​​**1**

#### 

#### **Ethics must began a priori. Permissibility negates since the word ought in the resolution indicates an obligation so its their burden to prove the existence of one.**

#### **1] Is/Ought Gap – experience in the phenomenal world only tells us what is since we can only perceive what is, not what ought to be. But it’s impossible to derive an ought from descriptive premises, so there needs to be additional a priori premises within the noumenal world to make a moral theory.**

#### **The existence of extrinsic goodness requires unconditional human worth—that means we must treat others as ends in themselves.**

**Korsgaard ’83** (Christine M., “Two Distinctions in Goodness,” The Philosophical Review Vol. 92, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), pp. 169-195, JSTOR) OS/Recut Lex AKu \*brackets for gendered language

The argument shows how Kant's idea of justification works. It can be read as a kind of regress upon the conditions, starting from an important assumption. The assumption is that **when a rational being makes a choice or undertakes an action,[they] he or she supposes the object to be good, and its pursuit to be justified**. At least, **if there is a categorical imperative there must be objectively good ends, for then there are necessary actions and so necessary ends** (G 45-46/427-428 and Doctrine of Virtue 43-44/384-385). **In order for there to be any objectively good ends, however, there must be something that is unconditionally good and so can serve as a sufficient condition of their goodness**. Kant considers what this might be: **it cannot be an object of inclination**, for those have only a conditional worth, "**for if the inclinations and the needs founded on them did not exist, their object would be without worth**" (G 46/428). It cannot be the inclinations themselves because a rational being would rather be free from them. Nor can it be external things, which serve only as means. So, Kant asserts, **the unconditionally valuable thing must be "humanity" or "rational nature,"** which he defines as "**the power set to an end**" (G 56/437 and DV 51/392). Kant explains that **regarding your existence as a rational being as an end in itself is a "subjective principle of human action."** By this I understand him to mean that **we must regard ourselves as capable of conferring value upon the objects of our choice, the ends that we set, because we must regard our ends as good**. But since "every other rational being thinks of his existence by the same rational ground which holds also for myself' (G 47/429), **we must regard others as capable of conferring value by reason of their rational choices and so also as ends in themselves**. Treating another as an end in itself thus involves making that person's ends as far as possible your own (G 49/430). **The ends that are chosen by any rational being, possessed of the humanity or rational nature that is fully realized in a good will, take on the status of objective goods. They are not intrinsically valuable, but they are objectively valuable in the sense that every rational being has a reason to promote or realize them**. For this reason it is our duty to promote the happiness of others-the ends that they choose-and, in general, to make the highest good our end.

#### **Practical reason resolves regress - I can keep asking “why should I follow this” but asking “why reason” requires reason so its inescapable. Regress collapses to skep since no one can generate obligations absent grounds for accepting them.**

There is an act omission distinction otherwise we are infinitely culpable for anything like, me being responsible for the the war in Yemen which is illogical – negate, omitting is a morally permissible action to avoid culpability, which means the squo is ok and theres no moral obligation to do the aff

Ethics must be universal – 2+2 = 4 can’t be true for me but not for you. That’s incoherent.

Now negate

#### **1] Spece mandates a market-oriented approach—that negates**

**Broker 20** [(Tyler, work has been published in the Gonzaga Law Review, the Albany Law Review and the University of Memphis Law Review.) **“Space Law Can Only Be Libertarian Minded,”** Above the Law, 1-14-20,<https://abovethelaw.com/2020/01/space-law-can-only-be-libertarian-minded/>] TDI

The impact on human daily life from a transition to the virtually unlimited resource reality of space cannot be overstated. **However, when it comes to the law, a minimalist, dare I say libertarian, approach appears as the only applicable system.** In the words of NASA, “2020 promises to be a big year for space exploration.” Yet, as Rand Simberg points out in Reason magazine, **it is actually private American investment that is currently moving space exploration to “a pace unseen since the 1960s.”** According to Simberg, due to this increase in private investment “We are now on the verge of getting affordable private access to orbit for large masses of payload and people.” The impact of that type of affordable travel into space might sound sensational to some, but in reality the benefits that space can offer are far greater than any benefit currently attributed to any major policy proposal being discussed at the national level. The sheer amount of resources available within our current reach/capabilities simply speaks for itself. However, although those new realities will, as Simberg says, “bring to the fore a lot of ideological issues that up to now were just theoretical,” I believe it will also eliminate many economic and legal distinctions we currently utilize today. **For example, the sheer number of resources we can already obtain in space means that in the rapidly near future, the distinction between a nonpublic good or a public good will be rendered meaningless. In other words, because the resources available within our solar system exist in such quantities, all goods will become nonrivalrous in their consumption and nonexcludable in their distribution.** This would mean government engagement in the public provision of a nonpublic good, even at the trivial level, or what Kevin Williamson defines as socialism, is rendered meaningless or impossible. In fact, in space, I fail to see how any government could even try to legally compel collectivism in the way Simberg fears. Similar to many economic distinctions, however, it appears that many laws, both the good and the bad, will also be rendered meaningless as soon as we begin to utilize the resources within our solar system. For example, if every human being is given access to the resources that allows them to replicate anything anyone else has, or replace anything “taken” from them instantly, what would be the point of theft laws? If you had virtually infinite space in which you can build what we would now call luxurious livable quarters, all without exploiting human labor or fragile Earth ecosystems when you do it, what sense would most property, employment, or commercial law make? Again, this is not a pipe dream, no matter how much our population grows for the next several millennia, the amount of resources within our solar system can sustain such an existence for every human being. **Rather than panicking about the future, we should try embracing it, or at least meaningfully preparing for it. Currently, the Outer Space Treaty, or as some call it “the Magna Carta of Space,” is silent on the issue of whether private individuals or corporate entities can own territory in space. Regardless of whether governments allow it, however, private citizens are currently obtaining the ability to travel there, and if human history is any indicator, private homesteading will follow**, flag or no flag. We Americans know this is how a Wild West starts, where most regulation becomes the impractical pipe dream. **But again, this would be a Wild West where the exploitation of human labor and fragile Earth ecosystem makes no economic sense, where every single human can be granted access to resources that even the wealthiest among us now would envy, and where innovation and imagination become the only things we would recognize as currency. Only a libertarian-type system, that guarantees basic individual rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness could be valued and therefore human fidelity to a set of laws made possible, in such an existence.**

#### **2] Forbidding ownership of unowned property is a form of restricting freedom.**

**Feser 2**, (Edward Feser, 1-1-2005, accessed on 12-15-2021, Cambridge University Press, "THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN UNJUST INITIAL ACQUISITION | Social Philosophy and Policy | Cambridge Core", Edward C. Feser is an American philosopher. He is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College in Pasadena, California. [https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)[brackets](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)%5bbrackets) for gen lang]//phs st

There is. **An alternative, soft-line approach could acknowledge that the initial acquirer who abuses a monopoly over a water hole** (or any similar crucial resource) **does commit an injustice against those who are disad- vantaged, but such an approach could still hold that the acquirer never- theless has not committed an injustice in acquisition** —his acquisition was, as I have said, neither just nor unjust. **Nor does he fail to own what he has acquired**; he still cannot be said to have stolen the water from anyone. Rather, **his injustice is an unjust use of what he owns, on a par with the unjust use I make of my self-owned fist when I wield it, unprovoked, to bop you on your self-owned nose.** In what sense does the water-hole owner use his water unjustly, though? He doesn’t try to drown anyone in it, after all— indeed, **the whole problem is that he won’t let anybody near it!** Eric Mack gives us the answer we need in what he has put forward as the **“self-ownership proviso”** (SOP).28 **This is a proviso not** (as the Lock- ean proviso is) **on the initial acquisition of property, but rather on how one can use his property in a way that respects others’ self-ownership rights**. **It is motivated by consideration of the fact that the talents, abilities, capac- ities, energies,** etc., **that a person rightfully possesses as a self-owner are inherently “world-interactive”;** that is, it is of **their very essence that they are directed toward the extra-personal environment**.29 **Your capacity to use your hand, for instance, is just a capacity to grasp and manipulate external objects;** thus, **what you own in owning your hand is something essentially grasping** and manipulating.30 Now if someone were to cut off your hand or invasively keep you from using it (by tying your arm against your body or holding it behind your back), he would obviously be violating your self-ownership rights. But **there are**, Mack suggests, **other, noninvasive ways in which those rights might be violated. If**, to use an example of Mack’s, **I effectively nullify your ability to use your hand by creating a device that causes anything you reach for to be propelled beyond your grasp,** making it impossible for you ever to grasp or manip- ulate anything, **I have violated your right to your hand** as much as if I had cut it off or tied it down. I have, in any case, prevented your right to your hand from being anything more than a formal right, one that is practically useless. In the interests of guaranteeing respect for substantive, robust rights of self-ownership, then, **“[t]he SOP requires that persons not deploy their legitimate holdings**, i.e., their extra-personal property, **in ways that severely**, albeit noninvasively, **disable any person’s world-interactive powers.”** 31 **The SOP follows**, in Mack’s view, **from the thesis of self-ownership itself**; or, at any rate, the considerations that would lead anyone to accept that thesis should also, in his view, lead one to accept the proviso.32 A brief summary of a few of Mack’s thought experiments should suffice to give a sense of why this is so.33 In what Mack calls the Adam’s Island example, Adam acquires a previously uninhabited island and later refuses a shipwrecked Zelda permission to come ashore, as a result of which she remains struggling at sea (and presumably drowns). In the Paternalist Caging example, instead of drowning, Zelda becomes caught offshore in a cage Adam has constructed for catching large sea mammals, and, rather than releasing her, Adam keeps her in the cage and feeds her regularly. In the Knuckle-Scraper Barrier example, Zelda falls asleep on some unowned ground, whereupon a gang of oafish louts encircles her and, using their bodies and arms as barriers, refuses to let her out of the circle (accusing her of assault if she touches them in order to climb over or break through). In the Disabling Property Barrier example, instead of a human barrier, Adam constructs a plastic shield over and around the unowned plot of ground upon which Zelda sleeps, accusing her of trespassing upon his property when she awakens and tries to escape by breaking through the plastic. And in the (similarly named) Disabling Property Barriers example, seem to suggest an Aristotelian-Thomistic conception of natural function, and though this by no means troubles me, it might not be what Mack himself has in mind (nor, of course, is it something every philosopher is going to sympathize with). Mack’s view nevertheless seems to require something like this conception. And something like it —enough like it to do the job Mack needs to be done, anyway—is arguably to be found in Larry Wright’s well- known reconstruction, in modern Darwinian terms, of the traditional notion of natural function. See Larry Wright, “Functions,” Philosophical Review 82, no. 2 (1973): 139–68. Adam, instead of enclosing Zelda in a plastic barrier, encloses in plastic barriers every external object that Zelda would otherwise be able to use — thus, in effect, enclosing her in a larger, all-encompassing plastic barrier of a more eccentric shape. In all of these cases, Mack says, although Zelda’s formal rights of self-ownership have not been violated—no one has invaded the area enclosed by the surface of her skin —her rights over her self-owned powers, and in particular her ability to exercise those powers, have nevertheless been nullified. But a plausible self-ownership- based theory surely cannot allow for this. It cannot, for instance, allow the innocent Zelda justly to be imprisoned in any of the ways described! If Mack is right, then it seems we have, in the SOP, grounds for holding that a water-hole monopolist would indeed be committing an injustice against anyone he refuses water to, or to whom he charges exorbitant prices for access. The injustice would be a straightforward violation of a person’s rights to self-ownership, a case of nullifying a person’s self- owned powers in a way analogous to Adam’s or the knuckle-scrapers’ nullification of Zelda’s self-owned powers. It would not be an injustice in initial acquisition, however. The water-hole monopolist still owns the water hole as much as he ever did; he just cannot use it in a way that violates other individuals’ self-ownership rights (either by drowning them in it or by nullifying their self-owned powers by denying them access to it when there is no alternative way for them to gain access to the water necessary for the use of their self-owned powers). Is Mack right? The hard-liner might dig in his heels and insist that none of Mack’s examples amount to self-ownership-violating injustices; instead, they are merely subtle but straightforward property rights violations or cases of moral failings of various other sorts (cruelty, selfishness, etc.). The Adam’s Island case, for starters, is roughly analogous to the example of the water-hole monopolist, so that it arguably cannot give any non-question- begging support to the SOP, if the SOP is then supposed to show that the water-hole example involves an injustice. The Disabling Property Barriers case might also be viewed as unable to provide any non-question-begging support, since Adam’s encasing everything in plastic might plausibly be interpreted as his acquiring everything, in which case we are back to a water-hole-type monopoly example. The Knuckle-Scraper Barrier and Dis- abling Property Barrier examples might be explained by saying that in falling asleep on the unowned plot of land, Zelda in effect has come (at least temporarily) to acquire it, and (by virtue of walking) to acquire also the path she took to get to it, so that the knuckle-scrapers and Adam violate her property rights (not her self-ownership rights) in not allowing her to escape. The Paternalist Caging example can perhaps be explained by arguing that in building the cage, Adam has acquired the water route leading to it, so that in swimming this route (and thus getting caught in the cage) Zelda has violated his property rights and, therefore, can justly be caged. Accordingly, the hard-liner might insist, we can explain all of these examples in a hard-line way and thus avoid commitment to the SOP. Such a hard-line response would be ingenious (well, maybe), but still, I think, ultimately doomed to failure. Can the Paternalist Caging example, to start with, plausibly be explained away in the manner that I have suggested? Does Adam commit no injustice against Zelda even if he never lets her out? It will not do to write this off merely as a case of excessive punishment (explaining the injustice of which would presumably not require commitment to the SOP). For suppose Adam says, after a mere five minutes of confinement, “I’m no longer punishing you; you’ve paid your debt and are free to go, as far as I’m concerned. But I’m not going to bother exerting the effort to let you out. I never forced you to get in the cage, after all —you did it on your own —and you have no right to the use of my self-owned cage-opening powers to fix your mistake! So teleport out, if you can. Or get someone else —if you can find someone —to let you out.” Adam would be neither violating Zelda’s rights to external property nor excessively punishing her in this case; nor would he be invasively vio- lating her self-ownership rights. But wouldn’t he still be committing an injustice, however noninvasively? Don’t we need something like the SOP to explain why this is so? The barrier examples, for their part, do not require Zelda’s walking and falling asleep on virgin territory, which thus (arguably) becomes her prop- erty. We can, to appeal to the sort of science-fiction scenario beloved of philosophers, imagine instead a bizarre chance disruption of the structure of space-time that teleports Zelda into Adam’s plastic shell or into the midst of the knuckle-scrapers. There is no question now of their violating her property rights; yet don’t they still commit an injustice by nullifying her self-owned powers in refusing to allow her to exit? Consider a parallel example concerning property ownership itself. If your prized $50,000 copy of Captain America Comics number 1, due to another rupture in space-time or just to a particularly strong wind that blows it out of your hands and through my window, suddenly appears on the floor of my living room, do I have the right to refuse to bring it back out to you or to allow you to come in and get it? Suppose I attempt to justify my refusal by saying, “I won’t touch it, and you’re free to have it back if you can arrange another space-time rupture or gust of wind. But I refuse to exert my self-owned powers to bring it out to you, or to allow you on my property to get it. I never asked for it to appear in my living room, after all!” Would anyone accept this justification? Doesn’t your property right in the comic book require me to give it back to you? The hard-liner might suggest that this example transports the SOP advocate out of the frying pan and into the fire. For if the SOP is true, wouldn’t we also have to commit ourselves to a “property-ownership proviso” (POP) that requires us not to nullify anyone’s ability to use his external private property in a way consistent with its “world-interactive powers”? If I build a miniature submarine in my garage, and you have the only swimming pool within one thousand miles, must you allow me the use of your pool lest you nullify my ability to use the sub? If (to take an example of Cohen’s cited by Mack) I own a corkscrew, must I be provided with wine bottles to open lest the corkscrew sadly fail to fulfill its full potential?34 Mack’s response to this line of thought seems basically to amount to a bit of backpedaling on the claim that his proviso really follows from the notion of self-ownership per se —so as to avoid the conclusion that a (rather unlibertarian and presumably redistributionist) POP would also, in par- allel fashion, follow from the concept of property ownership. His response seems, instead, to emphasize the idea that the considerations favoring self-ownership also favor, via an independent line of reasoning, the SOP.35 In my view, however, a better response would be one that took note of some relevant disanalogies between property in oneself and property in external things. Note first that the self-owned world-interactive powers, the possible use of which the SOP is intended to guarantee, are possessed by a living being who is undergoing development, which involves passing through various stages; therefore, these powers are ones that flourish with use and atrophy or even disappear with disuse.36 **To nullify these powers even for a limited time**, then, **is** (very often at least) **not merely temporarily to inconvenience their owner, but, rather, to** **bring about a permanent reduc- tion or even disablement of these powers.** By contrast, a submarine (or a corkscrew) retains its powers even when left indefinitely in a garage (or a drawer). **This difference in the effect that nullification has on self-owned powers versus extra-personal property plausibly justifies a difference in our judgments concerning the acceptability**, from the point of view of justice, of such nullification in the two cases; that is, it justifies adoption of the SOP but not of the POP.37 Second, there is an element of choice (and in particular, of voluntary acquisition) where extra-personal property is concerned that is morally relevant here. **One’s self-owned powers, along with the SOP-guaranteed right to the non-nullification of those powers, are not something one chooses or acquires; one just has them** —indeed, to a great degree one just is the constellation of those powers, abilities, etc.—**and owns them fully. By contrast, extra-personal property is something one chooses to acquire or not to acquire,** and as we have seen, one always acquires property rights in various degrees, from partial to full ownership—and this would include the rights guaranteed by a POP. **If one chooses to acquire a corkscrew under conditions where wine bottles are unavailable, or are even likely at some point to become unavailable, one can hardly blame others if one finds oneself bottle-less**. To fail to acquire POP-like rights regarding the corkscrew (by, say, contracting with someone else to provide one with wine bottles in perpetuity) is not the same thing as to have those rights and then have them violated. **Someone who buys a corkscrew and then finds that he cannot use it is like the person who acquires only partial property rights in a water hole that others have already acquired partial use rights over. He cannot complain that his co-owners have violated his rights; he never acquired those other rights in the first place.** Similarly, the corkscrew owner cannot complain that he has no bottles to open; he never acquired the right to those bottles, only to the corkscrew. If full ownership of a corkscrew requires POP-like rights over it, then all that follows is that corkscrew owners who lack bottles are not full owners of their corkscrews.

## **2**

#### **Counterplan: States ought to limit the Public Trust Doctrine by implementing the hybrid approach outlined in Babcock 21.**

#### **That solves sustainable space development and the aff,**

#### **Babcock 21**

[Hope M. Babcock, 29 October 2021, "22 - Using the Public Trust Doctrine to Manage Property on the Moon", Cambridge University Press, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/cambridge-handbook-of-commons-research-innovations/using-the-public-trust-doctrine-to-manage-property-on-the-moon/18298C56686CA8A396517AB8D217666E, date accessed 1-25-2022] //Lex AT

Having a lottery or an auction of “ownership rights,” or **establishing a system of tradable credits might lessen the equity and technical problems with the economic zone management proposal**. While an auction theoretically would open up the market in development rights to non spacefaring nations, in practice, only the wealthy nations would be able to effectively bid on and secure those rights.58 **However, the idea of tradable credits might work**.59 **Under an outer space trading system, participant nations, regardless of their space faring capacity, would be allotted a fixed number of resource development credits, allowing the credit holder to extract a certain tonnage of materials or develop a fixed amount of celestial surface, during a specified time period**.60 The credits could apply to the amount of the resource a participant was allowed to extract, regardless of location, or could be tied to a particular area of a celestial body. Participants could buy credits from and sell them to other participants.61 The proposal would allow developing nations to benefit from space exploration and exploitation, and participants would run the market reducing the need for an administering international agency. Even though market participants would run the market, an international institution will be needed to allocate tradable credits and devise an allocation methodology that assures non-spacefaring nations receive some benefit. International oversight also will be needed to ensure that nations do not exceed their allotted credits. And tradable credits would need to be anchored by some form of authorization, like a permit, creating another need for a central administrative body. While the idea of tradable development credits is consistent with international law, could assure equitable distribution of the benefits of space development, and provide sufficient incentives for development of these resources, the approach may be too administratively encumbered. The public trust doctrine offers another approach for managing an open access commons. 62 Under this doctrine, the sovereign holds certain common properties in trust in perpetuity for the free and unimpeded use of the general public. The public’s right of access to and use of trust resources is never lost, and neither the government nor private individuals can alienate or otherwise adversely affect those resources unless for a comparable public purpose. Showing its adaptability, supporters of the doctrine are currently arguing in court that it applies to the atmosphere.63 The doctrine places on governments an affirmative, ongoing duty to safeguard the perpetual preservation of trust resources for the benefit of the general public, limiting the sovereign’s power on behalf of both present and future entities. It directs the government not to manage them for private gain and applies to private as well as public resources. Uses of trust resources that are inconsistent with the doctrine can be rescinded. The doctrine effectively places a permanent easement over trust resources that burdens their ownership with an overriding public interest in their preservation. Thus, the public trust doctrine protects the “people’s common heritage,” 64 just as the Moon Treaty protects outer space as part of the common heritage of mankind. A doctrine that imposes an enforceable perpetual duty on the sovereign to preserve trust resources, prevents their alienation for private benefit, and assures public access to them seems a particularly apt property management tool in outer space. The fact that public access to trust resources is so central to the doctrine65 is consistent with international space law’s open access principles. It avoids the problems of alienation and exclusion associated with private property management approaches and does not require the creation of a new administrative authority, as anyone can invoke the doctrine. Of all the management approaches discussed, the **public trust doctrine** seems the most suited to managing property in outer space. **However**, the doctrine **provides no incentives for development of trust resources.66 Its traditional use has been to curtail development, making it potentially a counter productive solution to the beneficial development of outer space**. **Allowing limited use of private property management approaches, like tradable development credits, might buffer that effect – a form of overlapping hybridity67 between one type of property, a commons, and a management regime from another, private property, enabled by application of the public trust doctrine. This approach might allow development of outer space, while assuring that it will not just be profitable for a few; rather, space’s development will be sustainable and equitable, ideally for all**.

#### **Permutation is severance,**

#### **Faraci 20**

[Stephanie L. Faraci, 7-1-2020, "Public Trust Doctrine: Risks in Land Purchases from Governmental Agencies", No Publication, https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/2020/07/public-trust-doctrine-risks-in-land-purchases-from-governmental-agencies, date accessed 1-25-2022] //Lex AT

**The public trust doctrine** **is** an ancient common law principle of property law that establishes the obligation of the government to hold certain natural resources in trust for the public’s benefit. Historically, these protected resources have included lands under navigable waters, which are bodies of water that provide a channel for commerce and transportation of people and goods. Under the doctrine, these waters must remain open to the public for commerce, navigation, fishing, and recreation. **Rooted in the notion that government is better suited than private property owners to manage certain natural resources, the doctrine imposes on the government an affirmative duty to protect, maintain, and hold these resources in trust for the public’s benefit**. Accordingly, **the government may not abdicate its role as fiduciary of trust property, nor alienate or extinguish the trust by granting land held in trust to a private entity for nonpublic trust purposes**.

#### **Expanding government role in the PTD sets precedent for the courts to override other branches,**

#### **Huffman 19**

[James Huffman, 6-19-2019, "The Limits of the Public Trust Doctrine", https://www.perc.org/2019/06/19/the-limits-of-the-public-trust-doctrine/, date accessed 1-25-2022] //Lex AT

**Broadening the set of preexisting public rights protected by the doctrine dramatically expands the scope of regulation**. **What might have been considered a regulatory taking**—in which the value of someone’s property is diminished as a result of regulation—**is rendered a case in which the property owner never possessed the right claimed to be taken**. If property owners never had a right to exclude those seeking access to such resources, for example, there can be no taking when the government enforces that public right. In addition, **an expanded public trust doctrine would impose affirmative duties on government to act for the purpose of protecting public rights**. **Failure of governments to meet such duties can, in turn, result in enforcement actions in the courts. Thus, an expanded public trust doctrine increases the power of the courts and puts courts in the position of overriding the actions of the legislative and executive branches of government**.

#### 

## **3**

#### **Interpretation – All paradigm issues proposed by the affirmative debater must be bidirectional. To clarify, the aff may not claim a particular paradigm on theory only applies to one side.**

#### **Violation – You read [x].**

#### **Standards –**

#### **1.** **Reciprocity – Only granting one side access to a paradigm issue is structurally irreciprocal since I cannot gain access to a particular model of theory debate. All paradigm issues affect my ability to generate offense on theory since I either don’t get an RVI or drop the debater which hinders equal access to the ballot on the same layer. Reciprocity is a voter since it’s the definition of procedural fairness as it structurally changes the chances of winning.**

#### **2.** **Norming – One side having exclusive access to a paradigm issue a) is incoherent since even if particular cases might justify one side getting a paradigm issue it can’t set the norm that one side never gets it b) kills theory clash since we spend more time debating paradigm issues than the actual shells which kills our ability to generate the best actual norms on theory and c) never allows a discussion of which wholistic paradigm issue is generally good because the debate is tailored down to each side which means we never set norms on paradigm issues.**

#### **Voters – Norming is an independent voter since justifying the value of debate necessarily justifies the norms of the activity being good in order for debate to be valuable. Theory education comes first since it is the ultimate test of critical thinking that carries outside round and shapes the activity in a positive way since theory is how we reclaim the activity from repressive rules. This shell controls the internal link to all of theirs since your structural access is precluded this abuse story – we can never endorse norms insofar as you have skewed their creation.**

#### **DD – a) deter abuse b) I spent time reading theory c) The round has already been skewed**

#### **CI – a) Reasonability is arbitrary since idk your BS meter b) It fosters the best norms through encouraging the fairest rule c) Reasonability collapses by debating the Brightline**

#### **No RVI – a) It’s illogical to vote for you for being fair b) Rounds without theory would be irresolvable c) It incentivizes you to bait theory and win off a scripted CI**

Meta-theory outweighs [a] it indicts your ability to read theory [b] any reason theory precedes substance is a reason meta-theory comes first since it’s an epistemic indict. Neg abuse is justified by aff abuse in the context of this shell – I need to have the ability to indict abusive theory arguments otherwise the 1AR can just stand up and just say that 1AR theory outweighs everything else and just collapse for 4 minutes

## **Case**

### **Overview**

#### **The universe is infinite.**

**Bostrom ’08** (Bostrom, Nick [Professor at University of Oxford, director of Oxford’s Future of Humanity Institute, PhD from London School of Economics]. The Infinitarian Challenge to Aggregative Ethics. 2008. http://www.nickbostrom.com/ethics/infinite.pdf)

In the standard Big Bang model, assuming the simplest topology (i.e., that space is singly connected), there are three basic possibilities: the universe can be open, flat, or closed. **Current data suggests a flat or open universe**, although the final verdict is pending. **If the universe is either open or flat, then it [that] is spatially infinite at every point in time and the model entails that it contains an infinite number of galaxies, stars, and planets**. There exists a common misconception which confuses the universe with the (finite) ‘observable universe’. But **the observable part**—the part that coulsd causally affect us—**would be just an infinitesimal fraction of the whole**. Statements about the “mass of the universe” or the “number of protons in the universe” generally refer to the content of this observable part; see e.g. [1]. **Many cosmologists [also] believe that our universe is just one in an infinite ensemble of universes** (a multiverse), **and this adds to the probability that the world is canonically infinite**; for a popular review, see e.g. [1].

#### **There’s always infinite pleasure and pain in the universe—util is incoherent since we can’t add or subtract from that and triggers permissibility.**

lbl