## 1

#### The standard is maximizing expected foreseen well-being.

#### Pleasure is both unconditionally and intrinsically valuable.

Goldstein 89 [Irwin Goldstein, “Pleasure and Pain: Unconditional, Intrinsic Values”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , Dec., 1989, Vol. 50, No. 2 (Dec., 1989), pp. 255-276, International Phenomenological Society, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2107959?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents>, Irvin Goldstein was a philosophy professor at Davidson College for 31 years] //Lex AKu

What is good overall, right, or obligatory varies according to effects. Each is context-dependent and may vary across cultures. Evaluations of what is so universally are hazardous; such high level principles seem inevitably to meet expectations. We need not expect exertion to be good overall univer- sally: its value hinges on effects, which vary. What is right may vary with context and so cross-culturally. Even stealing and killing are sometimes right (Noddings, i984: 93). If he is using 'moral demands' to designate duties (actual, not prima facie) and to exclude intrinsic badness, Gilbert Harman may be correct in saying "there are no basic moral demands that apply to everyone" (I984: 27). Though calling all members in a class good is risky, intrinsic universal evaluations can be less precarious than other universal evaluations. Pleasure's intrinsic worth is not context-dependent and so not subject to con- textual fluctuations. When in pain, I can immediately recognize bad even if I am oblivious to the sensation's context and indifferent to moral considerations; pain's intrinsic badness is not founded in and so potentially undermined by pain's surroundings. Because we direct so many evalua- tions to what is good overall or morally good, much of what we justly call 'good' simpliciter is good only in some circumstances. This helps camouflage the fact that pleasure and other value-conferring ends are good in themselves unconditionally. Pleasure is good as such, because of its pleasurableness, not because of some further good quality which colors pleasure and may or may not be present. The foundation of pleasure's goodness, its pleasurableness, marks every pleasure. How could pleasure fail to be intrinsically good? G. E. Moore's reasoning resembles mine when he writes that a judgment of intrinsic goodness "if true of one instance of the thing in question, is necessarily true of all" (1903: 27). Since at least some pleasure is good intrinsically simply because of its pleasurableness, pleasure should always be good intrinsically, whatever the society, and so be an unconditional value. Pleasure's standing as an intrinsic value is founded in pleasure's nature. Appreciating its value and understanding what pleasure is are not inde- pendent projects. Intrinsic goodness is not merely incidental to pleasure; I suggest it is fundamental to what makes an experience pleasure. As hot and cold are opposites in temperature and north and south in direction, so pleasure and pain, both physical and emotional, are opposites in intrinsic agreeability. Heat is ipso facto, and thus always, linked to high tempera- ture; so, achieved in a virtuous or vicious activity, pleasure in itself is ipso facto and so always agreeable and pain ipso facto and so always disagree- able. I propose that pleasure's goodness - which for me is, in part, its char- acter of affording valid, intrinsic grounds for desire - fixes pleasure's agreeableness, and pain's badness dictates its disagreeableness.' Plea- sure and pain, then, contrast with experiences of warmth or coldness, which are linked to value only incidentally: pleasure and pain are oppo- sites through their opposing intrinsic worth. For every pleasure, intrinsic goodness is fundamental to what marks a psychological occurrence, localized or nonlocalized, as pleasure. Grounding dislike, having dis- value, is a defining feature of the unpleasant and so common to all unpleasantness. This view of pleasure answers pluralists, who detect no property shared by all pleasure which unites the diverse phenomena we label 'pleasure' into a single class.'6 The interrelated properties of pleasure's agreeable- ness, its natural tendency to attract sentient beings and, more fundamen- tally, its intrinsic nonmoral goodness and intrinsic grounding of desire unify the psychological occurrences, localized and nonlocalized, we label 'pleasure'. Pain, physical and emotional, forms a single class opposite to pleasure through its disagreeableness, its tendency to repel, its intrinsic badness and grounding of aversion."

#### 2] Util is a lexical pre-requisite to any other framework: Threats to bodily security and life preclude the ability for moral actors to effectively utilize and act upon other moral theories since they are in a constant state of crisis that inhibit the ideal moral conditions which other theories presuppose. That precludes the ability to have agency and have the value conferring status that their framework says is valuable

#### 3] Actor specificity: A] Governments must aggregate since every policy benefit some and harms others, which also means side constraints freeze action. B] States lack wills or intentions since policies are collective actions. C] No act omission distinction---choosing to omit is an act itself – people psychologically decide not to act. Actor-specificity comes first since different agents have different ethical standings. Takes out util calc indicts since they’re empirically denied, and link turns them because the alt would be *no* action. AND No intent foresight distinction – if I forsee

#### 5] Extinction is the biggest impact.

Pummer 15 [Theron, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford. “Moral Agreement on Saving the World” Practical Ethics, University of Oxford. May 18, 2015] AT

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are s’o many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be ndermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

#### That means prefer consequentialism – its best suited to prevent extinction since looking into the intrinsic nature of stuff will never be able to prevent catastrophic consequences that lead to extinction but looking at foreseen consequences can.

## 2

#### The US is concerned about Saudi IPR but trade relations are fine now

US Gov 21 [United States Government, Office of the US Trade Representative “2021 Special 301 Report” Published: 2021] [https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/reports/2021/2021%20Special%20301%20Report%20(final).pdf] || SM

Saudi Arabia remains on the Priority Watch List in 2021.

Ongoing Challenges and Concerns

Saudi Arabia was placed on the Priority Watch List in 2019 for failing to take action against the rampant satellite and online piracy made available by illicit pirate service beoutQ, continued lack of effective protection of intellectual property (IP) for pharmaceutical products, and long-standing concerns regarding enforcement against counterfeit and pirated goods within the country. BeoutQ ceased operations in August 2019. The Saudi Authority for Intellectual Property (SAIP) continued to take steps to improve IP protection, enforcement, and awareness throughout Saudi Arabia in 2020. However, concerns remain over actions by the Saudi Arabia Food and Drug Authority (SFDA), which the Minister of Health oversees, that are contrary to Saudi Arabia’s public statements in paragraph 261 of the Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the World Trade Organization. Starting in 2016, SFDA has been granting marketing approval to domestic companies for subsequent versions of registered products, without requiring the submission of data that meets the same requirements applied to the initial applicant, despite the period of protection provided to the initial applicant by Saudi regulations. SFDA’s continued actions and the lack of redress for affected companies have intensified concerns. Furthermore, the National Unified Procurement Company for Medical Supplies, also overseen by the Minister of Health, reportedly awarded national tenders to some of these domestic companies for the affected products.

#### The plan stifles Saudi innovation by sending investors away which hurts US Saudi Relations.

Stevens 17 [Stevens, Philip. “Saudi Missteps on Intellectual Property Will Hold Back Its Economy.” *TheHill*, 17 Sept. 2017, thehill.com/opinion/international/351074-saudis-missteps-on-intellectual-property-will-hold-back-its-economy?rl=1., *Philip Stevens is director of Geneva Network, a UK-based research organization focusing on trade and innovation issues.*] //Lex AKu

Saudi Arabian policymakers know that increasing knowledge-based sectors is the key to sustainable growth as their economy transitions away from oil. “You cannot be depending on oil in a world where the knowledge economy is the driver of economic development — manufacturing is 20th century,” Fahd Al-Rasheed, CEO of King Abdullah Economic City, said in June. Vision 2030, the plan to diversify the Saudi economy, also sees a big role for knowledge-based industries. This makes sense. In the U.S., knowledge-intensive goods and services from sectors including biotech, chemicals, entertainment and information technology now make up over half of all U.S. exports, reversing the situation of only 40 years ago when manufacturing dominated. Advanced Asian economies — Japan, the Republic of Korea, Advanced Asian economies — Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan — have also taken this path, moving over recent decades from agriculture to manufacturing to knowledge-based economies. Few countries have developed thriving knowledge-based industries purely from domestic resources. Scientific knowledge, technological know-how and the required research and development capital are dispersed globally. Gone are the days when one R&D company, for example, the industrial behemoth General Electric or the biopharmaceutical major Merck, created products in-house from start to finish. Today, innovation is a result of collaboration between multinational companies, small companies, start-ups, academia and the public sector at all stages of the R&D cycle, often across borders. Saudi Arabia’s challenge is to become a meaningful participant in this new world of networked innovation. It must attract innovative companies to its shores, bringing with them the capital, skills and technological know-how the Kingdom may be missing. The potential prize is enormous: China now captures more Foreign Direct Investment in R&D than the U.S. thepharmaceuticals sector leads the way with investments, totaling $1.6bn between 2010 and 2015, according to FDI Markets. The Kingdom has some advantages that could direct it down the R&D path. It has a young population, a growing base of science graduates and relatively high investment in health care, internet and other forms of infrastructure. Tax incentives, and investment in education and information technology will only go so far, though. Above all, foreign investors need certainty over their intellectual property rights, including clearly defined and easily enforceable patent rights. If this protection is strong, companies will be more likely to invest in local R&D facilities, or enter into partnerships with local companies. New products will be launched early into Saudi Arabia, as innovators will have no fear of their valuable IP rights being compromised. Saudi Arabia has the intellectual property basics in place, in line with its World Trade Organization commitments. In fact, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s 2017 International IP index noted Saudi Arabia has a “strong patenting environment.” Yet, recent developments risk derailing this progress. Just months after granting a patent for a new medicine to a company based in the United States, the Saudi Food and Drug Administration (SFDA) reneged on the deal.The Saudi patent for Hepatitis drug Daclatasvir was granted by the Patent Office of the Gulf Cooperation council (which encompasses Saudi Arabia) to BMS in Dec 2016. Nevertheless, the SFDA granted marketing approval to a generic version manufactured Saudi company in May 2017, despite the BMS patent still being in force. Granting marketing approval to generic copies of the product in this way is arguably a breach of patent rights. Likewise, the SDFA has also recently allowed local companies to manufacture generic versions of another medicine developed by another U.S. biotech company — potentially contrary to World Trade Organization rules surrounding the protection of clinical test data, itself an important intellectual property right. Saudi IP law allows for 5-year period in which generic companies may not use the clinical trial data submitted to regulatory authorities by originator drug manufacturers to gain marketing approval ("data exclusivity"). Gilead Sciences was granted marketing approval by the SFDA in 2014 for its product Sofosbuvir. The SFDA has subsequently granted marketing approval for generic versions of this product made by a Saudi and Egyptian company — within the 5-year data exclusivity window. This could be a breach of Saudi data exclusivity regulations. Taken together, such actions send a hostile message to foreign investors that their valuable IP rights are not safe in Saudi Arabia. Such hostility will undermine Saudi’s economic ambition by scaring off valuable investment and skills. They also act as an irritant to U.S.-Saudi relations, with the Trump administration indicating a higher prioritization of IP enforcement amongst its trading partners. Meanwhile, regional neighbors such as the UAE and Asian competitors such as Singapore are seizing the opportunities presented by the globalization of innovation, which drive increasing proportions of their economic growth. Saudi Arabia could emerge as a global competitor in knowledge-based industries. It’s an achievable vision, but it requires the policy details to be right, not just the rhetoric.

#### US Saudi Coop key to prevent nuclear proliferation

Emily B. Landau and Shimon Stein 18 [Landau is senior research associate at the Institute for National Security Studies, where she is also director of the Arms Control and Regional Security Project. Stein was Israel's ambassador to Germany from 2001 to 2007. Previously, he participated in the Arms Control and Regional Security working group, as well as negotiations of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and served as head of the Regional Security, Arms Control, and Nonproliferation Department at the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs.], 12-4-2018, "Can the United States Prevent Saudi Arabia from Getting Nuclear Weapons?," National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/can-united-states-prevent-saudi-arabia-getting-nuclear-weapons-37812> {OS}

The United States has always been very concerned about the proliferation risks involved in nuclear cooperation, and in 2008 it was able to achieve a memorandum of understanding with Saudi Arabia on nuclear energy cooperation whereby the latter pledged to acquire nuclear fuel from international markets, rather than producing it indigenously. But ten years later, it seems that Saudi Arabia no longer views itself as bound by that understanding. The current challenge for the United States is how to insist on what is known as a 123 agreement with Saudi Arabia, meaning that the agreement explicitly denies Saudi Arabia the right to work on sensitive nuclear technologies (enrichment capabilities and plutonium reprocessing), without driving it into the hands of other nuclear suppliers, such as Russia, China and South Korea, that may be less worried about ensuring these restrictions.¶ There are concerns that the Trump administration might be willing to concede to Saudi Arabia sensitive capabilities, and the fact that it is not willing to divulge information regarding the status of the negotiations does not bode well in this regard. The administration is keenly aware of the link to Iran’s nuclear posture, and that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) set a very negative precedent for nuclear cooperation with other states when it legitimized Iran’s enrichment capabilities. While Iran must cap its stockpile of enriched uranium for the duration of the deal, it is allowed—under the explicit terms of the deal—to work on R&D into an entire range of advanced centrifuges. Iran has plans to install and operate these centrifuges eleven years into the deal. There is a real question of how these capabilities can be denied to states like Saudi Arabia who are in good standing with the NPT, whereas Iran—who blatantly violated the nonproliferation treaty—was granted the right to continue with these dangerous enrichment-related activities.

#### Saudi prolif draws in India and Pakistan – goes nuclear

Edelman 11—Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Former Undersecretary for Defense—AND—Andrew Krepinevich—President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments—AND—Evan Montgomery—Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (Eric, The dangers of a nuclear Iran, FA 90;1, http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/2010.12.27-The-Dangers-of-a-Nuclear-Iran.pdf)

There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen css-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also oªered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the css-2s, which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional warheads eªectively. There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This “Islamabad option” could develop in one of several different ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer. Not only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own. Alternatively, Pakistan might oªer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the npt since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India. The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being **how India would respond**. Would it **target Pakistan**’s weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence **stability** during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India’s reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be **highly destabilizing**. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons **weakens the nonprolif**eration **regime**, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the npt. Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.- Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to **miscalc**ulation and **escalation** than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other.Multipolar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack. More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, **the bedrock of deterrence** is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents’ forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, **emerging nuclear powers might not invest in** expensive but **survivable capabilities** such as hardened missile silos or submarinebased nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to “launch on warning” of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly, would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering **a regional nuclear war.** Most existing nuclear powers have taken steps to protect their nuclear weapons from unauthorized use: from closely screening key personnel to developing technical safety measures, such as permissive action links, which require special codes before the weapons can be armed. Yet there is no guarantee that emerging nuclear powers would be willing or able to implement these measures, creating a significant risk that their governments might lose control over the weapons or nuclear material and that nonstate actors could gain access to these items. Some states might seek to mitigate threats to their nuclear arsenals; for instance, they might hide their weapons. In that case, however, a single intelligence compromise could leave their weapons vulnerable to attack or theft.

#### Extinction – nuke war fallout creates Ice Age and mass starvation

Steven Starr 15. “Nuclear War: An Unrecognized Mass Extinction Event Waiting To Happen.” Ratical. March 2015. <https://ratical.org/radiation/NuclearExtinction/StevenStarr022815.html> TG

A war fought with 21st century strategic nuclear weapons would be more than just a great catastrophe in human history. If we allow it to happen, such a war would be a mass extinction event that [ends human history](https://ratical.org/radiation/NuclearExtinction/StarrNuclearWinterOct09.pdf). There is a profound difference between extinction and “an unprecedented disaster,” or even “the end of civilization,” because even after such an immense catastrophe, human life would go on.

But extinction, by definition, is an event of utter finality, and a nuclear war that could cause human extinction should really be considered as the ultimate criminal act. It certainly would be the crime to end all crimes.

The world’s leading climatologists now tell us that nuclear war threatens our continued existence as a species. Their studies predict that a large nuclear war, especially one fought with strategic nuclear weapons, would create a post-war environment in which for many years it would be too cold and dark to even grow food. Their findings make it clear that not only humans, but most large animals and many other forms of complex life would likely vanish forever in a nuclear darkness of our own making.

The environmental consequences of nuclear war would attack the ecological support systems of life at every level. Radioactive fallout produced not only by nuclear bombs, but also by the destruction of nuclear power plants and their spent fuel pools, would poison the biosphere. Millions of tons of smoke would act to [destroy Earth’s protective ozone layer](https://www2.ucar.edu/atmosnews/just-published/3995/nuclear-war-and-ultraviolet-radiation) and block most sunlight from reaching Earth’s surface, creating Ice Age weather conditions that would last for decades.

Yet the political and military leaders who control nuclear weapons strictly avoid any direct public discussion of the consequences of nuclear war. They do so by arguing that nuclear weapons are not intended to be used, but only to deter.

Remarkably, the leaders of the Nuclear Weapon States have chosen to ignore the authoritative, long-standing scientific research done by the climatologists, research that predicts virtually any nuclear war, fought with even a fraction of the operational and deployed nuclear arsenals, will leave the Earth essentially uninhabitable.

## 3

**Counterplan text: WTO Member states should:**

**- substantially increase production and global distribution of the COVID-19 Vaccine, specifically providing all necessary vaccines to India and South Africa, and**

**- cooperate with allies to achieve increased production and global distribution of the COVID-19 Vaccine.**

**- reduce IP for all other medicines.**

**That comparatively solves better – IP rights don’t hinder vaccine cooperation, but manufacturing capacity is the current constraint.**

Hans **Sauer 6-17** [(Deputy General Counsel, Biotechnology Industry Organization.) “Web event — Confronting Joe Biden’s proposed TRIPS waiver for COVID-19 vaccines and treatments” <https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/210617-Confronting-Joe-Bidens-proposed-TRIPS-waiver.pdf?x91208&x91208>] TDI

But contrary to what Lori said, **there are genuine real problems in the supply chain** that are **not caused by patents**, that are simply caused by the unavailability and the constraints on existing capacity. There is in this world such a thing as maxed-out capacity that just can’t be increased on a dime. It’s not all due to intellectual property. This is true for existing vaccines as well as for vaccine raw materials. There are trade barriers. There are export restrictions that we should all be aware of and that we need to work on. And there are very real political, I think, interests in finding an explanation for how we got to this place that absolve governments around the world from their own policy decisions that they made in the past. In the United States, again, it was the declared policy of the previous administration, as well as this one, that we would vaccinate healthy college kids and go all down the line and offer a vaccine to everybody who wants it before we start sharing any with grandmothers in Burkina Faso. That was the policy. You can agree with it or disagree with it, but that was policy. We had export restrictions in place before a lot of other countries did. And that, too, contributed to unequal access of vaccines around the world. Another thing that was predictable was that politicians and governments around the world who want to be seen as proactive, on the ball, in control, for a long time were actually very indecisive, very unsure about how to address the COVID problem, which has so many dimensions. Vaccines are only one of those. But with respect to vaccines, not many governments took decisive action, put money on the table, put bets on multiple horses, before we knew whether these vaccines would work, would be approved. And it was governments in middle-income countries who now, I think, justifiably are concerned that they’re not getting fast enough access, who didn’t have the means and who didn’t have the decision-making structure to place the same bets on multiple horses, if you will, that were placed in the relatively more wealthy, global North and global West. But there is, I think, a really good and, with hindsight, predictable explanation of how we got to this place, and I think it teaches us something about how to fix the problem going forward. **So why will the waiver not work**? Well, first of all, with complex technology like vaccines, Lori touched on it, reverse engineering, like you would for a small molecule drug, is much more difficult if not impossible. But it depends very much more than small molecule drugs on cooperation, on voluntary transfer of technology, and on mutual assistance. We have seen as part of the pandemic response an unprecedented level of collaborations and cooperation and no indication that IP has stood in the way of the pandemic response. **The waiver proponents have found zero credible examples of where IP has actually been an obstacle,** where somebody has tried to block somebody else from developing a COVID vaccine or other COVID countermeasure, right? It’s not there. **Second, the myth of this vast global capacity to manufacture COVID vaccines that somehow exists** **out there is unsubstantiated** and frankly, in my opinion, untrue. But there is no such thing as vast untapped, idle capacity that could be turned around on a dime to start making COVID vaccines within weeks or even months. This capacity needs to be built; it needs to be established. And at a time when time is of the essence to beat this pandemic, starting capacity-building discussions is helpful, but it won’t be the answer to beat this pandemic. It will be the answer if we do everything right to beating the next pandemic. And if we learn any lesson of this, and then I will stop, is that the COVID waiver as well as the situation in which we find ourselves — if anything, it’s a reminder that we definitely have to take global capacity-building more seriously than we did in the past. That is true for the global North, as well as for middle-income countries — all of whom have to dedicate themselves much more determinedly to pandemic preparedness. And there’s a need to invest both in preparedness and in public health systems that hasn’t happened in the wake of past pandemic threats. This is what we will need to do. We will need to reduce export restrictions, and we will need to rededicate ourselves to preparing for the next pandemic. As far as this pandemic goes, **there are 11 vaccines around the world that are already being shot into arms, only four of which come from the global North. How many more vaccines do we want?** I don’t know, maybe 11 is enough if we start making more of them. But there are manufacturers around the world who know how to do this — including in China, including in India, and including in Russia. All developed their homegrown vaccines, apparently without interference by IP rights, right? **So let’s make more of those. I think that’s going to be the more practical and realistic answer to solving the problem**. And we need to lean on governments to stop export controls and to dedicate themselves to more global equity.

## 4

# Case

## Case

### Undv

### Pics Affirm

1] Conceded they defend all mdeicines. educe is only used for ip protections not for medicine they said they defend IP for all medicines. Functional competition is best – otherwise the can skirt out of all links to DA

## Fwk

### LBL

**Gyekyke – A] hijack util is character based since its reliant on subjective questions of what agents ought to be given their cirucmstnaces and individual values of pain/pleasure B] Your version of VE is duty based since you say agents must always promote virtue C] Collapses to conseqeuntialism – character is formed through consequential actions, also proves life is a prerequisite to flourishing**

**1AC Gyekye 2011** (Kwame [Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Ghana, Visiting Professor of Philosophy and African-American studies at Temple University]. “African Ethics.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, Fall 2011, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/african-ethics/.) //iLake AS RCT//SR

Good character is the essence of the African moral system, the linchpin of the moral wheel. The justification for a character-based ethics is not far to seek. For, all that a society can do, regarding moral conduct, is to impart moral knowledge to its members, making them aware of the moral values and principles of that society. In general, society satisfactorily fulfills this duty of imparting moral knowledge to its members through moral education of various forms, including, as in African societies, telling morally-freighted proverbs and folktales to its younger members. But, having moral knowledge—being made aware of the moral principles and rules of the society—is one thing; being able to lead a life consonant with the moral principles is quite another. An individual may know and may even accept a moral rule, such as, say, it is wrong to cheat the customs. But he may fail to apply this rule to a particular situation; he is, thus, not able to effect the transition from knowledge to action, to carry out the implications of his moral belief. In the Akan and other African moral systems such a moral failure would be put down to the lack of a good character (suban pa). In other words, the ability to act in accord with the moral principles and rules of the society requires the possession of a good character. Thus, in the context of the activities of the moral life—in our decisions to obey moral rules, in the struggle to do the right thing and to avoid the wrong conduct, in one's intention to carry out a moral duty, the quality of a person's character is of ultimate consequence. It is from a person's character that all his or her actions—good or bad—radiate: the performance of good or bad acts depends on the state of one's character. Wrong-doing is put down to a person's bad character. Thus, the Yoruba maxim (proverb): ‘Good character is a person's guard.’ African maxims are explicit about the formation of character: character is acquired. A person is therefore responsible for the state of his or her character, for character results from the habitual actions of a person. An Akan maxim has it that “one is not born with a bad ‘head’, but one takes it on from the earth.” The maxim means, among other things, that a bad habit is not an inborn characteristic; it is one that is acquired. It would be worthless to embark on moral instruction through moral proverbs and folktales, as it is done in African societies, if our character or habits were inborn. But the belief is that the moral narratives would help the young people to acquire and internalize the moral values of the society, including specific moral virtues, embedded in those ethical narratives. The appropriate responses to moral instruction are expected to lead to the acquisition of appropriate habits and their corresponding characters. And, because character is acquired through our actions, habits, and expected responses to moral instructions, it can, according to African moral systems, be changed or reformed. Character is defined by the Akan thinkers in terms of habits, which result from a person's deeds or actions: ‘character comes from your actions’ (or deeds: nneyee), says an Akan traditional thinker. Persistent performance of a particular action will produce a certain habit and, thus, a corresponding character. To acquire virtue, a person must perform good actions, that is, morally acceptable actions so that they become habitual. The action or deed that led to the acquisition of a newly good habit must be persistently performed in order to strengthen that habit; in this way, virtue (or, good character) is acquired. Over time such an acquired virtue becomes a habit. This is the position of Akan ethics on the development and acquisition of a good (or, bad) character, for this is what the Akan people mean when they say aka ne ho, “it has remained with him,” “it has become part of him,” “it has become his habit.” Character is, thus, a behavior pattern formed as a result of past persistent actions. Thus, moral virtues (excellences of character) or vices arise through habituation. The logic of the acquisition of our character or habits is that the original nature of the human being was morally neutral, neither good nor bad. A person's original moral neutrality will in the course of his life come to be affected, in one direction (the good) or the other direction (the bad) by his actions and responses to moral instruction, advice and persuasion. The original moral neutrality of a human being constitutes the foundation of our conception of the moral person, for it makes for—allows room for—choice, that is, moral choice. Consequently, what a person does or does not do is most crucial to the formation and development of his or her character, and, thus, to becoming moral or immoral.

## Generic

## Adv

#### IP Protections are key to the pharma sector – strong innovation solves future pandemics.

**Wilbur 20** [Tom Wilbur, Tom Wilbur is Director of Public Affairs at PhRMA focusing on message development and opinion research. Prior to joining PhRMA in 2019, Tom worked on Capitol Hill and on political campaigns for nearly a decade, most recently responsible for communications, campaigns and strategy for U.S. Rep. Fred Upton and the House Energy and Commerce Committee. 5-4-2020, accessed on 8-3-2021, Catalyst.phrma.org, "What they are saying: Intellectual property protections are critical as we work to defeat COVID-19", <https://catalyst.phrma.org/what-they-are-saying-intellectual-property-protections-are-critical-as-we-work-to-defeat-covid-19>] Adam

The U.S. biopharmaceutical industry depends on reliable intellectual property (IP) protections to promote the development of new breakthrough treatments and cures for patients. Strong IP protections are especially important while biopharmaceutical companies work around the clock to develop solutions to help prevent infection and treat those with COVID-19, a disease cause by the novel strain of coronavirus. In fact, many of the existing medicines and investigational medicines being tested for COVID-19 exist today because of IP and other incentives that drove their research and development.

Here is a closer look at recent comments spotlighting how strong IP protections help fuel discovery efforts for COVID-19 treatments and vaccines:

“The world has placed its profound confidence in the free enterprise of the leading scientists and innovators to reach as many solutions as possible in the shortest amount of time. It is obviously a heavy weight for researchers to bear, but not a burden…Removing the ability of these first responders to own their work while they are in the process, or after completion, undermines their efforts. Keeping these rights intact not only allows more knowledge-sharing in the fight against COVID-19 but also ensures long-term research to ready the fight against the next pandemic, as well.” – Philip Thomas, policy analyst at the Property Rights Alliance, in [Morning Consult](https://morningconsult.com/opinions/fighting-covid-19-doesnt-require-selling-out-our-innovation-ecosystem/)