## **1**

#### **Xi’s regime is stable now, but its success depends on strong growth and private sector development.**

**Mitter and Johnson 21** [Rana Mitter and Elsbeth Johnson, [Rana Mitter](https://hbr.org/search?term=rana%20mitter&search_type=search-all) is a professor of the history and politics of modern China at Oxford. [Elsbeth Johnson](https://hbr.org/search?term=elsbeth%20johnson&search_type=search-all), formerly the strategy director for Prudential PLC’s Asian business, is a senior lecturer at MIT’s Sloan School of Management and the founder of SystemShift, a consulting firm. May-June 2021, "What the West Gets Wrong About China," Harvard Business Review, [https://hbr.org/2021/05/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-china accessed 12/14/21](https://hbr.org/2021/05/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-china%20accessed%2012/14/21)] Adam

**In China, however, growth has come in the context of stable communist rule,** suggesting that **democracy and growth are not inevitably mutually dependent**. In fact, **many Chinese believe that the country’s recent economic achievements**—**large-scale** poverty reduction, huge infrastructure investment, and development as a world-class tech innovator—have come about because of, not despite, China’s authoritarian form of government. Its **aggressive handling of Covid-19—in sharp contrast to that of many Western countries with higher death rates and later, less-stringent lockdowns—has, if anything, reinforced that view.**

**China has also defied predictions that its authoritarianism would inhibit its capacity to** [**innovate**](https://hbr.org/2011/06/what-the-west-doesnt-get-about-china)**.** **It is a global leader in AI, biotech, and space exploration.** Some of its technological successes have been driven by market forces: People wanted to buy goods or communicate more easily, and the likes of Alibaba and Tencent have helped them do just that. But **much of the technological progress has come from a highly innovative and well-funded military that has invested heavily in China’s burgeoning new industries.** This, of course, mirrors the role of U.S. defense and intelligence spending in the development of Silicon Valley. **But in China the** consumer applications **have come faster, making more obvious the link between government investment and products and services that benefit individuals.** That’s why **ordinary Chinese people see Chinese companies such as Alibaba, Huawei, and TikTok as sources of national pride—international** vanguards of Chinese success**—rather than simply sources of jobs or GDP, as they might be viewed in the West.**

Thus July 2020 polling data from the Ash Center at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government revealed **95% satisfaction with the Beijing government among Chinese citizens.** Our own experiences on the ground in China confirm this. **Most ordinary people we meet don’t feel that the authoritarian state is solely oppressive,** although it can be that; for them it also provides opportunity. A cleaner in Chongqing now owns several apartments because the CCP reformed property laws. A Shanghai journalist is paid by her state-controlled magazine to fly around the world for stories on global lifestyle trends. A young student in Nanjing can study propulsion physics at Beijing’s Tsinghua University thanks to social mobility and the party’s significant investment in scientific research.

#### **Xi has committed to the commercial space industry as the linchpin of China’s rise – the plan is seen as a complete 180**

**Patel 21** [Neel V. Patel, Neel is a space reporter for MIT Technology Review. 1-21-2021, "China’s surging private space industry is out to challenge the US," MIT Technology Review,<https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/01/21/1016513/china-private-commercial-space-industry-dominance/> accessed 12/14/21] Adam

Until recently, China’s space activity has been overwhelmingly dominated by two state-owned enterprises: the China Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation Limited (CASIC) and the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC). A few **private space firms have been allowed to operate in the country for a while**: for example, there’s the China Great Wall Industry Corporation Limited (in reality a subsidiary of CASC), which has provided commercial launches since it was established in 1980. But for the most part, China’s commercial space industry has been nonexistent. Satellites were expensive to build and launch, and they were too heavy and large for anything but the biggest rockets to actually deliver to orbit. The costs involved were too much for anything but national budgets to handle. That **all changed this past decade as the costs of making satellites and launching rockets plunged.** In 2014, a year **after** **Xi Jinping took over as the new leader of China,** the **Chinese government decided to treat civil space development as a key area of innovation,** as it had already **begun doing with AI and solar power**. It **issued a policy directive called** [**Document 60**](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/www.cpppc.org/en/zy/994006.jhtml) **that year to enable large private investment in companies interested in participating in the space** industry**.** “**Xi’s goal was that** if China has to become a critical player in technology, including in civil space and aerospace, it was critical to develop a space ecosystem that includes the private sector,” says Namrata Goswami, a geopolitics expert based in Montgomery, Alabama, who’s been studying China’s space program for many years. “**He was taking a cue from the American private sector to encourage innovation from a talent pool that extended beyond state-funded organizations.”** As a result, there are **now 78 commercial space companies operating in China,** according to a [2019 report by the Institute for Defense Analyses](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/e/ev/evaluation-of-chinas-commercial-space-sector/d-10873.ashx). More than **half have been founded since 201**4, and the vast majority focus on satellite manufacturing and launch services. For example, **Galactic Energy**, founded in February 2018, is building its Ceres rocket to offer rapid launch service for single payloads, while its Pallas rocket is being built to deploy entire constellations. Rival company **i-Space**, formed in 2016, became the first commercial Chinese company to make it to space with its Hyperbola-1 in July 2019. It wants to pursue reusable first-stage boosters that can land vertically, like those from SpaceX. So does **LinkSpace** (founded in 2014), although it also hopes to use rockets to deliver packages from one terrestrial location to another. **Spacety**, founded in 2016, wants to turn around customer orders to build and launch its small satellites in just six months. In December it launched a miniaturized version of a satellite that uses 2D radar images to build 3D reconstructions of terrestrial landscapes. Weeks later, it [released the first images taken by the satellite](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/spacenews.com/spacety-releases-first-sar-images/), Hisea-1, featuring three-meter resolution. Spacety wants to launch a constellation of these satellites to offer high-quality imaging at low cost. To a large extent, **China is following the same blueprint drawn up by the US**: using **government contracts and** subsidies to give these companies a foot up. US firms like SpaceX benefited greatly from NASA contracts that paid out millions to build and test rockets and space vehicles for delivering cargo to the International Space Station. With that experience under its belt, SpaceX was able to attract more customers with greater confidence. Venture capital is another tried-and-true route. The IDA report estimates that VC **funding for Chinese space companies was up to $516 million in 2018**—far shy of the $2.2 billion American companies raised, but **nothing to scoff at for an industry that really only began seven years ago**. At least **42 companies had no known government funding.** And much of the **government support these companies do receive doesn’t have a federal origin, but a provincial one**. “[These **companies**] are **drawing high-tech development to these local communities,**” says Hines. “And in return, **they’re given more autonomy by the local government.”** While most have headquarters in Beijing, many keep facilities in Shenzhen, Chongqing, and other areas that might draw talent from local universities. There’s also **one advantage specific to China: manufacturing.** “What is the best country to trust for manufacturing needs?” asks James Zheng, the CEO of Spacety’s Luxembourg headquarters. “It’s **China. It’s the manufacturing center of the world.”** Zheng believes the **country is in a better position than any other to** take advantage of the space industry’s new need for **mass production of satellites and rockets alike.** Making friends The **most critical strategic reason to encourage a** private space sector is to create opportunities for international collaboration—particularly to attract customers wary of being seen to mix with the Chinese government. (US agencies and government contractors, for example, are barred from working with any groups the regime funds.) Document 60 and others issued by China’s National Development and Reform Commission were aimed not just at promoting technological innovation, but also at drawing in foreign investment and maximizing a customer base beyond Chinese borders. “China realizes there are certain things they cannot get on their own,” says Frans von der Dunk, a space policy expert at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln. Chinese companies like LandSpace and MinoSpace have worked to accrue funding through foreign investment, escaping dependence on state subsidies. And by avoiding state funding, a company can also avoid an array of restrictions on what it can and can’t do (such as constraints on talking with the media). Foreign investment also makes it easier to compete on a global scale: you’re **taking on clients around the world, launching from other countries, and bringing talent from outside China.** Although **China is taking inspiration from the US in building out its private industry,** the **nature of the Chinese state also means these new companies face obstacles that their rivals in the West don’t have to worry about**. While Chinese companies may look **private on paper**, they must **still submit to government guidance and control**, and accept some level of interference. It may be difficult for them to make a case to potential overseas customers that they are independent. The **distinction between companies that are truly private and those that are more or less state actors is still quite fuzzy**, especially if the **government is a frequent customer**. “That could still lead to a lack of trust from other partners,” says Goswami. It doesn’t help that the government itself is often [very cagey about what its national program is even up to](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-54076895). And Hines adds that it’s **not always clear exactly how separate these companies are from, say, the People’s Liberation Army**, given the historical ties between the space and defense sectors. “Some of these things will pose significant hurdles for the commercial space sector as it tries to expand,” he says.

#### **Loss of stability causes the CCP to escalate tensions and lash out – uniquely threatens Taiwan.**

**Blumenthal and Urda 9/28** [09-28-20, Dan Blumenthal, Jakob Urda, The National Interest, “China’s aggressive tactics aim to bolster the Communist Party’s legitimacy”, https://www.aei.org/articles/chinas-aggressive-tactics-aim-to-bolster-the-communist-partys-legitimacy/, Jakob Urda is a Masters Student at Georgetown University and research specialist at a technology consultancy. He has previously worked at the Chicago Project on Security and Threats and studied in the Institute for the Study of War’s War Studies Program. Dan Blumenthal is the director of Asian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute and the author of the forthcoming book The China Nightmare: the Grand Ambitions of a Decaying State (AEI Press, November 17, 2020] //Lex AKu

Yet **for the CCP, external aggression is a necessary tool to combat internal weakness.** **The CCP is obsessed with its fragilities, such as the threat of losing popular support and legitimacy and demands for more justice and freedoms.** **When Chinese people criticize their government, China must** act more aggressively abroad. Beijing uses external aggression to fan Chinese nationalism and cast the CCP as the protector **of the people and champion of a new era of Chinese glory.** Coronavirus was a true moment of weakness for the CCP, as it exposed fissures in China’s overcentralized authoritarian political system to light. A now-infamous example of Chinese paranoia over potentially out-of-control domestic crises was the case of Dr. Li Wenliang. On February 7, Li, a doctor who warned of the coronavirus but was quickly censored by the Wuhan police, died from the virus himself. Li’s death quickly became the top trending topic on Chinese social media with hashtags such as “We want freedom of speech.” The CCP censored all mentions of Li or any coronavirus failings, fearing more organized protests. Simultaneously, the coronavirus battered China’s economic growth, which underpins the CCP’s claim to legitimacy, with an unprecedented 6.8 percent Q1 contraction. Far from the unified front which Beijing seeks to project, the coronavirus revealed the CCP’s dysfunction. For example, Dali, a midsize city, intercepted and distributed a shipment of surgical masks headed to the hard-hit municipality of Chongqing. Similarly, the City of Qingdao instructed customs officials to hold on to a shipment of masks and medical products headed to Shenyang. At the same time, Hong Kong dealt the CCP a major political embarrassment when it halted traffic coming in from the mainland. These reports demonstrate the government’s inability to enforce basic order among competing cities and provinces. **In response to the tumult caused by the coronavirus crisis, the CCP mobilized popular support by** reigniting conflicts with its neighbors. On April 2, during the peak of the coronavirus, **a Chinese maritime security vessel sank a Vietnamese fishing boat near the Parcel islands.** Just two weeks later on April 16, **China escalated a month’s long standoff with Malaysia by deploying the coast guard to a disputed oil shelf**. **China also stepped up its military activities targeting Taiwan**—who’s coronavirus response was strong and effective—**with as many as three incursions in a single week in June.** These episodes were widely condemned by the international community, but greeted with nationalist revelry at home. **The** need to project strength and unity domestically explains the timing of China’s border dispute with India**.** **In May, violent brawls broke out between Chinese and Indian soldiers near Sikkim. On June 15, the Indian government reported that twenty Indian soldiers were killed by Chinese soldiers in the Galwan River Valley**, a disputed border region controlled by India but claimed by China. The **CCP has made full use of the crisis to rally nationalism**. China’s foreign ministry issued statements blaming India for the clashes and state-propaganda popularized the slogan “China is not afraid.” The Global Times, a propaganda outlet, cast the clashes as an Indian invasion, saying “India has illegally constructed defense facilities across the border into Chinese territory in the Galwan Valley region.” Importantly, Chinese state-owned news outlets were also running news about India’s poor coronavirus response at the time, in contrast to its own “successes.” The recent border clashes mirror China’s 2017 standoff with India at Doklam, a strategic point near Bhutan. During the conflict, Foreign Minister Wang Yi made statements that cast the conflict as an Indian attack upon China, and state media circulated images from the 1962 Sino-Indian War, to remind the China populace that Beijing had defeated Delhi before. The India clashes coincided with another threat to CCP legitimacy: a fight to remove pro-democracy advocates from the Hong Kong Legislative Council. China ended up harshly cracking down on the supposedly autonomous city as well. Understanding China’s weaknesses is essential for policymakers attempting to make sense of its aggression. This dynamic is not only a Xi Jinping phenomenon: China’s modern history shows that domestic crises are often followed by belligerence. A **study that pre-dated Xi’s rule, with a dataset of over three thousand interactions between the United States and China, found that the CCP was twice as likely to initiate disputes when the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) experienced a substantial drop.** **The SSE is a barometer of elite sentiment in China because the government pledges to protect elite investments and uses SSE listings to reward party insiders.** Insight into the CCP’s domestic political objectives helps determine the magnitude of the conflict and appropriate response. **The editor of the Global Times wrote that a belligerent foreign policy was “necessary to satisfy the Chinese people.”** Policymakers can use history to deduce what levels of aggression are “necessary” for the CCP’s goals. In India, it is unlikely that clashes will escalate into invasion because the current skirmishes satisfy the CCP’s purpose of bolstering legitimacy. However, **Taiwan** may be **in particular danger from China’s reactionary aggression.** This is because **the ways in which conflict with Taiwan would bolster the CCP’s legitimacy align more closely with more violent coercion**—reunification is a core element of the CCP’s platform and Taiwan’s clear success fighting the coronavirus is a major blow to Beijing’s legitimacy. Because Taiwan’s “threat” to the CCP stems from its mere existence, it is particularly vulnerable to reactionary aggression. Xi is a self-proclaimed follower of Mao. So, the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis is a powerful example; Mao needed to generate support for the great leap forward and deflect criticism **from poor economic growth.** To stir the nation, **Mao seized islands controlled by Taiwan and threatened an invasion of the country until restrained by American nuclear brinksmanship.** Over the last three months, China has faced another crisis in the form of historic floods. The Yangtze river basin has been inundated, affecting sixty-three million Chinese and inflicting over twenty-five billion dollars in direct damages. Many Chinese have raised concerns that the government’s massive infrastructure projects have worsened the crisis by draining wetlands and promoting development in flood-prone areas. Poor transparency has stirred more backlash as the CCP has been accused of hiding the extent of damages and censoring criticism. One political commentator in Beijing even predicted that the “Chinese public will question Beijing from this year’s continuous natural and man-made disasters, and even question China’s governance model and its effectiveness.” Instead of hoping that the crisis created by the current floods will give China’s neighbors breathing space, **the** United States should brace itself for the possibility of renewed aggression**. The CCP must prove its worthiness to the tens of millions of displaced people across China**, **making it prone to lashing out**. **Taiwan may be an appealing target; it has been spared from flooding and has been visible in assisting neighboring countries like Japan with post-flood reconstruction**. Already, China has begun live-fire sea-crossing drills near Taiwan.

#### **Attempts at Taiwan cause US draw in, even during decline**

**Bernstein 20** Richard Bernstein,, 8-17-2020, "The Scary War Game Over Taiwan That the U.S. Loses Again and Again," No Publication, https://www.realclearinvestigations.com/articles/2020/08/17/the\_scary\_war\_game\_over\_taiwan\_that\_the\_us\_loses\_again\_and\_again\_124836.html mvp

But as **the U.S. seeks a closer alliance with Taiwan – illustrated by** the visit of Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar there last week, the highest-level official U.S. delegation to the island in 40 years **– the possibility of war between the two superpowers may be more than theoretical: A bill now before both houses of Congress, the Taiwan Defense Act, would end the long-held American policy of “strategic ambiguity” –** which aims to keep China guessing as to the U.S. response to any attempt to take Taiwan by force – **and require the U.S. “to delay, degrade, and ultimately defeat” an attempt by China “to use military force to seize control of Taiwan.”**

C/a taiwan scenario

## **2**

#### **Interpretation – the aff may not defend that the appropriation of outer space by a certain set of private entities is unjust.**

#### **Entities is a generic bare plural**

**Nebel 20** [Jake Nebel is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Southern California and executive director of Victory Briefs. He writes a lot of this stuff lol – duh.] “Indefinite Singular Generics in Debate” Victory Briefs, 19 August 2020. no url AG

I agree that if “a democracy” in the resolution just meant “one or more democracy,” then a country-specific affirmative could be topical. But, as I will explain in this topic analysis, that isn’t what “a democracy” means in the resolution. To see why, we first need to back up a bit and review (or learn) the idea of generic generalizations.

The most common way of expressing a generic in English is through a *bare plural*. **A bare plural is a plural noun phrase, like “dogs” and “cats,” that lacks an overt determiner**. (A determiner is **a word that tells us which or how many**: determiners include quantifier words like “all,” “some,” and “most,” demonstratives like “this” and “those,” posses- sives like “mine” and “its,” and so on.) LD resolutions often contain bare plurals, and **that is the most common clue to their genericity**.

We have already seen some examples of generics that are not bare plurals: “A whale is a mammal,” “A beaver builds dams,” and “The woolly mammoth is extinct.” The first two examples use indefinite singulars—singular nouns preceded by the indefinite article “a”—and the third is a definite singular since it is preceded by the definite article “the.” Generics can also be expressed with bare singulars (“Syrup is viscous”) and even verbs (as we’ll see later on). The resolution’s “a democracy” is an indefinite singular, and so it very well might be—and, as we’ll soon see, is—generic.

But it is also important to keep in mind that, just as not all generics are bare plurals, not all bare plurals are generic. “Dogs are barking” is true as long as some dogs are barking. Bare plurals can be used in particular ways to express existential statements. The key question for any given debate resolution that contains a bare plural is whether that occurrence of the bare plural is generic or existential.

The same is true of indefinite singulars. As debaters will be quick to point out, some uses of the indefinite singular really do mean “some” or “one or more”: “A cat is on the mat” is clearly not a generic generalization about cats; it’s true as long as some cat is on the mat. The question is whether the indefinite singular “a democracy” is existential or generic in the resolution.

Now, my own view is that, if we understand the difference between existential and generic statements, and if we approach the question impartially, without any invest- ment in one side of the debate, we can almost always just tell which reading is correct just by thinking about it. **It is clear that “In a democracy, voting ought to be compul- sory” doesn’t mean “There is one or more democracy in which voting ought to be com- pulsory.”** I don’t think a fancy argument should be required to show this any more than a fancy argument should be required to show that “A duck doesn’t lay eggs” is a generic—a false one because ducks do lay eggs, even though some ducks (namely males) don’t. And if a debater contests this by insisting that “a democracy” is existen- tial, the judge should be willing to resolve competing claims by, well, judging—that is, by using her judgment. Contesting a claim by insisting on its negation or demanding justification doesn’t put any obligation on the judge to be neutral about it. (Otherwise the negative could make every debate irresolvable by just insisting on the negation of every statement in the affirmative speeches.) Even if the insistence is backed by some sort of argument, we can reasonably reject an argument if we know its conclusion to be false, even if we are not in a position to know exactly where the argument goes wrong. Particularly in matters of logic and language, speakers have more direct knowledge of particular cases (e.g., that some specific inference is invalid or some specific sentence is infelicitious) than of the underlying explanations.

But that is just my view, and not every judge agrees with me, so it will be helpful to consider some arguments for the conclusion that we already know to be true: that, even if the United States is a democracy and ought to have compulsory voting, that doesn’t suffice to show that, in a democracy, voting ought to be compulsory—in other words, that “a democracy” in the resolution is generic, not existential.

Second, **existential uses of the indefinite, such as “A cat is on the mat,” are upward- entailing.3 This means that if you replace the noun with a more general one, such as “An animal is on the mat,” the sentence will still be true. So let’s do that with “a democracy.” Does the resolution entail “In a society, voting ought to be compulsory”? Intuitively no**t, because you could think that voting ought to be compulsory in democracies but not in other sorts of societies. This suggests that “**a democracy” in the resolution is not existential**.

#### **It applies to this topic – a] entities is an existential bare plural bc it has no determiner b] The sentence “The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust” does not imply “the appropriation of outer space by private and public entities is unjust”**

#### **Violation – they spec entities in china**

#### **Standards**

#### **1] Limits – they can spec infinite different entities like spaceX, etc.. - that’s supercharged by the ability to spec combinations of types of entities. This takes out functional limits – it’s impossible for me to research every possible combination of entities, governments, and appropriation.**

#### **2] TVA solves – just read your aff as an advantage to a whole rez aff – we don’t stop them from reading new FWs, mechanisms or advantages. PICs aren’t aff offense – a] it’s ridiculous to say that neg potential abuse justifies the aff being non-T b] There’s only a small number of pics on this topic c] PICs incentivize them to write better affs that can generate solvency deficits to PICs**

#### **Fairness and education are voters – debate’s a game that needs rules to evaluate it and education gives us portable skills for life like research and thinking.**

#### **Drop the debater – a) they have a 7-6 rebuttal advantage and the 2ar to make args I can’t respond to, b) it deters future abuse and sets a positive norm.**

#### **Use competing interps – a) reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention since we don’t know your bs meter, b) collapses to competing interps – we justify 2 brightlines under an offense defense paradigm just like 2 interps.**

#### **No RVIs – a) illogical – you shouldn’t win for being fair – it’s a litmus test for engaging in substance, c) chilling effect – forces you to split your 2AR so you can’t collapse and misconstrue the 2NR, d) topic ed – prevents 1AR blipstorm scripts and allows us to get back to substance after resolving theory**

## **3**

#### **Ethics must began a priori. Permissibility negates since the word ought in the resolution indicates an obligation so its their burden to prove the existence of one.**

#### **1] Is/Ought Gap – experience in the phenomenal world only tells us what is since we can only perceive what is, not what ought to be. But it’s impossible to derive an ought from descriptive premises, so there needs to be additional a priori premises within the noumenal world to make a moral theory.**

#### **The existence of extrinsic goodness requires unconditional human worth—that means we must treat others as ends in themselves.**

**Korsgaard ’83** (Christine M., “Two Distinctions in Goodness,” The Philosophical Review Vol. 92, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), pp. 169-195, JSTOR) OS/Recut Lex AKu \*brackets for gendered language

The argument shows how Kant's idea of justification works. It can be read as a kind of regress upon the conditions, starting from an important assumption. The assumption is that **when a rational being makes a choice or undertakes an action,[they] he or she supposes the object to be good, and its pursuit to be justified**. At least, **if there is a categorical imperative there must be objectively good ends, for then there are necessary actions and so necessary ends** (G 45-46/427-428 and Doctrine of Virtue 43-44/384-385). **In order for there to be any objectively good ends, however, there must be something that is unconditionally good and so can serve as a sufficient condition of their goodness**. Kant considers what this might be: **it cannot be an object of inclination**, for those have only a conditional worth, "**for if the inclinations and the needs founded on them did not exist, their object would be without worth**" (G 46/428). It cannot be the inclinations themselves because a rational being would rather be free from them. Nor can it be external things, which serve only as means. So, Kant asserts, **the unconditionally valuable thing must be "humanity" or "rational nature,"** which he defines as "**the power set to an end**" (G 56/437 and DV 51/392). Kant explains that **regarding your existence as a rational being as an end in itself is a "subjective principle of human action."** By this I understand him to mean that **we must regard ourselves as capable of conferring value upon the objects of our choice, the ends that we set, because we must regard our ends as good**. But since "every other rational being thinks of his existence by the same rational ground which holds also for myself' (G 47/429), **we must regard others as capable of conferring value by reason of their rational choices and so also as ends in themselves**. Treating another as an end in itself thus involves making that person's ends as far as possible your own (G 49/430). **The ends that are chosen by any rational being, possessed of the humanity or rational nature that is fully realized in a good will, take on the status of objective goods. They are not intrinsically valuable, but they are objectively valuable in the sense that every rational being has a reason to promote or realize them**. For this reason it is our duty to promote the happiness of others-the ends that they choose-and, in general, to make the highest good our end.

#### **Practical reason resolves regress - I can keep asking “why should I follow this” but asking “why reason” requires reason so its inescapable. Regress collapses to skep since no one can generate obligations absent grounds for accepting them.**

Ethics must be universal – 2+2 = 4 can’t be true for me but not for you. That’s incoherent.

Now negate

#### **1] Spece mandates a market-oriented approach—that negates**

**Broker 20** [(Tyler, work has been published in the Gonzaga Law Review, the Albany Law Review and the University of Memphis Law Review.) **“Space Law Can Only Be Libertarian Minded,”** Above the Law, 1-14-20,<https://abovethelaw.com/2020/01/space-law-can-only-be-libertarian-minded/>] TDI

The impact on human daily life from a transition to the virtually unlimited resource reality of space cannot be overstated. **However, when it comes to the law, a minimalist, dare I say libertarian, approach appears as the only applicable system.** In the words of NASA, “2020 promises to be a big year for space exploration.” Yet, as Rand Simberg points out in Reason magazine, **it is actually private American investment that is currently moving space exploration to “a pace unseen since the 1960s.”** According to Simberg, due to this increase in private investment “We are now on the verge of getting affordable private access to orbit for large masses of payload and people.” The impact of that type of affordable travel into space might sound sensational to some, but in reality the benefits that space can offer are far greater than any benefit currently attributed to any major policy proposal being discussed at the national level. The sheer amount of resources available within our current reach/capabilities simply speaks for itself. However, although those new realities will, as Simberg says, “bring to the fore a lot of ideological issues that up to now were just theoretical,” I believe it will also eliminate many economic and legal distinctions we currently utilize today. **For example, the sheer number of resources we can already obtain in space means that in the rapidly near future, the distinction between a nonpublic good or a public good will be rendered meaningless. In other words, because the resources available within our solar system exist in such quantities, all goods will become nonrivalrous in their consumption and nonexcludable in their distribution.** This would mean government engagement in the public provision of a nonpublic good, even at the trivial level, or what Kevin Williamson defines as socialism, is rendered meaningless or impossible. In fact, in space, I fail to see how any government could even try to legally compel collectivism in the way Simberg fears. Similar to many economic distinctions, however, it appears that many laws, both the good and the bad, will also be rendered meaningless as soon as we begin to utilize the resources within our solar system. For example, if every human being is given access to the resources that allows them to replicate anything anyone else has, or replace anything “taken” from them instantly, what would be the point of theft laws? If you had virtually infinite space in which you can build what we would now call luxurious livable quarters, all without exploiting human labor or fragile Earth ecosystems when you do it, what sense would most property, employment, or commercial law make? Again, this is not a pipe dream, no matter how much our population grows for the next several millennia, the amount of resources within our solar system can sustain such an existence for every human being. **Rather than panicking about the future, we should try embracing it, or at least meaningfully preparing for it. Currently, the Outer Space Treaty, or as some call it “the Magna Carta of Space,” is silent on the issue of whether private individuals or corporate entities can own territory in space. Regardless of whether governments allow it, however, private citizens are currently obtaining the ability to travel there, and if human history is any indicator, private homesteading will follow**, flag or no flag. We Americans know this is how a Wild West starts, where most regulation becomes the impractical pipe dream. **But again, this would be a Wild West where the exploitation of human labor and fragile Earth ecosystem makes no economic sense, where every single human can be granted access to resources that even the wealthiest among us now would envy, and where innovation and imagination become the only things we would recognize as currency. Only a libertarian-type system, that guarantees basic individual rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness could be valued and therefore human fidelity to a set of laws made possible, in such an existence.**

#### **2] Forbidding ownership of unowned property is a form of restricting freedom.**

**Feser 2**, (Edward Feser, 1-1-2005, accessed on 12-15-2021, Cambridge University Press, "THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN UNJUST INITIAL ACQUISITION | Social Philosophy and Policy | Cambridge Core", Edward C. Feser is an American philosopher. He is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College in Pasadena, California. [https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)[brackets](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)%5bbrackets) for gen lang]//phs st

There is. **An alternative, soft-line approach could acknowledge that the initial acquirer who abuses a monopoly over a water hole** (or any similar crucial resource) **does commit an injustice against those who are disad- vantaged, but such an approach could still hold that the acquirer never- theless has not committed an injustice in acquisition** —his acquisition was, as I have said, neither just nor unjust. **Nor does he fail to own what he has acquired**; he still cannot be said to have stolen the water from anyone. Rather, **his injustice is an unjust use of what he owns, on a par with the unjust use I make of my self-owned fist when I wield it, unprovoked, to bop you on your self-owned nose.** In what sense does the water-hole owner use his water unjustly, though? He doesn’t try to drown anyone in it, after all— indeed, **the whole problem is that he won’t let anybody near it!** Eric Mack gives us the answer we need in what he has put forward as the **“self-ownership proviso”** (SOP).28 **This is a proviso not** (as the Lock- ean proviso is) **on the initial acquisition of property, but rather on how one can use his property in a way that respects others’ self-ownership rights**. **It is motivated by consideration of the fact that the talents, abilities, capac- ities, energies,** etc., **that a person rightfully possesses as a self-owner are inherently “world-interactive”;** that is, it is of **their very essence that they are directed toward the extra-personal environment**.29 **Your capacity to use your hand, for instance, is just a capacity to grasp and manipulate external objects;** thus, **what you own in owning your hand is something essentially grasping** and manipulating.30 Now if someone were to cut off your hand or invasively keep you from using it (by tying your arm against your body or holding it behind your back), he would obviously be violating your self-ownership rights. But **there are**, Mack suggests, **other, noninvasive ways in which those rights might be violated. If**, to use an example of Mack’s, **I effectively nullify your ability to use your hand by creating a device that causes anything you reach for to be propelled beyond your grasp,** making it impossible for you ever to grasp or manip- ulate anything, **I have violated your right to your hand** as much as if I had cut it off or tied it down. I have, in any case, prevented your right to your hand from being anything more than a formal right, one that is practically useless. In the interests of guaranteeing respect for substantive, robust rights of self-ownership, then, **“[t]he SOP requires that persons not deploy their legitimate holdings**, i.e., their extra-personal property, **in ways that severely**, albeit noninvasively, **disable any person’s world-interactive powers.”** 31 **The SOP follows**, in Mack’s view, **from the thesis of self-ownership itself**; or, at any rate, the considerations that would lead anyone to accept that thesis should also, in his view, lead one to accept the proviso.32 A brief summary of a few of Mack’s thought experiments should suffice to give a sense of why this is so.33 In what Mack calls the Adam’s Island example, Adam acquires a previously uninhabited island and later refuses a shipwrecked Zelda permission to come ashore, as a result of which she remains struggling at sea (and presumably drowns). In the Paternalist Caging example, instead of drowning, Zelda becomes caught offshore in a cage Adam has constructed for catching large sea mammals, and, rather than releasing her, Adam keeps her in the cage and feeds her regularly. In the Knuckle-Scraper Barrier example, Zelda falls asleep on some unowned ground, whereupon a gang of oafish louts encircles her and, using their bodies and arms as barriers, refuses to let her out of the circle (accusing her of assault if she touches them in order to climb over or break through). In the Disabling Property Barrier example, instead of a human barrier, Adam constructs a plastic shield over and around the unowned plot of ground upon which Zelda sleeps, accusing her of trespassing upon his property when she awakens and tries to escape by breaking through the plastic. And in the (similarly named) Disabling Property Barriers example, seem to suggest an Aristotelian-Thomistic conception of natural function, and though this by no means troubles me, it might not be what Mack himself has in mind (nor, of course, is it something every philosopher is going to sympathize with). Mack’s view nevertheless seems to require something like this conception. And something like it —enough like it to do the job Mack needs to be done, anyway—is arguably to be found in Larry Wright’s well- known reconstruction, in modern Darwinian terms, of the traditional notion of natural function. See Larry Wright, “Functions,” Philosophical Review 82, no. 2 (1973): 139–68. Adam, instead of enclosing Zelda in a plastic barrier, encloses in plastic barriers every external object that Zelda would otherwise be able to use — thus, in effect, enclosing her in a larger, all-encompassing plastic barrier of a more eccentric shape. In all of these cases, Mack says, although Zelda’s formal rights of self-ownership have not been violated—no one has invaded the area enclosed by the surface of her skin —her rights over her self-owned powers, and in particular her ability to exercise those powers, have nevertheless been nullified. But a plausible self-ownership- based theory surely cannot allow for this. It cannot, for instance, allow the innocent Zelda justly to be imprisoned in any of the ways described! If Mack is right, then it seems we have, in the SOP, grounds for holding that a water-hole monopolist would indeed be committing an injustice against anyone he refuses water to, or to whom he charges exorbitant prices for access. The injustice would be a straightforward violation of a person’s rights to self-ownership, a case of nullifying a person’s self- owned powers in a way analogous to Adam’s or the knuckle-scrapers’ nullification of Zelda’s self-owned powers. It would not be an injustice in initial acquisition, however. The water-hole monopolist still owns the water hole as much as he ever did; he just cannot use it in a way that violates other individuals’ self-ownership rights (either by drowning them in it or by nullifying their self-owned powers by denying them access to it when there is no alternative way for them to gain access to the water necessary for the use of their self-owned powers). Is Mack right? The hard-liner might dig in his heels and insist that none of Mack’s examples amount to self-ownership-violating injustices; instead, they are merely subtle but straightforward property rights violations or cases of moral failings of various other sorts (cruelty, selfishness, etc.). The Adam’s Island case, for starters, is roughly analogous to the example of the water-hole monopolist, so that it arguably cannot give any non-question- begging support to the SOP, if the SOP is then supposed to show that the water-hole example involves an injustice. The Disabling Property Barriers case might also be viewed as unable to provide any non-question-begging support, since Adam’s encasing everything in plastic might plausibly be interpreted as his acquiring everything, in which case we are back to a water-hole-type monopoly example. The Knuckle-Scraper Barrier and Dis- abling Property Barrier examples might be explained by saying that in falling asleep on the unowned plot of land, Zelda in effect has come (at least temporarily) to acquire it, and (by virtue of walking) to acquire also the path she took to get to it, so that the knuckle-scrapers and Adam violate her property rights (not her self-ownership rights) in not allowing her to escape. The Paternalist Caging example can perhaps be explained by arguing that in building the cage, Adam has acquired the water route leading to it, so that in swimming this route (and thus getting caught in the cage) Zelda has violated his property rights and, therefore, can justly be caged. Accordingly, the hard-liner might insist, we can explain all of these examples in a hard-line way and thus avoid commitment to the SOP. Such a hard-line response would be ingenious (well, maybe), but still, I think, ultimately doomed to failure. Can the Paternalist Caging example, to start with, plausibly be explained away in the manner that I have suggested? Does Adam commit no injustice against Zelda even if he never lets her out? It will not do to write this off merely as a case of excessive punishment (explaining the injustice of which would presumably not require commitment to the SOP). For suppose Adam says, after a mere five minutes of confinement, “I’m no longer punishing you; you’ve paid your debt and are free to go, as far as I’m concerned. But I’m not going to bother exerting the effort to let you out. I never forced you to get in the cage, after all —you did it on your own —and you have no right to the use of my self-owned cage-opening powers to fix your mistake! So teleport out, if you can. Or get someone else —if you can find someone —to let you out.” Adam would be neither violating Zelda’s rights to external property nor excessively punishing her in this case; nor would he be invasively vio- lating her self-ownership rights. But wouldn’t he still be committing an injustice, however noninvasively? Don’t we need something like the SOP to explain why this is so? The barrier examples, for their part, do not require Zelda’s walking and falling asleep on virgin territory, which thus (arguably) becomes her prop- erty. We can, to appeal to the sort of science-fiction scenario beloved of philosophers, imagine instead a bizarre chance disruption of the structure of space-time that teleports Zelda into Adam’s plastic shell or into the midst of the knuckle-scrapers. There is no question now of their violating her property rights; yet don’t they still commit an injustice by nullifying her self-owned powers in refusing to allow her to exit? Consider a parallel example concerning property ownership itself. If your prized $50,000 copy of Captain America Comics number 1, due to another rupture in space-time or just to a particularly strong wind that blows it out of your hands and through my window, suddenly appears on the floor of my living room, do I have the right to refuse to bring it back out to you or to allow you to come in and get it? Suppose I attempt to justify my refusal by saying, “I won’t touch it, and you’re free to have it back if you can arrange another space-time rupture or gust of wind. But I refuse to exert my self-owned powers to bring it out to you, or to allow you on my property to get it. I never asked for it to appear in my living room, after all!” Would anyone accept this justification? Doesn’t your property right in the comic book require me to give it back to you? The hard-liner might suggest that this example transports the SOP advocate out of the frying pan and into the fire. For if the SOP is true, wouldn’t we also have to commit ourselves to a “property-ownership proviso” (POP) that requires us not to nullify anyone’s ability to use his external private property in a way consistent with its “world-interactive powers”? If I build a miniature submarine in my garage, and you have the only swimming pool within one thousand miles, must you allow me the use of your pool lest you nullify my ability to use the sub? If (to take an example of Cohen’s cited by Mack) I own a corkscrew, must I be provided with wine bottles to open lest the corkscrew sadly fail to fulfill its full potential?34 Mack’s response to this line of thought seems basically to amount to a bit of backpedaling on the claim that his proviso really follows from the notion of self-ownership per se —so as to avoid the conclusion that a (rather unlibertarian and presumably redistributionist) POP would also, in par- allel fashion, follow from the concept of property ownership. His response seems, instead, to emphasize the idea that the considerations favoring self-ownership also favor, via an independent line of reasoning, the SOP.35 In my view, however, a better response would be one that took note of some relevant disanalogies between property in oneself and property in external things. Note first that the self-owned world-interactive powers, the possible use of which the SOP is intended to guarantee, are possessed by a living being who is undergoing development, which involves passing through various stages; therefore, these powers are ones that flourish with use and atrophy or even disappear with disuse.36 **To nullify these powers even for a limited time**, then, **is** (very often at least) **not merely temporarily to inconvenience their owner, but, rather, to** **bring about a permanent reduc- tion or even disablement of these powers.** By contrast, a submarine (or a corkscrew) retains its powers even when left indefinitely in a garage (or a drawer). **This difference in the effect that nullification has on self-owned powers versus extra-personal property plausibly justifies a difference in our judgments concerning the acceptability**, from the point of view of justice, of such nullification in the two cases; that is, it justifies adoption of the SOP but not of the POP.37 Second, there is an element of choice (and in particular, of voluntary acquisition) where extra-personal property is concerned that is morally relevant here. **One’s self-owned powers, along with the SOP-guaranteed right to the non-nullification of those powers, are not something one chooses or acquires; one just has them** —indeed, to a great degree one just is the constellation of those powers, abilities, etc.—**and owns them fully. By contrast, extra-personal property is something one chooses to acquire or not to acquire,** and as we have seen, one always acquires property rights in various degrees, from partial to full ownership—and this would include the rights guaranteed by a POP. **If one chooses to acquire a corkscrew under conditions where wine bottles are unavailable, or are even likely at some point to become unavailable, one can hardly blame others if one finds oneself bottle-less**. To fail to acquire POP-like rights regarding the corkscrew (by, say, contracting with someone else to provide one with wine bottles in perpetuity) is not the same thing as to have those rights and then have them violated. **Someone who buys a corkscrew and then finds that he cannot use it is like the person who acquires only partial property rights in a water hole that others have already acquired partial use rights over. He cannot complain that his co-owners have violated his rights; he never acquired those other rights in the first place.** Similarly, the corkscrew owner cannot complain that he has no bottles to open; he never acquired the right to those bottles, only to the corkscrew. If full ownership of a corkscrew requires POP-like rights over it, then all that follows is that corkscrew owners who lack bottles are not full owners of their corkscrews.

## **Case – fwk**

#### **1] Pain and pleasure aren’t a reliable starting point for ethics – everyone has a constantly changing and different account of what causes them pain or pleasure, i.e a masochist or a smoker which makes aggregating impossible since empirical circumstances are fluctuating.**

#### **2] Kant hijacks – the way to maximize well – being is by following the categorical imperative since it avoids pain through things like murder and exploitation.**

#### **3] Induction fails-induction relies on another induction since we are literally unable to predict the future which is circular. Only deduction solves which mandates intentionality.**

#### **4] Infinite consequences-every action has an infinite number of consequences proven by the butterfly effect- this means that there’s an infinite obligation triggering infinite regression.**

#### 

### **AT: Moen**

Group the Moen Evidence

#### **1] C/A Korsgaard – we confer value upon pleasure it’s not intrinsically valuable.**

#### **2] Impact justified - The evidence just asserts that pa3in and pleasure are an end value without explaining how or why that is the case.**

3] Even if pleasure is intrinsically valuable we have to set and pursue that end of achieving it

### **AT: Bostrom**

#### **1] Presumes we care about consequentialism.**

#### **2] Fallacy of origin – Just because extinction precludes moral theorizing, doesnt meant that extinction is necessarily a good or a bad thing which proves its impact justified. We could be alive and theorize that life is a bad thing.**

3] **Prefer impacts happening now – freedom violations outweigh (A) probability - they’re certain (B) magnitude – they’re worse because actors’ intrinsic value is being infringed on and (C) strength of link – extinction’s strength of link to util is super weak, it’s just more pain, that’s only marginally worse than the impact of something like nuke war whereas mine is super high because freedom violations are the worst thing to happen under the framing**

## **Case – Adv**

### **Private not key**

#### **They ban appropriation which means that private companies can't go out into space and own asteroids but that doesn't prevent them from commercializing tech and giving it to the government or just launching sats**

#### **Chinese space will be dominated by government enterprises — they're far more established making private corporations unprofitable and limits them to a niche role instead of broad capabilities**

**Zhou and Zhang 21** [Qian Zhou and Zoey Zhang, 6-18-2021, Qian manages editorial and research operations for Asia Briefing in China. She serves as a legal expert, providing foreign companies with advice on doing business in China. In addition, she manages all China Briefing magazines and guides and consults on business intelligence projects. As a legal specialist, Qian leads research and advisory on a range of FDI concerns in China, including pre-investment advisory, business model comparison, corporate establishment, corporate administration, internal control, and inter-cultural management. Qian also leads regulatory monitoring activities for China Briefing. She examines policies to gauge their impact on key FDI sectors, including pharmaceuticals, medical devices, medical institutions, education, cosmetics, health food, and green industries, amongst others. Qian holds LLM in International Law from Transnational Law and Business University, Korea and a BL in Law from China University of Political Science and Law, China. She is a Chinese native. Zoey is an Associate Editor for Asia Briefing based in Shanghai, China. She monitors business, economic, and regulatory issues in China and provides market insights for foreign investors. Zoey specializes in writing breaking news and in-depth features and analysis relating to regulatory developments, regional investment strategies, industry trends, and economic phenomena. Prior to joining Asia Briefing, Zoey was employed as an agency development officer at a UK-based Fortune 500 insurance company in Hong Kong, where she assisted with corporate business expansion. Earlier in her career, she interned in print and online media, where she gained a wide range of experience in general news, business journalism, data analysis, and graphic design. Zoey earned a master’s degree in International Journalism from Hong Kong Baptist University and an undergraduate degree in Financial Journalism from the Central University of Finance and Economics in Beijing, China. She is a native of China.

"Tapping into China’s Space Program," China Briefing News, https://www.china-briefing.com/news/tapping-into-chinas-space-program/] mk

China’s space program From the launch of China’s space program in the mid-1950s to becoming a complete space power with autonomous access to outer space and to deep-space exploration, China has been very persistent in pursuing a “space dream”, as said by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013. Especially in recent years, China’s space industry has produced remarkable achievements. In 2019, China became the first country to send an uncrewed rover to the far side of the Moon. In 2020, China successfully put into orbit its final Beidou satellite in June, sent an unmanned probe to Mars in July, launched an uncrewed mission called Chang’e-5 with the aim of collecting lunar material in November, and successfully landed the Chang’e-5 probe on the moon’s surface in December. In 2021, China accelerated its Tiangong Space Station program, with the successful launch of the Tianhe core module in April, the Tianzhou-2 cargo craft in May, the Shenzhou-12 manned spaceship in June, and another planned Tianzhou-3 mission in September. A more detailed timeline of China’s space station construction can be found below. China's space station program In the long-term, China has set the following goals for its space program: Improve China’s standing in the world of space science Establish a crewed space station Crewed missions to the Moon Establish a crewed lunar base Robotic mission to Mars Exploit Earth-Moon space for industrial development **The two state-owned enterprises behind China’s space program China’s space activity has been overwhelmingly dominated by two state-owned enterprises: China Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation Limited (CASIC) and China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC). CASIC and CASC provide the technology and devices required by the state space and military programs, such as launch vehicles, satellites, manned spaceships, cargo spaceships, deep space explorers, space station, nuclear missiles, conventional ground-to-ground missiles, and air and missile defense equipment. The two state-owned corporations have decades of experience, secured state funding, thousands of personnel, dozens of labs and subsidiaries, and an established suite of high-tech products and services. In the years ahead, the Chinese state-owned space titans will continue to lead the country’s space program, while private commercial space companies are likely to serve as “supplements” to China’s broader space activities.** Participation of private commercial players The past decade has witnessed an explosive growth in the number of China’s commercial space companies. By November 2020, China was home to over 160 commercial space companies. More than half of them were founded since 2014 – a year after Xi Jinping took over as the new leader of China and the government decided to treat civil space development as a key area of innovation. The private space enterprises boast a range of offerings from satellite manufacturing and rocket launch. FutureAerospace, a state-funded industry think tank, reports that investment in Chinese commercial space firms totaled RMB 3.57 billion (US$550 million) in 2018, and will exceed RMB 30.6 billion (US$4.7 billion) by 2025. The upsurge is fueled by rising demand for launching satellites. In the next decade, China envisions massive constellations of commercial satellites that can offer services ranging from high-speed internet for aircraft to tracking coal shipments. To boost the commercial space industry, **China uses government contracts and subsidies to give these companies a foot up. However, state-owned commercial space companies like Expace and China Rocket can have easier access to government funding and Chinese financing. Private commercial space companies either receive government support or seek venture capital.** A 2019 report by the Institute for Defense Analyses estimates that VC funding for Chinese space companies reached US$516 million in 2018, although the amount was far shy of the US$2.2 billion American companies raised. Unlike American companies, such as SpaceX and Blue Origin, whose billionaire founders are ready to take on large expensive risks**, Chinese companies who are late starters have to consider whether they can be supported by deep-pocked and risk-prone investors.** Some private companies like LandSpace and MinoSpace have managed to accrue foreign investment, which could make it easier for them to compete on a global scale, in terms of taking on overseas clients, launching from other countries, and attracting international talents. **However, to maintain investor confidence will not be easy. At present, none of the new commercial space companies are profitable. These companies’ launch success rates have been erratic. And they have shown no sign of explosive innovation – the current offerings consist almost solely for small, solid-fuel, single-use rockets. Thus, China’s private commercial space sector is not yet positioned to upend the state-dominated or global space ecosystems any time soon, though eventually new entrants may carve out niche areas for themselves in the domestic market.**

#### **China's distinct environment guarantee’s private failure, contracts favor the public sector and independently private companies are funded by the govt which guarantees circumvention**

**Waidelich 21** [Brian Waidelich, Brian Waidelich is a Research Analyst with the China and Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Division at CNA, 3-13-2021, "China’s commercial space sector shoots for the stars," East Asia Forum, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/03/13/chinas-commercial-space-sector-shoots-for-the-stars/] mk

**Despite the hype surrounding Chinese space startups, the prospects for a Chinese SpaceX are not so optimistic. China’s space startups are hardly commercial, compared to countries like the United States where commercial space ventures are meaningfully supported by private capital. Some of China’s commercial space companies are directly state-owned, such as Expace and China Rocket. Other nominally private companies have received substantial investment from provincial and local governments. The lack of private capital at risk diminishes these companies’ motivation to innovate or lower costs. ‘Private’ Chinese space startups also find themselves facing two massive state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that dominate both the domestic industry and Chinese financing. The state-owned Expace received over one billion RMB (US$154 million) in series A financing, while nominally private Chinese companies like iSpace received around 100 million RMB (US$15 million). This apparent favouritism aligns with Chinese President Xi Jinping’s stated objective of making SOEs ‘stronger, better, and bigger’. Legislative gaps create further uncertainties for the activities of China’s commercial space companies. China still has no comprehensive space law**, despite incorporating the need for one in the National People’s Congress’s legislation plan in 2013. New regulations on commercial launches in 2019 were a step forward, **but many ambiguities remain. It is still unclear, for example, whether companies can build their own launch sites, or if they must use one of the four military-controlled sites. The launch record of China’s commercial space companies has also been rocky. Two of the three ‘private’ companies to conduct orbital launches — OneSpace and LandSpace — have failed in their sole attempts. Several other companies have fared better, but all three of their most recent launches — two by Expace in July and September 2020, and one by iSpace in February 2021 — ended in failure. These challenges suggest that China’s commercial space industry cannot yet rival its US and European counterparts**. Chinese commercial launch companies have shown no signs of explosive innovation; indeed, their current offerings consist almost solely of small, solid-fuel, single-use rockets. Nor have these companies offered prices to challenge global leaders — Expace has announced launches of its Kuaizhou rockets at US$10,000/kg of payload, which will be eventually lowered to US$5000/kg, but this doesn’t even come close to SpaceX’s advertised prices — about US$2720/kg for the Falcon 9, and US$1410/kg for the Falcon Heavy. In the years ahead, **breakthroughs in Chinese space technologies will almost certainly come from traditional state-owned contractors, not nominally private firms**. CASC and the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation have decades of experience, secure state funding, thousands of personnel, dozens of labs and subsidiaries, and an established suite of high-tech products and services. **These contractors’ best products and services will be primarily offered to Chinese military and government organisations, rather than private or international clients. The addition of ‘private’ commercial space companies provides China’s traditional contractors with some token competition**, and eventually new entrants may carve out niche areas for themselves in the domestic market. But Chinese commercial space firms will not lead China’s space program — indeed, these companies describe themselves as ‘supplements’ to China’s broader space activities. They are not positioned to disrupt the domestic or global space ecosystems with low-cost, innovative offerings any time soon.

### **Heg Good**

#### **No hegemony impact – empirics and political psychology prove US posture is unrelated to great power peace**

Christopher **Fettweis 17**, associate professor of political science at Tulane University. 5/8/17, “Unipolarity, Hegemony, and the New Peace” http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09636412.2017.1306394?needAccess=true

**Both strains of the hegemonic-stability explanation assume not only that US power is benevolent, but that others perceive it that way.** **Hegemonic stability depends on the perceptions of other states to be successful; it has no hope to succeed if it encounters resistance from the less powerful members of the system, or even if they simply refuse to follow the rules**. **Relatively small police forces require the general cooperation of large communities to have any chance of establishing order.** **They must perceive the sheriff as just, rational, and essentially nonthreatening.** The lack of balancing behavior in the system, which has been puzzling to many realists, seems to support the notion of widespread perceptions of benevolent hegemony.101 Were they threatened by the order constructed by the United States, the argument goes, smaller states would react in ways that reflected their fears. Since internal and external balancing accompanied previous attempts to achieve hegemony, the absence of such behavior today suggests that something is different about the US version.

**Hegemonic-stability theorists purport to understand the perceptions of others, at times better than those others understand themselves**. Complain as they may at times, other countries know that the United States is acting in the common interest. Objections to unipolarity, though widespread, are not “very seriously intended,” wrote Kagan, since “the truth about America’s dominant role in the world is known to most observers. And the truth is that the benevolent hegemony exercised by the United States is good for a vast portion of the world’s population.” 102 **In the 1990s, Russian protests regarding NATO expansion—though nearly universal—were not taken seriously, since US planners believed the alliance’s benevolent intentions were apparent to all.** Sagacious Russians understood that expansion would actually be beneficial, since it would bring stability to their western border.103 **President Clinton and Secretary of State Warren Christopher were caught off guard by the hostility of their counterparts regarding the issue at a summit in Budapest in December 1994**.104 **Despite warnings from the vast majority of academic and policy experts about the likely Russian reaction and overall wisdom of expansion itself, the administration failed to anticipate Moscow’s position.**105 **The Russians did not seem to believe American assurances that expansion would actually be good for them. The United States overestimated the degree to which others saw it as benevolent.**

**Once again, the culture of the United States might make its leaders more vulnerable to this misperception. The need for positive self-regard appears to be particularly strong in North American societies** compared to elsewhere.106 **Western egos tend to be gratified through self-promotion rather than humility, and independence rather than interdependence**. **Americans are more likely to feel good if they are unique rather than a good cog in society’s wheel, and uniquely good. The need to be perceived as benevolent**, though universal, may well exert stronger encouragement for US observers to project their perceptions onto others.

**The United States almost certainly frightens others more than its leaders perceive**. **A quarter of the 68,000 respondents to a 2013 Gallup poll in sixty-five countries identified the United States as the “greatest threat to world peace,” which was more than three times the total for the second-place country** (Pakistan).107 **The international community always has to worry about the potential for police brutality, even if it occurs rarely**. Such ungratefulness tends to come as a surprise to US leaders. In 2003, Condoleezza Rice was dismayed to discover resistance to US initiatives in Iraq: “There were times,” she said later, “that it appeared that American power was seen to be more dangerous than, perhaps, Saddam Hussein.” 108 Both liberals and neoconservatives probably exaggerate the extent to which US hegemony is everywhere secretly welcomed**; it is not just petulant resentment, but understandable disagreement with US policies, that motivates counterhegemonic beliefs and behavior.**

**To review, assuming for a moment that US leaders are subject to the same forces that affect every human being, they overestimate the amount of control they have over other actors**, **and are not as important to decisions made elsewhere as they believe themselves to be. And they probably perceive their own benevolence to be much greater than do others.** **These common phenomena all influence US beliefs in the same direction, and may well increase the apparent explanatory power of hegemony beyond what the facts would otherwise support.** **The United States is probably not as central to the New Peace as either liberals or neoconservatives believe.**

In the end, what can be said about the relationship between US power and international stability? Probably not much that will satisfy partisans, and the pacifying virtue of US hegemony will remain largely an article of faith in some circles in the policy world. Like most beliefs, it will remain immune to alteration by logic and evidence. Beliefs rarely change, so debates rarely end.

For those not yet fully converted, however, **perhaps it will be significant that corroborating evidence for the relationship is extremely hard to identify. If indeed hegemonic stability exists, it does so without leaving much of a trace.** **Neither Washington’s spending**, nor its **interventions, nor** its overall **grand strategy seem to** **matter much to the levels of armed conflict around the world** (apart from those wars that Uncle Sam starts). **The empirical record does not contain strong reasons to believe that unipolarity and the New Peace are related, and insights from political psychology suggest that hegemonic stability is a belief particularly susceptible to misperception**. US leaders probably exaggerate the degree to which their power matters, and could retrench without much risk to themselves or the world around them. **Researchers will need to look elsewhere to explain why the world has entered into the most peaceful period in its history.**

The good news from this is that **the New Peace will** probably **persist** for quite some time, **no matter how dominant the United States is, or what policies President Trump follows**, or how much resentment its actions cause in the periphery. **The people of the twenty-first century are likely to be much safer and more secure than any of their predecessors, even if many of them do not always believe it.**

#### **China passes the US and creates their own international order --- the US either goes peacefully, ushering in multipolarity, or goes down fighting in a great power war.**

**Layne 18** [(Christopher, Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) “The US–Chinese power shift and the end of the Pax Americana.” International Affairs Vol 94, 2018,<https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/images/ia/INTA94_1_6_249_Layne.pdf>]

**The fate of international orders is closely linked to power transition dynamics**. Throughout modern international history the prevailing international order has reflected the balance of power that existed at the time of its creation. **When that balance changes sufficiently, the old order will be replaced by a new one.** Viewed from this perspective, what are the Pax Americana’s prospects? **How will China’s rise, and America’s decline, affect the international order in the years ahead? The surprising answer** given **by** top US security studies scholars is: ‘**Not much.**’ **The United States**, so the argument goes, **can ‘lock in’ the Pax Americana’s essential features, including its rules, norms and institutions**.65 John Ikenberry, Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth are the leading proponents of the lock-in thesis. Ikenberry was the first to set out the concept, arguing in After victory that **a hegemon**, by building an institutionalized, rules-based international order, ‘**can lock-in favorable arrangements that continue beyond the zenith of its power’**.66 In other words, **the international order can remain intact even after the hegemonic power that created it has lost its pre-eminent position in the international political system**. On this point, Ikenberry echoes Robert Keohane’s argument in After hegemony that, once a liberal international order has been established by a hegemonic power, **if the hegemon declines it is possible for a small group of Great Powers to take the place of the former hegemon and collectively manage the international system**.67 That is, under certain conditions ‘**hegemonic stability’ can exist even if there is no hegemonic power**. In Liberal Leviathan, Ikenberry built on this logic to argue that, **even if the Pax Americana were to wither completely, the LRBIO would nevertheless survive**. As Ikenberry put it: **‘America’s position in the global system may decline but the international order it leads can remain the dominating logic of the twenty-first century**.’68 Ikenberry’s view seems to have evolved, however. In jointly authored articles in International Security and Foreign Affairs, Brooks, Ikenberry and Wohlforth embrace hegemonic stability theory.69 That is, they contend that, like all international orders, the post-1945 international order does, in fact, require a hegemonic power to maintain it—and not just any hegemon, but the United States. The logic of their argument is that the LRBIO and the Pax Americana are one and the same, and that US pre-eminence is a necessary condition for the LRBIO. According to them, the United States must exercise ‘global leadership’—the US foreign policy establishment’s code phrase for hegemony—by acting as a security provider and geopolitical stabilizer; by maintaining an open, liberal international economy; and by promoting global cooperation through upholding and revising the post-1945 liberal order—which is both ‘institutional and normative’—created by the Pax Americana.70 They also claim that the post-1945 Pax Americana ‘allows the United States to … wrap its hegemonic rule in a rules-based order’.71 This helps to conceal the actual motives of self-interest and realpolitik that underlie American hegemony. Read together, the International Security and Foreign Affairs articles by Brooks, Ikenberry and Wohlforth make clear the authors’ view that the post-1945 LRBIO is inextricably linked to US hegemony; that is, to the Pax Americana. This is in keeping with the common understanding of hegemonic stability theory. As they see it, the post-1945 international order based on American pre-eminence ‘has served the US well for the past six decades and there is no reason to give it up now’.72 The argument has special force given that, according to the— correct—logic of their argument (and of hegemonic stability theory), if American hegemony goes, the LRBIO goes with it. In their preference for maintaining the post-1945 hegemonic American international order, Brooks, Ikenberry and Wohlforth echo the renowned late nineteenthcentury British statesman Lord Salisbury. Presiding over a hegemonic Britain that was already perceptibly declining, he famously said: ‘Whatever happens will be for the worse. Therefore, it is in our interest that as little should happen as possible.’ The post-1945 international order is (or was) a concrete manifestation of America’s hegemonic status. So, of course, the US foreign policy establishment wants as little change as possible in international politics. Why would it wish otherwise, when change would inevitably be both the cause and effect of diminishing American power and influence? The United States has every incentive for wanting to prolong the post-1945 international order. After all, **for most of the last 70 years or so, the US has occupied the geopolitical penthouse (‘when America ruled the world’). From that lofty height, however, the only direction it can go is down.** The lock-in strategy is seductive because it holds out (or appears to hold out) the possibility that the United States can preserve the status quo—the post-1945 international order—even as the geopolitical status quo of American hegemony is changing. Lock-in is attractive—superficially—because it assumes that China’s rise will not effect a major change in the international system. Specifically, lock-in holds that China’s rise can be managed by integrating it into the post-1945 international order, and ensuring that the exercise of Chinese power takes place within that order’s rules and institutions.73 By doing so, it is claimed, the United States can offset its declining power and ‘ensure the international order it leads can remain the dominating logic of the twenty-first century’.74 Lock-in assumes that China has no interest in overturning—or significantly modifying—the post-1945 international order in which it rose and became wealthy. Certainly, China did rise within the Pax Americana’s LRBIO. However, China did not rise to preserve that American-dominated order. For some three decades (beginning with Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms) China took a low profile in international politics, and avoided confrontation both with the United States and with its regional neighbours. Integration into the open international economy spurred China’s rapid growth. China’s self-described ‘peaceful rise’ followed the script written by Deng Xiaoping: ‘Lie low. Hide your capabilities. Bide your time.’ However, the fact that China bandwagoned with the United States in joining the international economic order did not mean that its longer-term intention was—or is—to preserve the post-1945 international order. In joining the liberal economic order, Beijing’s goal was not simply to get rich; by integrating itself into the post-1945 international order, China was able to avoid conflict with the United States until it became wealthy enough to acquire the military capabilities necessary to compete with America for regional hegemony in east Asia.75 Judging from Xi Jinping’s policy pronouncements, China’s days of biding its time and hiding its capabilities are over. Lock-in proponents argue that even as the Sino-American military and economic balance continues to tilt increasingly in Beijing’s favour, the post-1945 international order’s rules, institutions and norms will offset America’s loss of hard power. There is historical evidence that suggests this is wishful thinking. Take the case of Britain after the Second World War. Despite the dramatic weakening of Britain’s economic and financial clout caused by its efforts in the two world wars, after 1945 British leaders believed that the United Kingdom could remain one of three major world powers. In pursuit of this goal, they formulated their own version of lock-in. As the historian John Darwin puts it, officials in London thought that by transforming the Commonwealth, Britain could transition ‘from an empire of rule to an empire of influence’.76 Specifically, they believed that ‘free from the authoritarian, acquisitive and exploitative traditions of the old version of empire’, the reconfigured Commonwealth ‘would make the British connection voluntary, democratic, and mutually beneficial’.77 The reformed Commonwealth therefore would serve as the institutional instrument of continuing British world power, within which shared values and norms would bind Britain’s former colonies and dominions to London’s leadership.78 The reasons why British policy makers bought into this vision sound an awful lot like the reasons why the presentday American proponents of lock-in think it will preserve the United States’ global leadership even as its hard power erodes. Lock-in did not work for Britain following the Second World War, and there is scant reason to think it will work for the United States in the coming years of the twenty-first century. The lock-in strategy also assumes that if the Pax Americana’s institutions are reformed, Beijing (and other non-western emerging powers) will find it more attractive to remain in the post-1945 international order than to overturn it. That assumption, however, is logically flawed: achieving lock-in by reforming the existing international order presumes that the United States can have its cake (preserving the Pax Americana) and eat it too (reforming the current international system’s legacy institutions). But, as we all know, when the cake is eaten, it’s gone. Reform—at least, any kind of reform that would appeal to China—would mean the United States yielding significant power in international institutions to accommodate Beijing. However, doing so would reduce US ability to shape outcomes, diminish Washington’s voice in international institutions, and impose constraints on US autonomy in foreign and domestic policy.79 As University of Birmingham lecturer Sevasti-Eleni Vezirgiannidou observes with respect to institutional reform: ‘It is questionable whether this will really preserve US influence or rather, on the contrary, diminish it, as the United States will have to share power in a reformed order and thus will be restricted in its ability to act unilaterally.’80 The US foreign policy establishment may talk the talk of reforming the international order (and the institutions that underpin it), but it is doubtful it will walk the walk with respect to reform, because that would mean accepting a downsized American role in international politics. On the contrary**, Washington’s opposition to the AIIB indicates that the United States is not prepared to see its influence in the international order diminished**. And, **with respect to reforming the post-1945 international order to accommodate the reality of a risen China, this is the nub of the problem: instead of preserving the Pax Americana, reform would lead to changes in the international order that would undermine it**. Of course, regardless of whether there is institutional reform, **the coming decades are likely to witness major changes in the international order irrespective of America’s preferences.** **What will happen to the international order as China continues to rise, and America’s relative power continues to decline?** As Yogi Berra, the greatest of all American philosophers (immortalized in baseball’s Hall of Fame), said: ‘Making predictions is hard. Especially about the future.’ However, one thing seems pretty certain: China is not on the verge of either of ruling the world, or becoming a global hegemon comparable to the United States after the Second World War; not yet, anyway. Thus, for the next several decades (at least) it will be neither China’s world nor America’s: international leadership will be contested.81 During this period, China can be expected to act pretty much as one would expect any Great Power to act while making the shift from rising to risen: it will use its newfound power to seek a much greater voice in managing—and shaping—the international order, and its underlying norms. For example, China will want others to acknowledge its ‘core interests’, including respect for its territorial integrity and its sovereignty. Beijing has expanded the geographic scope of its core interests beyond Tibet and Taiwan to include the South and East China Seas and Xinjiang. And, reflecting its insistence that states should refrain from intervening in others’ internal affairs, preservation of its political, economic and social systems also has been defined as a core interest.82 During the period of contested international leadership there is unlikely to be wholesale abandonment of the post-1945 international institutions. For example, as one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Beijing is an acknowledged part of the Great Power club. Similarly, **we should not expect to see a dramatic overhaul of the international economic system. As the world’s top-ranking exporter and trading state, China benefits hugely from economic openness**. However, the state plays a much greater role in China’s economy than it does in the United States and Europe. Beijing will want rules that protect its semimercantilist economic policies and also ensure that its state-owned industries are not disadvantaged. Beijing will continue pressing for an even greater voice, both for itself and for the developing world, in institutions such as the IMF and World Bank (unless or until they are superseded by new ‘made in China’ institutions). In this respect, China will position itself as the developing world’s champion—a role for which it is well suited. Like many nations in the developing world— but unlike the United States—China has been a victim of western Great Power policies of imperialism and colonialism. As such, China has a claim to prominence in constructing a new international order that reflects the values of the developing world rather than those of the United States and the West.83 Even though the international economy will remain (more or less) open, in other respects the international system is likely to become much less liberal politically. The Chinese Communist Party’s 19th Congress demonstrated that China is not converging with the West: it is not going to become a democracy any time soon—if ever. Consequently, as China’s role in shaping the international agenda increases, democracy and human rights will become less salient. China will almost certainly try to change the norms that favour democracy promotion, ‘humani tarian’ intervention, human rights and the Responsibility to Protect. Beijing will resist norms that divide states into two camps, ranging democratic ‘good guys’ against non-democratic ‘bad guys’.84 Instead, it will offer its policy of ‘market authoritarianism’ to developing states as a better model of political, social and economic development than the US model based on the Washington Consensus. As its power continues to increase, China will seek to recast the world order in a way that not only advances its interests but also acknowledges both its enhanced power and its claims to status and prestige equal to those of the declining hegemon.85 For now, **Beijing is (mostly) ‘working within the system’ to revise the post-1945 international order while simultaneously laying the groundwork for an alternative international order that eventually could displace the Pax Americana**. As a 2007 report by the Center for a New American Security concluded: Rather than seeking to weaken or confront the United States directly, **Chinese leaders are pursuing a subtle, multifaceted, long-term grand strategy that aims to derive as many benefits as possible from the existing international system while accumulating the economic wherewithal, military strength, and soft power resources to reinforce China’s emerging position as at least a regional great power**.86 Even as it stays within the post-1945 international order, Beijing is not doing so to preserve it. In this sense, as Martin Jacques has observed, **China is playing a double game. It is operating ‘both within and outside the existing international system while at the same time, in effect, sponsoring a new China-centric international system which will exist alongside the present system and probably slowly begin to usurp it’**.87 **The creation of the AIIB, which Beijing intends should ultimately eclipse the IMF and World Bank, is a good example** of this strategy. American scholars and policy-makers believe that a lock-in strategy can be employed to head off any Chinese attempt to create a new international order, or to create a parallel order. They believe this because they have imbued the concept of a ‘rules-based, institutionalized, liberal international order’ with a talismanic quality. In so doing they have air-brushed Great Power politics out of the picture. As they see it, rules and institutions are politically neutral and, ipso facto, beneficial for all. Hence, they can be an effective substitute for declining hard power. However, rather than existing separately from the balance of power, rules, norms and institutions reflect it. Hence the world is no more likely to continue upholding the Pax Americana once US power declines than Britain’s dominions and former colonies were inclined to perpetuate the empire after the Second World War. **The fate of the Pax Americana, and that of the international order, will be determined by the outcome of the Sino-American rivalry** As the British scholar E. H. Carr observed, **a rules-based international order ‘cannot be understood independently of the political foundation on which it rests and the political interests which it serves’**.88 T**he post-Second World War international order is an American order that privileges US interest**s.89 Even the discourse of ‘liberal order’ cannot disguise this fact. Today, **the ground is shifting beneath the Pax Americana’s foundations. Those who believe that lock-in can work view international politics as being**, in essence**, geopolitically antiseptic**. For them, Great Power competition and conflict are transcended by international institutions, rules and norms. This is not how the real world works, however.90 Great Power politics is about power. **Rules and institutions do not exist in a vacuum, hermetically sealed off from Great Power politics.** Nor are they neutral. Rather, they reflect the distribution of power in the international system. In international politics, who rules makes the rules. In his classic study of international relations between the world wars, The Twenty years’ crisis, Carr analysed the political crisis of the 1930s caused by the breakdown of the post-First World War order symbolized by the Versailles Treaty.91 The Versailles system cracked, Carr argued, because of the widening gap between the order it represented and the actual distribution of power in Europe. Carr used the events of the 1930s to make a larger geopolitical point. International orders reflect the balance of power that exists at time of their creation. Over time, however, **the relative power of states changes, and eventually the international order no longer reflects the actual distribution of power between or among the leading Great Powers**. When that happens, the legitimacy of the prevailing order is called into question, and it will be challenged by the rising power(s). **When the balance of power swings—or is perceived to swing—in its direction, a rising power becomes increasingly dissatisfied with the international order, and seeks to revise it. The challenger wants to change the rules embodied in the existing international order—rules written, of course, by the once dominant but now declining Great Power that created it. It also wants the allocation of prestige and status changed to reflect its newly acquired power. The incumbent hegemon**, of course, **wants to preserve the existing international order as is—an order that it midwifed to advance, and consolidate, its own interests**. The E. H. Carr Moment presents the incumbent hegemon with a choice. **It can dig in its heels and try to preserve the prevailing order—and its privileged position therein; or it can accede to the rising challenger’s demands for revision. If it chooses the former course of action, it runs the risk of war with the dissatisfied challenger. If it chooses the latter, it must come to terms with the reality of its decline, and the end of its hegemonic position.** The E. H. Carr Moment is **where the geopolitical rubber meets the road: the status quo power(s) must choose between accommodating or opposing the revisionist demands of the rising power(s).** Liberal internationalists such as John Ikenberry argue **that China will not challenge the current international order**, even as the distribution of power continues to shift in its favour. This **is a doubtful proposition**. The geopolitical question—the E. H. Carr Moment—of our time is whether the declining hegemon in east Asia, the United States, will try to preserve a status quo that is becoming increasingly out of sync with the shifting distribution of power, or whether it can reconcile itself to a rising China’s revisionist demands that the international order in east Asia be realigned to reflect the emerging power realities. **Unless the United States can adjust gracefully to this tectonic geopolitical shift, the chances of a Sino-American war are high—as they always are during power transitions**.92 However, **whether change comes peacefully or violently, the Pax Americana’s days are numbered.**

#### **Pursuit of hegemony leads to Sino-Russia alliance and is unsustainable.**

**Porter, DPhil, 19**

(Patrick, ModernHistory@Oxford, ProfInternationalSecurityAndStrategy@Birmingham, Advice for a Dark Age: Managing Great Power Competition, The Washington Quarterly, 42:1, 7-25)

**Even the U**nited **S**tates **cannot** prudently **take on every adversary on multiple fronts.** **The costs** of military campaigns against these adversaries in their backyards, whether in the Baltic States or Taiwan, **would outstrip the losses that the U.S. military has sustained in decades**. Short of all-out conflict, **to mobilize for dominance and risk escalation on multiple such fronts would court several dangers**. **It would overstretch the country**. The U.S. defense budget now approaches $800 billion annually, not including deficit-financed military operations. This is a time of ballooning deficits, where the Congressional Budget Office warns that “the prospect of large and growing debt poses substantial risks for the nation.”27 **If** in such conditions, **current expenditure is not enough to buy unchallengeable military preponderance**—**and it may not be**—**then the failure lies not in the failure to spend even more.** Neither is the answer to sacrifice the quality of civic life at home to service the cause of preponderance abroad. **The old “two war standard**,” a planning construct whereby the United States configures its forces to conduct two regional conflicts at once, **would be unsustainably demanding against more than one peer competitor,** or potentially with a roster of major and minor adversaries all at once.28 After all, the purpose of American military power is ultimately to secure a way of life as a constitutional republic. To impose ever-greater debts on civil society and strip back collective provision at home, on the basis that the quality of life is expendable for the cause of hegemony, is perversely to set up power-projection abroad as the end, when it should be the means. **The problem lies, rather, in the inflexible pursuit of hegemony itself, and the failure to balance commitments with scarce resources. To attempt to suppress every adversary simultaneously** would **drive adversaries together, creating hostile coalitions**. **It also may not succeed**. Counterproliferation in North Korea is difficult enough, for instance, but the task becomes more difficult still if U.S. enmity with China drives Beijing to refuse cooperation over enforcing sanctions on Pyongyang. **Concurrent competitions would** also **split American resources, attention and time**. **Exacerbating the strain on scarce resources** between defense, consumption and investment **raises the polarizing question of whether preponderance is even worth it**, which then undermines the domestic consensus needed to support it. At the same time, **reduced investment in infrastructure and education would damage the economic foundations for conducting competition abroad in the first place.** Taken together, **indiscriminate competition risks creating the thing most feared in traditional U.S. grand strategy: a hostile Eurasian alliance** leading to continuous U.S. mobilization against hostile coalitions, **turning the U.S**. republic **into an illiberal garrison state**. If the prospect for the United States as a great power faces a problem, it is not the size of the defense budget, or the material weight of resources at the U.S. disposal, or popular reluctance to exercise leadership. Rather, **the problem lies in the scope of the policy that those capabilities are designed to serve**. To make the problem smaller, **Washington should take steps to make the pool of adversaries smaller.**

#### **Unipolarity is specifically responsible for the globalization of extremism – that makes heg unsustainable.**

**Ibrahimi 18** (2/19/18; S. Yaqub Ibrahimi, [researcher and instructor of political science. PhD @ Carleton University] “Unipolar politics and global peace: a structural explanation of the globalizing jihad”; taylor and francis<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17467586.2018.1428763?needAccess=true)>

- JSG = Jihadi-Salafi Groups

Three conclusions can be drawn from this paper. First, the peacefulness of the contemporary unipolar system could be discussed beyond the interstate conflict and the likelihood of great powers competition debate. The new forms of asymmetric warfare, particularly the emergence of JSGs and their violent activities at different levels of the global order, could be assessed as another variable in debates on the peacefulness of the system. These actors DYNAMICS OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 59 emerged and operate under the unipolarity conditions**. Unipolarity, in this sense, has generated conflict-producing mechanisms and nonstate actors that drove sovereign states in lengthy wars against JSGs**. This argument makes a significant contribution to the unipolarity-peace puzzle, which is conventionally addressed from the interstate conflict perspective. Second, **unipolarity transformed Islamist-oriented terrorism from domestic to global. In addition to other conflict-generating conditions produced under unipolarity, the United States’ unipolar policies in Muslim regions transformed the traditional near-enemy-centric narrative of jihad into a far-enemy-centric ideology. As a result of the transformation of this doctrine, new forms of JSGs emerged that posed a threat to peace and security at all levels.** Finally, because of **the unipolarity of the system, global peace depends largely on the sole great power’s foreign and military policies. The US interventionism, due to the absence of a challenging great power,** might not generate interstate conflict. However, it **would engage the US in asymmetric warfare with nonstate actors that would** emerge independently or on behalf of states **to disrupt the US hegemony through insurgency, terrorism, and other forms of violence at different levels.** These all might not challenge the durability of unipolarity, drastically, but they would disrupt peace and security at all domestic, regional, and global levels.