what constitutes right and wrong action – they must win uncertainty exists ABSENT of using Bostrom by itself but some other indict – means you should just evaluate the framework debate as normal

#### 2] Counterplan Text: states ought to ban nuclear weapons

#### 3] Consequentialist – presupposes we theorize a better conclusion in the future which is based on consequences

#### 4] Not saying extinction is irrelevant – there are other means of solving extinction that we agree with, but we disagree with this one policy action – make it an exception

5] Turn – point of ethical theories is to chose between 2 actions, but now the only action we care about is avoiding extinction

### A2 Act omission

#### Yes A/O – anything else causes infinite obligations

### a2 kan’t can’t resolve value conflicts

#### katn sovles value conflicts –

#### a] determine actions that are unconditionally bad is sufficient and imperfect duties of being benelovent would help us choose between these

#### b] they don’t identify which value conflicts arise

**A2 intent foresight**

#### 1] There is an intent foresight distinction – you can’t foresee every consequence no one could have predicted global warming would have been a consequence of the industrial revolution.

2**] Empirically denied: Multiple people can intend the same action looking for different consequences IE going home to see family vs to avoid work.**

### A2 Actor specificity–

is ought fallacy – just because governments use util doesn’t mean they ought to 2)Empirically denied: a) Governments have side constraints like the constitution b) they’d be sending 90% of our GDP to countries in Africa but they don’t

A2: Gov must aggregate

1] Just cuz every policy has benefits and harms, doesn’t mean that we care about those benefits and harms or that they are morally relevant – this assumes consequentialism

A2: No unified intention

1] no link – institutions can have intention, for example the purpose of the school is to teach, just like the purpose of the government is to distribute rights.

2] its not about intentioned of people, but rather the structure of the law that the aff defends.

### COVID inequality

#### 1-Reductions in protections kill medical innovation, economic growth, and knowledge building for the future

McDole and Ezell 04/29 – Jaci McDole is a senior policy analyst covering intellectual property (IP) and innovation policy at ITIF. She focuses on IP and its correlations to global innovation and trade. Her work includes ITIF’s Innovate4Health Initiatives (2017–2019) and A Covid-19 TRIPS Waiver Makes No More Sense for Copyrights Than It Does for Patents (2021). McDole comes to ITIF from the Institute for Intellectual Property Research, an organization she cofounded to study and further robust global IP policies. Stephen J. Ezell is ITIF vice president for Global Innovation Policy. He focuses on science, technology, and innovation policy as well as international competitiveness and trade policy issues. He is the coauthor of Innovating in a Service Driven Economy: Insights Application, and Practice (Palgrave McMillan, 2015) and Innovation Economics: The Race for Global Advantage (Yale 2012). The Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) is an independent, nonprofit, nonpartisan research and educational institute focusing on the intersection of technological innovation and public policy. Recognized by its peers in the think tank community as the global center of excellence for science and technology policy, ITIF’s mission is to formulate and promote policy solutions that accelerate innovation and boost productivity to spur growth, opportunity, and progress; April 29, 2021; “Ten Ways IP Has Enabled Innovations That Have Helped Sustain the World Through the Pandemic”; <https://itif.org/publications/2021/04/29/ten-ways-ip-has-enabled-innovations-have-helped-sustain-world-through> //advay

Innovation can—and does—happen anywhere and at any time. As society ground to a halt in 2020, innovators around the world worked tirelessly to develop treatments, vaccines, and solutions to COVID-19 pandemic-related challenges. From personal protective equipment (PPE) to treatments and vaccines to autonomous delivery robots to remote and social distancing solutions for the workplace, intellectual property (IP) played an indispensable role in enabling research, development, and commercialization of many of the innovations meeting the challenges of the pandemic. IP enables start-ups to gain access to much-needed capital. IP gives innovators the confidence to invest in research and development (R&D) and provides incentives for commercialization. Indeed, it is difficult to innovate without the protection of ideas.

Despite this, some—particularly anti-business IP opponents—have blamed IP rights for a host of problems, including limited access to therapeutics, vaccines, and biotechnology. They offer seemingly simple solutions—weaken or eliminate IP rights—and innovation will flow like manna from heaven. Eliminating IP rights might accelerate the diffusion of some pre-existing innovations, but it would absolutely limit future innovations. Innovators, a bit like Charlie Brown kicking the football held by Lucy, would be wary of trusting governments who might say, “Well, this time we won’t take away your IP rights, so go ahead and invest large amounts of time and money.” Given the nature of COVID-19, nations around the world cannot afford to take this risk. Future pandemics and other challenges for which we will need to rely on IP-protected innovations to overcome are near certain to arise.

Moreover, the blame game usually ignores the real, underlying problems. For access to innovations to fight COVID-19, especially biotechnology, vaccines, and therapeutics, the underlying problems are regulatory delays and a lack of adequate and appropriate manufacturing infrastructure.1 The lack of infrastructure has resulted in supply chain bottlenecks in places where few are currently equipped to handle the manufacturing requirements.2 Meanwhile, regulatory delays have prevented vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics from entering certain markets.3

To better understand the role of IP in enabling solutions related to COVID-19 challenges, this report relies on 10 case studies drawn from a variety of nations, technical fields, and firm sizes. This is but a handful of the thousands of IP-enabled innovations that have sprung forth over the past year in an effort to meet the tremendous challenges brought on by COVID-19 globally. From a paramedic in Mexico to a veteran vaccine manufacturing company in India and a tech start-up in Estonia to a U.S.-based company offering workplace Internet of Things (IoT) services, small and large organizations alike are working to combat the pandemic. Some have adapted existing innovations, while others have developed novel solutions. All are working to take the world out of the pandemic and into the future.

The case studies are:

Bharat Biotech: Covaxin

Gilead: Remdesivir

LumiraDX: SARS-COV-2 Antigen POC Test

Teal Bio: Teal Bio Respirator

XE Ingeniería Médica: CápsulaXE

Surgical Theater: Precision VR

Tombot: Jennie

Starship Technologies: Autonomous Delivery Robots

Triax Technologies: Proximity Trace

Zoom: Video Conferencing

As the case studies show, IP is critical to enabling innovation. Policymakers around the world need to ensure robust IP protections are—and remain—in place

#### 2 - Waivers don’t improve vaccine supply or distribution, but do allow for poorly made vaccines that undermine vaccine confidence.

Delgado 21 [(Carla, health & culture journalist who’s written for Insider, Architectural Digest, Elemental, Observer, and Mental Floss) “Experts Say Patent Waivers Aren't Enough To Increase Global Vaccination,” Verywell Health, 5/25/2021] JL

“Waiving intellectual property rights for COVID-19 vaccines is likely to only have a modest impact on global vaccine supply,” William Moss, MD, executive director of the International Vaccine Access Center at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, tells Verywell. “A vaccine IP waiver is not in itself likely to lead to increased vaccine production in less developed countries because much more needs to be in place to increase the global vaccine supply.” For several countries outside of the U.S. that have the necessary equipment to produce mRNA vaccines effectively and safely, the IP waiver can be of great help. However, many more countries lack this capacity, and this move still leaves them behind. “The majority of the world’s countries lack the capacity to produce and distribute COVID-19 vaccines, and especially at the scale required to get this pandemic under control,” Richard Marlink, MD, director of the Rutgers Global Health Institute, tells Verywell. “They need funding, manufacturing facilities, raw materials, and laboratory staff with the technological expertise required.” We've already seen what can go wrong with substandard vaccine manufacturing. In April, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) inspected the Emergent BioSolutions factory in Baltimore and consequently shut down their production after concerning observations, which include:3 The factory was not maintained in a clean and sanitary condition. Waste handling was found to be inadequate because generated waste was transported through the warehouse before disposal, which can potentially contaminate other areas.  Employees were seen dragging unsealed bags of medical waste from the manufacturing area across the warehouse. Peeling paint, paint flecks, loose particles/debris were observed. There were also damaged floors and rough surfaces that cannot be properly cleaned and sanitized.  Employees were seen removing their protective garments where raw materials were staged for manufacturing. They reportedly spoiled about 15 million doses of the Johnson and Johnson COVID-19 vaccine, and more than 100 million doses are on hold as regulators inspect them for possible contamination.4 “Vaccines are complex biological products, much more complex than drugs, and need to be produced by manufacturers and in facilities with the highest quality control standards,” Moss says. “Adverse events associated with a poorly made or contaminated batch of vaccines would have a devastating impact on vaccine confidence.” In a statement last October, Moderna announced that they will not enforce their COVID-19-related patents against those who will make vaccines during this pandemic.5 While waiving some vaccine patents may allow third-party manufacturers to make and sell COVID-19 vaccines, the transfer of skills and technology that will allow them to manage production isn't very simple.  For instance, a spokesperson for Pfizer said that the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine required 280 different components sourced from 86 suppliers across various countries. Manufacturing the vaccine would require highly specialized equipment and complex technology transfers.6 “Technology transfer also would need to be a critical component to expand vaccine manufacturing by other companies as an IP waiver is insufficient to provide the ‘know how’ needed to manufacture mRNA or adenovirus-vectored COVID-19 vaccines,” Moss says. “And supply chains for the reagents, supplies, and equipment would be needed.” Interested manufacturers would need to have the proper equipment to test the quality and consistency of their manufacturing. At present, the World Health Organization (WHO) has plans to facilitate the establishment of technology hubs to transfer "a comprehensive technology package and provide appropriate training" to manufacturers from lower- and middle-income countries.7 While waiving vaccine patents is necessary, it's likely not enough. Additionally, negotiations about it are still ongoing. Even though the U.S. supports the waiver of COVID-19 vaccine patents, other countries like the United Kingdom, Japan, and Germany oppose it.8 It's also important to remember that manufacturing vaccines is only one step of the process of vaccinating the global population—distributing it is yet another hurdle. “Many countries are counting on COVAX, a global collaboration to distribute COVID-19 vaccines more equitably around the world,” Marlink says. “The single largest supplier to COVAX is in India, where exports have been suspended since March due to the country’s COVID-19 crisis.”

### WTO credibility

#### 1 - A reduction in IP protections unnecessarily slows down the WTO—only a balance solves. Bacchus 20

James Bacchus; James Bacchus is a member of the Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies, the Distinguished University Professor of Global Affairs and director of the Center for Global Economic and Environmental Opportunity at the University of Central Florida. He was a founding judge and was twice the chairman—the chief judge—of the highest court of world trade, the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization in Geneva, Switzerland.; 12‑16‑2020; ”An Un‑ necessary Proposal: A WTO Waiver of Intellectual Property Rights for COVID‑19 Vaccines”; https://www.cato.org/free‑trade‑bulletin/unnecessary‑proposal‑wto‑waiver‑ intellectual‑property‑rights‑covid‑19‑vaccines#, Cato Institute, accessed 7‑21‑2021; JPark

The solution is not another impassioned and prolonged multilateral impasse inside the WTO. The solution is multilateral action in international institutions and international endeavors outside the WTO. It is the slow pace and the uncertain success in those other global arenas that have led developing countries to seek a waiver from the WTO. Rather than continuing to press for an unnecessary WTO waiver, they should redouble their combined efforts to reach solutions in those other arenas. And the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and other developed countries should do more to work with them toward that end. In no event should IP rights become legal obsta‑ cles to ensuring early access to affordable medicines for everyone in the world during a pandemic that has already killed more than a million people worldwide and threat‑ ens to kill millions more. But also, in no event should WTO members act in ways that would eliminate the incentives that are essential to inspire the innovations that make new medicines possible. The right balance in the WTO trade rules on IP is a balance that provides all countries with sufficient flexibility to protect IP rights while also pro‑ moting access to life‑saving medicines.22 For COVID‑19 medicines, there is no proof at this time that this balance does not exist. Maintaining this balance must remain the aim of the WTO, and it must be the aim of every endeavor of multilateral cooperation in the fight to end this pandemic.

#### Trade is irrelevant for war

Katherine Barbieri 13, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of South Carolina, Ph.D. in Political Science from Binghamton University, “Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or Source of Interstate Conflict?” Chapter 10 in Conflict, War, and Peace: An Introduction to Scientific Research, google books

How does interdependence affect war, the most intense form of conflict? Table 2 gives the empirical results. The rarity of wars makes any analysis of their causes quite difficult, for variations in interdependence will seldom result in the occurrence of war. As in the case of MIDs, the log-likelihood ratio tests for each model suggest that the inclusion of the various measures of interdependence and the control variables improves our understanding of the factors affecting the occurrence of war over that obtained from the null model. However, the individual interdependence variables, alone, are not statistically significant. This is not the case with contiguity and relative capabilities, which are both statistically significant. Again, we see that contiguous dyads are more conflict-prone and that dyads composed of states with unequal power are more pacific than those with highly equal power. Surprisingly, no evidence is provided to support the commonly held proposition that democratic states are less likely to engage in wars with other democratic states.¶ The evidence from the pre-WWII period provides support for those arguing that economic factors have little, if any, influence on affecting leaders’ decisions to engage in war, but many of the control variables are also statistically insignificant. These results should be interpreted with caution, since the sample does not contain a sufficient number wars to allow us to capture great variations across different types of relationships. Many observations of war are excluded from the sample by virtue of not having the corresponding explanatory measures. A variable would have to have an extremely strong influence on conflict—as does contiguity—to find significant results. ¶ 7. Conclusions This study provides little empirical support for the liberal proposition that trade